Transportation Security Officers’ Actions Upheld, Lauded in Ninth Circuit Decision
News & Happenings
August 20, 2007
Corrine Motonaga, a Transportation
Security Officer at Honolulu
International Airport. Motonaga
directed Aukai to secondary
screening, which led to the
discovery of illegal drugs.
On August 10, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that checkpoint screening, including secondary screening, was not only constitutional, but necessary to meet the government's legitimate aviation security goal to protect against terrorist threats.
On February 1, 2003, Daniel Kuualoha Aukai presented his boarding pass at Honolulu International Airport's checkpoint. Because he did not have a form of identification, he was designated for secondary screening.
TSOs Andrew Misajon and Corrine Motonaga, and Supervisory TSO Joseph Vizcarra conducted the secondary screening, and during their search they discovered narcotics. Airport police were notified and Aukai was arrested and ultimately indicted "for knowingly and intentionally possessing, with the intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine."
Aukai pleaded guilty to the charges, but reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the secondary search. At issue in the appeal was whether Aukai, having initially submitted to checkpoint screening, could change his mind (or as stated by Aukai, withdraw his consent) about being searched after presenting himself for screening, thereby preventing TSA from completing the security screening process. The court also reviewed whether the methods employed by TSA's personnel that day were unconstitutional.
At the outset, the court pointedly emphasized TSA's mission to protect 700 million passengers who board planes in the U.S. each year, as well as protect those on the ground who may be at risk from terrorists who might take over an airplane.
In determining whether the checkpoint screening, including secondary screening, was justified as a warrantless administrative search, the panel focused on each detail of the security operation and, using language from a Third Circuit decision, it described the officers' actions as "well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search."
Further, referring to the search as an administrative detention, the court said it was narrowly focused and its duration of 18-minutes was reasonable under the circumstances.
