Testimony by Kip Hawley
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration
Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection
July 31, 2007
Thank you. Good morning, Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to put the Registered Traveler Program in context, and I think the comments the chairwoman made about Phoenix underscore the many serious issues that we have before us in aviation security.
In putting the Registered Traveler Program in context, I think it's important to note that that context is dominated by today's threat environment.
Two weeks ago, the National Intelligence Estimate confirmed publicly what members of this committee have known for quite some time: We are under heightened terrorist threat, it is real, and it will not go away soon.
We know of continued terrorist interests in attacking the aviation sector, we know of training in the use of improvised explosive devices, we must account for the possibility of terrorist dry runs, and we've seen the effects of the so-called clean-skin terrorists, those who are not known to the authorities and who have no obvious identifiable risk factors.
Madam Chairwoman, Mr. Lungren, members of the committee, you've made this committee's expectations very clear to me that TSA must focus its resources on the highest priority efforts against the active terrorist threat. We share the same priorities: Partner with others to help stop threats at their earliest stages and by our own actions deter and disrupt this adaptive enemy whose goal is mass casualties and dramatic destruction.
That is the real problem we face every day. The threat is real, TSA's responsibility is very real, and the question is, how does R.T. fit into that picture?
We all want to go through faster with less hassle, because we all know that we are not the terrorists. Why waste time screening me? A passenger goes through screening knowing that he or she is low risk, and it's logical to think that there has to be a way not to waste resources screening me. The crux of the problem is how we define we and me?
Just as relying on frequent flyer miles isn't enough, in the age of the clean-skin suicide bomber, just the absence of a negative is no longer enough. Once we define trusted, that provides a blueprint for vulnerability. And the security risk introduced at R.T. becomes a risk for every passenger, because what we make easy for one becomes easy for many.
We need many layers of security to mitigate the risk of defeating anyone. We want to increase the level of security, not decrease it. And after prioritizing our security initiatives based on risk, TSA decided that taxpayer resources are best applied to more critical needs than Registered Traveler.
Explosives detection training, better quality workforce through better recruiting, higher retention, pay for performance, career progression, additional layers of security in behavior detection, viper teams, document checking, employee screening, daily checkpoint explosives detection drills, better intelligence integration, proactive federal air marshal missions, secure flight, checkpoint process improvement, harmonization of international security measures, more effective use of existing affordable technology, active engagement with our partners in transit security, in general aviation, in rail, in port security, better vetting of those with access to critical infrastructure, to name just several highlights. These are the security measures that help protect against the threat we know we face.
In the context of these other activities, R.T. is not now an effective operations tool against the clean-skin terrorists, and, therefore, we have not reduced the security process for R.T. passengers. There is lots of room for innovation that doesn't lower security. It doesn't cost the government money or doesn't burden extra passengers.
However, TSA is not waiting for RT. We are moving forward to improve the security process for all passengers. As I announced last week, we are reviewing the checkpoint process to make it less dependent on the 25-foot by 15-foot box at the checkpoint. We understand that the legacy process appears to pit TSA against the passengers by jamming us into a small space and launching 2 million passengers a day through the magnetometers at us. We can improve security and make the process smoother by spreading out security, calming down the environment and changing up our security measures. I am hopeful that R.T. can play a role in that effort.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss these issues and be happy to answer any questions.
