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Oral Statement of Kip Hawley

Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration

Before the United States Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

December 12, 2005

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Co-Chairman Inouye, and Members of the Committee.  I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the TSA’s strategies in aviation security and planned changes to implement them.

Let me preface my remarks today by expressing my deepest sympathy to the family of Rigoberto Alpizaz.

As you know, Mr. Alpizar was shot by Federal Air Marshals last week in Miami.  His death is regrettable to all of us.

Our initial review of the facts indicates that TSA’s Federal Air Marshals acted in a manner consistent with their training to protect the public.

TSA, the Federal Air Marshals Service, and the marshals involved are working with and cooperating fully with the authorities as they complete their formal review. 

We will apply any lessons learned to future protocols and training.

Mr. Chairman, on 9/11, terrorists used the threat of explosives and sharp instruments to commandeer commercial jets and use those jets as weapons of mass destruction. 

To battle that enemy and that threat, a list of objects that could be brought on to a plane and used by terrorists to take over a plane were immediately put on a prohibited items list.

Since then, with ATSA as its statutory foundation, TSA worked with the airlines, airports, shipping industry, flight crews, law enforcement, and passengers to take aviation security orders of magnitude beyond where it stood on 9/11. 

The reason is that we have many independent, interlocking layers of security that reinforce each other.

Any one of them can be beaten, but together, they are formidable.

For instance, the subject of today’s hearing is a very small piece of one of these layers.

In order to evaluate the merits of our actions at the passenger checkpoint, it helps to see where they fit in the larger context.

Here, then, are the layers in place today for protection of the cockpit and passenger cabin specifically:

  1. U.S. government agencies work with others around the globe to identify and disrupt terrorist activities at their source.
  2. Customs & Border Protection activities further identify potential terrorists and bar their entry into the United States.
  3. Federal, State, and local law enforcement work together with the FBI in Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States to identify and disrupt terrorist activities within the U.S.
  4. A No-Fly system is used to prevent anyone known to an agency of the U.S. government to be a threat to commit a terrorist act from flying into or in the United States.
  5. Airline flight crews and airport employees who have access to an aircraft are subject to an even stricter vetting standard than the No-Fly analysis.
  6. These first five security layers mean that anybody known to U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agencies as a terrorist or a close terrorist associate never gets close to the airplane.  But there is much more.
  7. An additional, risk-based computer-assisted pre-screening of passengers is conducted before a boarding pass is issued.
  8. Hundreds of K-9 teams and local law enforcement officers are working at airports across the country.
  9. Surveillance activities occur in and around the airport environment on a daily basis.
  10. That’s what happens before a passenger even shows up at a TSA checkpoint.

At the checkpoint:

  1. A professional, well-trained, experienced team of Transportation Security Officers, assisted by multiple technologies, screens passengers and their carry-on bags for weapons and explosives.

Then, on the aircraft:

  1. Thousands of Federal Air Marshals fly undercover on a very significant number of flights, both domestic and international.
  2. Thousands of pilots who undergo special training and become Federal Flight Deck Officers are authorized and ready to protect the cockpit with firearms.
  3. Other local, State, and Federal law enforcement officers travel armed as part of their normal duties.
  4. Hardened cockpit doors prevent unauthorized access to the flight deck.
  5. And, sitting quietly on every airplane, are passengers who remember the courage and commitment of the men and women on United Flight 93.

The way Americans think about hijackings changed on that flight.

For decades, the accepted highjacking response was to avoid confrontation.  That doctrine was in effect the early morning of September 11, 2001. 

By 11:00 a.m. on that day, the paradigm changed and is gone forever.

Americans will not sit still when threatened. 

This is a changed battlefield, Mr. Chairman. We know it and terrorists know it. 

After four years, we’ve built a multi-layered system that makes another 9/11-style attack a losing bet for terrorists. 

It’s time to take down some of the security scaffolding that we quickly put in place as a stop-gap measure. The more permanent structure is in place, and it is better.

This discussion today is not about the number of resources, it is about the smart use of those resources.

In today’s world, with today’s security system, the small objects we are talking about aren’t going to enable a major terrorist attack. 

I am sympathetic with the fears of some passengers and crew members who are worried about their personal safety. 

The fact is that scissors and tools can be used as weapons on aircraft, in shopping malls, and here in the Dirksen Senate Office Building itself. 

It is also a fact that there are thousands of items that do not appear on our prohibited items list that can also be used as a weapon by someone intent on causing injury; pens, pencils, belts, credit cards, soda cans, bare hands and many more.

Clearly, if someone is intent on causing personal injury, a prohibition on small scissors and tools will not stop them.

It’s not about scissors, it’s about bombs.

The changes we are making to the prohibited items list are important, but they are just one highly visible piece of a much larger effort to refresh our security strategy.

TSA initiated a reexamination of its activities last July in conjunction with Secretary Chertoff’s Second Stage Review and his resulting direction. 

We systematically reviewed the full range of measures we currently employ to mitigate risk,  as well as the additional measures now available to us,  including new technologies and their deployment schedule. 

We examined regularly collected data concerning items confiscated at TSA checkpoints, as well as data generated by studies that allowed us to focus more clearly on particular weaknesses. This decision was made based on data and metrics.   

Our analysis considered of a variety of potential changes, including a range of changes to the prohibited items list and screening procedures at TSA checkpoints, as well as the deployment of both old and new explosives detection technology and different types of employee training. 

The changes reflect the new and evolving threat environment, as well as what we’ve done to narrow our vulnerabilities.

In addition to changing the prohibited items list, TSA is implementing a number of changes specifically related to explosives detection and screening. 

Our goal is to establish flexible protocols based on risk, so that terrorists cannot use the predictability of our security measures to their advantage when planning an attack.

We are piloting other activities as we move forward. 

Some will be visible, some will not be visible to passengers or to terrorists. 

All of these changes in our explosives detection capability, TSA screening protocols, and the prohibited items list  are important to maintaining the vitality of our security process. 

TSA must be able to

The flexibility to make changes quickly is vital to our mission.

We need the ability to move away from measures that are no longer needed, and to move decisively when changes are required.

Threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 

Those are the three dimensions of terrorist risk and they are our guide as to how to allocate our resources.

Small scissors and tools versus bombs.

If you do the analysis, it’s not even close.

Sorting through tens of thousands of bags a day at two or three minutes apiece to pull out small scissors and tools does not help security, it hurts it.

TSA’s changes to the checkpoint process:

These are the steps that will improve security.

Mr. Chairman, I do not say lightly that, based on all I know,

I believe that we need to strengthen our efforts against explosives at the passenger checkpoint including the changes to the prohibited items list.

We have done the risk-based analysis, now we need to implement it without delay.

I would be happy to respond to questions.