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Kip Hawley

Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration

Remarks Delivered to the International Air Transport Association Conference

Sydney, Australia
October 17, 2006

Thank you Gunter, good morning everybody.  Thanks to IATA (International Air Transport Association), our sponsors, and hosts in this lovely, friendly city.  This is one of most important yearly gatherings in the aviation sector and it is a great pleasure to be asked to join such a distinguished group here this morning.

It is always a fitting time to get together and assess where we are.

However, I think that with the combination of the recent terrorist plot and the fifth anniversary of 9/11, it truly is excellent timing for us to get together and take stock of where we are and look at what lies ahead.

With this timing and those topics, it is fortuitous indeed for all of us at this conference to have Marjeta Jager and Michel Wachenheim with us today.  It is a great personal honor to share the podium with you both.

Last year, about this time, we were in Geneva and I was introducing myself to you and describing the approach that TSA would be taking to security issues under Secretary Chertoff’s leadership.

I was outlining Secretary Chertoff’s risk-based approach to security.  For TSA, I described how we look at risk and how we attack it.

Terrorist risk is non-linear, it does not follow a readily predictable course.  We attack it by linking TSA’s efforts to other networks in industry and with other governments.  After August 10th, could there be a more dramatic example of no-linear risk than the liquid explosives plot?

This was a seriously undertaken and carefully prepared attack on civil aviation designed precisely around all the efforts that we have put in place since 9/11.

After August and September, could there be a more dramatic example of linking networks than August’s decisive world-wide action by airlines, airports and government authorities around the world?

My thanks to all our partners, many in this room, for the speedy and effective action in securing the world’s aviation system in the face of a new and imminent threat.  On no notice, and with little specific reason given, at the time aviation partners in airlines, airports, and governments around the world stepped-up to that moment.

This plot was real.  It was imminent.  It was teamwork that discovered it and it was teamwork, for now at least, that has stopped it.  In that context, the conference theme of proactivity, of taking steps ourselves to define our future, of seizing the initiative is right on point at this critical time.

Let me take you back to early August.  The world was dealing with the aftermath of hostilities in the Mideast.  Elsewhere an attack on aviation moved into its operational phase.

Fortunately, the best defense against terrorist attack – pre-emptive intervention – was possible because of unprecedented cooperation and the fine work done by the U.K. and others involved.

Should I have been surprised, that when the day came that we had an attack, more horrible even than 9/11, was imminent, when it really mattered, when there was no time to lose, should I have been surprised that it was the extended network of aviation security partners around the world who – were ready and decisive?

With all that we have done in the five years since 9/11, it is sobering thought that any one of us acting by ourselves, may not have stopped this attack.  When attacked by this terrorist enemy, defending alone will not suffice.  No matter how good we are, we are vulnerable if we stand apart.

So, in early August, before the 9th, working in complete synchronization with our partners in the U.K., we shared information and experience, we debated various strategies, we tested out our different ideas.  We agreed on the same approach in similar, but not identical measures.

Then, on the evening of August 9th, as midnight came to Europe, immediate action was required.  We had to join forces with our partners in the airlines, in the airports, and in other nations around the world.  And we had to start in the middle of the night.

All of us working together stopped this plot.  We know that we have no time to waste in getting prepared for the next time – perhaps without the benefit of advance warning.

We know that this particular branch of the attack was directed at U.K.-U.S. flights, but we also know that the threat is really to us all.  This was the time for us to act on the words we have all spoken-about harmonized security efforts.

I had the chance to talk with several of my colleagues around the world during this time, including some in this room, and the message was remarkably consistent  – we will support you without hesitation in this emergency and we will work with you on joint security measures going forward.

In the following weeks, it became clear that our partners in the EU and Canada were committed to working quickly and openly with the U.K. and the U.S. to take advantage of our learnings, share our own insights and share their insights, and see what common measures might be possible.

Through face-to-face meetings, technical working groups, video conferences, E-mails and telephone calls, a wide range of issues were vigorously discussed and resolved.

Unprecedented sharing among nations and industry opened the door for joint action.  Unprecedented leadership in governments and industry has made it a reality.  I think all of us involved in that effort view it as the way to do business going forward.

Very shortly, a traveler starting off in Slovenia who travels to Paris, then to Ottawa and on to San Francisco, can use the identical security procedures for carrying on liquids, aerosols and gels.  This is not only convenient for the passenger, it means that more than half the world’s air travelers will be covered by the security procedures that will stop terrorists who might have otherwise have used some of these new liquid explosives for an attack.

So, what then are the lessons?

There are two that I would like to highlight in particular:

Lesson 1

We know that terrorists use the transportation system – specifically aviation – to travel the world without respect to national boundaries.  None of us can say that this is not a problem for all of us.

So, the degree that we look at terrorism as our own problem or, as someone else’s – we are opening a vulnerability that exposes us all.

Lession 2

If we’re all in it together, we should act together.  The opportunities for cooperative action are numerous.  The liquid threat is one small piece of a larger threat puzzle.

Working with ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and our regional organizations, we can take a fresh look at tour security measures and see if there are opportunities to improve security and efficiency.

Going forward with our risk-based approach, we in the U.S. will continue the path I outlined last year in Geneva:  focus on IED’s (improvised explosive device) agile security that is not predictable to terrorists.

For IEDs, we have re-trained our workforce and are introducing professional bomb (technicians) at checkpoints at our major airports.  We are interested in process innovation and layers of technology.  To defeat terrorists with any surveillance or attack plans, we are now deploying specially trained behavior observation officers throughout our system.  But most important, it is working with other network partners, to share and actively engage with them in the planning and delivery of our security activities.

How far have we come in the five years since 9/11?

Far enough that the system we have in place together was able to identify and stop a real attack, implement new security measures world-wide, with no notice, and in a matter of hours.  Far enough that our first reaction was to reach out, share, trust, and engage.  Far enough that we can plan and act, united. 

We are all pre-occupied and challenged by responsibilities for our own institutional programs.  Perhaps the best way to increase the effectiveness and affordability of those programs is to look outside.

The software of commitment, communication, compromise, and coordination may be every bit as important as the hardware we buy.

The cost of a phone call, plane ticket, and cup of coffee may have the highest security return on investment of them all.

Thank you very much.