A. There were relatively few comments on this section of the SNPRM, most of which agreed with the proposed language. We have adopted the suggestion of some commenters that specific reference be made to the role of the DBE program in helping DBEs overcome barriers (e.g., access to capital and bonding) to equal participation. We have also added a specific reference to the role of the program in creating a level playing field on which DBEs can compete fairly for DOT-assisted contracts. Some non-DBE contractors urged that language be added to explicitly oppose ``reverse discrimination.'' The rule clearly states that nondiscrimination is the program's first objective and the Department reiterates here that it opposes unlawful discrimination of any kind.

A. This provision is unchanged from the SNPRM, except for references to the new TEA-21 statutory provisions. A few commenters wanted this provision to apply to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) programs, as did the original version of former part 23. However, FRA does not have specific statutory authority for a DBE program parallel to the TEA-21 language. One commenter asked if the language saying that DBE requirements do not apply to contracts without any DOT funding is inconsistent with Federal Transit Administration (FTA) guidance on applicability. While the structure of the FTA program is such that FTA funds are commingled with local funds in many transit authority contracts (e.g., any contract involving FTA operating assistance funds), to which DBE requirements would apply, a contract which is funded entirely with local funds--and without any Federal funds--would not be subject to requirements under this rule.

A. There were relatively few comments on the definitions proposed in the SNPRM. One commenter wanted to substitute the term ``historically underutilized business'' for DBE. Given the continued use of the DBE term in Congressional consideration of the program, the continued use of the ``socially and economically disadvantaged individuals'' language in the statute, and the familiarity of concerned parties with the DBE term, we do not believe changing the term would be a good idea.

A few commenters asked for additional definitions or elaboration of existing definitions (e.g., ``form of arrangement,'' ``financial assistance program,'' ``commercially useful function''). These terms are either already defined sufficiently or are best understood in context of the operational sections in which they are embedded, and abstract definitions in this section would not add much to anyone's ability to make the program work well. Consequently, we are not adding them. Otherwise the final rule adopts the SNPRM proposals for definitions with only minor editorial changes.

The Department has added, for the sake of clarity and consistency with other Federal programs, definitions of the terms Alaskan native, Alaskan native corporation (ANC), Indian tribe, immediate family member, Native Hawaiian, Native Hawaiian organization, principal place of business, primary industry classification, and tribally-owned concern. These definitions are taken from the SBA's new small disadvantaged business program regulation (13 CFR Sec. 124.3). The definitions of the designated groups included in the definition of "socially and economically disadvantaged individual" also derive from the SBA regulations, as the Department's DBE statutes require. We believe these will be useful terms of art in implementing the DBE program.

A few commenters requested definitions for the terms "race- conscious" and "race-neutral," and we have provided definitions. A race-conscious program is one that focuses on, and provides benefits only for, DBEs. The use of contract goals is the primary example of a race-conscious measure in the DBE program. A race-neutral program is one that, while benefiting DBEs, is not solely focused on DBE firms. For example, small business outreach programs, technical assistance programs, and prompt payment clauses can assist a wide variety of small businesses, not just DBEs.

A.One commenter wanted to add prohibitions of discrimination based on age, disability and religion. The Department is not doing so, because discrimination on these grounds is already prohibited by other statutes (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act with respect to disability). Also, statutes which form the basis for this rule focus on race, color, national origin, and sex. Congress determined that remedial action focused on these areas is necessary. These grounds for discrimination are also most relevant to problems in the DBE program that have been alleged to exist (e.g., disparate treatment of DBE certification applicants by race or sex). Some opponents of the program said that the DBE program discriminates against non-DBEs. However, the Department believes that the program is constitutional and does not violate equal protection requirements. A reference to DOT Title VI regulations has been deleted as unnecessary; otherwise, this provision is the same as in the SNPRM.

A.Commenters, most of whom were recipients, focused on two issues in this section. First, a majority of the comments favored the ``coordination mechanism'' concept for ensuring consistent DOT guidance and interpretations. The few that disagreed with this approach did so out of a concern that the mechanism would add delays to the process. These commenters favored additional training or an 800 number hot line to speed up the process.

We believe that proper coordination of interpretations and guidance is vital to the successful implementation of this rule. As the preambles to the 1992 and 1997 proposed rules mentioned, inconsistent implementation of part 23 has been a continuing problem, which has been criticized by a General Accounting Office report and which has created unnecessary difficulty for recipients, contractors, and the Department itself. A process for ensuring that the Department speaks with one voice on DBE implementation matters, and for letting the public know when DOT has spoken, will greatly improve the service we give our customers.

We do not believe this coordination process will result in significant delays in providing guidance. Nor will it inhibit the ability of DOT staff and customers to communicate with one another. For example, the process does not apply to informal advice provided by staff to recipients or contractors over the phone or in a letter or e- mail. It does maintain, however, the important distinction between informal staff assistance on one hand and a binding institutional position on the other.

For clarity in the process, we have modified the language of the rule text to make clear that interpretations and guidance are binding, official Departmental positions if the Secretary signs them or if the document includes a statement that they have been reviewed and approved by the General Counsel. The General Counsel will consult fully with all concerned offices as part of this review process.

We intend to post significant guidance documents and interpretations on the Department's web site to make them widely and quickly available. As some commenters suggested, we are also continuing to consider forming an advisory committee (or working group of an existing committee) to facilitate customer input into DBE program matters. This is separate from the coordination mechanism, however, which is an internal DOT process.

The rule's provisions regarding exemptions and waivers, previously found in the SNPRM's Sec. 26.9 (c) and (d), are now included as a separate section at Sec. 26.15.

A.The Department asked, in the SNPRM, whether it would be advisable to have one standard reporting form for information about the DBE program. Currently, each operating administration (OA) has its own reporting form and requirements. Virtually all the commenters that addressed this issue favored a single, DOT-wide reporting form. Commenters also had a wide variety of suggestions for what data should be reported, formats, and retention periods.

The Department is adopting the suggestion of having a single reporting form, which we believe will reduce administrative burdens for recipients, particularly those who receive funds from more than one OA. Because we do not want to delay the issuance of this rule while a form is being developed, we are reserving the date on which this single form requirement will go into effect. We will take comments on the specifics of reporting into account and consult with interested parties as we devise the form, which will be published subsequently in Appendix B to this rule. The Appendix will also address the issues of reporting frequency and record retention periods. Meanwhile, recipients will continue to report as directed by the concerned OA(s), using existing reporting forms.

The rule is also adding a requirement that recipients develop and maintain a ``bidders'' list. The bidders list is intended to be a count of all firms that are participating, or attempting to participate, on DOT-assisted contracts. The list must include all firms that bid on prime contracts or bid or quote subcontracts on DOT-assisted projects, including both DBEs and non-DBEs. Bidders lists appear to be a promising method for accurately determining the availability of DBE and non-DBE firms and the Department believes that developing bidders data will be useful for recipients. Creating and maintaining a bidders list will give recipients another valuable way to measure the relative availability of ready, willing and able DBEs when setting their overall goals. (See Sec. 26.45). We realize that identifying subcontractors, particularly non-DBEs and all subcontractors that were unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain contracts, may well be a difficult task for many recipients. Mindful of that potential burden, the rule will not impose any procedural requirements for how the data is collected. Recipients are free to choose whether or not they wish to gather this data through their existing bidding and reporting processes. Recipients are encouraged to make use of all of the data already available to them and all methods of reporting and communication with their contracting community that they already have in place. In addition, the Department suggests that recipients consider using a widely publicized public notice or a widely disseminated survey to encourage all firms that have bid or quoted contracts to make themselves known to recipients.

Once recipients have created the list of bidders, they will have to supplement that information with the age of each firm (since establishment) and the annual gross receipts of the firm (or an average of its annual gross receipts). Recipients can gather this additional information by sending a questionnaire to the firms on the list, or by any other means that the recipient believes will yield reliable information. The recipient's plan for how to create and maintain the list and gather the required information must be included in its DBE program.

A.There were few comments on this section. Most of these supported the proposal. One comment suggested specific mention of prompt payment, but in view of the substantive requirements on this subject, we do not believe such a mention is needed. Some commenters favored requiring additional public participation as part of the assurance for recipients. Again, given substantive provisions of this rule concerning public participation, we do not believe that repetition here is needed. One commenter said that incorporating the requirements of part 26 in the contract was confusing, since many provisions of part 26 apply only to recipients. We have rewritten the assurance for contractors in response to this concern, specifying that contractors are responsible only for carrying out the requirements of part 26 that apply to them.

A.There has been some confusion as to this rule's distinction between exemption and waiver. Put simply, exemptions are for unique situations that are most likely not to be either generally applicable to all recipients or to have been contemplated in the rulemaking process. If such a situation occurs and it makes it impractical for a particular recipient to comply with a provision of part 26, the recipient should apply for an exemption from that provision. The waiver provision, by contrast, is not designed for extraordinary circumstances where a recipient may not be able to comply with part 26. Waiver is for a situation where a recipient believes that it can better accomplish the objectives of the DBE program through means other than the specific provisions of part 26.

There were a number of comments about the proposed program waiver provision. Most commenters on this issue favored the proposal, believing it could add flexibility to the way recipients implement the DBE program. A few commenters were concerned that too liberal use of the waiver provision might undermine the goals of the rule.

The Department believes that the waiver provision is an important aspect of the DBE program. The provision ensures that the Department and a recipient can work together to respond to any unique local circumstances. Recipients are encouraged to carefully review the circumstances in their own jurisdictions to determine what mechanisms are best suited to achieving compliance with the overall objectives of the DBE program. If a recipient believes it is appropriate to operate its program differently from the way that a provision of Subpart B or C provides, including, but not limited to, any provisions regarding administrative requirements, overall or contract goals, good faith efforts or counting provisions, it can apply for a waiver. For example, waiver requests could pertain to such subjects as the use of a race- conscious measure other than a contract goal, different ways of counting DBE participation in certain industries, use of separate overall or contract goals to address demonstrated discrimination against specific categories of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, the use or wording of assurances, differences in information collection requirements and methods, etc.

The Department will, of course, carefully review any applications for waivers to make sure that innovative state or local programs are able to meet the objectives of the statutes and regulation. Decisions on waiver requests are made by the Secretary. This authority has not been delegated to other officials. The waiver provision, which the Department believes will help assist recipients to ``narrowly tailor'' the program to state and local circumstances and ensure nondiscrimination, remains in the final rule.

A.The only substantive comment concerning this provision asked that Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) programs be included. The Department is not including FRA programs under this rule because FRA does not have a specific DBE program statute parallel to those covering the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FTA, and FHWA. FRA could consider issuing a rule similar to part 26 under its own, separate statutory authority. The Department shortened paragraph (b)(1) to make it easier to understand. Within 180 days of the effective date of this rule, all recipients with existing programs must submit revised programs to the relevant OA for approval. The only changes from existing programs that recipients would have to make are changes needed to accommodate differences between former part 23 and part 26. Future new recipients would, of course, submit a DBE program as part of the approval process for financial assistance.

A.There were no substantive comments concerning Secs. 26.23-26.27, and the Department is adopting them as proposed.

A.There were no substantive comments concerning Secs. 26.23-26.27, and the Department is adopting them as proposed.

A.There were no substantive comments concerning Secs. 26.23-26.27, and the Department is adopting them as proposed.

A.There was substantial comment on the issue of prompt payment. A majority of commenters supported the concept of prompt payment provisions. Some recipients pointed out that they already had prompt payment provisions on the books. DBEs generally supported mandating prompt payment provisions though they, as well as other commenters, recognized that slow payment is a problem affecting many subcontractors, not just DBEs. Some of these comments suggested making prompt payment requirements applicable to subcontracts in general, not just DBE subcontracts. Some recipients were concerned about getting in the middle of disputes between prime contractors and subcontractors. Some commenters wanted the Department to mandate prompt payment provisions, while others preferred that their use by recipients remain optional.

Having considered the variety of views expressed on this subject, the Department believes that prompt payment provisions are an important race-neutral mechanism that can benefit DBEs and all other small businesses. Under part 26, all recipients must include a provision in their contracts requiring prime contractors to make prompt payments to their subcontractors, DBE and non-DBE alike. It is clear that DBE subcontractors are significantly--and, to the extent that they tend to be smaller than non-DBEs, disproportionately--affected by late payments from prime contractors. Lack of prompt payment constitutes a very real barrier to the ability of DBEs to compete in the marketplace. It is appropriate for the Department to require recipients to take reasonable steps to deal with this barrier. We recognize that delayed payments do not affect only DBE contractors; a prompt payment requirement applying to all subcontracts is an excellent example of a race-neutral measure that will assist DBEs, and we are therefore requiring that recipients' prompt payment mechanisms apply to all subcontracts on Federally-assisted contracts.

Paragraph (a) of this section requires recipients to put into their DBE programs a requirement for a prompt payment contract clause. This clause would appear in every prime contract on which there are subcontracting possibilities, and it would obligate the prime contractor to pay subcontractors within a given number of days from the receipt of each payment the recipient makes to the prime contractor. Payment is required only for satisfactory completion of the subcontractor's work. The clause would also apply to the return of retainage from the prime to the subcontractor. Retainage would have to be returned within a given number of days from the time the subcontractor's work had been satisfactorily completed, even if the prime contract had not yet been completed. A majority of commenters on the retainage issue favored a requirement of this kind.

The number of days involved would be selected by the recipient, subject to OA approval as part of the recipient's DBE program. In approving these time frames, the OAs will consider whether they are realistic and sufficiently brief to ensure genuinely prompt payment. Recipients who already operate under prompt payment statutes may use their existing authority in implementing this requirement. It may be necessary to add to existing contract clauses in some cases (e.g., if existing prompt payment requirements do not cover retainage).

Paragraph (b) lists a series of additional measures that the regulation authorizes, but does not require, recipients to use. These include alternative dispute resolution, holding of payments to primes until subcontractors are paid, and other mechanisms that the recipient may devise. All these mechanisms could be made part of the recipient's DBE programs.

A.Recipients maintain directories listing certified DBEs. The issue most discussed by commenters on this section was whether the directory should include material concerning the qualifications of the firm to do various sorts of work. For example, has the firm been pre-qualified by the recipient? Can it do creditable work? What kinds of work does the firm prefer to do? Some commenters also asked that the directory should list the geographical areas in which the firm is willing to work. Other commenters opposed the idea of including this kind of information in the directory.

The Department believes that the directory and the certification process are closely intertwined. The primary purpose of the directory is to show the results of the certification process. Consequently, the directory should list all firms that the recipient has certified, along with basic identifying information for the firm. Since certification under this rule pertains to the various kinds of work a firm's disadvantaged owners can control, it is important to list those kinds of work in the directory. For example, if a firm seeks to work in fields A, B, and C, but the recipient has determined that its disadvantaged owners can control its operations only with respect to A and B, then the directory would recite that the firm is certified to perform work as a DBE in fields A and B.

The focus of the directory is intended to be eligibility. A directory is a list of firms that have been certified as eligible DBEs, with sufficient identifying information to permit interested firms to contact the DBEs. We do not intend to turn a recipient's directory into a comprehensive business resource manual. For example, information about firms' qualifications, geographical preferences for work, performance track record, capitalization, etc. are not required to be part of the directory. Some commenters favored including one or more of these elements, but we are concerned that other business information-- however useful in its own right--could clutter up the directory and dilute its focus on certification.

A.For some time, the Department has heard allegations that DBEs are overconcentrated in certain fields of highway construction work (e.g., guardrail, fencing, landscaping, traffic control, striping). The concern expressed is that there are so many DBEs in these areas that non-DBEs are frozen out of the opportunity to work. In an attempt to respond to these concerns, the SNPRM asked for comment on a series of options for ``diversification'' mechanisms, various incentives and disincentives designed to shift DBE participation to other types of work.

The Department received a great deal of comment on these proposals, almost all of it negative. There were few comments suggesting that overconcentration was a serious problem, and many comments said that the alleged problem was not real. Some FTA and FAA recipients said that if there was a problem with overconcentration, it was limited to the highway construction program. As a general matter, recipients said that the proposed mechanisms were costly, cumbersome, and too prescriptive.

Prime contractors opposed the provisions because they would make it more difficult for them to find DBEs with which to meet their goals, while DBEs opposed them because they felt the provisions would penalize success and force them out of areas of business in which they were experienced. Many commenters suggested using outreach or business development plans as ways of assisting DBEs to move into additional areas of work.

The Department does not have data from commenters or other sources to support a finding that ``overconcentration'' is a serious, nationwide problem. However, as part of the narrow tailoring of the DBE program, we believe it would be useful to give recipients the authority to address overconcentration problems where they may occur. In keeping with the increased flexibility that this rule provides recipients, we give recipients discretion to identify situations where overconcentration is unduly burdening non-DBE firms. If a recipient finds an area of overconcentration, it would have to devise means of addressing the problem that work in their local situations. Possible means of dealing with the problem could include assisting prime contractors to find DBEs in non-traditional fields or varying the use of contract goals to lessen any burden on particular types of non-DBE specialty contractors. While recipients would have to obtain DOT approval of determinations of overconcentration and measures for dealing with them, the Department is not prescribing any specific mechanisms for doing so.

A.In the SNPRM, both mentor-protege programs and business development programs (BDPs) were cast as tools to use for diversification. They still may be used for that purpose, as noted in Sec. 26.33. However, the Department believes that they may have a broader application, and their use in the final rule is not limited to diversification purposes. BDPs, in particular, are good examples of race-neutral methods recipients can use to promote the participation of DBEs and other small businesses in their contracting programs.

There were few comments on these provisions. Recipients wanted flexibility, and suggested that these kinds of programs should be optional. Their comments said that such programs were resource- intensive, and that Federal financial assistance for them would be welcome. One contractors' organization offered its own mentor-protege plan as a model. A few comments voiced suspicion of mentor-protege plans, on the basis that they allowed fronts and frauds into the program.

The final rule makes the use of BDPs and mentor-protege programs optional for recipients. An operating administration can direct a particular recipient to institute a BDP, but BDPs are not mandatory across the board. The operating administration would negotiate with the recipient before mandating a BDP.

One feature added to this provision allows recipients to establish a kind of mini-graduation requirement for firms that voluntarily participate in BDPs. One of the purposes of a BDP is to equip DBE firms to compete in the market outside the DBE program. Therefore, a recipient could ask BDP participants to agree--as a condition of receiving BDP assistance--to agree to leave the DBE program after a certain number of years, or after certain business development objectives had been achieved.

Standing alone, mentor-protege programs are not an adequate substitute for the DBE program. While they can be an important tool to help selected firms, they cannot be counted on to level the playing field for DBEs in general. An effective mentor-protege program requires close monitoring to guard against abuse, which further limits the number of DBEs they can assist. Even with these limits, a mentor- protege program that has safeguards to prevent large non-DBE firms from circumventing the DBE program can be a useful component of a recipient's overall strategy to ensure equal opportunities for DBEs.

The final rule includes safeguards intended to prevent the misuse of mentor-protege programs. Only firms that a recipient has already certified as DBEs (necessarily including a determination that they are independent firms) can participate as proteges. This is intended to preclude non-DBE firms from creating captive DBE firms to serve as proteges. A non-DBE mentor firm cannot get credit for more than half its goal on any contract by using its own protege. Moreover, a non-DBE mentor firm cannot get DBE credit for using its own protege on more than every other contract performed by the protege. That is, if Mentor Firm X uses Protege Firm Y to perform a subcontract, X cannot get DBE credit for using Y on another subcontract until Y had first worked on an intervening prime contract or subcontract with a different prime contractor.

To make mentor-protege relationships feasible, the rule provides that mentors and proteges are not treated as affiliates of one another for size determination purposes. Mentor-protege programs and BDPs must be approved by the concerned operating administration before they take effect. Recipients who already have such programs in place would make them part of their revised DBE programs sent to the concerned OA within 180 days of the effective date of part 26.

A.The few comments on this section asked for more detail and clarification. In the interest of flexibility, the Department is reluctant to be prescriptive in the matter of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. What we are looking for is a strong and effective set of monitoring and compliance provisions in each recipient's DBE program. These mechanisms could be most anything available to the recipient under Federal, state, or local law (e.g., liquidated damages provisions, responsibility determinations, suspension and debarment rules, etc.)

One of the main purposes of these provisions is to make sure that DBEs actually perform work committed to them at contract award. The results that recipients must measure consist of payments actually made to DBEs, not just promises at the award stage. Credit toward goals can be awarded only when payments (including, for example, the return of retainage payments) are actually made to DBEs. Under the final rule, recipients would keep a running tally of the extent to which, on each contract, performance had matched promises. Prime contractors whose performance fell short of original commitments would be subject to the compliance mechanisms the recipient had made applicable.

A.This is a new section, intended to explain what role the 10 percent statutory goal plays in the DBE program. Under former part 23, the 10 percent figure derived from the statute had a role in the setting of overall goals by recipients. For example, if recipients had a goal of less than 10 percent, the rule required them to make a special justification.

This section makes clear that the 10 percent goal is an aspirational goal that applies to the Department of Transportation on a national level, not to individual recipients. It is a goal that the Department can use to evaluate its overall national success in achieving the objectives that Congress has established for this program. However, the national 10 percent goal is not tied to recipients' goal-setting decisions. Recipients set goals based on what will achieve a level playing field for DBEs in their own programs, without regard to the national goal. Recipients are not required to set their overall or contract goals at 10 percent or any other particular level. Recipients are no longer required to make a special justification if their overall goals are less than 10 percent.

As discussed in connection with the Congressional debate on the TEA-21 DBE provision, Congress viewed flexibility concerning the statutory 10 percent goal as an important feature of narrow tailoring and made clear that it was setting a national goal, not a goal for any individual recipient. The Department wants to ensure that state and local programs have sufficient flexibility to implement their programs in a narrowly tailored way. This section is part of the Department's effort toward that end.

A.The DBE program has often been labeled as a ``quota'' or ``set- aside'' program, especially, though not exclusively, by its opponents. This label is, and always has been, incorrect. Fifteen years ago, in the preamble to the Department's first rule implementing a DBE statute, the Department carefully specified that neither quotas nor set-asides were required (see 48 FR 33437-38; July 21, 1983). This remains true today. However, in light of Adarand and this year's Congressional debates on the DBE statutes, we believe this point deserves additional emphasis. This regulation prohibits quotas under any circumstances and makes clear that set- asides can only be used as a means of last resort for redressing egregious discrimination.

A number of non-DBE contractors and their organizations continued to assert, in comments on the SNPRM, that the DBE program operates as a quota program. This section makes clear that recipients cannot use quotas on DOT-assisted contracts under any circumstances. A quota is a simple numerical requirement that a recipient or contractor must meet, without consideration of other factors. For example, if a recipient sets a 12 percent goal on a particular contract and refuses to award the contract to any bidder who does not have 12 percent DBE participation, either refusing to look at showings of good faith efforts or arbitrarily disregarding them, then the recipient has used a quota. The Department's regulations have never endorsed this practice. The issue of good faith efforts is discussed further below in connection with Sec. 26.51.

A set-aside is a very specific tool. A contracting agency sets a contract aside for DBEs if it permits no one but DBEs to compete for the contract. Firms other than DBEs are not eligible to bid. The Department's DBE program has never required the use of set-asides and has allowed recipients to use set-asides only under very limited circumstances.

Under the SNPRM, a recipient could use a set-aside on a DOT- assisted contract only if other methods of meeting overall goals were demonstrated to be unavailing and the recipient had legal authority independent of part 26. Comments were divided concerning the use of set-asides. A number of non-DBE contractors opposed the use of set- asides, some of them saying that set-asides might be something they could live with if their use were balanced by the elimination of DBE contract goals on other contracts in the same field. Some recipients and DBEs said, however, that set-asides were a useful tool to achieve goals, particularly for start-up contractors or small contracts.

The Department has carefully reviewed these comments and continues to believe that set-asides should not be used in the DBE program unless they are absolutely necessary to address a specific problem when no other means would suffice. If a recipient has been unable to remedy the effects of egregious discrimination through other means, it may, as a last resort, make limited use of set-asides to the extent necessary to resolve the problem.

A.Since its inception, the recipient's overall goal has been the heart of the DBE program. Responding to Adarand, DOT clarified the theory and purpose of the overall goal in the SNPRM. In the proposed rule, the Department made clear that the purpose of the overall goal-- and, in fact, the DBE program as a whole--is to achieve a ``level playing field'' for DBEs seeking to participate in federal-aid transportation contracting. To reach a level playing field, recipients need to examine their programs and their markets and determine the amount of participation they would expect DBEs to achieve in the absence of discrimination and the effects of past discrimination. The focus of the goal section of the SNPRM was to propose ways to measure what a level playing field would look like and to seek input on the availability of data to make such a measurement.

The Proposed Rule and Comments

The Department proposed several options that recipients might use for setting overall goals, including three alternative formulas for measuring the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in local markets. The specific formulas will be discussed below, but generally, they each called for setting a goal that reflected the percentage of locally available firms that were DBEs (i.e. dividing the number of DBEs by the number of all businesses). On all of the alternatives, the SNPRM sought comments on both the feasibility and practical value of the options, as well as the prospects for combining any of the approaches and the question of whether to mandate a single approach or allow each recipient to choose amongst the options. We invited commenters to propose changes to any of the details of the options or to devise entirely new ones. Finally, we asked commenters for their input on the availability of reliable data for use with each of the options.

Hundreds of commenters of all types--including DBEs and non-DBEs, prime and subcontractors, state and local recipients, industry and interest groups and private individuals--responded with a wealth of feedback, opinions and data. It is an understatement to say that there was no consensus among commenters as to the best way to set overall goals. Support for the proposed options was almost evenly spread over the choices presented, with many commenters firmly against all of the options. Still more suggested that the current, non-formulaic method was the best way to ensure the flexibility to respond to local market conditions. Similarly, among those who expressed an opinion, commenters were split between the propriety of choosing a single ``best'' method and imposing it on all recipients and allowing recipients to choose amongst all the options. One of the few universal themes in the goal- setting comments was the problem of the availability of reliable data on the number of DBE and non-DBE contractors.

There were a few common threads that different groups of commenters tended to apply to all of the formulas. Among recipients, many comments focused on the lack of data about non-DBE contractors, especially subcontractors. Recipients often noted that they would not have the information needed for the denominator of any of the formulas (i.e. the total number of available businesses). Non-DBE contractors--and industry groups representing them--generally believed that there should be a capacity measure built into any goal setting mechanism. Finally, DBEs--and their industry associations--were concerned that all of the formulas would create goals based only on the current number of DBEs, locking in the effects of past discrimination by ignoring the fact that the lack of opportunities in the past has suppressed the number of DBE firms available today.

Under the proposed rule's Alternative 1, recipients would calculate the percentage of DBE firms in their directories among all firms available to work on their DOT-assisted contracts. Under Alternative 2, recipients would calculate the percentage of all minority-and women- owned firms in certain SIC codes in their areas among all firms in these SIC codes in the same areas. Under Alternative 3, recipients would calculate a percentage based on the average number of DBE firms that had worked on their DOT-assisted contracts in recent years divided by the average number of all firms that had worked on their DOT- assisted contracts in the same period. The SNPRM also proposed that recipients could use other means, such a disparity studies or goals developed by other recipients serving the same area, as a basis for their goals.

Each of the three proposed alternatives received some support, though this was often the rather tepid endorsement of commenters who felt that one or another alternative was the best of a bad lot. Non-DBE contractors often claimed that the alternatives would unfairly increase goals, while DBE contractors often claimed that the same proposals would unfairly decrease goals.

Commenters said that data for determining the denominators of the equations in Alternatives 1 and 2, as well as the numerator in Alternative 2, did not exist and that it would be a major, time- consuming job to begin to obtain the data. Adaptation of existing information from other sources (e.g., Census data) was said to have significant statistical difficulties. The difficulty of getting data on out-of-state firms was emphasized in some comments.

Commenters looked on the alternatives as cumbersome, creating unreasonable administrative burdens, and as producing statistical results that were skewed in various ways. The use of DBE directories as the source of the numerator in Alternative 1 was criticized on the basis that directories may contain firms that never actually participate in DOT-assisted contracts. It was suggested that the number of firms bidding rather than the number of firms certified would be a more reliable guide, but it was also pointed out that, because subcontractors seldom formally bid for work, this data would be hard to obtain. Some commenters proposed adding overall population statistics to the mix.

A significant number of commenters--primarily non-DBE contractors, but including some recipients and other commenters as well--emphasized the need to take ``capacity'' into account. Most popular among these comments was using a capacity version of Alternative 3. These comments did not propose a method of determining the capacity of the firms contracting with the recipient.

In view of the complexity and importance of the goal setting process and the many issues raised by commenters, the Department has decided to adopt a two step process for goal setting. The process is intended to provide the maximum flexibility for recipients while ensuring that goals are based on the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in each recipient's relevant market. The Department believes that this approach is critical to meeting our constitutional obligation to ensure that the program is narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of discrimination. The first step of the process will be to create a baseline figure for the relative availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in each recipient's market. The second step will be to make adjustments from the base figure, relying on an examination of additional evidence, past experience, local expertise and anticipated changes in DOT-assisted contracting over the coming year.

Step 1: Determining a Base Figure for the Overall Goal

The base figure is intended to be a measurement of the current percentage of ready, willing and able businesses that are DBEs. Ensuring that this figure is based on demonstrable evidence of each recipient's relevant market conditions will help to ensure that the program remains narrowly tailored. To be explicit, recipients cannot simply use the 10 percent national goal, their goal from the previous year, or their DBE participation level from the previous year as their base figure. Instead, all recipients must take an actual measurement of their marketplace, using the best evidence they have available, and derive a base figure that is as fair and accurate a representation as possible of the percentage of available businesses that are DBEs.

There are many different ways to measure the contracting market and assess the relative availability of DBEs. As discussed above, the SNPRM proposed three alternate formulas to measure relative availability, none of which were particularly popular with commenters. In this final rule, the Department is placing primary emphasis on the principles underlying the measurement, mandating only that a measurement of the relative availability of DBEs be made on the basis of demonstrable evidence of relevant market conditions, rather than requiring that any particular procedure or formula be used. The final rule contains a number of examples of how to create a base figure which recipients are free to adopt in their entirety or to use as guidelines for how to devise their own measurement.

There are several reasons we have taken this approach. First, the Department is aware of the differences in available data in various markets across the nation. The flexibility inherent in this approach will ensure that all recipients can use the procedure to set a reasonable goal and allow each recipient to use the best data available to it. As discussed in another section, this rule will also provide for the development of more standard data for future goal setting. Second, for many recipients, setting goals in this way will be a new exercise. By fixing only the basic principle, but allowing the methodology to change, recipients will have the opportunity to fine tune the process each year as their experience grows and the data available to them improve. Finally, the rule makes sure that every recipient will have at least one reasonable and practical goal setting method available to them.

The first example for setting a base figure relies on data sources that are immediately available to all recipients: their DBE directories, and a Census Bureau database that DOT and the Census Bureau will make available to all recipients that wish to use it. This example has its roots in the first two goal setting formulas proposed in the SNPRM. Recipients would first assess the number of ready, willing and able DBEs based on their own directories. For some recipients this will be as simple as counting the number of firms in their directory. For others, particularly those using directories maintained by other agencies, the directories will have to be ``filtered'' for firms involved in transportation contracting. The resulting number of DBEs would become the numerator. The denominator would then be derived from the Census Bureau's County Business Pattern (CBP) database. We will provide user-friendly electronic access to the database via the internet to allow recipients to input the geographic area and SIC codes in which they contract and receive a number for the availability of all businesses.

There are several issues that must be addressed when comparing numbers derived from two different data sources, some of which were raised in the comments on the SNPRM. Recipients will need to ensure that the scope of businesses included in the numerator is as close as possible to the scope included in the denominator. Using as close as possible to the same SIC codes and geographic base is very important. A recipient using its own DBE directory, particularly one that contains only firms in the fields in which it contracts, will still need to determine what fields it will use for the denominator when sorting through the CBP database. The best way to do this would be to examine their contracting program and determine the SIC codes in which they let the substantial majority of their contracts and subcontracts. The geographic area used for both the numerator and the denominator should cover the area from which the recipient draws the substantial majority of its contractors. While it may be sufficient for some state recipients to use their state borders as their contracting area, local transit and airport recipients will rarely have such an obvious choice. Those recipients will need to more carefully examine the geographic area from which they draw contractors and base their calculation of both the numerator and denominator of the equation on the same area.

The Department and the Census Bureau will make the CBP data available in a format that gives recipients as much flexibility as possible to tailor the data to their contracting programs. Recipients will be able to extract the data in one block for all of the SIC codes they expect to contract in, or by individual SIC codes, allowing them to weight the relative availability of DBEs in various fields, giving more weight to the fields in which they spend more money. For example, let us assume a recipient estimates that it will expend 10% of its federal aid funds within SIC code 15, 40% in SIC code 16, 25% in SIC code 17, and the remaining 25% on contracting spread over SIC codes 07, 42 and 87. The recipient could separately determine the relative availability of DBEs for each of the three major construction SIC codes (i.e., 15, 16 and 17) and the relative availability of DBEs in the other three SIC codes grouped together and weight each according to the amount of money to be spent in each area. In this example, the recipient could calculate its weighted base figure by first determining the number of DBEs in its directory for each of the groups, then extracting the availability of CBP businesses for the same groups. It would then perform the following calculation to arrive at a base figure for step one of the goal setting process: Base=[.10(DBEs in SIC 15) + .40(DBEs in 16) + .25(DBEs in 17) +.25(DBEs in 07,42,87) ]x 100 Figure CBPs in SIC 15 CBPs in 16 CBPs in 17 CBPs in 07,42,87

As has been stated generally, this formula is offered only as an example of a way that a recipient could choose to use the CBP database. Recipients using the CBP data should choose whether to weight their calculation, and whether to do so by individual SIC codes or by groups of SIC codes, based on their own assessment of what method will best fit their spending pattern.¹

¹While it is not statistically necessary to account for 100% of program dollars when performing this type of weighting, the greater the percentage accounted for, the more accurate the resulting calculation will be.

Finally, there is still the question of the propriety of comparing data from two sources as different as DBE directories and the CBP. As mentioned above, some commenters asserted that the directories may contain firms that do not normally perform DOT-assisted contracts. This problem is greatest, of course, for directories maintained by other agencies for purposes beyond DOT-assisted contracting. We believe that the recipient's knowledge of its contracting needs and the contents of its DBE directory will allow it to solve this problem by sorting the directories by SIC code to extract only the firms likely to be interested in DOT-assisted contracting. Any remaining effect from DBEs that are certified in the relevant SIC codes but still do not intend to compete for DOT-assisted contracts will be more than offset by the hurdles involved in actually becoming a DBE. It is important to note here that the certification process itself, with its paperwork, review and on-site inspection, create a filter on the number of existing firms that will be counted in the numerator without there being any equivalent filter culling firms out of the denominator. Ultimately, the Department chose these two data sources for the example because; while they may not be perfect, they represent the best universally available current data on both the presence of DBEs and the presence of all businesses in local markets. Any recipient that believes it has available to it better sources of local data from which to make a similar calculation for its base figure is encouraged to use them.

The second example for calculating a base figure is using a bidders list to determine the relative availability of DBEs. The concept is similar to the one described above. The recipient would divide the number of available ready, willing and able DBEs by the number for all firms. The difference is that instead of measuring availability by DBE certifications and Census data, the recipient would measure availability by the number of firms that have directly participated in, or attempted to participate in, DOT-assisted contracting in the recent past. This approach has its roots in Alternative 3 from the SNPRM. Of fundamental importance to this approach is that the recipient would need to include all firms that have sought DOT-assisted contracts, regardless of whether they did so by bidding on a prime contract or quoting a job as a subcontractor. Because most DOT recipients derive the substantial majority of their DBE participation through subcontracting, it is absolutely essential that all DBE and non-DBE firms that quote subcontracts be included in the bidders list.² Bidders lists are a very focussed measure of ready, willing and able firms because they filter the pool of available firms by requiring a demonstration of their ability to participate in the process through tracking and identifying contracting opportunities, understanding the requirements of a particular job and assembling a bid for it. Another attractive feature of the bidding ``filter'' is that it applies equally to both DBEs and non-DBEs.

²To prevent any confusion, it is important to note that the DBE program does not use the so-called ``benchmarking'' system employed in direct Federal procurement. The benchmarking system relies on a unique database created specifically for use in the federal procurement program.

The third example included in the final rule for setting a base figure is using data derived from a disparity study. As was discussed in the SNPRM, the Department is not requiring recipients to do a disparity study, but is only making clear that use of disparity study data by recipients that have them or choose to conduct them is a valid means of setting a goal. Disparity studies generally contain a wide array of statistical data, as well as anecdotal data and analysis that can be particularly useful in the goal setting process. We list disparity studies here, not because they are needed to justify operating the DBE program--Congress has already established the compelling need for the DBE program--but because the data a good disparity study provides can be an excellent guide for a recipient to use to set a narrowly tailored goal.

The Department will not set out specific requirements for what data or analysis is required before a disparity study can be used for setting a goal, because we believe that the design and conduct of the study is best left to the local officials and the professional organizations with which they contract to conduct the studies. Instead, we again offer simple general principles that should apply to all studies used for goal setting. Any study data relied on in the goal setting process should be as recent as possible and be focussed on the transportation contracting industry. When setting the goal, first use the study's statistical evidence to set a base figure for the relative availability of DBEs. Other study information, whether it is anecdotal data, analysis or statistical information about related fields, should be included when making adjustments to the base figure (discussed in more detail below), but not included in the base figure for the relative availability of DBEs.

The last specific example included in the rule is using the goal of another recipient as the base figure for goal setting. This option was also included in the SNPRM. It is intended to avoid duplicative work and to lighten the burden the goal setting process might put on smaller recipients. It is important to note that a recipient could only use another recipient's goal if it was set in accordance with this rule and the other recipient performed similar contracting in a similar market area. Using another recipient's approved goal would only satisfy the first step of the goal setting process. It would serve as the base figure, and could not be used to skip over step two of the process. The recipient would need to examine the same additional evidence it would otherwise use to determine whether to adjust its goal from the base figure, as well as being required to make adjustments to account for differences in its local market or contracting program.

The final rule also maintains the option of devising an alternative method of calculating a base figure for the goal setting process. Explicitly listing this option serves to emphasize the point that the options in the rule are examples meant as guidelines intended to ensure maximum flexibility for recipients. Recipients can use this option to take advantage of their unique expertise or any unique source of data that they have that may not be available to other recipients. The concerned operating administration will review and approve the proposals of recipients that believe they can calculate a base figure that will better reflect their relevant market than any of the examples provided in this rule. Approval will be contingent on the proposals following the same principles that apply to any recipient: the methodology must be based on demonstrable data of relevant market conditions and be designed to reach a goal that the recipient would expect DBEs to achieve in the absence of discrimination.

Step 2: Adjusting the Base Figure

As alluded to above, measuring the relative availability of DBEs to derive a base figure is only the first step of the goal setting process. To ensure that they arrive at goals that truly and accurately reflect the participation they would expect absent the effects of discrimination, recipients must go beyond the formulaic measurement of current availability to account for other evidence of conditions affecting DBEs. To accomplish this second step, recipients must first survey their jurisdiction to determine what types of relevant evidence is available to them. Then, relying on their own knowledge of their contracting markets they must review the evidence to determine whether either an up or down adjustment from the base figure is needed.

One universally available form of evidence that all recipients should consider is the proven capacity of DBEs to perform work on DOT- assisted contracts. All recipients have been tracking and reporting the dollar volume of work that is contracted and subcontracted to DBEs each year. Viewed in isolation, the past achievements of DBEs do not reflect the availability of DBEs relative to all available businesses, but it is an important and current measure of the ability of DBEs to perform on DOT-assisted contracts.

Though not universally available, there are hundreds of existing disparity studies that contain a wealth of statistical and anecdotal evidence on the utilization of disadvantaged businesses. In addition to being a possible source of data for Step 1 of the goal setting process, disparity studies should be considered during Step 2 of the process. The base figure from Step 1 is intended to determine the relative availability of DBEs. The data and analysis in a disparity study can help a recipient determine whether those existing businesses are under- or over-utilized. If a recipient has a study with disparity ratios showing that existing DBEs are receiving significantly less work than expected, an upward adjustment from the base figure is called for. Similarly, if the disparity ratio shows overutilization, a downward adjustment to the base figure would be warranted. The anecdotal evidence and analysis of contracting requirements and conditions that may have a discriminatory impact on DBEs are also important sources that should be examined when determining what adjustment to make to the base figure.³ Finally, disparity studies that are conducted within a recipient's jurisdiction should be examined even if they were not done specifically for the recipient. For example, a state highway agency may find useful data and analysis in either a statewide disparity study covering other agencies or in a disparity study examining contracting in a county or city within the state.

³ It is important to note that adjusting the goal is only part of the response a recipient should make to evidence of discriminatory barriers for DBEs. All recipients have a primary responsibility to ensure non-discrimination in their programs and should act aggressively to remove any discriminatory barriers in their programs.

If a recipient uses another recipient's goal as its base figure under Step 1 of the goal setting process, it will have to make additional adjustments to ensure that its final goal is narrowly tailored to its market and contracting program. For example, if a local transit or airport authority adopts a statewide goal as its base figure, it must determine the extent that local relative availability of DBEs differs from the relative availability of DBEs in the contracting area relied on by the state. The local recipient would also need to examine the differences in the type of contracting work in its program and determine whether there are significant differences in the relative availability of DBEs in any fields that are unique to its program--or unique to the program of the other recipient. Similarly, if one local recipient used the goal of another local recipient in the same market as its base figure, it would also need to adjust for differences in the contracting fields used by the two programs.

Finally, the rule contains a brief list of other types of data a recipient could consider when adjusting its base figure to arrive at an overall goal. The list is by no means intended to be exhaustive. Instead, it is meant as a guide to the types of information a recipient should look for in Step 2 of the goal setting process. There is a wide array of relevant local, regional and national information about the utilization of disadvantaged businesses. Recipients are encouraged to cast as wide a net as they can to carefully examine their contracting programs and the public and private markets in which they operate.

Additional Goal Setting Issues

The Department proposed, in both the 1992 NPRM and the 1997 SNPRM, that overall goals be calculated as a percentage of DOT funds a recipient expects to expend in DOT-assisted contracts. This is different from the existing part 23 rule, which asked recipients to set overall goals on the basis of all funds, including state and local funds, to be expended in DOT-assisted contracts. This change is for accounting and administrative convenience and is not intended to have a substantive effect on the program. While not the subject of many comments, those who did comment on the proposal favored the change. The final rule adopts this approach.

A few recipients commented that public participation concerning goal setting was bothersome. Nevertheless, we view it as an essential part of the goal setting process. There are many stakeholders involved in setting goals, and it is reasonable that they should be involved in the process and have an opportunity for comment. The part 23 provision requiring getting a state governor's approval of a goal of less than 10 percent has been eliminated, both because overall goals are no longer tied to the national 10 percent goal and to reduce administrative burdens.

The goal setting provision of the final rule continues to direct recipients to set one annual overall goal for DBEs, rather than group- specific goals separating minority and women-owned businesses.

A.This is a new section of the regulation, the purpose of which is to clarify the Department's views on the situations in which it is appropriate to impose sanctions on recipients with respect to goals. The provision states explicitly what has long been the Department's policy: no recipient is sanctioned, or found in noncompliance, simply because it fails to meet its overall goal. In fact, through the history of the DBE program, the Department never has sanctioned a recipient for failing to obtain a particular amount of DBE participation.

On the other hand, if a recipient fails to set an overall goal which the concerned operating administration approves, or fails to operate its program in good faith toward the objective of meeting the goal, it is subject to a finding of noncompliance and possible sanctions. For example, if a recipient refuses to establish a goal or, having established one, does little or nothing to work toward attaining it, it would be reasonable for the Department to find the recipient in noncompliance. Like all compliance provisions of the rule, this provision is subject to the ``court order'' exception recently created by statute (see Sec. 26.101(b)).

A.This provision basically continues in effect the existing transit vehicle manufacturer (TVM) provisions of the rule. The SNPRM proposed to change the existing rule in two respects. FHWA or FAA recipients could avail themselves of similar provisions, if they chose. The final rule retains this flexibility. Also, it was proposed that FTA, rather than manufacturers, would set TVM goals. The few comments we received on this section objected to the latter change. Consequently, we will not adopt the proposed change and will continue to require the TVMs themselves to set their own goals based on the principles outlined in Sec. 26.45 of this rule.

A.One of the key points of both the SNPRM and this final rule is that, in meeting overall goals, recipients have to give priority to race-neutral means. By race-neutral means (a term which, for purposes of this rule, includes gender neutrality), we mean outreach, technical assistance, procurement process modification, etc.--measures which can be used to increase opportunities for all small businesses, not just DBEs, and do not involve setting specific goals for the use of DBEs on individual contracts. Contract goals, on the other hand, are race- conscious measures.

In the context of these definitions, it is important to note that awards of contracts to DBEs are not necessarily race-conscious actions. Whenever a DBE receives a prime contract because it is the lowest responsible bidder, the resulting DBE participation was achieved through race-neutral means. Similarly, when a DBE receives a subcontract on a project that does not have a contract goal, its participation was also achieved through race-neutral means. Finally, even on projects that do carry contract goals, when a prime awards a particular subcontract to a DBE because it has proven in the past that it does the best or quickest work, or because it submitted the lowest quote, the resulting DBE participation has, in fact, been achieved through race-neutral means. We also note that the use of race-neutral measures (e.g., outreach, technical assistance) specifically to increase the participation of DBEs does not convert these measures into race-conscious measures.

A number of non-DBE contractors commented that race-neutral measures should not only be given priority, but must be tried and fail before any use of contract goals can occur. This, they asserted, is essential for a program to be narrowly tailored. The law on this point is fairly clear, and does not support the commenters' contention. The extent to which race-neutral alternatives were considered and deemed inadequate to remedy the problem is the relevant narrow tailoring question. Both in past legislation and when considering TEA-21, Congress did consider race-neutral alternatives. In fact, as described above, throughout the debate, Member after Member gave examples of how state and local race-neutral programs without goals fail to overcome the discriminatory barriers that face DBEs. Congress' careful consideration and conclusion that race-neutral means are insufficient, buttressed by this rule's emphasis on achieving as much of the goal as possible through race-neutral means, satisfies this part of the narrow tailoring requirement.

No one opposed the use of race-neutral means, though a number of DBEs and recipients stressed that these means, standing alone, were insufficient to address discrimination and its effects. Most recipients and non-DBE contractors supported the use of race-neutral measures, though some recipients said that increased use of these measures would require additional resources.

The relationship between race-conscious and race-neutral measures in the final rule is very important. The recipient establishes an overall goal. The recipient estimates, in advance, what part of that goal it can meet through the use of race-neutral means. This projection, and the basis for it, would be provided to the concerned operating administration at the same time as the overall goal, and is subject to OA approval.

The requirement of the rule is that the recipient get the maximum feasible DBE participation through race-neutral means. The recipient uses race-conscious measures (e.g., sets contract goals) to get the remainder of the DBE participation it needs to meet the overall goal. If the recipient expects to be able to meet its entire overall goal through race-neutral means, it could, with OA approval, implement its program without any use of contract goals.

For example, suppose Recipient X establishes an 11 percent overall goal for Fiscal Year 2000. This is the amount of DBE participation that X has determined it would have if the playing field were level. Recipient X projects that, using a combination of race-neutral means, it can achieve 5 percent DBE participation. Recipient X then sets contract goals on some of its contracts throughout the year to bring in an additional 6 percent DBE participation. Recipients would keep data separately on the DBE participation obtained through those contracts that either did or did not involve the use of contract goals. Recipients would use this and other data to adjust their use of race- neutral means and contract goals during the remainder of the year and in future years. For example, if Recipient X projected being able to attain 5 percent DBE participation through race-neutral measures, but was only able to obtain 1 percent from the race-neutral measures it used, Recipient X would increase its future use of contract goals. On the other hand, if Recipient X exceeded its prediction that it would get 5 percent DBE participation from race-neutral measures and actually obtained 10 percent DBE participation from the contracts on which there were no contract goals, it would reduce its future use of contract goals. A recipient that was consistently able to meet its overall goal using only race-neutral measures would never need to use contract goals.

Most recipients and non-DBE contractors agreed with the SNPRM's proposal that (contrary to the part 23 provision on this subject) contract goals not be required on all contracts. This provision is retained in the final rule. We believe that this provision provides recipients the ability to achieve the objective of a narrowly tailored program. The rule also reiterates that the contract goal need not be set at the same level as the overall goal. To express this more clearly, let us return to the above example of Recipient X. Just because Recipient X has an overall goal of 11 percent, it does not have to set a contract goal on each contract. Nor does it have to establish an 11 percent goal on each contract on which it does set a contract goal. Indeed, since X has projected that it can achieve almost half of its overall goal through race-neutral means, it would most likely set contract goals on some contracts but not on others. On contracts with a contract goal, the goal might be 4 percent one time, 18 percent another time, 9 percent another time, depending on the actual work involved in each contract, the location of the work and the subcontracting opportunities available. The idea is for X to set contract goals that, cumulatively over the year, bring in 6 percent DBE participation, which, added to the 5 percent participation X projects achieving from race-neutral measures, ends up meeting the 11 percent overall goal.

The SNPRM asked for comment on evaluation credits as an additional race-conscious measure that recipients could use to meet overall goals. The vast majority of the many comments on this subject opposed the use of evaluation credits, on both legal (e.g., as contrary to narrow tailoring) and policy (e.g., as confusing and subjective) grounds. A smaller number of commenters favored at least giving recipients discretion to use this tool. While the Department does not agree with the contention that evaluation credits are legally suspect, we do agree with much of the sentiment against using them in the DBE program, particularly the practical difficulties they might involve when applied to subcontracting (which constitutes the main source of DBE participation in the program). As a result, the final rule does not contain an evaluation credits provision.

The SNPRM proposed certain mechanisms for determining when it was appropriate to ratchet back the use of contract goals. Most commenters said they found these particular mechanisms complicated and confusing. The Department believes that, as a matter of narrow tailoring, it is important to have concrete mechanisms in place to ensure that race- conscious measures like contract goals are used only to the extent necessary to ensure a level playing field. The final rule contains examples of four such mechanisms.

The first mechanism applies to a situation in which a recipient estimates that it can meet its overall goal exclusively through the use of race-neutral goals. In this case, the recipient simply does not set contract goals during the year. The second mechanism takes this approach one step further. If the recipient meets its overall goal two years in a row using only race-neutral measures, the recipient continues to use only race-neutral measures in future years, without having to project each year how much of its overall goal it anticipates meeting through race-neutral and race-conscious means, respectively. However, if in any year the recipient does not meet its overall goal, the recipient must make the projection for the following year, using race-conscious means as needed to meet the goal.

The third mechanism applies to recipients who exceed their overall goals for two years in a row while using contract goals. In the third year, when setting their overall goal and making their projection of the amount of DBE participation they will achieve through race-neutral means, they would determine the average percentage by which they exceeded their overall goals in the two previous years. They would then use that percentage to reduce their reliance on contract goals in the coming year, as noted in the regulatory text example. The rationale for this reduction is that the recipient's overall goal represents its best estimation of the participation level expected for DBEs in the absence of discrimination. By exceeding that goal consistently, the recipient may be relying too heavily on race-conscious measures. Scaling back the use of contract goals--while keeping careful track of DBE participation rates on projects without contract goals--will ensure that the recipient's DBE program remains narrowly tailored to overcoming the continuing effects of discrimination.

The fourth mechanism operates within a given year. If a recipient determines part way through the year that it will exceed (or fall short of) its overall goal, and it is using contract goals during that year, it would scale back its use of contract goals (or increase it use of race-neutral means and/or contract goals) during the remainder of the year to ensure that it is using an appropriate balance of means to meet its ``level playing field'' objectives.

There were also a number of comments on how contract goals should be expressed. Most favored continuing the existing practice of adding together the Federal and local shares of a contract and expressing the contract goal as a percentage of the sum because it works well and avoids confusion. A few comments favored expressing contract goals as a percentage of only the Federal share of a contract. Ultimately, we believe that it is not necessary for the Department to dictate which method to use. Recipients may continue to use whichever method they feel works best and allows them to accurately track the participation of DBEs in their program. Recipients need only ensure that they are consistent and clearly express the method they are using, and report to the Department the total federal aid dollars spent and the federal aid dollars spent with DBEs.

As a last note on this topic, FAA recipients are reminded that funds derived from passenger facility charges (PFCs) are not covered by this part and should not be counted as part of the Federal share in any goal calculation. If a recipient chooses to express its contract goals as a percentage of the combined Federal and local share, it may include the PFC funds as part of the local share.

A.There was little disagreement about the main point of this section. When a recipient sets a contract goal, the basic obligation of bidders is to make good faith efforts (GFE) to meet it. They can demonstrate these efforts in either of two ways, which are equally valid. First, they can meet the goal, by documenting that they have obtained commitments for enough DBE participation to meet the goal. Second, even though they have not met the goal, they can document that they have made good faith efforts to do so. The Department emphasizes strongly that this requirement is an important and serious one. A refusal by a recipient to accept valid showings of good faith is not acceptable under this rule.

Appendix A discusses in greater detail the kinds of good faith efforts bidders are expected to make. There was a good deal of comment concerning its contents. Non-minority contractors recited that good faith efforts standards should be ``objective, measurable, realistically achievable, and standardized.'' Not one of these comments provided any examples or suggestions of what ``objective, measurable, realistically achievable, and standardized'' standards would look like, however. Certainly a one-size-fits-all checklist is neither desirable nor possible. What constitutes a showing of adequate good faith efforts in a particular procurement is an intrinsically fact-specific judgment that recipients must make. Circumstances of procurements vary widely, and GFE determinations must fit each individual situation as closely as possible.

The proposed good faith efforts appendix suggested that one of the factors recipients could take into account is the behavior of bidders other than the apparent successful bidder. For example, if the latter failed to meet the contract goal, but other bidders did, that could suggest that the apparent successful bidder had not exerted sufficient efforts to get DBE participation. Recipients who commented on this issue favored the concept; non-DBE contractors opposed it. The final rule's Appendix A makes clear that recipients are not to use a ``conclusive presumption'' approach, in which the apparent successful bidder is summarily found to have failed to make good faith efforts simply because another bidder was able to meet the goal. However, the track record of other bidders can be a relevant factor in a GFE determination, in more than one way. If other bidders have met the goal, and the apparent successful bidder has not, this at least raises the question of whether the apparent successful bidder's efforts were adequate. It does not, by itself, prove that the apparent successful bidder did not make a good faith effort to get DBE participation, however. On the other hand, if the apparent successful bidder--even if it failed to meet the goal--got as much or more DBE participation than other bidders, then this fact would support the apparent successful bidder's showing of GFE. The revised Appendix makes these points.

The proposed good faith efforts appendix also expanded on language in part 23 concerning price-based decisions by prime contractors. The existing language provides that a recipient can use, as evidence of a bidder's failure to make good faith efforts, the recipient's rejection of a DBE subcontractor's ``reasonable price'' offer. The SNPRM added that a recipient could set a price differential from 1-10 percent to evaluate bidders' efforts. If a bidder did not meet the goal and rejected a DBE offer within the range, the recipient could view the bidder as not making good faith efforts. This was an attempt to provide additional, quantified, guidance to recipients on this issue.

Comment was mixed on this issue. Non-DBE prime contractors generally opposed the price differential idea, saying that it encouraged deviations from the traditional low bid system. It should be noted, however, that subcontracts are typically awarded outside any formal low bid system. Some recipients thought that it was a bad idea to designate a range, because it would limit their discretion, while others liked the additional definiteness of the range. Most recipients supported the ``reasonable price'' concept in general, even if they had their doubts about the value of a range. Some DBE organizations favored the range approach.

Taking all the comments into consideration, the Department has decided to retain language similar to that of part 23, without reference to any specific range. Appendix A now provides that the fact that some additional costs may be involved in finding and using DBEs is not in itself sufficient reason for a bidder's failure to meet a DBE contract goal, as long as such costs are reasonable. Along with this emphasis on the reasonableness of the cost necessarily comes the fact that prime contractors are not expected to bear unreasonable costs. The availability of a good faith efforts waiver of the contract goal helps to ensure that a prime contractor will not be in a position where it has to accept an excessive or unreasonable bid from a DBE subcontractor. At the same time, any burden that a non-DBE subcontractor might face is also limited by the reasonableness of competing bids. This approach retains flexibility for recipients while avoiding the concerns commenters expressed about a particular range.

The SNPRM proposed that recipients would have to provide for an administrative review of decisions that a bidder's GFE showing was inadequate. The purpose of the provision was to ensure that recipients did not arbitrarily dismiss bidders' attempts to show that they made good faith efforts. The provision was meant to emphasize the seriousness with which the Department takes the GFE requirement and to help respond to allegations that some recipients administered the program in a quota-like fashion. The SNPRM also asked whether such a mechanism should be operated entirely by the recipient or whether a committee including representatives of DBE and non-DBE contractors should be involved.

A number of recipients, and a few contractors, opposed the idea on the basis of concern about administrative burdens on recipients and potential delays in the procurement process. A greater number of commenters, largely non-DBE contractors but also including recipients and DBEs, supported the proposal as ensuring greater fairness in the process. A significant majority of all commenters said that the recipient should operate the system on its own, because a committee would make the process more cumbersome and raise conflict of interest issues.

The Department will adopt this proposal, which should add to the fairness of the system and make allegations of de facto quota operations less likely. The Department intends that reconsideration be administered by recipients. The regulation does not call for a committee involving non-recipient personnel. The Department intends that the process be informal and timely. The recipient could ensure that the process be completed within a brief period (e.g., 5-10 days) to minimize any potential delay in procurements. The bidder would have an opportunity to meet with the reconsideration official, but a formal hearing is not required. To ensure fairness, the reconsideration official must be someone who did not participate in the original decision to reject the bidder's showing. The recipient would have to provide a written decision on reconsideration, but there would be no provision for administrative appeals to DOT.

A point raised by several non-DBE commenters was that DBEs should have to make good faith efforts (even when they were not acting as prime contractors). The commenters suggested things like providing capacity statements and documenting that they have bid on contracts. This point is unrelated to the subject of this section, which has to do with what efforts bidders for prime contracts have to make to show that they have made to obtain DBE subcontractors. It is difficult to see what purpose the additional paperwork burdens these commenters' requests would serve.

One of the most hotly debated issues among commenters was whether DBE firms bidding on prime contracts should have to meet goals and make good faith efforts to employ DBE subcontractors. Under part 23, DBE prime contractors did not have to meet goals or make good faith efforts. The rationale for this position was that, as DBEs, 100 percent of the work of these contractors counted toward recipients' contract goals, which the firms automatically met.

A significant majority of commenters on this issue--particularly non-DBE contractors but also including some recipients and a few DBEs-- argued that DBE primes should meet goals and make GFE the same as other contractors. Failing to do so, they said, went beyond providing a level playing field to the point of providing an unfair advantage for DBE bidders for prime contracts. This change would also increase opportunities for DBE subcontractors, they said. One comment suggested requiring DBE prime contractors to meet goals or make GFE, but stressed that work they performed with their own forces as well as work awarded to DBE subcontractors should count toward goals.

Supporters of the current system said that many prime contracts performed by DBEs are too small to permit subcontracting (of course, goals need be set only on contracts with subcontracting possibilities). Moreover, these commenters--mostly DBEs and recipients--said that there was already inequity as between DBEs and non-DBEs, and requiring DBEs to meet the same requirements simply maintained the inequity. There was also some support for a third option the Department included in the SNPRM, in which DBEs would have to meet goals and make GFE to the extent that work they proposed to perform with their own forces was insufficient to meet goals.

The Department believes that, in a rule aimed at providing a level playing field for DBEs, it is appropriate to impose the same requirements on all bidders for prime contracts. Consequently, part 26 will depart from the part 23 approach and require DBE prime contractors to meet goals and make good faith efforts on the same basis as other prime contractors. However, in recognition of the DBE bidders' status as DBEs, we will permit them to count toward goals the work that they commit to performing with their own forces, as well as the work that they commit to be performed by DBE subcontractors. DBE bidders on prime contracts will be expected to make the same outreach efforts as other bidders and to document good faith efforts in situations where they do not fully meet contract goals.

Under part 23 and the SNPRM, recipients have a choice between handling bidder compliance with contract goals and good faith efforts requirements as a matter of responsiveness or responsibility. Some recipients and other contractors recounted successful experience with one approach or the other, and suggested reasons why everyone should follow each approach (e.g., responsiveness as a deterrent to bid- shopping; responsibility as a more flexible and cost-effective approach). Both approaches have their merits, and the Department believes the best course is to maintain the existing recipient discretion on this issue.

Some recipients use so-called ``design-build'' or ``turnkey'' contracts, in which the design and construction of an entire project is contracted out to a master contractor. The master contractor then lets subcontracts, which are often equivalent to the prime contracts that the recipient would let if it were designing and building the project directly. In a sense, the master contractor stands in the shoes of the recipient.

On design-build contracts, the normal process for setting contract goals does not fit the contract award process well. At the time of the award of the master contract, neither the recipient nor the master contractor knows in detail what the project will look like or exactly what contracting opportunities there will be, let alone the identity of DBEs who may subsequently be involved. In these situations, the recipient may alter the normal process, setting a project goal to which the master contractor commits. Later, when the master contractor is letting subcontracts, it will set contract goals as appropriate, standing in the shoes of the recipient. The recipient will exercise oversight of this process.

The final issue in this section has to do with replacement of DBEs that drop out of a contract. What actions, if any, should a prime contractor have to take when a DBE is unable to complete a subcontract, for whatever reason? Should it matter whether or not the DBE's participation is needed to achieve the prime contractor's goal?

Comment on this issue came mostly from recipients, with some non- DBE contractors and a few DBEs providing their views. A majority of the commenters believed that replacement of a fallen-away DBE with another DBE (or making a good faith effort toward that end) should be required only when needed to ensure that the prime contractor continued to meet its contract goal. Others said that, since using DBEs to which the prime had committed at the time of award was a contractual requirement, replacement or good faith efforts should be required regardless of the prime's ability to meet the goal without the lost DBE's participation.

The Department believes that, in a narrowly tailored rule, it is not appropriate to require DBE participation at a level exceeding that needed to ensure a level playing field. Consequently, we will require a prime contractor to replace a fallen-away DBE (or to demonstrate that it has made good faith efforts toward that end) only to the extent needed to ensure that the prime contractor is able to achieve the contract goal established by the recipient for the procurement. The Department will also retain the SNPRM provision--supported by most commenters who mentioned it--that a prime contractor may not terminate a DBE firm for convenience and then perform the work with its own forces without the recipient's written consent. This provision is intended to prevent abuse of the program by a prime contractor who would commit to using a DBE and then bump the DBE off the project in favor of doing the work itself.

A.In a narrowly tailored program, it is important that DBE credit be awarded only for work actually being performed by DBEs themselves. The necessary implication of this principle is that when a DBE prime contractor or subcontractor subcontracts work to another firm, the work counts toward DBE goals only if the other firm is itself a DBE. This represents a change from the existing rule and the SNPRM, which said that all the work of a DBE's contract (implicitly including work subcontracted to non-DBEs) counts toward goals. A few comments urged such a change. The new language is also consistent with the way that the final rule treats goals for DBE prime contractors.

The value of work performed by DBEs themselves is deemed to include the cost of materials and supplies purchased, and equipment leased, by the DBE from non-DBE sources. For example, if a DBE steel erection firm buys steel from a non-DBE manufacturer, or leases a crane from a non- DBE construction firm, these costs count toward DBE goals. There is one exception: if a DBE subcontractor buys supplies or leases equipment from the prime contractor on its contract, these costs do not count toward DBE goals. Several comments from prime contractors suggested these costs should count, but this situation is too problematic, in our view, from an independence and commercially useful function (CUF) point of view to permit DBE credit.

One of the most difficult issues in this section concerns how to count DBE credit for the services of DBE trucking firms. The SNPRM proposed that, to be performing a CUF, a DBE trucking firm had to own 50 percent of the trucks it used in connection with a contract. A number of comments said that this requirement was out of step with industry practice, which commonly involves companies leasing trucks from owner-operators and other sources for purposes of a project. In response to these comments, the Department revisited this issue and reviewed the trucking CUF policies of a number of states. The resulting provision requires DBEs to have overall control of trucking operations and own at least one truck, but permits leasing from a variety of sources under controlled conditions, with varying consequences for DBE credit awarded.

A DBE need not provide all the trucks on a contract to receive credit for transportation services, but it must control the trucking operations for which it seeks credit. It must have at least one truck and driver of its own, but it can lease the trucks of others, both DBEs and non-DBEs, including owner operators. For work done with its own trucks and drivers, and for work with DBE lessees, the firm receives credit for all transportation services provided. For work done with non-DBE lessees, the firm gets credit only for the fees or commissions it receives for arranging the transportation services, since the services themselves are being performed by non-DBEs.

When we say that a DBE firm must own at least one of the trucks it uses on a contract, we intend for recipients to have a certain amount of discretion for handling unexpected circumstances, beyond the control of the firm. For example, suppose firm X starts the contract with one truck it owns. The truck is disabled by an accident or mechanical problem part way through the contract. Recipients need not conclude that the firm has ceased to perform a commercially useful function.

Most commenters who addressed the issue agreed with the SNPRM proposal that a DBE does not perform a CUF unless if performs at least 30 percent of the work of a contract with its own forces (a few commenters suggested 50 percent). This provision has been retained. A commenter suggested that the use of two-party checks by a DBE and another firm should not automatically preclude there being a CUF. While we do not believe it is necessary to include rule text language on this point, we agree with the commenter. As long as the other party acts solely as a guarantor, and the funds do not come from the other party, we do not object to this practice where it is a commonly-recognized way of doing business. Recipients who accept this practice should monitor its use closely to avoid abuse.

One commenter noted an apparent inconsistency between counting 100 percent of the value of materials and supplies used by a DBE construction contractor (e.g., in the context of a furnish and install contract) and counting only 60 percent of the value of goods obtained by a non-DBE contractor from a DBE regular dealer. The two situations are treated differently, but there is a policy reason for the difference. There is a continuing concern in the program that, if non- DBEs are able to meet DBE goals readily by doing nothing more than obtaining supplies made by non-DBE manufacturers through DBE regular dealers, the non-DBEs will be less likely to hire DBE subcontractors for other purposes. As a policy matter, the Department does not want to reduce incentives to use DBE subcontractors, so we have not permitted 100 percent credit for supplies in this situation. Giving 100 percent credit for materials and supplies when a DBE contractor performs a furnish and install contract does not create the same type of disincentive, so the policy concern does not apply. In our experience, the 60 percent credit has been an effective incentive for the use of DBE regular dealers, so those firms are not unduly burdened.

A.This section, which states a ``preponderance of evidence'' standard for applicants' demonstration to recipients concerning group membership, ownership, control, and business size, received favorable comment from all commenters who addressed it. We are retaining it with only one change, a reference to the fact that, in the final rule, recipients will collect information concerning the economic status of prospective DBE owners.

A.There were several comments on details of this provision. One commenter suggested that tribal registration be used as an identifier for Native Americans. The suggestion is consistent with long-standing DOT guidance; however this section of the regulation is meant to set out general rules applicable to all determinations of group membership, not to enumerate means of making the determination for specific groups. The same commenter suggested that if someone knowingly misrepresents himself as a group member, he should not be given further consideration for eligibility. Misrepresentation of any kind on an application is a serious matter. Indeed, misrepresentation of material facts in an application can be grounds for debarment or even criminal prosecution. While it would certainly be appropriate for recipients to take action against someone who so misrepresented himself, the regulatory text on group membership is not the place to make a general point about the consequences of misrepresentation.

Some commenters wanted further definition of what ``a long period of time'' means. We believe it would be counterproductive to designate a number of years that would apply in all cases, since circumstances are likely to differ. The point is to avoid ``certification conversions'' in which an individual suddenly discovers, not long before the application process, ancestry or culture with which he previously has had little involvement.

We are adopting the SNPRM provision without substantive change.

A.By statute, the Department is mandated to apply SBA small business size standards to determining whether a firm is a small business. The Department is also mandated to apply the statutory size cap ($16.6 million in the current legislation, which the Department adjusts for inflation from time to time). Consequently, the Department cannot adopt the variety of comments we received to adjust size standards or the gross receipts cap to take differences among industries or regions into account. We are adopting the proposed language, using the new statutory gross receipts cap. As under part 23, a firm must fit under both the relevant SBA size standard and the generally applicable DOT statutory cap to be eligible for certification.

A few commenters asked for additional guidance for situations in which a firm is working in more than one SIC code, and the SBA size standards for the different SIC codes are different. First, size determinations are made for the firm as a whole, not for one division or another. Second, suppose the size of Firm X (e.g., determined through looking at the firm's gross receipts) is $5 million, and X is seeking certification as a DBE in SIC code yyyy and zzzz, whose SBA small business size standards are $3.5 and $7 million, respectively. Firm X would be a small business that could be certified as a DBE, and that could receive DBE credit toward goals, in SIC code zzzz but not in SIC code yyyy. This approach to the issue of differing standards being involved with the same firm fits in well with the general requirement of part 26 that certification be for work in particular SIC codes.

A.The statutes governing the DBE program continue to state that members of certain designated groups are presumed to be both socially and economically disadvantaged. Therefore, the Department is not adopting comments suggesting that one or both of the presumptions be eliminated from the DBE rule. While the rule does specify that applicants who are members of the designated groups do have to submit a signed certification that they are, in fact, socially and economically disadvantaged, this requirement should not be read as making simple ``self-certification'' sufficient to establish disadvantage. As has been the case since the beginning of the DBE program, the presumptions of social and economic disadvantage are rebuttable.

The Department is making an important change in this provision in response to comments about how to rebut the presumption of economic disadvantage. Recipient comments unanimously said that recipients should collect financial information, such as statements of personal net worth (PNW) and income tax returns, in order to determine whether the presumption of economic disadvantage really applies to individual applicants. Particularly in the context of a narrowly tailored program, in which it is important to ensure that the benefits are focussed on genuinely disadvantaged people (not just anyone who is a member of a designated group), we believe that these comments have merit. While charges by opponents of the program that fabulously wealthy persons could readily participate under part 23 have been exceedingly hyperbolic and inaccurate (e.g., references to the Sultan of Brunei as a potential DBE), it is appropriate to give recipients this tool to make sure that non-disadvantaged persons do not participate.

For this reason, part 26 requires recipients to obtain a signed and notarized statement of personal net worth from all persons who claim to own and control a firm applying for DBE certification and whose ownership and control are relied upon for DBE certification. These statements must be accompanied by appropriate supporting documentation (e.g., tax returns, where relevant). The rule does not prescribe the exact supporting documentation that should be provided, and recipients should strive for a good balance between the need for thorough examination of applicants' PNW and the need to limit paperwork burdens on applicants. For reasons of avoiding a retroactive paperwork burden on firms that are now certified, the rule does not require recipients to obtain this information from currently certified firms. These firms would submit the information the next time they apply for renewal or recertification. The final rule's provisions on calculating personal net worth are derived directly from SBA regulations on this subject (see 13 CFR Sec. 124.104(c)(2), as amended on June 30, 1998).

One of the primary concerns of DBE firms commenting about submitting personal financial information is ensuring that the information remains confidential. In response to this concern, the rule explicitly requires that this material be kept confidential. It may be provided to a third party only with the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains. This provision is specifically intended to pre-empt any contrary application of state or local law (e.g., a state freedom of information act that might be interpreted to require a state transportation agency to provide to a requesting party the personal income tax return of a DBE applicant who had provided the return as supporting documentation for his PNW statement). There is one exception to this confidentiality requirement. If there is a certification appeal in which the economic disadvantage of an individual is at issue (e.g., the recipient has determined that he or she is not economically disadvantaged and the individual seeks DOT review of the decision), the personal financial information would have to be provided to DOT as part of the administrative record. The Department would treat the information as confidential.

Creating a clear and definitive standard for determining when an individual has overcome the economic disadvantage that the DBE program is meant to remedy has long been a contentious issue. In 1992, the Department proposed to use a personal net worth standard of $750,000 to rebut the presumption of disadvantage for members of the designated groups. In 1997, the Department proposed a similar idea, though rather than use the $750,000 figure, the SNPRM asked the public for input on what the specific amount should be. Finally, as discussed in detail above, the issue of ensuring that wealthy individuals do not participate in the DBE program was a central part of the 1998 Congressional debate.

Public comment on both proposals was sharply divided. Roughly equal numbers of commenters thought $750,000 was too high as thought it was too low. Commenters proposed figures ranging from $250,000 to $2 million. Others supported the $750,000 level, which is based on the SBA's threshold for participation in the SDB program (it is also the retention level for the 8(a) program). One theme running through a number of comments was that recipients should have discretion to vary the threshold depending on such factors as the local economy or the type of firms involved. Some comments opposed the idea of a PNW threshold altogether or suggested an alternative approach (e.g., based on Census data about the distribution of wealth).

Others commented that rebutting the presumption did not go far enough, pointing out that the only way to ensure that wealthy people did not participate in the program was for the threshold to act as a complete bar on the eligibility of an individual to participate in the program. Congress appears to share this concern. While they differed on the effectiveness of past DOT efforts, both proponents and opponents of the program agreed that preventing the participation of wealthy individuals was central to ensuring the constitutionality of the DBE program.

The Department agrees and, in light of the comments and the intervening TEA-21 debate, is adopting the clearest and most effective standard available: when an individual's personal net worth exceeds the $750,000 threshold, the presumption of economic disadvantage is conclusively rebutted and the individual is no longer eligible to participate in the DBE program. The Department is using the $750,000 figure because it is a well established and effective part of the SBA programs and is a reasonable middle ground in view of the wide range of comments calling for higher or lower thresholds. Using a figure any lower, as some commenters noted, could penalize success and make growth for DBEs difficult (since, for example, banks and insurers frequently look to the personal assets of small business owners in making lending and bonding decisions). Operating the threshold as a cap on eligibility for all applicants also serves to treat men and women, minorities and non-minorities equally.

When a recipient determines, from the PNW statement and supporting information, that an individual's personal net worth exceeds $750,000, the recipient must deem the individual's presumption of economic disadvantage to have been conclusively rebutted. No hearing or other proceeding is called for in this case. When this happens in the course of an application for DBE eligibility, the certification process for the applicant firm stops, unless other socially and economically disadvantaged owners can account for the required 51 percent ownership and control. A recipient cannot count the participation of the owner whose presumption of economic disadvantage has been conclusively rebutted toward the ownership and control requirements for DBE eligibility.

There may be other situations in which a recipient has a reasonable basis (e.g., from information in its own files, as the result of a complaint from a third party) for believing that an individual who benefits from the statutory presumptions is not really socially and/or economically disadvantaged. In these cases, the recipient may begin a proceeding to rebut the presumptions. For example, if a recipient had reason to believe that the owner of a currently-certified firm had accumulated personal assets well in excess of $750,000, it might begin such a proceeding. The recipient has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the individual is not disadvantaged. However, the recipient may require the individual to produce relevant information.

It is possible that, at some time in the future, SBA may consider changing the $750,000 cap amount. The Department anticipates working closely with SBA on any such matter and seeking comment on any potential changes to this rule that would be coordinated with changes SBA proposes for Federal procurement programs in this area.

Under part 23, recipients had to accept 8(a)-certified firms (except for those who exceeded the statutory gross receipts cap). The SNPRM proposed some modifications of this requirement. Recipients were concerned that in some situations information used for 8(a) certification could be inaccurate or out of date. They noted differences between 8(a) and DBE certification standards and procedures. They asked for the ability to look behind 8(a) certifications and make their own certification decisions.

In response to these comments, the Department is providing greater discretion to recipients. Under part 26, recipients can treat 8(a) certifications as they do certifications made by other DOT recipients. A recipient can accept such a certification in lieu of conducting its own certification process or it can require the firm to go through part or all of its own application process. Because SBA is beginning a certification process for firms participating in the small and disadvantaged business (SDB) program, we will treat certified SDB firms in the same way. If an SDB firm is certified by SBA or an organization recognized by SBA as a certifying authority, a recipient may accept this certification instead of doing its own certification. (This does not apply to firms whose participation in the SDB program is based on a self-certification.) We note that this way of handling SBA program certifications is in the context of the development by DOT recipients of uniform certification programs. If a unified certification program (UCP) accepts a firm's 8(a) or 8(d) certification, then the firm will be certified for all DOT recipients in the state.

People who are not presumed socially and economically disadvantaged can still apply for DBE certification. To do so, they must demonstrate to the recipient that they are disadvantaged as individuals. Using the guidance provided in Appendix E, recipients must make case-by-case decisions concerning such applications. It should be emphasized that the DBE program is a disadvantage-based program, not one limited to members of certain designated groups. For this reason, recipients must take these applications seriously and consider them fairly. The applicant has the burden of proof concerning disadvantage, however.

A.Commenters on the ownership provisions of the SNPRM addressed a variety of points. Most commenters agreed that the general burden of proof on applicants should be the preponderance of the evidence. A few commenters thought that this burden should also apply in situations where a firm was formerly owned by a non-disadvantaged individual. For some of these situations, the SNPRM proposed the higher ``clear and convincing evidence'' standard, because of the heightened opportunities for abuse involved. The Department believes this safeguard is necessary, and we will retain the higher standard in these situations.

Commenters asked for more guidance in evaluating claims that a contribution of expertise from disadvantaged owners should count toward the required 51 percent ownership. They cited the potential for abuse. The Department believes that there may be circumstances in which expertise can be legitimately counted toward the ownership requirement. For example, suppose someone with a great deal of expertise in a computer-related field, without whom the success of his or her high- tech start-up business would not be feasible, receives substantial capital from a non-disadvantaged source.

We have modified the final rule provision to reflect a number of considerations. Situations in which expertise must be recognized for this purpose are limited. The expertise must be outstanding and in a specialized field: everyday experience in administration, construction, or a professional field is unlikely to meet this test. (This is not a ``sweat equity'' provision.) We believe that it is fair that the critical expertise of this individual be recognized in terms of the ownership determination. At the same time, the individual must have a significant financial stake in the company. This program focuses on entrepreneurial activity, not simply expertise. While we will not designate a specific percentage of ownership that such an individual must have, entrepreneurship without a reasonable degree of financial risk is inconceivable.

The SNPRM's proposals on how to treat assets obtained through inheritance, divorce, and gifts were somewhat controversial. Most comments agreed with the proposal that assets acquired through death or divorce be counted. One commenter objected to the provision that such assets always be counted, saying that the owner should have to make an additional demonstration that it truly owned the assets before the recipient counted them. We do not see the point of such an additional showing. If a white male business owner dies, and his widow inherits the business, the assets are clearly hers, and the deceased husband will play no further role in operating the firm. Likewise, assets a woman obtains through a divorce settlement are unquestionably hers. Absent a term of a divorce settlement or decree that limits the customary incidents of ownership of the assets or business (a contingency for which the proposed provision provided), there is no problem for which an additional showing of some sort by the owner would be a useful remedy.

A majority of comments on the issue of gifts opposed the SNPRM proposal, saying that gifts should not be counted toward ownership at all. The main reason was that allowing gifts would make it easier for fronts to infiltrate the program. Some comments also had a flavor of opposition to counting what commenters saw as unearned assets. The Department understands these concerns. If a non-disadvantaged individual who provides a gift is no longer connected with the business, or a disadvantaged individual makes the gift, the issue of the firm being a potential front is much reduced. Where a non- disadvantaged individual makes a gift and remains involved with the business, the concern about potential fronts is greater.

For this reason, the SNPRM erected a presumption that assets acquired by gift in this situation would not count. The applicant could overcome this presumption only by showing, through clear and convincing evidence--a high standard of proof--that the transfer was not for the purpose of gaining DBE certification and that the disadvantaged owner really controls the company. This provides effective safeguards against fraud, without going to the unfair extreme of creating a conclusive presumption that all gifts are illegitimate. Also, for purposes of ownership, all assets are created equal. If the money that one invests in a company is really one's own, it does not matter whether it comes from the sweat of one's brow, a bank loan, a gift or inheritance, or hitting the lottery. As long as there are sufficient safeguards in place to protect against fronts--and we believe the rule provides them--the origin of the assets is unimportant. We are adopting the proposed provisions without change.

Commenters were divided about how to handle marital property, especially in community property states. Some commenters believed that such assets should not be counted at all. This was based, in part, on the concern that allowing such assets to be counted could make it difficult to screen out interspousal gifts designed to set up fronts, even if irrevocable transfers of assets were made. Other commenters said they thought the proposal was appropriate, and some of these thought the requirement for irrevocable transfers was unfair.

The Department is adopting the proposed language. In a community property state, or elsewhere where property is jointly held between spouses, the wife has a legal interest in a portion of the property. It is really hers. It would be inappropriate to treat this genuine property interest as if it did not exist for purposes of DBE ownership.

To ensure the integrity of the program, it is necessary to put safeguards in place. The regulation does so. First, recipients would not count more assets toward DBE ownership than state law treats as belonging to the wife (the final rule provision adds language to this effect). Second, the irrevocable transfer requirement prevents the husband from being in a position to continue to claim any ownership rights in the assets. If an irrevocable transfer of assets constitutes a gift from a non-disadvantaged spouse who remains involved in the business, then the presumption/clear and convincing evidence mechanism discussed above for gifts would apply to the transaction. If recipients in community property states wanted to establish a mechanism for allocating assets between spouses that was consistent with state law, but did not require court involvement or other more formal procedures, they could propose doing so as part of their DBE programs, subject to operating administration approval.

Most commenters supported the SNPRM's proposal concerning trusts, particularly the distinction drawn between revocable living and irrevocable trusts. One commenter favored counting revocable living trusts when the same disadvantaged individual is both the grantor and beneficiary. The Department believes there is merit in making this exception. If the same disadvantaged individual is grantor, beneficiary, and trustee (i.e., an individual puts his own money in a revocable living trust for tax planning or other legitimate purposes and he alone plays the roles of grantor, beneficiary, and trustee), the situation seems indistinguishable for DBE program purposes from the situation of the same individual controlling his assets without the trust. In all other situations, revocable living trusts would not count.

Some comments asked for clarification of the 51 percent ownership requirement, a subject on which the Department has received a number of questions over the years. The Department has clarified this requirement, with respect to corporations, by stating that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals must own 51 percent of each class of voting stock of a corporation, as well as 51 percent of the aggregate stock. A similar point applies to partnerships and limited liability companies. This latter type of company was not mentioned in the SNPRM, but a commenter specifically requested clarification concerning it. (We have also noted, in Sec. 26.83, that limited liability companies must report changes in management responsibility to recipients. This is intended to include situations where management responsibility is rotated among members.) These clarifications are consistent with SBA regulations.

There are some ownership issues (e.g., concerning stock options and distribution of dividends) that SBA addresses in some detail in its regulations (see 13 CFR Sec. 124.105 (c), (e), (f)) that were not the subject of comments to the DOT SNPRM. These issues have not been prominent in DOT certification practice, to the best of our knowledge, so we are not adding them to the rule. However, we would use the SBA provisions as guidance in the event such issues arise.

A.Commenters generally agreed with the proposed provisions concerning expertise and delegation of responsibilities, 51 percent control of voting stock, and differences in remuneration. A few commenters expressed concern about having to make judgments concerning expertise. However, this expertise standard, as a matter of interpretation, has been part of the DBE program since the mid-1980s. We do not believe that articulating it in the regulatory text should cause problems, and we believe it is a very reasonable and understandable approach to expertise issues. The provision concerning 51 percent ownership of voting stock, as discussed above, has been relocated in the ownership section of the rule. The Department has added three useful clarifications of the general requirement that disadvantaged owners must control the firm (e.g., by serving as president or CEO, controlling a corporate board). These clarifications are based on SBA's regulations (see 13 CFR Sec. 124.106(a)(2), (b), (d)(1)). The Department intends to use other material in 13 CFR Sec. 124.106 as guidance on control matters, when applicable. Otherwise, the Department is adopting these provisions as proposed.

There was some concern about the proposal concerning licensing. Some recipients thought that it would be better to require a license as proof of control in the case of all licensed occupations. We do not think it is justifiable for the DBE program to require more than state law does. If state law allows someone to run a certain type of business (e.g., electrical contractors, engineers) without personally having a license in that occupation, then we do not think it is appropriate for the recipient to refuse to consider that someone without a license may be able to control the business. The rule is very explicit in saying that the recipient can consider the presence or absence of a license in determining whether someone really has sufficient ability to control a firm.

Family-owned firms have long been a concern in the program. The SNPRM provided explicitly that if the threads of control in a family- run business cannot be disentangled, such that the recipient can specifically find that a woman or other disadvantaged individual independently controls the business, the recipient may not certify the firm. A business that is controlled by the family as a group, as distinct from controlled individually by disadvantaged individuals, is not eligible. Notwithstanding this provision, a few recipients commented that certifying any businesses in which non-disadvantaged family members participate would open the program to fronts. We do not agree. Non-disadvantaged individuals can participate in any DBE firm, as long as disadvantaged individuals control the firm. It is not fair and does not achieve any reasonable program objective to say that an unrelated white male may perform functions in a DBE while the owner's brother may never do so.

Commenters generally supported the provision calling for recipients to certify firms only for types of work in which disadvantaged owners had the ability to control the firm's operations. One commenter suggested that recipients, while not requiring recertification of firms seeking to perform additional types of work as DBEs (e.g., work in other than their primary industrial classification), should have to approve a written request from firms in this position. We do believe it is necessary for recipients to verify that disadvantaged owners can control work in an additional area, and we have added language to this effect. Recipients will have discretion about how to administer this verification process.

Commenters asked for additional clarification about the eligibility of people who work only part-time in a firm. We have done so by adding examples of situations that do not lead to eligibility (part-time involvement in a full-time firm and absentee ownership) and a situation that may, depending on circumstances, be compatible with eligibility (running a part-time firm all the time it is operating). It should be noted that this provision does not preclude someone running a full-time firm from having outside employment. Outside employment is incompatible with eligibility only when it interferes with the individual's ability to control the DBE firm on a full-time basis.

One commenter brought to the Department's attention the situation of DBEs who use ``employee leasing companies.'' According to the commenter, employee leasing companies fill a number of administrative functions for employers, such as payroll, personnel, forwarding of taxes to governmental entities, and drug testing. Typically, the employees of the underlying firm are transferred to the payroll of the employee leasing firm, which in turn leases them back to the underlying employer. The underlying employer continues to hire, fire, train, assign, direct, control etc. the employees with respect to their on- the-job duties. While the employee leasing firm sends payments to the IRS, Social Security, and state tax authorities on behalf of the underlying employer, it is the latter who is remains responsible for paying the taxes.

For practical and legal purposes, the underlying employer retains an employer-employee relationship with the leased employees. The employee leasing company does not get involved in the operations of the underlying employer. In this situation, the use of an employee leasing company by a DBE does not preclude the DBE from meeting the control requirements of this rule. Nor does the employee leasing company become an affiliate of the DBE for business size purposes. Case-by-case judgement, of course, remains necessary. Should an employee leasing company in fact exercise control over the on-the-job activities of employees of the DBE, then the ability of the DBE to meet control requirements would be compromised.

One commenter said, as a general matter, that independence and control should be considered separately. We view independence as an aspect of control: If a firm is not independent of some other business, then the other firm, not the disadvantaged owners, exercise control. While independence is an aspect of control that recipients must review, we do not see any benefit in separating consideration of the two concepts.

A recent court decision (Jack Wood Construction Co., Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 12 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C., 1998)) overturned a DOT Office of Civil Rights certification appeal decision that upheld a denial of certification based on lack of control. The court, reading existing part 23 closely, said that a non-disadvantaged individual who was an employee, but not an owner, of a firm could disproportionately control the affairs of a firm without making it ineligible. The court also said that the existing rule language did not make it necessary for a disadvantaged owner to have both technical and managerial competence to control a firm. Part 26 solves both problems that the court found to exist in part 23's control provisions (see Sec. 26.71(e)-(g)).

A.There were relatively few comments on this section. One commenter disagreed with the proposal to continue the provision that a firm owned by a DBE firm, rather than by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, was not eligible. The argument against this provision, as we understand it, is that precluding a DBE firm from being owned by, for example, a holding company that is in turn owned by disadvantaged individuals would deny those individuals a financing and tax planning tool available to other businesses.

This argument has merit in some circumstances. The purpose of the DBE program is to help create a level playing field for DBEs. It would be inconsistent with the program's intent to deny DBEs a financial tool that is generally available to other businesses. The Department will allow this exception. Recipients must be careful, however, to ensure that certifying a firm under this exception does not have the effect of allowing the firm, or its parent company, to evade any of the requirements or restrictions of the certification process. The arrangement must be consistent with local business practices and must not have the effect of diluting actual ownership by disadvantaged individuals below the 51 percent requirement. All other certification requirements, including control by disadvantaged individuals and size limits, would continue to apply.

Another commenter suggested a firm should not be certified as a DBE if its owners have interests in non-DBE businesses. We believe that a per se rule to this effect would be too draconian. If owners of a DBE-- whether disadvantaged individuals or not--also have interests in other businesses, the recipient can look at the relationships among the businesses to determine if the DBE is really independent.

One commenter opposed basing certification on the present status of firms, seeking discretion to deny certification based on the history of the firm. We believe there is no rational or legal basis for denying certification to a firm on the basis of what it was in the past. Is it a small business presently owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals? If so, it would be contrary to the statute, and to the intent of the program, to deny certification because at some time--perhaps years--in the past, it was not owned and controlled by such individuals. The rule specifies that recipients may consider whether a firm has engaged in a pattern of conduct evincing an intent to evade or subvert the program.

The final provision of this section concerns firms owned by Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs), Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations. Like the NPRM, it provides that firms owned by these entities can be eligible DBEs, even though their ownership does not reside, as such, in disadvantaged individuals. These firms must meet the size standards applicable to other firms, including affiliation (lest large combinations of tribal or ANC-owned corporations put other DBEs at a strong competitive disadvantage). Also, they must be controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. For example, if a tribe or ANC owns a company, but its daily business operations are controlled by a non-disadvantaged white male, the firm would not be eligible.

Commenters pointed us to the following provision of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA):

(e) Minority and economically disadvantaged status--

(1) For all purposes of Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be considered to be a corporation owned and controlled by Natives and a minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprise if the Settlement Common Stock of the corporation and other stock of the corporation held by holders of Settlement Common Stock and by Natives and descendants of Natives, represents a majority of both the total equity of the corporation and the total voting power of the corporation for the purposes of electing directors.

(2) For all purposes of Federal law, direct and indirect subsidiary corporations, joint ventures, and partnerships of a Native Corporation qualifying pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be considered to be entities owned and controlled by Natives and a minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprise if the shares of stock or other units of ownership interest in any such entity held by such Native Corporation and by the holders of its Settlement Common Stock represent a majority of both--

(A) The total equity of the subsidiary corporation, joint venture, or partnership; and

(B) The total voting power of the subsidiary corporation, joint venture, or partnership for the purpose of electing directors, the general partner, or principal officers. (43 U.S.C. 1626(e)).

The question for the Department is whether, reading this language together with the language of the Department's DBE statutes, DOT must alter these provisions.

The DOT DBE statute (TEA-21 version) provides as follows:

(b) Disadvantaged Business Enterprises.--

(1) General rule--Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, not less than 10 percent of the amounts made available for any program under titles I, III, and V of this Act shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.

Definitions--In this subsection, the following definitions apply:

(A) Small business concern.--The term ``small business concern'' has the meaning such term has under section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632); except that such term shall not include any concern or group of concerns controlled by the same socially and economically disadvantaged individual or individuals which has average annual gross receipts over the preceding 3 fiscal years in excess of $16,600,000, as adjusted by the Secretary for inflation.

(B) Socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.--The term ``socially and economically disadvantaged individuals'' has the meaning such term has under section 8(d) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(d)) and relevant subcontracting regulations promulgated pursuant thereto; except that women shall be presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged individuals for purposes of this subsection.

(4) Uniform certification--The Secretary shall establish minimum uniform criteria for State governments to use in certifying whether a concern qualifies for purposes of this subsection. Such minimum uniform criteria shall include but not be limited to on-site visits, personal interviews, licenses, analysis of stock ownership, listing of equipment, analysis of bonding capacity, listing of work completed, resume of principal owners, financial capacity, and type of work preferred.

While the language Sec. 1626(e) is broad, the terms used in the two statutes are not identical. Section 1626(e) refers to ``minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprise[s]'', while the Department's statutes refer to ``small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.'' Requirements applicable to the former need not necessarily apply to the latter.

The legislative history of Sec. 1626(e) lends support to distinguishing the two statutes. The following excerpt from House Report 102-673 suggests that the intent of Congress in enacting this provision was to focus on direct Federal procurement programs:

[The statute] amends section [1626(e)] of ANCSA to clarify that Alaska Native Corporations are minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprises for the purposes of implementing the SBA programs * * * This section would further clarify that Alaska Native Corporations and their subsidiary companies are minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprises for purposes of qualifying for participation in federal contracting and subcontracting programs, the largest of which include the SBA 8(a) program and the Department of Defense Small and Disadvantaged Business Program. These programs were established to increase the participation of certain segments of the population that have historically been denied access to Federal procurement activities. While this section eliminates the need for Alaska Native Corporations or their subsidiaries to prove their ``economic'' disadvantage the corporations would still be required to meet size requirements as small businesses. This will continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis. (Id. at 19.)

This statute, in other words, was meant to apply to direct Federal procurement programs like the 8(a) program or the DOD SBD program, rather than a program involving state and local procurements reimbursed by DOT financial assistance.

The TEA-21 program is a more recent, more specific statute governing DOT recipients' programs. In contrast, the older, more general section 1626(e) evinces no specific intent to govern the DOT DBE program. There is no evidence that Congress, in enacting section 1626(e), had any awareness of or intent to alter the DOT DBE program.

A number of provisions of the TEA-21 statute suggest that Congress intended to impose specific requirements for the DOT program, without regard to other more general statutory references. For example, the $16.6 million size cap and the uniform certification requirements suggest that Congress wanted the eligibility for the DOT program to be determined in very specific ways, giving no hint that they intended these specific requirements to be overridden in the case of ANCs.

The Department concludes that section 1626(e) is distinguishable from the DOT DBE statutes, and that the latter govern the implementation of the DBE program. The Department is not compelled to alter its approach to certification in the case of ANCs.

A.As was the case following the 1992 NPRM, a significant majority of the large number of commenters addressing the issue favored implementing the proposed UCP requirement, which the final rule retains largely as proposed. A few commenters suggested that airports be included in UCPs for concession purposes as well as for FAA-assisted contracting, because there are not any significant differences between the certification standards for concessionaires and contractors (the only exception is size standards, which are easy to apply). We agree, and the final rule does not make an exception for concessions (regardless of the CFR part in which the concessions provisions appear). Some commenters wanted either a longer or shorter implementation period than the SNPRM proposed, but we believe the proposal is a good middle ground between the goal of establishing UCPs as soon as possible and the time recipients will need to resolve organizational, operational, and funding issues.

There were a number of comments and questions about details of the UCP provision. One recipient wondered whether a UCP may or must be separate from a recipient and what the legal liability implications of various arrangements might be. As far as the rule is concerned, a UCP can either be situated within a recipient's organization or elsewhere. Recipients can take state law concerning liability into account in determining how best to structure a UCP in their state. Another recipient asked if existing UCPs could be exempted from submitting plans for approval. Rather than being exempted, we believe that it would be appropriate for such UCPs to submit their existing plans. They would have to change them only to the extent needed to conform to the requirements of the rule.

Some commenters asked about the relationship of UCPs to recipients. For example, should a recipient be able to certify a firm that the UCP had not certified (or whose application the UCP had not yet acted on) or refuse to recognize the UCP certification of a firm the recipient did not think should be eligible? In both cases, the answer is no. Allowing this kind of discretion would fatally undermine the ``one-stop shopping'' rationale of UCPs. However, a recipient could, like any other party, initiate a third-party challenge to a UCP certification action, the result of which could be appealed to DOT.

We would emphasize that the form of the UCP is a matter for negotiation among DOT recipients in a state, and this regulation does not prescribe its organization. A number of models are available, including single state agencies, consortia of recipients that hire a contractor or share the workload among themselves, mandatory reciprocity among recipients, etc. It might be conceivable for a UCP to be a ``virtual entity'' that is not resident in any particular location. What matters is that the UCP meet the functional requirements of this rule and actually provide one-stop shopping service to applicants. The final rule adds a provision to clarify that UCPs--even when not part of a recipient's own organization--must comply with all provisions of this rule concerning certification and nondiscrimination. Recipients cannot use a UCP that does not do so. For example, if a UCP fails to comply with part 26 certification standards and procedures, or discriminates against certain applicants, the Secretary reserves the right to direct recipients not to use the UCP, effectively ``decertifying'' the UCP for purposes of DOT-assisted programs. In this case, which we hope will never happen, the Department would work with recipients in the state on interim measures and replacement of the erring UCP.

The SNPRM proposed ``pre-certification.'' That is, the UCP would have to certify a firm before the firm became eligible to participate as a DBE in a contract. The application could not be submitted as a last-minute request in connection with a procurement action, which could lead to hasty and inaccurate certification decisions. Commenters were divided on this issue, with most expressing doubts about the concept. The Department believes that avoiding last-minute (and especially post-bid opening) applications is important to an orderly and accurate certification process, so we are retaining this requirement. However, we are modifying the timing of the requirement, by requiring that certification take place before the bid/offer due date, rather than before the issuance of the solicitation. The certification action must be completed by this date in order for the firm's proposed work on the particular contract to be credited toward DBE goals. It is not enough for the application to have been submitted by the deadline.

The SNPRM proposed that, once UCPs were up and running, a UCP in State A would not have to process an application from a firm whose principal place of business was in State B unless State B had first certified the firm. Most commenters supported this proposal, one noting that it would help eliminate problems of having to make costly out-of- state site visits. It would also potentially reduce confusion caused by multiple, and potentially conflicting, outcomes in certification decisions. One commenter was concerned that this provision would lead to ``free-rider'' problems among recipients. The Department will be alert to this possibility, but we do not see it as precluding going forward with this provision. We have added a provision making explicit that when State B has certified a firm, it would have an obligation to send copies of the information and documents it had on the firm to State A when the firm applied there.

All save one of the comments on mandatory reciprocity opposed the concept. That is, commenters favored UCPs being able to choose whether or not to accept certification decisions made by other UCPs. The Department urges UCPs to band together in multi-state or regional alliances, but we believe that it is best to leave reciprocity discretionary. Mandatory reciprocity, even among UCPs, could lead to forum shopping problems.

UCPs will have a common directory, which will have to be maintained in electronic form (i.e., on the internet). One commenter suggested that this electronic directory be updated daily. We think this comment has merit, and the final rule will require recipients to keep a running update of the electronic directory, making changes as they occur.

A.Commenters generally supported this certification process section, and we are adopting it with only minor changes. Commenters suggested that provision for electronic filing of applications be discretionary rather than mandatory. We agree, and the final rule does not mandate development of electronic filing systems. Some commenters remained concerned about site visits and asked for more guidance on the subject. We intend to provide future guidance on this subject.

Most commenters who addressed the subject favored the development of a mandatory, nationwide, standard DOT application form for DBE eligibility. A number of commenters supplied the forms they use as examples. We believe that this is a good idea, which will help avoid confusion among applicants in a nationwide program. However, we have not yet developed a form for this purpose. The final rule reserves a requirement for recipients to use a uniform form. We intend to work on developing such a form during the next year, in consultation with recipients and applicants. Meanwhile, recipients can continue to use existing forms, modified as necessary to conform to the requirements of this part.

The SNPRM said recipients could charge a reasonable fee to applicants. A majority of commenters, both recipients and DBEs, opposed the idea of a fee or said it should be capped at a low figure. Fees are not mandatory, and they would be limited, under the final rule, to modest application fees (not intended to recover the cost of the certification process). However, if a recipient wants to charge a modest application fee, we do not see that it is inconsistent with the nature of the program to allow it to do so. Fee waivers would be required if necessary (i.e., a firm who showed they could not afford it). All fees would have to be approved by the concerned OA as part of the DBE program approval process, which would preclude excessive fees.

Given that reciprocity is discretionary among recipients, we thought it would be useful to spell out the options a recipient has when presented by an applicant with the information that another recipient has certified the firm. The recipient may accept the other recipient's certification without any additional procedures. The recipient can make an independent decision based, in whole or in part, on the information developed by the first recipient (e.g., application forms, supporting documents, reports of site visits). The recipient may make the applicant start an entire new application process. The choice among these options is up to the recipient. (As noted above, UCPs will have these same options.)

Most commenters on the subject supported the three-year term for certifications. Some wanted a shorter or longer period. We believe the three-year term is appropriate, particularly given the safeguards of annual and update affidavits that the rule provides. In response to a few comments that recipients should have longer than the proposed 21 days after a change in circumstances to submit an update affidavit, we have extended the period to 30 days. If recipients want to have a longer term in their DBE programs than the three years provided in the rule, they can do so, with the Department's approval, as part of their DBE programs.

A few recipients said that the 90-day period for making decisions on applications (with the possibility of a 60-day extension) was too short. Particularly since this clock does not begin ticking until a complete application, including necessary supporting documentation, is received from the applicant, we do not think this time frame is unreasonable. We would urge recipients and applicants to work together to resolve minor errors or data gaps during the assembly of the package, before this time period begins to run.

A.A modest number of commenters addressed this section, most of whom supported it as proposed. One commenter noted that it was appropriate to permit minor errors to be corrected in an application without invoking the 12-month reapplication waiting period. We agree, and we urge recipients to follow such a policy. Most commenters thought 12 months was a good length for a reapplication period. A few opposed the idea of a waiting period or thought a shorter period was appropriate. The rule keeps 12 months, but permits recipients to seek DOT approval, through the DBE program review process, for shorter periods.

A.As long ago as 1983, the Department (in the preamble to the first DBE rule) strongly urged recipients to use appropriate due process procedures for decertification actions. Recipient procedures are still inconsistent and, in some cases, inadequate, in this respect. Quite recently, for example, litigation forced one recipient to rescind a decertification of an apparently ineligible firm because it had failed to provide administrative due process. We believe that proper due process procedures are crucial to maintaining the integrity of this program. The majority of commenters agreed, though a number of commenters had concerns about particular provisions of the SNPRM proposal.

Some recipients, for example, thought separation of functions was an unnecessary requirement, or too burdensome, particularly for small recipients. We believe separation of functions is essential: there cannot be a fair proceeding if the same party acts as prosecutor and judge. We believe that the burdens are modest, particularly in the context of state DOTs and statewide UCPs. We acknowledge that for small recipients, like small airports and transit authorities, small staffs may create problems in establishing separation of functions (e.g., if there is only one person in the organization who is knowledgeable about the DBE program). For this reason, the rule will permit small recipients to comply with this requirement to the extent feasible until UCPs are in operation (at which time the UCPs would have to ensure separation of functions in all such cases). The organizational scheme for providing separation of functions will be part of each recipient's DBE program. In the case of a small recipient, if the DBE program showed that other alternatives (e.g., the airport using the transit authority's DBE officer as the decision-maker in decertification actions, and vice-versa) were unavailable, the Department could approve something less than ideal separation of functions for the short term before the UCP becomes operational. In reviewing certification appeals from such recipients, the Department would take into account the absence of separation of functions.

It is very important that the decision-maker be someone who is familiar with the DBE certification requirements of this part. The decisionmaker need not be an administrative law judge or some similar official; a knowledgeable program official is preferable to an ALJ who lacks familiarity with the program.

Another aspect of the due process requirements that commenters addressed was the requirement for a record of the hearing, which some commenters found to be burdensome. We want to emphasize that, while recipients have to keep a hearing record (including a verbatim record of the hearing), they do not need to produce a transcript unless there is an appeal. A hearing record is essential, because DOT appellate review is a review of the administrative record.

Some commenters suggested deleting two provisions. One of these allowed recipients to impose a sort of administrative temporary restraining order on firms pending a final decertification decision. The other allowed the effect of a decertification decision to be retroactive to the date of the complaint. The Department agrees that these two provisions could lead to unfairness, and so we have deleted them.

A.Several commenters addressed this section, supporting it with a few requests for modification. Some commenters wanted a time limit for DOT consideration of appeals. We have added a provision saying that if DOT takes longer than 180 days from the time we receive a complete package, we will write everyone concerned with an explanation of the delay and a new target date for completion. Some commenters thought a different time limit for appeals to the Department (e.g., 180 days) would be beneficial. We believe that 90 days is enough time for someone to decide whether a decision of a recipient or UCP should be appealed and write a letter to DOT. This time period starts to run from the date of the final recipient decision on the matter. DOT can accept late-filed appeals on the basis of a showing of good cause (e.g., factors beyond the control of the appellant). Some recipients thought that more time might be necessary to compile an administrative record, so we have permitted DOT to grant extensions for good cause. Generally, however, the Department will adhere to the 90-day time period in order to prevent delays in the appeals process. As a clarification, we have added a provision that all recipients involved must provide administrative record material to DOT when there is an appeal. For example, State A has relied on the information gathered by State B to certify Firm X. A competitor files an ineligibility complaint with State A, which decertifies the firm. Firm X appeals to the Department. Both State A and State B must provide their administrative record materials to DOT for purposes of the appeal. (The material would be provided to the Departmental Office of Civil Rights.)

A.There were few comments concerning this section. Some comments suggested DOT appeal decisions should have mandatory nationwide effect. That is if DOT upheld the decertification action of Recipient A, Recipients B, C, D, E, etc. should automatically decertify the firm. This approach is inconsistent with the administrative review of the record approach this rule takes for appeals to DOT.

A DOT decision that A's decertification was supported by substantial evidence is not a DOT decision that the firm is ineligible. It is only a finding that A had enough evidence to decertify the firm. Other results might also be supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, when the Department takes action on an appeal, other recipients would be well advised to review their own decisions to see if any new proceedings are appropriate. One comment suggested the Department should explain a refusal to accept a complaint. This is already the Department's practice.

The SNPRM included a proposal to permit direct third-party complaints to the Department. There were few comments on this proposal, which would have continued an existing DOT practice. Some of these comments suggested dropping this provision, saying it made more sense to have all certification matters handled at the recipient level in the first instance. Others raised procedural issues (e.g., the possibility of the Department holding de novo hearings). The Department has reconsidered this proposal, and we have decided to delete it. We believe it will avoid administrative confusion and simplify procedures for everyone if all certification actions begin at the recipient level, with DOT appellate review on the administrative record.