OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) -- EXAMINING TSA'S EFFORTS AND PROGRESS ON H.R. 1, "IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007"

TESTIMONY OF

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COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

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Good morning Chairman Inouye, Vice-Chairman Stevens, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I am pleased to speak with you this morning to discuss the state of transportation security and the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to begin implementation of the important bill that you just passed – the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, (9/11 Act).

First, I would like to thank this Committee for the continued support you have given TSA since its inception and to the Committee staff for its professionalism and the hard work and cooperative spirit they displayed in working with the Department of Homeland Security (Department) and TSA to finalize the provisions of the 9/11 Act.

TSA appreciates that the 9/11 Act includes many provisions which we sought as tools to provide better transportation security to the United States. In particular, we are pleased that based on this Committee's leadership, the 9/11 Act gives us the flexibility to craft a robust air cargo security system that will provide security and an unimpeded flow of commerce. We also appreciate that the 9/11 Act recognizes and supports the expansive training that we are providing to our Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce to move our security outward from the static checkpoint. We very much needed authority to establish an administrative process for civil enforcement of surface transportation regulations and orders and you gave us that authority. Additionally, you emphatically recognized the importance of our integrated Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams (VIPR), which provide a mobile surge of TSA resources in all modes of transportation.

It is also important to understand the challenge that the 9/11 Act places on TSA and our resources. Fully half of the many tasks required of the Department by the 9/11 Act fall

on TSA's shoulders. They affect all aspects of transportation security, including strategic planning, aviation security, rail security, security of public transit facilities, pipelines, over-the-road buses, and trucking security. TSA has a big task in continuing the implementation of the 9/11 Act and in working with the many stakeholders in the transportation sector to assure the level of security that Congress and the 9/11 Commission envisioned. TSA will now need to integrate the many mandates in the 9/11 Act into our current priorities and resources to enable key initiatives to progress without delay while not losing focus on our threat-based operations.

The current restriction on funding presents an immediate challenge for TSA's efforts to implement certain requirements of the 9/11 Act. As you know, we are operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR). The CR presents additional financial challenges to TSA as we are limited in our spending to a prescribed formula based on our fiscal year (FY)2007 appropriations, and we are prohibited from initiating new programs or projects that were not funded in fiscal year (FY)2007. Placed in the context of implementing the 9/11 Act, this situation creates particularly difficult challenges.

Additionally, many of the rule making requirements mandated in the 9/11 Act do not adequately recognize the obligations that TSA must give the many stakeholders affected by proposed regulations and the general public an opportunity to be heard throughout the development process. These requirements are time consuming but are time well spent to assure that our regulations achieve their objective in a way that is transparent to stakeholders and the public and does not adversely affect travel and commerce.

TSA is actively working to implement the 9/11 Act and we are assessing what resources are needed to continue the implementation. We are working with our partners in the Department and other Federal agencies toward those goals that require close cooperation to implement inter-Departmental and inter-agency requirements.

Ongoing Threat

Before I discuss in greater detail the current and future efforts of TSA to secure our nation's transportation systems and fulfill the requirements of the 9/11 Act, I believe it is important for me to explain the context in which TSA operates and the direction TSA is going to anticipate threats to transportation.

The effort to ensure the security of the transportation system remains as important now as it ever has been in the past six years. The National Intelligence Estimate on threats to the U.S. Homeland issued in July 2007 confirmed publicly that the terrorist threat is real. This threat is persistent and evolving. Terrorists maintain an undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and show a continued effort to adapt and improve their capabilities. They are innovative in overcoming security obstacles. They are training to use improvised explosive devices (IED). Terror groups continue to focus on prominent infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties. We know they are working to defeat us, and we must remain vigilant.

Keeping Ahead of Terrorists

TSA's security strategy is based on flexible, mobile, and unpredictable methods. To counter the evolving threat and adaptive capabilities of terrorists, we are staying ahead by rethinking the entire screening process and changing the legacy systems that originated in the 1970s. We are going on the offense to address current threats. We are being proactive in an effort to stay ahead of the threats. We, therefore, rely heavily upon intelligence.

Intelligence and information sharing are at the core of our overall transportation security strategy. Building on the efforts of our partners in the Intelligence Community (IC), we use intelligence and analysis to prioritize our security activities. We begin each day with briefings on the latest intelligence from the IC, and that information drives our decision making process both operationally and strategically. In addition, we share intelligence as appropriate with our front-line employees and stakeholders, enabling them to make informed security decisions.

Sharing intelligence information with our stakeholders in surface transportation is especially important as they are primarily responsible for providing the direct staff and resources to secure their respective transportation systems. Providing intelligence to these stakeholders enables us to partner with them through our security grant programs to apply resources in the most effective way possible.

We recognize that we cannot protect every person or all property against every possible threat to the system. Given the nature of the threats to aviation, we must manage risk consistent with what we understand of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We will prioritize our resources to protect against the high-threat, high-consequence events.

Aviation Security

The discussion of aviation security almost always starts at the familiar TSA security checkpoint. For the two million travelers a day who fly, that is TSA to them. However, TSA looks at the checkpoint as but a piece – an important piece – of a much larger picture. Therefore, before discussing checkpoint issues, I would like to point out that TSA looks at the entire transportation network in evaluating risk, including threat information. A large part of TSA's work involves working closely on a daily basis with the intelligence and law enforcement communities and our global partners to try to stay ahead of the current threat.

We have to be strong at the checkpoint, but also many other places – including the back, front, and sides of the airport. Risk-based security means that we take the whole picture into account and implement selective and unpredictable security measures. We must first deny the terrorist a stationary target where a planner can take the time to map an attack with high odds of success. Nothing can be uncovered, but likewise, we cannot fool ourselves into thinking that fixed, robust security is impenetrable. Our security needs to play offense, not just defense.

TSA is focusing beyond the physical checkpoint—to push our borders out, so to speak—to look more at people and to identify those with hostile intent or those conducting surveillance even if they are not carrying a prohibited item. By spreading our layers of security throughout the airport environment and elsewhere, we have multiple opportunities to detect terrorists and leverage the capabilities of our workforce, our partners, and our technology.

Travel Document Checking

We are placing specially trained TSOs at the front of the checkpoint to review travel documents to find fraudulent identification (IDs) and also to look at behavior. The 9/11 Commission recognized that travel documents are akin to weapons for terrorists. We will make it harder for dangerous people to use fraudulent documents and IDs by raising the standard of inspection and providing additional equipment for our TSOs to perform this function. We ask this Committee to fully support the President's budget for this program so that TSA can make a seamless transition from the airlines and continue the program with as little disruption as possible to the flow of passenger screening.

Behavior Observation

We continue to expand the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, which utilizes non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. Individuals exhibiting specific observable behaviors may be referred for additional screening at the checkpoint that may include handwanding, pat down, or physical inspection of their carry-on baggage. SPOT adds an element of unpredictability to the security screening process that is easy for passengers to navigate but difficult for terrorists to manipulate. It serves as an important additional layer of security in the airport environment, requires no additional specialized screening equipment, can easily be deployed to other modes of transportation, and presents yet one more challenge for terrorists attempting to defeat our security system. The SPOT program has already added great value to our overall security system. For example, a Behavior Detection Officer recently identified an individual at a ticket counter carrying a loaded gun and more than 30 rounds of ammunition.

Aviation Direct Access Screening Program

We continue to expand the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program --deploying TSOs and Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) to locations throughout airports to screen airport employees, their accessible property, and vehicles entering a direct access point to secured areas of airports. The random screening at unexpected locations is a valuable measure to increase the protection on the "back side" of airports.

This random and unpredictable screening allows airport workers to perform their duties with minimal interruptions and keeps the aviation industry operating. TSA's approach is both practical and effective. Requiring 100% screening of all airport workers, even in a pilot program, is contrary to this philosophy; it unnecessarily diverts resources from higher risk operations without providing the improvements in security that we need. We would like to continue to work with the Committee to craft a pilot program that will test

varying methods of improving an airport worker screening program that will offer better security.

This strategy of active, nimble, flexible security depends on the quality of the people involved. TSA has had a major focus on improving security by improving the capabilities of its people. Better recruiting and hiring, better training, better incentive systems, career progression opportunity, more involvement in decisions effecting the workforce, and more recognition of the critical role played by our people – these efforts all have a positive effect on the security result TSA delivers. The success of all these programs in increasing the layers of security would not be possible without the incredible effort, professionalism, and dedication shown by TSA's workforce. Our highly trained and highly motivated workforce—TSOs, TSIs, Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), and other professionals--have proven to be a nimble, adaptable workforce that can quickly adjust to counter an emerging terrorist threat. In August of 2006, TSOs employed new standard operating procedures within hours to deal with the threat identified as part of the United Kingdom (UK) plot to blow up commercial aircraft with liquid explosives. TSA has rapidly deployed FAMs to international destinations to support its mission coverage based on new threats. We are constantly reviewing and adjusting our procedures and strategies to ensure our personnel are ahead of the next threat. TSA's workforce has met every challenge in the past five years and I am confident they will continue to do so.

Workforce Safety

Maintaining a healthy, able-bodied workforce is also critical to TSA's mission. We improved workplace safety through a series of aggressive initiatives, including nurse case managers, Optimization and Safety Teams, automated injury claims filing process, involvement of the National Advisory Council in planning and implementing the Safety Week Campaign and other aspects of the Safety Program, deployment of contract safety specialists to support TSA field operations, and speedy investigations to correct safety problems. Through these programs, TSA has reduced the rate for employees losing time from duty due to injury by almost half from 11.56 per 100 employees in FY2005 to 6.75 for the 3rd Quarter of FY2007.

New Technology

We are also adding significant new technology. A lesson from 9/11 is that we must be proactive—we must anticipate threats that continue to grow in sophistication and complexity. This effort includes leveraging the skills of our TSOs with new technology. This next generation of technology will assist our TSOs in separating friend from foe, increasing efficiency, and helping minimize the impact to travelers and businesses:

- Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray. We will begin deploying AT X-ray equipment for carry-on baggage. It provides TSOs with a better capability to identify and detect threats through improved imagery and analysis tools.

- Checkpoint Automated Carry-On Explosives Detection Systems (Auto-EDS). We are exploring Auto-EDS for inspecting carry-on items. Auto-EDS may provide additional detection and automation opportunities.
- Whole Body Imagers. We are pilot testing whole body imagers, such as the backscatter and millimeter wave technologies, to quickly and safely screen passengers for prohibited items without the need for physical contact on a voluntary basis.
- Cast & Prosthesis Scanner. We are testing new cast and prosthesis scanners to provide a safe, dignified, and non-invasive way to identify potential threats and clear passengers wearing casts, braces, and prosthetic devices.
- Bottled Liquids Scanners. We have begun deploying liquids scanning devices at checkpoints, and are now using a hand-held liquids scanner for non-checkpoint screening locations.
- New Explosives Detection Systems. We are evaluating several new products that will greatly increase the speed of handling and screening checked baggage, particularly when integrated into an airport's baggage handling system, while reducing the size of the footprint of the baggage screening location.

Improving Security By Improving the Security Experience

Despite the critical need for enhanced security measures, such as the requirement to remove all shoes and the restrictions on liquids, gels, and aerosols, we know we need to improve the checkpoint screening process so it is less stressful for the traveling public.

Working with our stakeholders, we are pursuing programs and processes that improve the security screening process. We are moving from the legacy approach of simply looking for weapons to a more fluid process focused on the goals of: 1) improving detection of explosives; and 2) developing the capability to evaluate travel documents as well as detect hostile intent or possible surveillance.

Looking Ahead in Aviation Security

Screening of Air Cargo

As you know, the 9/11 Act requires the establishment of a system for industry to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft within 3 years. As we proceed towards enabling industry to meet the cargo screening requirements, TSA will stress effective security management of the air cargo supply chain. This process will require substantial collaboration with stakeholders, specifically, U.S.-based shippers, freight forwarders, and passenger air carriers. This Committee was a leader in including key language in the bill that authorizes TSA to develop and implement a program that will enable shippers to screen cargo early in the supply chain using currently approved screening methods and meeting additional stringent facility and personnel security standards. This is a critical element in enabling the improved security for air cargo on passenger aircraft that Congress requires. I am grateful to the Committee for its recognition that better screening occurs when shipments are screened and secured at various points along the supply chain. Waiting until the freight is dropped at the airport,

often in large pallets, to begin screening would result in less effective screening as well as defeat the whole purpose of the air cargo system that strives to provide expeditious delivery of goods from origin to destination. We are working closely with all stakeholders within the air cargo supply chain and our initial feedback has been very positive. The stakeholders clearly recognize the need to achieve our country's heightened security requirements while continuing the free flow of commerce upon which our economy relies. TSA will build upon our established programs: air cargo security regulations; Security Directives; the Known Shipper Management System; and increased use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams and Transportation Security Inspectors for Cargo.

In addition, the $80 million dollars appropriated to TSA this year for air cargo security as part of the FY2007 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-28) will contribute to our increased efforts through the hiring of at least 150 additional cargo inspectors and expansion of the National Explosives Detection Canine Program by no fewer than 170 teams.

Secure Flight

TSA has taken a significant step toward implementing the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the requirement of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to enhance the vetting of aviation passengers against terrorist watch lists. On August 23, 2007, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing implementation of the Secure Flight program. Secure Flight, if implemented as proposed, will bring the process of comparing passenger names against the watch list, now performed by aircraft operators, into the government, and will align domestic and international passenger pre-screening. By establishing a more consistent and effective watch list matching process, TSA will strengthen a key layer of security and enhance its ability to stop terrorists before they get to the passenger screening checkpoint. The program is designed to better focus enhanced passenger screening efforts on individuals likely to pose a threat to civil aviation, and to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the vast majority of the traveling public by distinguishing them from individuals on the watch list.

We have taken the time to build the Secure Flight program right, and we believe that the NPRM and associated Privacy Act System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment demonstrate that TSA has built a program with the operational requirements necessary to enhance aviation security while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of the traveling public. The Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) is available for passengers who feel they have been improperly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft.

Over the next few months, TSA intends to begin a testing period using data from aircraft operators that volunteer to participate. During testing, air carriers will continue conducting watch list checks for domestic flights, and TSA will compare the results of its watch list matching with air carrier results to ensure the validity of the Secure Flight system.

It is therefore extremely critical that Congress provide the necessary funding for Secure Flight requested by the President in the FY 2008 budget. Without the necessary funding, the program will have to scale back benchmark testing with airlines, Secure Flight system to airline system testing, parallel operations with airlines, and the stand up of the Secure Flight Service Center or Secure Flight Operations Center. In short, the program would have a system with no ability to connect, communicate, or test with airlines for the purposes of implementation. Important contract awards would be postponed. From a schedule perspective, rollout of the Secure Flight program would be severely delayed. An immediate concern is the significant budget constraint imposed on the Secure Flight program due to the enactment of the current CR. The restrictions on funding under the CR will inhibit TSA's ability to implement this critical program to improve aviation security and fulfill a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. Now that we have demonstrated major progress on the Secure Flight program through the issuance of the NPRM and associated privacy documents, we need your support to fund this vital program.

General Aviation

TSA is working closely with the general aviation (GA) community to develop reasonable, feasible, and effective security for GA operations while ensuring that these measures support continued operations and increased growth of the industry.

TSA is also working with aircraft operators and Fixed Base Operators directly to develop voluntary programs of verifying the identification of passengers on board aircraft and maintaining facility security in and around GA aircraft.

TSA is working closely with our interagency partners to improve GA security. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently issued a NPRM that will require GA operators to submit comprehensive manifest data about passengers, crew, and flight information electronically to CBP, as part of its Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (e-APIS), at least 60 minutes before the aircraft departs for the United States.

Currently, we only receive very basic information from GA aircraft coming into the United States, such as who is and is not a U.S. citizen. That is not enough. Having this information an hour before departure will give CBP inspectors more time to fully pre-screen travelers and crews and take necessary actions to resolve threats.

Surface Transportation Security

As the security framework for transportation continues to grow, TSA is moving to apply many of the same tools to protect all modes of transportation. TSA is building information sharing networks in surface transportation. We work closely with stakeholders in these industries, putting an emphasis on sharing intelligence, capacity, and technology with that of other law enforcement, intelligence or other agencies at every level of government.

When I appeared before this Committee in January, I explained TSA's comprehensive strategy that we are applying across all transportation networks, regardless of mode. Today, I want to focus on the last two elements of our strategy: closing gaps; and developing enhanced security systems.

Program Improvements

Freight Rail. Secretary Chertoff established the priority goal of achieving a 50% drop in the objectively measured risk posed by rail cars carrying toxic inhalation hazards (TIH) by the end of 2008. To achieve this goal, TSA is implementing a multi-layered security strategy which includes regulatory development, cooperative agreements, and comprehensive risk-based programs.

On December 21, 2006, TSA published a proposed rule (NPRM) to strengthen the security of the Nation's freight rail systems in high threat urban areas (HTUA). The NPRM addressed shippers, carriers, and receivers of TIHs and other security-sensitive materials by rail. Proposed requirements include railcar location reporting within a specific time period and the establishment of a secure chain of custody in and through HTUAs. TSA also proposed requirements for designating rail security coordinators and suspicious incident reporting by rail mass transit, passenger rail, and all freight rail carriers. We intend to publish this final rule by the end of the year.

Prior to publishing the NPRM, TSA separately reached an agreement with the rail carrier industry to reduce the standstill time of unattended TIH cars in HTUAs beginning in early 2007. To support this effort, TSA is developing a comprehensive database to identify highest priority risk reduction opportunities. Additionally, working in conjunction with TSA, the nation's rail carriers are developing site-specific security plans focused on reducing the risk of TIH cars in HTUAs.

In addition to reducing the risks to TIH in freight rail transportation, TSA is working with rail carriers to raise the baseline in security training. TSA is developing a training video that addresses inspection of TIH rail cars, emphasizing the recognition of IEDs, as well as general security awareness for rail employees. The video will be available by the end of the year.

Passenger Transit Programs and Grants. TSA, in partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Federal Transit Administration, leverages the Transit Security Grant Program funds to focus on reducing risk and increasing security capabilities in State and local transit systems with the most risk. We are continuing research to expand our understanding of the vulnerabilities and the consequences of terrorist attacks on our critical infrastructure, applying the results as they are developed in immediate and phased mitigation strategies. We have partnered with the National Laboratories and affected passenger transit systems to complete assessments of the nation's 29 underwater transit tunnels and produce priorities for risk mitigation. From

the information gained, TSA developed action items intended to elevate security, harden targets, and mitigate risk using available resources and investment of grant funds.

A recent change to the Transit Security Grant Program supports the ability of high-risk systems to field dedicated anti-terrorism teams through cooperative funding of operational packages. This initiative provides funding for the training and operations of teams specifically deployed to engage in visible and covert activities to detect, disrupt, and deter terrorist activities.

TSA trains and certifies explosives detection canine teams to provide a mobile and flexible deterrence and detection capability to passenger transit systems. Since late 2005, TSA's National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program has partnered with passenger transit systems to deploy some 60 explosives detection canine teams to 14 major transit systems using a risk-based application of resources. More than 50 of these teams are currently in place, with the remaining force projected for training, certification, and deployment in the coming months.

The Department has awarded roughly $18 billion to State and local governments for programs and equipment that help to manage risk. In passenger transit, the Transit Security Grant Program, which funded $275 million in FY 2007, is the centerpiece of the Department's interagency strategy to close gaps in operator security status and baseline standards. The Department allocates those grants to enhance capabilities in areas of weakness identified in the system security assessments under the BASE program, with particular emphasis on elevating security posture in six fundamental areas underpinning the broader transit security strategy. These priority areas are protection of underwater and underground infrastructure; protection of other high consequence systems and assets; expanded random, unpredictable security activities for deterrent and disruptive effect against terrorist planning and reconnaissance; security training of frontline employees; drills and exercises; and public outreach and awareness. Cooperative efforts through the Regional Transit Security Working Groups in higher risk areas secure agreement on risk-based priorities and security enhancement solutions advanced by targeted application of grant funds. Amtrak participates in these regional meetings. Additionally, TSA engages directly with Amtrak to reach agreement on risk-based priorities and the most effective use of grant funds for risk mitigation and security enhancement.

An area security assessment indicated a need for a more focused effort on security training for transit agency employees. Although an extensive Federal security training program has been implemented since 9/11 – including 17 security courses, more than 500 course presentations, and more than 78,000 transit employees trained – the assessment results indicate wide variations in the quality of transit agencies' security training programs and an inadequate level of refresher or follow-on training. Well-trained employees are a security force multiplier for security efforts implemented by transit agencies. To close the gap identified in the assessments, TSA produced a Mass Transit Security Training Program that assists agencies in developing and implementing more consistent training programs. The program aligns substantive training areas with specific types of employees, which in turn guides the development and execution of training

programs. To support actual delivery of training courses, the Transit Security Grant Program offers a streamlined application process to fund the instruction and overtime costs incurred by substitutions for employees in training. This initiative significantly expands the volume and quality of training for transit employees during 2007. TSA anticipates maintaining this commitment in future years, as resources allow.

The collective effort in passenger transit security aims to build security force multipliers in the rail and bus systems – the capabilities of law enforcement and frontline employees and the awareness of the traveling public – and to maximize regional collaboration for the employment of the full range of available resources in random, unpredictable applications for a deterrent effect.

Highway. TSA is working on a number of strategies to close gaps in performance. We are currently considering a number of voluntary incentive programs and regulatory options. Prior to the enactment of the 9/11 Act, TSA was developing many programs and initiatives in collaboration with industry within the context of implementing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan (TSSP), Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Annex.

These programs and initiatives include the following:

Training: The School Transportation Security Awareness Program, Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment Program, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) training course for commercial motor vehicle (CMV) enforcement officers and security specialists, and Operation Secure Transport Training Program for the over-the-road bus industry were developed.

Standards/Guidelines: Security Standards are currently being developed in collaboration with industry for the HAZMAT Motor Carrier industry, the School Transportation Industry, the over-the-road bus industry, and the Highway Infrastructure sector.

Information Sharing: The Highway and Motor Carrier sector Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) have been developed and are actively meeting on a regular basis. In addition, the Homeland Security Information Network Highway portal, TSA Highway & Motor Carrier (HMC) Webpage, internal TSA Highway and Motor monthly newsletter for field personnel, and inclusion of security notes in industry trade periodicals have been developed. The Highway and Motor Carrier Industry Information and Analysis Center and Highway Watch programs are active and continually processing reports from highway operators and sharing information between industry and TSA.

Domain Awareness: Corporate Security Reviews (CSRs) are conducted with organizations engaged in transportation by motor vehicle, as well as those that

maintain or operate key physical assets within the highway transportation community, with a current focus on the transportation of HAZMAT transported by motor carriers. TSA is developing a pilot project for testing the feasibility of tracking trucks carrying HAZMAT. This practice will allow not only the continual tracking of truck locations, but also hazardous load types in all 50 states. The pilot includes the development of a set of protocols capable of interfacing with existing truck tracking systems, State and local government intelligence operations centers, and federal law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders. The Integrated Intermodal Information System-Domestic Feasibility Study focused on the transportation of Extremely Hazardous Materials throughout the domestic transportation system.

Plans and Exercises: The Highway and Motor Carrier GCC collaborated with the HMC SCC to create the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Modal Annex to the Transportation System Sector-Specific Plan. This document describes how the goals and objectives of the transportation sector will be achieved to protect the highway transportation system.

Risk Management and Grants: The Highway Watch Program® is a TSA grant initiative that is administered by the American Trucking Associations with an enrollment of nearly 500,000 driving professionals to observe, assess, and report incidents to the appropriate authorities that are potential terrorist activities, accidents, disabled vehicles, hazardous road conditions, or other highway incidents. In January 2006, TSA initiated a CSR pilot program with the State of Missouri Department of Transportation Motor Carriers Services Division (MoDOT). 44 MoDOT officers were trained to conduct over 2,700 CSRs during their safety audits on trucking companies and their equipment within Missouri. The HAZMAT Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment Training program focuses on transportation security regulations and specific terrorist and criminal threats to the HAZMAT motor carrier industry. It conducts security assessments, produces security action items, and reports procedures for security related incidents. The HMC office is supporting the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program in assessing which over-the-road motorcoaches qualify for grants and how the grant funding can be used to enhance motorcoach security. Additionally, in partnership with the motorcoach industry, we developed training entitled “Operation Secure Transport”, which is specifically geared toward passenger motor carrier operators.

Pipeline. TSA initiated a number of programs to assist pipeline companies in their efforts to secure these vital systems. For example, through the CSR Program, we compiled the best security practices observed throughout the industry and established that pipeline companies adopt a minimum of 70% of TSA pipeline security guidelines.

TSA partnered with our counterparts in Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) to hold an International Pipeline Security Forum. This event provided an opportunity for pipeline companies, industry associations, and government representatives to exchange security information and best practices. We continue to work with NRCan on cross border

pipeline assessments in accordance with the Security and Prosperity Partnership agreement.

Identifying a shortfall in security awareness training through the CSR results, TSA developed a compact disc-based training program. Over 300 U.S. pipeline companies, representing approximately 61,000 industry employees, have requested the CD and accompanying brochure.

Enhanced Systems of Security

The final part of our strategy is to enhance the systems of security. As we take actions to close gaps, we also need to improve security technology and practices that apply to multiple modes of transportation.

Over this past summer we began to more broadly deploy VIPR teams in aviation and surface transportation facilities. Comprised of TSOs, TSIs, and FAMs, VIPR teams collaborate with local law enforcement agencies to intensify the visible presence of security personnel at various points throughout the transportation system. More than 100 VIPR deployments have been conducted at key commuter and regional passenger rail facilities, Amtrak stations, ferries, and airports. VIPR teams have proven that TSA and our stakeholders can greatly improve security by altering and enhancing security measures at transportation facilities.

The Department is developing a number of screening techniques and technologies which may be implemented or deployed quickly to systems facing a specific threat, or in support of major events such as National Special Security Events. Pilot programs to test these technologies are already underway in several major American cities.

Mitigation of risk to underwater and underground infrastructure is a top priority of the joint Department Science and Technology Directorate and TSA research and development effort. Collaborative efforts with particular systems as operational test beds advance development of anomaly detection and explosives trace detection; smart video surveillance; and integrated prevention and response actions by security and law enforcement personnel. As one example, through the Rail Security Pilot, the Department field tested the effectiveness of explosives detection techniques and imaging technologies in partnership with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Finally, we maintain mobile security equipment, which can fit into two standard size shipping containers, for rapid deployment for use in screening and detection at any major system in the country, should the need arise.

In addition to technologies that may apply primarily to passenger modes, TSA is working closely with a number of parties to develop advanced railcar tracking systems with geofenced event-notification capabilities. TSA is also cooperating in efforts to develop next generation hazardous materials rail cars designed to better withstand terrorist attacks and operating accidents.

TSA is working with selected hazardous material carriers to test truck tracking and control technologies. We are also in the early stages of security technology applications to the pipeline industry. Two specific areas TSA is involved in are blast mitigation and unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles.

In addition to our progress toward implementing the requirements of the 9/11 Act, I am pleased to report to this Committee the success of another milestone for TSA and the Department. Today, port workers, longshoremen, truckers, and others at the port of Wilmington, Delaware became the first workers in the nation to begin enrollment in the DHS Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. This program will ensure that any individual with unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities and vessels received a thorough background check and is not a security threat. TWIC will be one of the world's most advanced, interoperable biometric credentialing programs and is powered by state-of-the-art technologies. I would like to thank our partners, the U.S. Coast Guard, and maritime stakeholders for their valuable input, for making the launching of the TWIC program a reality.

Conclusion

Although the threats and challenges to the security of transportation systems are numerous, so are the solutions and efforts of TSA to continue to successfully carry out our mission. We will continue to use our personnel, information, and technology in innovative ways to stay ahead of the evolving threats and facilitate passenger travel and the flow of commerce.

Chairman Inouye, Vice-Chairman Stevens, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to respond to the Committee's questions.