Op-Eds

The End of an Era in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

by Shlomo Brom

This unpublsihed op-ed was written in February 2006.

The departure of Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, from the political scene and the dramatic victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections raise vital questions about the future of Middle East peace. Will Sharon's legacy—in the form of a new political party credible on the issue of security but dedicated to peaceful co-existence with Palestinians—survive him? Will Hamas' rise to power derail the peace process and neutralize the positive effects of Sharon's final quest? My answer to the first question is certainly yes; to the second I must say, not necessarily.

In his final tenure as prime minister, Sharon left an indelible imprint on Israeli life and on the region. By implementing the unilateral Disengagement Plan he became the first Israeli leader who dared to dismantle settlements in the historic area of the Holy Land, a remarkable turn for a man who had been a driving force for the settlements. In doing so, he also alienated his closest political allies. But the disengagement was astute: in one act he re-aligned himself with the majority of the Israeli public, which yearns for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is willing to give up most of the territories occupied in 1967, but is simultaneously frustrated by the disarray in the Palestinian leadership and does not believe that they are a viable partner for a negotiated settlement.

That Sharon so faithfully represented the main currents of Israeli public opinion in his last years is the key to whether or not his legacy of accepting the establishment of a Palestinian state on the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank will outlive him. Sharon already caused a major shift to the left of the Israeli political spectrum. No Israeli politician can ignore these currents, and, thanks to Sharon's example, no politician need fear that accepting them will irretrievably damage his reputation. Thus, regardless of who wins the March elections, Sharon's basic policies are likely to endure, as will his new party.

Hamas' victory could cause a crisis in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the short term, and will probably make a negotiated settlement even harder then before. However, it may also be a stage in the co-optation of the Islamic movement into the Palestinian political process, leading to greater pragmatism on its behalf and eventually the creation of a credible Palestinian leadership capable of both making decisions and implementing them.

Recent developments on the Israeli and Palestinian sides have clarified the issues and distilled the alternatives the two future governments face. The Palestinians can no longer use the excuse that they are not capable of fulfilling their security commitments because they cannot control the opposition forces. They will have to choose between peace and war. The Israeli government will face the same choice: either continuing Sharon's way or choosing endless war with the Palestinians.

If the two parties do choose peace it may be most convenient for both of them to continue down the unilateral track. Israel does not need to trust the Palestinian partner to take unilateral steps, and Hamas could defer the tough clash between ideology and reality by focusing on governance and building of the Palestinian state, creating a de facto peaceful relationship with Israel.

The U.S. and the international community will play a significant role in putting these alternatives very clearly before the two parties. It is especially important in the case of Hamas that they not suffer initially from the illusion that the international community will be forced to accept them as a legitimate partner regardless of their policies. The international community must not obfuscate.

The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.