Incident at St. Louis International Airport

At approximately 6:50 p.m. on March 29, 2009, a metal box alarmed the X-ray machine at Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, triggering the need for additional screening. Because the box contained a number of items including a large amount of cash, all of which needed to be removed to be properly screened, it was deemed more appropriate to continue the screening process in a private area. A Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee and members of the St. Louis Airport Police Department can be heard on the audio recording. The tone and language used by the TSA employee was inappropriate. TSA holds its employees to the highest professional standards. TSA will continue to investigate this matter and take appropriate action.

Movements of large amounts of cash through the checkpoint may be investigated by law enforcement authorities if criminal activity is suspected. As a general rule, passengers are required to cooperate with the screening process. Cooperation may involve answering questions about their property, including why they are carrying a large sum of cash. A passenger who refuses to answer questions may be referred to appropriate authorities for further inquiry.


Bob

EoS Blog Team

Click here to view Comments 201 & above.

Pilot Program Tests Millimeter Wave for Primary Passenger Screening

This week, TSA began testing MMW technology in the place of a metal detector at Tulsa International Airport to assess passenger throughput and acceptance.

Currently, 18 airports have millimeter wave equipment installed at checkpoints in a “secondary” screening configuration, which means that metal detectors are still the primary method of screening passengers. At these airports, randomly selected passengers and those requiring secondary screening can be screened by millimeter wave technology as a non-invasive alternative to a pat-down from an officer.

In Tulsa, instead of walking through the metal detector, passengers will go directly through the millimeter wave machine. A passenger can opt not to go through the unit, but will go through the metal detector and get a pat-down instead. Signage at the checkpoint informs travelers about the technology and lets them know that using it is voluntary. We’ve included one of the signs below.


So far the pilot seems to be going well, as noted in an article in USA Today. In the first three days of primary MMW at Tulsa, 3,780 passengers have been screened using the technology and only 8 people have opted for the metal detector and a pat-down.

In addition to the security benefit of whole body imaging – it can detect metallic and non-metallic threat items – the technology also reduces the need to pat-down passengers with hip replacements, prosthetics and other surgical implants. At airports without Whole Body Image machines, when passengers alarm the metal detector, the alarm must be resolved through a hand-held metal detector and a pat down. This often takes two to four minutes as opposed to about 15 seconds with millimeter wave.

For every person who is hesitant to go through the millimeter wave portal for whatever reason, there are 100 people with metallic surgical implants that are rejoicing. Here is a quote from Thomas Frank’s USA Today Article:

“For passengers with metallic hips or knees, the scanners were a relief from metal detectors, which invariably sound alarms that lead to pat-downs. ‘I walked through, raised my arms and was done,’ said a beaming Larry Brenden, 43, of Albuquerque. ‘I was like, what, no pat-down?"

And yes, whenever we talk about whole body imaging we get lots of comments and questions about privacy. We suggest checking out 60 Minutes correspondent Leslie Stahl’s commentary on millimeter wave or this article by the producer of Ms. Stahl’s segment. For anyone just hearing about millimeter wave and wanting to know more, please read Blogger Bob’s two previous MMW posts: [link 1] [link 2]. The short version: the technology is completely safe, WBI images are never transmitted, printed or stored, the officer at the machine cannot see the image and the officer viewing the image cannot see the passenger.

In the next two months, the pilot program will expand to San Francisco, Las Vegas, Miami, Albuquerque, and Salt Lake City.

If you have the chance to go through a millimeter wave machine – in primary or secondary – please share your thoughts here on the blog.

- Poster Paul

EoS Blog Team

**Update:

TSA’s partnership with European civil aviation authorities has also had a significant impact on TSA’s decision to begin the Primary MMW pilot. A Primary MMW trial at Schiphol airport in the Netherlands has been underway since late 2006. Prior to TSA’s pilot program, TSA technology experts met with Dutch civil aviation authorities and technology experts to discuss the process and recent results.

***Addendum:

Including the above, three signs will be on display at the security checkpoint for airports participating in the Primary MMW pilot. See the other two below. All three are currently on display at Tulsa.

Family/Special Needs Lanes Coming to All Airports in Time for Thanksgiving Travel

The Diamond Self Select Program [link] started back in February 2008 at Salt Lake City International Airport and is now operating in 48 airports. The program allows passengers to proceed through the security checkpoint at their own pace by selecting one of three lanes: Black Diamond (for Expert Travelers), Blue Square (for Casual Travelers), and Green Circle (for Families, those with special needs, and those unfamiliar with TSA procedures.)

Today, TSA announced that the Family/Special Needs Lane (Green Circle) will be implemented at every security checkpoint across the nation by November 20, 2008—just in time for the busy Thanksgiving travel season.

While many frequent travelers appreciate the Black Diamond Lane, we’ve also seen a great deal of success with the Family Lanes. Families and those with special needs appreciate the extra time and assistance, and our officers have seen the number of prohibited items in these lanes drop significantly because passengers have more time to divest.

From a risk management standpoint, directing all medically necessary liquids that exceed the 3-1-1 limits to a dedicated lane makes sense. This move is the first step in the path forward on liquids that Kip Hawley wrote about last month [link].

What do passengers need to know about this development? If you’re flying after November 20th and carrying medically necessary liquids in containers larger than 3 ounces, you should use the Family Lane. Medically necessary liquids include: baby formula, breast milk, insulin, cough syrup, contact lens solution, and prescription medications. These liquids must be presented to a TSA Officer for additional screening, which should usually take less than 2 minutes.

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If you don’t have any exempt liquids, proceed with your baggie to any other security lane. Remember, you can pack any amount of liquid in your checked luggage.

Answers to Your Top 10 Questions

Here are the top ten questions we received from our recent request. We tallied the number of times we received each question or a similar version of it and noted the total for each question below. Thanks to the Office of Chief Counsel, Privacy Office and Kip for helping us provide you with the answers.

10) What immediate measures can a person take when encountering a less than friendly TSA agent? 12 of our readers asked this question.

First, you can request a lead or supervisor. If you're not satisfied after speaking with a lead or supervisor, you can request a manager. If you're in a hurry and don't have time to talk, or if you are not comfortable making your complaint in person, you can visit our new Got Feedback? web page. "Got Feedback?" is a new program that allows passengers to contact us via e-mail with very specific questions, comments, complaints, etc. Rather than your e-mail being sent to a single mail box where it sits in the queue waiting for a response, it is actually sent directly to the TSA Customer Support Manager at the airport your feedback concerns. Upon request, the Customer Service manager will contact you. Click here to read more about the "Got Feedback?" program.

Our officers have a tough job, and they are there to protect you and your family. Everyone at TSA appreciates the support of the traveling public, including those who express their support with their courteous behavior and words of support.

9) Do any members of the Blog team actively perform screening functions? 12 of our readers asked this question.

Not currently. When Bob joined the blog team, he was a Behavior Detection Officer based out of Cincinnati and a former Transportation Security Officer who performed screening duties. Bob eventually came to headquarters as a full-time blog team member. So, while Bob has 5 ½ years experience in various screening functions, he is no longer a TSO/BDO.

While not in a screening function, Jay is a Federal Security Director for an airport in the Midwest. He oversees screening operations at about 10 airports of varying sizes. Also, we had a TSO contribute as a guest blogger and write an article on Checkpoint Evolution.

There are currently many TSOs and other field employees actively involved commenting on the blog, and we appreciate their participation.

We will continue to invite members of the workforce to weigh in on the blog to keep it relevant to what is happening in airports. The blog will improve as we add new folks with various areas of expertise.

8) Why do you have access to my political affiliation? 13 of our readers asked this question.

"It's unequivocally not our policy to use political, religious, or other sensitive personal topics as identity validation. If it happened, it was wrong and will not be repeated." Administrator Kip Hawley

Perhaps you're asking this question because of a recent story about a person who said that their identity was verified at a checkpoint by asking their political affiliation. Early on, there was a case where the operations call center ran a passenger's information through their database (which includes commercial data) for a passenger without ID, and found no significant information to verify their identity. One thing that did come up was political donations for a person with the same name. Political donations are a matter of public record and accessible to anyone with basic Internet search skills. As a last ditch effort to help the passenger, a decision was made to ask them about their political affiliation. It was a mistake.

7) Why has TSA restarted the pointless gate screening? If the sterile area is in fact sterile, there's no need to screen those who have already been screened. 13 of our readers asked this question.

In reality, we do very little screening of bags at gates. We do, however, conduct a great deal of additional security in the sterile area. For instance, we have Behavior Detection Officers and K-9 teams on regular patrols as well as undercover Federal Air Marshals throughout the sterile area. Not to mention video coverage. We want to pick up on people who may be doing surveillance or attempting to prepare for a later attack. We are interested in activity around gates, but also restaurants, Duty Free shops, and other common areas.

As to gate screening itself, we have special purpose checks for specific items and behaviors. We may also have a particular interest in different flights. We layer in some random activities so as not to raise attention when we do have a specific interest. You may see our inspectors with new portable explosives detection devices that go onboard an aircraft ahead of boarding and check employees with access to the aircraft, including catering.

TSA’s overall strategy is to incorporate mobile, unpredictable, intelligence-driven security measures in ways that frustrate a terrorist planner seeking to engineer attacks against an easier, stationary target. We do not, as the question suggests, do gate screening of bags merely to re-do what we already did at the checkpoint.

Click here to watch a short video on gate screening.

6) I had a TSA agent tell me that each airport is free to implement security standards beyond those listed on the TSA site -- meaning that they could restrict items from being allowed in carry-on baggage that are explicitly allowed according to the TSA site. 14 of our readers asked this question.

There is a standard list of prohibited items that is available on our Web site to anybody with an internet connection, including terrorists. Clearly we have to pay attention to those items, since they are obvious tools of would-be attackers.

We cannot, however, fixate on those items and think that if we stop them, we're safe. Terrorists know TSA's standard operating procedures and work on how to engineer around them. Look no further than the August '06 London bomb plot with liquid sports drinks. If those terrorists had made it to the checkpoint, many of the items they were bringing would have been extremely hard to identify.

TSA is moving the focus of our officers from a checklist mentality to an empowered environment where officers use their experience and training -- and trust their instincts. The TSA workforce has screened more than 3 billion people, about half the population of the earth. We have a good handle on what "normal" looks like. Anything out of the "normal" range may get additional scrutiny, whether or not it is on the prohibited items list. That could mean a variety of things from a more thorough physical search to a seemingly casual conversation. It depends on what the anomaly might be. We know that with many layers of security the thinking, engaged and experienced TSO will be the one to stop an attack.

TSA is committed to using the judgment and experience of our officers to keep the security advantage. TSA is embarking on a two-day training for all officers that will tie together the latest intelligence analysis, more advanced explosives detection skills, and ways to engage with passengers in a way that promotes a calmer environment and better security result. It uses the physical checkpoint to our advantage to improve security.

5) Why doesn't TSA consider items being stolen from checked bags a security threat? Dangerous items could just as easily be ADDED to luggage. 15 of our readers asked this question.

We do! We consider every opportunity for someone to get a weapon or a bomb onto a plane and use a variety of methods to ensure there's something in place to mitigate that threat.

Specifically, there are video monitoring systems in places where individuals have access to checked bags, both airline baggage handling areas and TSA inspection stations.
Beyond that, we have a multi-layered approach to security, because if one layer gets breached, another layer or layers can step in to fill the gap. Let's focus on layers that directly affect your question.

TSA does background checks on and issues credentials to all employees who work in the secure area of the airport – which includes people handling baggage. TSA also conducts random employee screening every day in airports to ensure only people with proper and valid credentials get into the secure area.

TSA initiates internal investigations or ‘stings’ if we have a concern. When caught, arrests are made and serious federal charges are brought. Also, behavior detection officers are trained to spot suspicious behavior anywhere in the airport.

It's also important to note that employees who work in the airport often see the same people day in and day out, and know when something doesn't seem right. While they don't always work for TSA, they are another set of eyes and ears keeping watch for your safety.

4) Where is the Privacy Impact Assessment for the form that TSA provides to people who claim to be unable to present credentials at TSA airport checkpoints? 15 of our readers asked this question.

The Privacy Impact Assessment, or PIA, that covers the information collection and handling associated with identity verification is the Operations Center Information Management System PIA. Identity verification is one of several types of information associated with airport security efforts that fall within the coverage of this PIA.

For bonus points, we'll answer another question that some have asked: whether the form itself requires an OMB control number. Since the form entails no burden beyond identifying the individual and home address, it is exempt from Paperwork Reduction Act requirements pursuant to 5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1).

3) Given that it's trivially easy to forge a boarding pass, how does presentation of validated IDs do anything to ensure that people on selectee/no-fly lists don't enter the sterile area? 16 of our readers asked this question.

An excellent question. TSA's document checkers are looking at IDs and boarding passes. They are aware of the techniques that forgers use and are looking out for them. We are working with the airlines both in the U.S. and world-wide on this issue. There are encryption and other methods of validating a boarding pass. Some are sophisticated, some are very low-tech and simple. Some airlines are now using encrypted electronic boarding passes that appear on a passenger's cell phone or PDA. The International Air Transport Association, which secures international cooperation and uniformity in aviation regulations and standards, is moving all of its members to use this technology by the end of 2010.

Even so, it is important to remember that the different layers of security work together. We're not only checking IDs and boarding passes at the checkpoint, we have measures throughout the airport, at the gate, and on the aircraft, that identify someone who may be dangerous.

Lastly, one of the other Top Ten questions dealt with random gate screening, which is another way of closing the loophole. The random check can also be used to ensure additional security measures when our information suggests it is warranted.

2) In the context of ensuring air travel safety, what is the difference between two people, both of whom are willing to cooperate with TSA's invasive interrogations, one of whom politely declines to show ID, the other of whom claims he lost or misplaced his ID? 20 of our readers asked this question.

Bottom line is identity matters. We need to verify who is getting on the plane.
The best and quickest way for us to assure identity is with a photo ID issued by a federal or state government. We work with passengers who have something less than that, including no ID. Most passengers in that situation help us quickly resolve the matter by sharing whatever information they have, sometimes verified through our Ops Center in Virginia. Someone declining to show an ID that they have on them endures a lot of hassle for not much of a point since it is far more intrusive for us to resolve it through the Ops Center than showing a legitimate ID up front. It is only when someone refuses to identify themselves or attempts to use fake ID that we would deny entry to the sterile area based on ID.

Ever since airport security started decades ago, it was based on "things" – making sure a bad thing like a gun or a bomb didn't get on a plane. Problem is, terrorists kept finding new ways to disguise their tools to be almost identical to ordinary objects; most recently, bottles of sports drinks and batteries with explosives inside. They will continue to find more novel threats. That is why the additional layer of identity verification matters more now than ever. Watch lists are a valuable tool in keeping people with known ties to terror plotting off planes.

1) TSA cites 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 and 1540.105(a)(2) as the law giving them authority to demand identification as a condition of granting access to a sterile area of an airport. 49 C.F.R § 1540.5 appears to limit such passenger screenings to searches for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries as the only requirement for granting access to the sterile area. How does TSA reconcile this conflict? 27 of our readers asked this question.

There is no conflict to reconcile. It is true that 49 C.F.R Section 1540.5 describes screening functions and screening locations in terms of the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries. However, 49 C.F.R. Section 1540.105(a)(2) doesn't use the word 'screening' at all. Section 1540.105(a)(2) simply states that persons may not enter the sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to that area. TSA's identification requirement is one such system, measure or procedure that is used to determine who is permitted to access the sterile area.

By citing 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107 in our original post, we were trying to illustrate one of the ways (and indeed, the most visible way) in which TSA has used its statutory authority to establish security procedures at airports. But, it's important to note that TSA's responsibility for aviation security is not just limited to checkpoint screening. TSA has broad authority to develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with the changing threats to aviation security. See, for example, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(d) and (f) (addressing TSA functions, duties, and powers); id. § 114(h) (addressing notification procedures concerning persons who may pose risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to the airline or passenger safety). This authority is in addition to TSA's responsibility for the screening of passengers and property. See, for example, 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(e) (addressing screening operations), 44901(a) (addressing screening of passengers and property).

Thanks,

Bob

EoS Blog Team

Why is ID Important for Security?

Last week we announced on our Web site a plan to begin REQUIRING ID from travelers on June 21st. This plan includes enabling our officers to refuse entry into the area beyond the security checkpoint to anyone who does not cooperate with us to establish his or her identity. The exclusive reason to do this is to ensure people are who they say they are and are not gaming the system by using a boarding pass with a fake name; a well-known endeavor of professionals and college kids alike that could potentially circumvent the no-fly list.

Does that mean that if you lose your wallet in the cab on the way to the airport you’re going to have to walk home?

Absolutely not…this rule is solely focused on the passenger who simply will not provide ID or help us establish their identity.

So for the security experts in the crowd (and you know you’re out there) you might be asking yourself a few questions, like:

So if a terrorist shows up and says his dog ate his ID, you’ll just let him go?

The answer is a simple and clear NO. Under today’s rules, you show up, say you lost your ID, get a quick pat down, have your bag searched and you’re on your way. One enterprising fellow has even advocated it as a quicker way through security in the past.

Starting June 21, that person could be subjected to a range of options, including interviews with behavior detection officers and local and/or federal law enforcement, enhanced pat-downs or other options. By increasing our options, people with bad intentions don’t know what exactly to plan against, have to beat multiple layers at the checkpoint and need to be ready to face any number of obstacles to their plans.

Why would a terrorist show up and say he has no ID when he can just show a fake and breeze right through?

Ah hah, that’s where layers of security really come into play. TSA has deployed thousands of highly-trained document checkers to identify fake IDs. We’ve caught everything from Spring Breakers with terrible IDs to fraudulent passports. Our officers are very adept at finding fake documents and work closely with behavior detection officers on a daily basis. The old story of the airline contractor not even looking up at a person while checking IDs is long in the rear view mirror.

This is just an assault on my personal freedoms and security theater.

The only reason we’re doing this is to make sure people are who they say they are and not someone who is a known threat to aviation.

Also, our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities work tirelessly to identify potential threats to aircraft. Enhancing our ID requirements further enables TSA security officers to ensure that individuals are who they say they are when they enter the security checkpoint and not individuals who may pose a threat.

And for all the legal eagles out there, it is my constitutional right to fly without ID.

Under the law that created TSA, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, the TSA administrator is responsible for overseeing aviation security (P.L. 107-71) and has the authority to establish security procedures at airports (49 C.F.R. § 1540.107). Passengers who fail to comply with security procedures may be prohibited from entering the secure area of airports to catch their flight (49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2). Additionally, in Gilmore v. Gonzalez, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to a passenger identification policy.

This initiative is simply a way for us to better enforce the no-fly list and ensure the safety of the traveling public. No secret motives, no hidden agendas, just a security enhancement aimed at people trying to game the system.

For more information, go here.

Christopher

EOS Blog Team

Update: 6/14/08

Just a quick note… Our ticket checkers found a fraudulent ID at JFK. Just thought some of you might be interested.

At New York Kennedy Airport (JFK) on Thursday, June 12, a passenger was interviewed by police after attempting to enter into a security checkpoint with a fraudulent ID.

A TSA Travel Document Checker noticed a passenger trying to use a fraudulent New York driver’s license and notified the Port Authority Police Department who came and interviewed her. The Port Authority Police Department released the passenger after issuing a Summons to Appear.

Travel Document Checkers are TSA officers that are specially trained to detect fraudulent IDs and boarding passes to help keep our airports safe and secure.

Bob

EoS Blog Team

TSA and Piercings

Your questions and comments on the incident in Lubbock, Texas have not gone unnoticed. Yesterday, as soon as TSA became aware of the situation, people in our Security Operations office looked into it. They interviewed the four Security Officers who at one point or another, screened or spoke to the passenger - two men and two women (if a passenger requests private screening, they must get an officer of the same sex to screen them there). TSA has also been in touch with the passenger’s lawyer on several occasions.

The bottom line: the security officers followed the procedures for when someone alarms the metal detector and did nothing wrong. But, after looking at the procedure the officers followed, it was determined that the procedures should be modified. An official statement has been posted on our website here.

Lynn

TSA EoS Blog Team

Layers of Security

By this time, most of you are getting pretty familiar with what TSA does on a daily basis. If you’re a regular reader of this blog, you’ve likely heard us mention layers of security. It’s a term we use a lot but it’s a lot more than just a catch phrase, it really is what we do.

Throughout my time at TSA, many analogies, metaphors and comparisons have been used to describe the layers. Some stick, some fall by the wayside. One way of describing it is like the combination to a lock. One correct number won’t get you access, all have to be correct. Today, I thought I’d take you inside the “layered security approach” for a closer look at what we do.

Each time a passenger boards a flight they’re subject to up to 20 of these layers. I know what you’re thinking…we’ve got the checkpoint, metal detector, screening process, etc but what else?

Before you ever step foot on an airplane, TSA intelligence officials have worked with their counterparts throughout the federal government and its international partners to determine any threats to aviation security. Concurrently, TSA collaborates with CBP and the Joint Terrorism Task Force on threats and security issues. TSA also leans heavily on relationships with local law enforcement. Their work around the airport is vital to successful security.

In addition, passengers are checked against no-fly lists and crews vetted. All of this occurs before the passenger ever reaches the airport.

Once at the airport the other layers of security begin to take shape. Each airport with commercial flights is required to have a TSA-approved security program. This program covers everything from the type of fencing required around the perimeter of the airport to how many police officers are needed to make sure vehicles don’t park too close to the curb. In addition to this plan, VIPR teams consisting of federal air marshals, local law enforcement, canine teams and behavior detection officers may be patrolling the area. This can occur before or beyond the checkpoint, anywhere at an airport.

Passengers entering the security checkpoint are subject to noninvasive screening by TSA’s behavior detection officers. BDOs are trained to detect involuntary physical and physiological reactions exhibited by those looking to avoid being discovered.

The passenger also hands their boarding pass and ID to a TSA travel document checker. This layer of security is relatively new, beginning in June 2007. Checking the validity of documents and the person holding them provides a significant security upgrade. Individuals with phony or suspicious documents are referred to local law enforcement for additional scrutiny.

TSA canine teams also patrol the airports perimeter and interior. These teams, composed of a local law enforcement officer and TSA provided canine, are one of the quickest, most efficient means of detecting possible explosive substances. TSA has trained and certified more than 500 teams in partnership with state and local law enforcement agencies. They’re working in 70 airports and 14 mass transit systems. TSA will certify more than 400 additional canine teams over the next two years, including teams led by TSA canine handlers that will focus on air cargo.

As previously mentioned, the checkpoint is one of 20 layers of security. Great work is done by TSOs there at over 450 airports nationwide, That said, not a whole lot of ink will be spilled here about it, we’ve done a lot of that already.

TSA also screens every piece of luggage that you’ve checked. Modern inline systems streamline the process in many airports (As demonstrated by this post). Stand alone systems are used in other airports.

The planes themselves are screened as well. Transportation Security Inspectors randomly screen planes and are also involved in VIPR teams and employee screening.

That leads us onto our next layer, which is employee screening. Those with access to the airport’s secure areas including gate workers and food service employees are subject to random screening in addition to going through thorough background checks and being checked everyday against terror watch lists.

TSA’s Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs) are also working to increase the strength of our security approach. BAOs were trained at one of two specialized schools and have extensive operational experience in the field as members of military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units or accredited law enforcement/public safety bomb squads. They perform advanced alarm resolution at the checkpoint as well as expert training. Their presence in the airport environment helps security while increasing the abilities of those working with them.

Another vital layer of security is the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). FAMs are TSA’s law enforcement arm. They are specifically trained to work within the aircraft but their role is ever expanding. They participate in VIPR missions and are on duty throughout the airport environment.

Through the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, TSA trains and authorizes pilots and other approved flight crew members to carry a firearm aboard the plane. TSA also offers course to train other members of the flight crew to defend themselves inside an aircraft. The program, known as Crew Member Self Defense, adds an additional layer to the security system.

The hardening of cockpit doors occurred after 9/11 and provides yet another layer preventing possible attack. The vigilance of the flying public in-flight and on the ground is an important piece of aviation security. Passengers’ willingness to work with TSA and local law enforcement is crucial to enhancing security.

Check this out for a clearer, more graphically appealing view of TSA’s layers of security.

Jim

TSA EoS Blog Team

Why We Do What We Do: When Security Officers Find Illegal Items at the Checkpoint

A number of readers have raised questions about TSA's legal authority to make a referral to other law enforcement entities when evidence of a crime unrelated to aviation security is discovered during the screening process. This post explains that Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are required to make such referrals. TSO referrals have led to the arrest and/or conviction of individuals for serious crimes such as illegally possessing narcotic drugs, transporting child pornography, and bulk cash smuggling.

As you know, the job of our security officers is to screen passengers and their belongings for weapons, explosives, and other prohibited items that pose a risk to transportation security. In the course of performing that responsibility, security officers sometimes come across illegal items that are not directly related to transportation security. For instance, last month in Guam, TSOs screening checked baggage discovered almost $900,000 in U.S. currency along with an undisclosed amount of crystal methamphetamine. Although anyone in the United States is free to travel with currency, the failure to make a currency report to Customs and Border Protection when leaving the country with more than $10,000 in cash is a violation of federal criminal law. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 and 5322. Attempting to smuggle bulk cash out of the country also violates 31 U.S.C. § 5332, a felony that carries a possible prison term of up to 5 years.

As a component of the Department of Homeland Security, TSA's standard operating procedures require Transportation Security Officers to report evidence of potential crimes to the appropriate local, state or federal law enforcement authorities. When a TSO opens a bag and discovers a large stash of ecstasy or obvious child pornography, he or she is not permitted to close the bag and turn a blind eye to these serious offenses. Instead, a TSO is required to call for law enforcement support. It is up to the responding law enforcement authorities—not our TSOs—to decide whether an arrest is warranted.

TSA's practice of referring evidence of criminality to other law enforcement entities is not only good public policy, it is fully supported by the court decisions. The courts have recognized that illegal items found during a warrantless “special needs” or administrative search, such as the search of an airline passeger's luggage for weapons or explosives, may be turned over to the police. See, for example, United States v. $557,993.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds (pdf), 287 F.3d 66, 81-83 (2d Cir. 2002) (plain-view seizure of large number of money orders valid because airport security screeners permitted to search briefcase for weapons were not required to ignore evidence of crimes).

This case and others apply the principle of the plain-view doctrine, which allows a police officer to seize an unlawful item that he discovers in plain view, even if he comes across the item while carrying out unrelated duties. For instance, police who enter a residence in response to a call for medical assistance may seize contraband they see in plain view. See, for example, United States v. Quezada, 446 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006) (seizure of shotgun in plain view valid because officer entered apartment with reasonable belief that someone was inside but unable to answer).

The incidental discovery of illegal items in the screening of carry-on bags, is not, as one post suggested, akin to forcing a motorist to open his trunk at a sobriety checkpoint. Police officers conducting field sobriety tests at a vehicular checkpoint have no need to look in the trunk of a car to determine if the driver is impaired. By contrast, TSA screeners need to inspect every carry-on bag for weapons, explosives, and other prohibited items that pose a risk to transportation security. To do so, they must examine all compartments of the bag that are capable of concealing such items. If their task causes them to discover evidence of crime, they must ensure a prompt law enforcement referral.

Alien Flight School Program: "9/11 Redux?"

Some of you may have seen a piece on ABC's World News Tonight last night about foreign student pilots training in the U.S. and alleged holes in the system that allow these individuals to take flying lessons without being checked. The memory of 9/11 was evoked and the name Mohammed Atta even made it into the piece.

Words like "TSA's enforcement is basically nonexistent," "Flight schools want the money to teach ‘em…then they just slip through the cracks," and "What happened in 9/11 (sic) we don't want to happen again…so something has to be done." were all uttered by a former FAA inspector Bill McNease in the piece.

Well, something has been done, is being done and will continue to be done. Here are the real facts behind the headlines:

• Former safety expert McNease estimated that about 8,000 foreigners with FAA certificates were not initially checked under the Alien Flight School Program. After conducting an analysis the actual number is 857, not the estimated 8,000. These 857 individuals held certificates prior to 9/11. In 2006, all 857 were checked and not a single person posed a threat to national security.
  
• Today, TSA checks EVERY foreign national that applies for flight training in this country or at FAA-certified facilities anywhere in the world. Flight schools are required to submit this application to TSA before training begins and our sister agency, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement checks individuals in the U.S.to make sure these students are here legally and properly.
• In addition to ICE's enforcement of immigration law, TSA inspectors have conducted 8,000 regulatory compliance inspections since 2005 to make sure flight schools, aren't "...gonna teach them how to fly and get their ratings and then they slip through the cracks." as the former safety inspector said.

In addition to all this checking of student pilots, we also know of the threat of already certified individuals. To address that threat we:

• Check 800,000 people with active FAA pilot certificates against terror watch lists every single day of the year. That way if an individual is deemed to pose a threat to aviation by a law enforcement or intelligence organization, they will not be allowed to fly into, out of or over the U.S.
• Check all master crew lists (that's cockpit crew, pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer) against terror watch lists to make sure the people flying commercial airliners don't pose a threat.

So, while thoughts of Atta flying around Florida pre-9/11 and former experts saying it's still happening are great for ratings, the TSA and our DHS partners are actively working to make sure that foreign flight students are getting the attention they deserve from us.

And Now, a Word from Our Lawyers…

Since there are no lawyers on the blog team, they asked me to weigh in on some comments that have come into the blog on legal and constitutional issues. I'm the Chief Counsel at TSA, Francine Kerner, and I hope I can provide some useful information to those interested in the legal aspects of the screening process.

In regard to comments questioning the constitutionality of TSA's airport security screening procedures, the courts have addressed the issue and disagree with the notion that our procedures are unconstitutional. TSA takes the rights of the traveling public very seriously, and in implementing security screening measures, carefully weighs the intrusiveness of those measures against the need to prevent terrorist attacks involving aircraft. Balancing the same considerations, the courts have long approved searches of airline passengers and their bags for weapons and explosives as constitutionally permissible under what is now commonly referred to as the "administrative search" or "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See, for example, United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974). More recently, the courts have ruled that TSA procedures involving identification checks and passenger screening satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and properly respect the public's qualified right to travel.

See, for example, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 929 (2007); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 111 (2006).

I see that at least one person was troubled by the fact that TSA's screening of airline passengers sometimes yields evidence of crimes not directly related to aviation security. Our responsibility and focus in the airport screening process is to prevent a terrorist attack involving aircraft. In the course of carrying out our mission by screening for weapons and explosives, however, we sometimes incidentally discover illegal items unrelated to transportation security. Federal law and policy require that we refer such items to law enforcement officers for appropriate action. See, for example, United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (2005).

To the commenters who have complained about receiving secondary screening despite not having alarmed the walk-through metal detector, there are several reasons why an airline passenger may receive additional screening. For example, some passengers are randomly selected for secondary screening in order to help detect dangerous items that might not alarm the metal detector. Adding this element of randomness to the process makes manipulating the system more difficult.

And finally, to address the comments that expressed concerns about screening in retaliation for voicing complaints about TSA: it is not TSA's policy to subject anyone to additional screening because of their political views or complaints about the screening process. However, threatening a security officer may trigger additional screening.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your concerns.



update by Francine on 2/27/08:

To date, we have received over 100 responses to our post regarding TSA's legal authority to conduct security screening at airports. Many of your responses raise questions about the authority of TSA personnel to request a name or other identifying information (ID) from a passenger. You also want to know why the information is requested, how the information is used after you provide it, and whether TSA is following the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act), 5 U.S.C. § 552a, in requesting and using your personal information. Today's post will answer these questions.

In simple terms, the Privacy Act is a statute that controls the government's collection of personal information for later use. This is an important point. Merely asking a traveler to provide ID for a quick examination at the checkpoint does not trigger application of the Privacy Act as long as the agency is not making a record of the information to use in the future. In contrast, if TSA records a traveler's name or other identifying information with the intention of filing the information so that it can be retrieved at a later date by the traveler's name or ID, the agency is required to comply with the provisions of the Privacy Act.

During the screening process, TSA tries to identify individuals who may be planning to do us harm now or in the future. TSA tries to prevent potentially dangerous items from being brought into the boarding area. Finally, TSA responds to incidents that occur during the screening process. A passenger may need medical assistance, screened property may be damaged, lost or stolen, or an individual may become abusive in challenging a screening determination. Handling of these or any other matters may lead TSA personnel to request a traveler's name or other identifying information for filing in a Privacy Act system of records.

As a general matter, information filed in a TSA Privacy Act system of records may be used for a variety of security and administrative purposes. It may be used to identify individuals who require special screening procedures. It may be used to pursue a criminal prosecution or a civil enforcement action. It may be used to evaluate an injury or property claim, or to respond to a passenger complaint. TSA has listed all of the routine uses for the information it collects in the Privacy Act system of records notices published by the agency in the Federal Register. Most of the personal information collected in connection with the screening process is kept in a TSA system of records entitled DHS/TSA 001 Transportation Enforcement Records System (TSERS). See 69 FR 71828 (Dec. 10, 2004).

In some situations where TSA collects information directly from an individual, the Privacy Act requires TSA to provide a written notice to the individual setting forth its authority to gather the information and describing how the agency will use the information. One example of a TSA Privacy Act notice appears on the comment card that may be obtained at some screening checkpoints. Requesting a comment card should not result in harassment of any traveler. Additionally, TSA will accept anonymous comments either by filling out a comment card or by forwarding comments to the TSA Contact Center at tsa-contactcenter@dhs.gov.

Under the Privacy Act, any individual may submit a request to TSA to obtain the information we have on file about the requestor. With rare exceptions, which are set forth in the Federal Register, we will provide the requestor with the information we have in our files.

If you wish to see a further discussion of the Privacy Act, please see our Web site, at:
http://www.tsa.gov/research/reading/regs/privacy_act_faq.shtm.

Thank you for your comments and questions about the Privacy Act. We hope that you will check back on the Blog for future posts regarding legal issues.

Why We Do What We Do: Additional Screening for People with Hip Replacements

We've received many comments and questions from people who have had hip replacements and other metal implanted in their bodies for medical reasons. Many want to be able to present a letter from their doctor, some type of medical card, or even an x-ray to confirm that it's for an authentic medical reason that they're alarming the metal detector.

We understand that this is an inconvenience to travelers who repeatedly have to go through additional security measures because of a medical condition, but we just can't accept a letter, a card or an x-ray. I’ll explain some of the reasons.

This is a true story: a passenger told a security officer that he knew he was going to set the metal detector off because he had a pin in his hip. He hoped the officer would give him a pass on additional screening. Instead, the security officer followed TSA guidelines patted down the passenger. Guess what? He found a gun strapped to the passenger’s leg. So, if the security officer had just taken his word for it, a gun would have gotten on the plane—and maybe even been in the seat next to you. Things like this happen all the time, more than you would think.

We know those of you with genuine medical conditions are not the problem. And we realize the additional screening makes your checkpoint experience a frustrating one. But if a passenger alarms the metal detector, our security officers must resolve the alarm or the passenger can't get on the plane. We want to be thorough and protect the safety of everyone. No officer wants to be the one to let a gun, knife or bomb get through to an airplane.

If terrorists (or people who just HAVE to take their gun or knife with them on the flight) thought they could get by with a letter from a doctor or medical ID card, they'd quickly find out a way to make fake ones. How can we tell the difference in just a few seconds in a busy checkpoint line? It may make it a bit easier for you—but it makes it way too easy for them. Unfortunately, the pat down is currently the only way to resolve the situation.

Like you, we’re not satisfied with this result either. So, we’ve been busy exploring less invasive technology solutions that will allow officers to distinguish passengers with metallic medical implants from those trying to sneak weapons through the checkpoint. Last year, we began field testing several different types of whole body imagers in Phoenix, Arizona. Some passengers who were required to undergo additional screening were given the option of going through a portal instead of a pat-down. We've gotten great feedback from passengers on the technology, so we plan to continue testing the technology in other airports like JFK in New York, LAX in California, and others later this Spring. If you happen to go through portal in Phoenix or other airports, write back and let us know what you think.

A Few Thoughts on Consistency and Where We're Going...by Kip Hawley

Thanks for participating in the Evolution of Security blog. In the coming weeks we will ask for your opinions about some issues we have now in discussion -- balancing intrusions into personal space (pat-downs, imaging) with better detection, devoting dedicated lanes to 'speedsters' frequent flyers and how to manage who goes to that lane -- are two examples. We will also continue to go where you take us with the issues you raise. I would like to address one of those issues now: 'why do I get different results at different airports?'

There are two main issues: a) process consistency, where we want to have the same result everywhere; and, b) purposeful variation so as not to offer a static target.

Let me say up front that we have sometimes confused the issue ourselves, seemingly excusing unwanted results with 'well we do it differently on purpose' answers. While I understand the frustration of not having a completely identical process every time, I cannot say that you will ever be able to go through completely on autopilot. Here's my perspective...

Let's take process consistency first. Imagine we were a manufacturing business and that we wanted to crank out identical, high quality widgets. That's hard to do even when you use precision equipment and consistent materials. If TSA were a manufacturer, we would be processing over 700 million unique transactions a year, using over 40,000 different people, at over 400 locations. And, rather than combating maintenance woes (although we do) and the standard banes of manufacturing quality, our enemy is active, intelligent, malicious, patient, and adaptive.

Because TSA started from scratch, we used very defined 'standard operating procedures' in order to get the new organization up and running. Over time, that detailed process control started to work against us. It had the effect of making the job checklist-oriented. ('If I follow the SOP, then I am doing my job.') The tighter we squeezed to demand tighter adherence to the SOP, the more we squeezed individual initiative and thinking out of it.

While we had great people as TSO's, we were putting them in situations where they had to do things 'because it's SOP' whether or not it made sense. It was not helpful for public credibility or for keeping our people sharp.

Since nobody would care that we followed the SOP precisely if there was a successful attack, and since our enemy can observe our SOP and plan ways to beat it -- we needed something more.

This is the purposeful variation part. The idea is to have a menu of different security measures that TSOs add randomly to the standard process.

Everybody goes through the magnetometer and puts carry-ons through the x-ray and if there is an alarm, it is resolved. However, given the limits of technology and simple human fallibility, vulnerabilities inevitably exist. We are covering those vulnerabilities by adding, truly at random, additional measures. For example, in the last couple of months, I have had two versions of a quick pat-down. My computer was swabbed for an explosives check, as were my shoes even though I didn't alarm going through (Yes, I go through security just like everyone else). We also have new handheld liquid and solid explosives detection devices deployed as well as a variety of other measures. You may, and should, see what I mean in an upcoming trip.

I should also add that we have recently added other layers of security to address the same vulnerabilities that I have been discussing -- behavior detection, document checking, K-9 teams, undercover air marshals, etc.

So, our theory of how to achieve process consistency from a quality control perspective is to train well and set outcome goals that encourage individual initiative and judgment. We think that for a distributed workforce that sees endless variety in passenger situations and faces an adaptive enemy -- that is the way to go. This means that, yes, you will see some differences trip to trip on some judgment things that are not on purpose. That is the price for a thinking, switched-on front-line -- if you want people thinking, then you have to let them make decisions based on their training and experience.

You will also see some different measures applied trip to trip that are purposeful, put there to prevent someone from exploiting a vulnerability.

Thanks for working with us, Kip

Why We Screen Veterans and Active Members of the Military

I’ve noticed many comments from concerned passengers as to why we screen soldiers and veterans at our checkpoints. Some folks find this shameful while others (including most soldiers and vets) realize it’s a necessity.

Let me preface this post by saying I have the utmost respect for our men and women in uniform. My Grandfather who I never met was a Combat Medic in an 82nd Airborne Glider Battalion during WWII. He lost his life during a practice rescue mission while serving in Alaska in 1949. I grew up hearing stories about his military career, which helped foster my fascination and respect for the military. My father was in the National Guard for 10 years. I was raised to respect soldiers and spent many a Sunday morning on the couch with Dad watching war documentaries and John Wayne movies. I eventually joined the Army myself and became a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Decontamination Specialist with the 3rd Armored Division. I served in Desert Storm and spent 3 years in the Army before being honorably discharged and starting college. While in the Army, I met some of the best people I’ll ever meet. Hardworking, loyal, trustworthy, respectable… It is natural to see one of our soldiers in uniform and instantly put them up on a pedestal. We should… they deserve respect for their service to our country. They sacrifice much of their freedom to protect ours. However, let me caution you that simply because somebody wears a uniform, it does not warrant blind trust.

Did you know that we’ve had soldiers bring grenades with them to the airport? Chances are there was no ill intent, but a grenade on a plane is a grenade on a plane. It just shouldn’t be there. (Kind of like snakes on a plane) We’ve also caught passengers impersonating soldiers thinking they would be able to bypass the screening process. Go to any Army/Navy store in America and for less than $50 dollars you too can look just like an active duty soldier, sailor, airman or marine.

The fact that any soldier serves is honorable, but soldiers and veterans are just as capable of committing unspeakable acts as any other human being. In Kuwait in 2003, US Army Sgt. Hasan Akbar killed two 101st Airborne officers and wounded 14 when he lobbed two grenades into a command tent. John Allen Muhammad (The DC Beltway Sniper) was a Sergeant in the Army and served for 16 years. Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (Oklahoma City Bombing) were both Army Veterans. My roommate of 2 years in the Army stole weapons from an armory and died in a shootout with police after killing two officers. My first year on the job with the TSA, a young man serving in the U.S. Air Force told me he was going to blow up the plane he was about to depart on. These are just a few examples of many. Would we need military prisons if all of our soldiers were the spotless squeaky-clean individuals we believe them to be?

The TSA gives Soldiers special accomodations , but just like any other passenger, if they alarm the walk through metal detector, or have something in their bag we need to look at, they will undergo secondary screening. We owe that to the safety of all passengers to resolve any alarm we receive. In fact, the same thing happens to a TSA employee when they are traveling. If they alarm, they get screened.

Lastly, I just want to touch on the amount of respect TSA employees have for our members of the Armed Forces both current and veterans. Many in our ranks are prior military. Some of us served for a couple of years and others retired with 20 plus years under their belts. Some during times of peace and others during war. I can’t count how many times I’ve seen a TSO stop to shake a service members hand and thank them for their service. Some of our employees even have family members and friends serving in Iraq or Afghanistan right now. At my airport and I’m sure many others, we have written letters and sent care packages to soldiers. In fact, some of us have adopted platoons and send items regularly. I’ve also screened many soldiers and veterans who have thanked me for screening them including a Battle of Bulge vet who limped due to frostbite from the war.

Read about the experience a Lead TSO had with a Medal of Honor Recipient this past summer.

Bob

Evolution Blog Team

HOORAY BLOGGERS!

A Win for the Blogosphere

Posters on this blog have had their first official impact on our operations. That’s right, less than one week since we began the blog and already you’re affecting security in a very positive way.

On Monday afternoon we began receiving questions about airports that were requiring ALL electronics to be removed from carry-on bags (everything, including blackberrys, iPods and even cords). This practice was also mentioned on several other blogs and left us scratching our heads.

So…we checked with our security operations team to figure out what was going on. After some calls to our airports, we learned that this exercise was set up by local TSA offices and was not part of any grand plan across the country. These practices were stopped on Monday afternoon and blackberrys, cords and iPods began to flow through checkpoints like the booze was flowing on Bourbon Street Tuesday night. (Fat Tuesday of course).

So thanks to everyone for asking about this and for giving us a chance to make it right. Our hope is that examples like this validate our forum and show the solid partnerships we can form with our customers - the traveling public - in not only increasing security but in making all of our lives just a little easier.

Thanks again and keep those comments and questions coming.

Inconsistencies, Part 1

Commenting on this post has been disabled. However, you can still comment on Inconsistencies by clicking here.

Did you have to take your shoes off in Ohio but not Colorado? Post all of your thoughts about inconsistencies on this blog post.

In response to an cmac's frustration with those who seem ungrateful for the job TSOs do each day...

Don't take negative comments left by a few to heart. People have the right to voice their opinion even when some of those people don't do it with the same courtesy and respect they expect from you. Without question a lot of our brothers and sisters feel the very same way you do sometimes. This blog is intended to bridge the gap with people who have legitimate issues with the TSA, but let's put the negative into proper context. Consider there are at most a few hundred complaints on this site. Of those complaints there are without a doubt many posts by the same author. Now consider there are some 35, 000 domestic flights per day in the U.S. with millions of passengers using our transportation system, all of which have experienced the professionalism and security provided each day by our Officers (and don't forget this site is accessible worldwide as we've seen people from different countries leaving posts). So if this were an election one might consider those numbers to be a landslide victory.

There's no doubt some people have had a bad experience with the TSA. Our job is to fix what's broken, but hey let's face it - security is a tough business. There's an old saying, "Security is a great thing... until it applies to me". Sure some complaints are valid and we need to improve in many areas, but when you look at the posts there are an awful lot of complaints because people brought a prohibited item into the checkpoint which was identified, and when TSA identified the item they claimed the rules were stupid or ineffective. Those stupid rules weren't that ineffective obviously.

Keep doing the job you do, take constructive criticism constructively, and if it doesn't apply to you or your team – take it with a grain of salt. Your commitment and professionalism are appreciated and never go unnoticed.

Jay


lancifer, said

Q: For everyone telling the rest of us how we've not had another terrorist attack simply because of beefed up security, I ask you this: Prior to September 11, 2001, when was the previous terrorist attack against the US? Where was it? What happened? Now, when was the attack prior to that?" When was the last terror attack against the U.S.?"

A: Have you been living under a rock? The answer to that question is simple, available, and lengthy.

Q: "We've seen evidence of potential plots for attacks. The fact is, terrorist attacks in the US are rare and isolated incidents."

A: Thankfully yes terror attacks on U.S. soil are rare events. But when you consider these facts: the last terror attack cost 3000+ innocent lives in a matter of minutes, it has heavily impacted our foreign policy, it has placed military service personnel in harms way costing more lives, and in short order has cost our economy in lost capital and venture to the tune of more than one TRILLION dollars - the investment to protect U.S. interest if even only for the rare or isolated attack is worth the return.


Q: I could get a boat and troll Lake Michigan all day long, catching large fish, and talking about how my vigilance has kept the lake secure from shark attacks. Never mind that the likelihood of a shark attack in Lake Michigan is little to none. Prove that I don't prevent shark attacks in Lake Michigan. That is how I feel about our increased security. We've got the government telling us about how much danger there is around us, but only a handful of people are questioning the validity of their claims. So if you don't mind, I've got to go keep Lake Michigan free of shark attacks.

A: Lake Michigan is a fresh water body; there are no sharks in Lake Michigan.


Your fishing venture on Lake Michigan doesn't change the fact we are still surrounded by sharks.

Jay

Lighters, Nail Clippers and Lithium Batteries

Just wanted to jump in with a quick post based on some of the comments we’ve received so far about lighters, nail clippers and batteries. We just wanted to let you know that lighters and nail clippers are allowed through the checkpoint. Lighters were allowed starting in July 2007, (not including torch lighters) and nail clippers, as well as smaller scissors and tools, have been allowed through the checkpoint since December 2005. Unlike improvised explosives devices (IEDs), these items do not present a significant threat to an airplane.

Also, recent rules about spare lithium batteries in checked bags were enacted by the Federal Aviation Administration, not TSA. Click here (pdf) to see the FAA rules.

Liquids, Part 2

Liquids cover 70% of the earth and they also make up a good percentage of our comments from the traveling public. Post your suggestions and concerns about liquids in this blog post. (Click here for Part 1) Refresh your knowledge of traveling with liquids.

So, how much damage could a liquid explosive cause? See for yourself from the Myth Busters page on TSA.gov:

» Click here to see our video (wmv, streaming).

Liquids, Part 1

Commenting on this post has been disabled. However, you can still comment on our Liquids policy by clicking here.

Liquids cover 70% of the earth and they also make up a good percentage of our comments from the traveling public. Post all of your suggestions and concerns about liquids in this blog post. Refresh your knowledge of traveling with liquids.

So, how much damage could a liquid explosive cause? See for yourself from the Myth Busters page on TSA.gov:

» Click here to see our video (wmv, streaming).

Shoes

It’s not all about Richard Reid when it comes to the screening of shoes. Post all of your thoughts about shoes in this blog post. To learn more about how the shoe fits in with the TSA, check out our web page on "why we screen shoes". Then come back here and let's talk.

01.31.08, 6:00pm
Christopher says:
Great first question on the ability to pick up foot fungus at the checkpoint and a very common one at that.

Believe it or not, TSA actually commissioned a study in 2003 with the Department of Health and Human Services to look at just that issue. I'm paraphrasing here and will have the actual letter posted tomorrow but they found that if the floor isn't moist then the possibility is, "extremely small to remote" to contract athlete's foot. If there are checkpoint floors that are moist, we generally have bigger issues on our hands than foot fungus.

Also interesting from that study, 15 percent of the public may be affected with athlete's foot at any given time. Think about that next time you're trying on clothes at the mall, looking for a new pair of shoes or going off the high dive at the local pool.

02.01.08, 2:00pm
Christopher says:

Great and lively debate here on shoes. As added fodders, here are two pictures of an altered pair of shoes our officers discovered last year in Alaska.

Yes, we find stuff like this all the time and yes our intel folks tell us terrorists are still interested in using shoes as (improvised explosive devices) IEDs or to hide components.

We've also posted an x-ray image so that you can see exactly what we are talking about.

02.05.08; 9:30am
Christopher says:

There have been several posts asking about the pictures above. Just to be perfectly clear, the first two pictures are of a pair of shoes we discovered during screening in Alaska last year. The wire and other small metal item were positioned under the insole just as they are shown.

The third picture is of an x-ray image of a pair of altered shoes we use to train our officers on x-ray displays in airports. As you can see, it doesn’t take an x-ray tech to tell these shoes have been altered.

Our officers literally see 4 Million shoes per day and they’re very, very good at telling the bad from the good.

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