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The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization

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THE INTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S REPRIORITIZATION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY *

In direct response to the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated a transformation that, among other things, established a new ranking of priorities and formally shifted a significant number of agents from traditional criminal investigative work to counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters. According to the Director, each of the changes was designed to reshape the FBI into an organization better able to combat the imminent threat of terrorism and to prevent another large-scale terrorist attack against the United States.

Prior to 9/11, the FBI utilized more of its field agent resources to investigate traditional criminal activity than to investigate matters related to terrorism. According to the FBI, since the reprioritization it is striving to incorporate more proactive, intelligence-based tactics and operations into its procedures, particularly in terrorism-related matters.

Non-terrorism related crime, however, still occurs, and because the FBI has the broadest jurisdiction of any federal law enforcement agency, it is expected to maintain a response capability for violations of federal criminal law. However, other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies may be capable of taking on increased responsibilities for certain investigative areas in light of the FBI's reprioritization. In order for this transition to occur effectively, the specific areas from which the FBI has reduced its involvement must be identified.

The objective of this Office of the Inspector General (OIG) review was to identify internal operational changes in the FBI resulting from its ongoing reprioritization efforts, focusing on the types of offenses that the FBI no longer investigated at pre-9/11 levels. The review, which covered fiscal years (FYs) 2000 through 2003, examined:

* This is the unclassified version of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) 486-page audit report, which was classified "Secret" by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To create an unclassified report for public release, the OIG redacted (deleted) the portions of the report that were classified by the FBI. The redacted portions are noted, and included information about the number of FBI personnel assigned to national security matters. The full report was provided to the Department of Justice, the FBI, and several Congressional committees.

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- 1) the allocation of the FBI's human resources,
- 2) the specific areas in which the FBI utilized its human resources,
- 3) the types and number of cases the FBI investigated, and
- 4) the direction provided to FBI personnel in how the reprioritization was to be implemented.

Because our objective was to determine changes since the reprioritization, we concentrated many of our analyses on comparing information from FYs 2000 and 2003 to obtain a view of resource utilization both before and well into the FBI's reprioritization efforts. The 9/11 attacks caused the FBI's human resource utilization data and casework data to be inordinately skewed towards terrorism-related matters at the end of FY 2001 and throughout the first half of FY 2002. Therefore, in order to conduct accurate analyses of changes within the FBI, we chose to concentrate on a comparison of FYs 2000 and 2003. Additional details of our audit objective, scope, and methodology can be found in Appendix I.

FBI Priorities

In May 2002, the FBI Director issued a new ranking of priorities that refocused FBI activities. We found that these new priorities guided the FBI's post-9/11 efforts and determined the structure of the FBI's program plans and new strategic plan, issued in March 2004. The top two priorities focus on terrorism-related matters, while priorities three through eight are FBI criminal investigative functions. The priorities are as follows:


1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack.
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high technology crimes.
4. Combat public corruption at all levels.
5. Protect civil rights.
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises.
7. Combat major white-collar crime.
8. Combat significant violent crime.
9. Support federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners.
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.

Overall Field Office Agent Allocation and Utilization

The means by which the FBI's priorities are most directly translated into operation is via the establishment of Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs), the method by which the FBI allocates its personnel resources. In general, as part of the budget planning and execution process the FBI allocates its agent resources to the field by establishing FSLs within each of its program areas. One FSL equates to one funded employee, or one full-time equivalent (FTE). The FBI sets FSLs by program only for non-supervisory agents in FBI field offices. Supervisory agent personnel are allocated to field offices in one lump sum as "management," while support personnel are allocated to field offices by type of support function.

We analyzed changes in the FBI's field agent allocations for FYs 2000 through 2003 and determined that the FBI generally shifted its allocation to reflect its new priorities. Specifically, we found that the FBI allocated more than 560 additional field agent positions to terrorism-related matters in FY 2003 than in FY 2000, while reducing the number of positions allotted for matters not related to terrorism during the same time period. Most of this reduction in non-terrorism related matters occurred within the Organized Crime/Drugs Program, where a total of 758 field agent positions were transferred during our review period.

**COMPARISON OF FIELD AGENT ALLOCATIONS
IN TERRORISM AND NON-TERRORISM MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**




Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

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The FBI classifies its cases and tracks the time of most of its field personnel by means of a three-tiered system consisting of 12 programs that reflect general crime areas and several administrative functions; 51 sub-programs that fall within 10 of these programs; and 759 investigative classifications, which provide the greatest level of detail.¹ For its human resource utilization comparisons, the FBI uses a computerized system called TURK (Time Utilization and Recordkeeping), which among other functions calculates the average number of personnel on-board at a particular point in time. This value is referred to as Average On Board (AOB) and is a measure used throughout this report.

In order to determine how well its actual utilization of personnel falls in line with its allocation, the FBI compares AOB to FSLs, generally at the program level. We performed this same comparison for field agents in FY 2003 in terrorism-related and non-terrorism related matters. We found that the FBI utilized 845 more agents than it had allocated for terrorism-related matters, while it utilized 879 fewer agents than planned in non-terrorism areas. The following chart illustrates that the FBI exceeded its planned level of commitment to terrorism-related matters by utilizing resources it had planned to use on non-terrorism related matters.

**FIELD AGENT ALLOCATION AND UTILIZATION
IN TERRORISM AND NON-TERRORISM MATTERS
FISCAL YEAR 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and Resource Management and Allocation Office data

¹ These figures are current as of the end of the period reviewed (September 20, 2003).

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Utilization and Casework Changes by Investigative Classification

We also compared the FBI's FY 2000 and FY 2003 field agent utilization at the investigative classification level to identify specific areas in which the FBI reduced its efforts the most. We then identified the top 30 investigative classifications that experienced the most significant reductions in on-board agents during our review period. The following chart shows the results of this review.

TOP 30 INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003		
Classification Number	Classification Name	On-board Agent Reduction
245C	OCDETF – Mexican Organizations	-123
281C	OC/DI – Mexican Organizations	-119
281A	OC/DI – LCN and Italian Organizations	-103
088A	Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence	-101
209A	Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program	-89
091A	Bank Robbery	-81
281F	OC/DI – Other Major Criminal Organizations	-76
245F	OCDETF – Other Major Criminal Organizations	-62
245B	OCDETF – Central/South American Organizations	-61
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
029C	FIF - \$25K - \$99,999 Fed-Insured Bank	-50
281B	OC/DI – Central/South American Organizations	-44
281I	OC/DI – Caribbean Organizations	-43
281E	OC/DI – Asian Organizations	-40
196A	Telemarketing Fraud	-38
245D	OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs	-37
196D	Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes	-35
209B	Health Care Fraud – Private Ins. Program	-32
245I	OCDETF – Caribbean Organizations	-31
087B	Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - \$25K+	-29
026B	ITSMV – Commercial Theft or Chop Shops	-29
092C	Racketeering Enterprise Investigations – Mexican Organizations	-28
196B	Insurance Fraud	-28
282A	Civil Rights – Color of Law – Force &/or Violence	-28
300A	Counterterrorism Preparedness – Special Events	-27
049A	Bankruptcy Fraud \$50K+ /or Court Officer	-26
249A	Environmental Crimes	-25
244	Hostage Rescue Team	-24
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
015B	TFIS – Loss of \$25K; Weapons, Explosives	-21


ACRONYMS:	
OCDETF = Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force	VCMO = Violent Crime/Major Offenders
OC/DI = Organized Crime/Drug Investigations	ITSMV = Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles
LCN = La Cosa Nostra	TFIS = Theft From Interstate Shipment
FIF = Financial Institution Fraud	

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data and NFIP Manual

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Each of the 30 investigative classifications identified is related to an FBI program. Specifically, 12 of the 30 investigative classifications experiencing the largest reductions in agent resource utilization are related to organized crime/drug matters. Eight classifications are associated with white-collar crime, six are related to violent crime, two are foreign counterintelligence matters, one is related to civil rights, and the other pertains to domestic terrorism. In order to develop an understanding of the general areas that were reduced the most by the reprioritization, we summarized the total on-board agent decreases within each of these 30 classifications and grouped them into their respective program areas.

ON-BOARD AGENT REDUCTIONS FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003 WITHIN PROGRAM AREAS FOR THE 30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION²



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

² Foreign Counterintelligence is a sub-program within the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The remaining components listed are all FBI programs.

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As shown in the preceding exhibit, 3 program areas were primarily affected by the 30 classifications experiencing the greatest reductions in on-board agents: Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D), White-Collar Crime, and Violent Crime. We analyzed each of these program areas in detail, including analyses of how the reductions in certain classifications impacted various types of field offices. For example, reductions in certain drug-related classifications involving Mexican organizations primarily affected field offices located along or near the southwest border of the United States, while reductions involving health care fraud generally occurred within the FBI's larger field offices.

In addition to our review of on-board agents, we analyzed a universe of 404,318 field cases worked by the FBI during our review period and found 121,798 that arose from the 30 classifications we identified as experiencing the greatest on-board agent reductions. We also reviewed trends in case openings and found that the FBI opened over 17,000 fewer cases within these 30 classifications in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. The FBI reduced the number of cases it opened most significantly with respect to violent fugitives, where 11,617 fewer cases were opened in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. No other reductions in case openings were as significant, although our result for bank robbery cases was notable. We found that although the FBI reduced its utilization of on-board field agents in the classification for bank robberies by 26 percent during our review period, the FBI actually opened 485 more bank robbery cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000.

Although we focused the bulk of our review on areas in which the FBI reduced its investigative efforts, we also identified the 30 investigative classifications that experienced the greatest increases in agent utilization. The majority of these classifications were in programs related to terrorism. Specifically, 24 of the 30 classifications with the greatest increases are part of either the National Foreign Intelligence or the Domestic Terrorism programs, while the remaining 6 classifications fall into the Violent Crime/Major Offenders, White-Collar Crime, and Applicant programs. These classifications are highlighted in the following table.

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TOP 30 INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST INCREASES IN AGENT UTILIZATION FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003

Classification Number	Classification Name	On-board Agent Increase
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
196C	Securities/Commodities Fraud	73
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
266A	AOT-DT – Violent Crimes – Predicate Offense	37
306	Serial Killings	28
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
067D	Support Applicant Investigations	21
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
067B	Special Agent Applicant Investigations	18
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
089B	Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer	11
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
164C	Crime Aboard Aircraft – All other	11
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
253A	Fraud & Rel Activity – Ident Documents (FRAID) – Terrorists	10
174D	Bomb Technician Activities	8
300B	CT Preparedness – Aviation Security	8
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
261G	Security Officer Matters – Other	6
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	

ACRONYMS:

AOT = Acts of Terrorism
DT = Domestic Terrorism

FRAID = Fraud & Related Activity Identification Documents
CT = Counterterrorism

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data and NFIP Manual

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As with those classifications experiencing the greatest reductions, we reviewed FBI cases worked during our review period from those classifications undergoing the largest increases in on-board agents. We found that 22,993 of the original universe of 404,318 cases worked during our review period fell into one of these classifications. We analyzed trends in the number of cases opened during our review period in these classifications and noted a general upward trend in total case openings. Specifically, we found that the FBI had opened 2,808 more cases in these classifications than it had in FY 2000, an increase of 81 percent. Of these 30 classifications, the number of cases opened involving investigations of [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED] increased the most during our review period. At the same time, we noted significant increases in case openings for investigations involving Usama Bin Laden, as well as foreign counterintelligence cases [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED].

Conclusions

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI reprioritized its mission, formally moved a significant number of funded personnel from traditional criminal investigative areas to matters related to terrorism, and reorganized itself with the intent of becoming a more proactive, intelligence-driven law enforcement agency. Our analyses revealed that FBI activities in FY 2003 were generally in line with its post-9/11 priorities.

Our analysis of FBI timekeeping data confirms that the FBI is performing less work in certain traditional criminal investigative areas and more work in areas related to terrorism. Each of the areas that experienced the most significant reductions in on-board agents was provided guidance in how to prioritize their diminished resources, including focusing their efforts on the major criminal issues that existed in their respective jurisdictions. Field offices were also told to give first priority to those criminal investigations that had ties to terrorism.

This report contains comprehensive, data-driven analyses of the changes in the FBI's use of resources as a result of its shift in priorities and allocation of staff. These types of analyses can be useful to FBI executive management and program directors for evaluating progress in meeting goals and obtaining a data-based view of the status of FBI operations. We recommend that the FBI endeavor to conduct similar analyses on a regular basis. In a follow-up review we plan to initiate, we intend to conduct further analyses to determine how the FBI's shift in priorities and operations has affected external law enforcement entities.

**THE INTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has initiated a large-scale reorganization and reprioritization. In connection with this, a significant portion of the FBI's agents and support personnel have been reassigned to terrorism-related matters. The objective of this audit was to identify internal operational changes in the FBI resulting from its ongoing reorganization and reprioritization efforts, including the types of offenses that the FBI no longer investigates at pre-9/11 levels.

Jurisdiction and Organizational Structure

The FBI is the lead investigative agency of the United States Department of Justice, responsible for enforcing over 200 federal laws. It has the broadest jurisdiction of any federal law enforcement agency and is charged with counterterrorism and counterintelligence responsibilities, as well as the investigation of criminal matters in the areas of civil rights, cyber crime, organized crime, drugs, violent crime, and white-collar crime.

The FBI is a field-based law enforcement agency, with its executive management located at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. In addition to its headquarters, the FBI is composed of 56 field offices, approximately 400 resident agencies (smaller, satellite offices), 46 Legal Attaché offices, and several additional, specialized facilities. The specialized facilities include the FBI Laboratory, the FBI Academy, and the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). Personnel at FBI Headquarters generally provide program direction and investigative support to FBI field components. As of May 31, 2004, the FBI employed 12,031 agents and 16,243 support personnel.

FBI Programs

The FBI operates within a framework of programs, sub-programs, and investigative classifications by which it allocates agent resources to field offices, tracks the time of most field employees, and classifies cases. This three-tiered organizational system includes 12 programs that reflect general crime areas and several administrative functions.³ A program is the most general category by which information is gathered, maintained, and tracked

³ The 12 programs cover the following areas: national foreign intelligence, domestic terrorism, computer intrusion, white-collar crime, organized crime and drugs, violent crime, cyber crime, criminal enterprises, civil rights, training, applicants, and miscellaneous matters. A description of each program is contained in Appendix II.

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
within the FBI. The next level, which is more specific, is the sub-program. There are a total of 51 sub-programs that fall within ten programs; neither the Civil Rights nor Miscellaneous programs have sub-programs. The most specific level that information is organized is an investigative classification. At the end of FY 2003, there were 751 investigative classifications. A crosswalk of FBI programs and sub-programs is located in Appendix III.

The FBI's program structure often changes to incorporate new investigative areas or to rename and consolidate existing investigative efforts and administrative functions. For example, during FY 2003 the FBI added two new programs, two new sub-programs, and eight new investigative classifications. Further, the FBI may reduce the number of classifications it currently maintains. In a memorandum issued in May 2003, the FBI Director described the list of investigative classifications as "cumbersome," and stated that his goal is to reduce the list by at least 20 percent.

FBI Transformation

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI Director initiated a transformation that overhauled FBI management, created a new ranking of priorities to drive FBI investigations, and formally shifted a significant number of agents from traditional criminal investigative work to counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters. According to the Director, each of these changes was designed to reshape the FBI into an organization better able to combat the imminent terrorist threat and to prevent another terrorist attack against the United States. A timeline of the FBI's transformation is shown in Exhibit 1-1.

EXHIBIT 1-1
FBI TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE
FISCAL YEAR 2000 THROUGH MARCH 2004



Source: OIG analysis of FBI planning materials

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Reorganization – The FBI restructured by merging or transferring several organizational components, dissolving other components, and creating new components. In addition, it created a new level of executive management, which consisted of five new Executive Assistant Director (EAD) positions. This supervisory level was placed between the office of the Deputy Director and most of the FBI's operational divisions and offices.⁴

Reprioritization – In addition to creating a new organizational structure, the Director determined that a new set of priorities clearly detailing FBI responsibilities should be established to shift the FBI from a traditional criminal investigative agency to one designed to combat terrorism. In May 2002 the FBI issued a ranked list of top ten priorities to focus FBI efforts on areas that other law enforcement agencies could not effectively address and that the FBI was in a unique position to handle. These new priorities listed prevention of a terrorist attack as the FBI's top priority, and also provided a roadmap for the FBI to evolve into a new, intelligence-driven law enforcement agency. A more detailed discussion of the new FBI priorities is contained in Chapter 2.

Additionally, in March 2004 the FBI formally issued its new strategic plan. The plan, which had last been updated in 1998, refers to the events of 9/11 and provides background on the FBI's transformational process since that date, specifically referencing how the FBI has adopted the concept of reengineering in order to effect change. Specifically, the plan discusses: 1) the FBI's intelligence-based forecast for the next five years in each of its priority areas; 2) the recruitment, hiring, training, and development of employees; and 3) the tools the FBI needs to achieve its goals, including information technology, investigative technology, communication systems, and security. Additionally, the largest part of the plan, organized along the lines of the FBI's priorities, articulates ten strategic goals the FBI must accomplish in order to achieve its mission. Each goal contains objectives and performance goals that must be met for the FBI to achieve success.

Reprogramming – To focus the FBI's efforts on terrorism and align its resources along the FBI's new priorities, in May 2002 the FBI Director formally reprogrammed more than 500 agents from traditional criminal investigative areas into terrorism-related programs. Most of these agents were moved from drug, violent crime, and white-collar crime matters to terrorism-related programs. The FBI's drug-related work was most

⁴ The FBI's current organizational structure was formally approved by the Attorney General on March 4, 2004. An organizational chart depicting this structure is contained in Appendix IV, while an organizational chart depicting the FBI's pre-9/11 structure is contained in Appendix V.

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impacted, with the transfer of 400 agents. The Director stated that he made his reprogramming decisions after consultation with his executive management staff (including the Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of all field offices), as well as the United States Attorney's Offices, Congress, and the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The May 2002 reprogramming is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Prior Reviews

We previously audited the FBI's casework and resource utilization, issuing a report in September 2003.⁵ We found that prior to 9/11, although the FBI stated that its top priority was terrorism-related work, the FBI utilized more of its agent resources in traditional criminal investigative areas, such as white-collar crime, violent crime, and organized crime/drugs than in terrorism programs. We also found that agent usage in terrorism-related areas significantly increased in the immediate weeks following 9/11, and after the initial flurry of activity, resource usage related to terrorism stabilized at a level higher than prior to 9/11. In that review, we made several recommendations to the FBI, including that the Director explore additional means of analyzing the FBI's resource utilization among its various programs.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) also reported on the status of the FBI Reorganization in June 2003.⁶ The GAO determined that progress had been made in the FBI's efforts to transform itself, but major challenges remained. Specifically, the GAO found that a comprehensive transformation plan with key milestones and assessment points to guide its overall transformation plans was still needed. The GAO noted that the FBI had not yet completed an update of its strategic plan and had not yet developed a human capital plan.⁷ According to the GAO, the FBI faced challenges in using personnel from other criminal investigative programs to

⁵ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report number 03-37, "Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Utilization," dated September 2003.

⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled "FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue," report number GAO-03-759T, dated June 18, 2003.

⁷ In March 2004, GAO again reported on FBI transformation in its report entitled "FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities," report number GAO-04-578T, dated March 23, 2004. GAO reviewed the FBI's new strategic and human capital plans, and reported that the FBI was continuing to make progress in its efforts to transform. However, the GAO noted that while the FBI had instituted a number of separate reengineering projects, it still did not have an overall transformation plan.

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address counterterrorism matters and the FBI did not possess adequate numbers of analytical, technical, and administrative support personnel.

Audit Approach

The purpose of this audit was to review further the FBI's internal changes resulting from its post-9/11 reprioritization and reorganization. Specifically, we sought to identify the investigative areas that experienced the greatest increases or reductions and then measure the level of change in both funded and utilized agent resources in these areas. To accomplish this, we reviewed planning documents and analyzed resource allocation utilization and casework data. In addition, we interviewed more than 40 officials at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the FBI Academy and Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia; and the Critical Incident Response Group in Aquia, Virginia.

In the wake of 9/11, vast amounts of resources from all FBI program areas were dedicated to assist in the investigations of the terrorist attacks. This caused resource utilization and casework data at the end of FY 2001 and throughout the first half of FY 2002 to be skewed towards terrorism-related matters. Therefore, in order to conduct better comparisons of FBI data, we eliminated FYs 2001 and 2002 from many of our evaluations, and instead concentrated on comparing FY 2000 data to FY 2003 data. Although our review period encompassed the entire period of September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003, our decision to focus on FYs 2000 and 2003 in many of our analyses afforded a better "before" and "after" view into the FBI's reprioritization efforts.⁸

The results of our review are detailed in Chapters 2 through 5, while the audit scope and methodology are contained in Appendix I. Specifically, in Chapter 2 we reviewed the steps the FBI took in implementing its new set of priorities and analyzed how this translated into funded agent and support positions in field offices and at FBI Headquarters. We also obtained from the FBI's timekeeping system data for on-board agent and support personnel for FYs 2000 through 2003. In Chapter 3 we analyzed changes at the program, sub-program, and investigative classification level to determine how the new list of priorities affected the FBI's human resource utilization. We also identified the investigative classifications in which the greatest resource usage changes occurred during our review period. In addition, we obtained a universe of field office cases from the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS)

⁸ According to the FBI's Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system, FY 2000 began on September 26, 1999, and FY 2003 ended on September 20, 2003.

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system for FYs 2000 through 2003, and reviewed them for changes that reflected the FBI's new priorities.

In line with our objective to identify those areas in which the FBI had reduced its effort, we focused on those criminal investigative matters in which the largest reductions in resource usage occurred. This included in-depth analyses on each of these areas to determine how the FBI's shift in priorities affected investigative work performed in the program area. The results of these analyses can be found in Chapter 4.⁹

⁹ In addition to the analyses presented in the body of this report, we also provided FBI management with several charts under separate cover. These charts, which contain more detailed information regarding the changes in on-board agents and casework experienced by each FBI field office during our review period, are found in Supplemental Appendices I through III.

CHAPTER 2: REPRIORITIZING THE FBI

On May 21, 2002, the FBI Director issued an e-mail to all FBI employees containing the new ranking of Top Ten Priorities, which formally refocused the FBI's mission. The following chart contains the May 2002 priorities as well as the FBI investigative programs to which each primarily applies.

EXHIBIT 2-1
FBI TOP TEN PRIORITIES AND RELATED PROGRAMS

Priorities	Related FBI Programs
1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International Terrorism¹⁰ ▪ Domestic Terrorism
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Foreign Counterintelligence¹⁰
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high technology crimes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cyber Crime ▪ Computer Intrusion
4. Combat public corruption at all levels.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Public Corruption¹¹
5. Protect civil rights.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Civil Rights
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Organized Crime/Drugs ▪ Criminal Enterprise Investigations
7. Combat major white-collar crime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ White-Collar Crime
8. Combat significant violent crime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Violent Crime/Major Offenders
9. Support federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners.	<i>All Programs</i>
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.	<i>All Programs</i>

Source: Director's memorandum dated May 21, 2002

¹⁰ This is a sub-program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

¹¹ This is a sub-program within the White-Collar Crime Program.

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The Director described the top three priorities on the list as being the FBI's most critical challenges and the ones that would require the FBI to change its operational goals. The wording of these priorities highlights that the most important goals for the FBI are protection and prevention, a change from its traditional focus as a more reactive law enforcement agency. Priorities four through eight are more traditional law enforcement functions, which encompass much of the FBI's historical investigative activities and which have remained primarily under the direction of the Criminal Investigative Division. Priorities nine and ten were designated as the critical infrastructure to support all of the FBI's investigative operations.

Funded Staffing Levels

The means by which the FBI's priorities are most directly translated into operation is via the establishment of Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs), the method by which the FBI allocates its personnel resources. As a reflection of the shift in priorities, the FBI stated that it would change the number of agents it had allocated to certain programs. For example, the events of 9/11 caused the Director to reevaluate current practices and reallocate a significant number of agent positions to terrorism-related areas. We reviewed this reallocation by comparing the FSL levels in FY 2000 to the levels in FY 2003.¹² Identifying the FSL changes indicated whether the FBI was, in fact, adjusting its human resource planning to meet its new objectives.

Resource Allocation Process

Field Offices – In general, the FBI allocates its agent resources to the field by establishing FSLs within each of its program areas. One FSL equates to one funded employee, or one full-time equivalent (FTE). This means that the FBI manager in charge of a program has a specific number of personnel to divide among the 56 field offices. The FBI Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) Office, with input from the Director, Headquarters' program managers, and SACs, is responsible for establishing the allocations annually as part of the budget planning and execution process. The FBI sets FSLs by program only for non-supervisory agents in FBI field offices. Supervisory agent personnel are allocated to field offices in one lump sum as "management," while support personnel are allocated to field offices as clerical/administrative, investigative, or technical types of support.

¹² We utilized final adjusted FSL values, provided by the FBI's Resource Management and Allocation Office, for each of our analyses involving FSLs.

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FBI Headquarters – In general, Headquarters personnel are in administrative positions. Therefore, the FBI does not allocate Headquarters agent or support positions by investigative programs. Instead, Headquarters FSLs for both agents and support are allocated according to organizational divisions (e.g., the Criminal Investigative Division, Counterterrorism Division, and Finance Division).¹³ In part, these organizational divisions encompass the various programs to which FSLs are allocated in the field. For instance, the Criminal Investigative Division oversees, among others, the Organized Crime/Drug and Violent Crime/Major Offenders programs.

Data Collection

We obtained FSL data for FYs 2000 through 2003 FSLs for the FBI's Headquarters and field office personnel, which was further divided between agent and support positions.¹⁴ We analyzed this information and discuss it in the following sections. It should be noted that the FBI experienced an overall decline in its FSLs from FYs 2000 to 2001. According to an FBI official, this reduction was primarily a result of a mandate issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which has become known as the "hollow work year" issue. In short, OMB believed that the FBI did not have sufficient money to fund its level of authorized positions. Therefore, during FY 2001 (but prior to 9/11), OMB ordered the FBI to reduce its reported numbers of funded positions. The FBI adhered to this mandate and cut both agent and support funded positions within Headquarters and field offices (although the majority of the reductions occurred in positions allocated to field offices). In doing this, no employees were terminated. Instead, all cuts took the form of the elimination of existing unfilled vacancies.

Overall FSL Analysis

The Headquarters and field office FSLs for our review period are noted in Exhibit 2-2. The combined total of 27,484 positions for FY 2003 reflects an increase of 243 compared to those allocated in FY 2000. As shown, significantly more personnel are assigned to field offices than FBI Headquarters. From FYs 2000 through 2003, field offices had approximately twice as many positions as those allocated to Headquarters.

¹³ An organizational chart that includes all FBI divisions is found in Appendix IV.

¹⁴ The FBI's FSL data did not include the positions allocated for specialized entities that are not a part of the field offices or FBI Headquarters (e.g., the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary; Legal Attaché Offices; and the Critical Incident Response Group).

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EXHIBIT 2-2
COMPOSITION OF FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003

	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>FY 2003</u>
Total	27,241	25,925	26,534	27,484
Agent	11,296	10,785	10,800	11,255
Support	15,945	15,140	15,734	16,229
Field Office FSL Subtotal	18,439	17,516	17,810	18,197
Agent ¹⁵	10,474	9,981	10,022	10,124
Support	7,965	7,535	7,788	8,073
Headquarters FSL Subtotal	8,802	8,409	8,724	9,287
Agent	822	804	778	1,131
Support	7,980	7,605	7,946	8,156

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

FBI Field Offices

As noted in Exhibit 2-2, the FBI allocated 18,439 of its personnel resources to its field offices during FY 2000 and 18,197 during FY 2003. Thus, there was a slight decrease in the number of funded positions in the field during this time period, amounting to a reduction of 242 positions. As previously mentioned, the FBI allocates its non-supervisory field agents by particular program areas and its field support personnel by the type of support they provide. Exhibit 2-3 provides a detailed account of how these agent and support FSLs were allocated from FYs 2000 through 2003.

¹⁵ The field agent FSLs include positions allocated for supervisory agents within field offices.

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EXHIBIT 2-3				
COMPOSITION OF FIELD OFFICE FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS				
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003				
	<u>FY 2000</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>FY 2003</u>
Field Office FSL Total	18,439	17,516	17,810	18,197
Field Agent FSL Subtotal	10,474	9,981	10,022	10,124
White-Collar Crime Program	2,460	2,404	2,210	2,303
Organized Crime/Drug Program	2,279	2,078	1,511	1,521
Violent Crime/Major Offenders Program	2,004	1,821	1,006	1,009
National Foreign Intelligence Program	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
Management	1,073	1,098	1,111	1,131
Domestic Terrorism	439	434	518	505
National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Program ¹⁶	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
Civil Rights Program	153	153	153	153
Applicants Program	132	121	79	79
Training Program	131	91	90	90
Criminal Enterprise Investigations Program	N/A	N/A	650	701
Cyber Crime Program	N/A	N/A	269	268
Technically Trained Agents	N/A	N/A	N/A	38
Evidence Response Teams	N/A	N/A	N/A	20
Field Support FSL Subtotal	7,965	7,535	7,788	8,073
Clerical/Administrative	3,987	3,852	3,940	3,960
Investigative	2,822	2,612	2,703	2,957
Technical	1,156	1,071	1,145	1,156

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

In FY 2003, the FBI's 56 field offices ranged in size from as large as 1,972 funded positions (New York City) to as small as 71 funded positions (Anchorage). In terms of funded positions, the FBI's five largest field offices were New York City, Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami. Combined, these offices represented over 30 percent of the total resources allocated to the field. Exhibit 2-4 provides a list of the total FSLs allocated to each field office and FBI Headquarters for FYs 2000 and FY 2003.

¹⁶ In FY 2003, the FBI did not allocate field agent positions for National Infrastructure Protection, only the Computer Intrusion Program.

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EXHIBIT 2-4

**AGENT AND SUPPORT FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS FOR FBI FIELD OFFICES AND FBI HEADQUARTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

LOCATION	FY 2000 AGENTS	FY 2003 AGENTS	CHANGE	FY 2000 SUPPORT	FY 2003 SUPPORT	CHANGE
FIELD OFFICES:						
NEW YORK CITY	1,156	1,071	-85	935	901	-34
LOS ANGELES	695	674	-21	448	456	8
WASHINGTON	662	711	49	702	725	23
CHICAGO	454	432	-22	309	304	-5
MIAMI	419	408	-11	287	286	-1
SAN FRANCISCO	360	353	-7	265	275	10
NEWARK	353	326	-27	217	212	-5
PHILADELPHIA	314	273	-41	206	198	-8
HOUSTON	306	276	-30	233	254	21
BOSTON	259	242	-17	174	173	-1
DALLAS	254	227	-27	206	198	-8
ATLANTA	250	214	-36	177	183	6
DETROIT	235	234	-1	167	172	5
SAN DIEGO	233	218	-15	158	170	12
PHOENIX	229	212	-17	130	146	16
BALTIMORE	211	199	-12	178	177	-1
SAN ANTONIO	200	189	-11	147	149	2
SAN JUAN	177	164	-13	109	106	-3
CLEVELAND	169	166	-3	131	121	-10
SALT LAKE CITY	168	146	-22	138	134	-4
NEW ORLEANS	160	153	-7	104	104	0
TAMPA	153	145	-8	109	114	5
DENVER	137	139	2	104	117	13
KANSAS CITY	137	133	-4	103	102	-1
PITTSBURGH	132	134	2	101	99	-2
SEATTLE	131	130	-1	106	119	13
EL PASO	130	112	-18	88	84	-4
OKLAHOMA CITY	128	124	-4	102	99	-3

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
LOCATION	FY 2000 AGENTS	FY 2003 AGENTS	CHANGE	FY 2000 SUPPORT	FY 2003 SUPPORT	CHANGE
SACRAMENTO	127	130	3	88	93	5
CHARLOTTE	117	114	-3	82	87	5
MINNEAPOLIS	115	115	0	83	88	5
LAS VEGAS	109	111	2	82	85	3
NEW HAVEN	104	103	-1	75	75	0
ALBUQUERQUE	101	98	-3	77	84	7
INDIANAPOLIS	92	94	2	73	75	2
PORTLAND	92	108	16	64	74	10
BUFFALO	91	107	16	79	89	10
MEMPHIS	90	88	-2	65	64	-1
HONOLULU	83	84	1	68	67	-1
MILWAUKEE	81	82	1	67	71	4
CINCINNATI	79	79	0	67	66	-1
ST. LOUIS	77	80	3	70	67	-3
LOUISVILLE	75	74	-1	67	65	-2
ALBANY	74	72	-2	62	60	-2
KNOXVILLE	73	69	-4	60	68	8
COLUMBIA	72	70	-2	57	58	1
BIRMINGHAM	71	74	3	63	64	1
JACKSONVILLE	71	76	5	65	64	-1
JACKSON	70	67	-3	52	54	2
RICHMOND	69	67	-2	57	56	-1
OMAHA	68	78	10	60	64	4
LITTLE ROCK	63	67	4	59	58	-1
NORFOLK	61	62	1	54	62	8
SPRINGFIELD	59	61	2	51	49	-2
MOBILE	54	55	1	50	51	1
ANCHORAGE	24	34	10	34	37	3
TOTAL FIELD OFFICES	10,474	10,124	-350	7,965	8,073	108
HEADQUARTERS	822	1,131	309	7,980	8,156	176
GRAND TOTAL	11,296	11,255	-41	15,945	16,229	284

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Resource Allocation Office data

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Field Agent Positions – Exhibit 2-5 highlights the resources allocated for field agents during our review period. As shown, the total agent positions allocated to FBI field offices ranged from 10,474 in FY 2000 to 10,124 in FY 2003, reflecting a decrease of 350 funded positions. Except for a single year decrease from FY 2000 to FY 2001, the number of agents allocated to field offices has increased in each subsequent fiscal year.

EXHIBIT 2-5
FIELD AGENT FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003¹⁷



Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

Because the FBI’s primary reason for transforming itself was to combat terrorism, we compared non-supervisory field agent resources allocated for matters related to terrorism to those allocated for non-terrorism work.¹⁸ Exhibit 2-6 illustrates what has occurred in each of these areas during our


¹⁷ Agent FSLs in this exhibit include those allocated for management positions within field offices.

¹⁸ We categorized FBI activities as being related to terrorism based on the program in which the work is captured. We considered terrorism-related work to be captured in the National Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Terrorism, and National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion programs.

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review period. In line with its shift in priorities, the FBI assigned additional non-supervisory field agent positions for terrorism-related matters and fewer agent resources for non-terrorism related matters.¹⁹ In fact, the number of allocated positions for terrorism-related matters has risen from FYs 2000 to 2002, with a slight decrease from FYs 2002 to 2003. In turn, the non-terrorism related agent staffing levels declined from FY 2000 to FY 2002, with a slight increase from FYs 2002 to 2003.

EXHIBIT 2-6
COMPOSITION OF NON-SUPERVISORY FIELD AGENT FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

The figures in Exhibit 2-6 provide the totals for the broad areas to which non-supervisory field agents were allocated, while Exhibit 2-7 provides a more in-depth look. This data is separated according to the various programs to which the FBI allocates field agent positions. As with Exhibit 2-6, we excluded field office management from this analysis because the FBI does not allocate supervisory agent positions among the various programs in the field.

¹⁹ In FY 2003, the FBI allocated 58 non-supervisory field agent positions to two new categories: Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) and Technically Trained Agents (TTAs). According to FBI officials, agents within these two categories provide investigative support to all program areas. Thus, we excluded these positions from our comparisons of terrorism-related and non-terrorism related funded positions.

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EXHIBIT 2-7
ALLOCATION OF NON-SUPERVISORY FIELD AGENTS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003

FUNDED COMPONENT		FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003
TERRORISM RELATED	Foreign Counterintelligence	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
	International Terrorism				
	Domestic Terrorism				
	National Infrastructure				
	Protection/Computer Intrusion ²⁰				
	Security				
SUBTOTAL		2,242	2,215	2,943	2,811
NON-TERRORISM RELATED	White-Collar Crime	2,460	2,404	2,210	2,303
	Violent Crimes and Major Offenders	2,004	1,821	1,006	1,009
	Organized Crime/Drugs	1,746	1,590	1,023	1,033
	Criminal Enterprise Investigations ²¹	N/A	N/A	650	701
	OCDETF ²²	533	488	488	488
	Civil Rights	153	153	153	153
	Applicant Matters	132	121	79	79
	Training	131	91	90	90
	Cyber Crime ²³	N/A	N/A	269	268
SUBTOTAL		7,159	6,668	5,968	6,124
OVERALL TOTALS		9,401	8,883	8,911	8,935

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

As can be seen in Exhibits 2-6 and 2-7, the overall reduction in field agent positions occurred in non-terrorism related programs. These areas experienced an overall decrease of 1,035 agent positions from FYs 2000 to 2003, a change of 14 percent. Specifically, the funded components that fall under the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) lost more than 1,200 agent positions during our review period, which equates to a decline of almost

²⁰ In FY 2003, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, which had been a part of the FBI's National Infrastructure/Computer Intrusion Program, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.

²¹ The FBI established the Criminal Enterprise Investigations Program during FY 2002 and began allocating field agent positions to this area in that fiscal year.

²² The Organized Crime/Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program is a coordinated effort of nine federal agencies. The FBI's budget specifically earmarks positions for this purpose and identifies them as reimbursable resources.

²³ The FBI established the Cyber Division in FY 2002 and began allocating field agent positions to its two components, Computer Intrusion and Cyber Crime, at that time.

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20 percent.²⁴ While most of these funded positions lost from CID programs were moved to terrorism-related work, some were redirected to the Cyber Division (i.e., the Computer Intrusion and Cyber Crime Programs) in FY 2002.

Conversely, the overall number of non-supervisory field agent positions allocated to terrorism-related matters increased significantly from FYs 2000 to 2003. More than 560 additional funded positions were allocated to these areas in FY 2003, an increase of 25 percent. In particular, the number of allocated agent positions [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED].

Using data from Exhibit 2-7, we examined FSL changes during our review period at the program level and developed a graphical representation, which is presented in Exhibit 2-8. As shown, the combination of the White-Collar Crime and Organized Crime/Drug programs accounted for more than half of the FBI's allocated non-supervisory field agent positions during FY 2000. By FY 2003, however, the greatest number of allocated positions resided within the White-Collar Crime and National Foreign Intelligence (NFIP) programs. Additionally, although it appears that the percentage of FBI funded agent positions encompassed by VCMO declined by approximately ten percent between FYs 2000 and 2003, this is not the case. In FY 2002, the FBI removed several sub-programs from VCMO and placed them into the newly-established Criminal Enterprise Investigations Program (CEI), which deals with violent criminal enterprises. Thus, a portion of VCMO agent resources was transferred to CEI. When combined, the percentage of FBI agent resources devoted to violent crime matters dropped by only two percent.

²⁴ The components in Exhibit 2-7 that fall under CID are White-Collar Crime, Violent Crime/Major Offenders, Organized Crime/Drugs, Criminal Enterprise Investigations, OCDETF, and Civil Rights.

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EXHIBIT 2-8
NON-SUPERVISORY FIELD AGENT FUNDED STAFFING LEVEL
ALLOCATIONS BY PROGRAM
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003²⁵

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED

FISCAL YEAR 2000

FISCAL YEAR 2003


Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

Field Support Positions – Based upon the data obtained from the FBI, FSLs for support resources in the field totaled 7,965 in FY 2000. In FY 2003, the total number of FSLs was 8,073, an increase of 108 positions since FY 2000. Exhibit 2-9 provides an overview of the total positions allocated to the field for support personnel.

As noted, in contrast to field agent positions, which are allocated at the program level, FSLs for field support personnel are divided into three categories: Clerical/Administrative, Investigative, or Technical. From the data collected by the FBI, it is not possible to determine if support personnel are working in areas that are terrorism or non-terrorism related. However, we reviewed how the FBI allocated resources to its three support categories in each fiscal year of our review period and found very little change. As shown in Exhibit 2-9, on average approximately half of the support positions in the field were comprised of Clerical/Administrative positions. Another 35 percent were allocated to the Investigative category, which includes positions such as special surveillance groups and language specialists. The remaining 15 percent were assigned to the Technical area, which includes positions such as electronics technicians.

²⁵ NFIP consists of the Foreign Counterintelligence, Security, and International Terrorism sub-programs. OC/D includes Organized Crime, Drugs, and OCDETF.

EXHIBIT 2-9
FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS FOR FIELD SUPPORT CATEGORIES
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office data

FBI Headquarters

Headquarters agent and support personnel are allocated by divisions or offices, and in FY 2000 the FBI allocated 8,802 FSLs to these Headquarters components (about 30 percent of the FBI’s total resources). Since that time, the resources allotted for Headquarters personnel have grown by 485 positions. As mentioned earlier, Headquarters’ FSLs can be further broken down into agent and support personnel.

Headquarters Agent Positions – There was not a significant change in the number of agent positions allocated to FBI Headquarters between FYs 2000 and 2002. However, there was a significant increase during FY 2003 when the number of allocated agent resources expanded from 778 in FY 2002 to 1,131 in FY 2003. Thus, from FYs 2000 to 2003, the number of Headquarters agent positions increased by 309 positions, or nearly 40 percent.

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**EXHIBIT 2-10
ALLOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS AGENTS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

HEADQUARTERS COMPONENT	FY 2000 FSL	FY 2003 FSL	FSL CHANGE	PERCENT CHANGE
Criminal Investigative Division	144	154	10	7
Laboratory Division	139	66	-73	-53
Counterterrorism Division	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
Training & Development Division	102	124	22	22
Counterintelligence Division	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
Office of International Operations	57	17	-40	-70
Inspection Division	30	29	-1	-3
Office of Professional Responsibility	28	25	-3	-11
Administrative Services Division	27	21	-6	-22
Information Resources Division	20	2	-18	-90
Office of the General Counsel	18	20	2	11
Criminal Justice Information Services Division	17	12	-5	-29
Office of Public Affairs	17	18	1	6
Finance Division	11	8	-3	-27
Director's Office	5	10	5	100
Office of EEO Affairs	5	4	-1	-20
Cyber Division ²⁶	N/A	48	48	N/A
Investigative Technology ²⁶	N/A	104	104	N/A
Records Management Division ²⁶	N/A	2	2	N/A
Security Division ²⁶	N/A	63	63	N/A
TOTALS	822	1,131	309	38%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource and Management Allocation Office data

Exhibit 2-10 shows the allocation of agent positions to Headquarters divisions for FYs 2000 and 2003, along with the corresponding changes over this time period. From this data, we noted that the FBI enhanced its agent staffing levels in those divisions with a direct connection to its new, terrorism-focused priorities. For instance, the Counterterrorism Division experienced an increase [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. Furthermore, the Counterintelligence Division was allocated [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. In turn, the FBI reduced the level of agent resources allocated to other divisions. For example, the Laboratory Division's FSLs decreased by 73 agent positions from FYs 2000 to 2003, a reduction of more than 50 percent. However, according to an FBI official, a portion of these positions were moved from the Laboratory Division to the Investigative Technology Division, which was established during FY 2003.

²⁶ No agent positions were allocated to this division during FY 2000.

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In terms of composition, based upon the FSL data the Counterterrorism Division was the largest FBI Headquarters Division during FY 2003, accounting for 20 percent of the total resources allocated for Headquarters agent personnel. From FYs 2000 to 2002, the Criminal Investigative Division was the largest FBI Headquarters division. From this perspective, the FBI has focused its FSL allocations according to its priorities.

Headquarters Support Positions – Unlike the FSLs for Headquarters agents, the total allotted positions for support personnel within FBI Headquarters did not significantly change from FYs 2000 to 2003. Over this time period, these resources increased by 176 positions, a growth of only 2 percent. However, as shown in Exhibit 2-11, the composition of Headquarters support positions did change to reflect the FBI's new priorities.

Similar to Exhibit 2-10, Exhibit 2-11 shows the allocation of support personnel positions to Headquarters divisions for FYs 2000 and 2003, along with the corresponding changes over this time period. These changes indicate the FBI also allocated its support staffing levels in accordance with terrorism-driven priorities. For example, the Counterterrorism Division was allotted [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED], while the Counterintelligence Division received [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. At the same time, several new components were created and allocated support positions, including the Cyber Division and the Records Management Division. In turn, the FBI reduced the level of resources allocated to other divisions. Notably, the Office of Public and Congressional Affairs (OPCA) experienced the greatest reduction of support positions within any Headquarters component, a decline of 680 positions. However, according to an FBI official, the majority of these positions were from the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts Section, which was moved from OPCA to the Records Management Division during FY 2002.

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**EXHIBIT 2-11
ALLOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

HEADQUARTERS COMPONENT	FY 2000 FSL	FY 2003 FSL	NUMBER CHANGE	PERCENT CHANGE
Criminal Justice Information Services Division	2,974	2,512	-462	-16
Laboratory Division	949	610	-339	-36
Office of Public & Congressional Affairs	766	86	-680	-89
Information Resources Division	753	572	-181	-24
Administrative Services Division	726	604	-122	-17
Finance Division	359	323	-36	-10
Training & Development Division	334	269	-65	-19
Investigative Services Division ²⁷	297	N/A	-297	-100
Counterintelligence Division	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
Counterterrorism Division	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
Office of the General Counsel	152	176	24	16
Criminal Investigative Division	143	194	51	36
Inspection Division	66	63	-3	-5
Office of Professional Responsibility	41	39	-2	-5
Director's Office	26	44	18	69
Office of EEO Affairs	23	22	-1	-4
Cyber Division ²⁸	N/A	45	45	N/A
Office of International Operations ²⁸	N/A	84	84	N/A
Investigative Technology ²⁸	N/A	514	514	N/A
Records Management Division ²⁸	N/A	851	851	N/A
Security Division ²⁸	N/A	556	556	N/A
TOTALS	7,980	8,156	176	2%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI Resource and Management Allocation Office data

Chapter Summary

A significant part of the FBI's transformation plans included allocating its funded positions (or FSLs) in accordance with its new priorities. Based upon our analysis of the data, we found that the FBI had, in fact, deployed its FSLs according to its new priorities in both the funded positions allocated to field programs and those allocated to Headquarters divisions.

²⁷ No support personnel positions were allocated to this division during FY 2003; it was disbanded in the FBI's post-9/11 reorganization.

²⁸ No support personnel positions were allocated to this division during FY 2000.

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Within field offices, the FBI increased the number of agent positions it allocated for terrorism-related matters. More than 560 additional funded positions were allocated to these types of areas in FY 2003 compared to FY 2000, an increase of 25 percent. In particular, the number of allocated agent positions [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. In turn, 1,035 fewer agent positions were allotted for non-terrorism related matters. Specifically, the resources allocated to various programs within the Criminal Investigative Division dropped by almost 20 percent.

Similar changes occurred within FBI Headquarters as the FBI enhanced its Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence divisions by allotting additional agent and support resources to each. In particular, the Counterterrorism Division's FSLs increased [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED] in both agent and support positions, while the Counterintelligence Division experienced a growth [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED] in its allocated agent resources from FY 2000 to FY 2003. We further noted that while the FBI added a relatively small number of positions (10 agents and 51 support personnel) to the Criminal Investigative Division, it also reduced the agent and support resources to some Headquarters divisions, such as the FBI Laboratory.

CHAPTER 3: RESOURCE UTILIZATION AND CASEWORK

In order to determine the specific investigative areas in which the FBI was concentrating its efforts, we reviewed resource utilization levels and casework data within the fiscal years covered by our review. While the FSL analysis in Chapter 2 assesses the FBI's *planned* resource usage, the examination of resource utilization in this chapter shows the types of investigations FBI personnel *actually* spent time performing. Moreover, the analysis of casework data provides additional information on certain investigative areas. We conducted these analyses to identify the areas of change in the FBI's operational efforts as a result of its reprioritization and reprogramming.

Based on our analyses of this FBI timekeeping data, we found that the FBI utilized agent resources consistent with its mandate to make combating terrorism its primary focus. Moreover, during FY 2003, agent resources were utilized above the allocated levels for matters related to the FBI's three highest priorities – counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. We also found that most of our casework analyses supported the same conclusions. The results of our analyses also specifically identified investigative areas in which the FBI significantly changed its resource utilization, either by increasing or decreasing its effort. To comply with FBI priorities, resources dedicated to terrorism matters significantly increased.

As discussed in Chapter 2, resources were transferred from traditional criminal investigative programs, specifically, the Organized Crime/Drug (OC/D), White-Collar Crime (WCC), and Violent Crime/Major Offenders (VCMO) programs, to programs related to combating terrorism. We found certain investigative areas, mostly within the OC/D, WCC, and VCMO programs, to be significantly affected by the reduction in funded agent resources. Moreover, in traditional crime programs, actual agent resource utilization decreased at an even greater rate than what was allocated. Therefore, the FBI's transformation significantly impacted the number of agents investigating traditional crime, even beyond what the FBI had planned.

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Automated System

The FBI uses the Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system to record time spent by most FBI field office personnel on various types of investigative matters.²⁹ The TURK system requires field agents to report daily the proportion of their time worked in FBI investigative classifications. Therefore, the data derived from the FBI TURK system is only as valid as the information reported by FBI field agents. TURK data is recorded for the following personnel:

AGENTS

- non-supervisory special agents grade GS-13 and below
- grade GS-14 Chief Division Counsels
- grade GS-14 Assistant Division Counsels

SUPPORT PERSONNEL

- investigative specialists
- language specialists
- financial assistants/analysts
- information technology specialists-forensic examiners
- intelligence research specialists
- surveillance specialists

For each agent (or support employee) the FBI TURK system maintains the percentage of time worked each day according to FBI investigative classifications, which the FBI calls Average on Board (AOB). The percentages are based on a 10-hour day for agents and an 8-hour day for support personnel. The FBI considers the TURK system's AOB data to be the best way to assess the actual amount worked by FBI employees in specific FBI investigative programs, sub-programs, and classifications. For the purposes of this report, we use the term AOB and on-board employee (agent or support) interchangeably.

Although time and attendance data is recorded daily by FBI personnel, data collection in the TURK system is divided into 13 TURK periods each fiscal year, making each TURK period consist of 2 pay periods. For example, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, occurred during TURK period 13 of FY 2001.

²⁹ FBI Headquarters personnel are not required to record their time in TURK because, generally, they do not work on specific investigative matters. In addition, top level management within FBI field offices do not record time in TURK.

Investigative Programs, Sub-programs, and Classifications

The FBI assigns each of its cases to an investigative classification based on the crime that is being investigated. The investigative classification is the greatest level of detail to which the FBI tracks resource utilization. Each classification is assigned to a program and, if appropriate, a sub-program. An example of this is detailed in Exhibit 3-1. If a "TURKing" FBI employee worked a bank robbery case, the percentage of time worked would be recorded for Classification 091A (Bank Robbery), which is within the Violent Incident Crimes sub-program of the Violent Crime/Major Offenders Program.

EXHIBIT 3-1		
FBI INVESTIGATIVE NOMENCLATURE		
<u>Category</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Indicator</u>
Program	Violent Crime/Major Offenders	VCMO
Sub-program	Violent Incident Crimes	VC
Classification	Bank Robbery	091A

Source: FBI Finance Division


Data Collection – We obtained TURK AOB information for both agent and support personnel from September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003.³⁰ The universe included a total of 1,009,971 records, consisting of agent AOB captured for each FBI field office at the program, sub-program, and investigative classification level for each TURK period of our reviewed timeframe.

Data Analysis – In general, we analyzed AOB data by fiscal year. Exhibit 3-2 shows the total agent AOB from FYs 2000 through 2003 for the FBI as a whole. Agent utilization within field offices has decreased by nearly 400 agents since FY 2000. A large portion of this decrease is related to a hiring freeze the FBI experienced in FY 2001, often referred to by the FBI as the "hollow work year" issue.³¹

³⁰ September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003, encompass FYs 2000 through 2003 in the TURK system. Because TURK periods are comprised of pay periods, fiscal years in the TURK system do not always end on September 30 or begin on October 1.

³¹ The hollow work year issue is discussed in Chapter 2.

EXHIBIT 3-2
TOTAL FBI ON-BOARD FIELD AGENTS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Agent Utilization at the FBI Program Level

We further analyzed agent resource utilization by reviewing AOB at the program level for FYs 2000 through 2003. However, it must be noted that both the WCC and VCMO programs had sub-programs transferred to the new Cyber Crime Program (CCP) and Criminal Enterprise Investigations (CEI) Program for FY 2003, as detailed in Exhibit 3-3.

EXHIBIT 3-3		
SUB-PROGRAMS TRANSFERRED BETWEEN PROGRAMS		
Sub-program	FYs 2000 – 2002 Program	FY 2003 Program
Intellectual Property Rights	WCC	CCP
Innocent Images Initiative	VCMO	CCP
OCDETF – VCMO	VCMO	CEI
Major Theft	VCMO	CEI
Violent Gangs	VCMO	CEI

Source: FBI Finance Division

Therefore, to accurately compare the change in the FBI’s investigative efforts at the program level, we adjusted the WCC and VCMO programs’ agent utilization figures for FY 2003 to encompass the transferred sub-programs’ agent utilization data. Exhibit 3-4 illustrates the average

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agent utilization within each FBI program for FYs 2000 through 2003, charting the change in the number of agent resources investigating cases within particular programs.

EXHIBIT 3-4 **AGENT UTILIZATION WITHIN FBI PROGRAMS** **ADJUSTED FOR SUB-PROGRAMS TRANSFERRED** **FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

As evidenced in Exhibit 3-4, traditional crime area programs, specifically the WCC, OC/D, and VCMO programs, experienced significant agent resource reductions during our review period.³² This reduction in resources is in accord with FBI officials' statements that resources were transferred from traditional crime programs to terrorism-related efforts. Conversely, the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) experienced a large increase in agent utilization. Between FYs 2000 and 2002, [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. This increase coincides with the FBI's changed priorities in counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters.

³² A more detailed discussion of these programs and their agent utilization reductions is contained in Chapter 4.

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As noted in Chapter 1, the 9/11 attacks caused agent utilization data at the end of FY 2001 and throughout the first half of FY 2002 to be skewed towards terrorism-related matters. Therefore, in order to conduct a better comparison of resource utilization within the FBI, we concentrated our analysis on comparing FY 2000 data to FY 2003 data. This approach provided a view of resource utilization both before and well into the FBI's reprioritization efforts, revealing the areas of greatest change in actual agent (and support personnel) time worked at the program, sub-program, and classification levels.

We computed the change in agent utilization within the FBI programs, as shown in Exhibit 3-5. Again, we adjusted the VCMO and WCC programs to reflect the programs' sub-program composition in FY 2000.³³ The program experiencing the largest increase in the number of agents working its investigations was NFIP, [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED] in FY 2003. Traditional crime programs – VCMO, WCC, and OC/D – experienced the largest reductions in agent utilization. These resource changes correlate with the FBI's new priorities and its changes to agent allocations (FSLs).

EXHIBIT 3-5 **ON-BOARD AGENT CHANGES IN FBI PROGRAMS** **FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

³³ Exhibit 3-3 details which sub-programs were transferred from the VCMO and WCC programs to the CEI Program and CCP.

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In addition to analyzing the change in the number of agents utilized within each program between FYs 2000 and 2003, we evaluated the proportion of the total number of agents utilized in each program, as graphically presented in Exhibit 3-6. These charts show the percentage of FBI agent resources used within each program for FYs 2000 and 2003. As shown, the largest decrease occurred in the OC/D Program; of the total investigative agents in each fiscal year, the OC/D Program utilized 10 percent fewer agents in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. Alternatively, the percentage of total agents investigating [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED].

EXHIBIT 3-6 **AGENT UTILIZATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF** **TOTAL AGENT RESOURCES** **FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

FISCAL YEAR 2000

FISCAL YEAR 2003

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Exhibit 3-4, Exhibit 3-5, and Exhibit 3-6 show that, before the FBI's reprioritization, the traditional criminal programs – WCC, OC/D, and VCMO – used more agent resources than other programs. However, subsequent to the reprioritization, NFIP, compared to all other programs, utilized the largest percentage of total FBI field agent resources and increased its agent utilization more than any other program.

Comparison of Agent Allocation to Utilization

As discussed in Chapter 2, the FBI allocates agent resources in terms of Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs). The data discussed within this chapter focuses on agent utilization – how agent resources were actually used. Exhibit 3-7 graphically compares allocated to actual field agent data for FYs 2000 through 2003. The difference between the allocated resources

(FSLs) and actual resources utilized (on-board agents) generates what the FBI refers to as the “burn rate.” In FY 2001, the FBI experienced an “overburn,” which occurs when resources are utilized at a level *above* the FSL; the overburn in FY 2001 was 165 agents. An “underburn” occurs when resources are utilized at a level *below* the FSL. This was the case in FYs 2000, 2002, and 2003. The largest underburn during our review period occurred in FY 2002; the FBI utilized 128 fewer on-board agents than it was allocated.

EXHIBIT 3-7
COMPARISON OF FIELD AGENT ALLOCATION TO UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003³⁴



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data and Resource Management and Allocation Office data


To better assess how the FBI’s reprioritization of terrorism-related work has affected its agent utilization since 9/11, we compared burn rates in two broad investigative categories: terrorism-related and non-terrorism related.³⁵ As seen in Exhibit 3-8, in FY 2003 the FBI experienced an

³⁴ On-board agent data only captures non-supervisory field agents, including ERTs and TTAs. Therefore, we excluded management positions allocated to field offices from this analysis.

³⁵ The FSL and on-board agent data for “Terrorism-Related” and “Non-Terrorism Related” correspond with the categories listed in Exhibit 2-7.

overburn of 845 field agent resources in terrorism-related matters and an underburn of 879 agent resources in non-terrorism related matters.

EXHIBIT 3-8
COMPARISON OF FIELD AGENT ALLOCATION TO UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEAR 2003³⁶




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and Resource Management and Allocation Office data

Casework at the FBI Program Level

In addition to agent utilization, we reviewed the universe of all field office cases in the ACS system during our review period and compared the number of cases opened, by program, in FY 2000 to those opened in FY 2003. We found that by FY 2003, the FBI opened fewer cases in traditional criminal areas and more in those areas related to terrorism. As shown in Exhibit 3-9, the number of cases opened in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and Domestic Terrorism (DT) Program increased between the two periods, while the number of cases opened in the OC/D, WCC, and VCMO programs decreased.

³⁶ On-board agent data only captures non-supervisory field agents. Therefore, we excluded management positions allocated to field offices from this analysis.

EXHIBIT 3-9
FIELD OFFICE CASES OPENED IN FBI PROGRAMS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003³⁷



Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data


Specifically, the FBI opened 8,925 more NFIP cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000, reflecting an increase of more than 70 percent. The FBI opened over 50 percent more Domestic Terrorism cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. In contrast, the FBI opened over 50 percent fewer Organized Crime/Drug cases, 40 percent fewer Violent Crime cases, and more than 25 percent fewer White-Collar Crime cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. The FBI also opened fewer Civil Rights, Training, and National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion cases in FY 2003 compared to FY 2000.

³⁷ The VCMO and WCC totals were adjusted to reflect the sub-programs from each that moved into new programs in FY 2003, as noted in Exhibit 3-3.

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We then consolidated the data found in Exhibit 3-9 into terrorism and non-terrorism related matters in order to review how trends in case openings within these two broader categories changed from FY 2000 to FY 2003. As shown in Exhibit 3-10, we found that the FBI increased the number of terrorism-related cases it opened by more than 60 percent and reduced the number of non-terrorism related cases it opened by 37 percent during our review period.

EXHIBIT 3-10
TERRORISM-RELATED AND NON-TERRORISM RELATED
FIELD OFFICE CASES OPENED
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003³⁸



Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Agent Utilization and Casework at the FBI Classification Level

To obtain the most detailed information possible, we analyzed agent utilization at the investigative classification level between FYs 2000 and 2003. Since our focus was on the FBI’s investigative efforts, we eliminated training and administrative classifications tracked within the TURK system from this analysis. Also, classifications that changed or existed in only one of the two fiscal years examined were not included in the analysis.³⁹

³⁸ Case openings in the MISC program, which are captured in Exhibit 3-9, are not included in this analysis because they are generally administrative (non-investigative) in nature.

³⁹ The classifications eliminated from our review are noted in Appendix I.

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During our analysis, we recognized the large impact of percent changes in agent utilization within classifications or programs. This is best explained by an example. In Classification 281A (*OC/DI LCN and Italian Organizations*) the Albany Field Office experienced a reduction from 0.49 agents in FY 2000 to 0.03 in FY 2003, a 95 percent change.⁴⁰ Therefore, even though Albany dedicated very few resources to investigating Classification 281A matters in any fiscal year, when looking at the percent change, one is led to believe that Albany was significantly impacted by its reduction in agent resources conducting such investigations. Thus, given this example, it would be misleading to focus exclusively on percent changes. Therefore, we focused our analysis primarily on total on-board agent changes. Still, percent changes cannot be entirely discounted, and we present them when they are appropriate for our analyses.

Increase in Resource Utilization – The FBI lists counterterrorism and counterintelligence as its top two priorities and, as discussed, it has transferred large amounts of resources to target these two priorities. As a result, a great majority of the investigative classifications experiencing the largest increase in agent utilization are related to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. This became apparent when we analyzed the TURK data and identified the 30 investigative classifications experiencing the greatest on-board agent increases between FYs 2000 and 2003. Our results are displayed in Exhibit 3-11.

⁴⁰ According to the FBI, La Cosa Nostra (LCN) is a nationwide alliance of organized criminals with its roots in Italian Organized Crime.

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**EXHIBIT 3-11
30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING
THE GREATEST INCREASES IN AGENT UTILIZATION
BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

Classification Number	Classification Name	AOB Change FYs 2000- 2003	
		Number	Percent
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
196C	Securities/Commodities Fraud	73	54
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
266A	AOT-DT – Violent Crimes – Predicate Offense	37	30
306	Serial Killings	28	1,201
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
067D	Support Applicant Investigations	21	264
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
067B	Special Agent Applicant Investigations	18	138
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
089B	Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer	11	72
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
164C	Crime Aboard Aircraft – All other	11	374
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
253A	Fraud & Rel Activity – Ident Documents (FRAID) – Terrorists	10	747
174D	Bomb Technician Activities	8	46
300B	CT Preparedness – Aviation Security	8	523
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		
261G	Security Officer Matters – Other	6	213
	CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		

ACRONYMS:

AOT = Acts of Terrorism
DT = Domestic Terrorism

FRAID = Fraud & Related Activity Identification Documents
CT = Counterterrorism

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data and NFIP Manual

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
Twenty four of the 30 investigative classifications listed in Exhibit 3-11 fell under the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and the Domestic Terrorism (DT) Program. The largest total on-board agent increase occurred within NFIP in Classification 265A (AOT-IT – *Violent Crimes Predicate Offense*).

Six of the 30 classifications listed in Exhibit 3-11 are from programs not related to terrorism. The classification undergoing the largest increase in this group, 196C (*Securities/Commodities Fraud*), is from the White-Collar Crime Program. Three other classifications are within the VCMO Program: 306 (*Serial Killings*), 089B (*Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer*), and 164C (*Crime aboard Aircraft – All Other*). The remaining two classifications – 067D (*Support Applicant Investigations*) and 067B (*Special Agent Applicant Investigations*) – are applicant classifications.

Casework – We also reviewed casework data from the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system and found that 22,993 cases (6 percent) from the original universe of 404,318 cases worked during our review period fell into one of the 30 investigative classifications undergoing the largest increase in on-board agents.⁴¹ We also noted a general upward trend in total case openings in these classifications. The only variation noted was a slight decrease of 310 cases between FYs 2000 and 2001. By FY 2003, the FBI had opened 2,808 more cases in these classifications than it had in FY 2000, an increase of 81 percent. Additionally, as shown in Exhibit 3-12, the FBI closed more cases in these classifications in each fiscal year of the review period, culminating in a high of 7,850 case closures in FY 2003. This amounts to an increase of 130 percent compared to FY 2000.

⁴¹ We designated a case as "worked" if it was open at any point during our review period. Additionally, case counts for each classification in the top 30 increasing classifications are contained in Appendix VI.

EXHIBIT 3-12
OVERALL CASES OPENED AND CLOSED IN
THE TOP 30 INCREASING CLASSIFICATIONS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Exhibit 3-13 highlights changes in the number of cases opened within each of these classifications between FYs 2000 and 2003.⁴² Our review determined that the largest increase in case openings was in Classification [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. We also noted a significant increase in cases involving Usama Bin Laden (199N), as well as foreign counterintelligence cases [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED]. These findings are consistent with the FBI's mandate to prioritize terrorism-related work. The large amount of work in Classification 199N is also logical in light of Usama Bin Laden's connection to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The large amount of work in classifications [CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED].

⁴² Exhibit 3-13 contains only 28 of the 30 investigative classifications that experienced the largest increases in agent utilization. Classifications 067B (Special Agent Applicant Investigations) and 067D (Support Applicant Investigations) were excluded from this review because only 15 cases within these classifications were captured in both fiscal years reviewed. Based on a review of the data file, it appears that these types of investigations are opened by FBI Headquarters, rather than FBI field offices.

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EXHIBIT 3-13

**CHANGES IN CASE OPENINGS IN THE CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING
THE GREATEST INCREASES IN AGENT UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

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We noted a few classifications in which case openings decreased. The classification with the most significant reduction in case openings, Securities/Commodities Fraud (196C), opened 266 fewer cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000.

Reduction in Resource Utilization – In addition to identifying the investigative classifications experiencing the largest agent utilization increases, we identified the investigative classifications with the greatest reductions in agent utilization between FYs 2000 and 2003. Again, we did not include classifications related to training or administrative matters. In addition, we did not include any classifications that changed or were eliminated between FYs 2000 and 2003.⁴³ The 30 investigative classifications experiencing the largest reduction in agent utilization are listed in Exhibit 3-14.

⁴³ The classifications eliminated from our review are noted in Appendix I.

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**EXHIBIT 3-14
30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING
THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION
BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

Classification Number	Classification Name	AOB Change FYs 2000- 2003	
		Number	Percent
245C	OCDETF – Mexican Organizations	-123	-44
281C	OC/DI – Mexican Organizations	-119	-63
281A	OC/DI – LCN and Italian Organizations	-103	-34
088A	Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence	-101	-60
209A	Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program	-89	-36
091A	Bank Robbery	-81	-26
281F	OC/DI – Other Major Criminal Organizations	-76	-70
245F	OCDETF – Other Major Criminal Organizations	-62	-54
245B	OCDETF – Central/South American Organizations	-61	-53
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
029C	FIF - \$25K - \$99,999 Fed-Insured Bank	-50	-67
281B	OC/DI – Central/South American Organizations	-44	-70
281I	OC/DI – Caribbean Organizations	-43	-76
281E	OC/DI – Asian Organizations	-40	-34
196A	Telemarketing Fraud	-38	-62
245D	OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs	-37	-28
196D	Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes	-35	-14
209B	Health Care Fraud – Private Ins. Program	-32	-34
245I	OCDETF – Caribbean Organizations	-31	-45
087B	Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - \$25K+	-29	-56
026B	ITSMV – Commercial Theft or Chop Shops	-29	-62
092C	Racketeering Enterprise Investigations – Mexican Organizations	-28	-66
196B	Insurance Fraud	-28	-51
282A	Civil Rights – Color of Law – Force &/or Violence	-28	-34
300A	Counterterrorism Preparedness – Special Events	-27	-43
049A	Bankruptcy Fraud \$50K+ /or Court Officer	-26	-59
249A	Environmental Crimes	-25	-75
244	Hostage Rescue Team	-24	-35
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED			
015B	TFIS – Loss of \$25K; Weapons, Explosives	-21	-60

ACRONYMS:

OCDETF = Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

OC/DI = Organized Crime/Drug Investigations

LCN = La Cosa Nostra

FIF = Financial Institution Fraud

ITSMV = Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles


TFIS = Theft From Interstate Shipment

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data and NFIP Manual

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Organized crime and drug-related matters accounted for 12 of the 30 investigative classifications experiencing the largest reductions in agent resource utilization. In fact, 3 of these 12 classifications had reductions of over 100 on-board agents: Classification 245C (*OCDETF – Mexican Organizations*), Classification 281C (*OC/DI – Mexican Organizations*), and Classification 281A (*OC/DI – LCN and Italian Organizations*). In addition to the 12 classifications relating to organized crime and drug matters, 8 were white-collar crime classifications, 3 were criminal enterprise classifications, 3 were violent crime classifications, 2 came from NFIP, and 1 each came from DT and Civil Rights. The on-board agent changes are summarized by program areas in Exhibit 3-15.

EXHIBIT 3-15
AGENT UTILIZATION CHANGE WITHIN PROGRAM AREAS
FOR THE 30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING
THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


The FBI officials we spoke with prior to our data analysis stated that the OC/D, VCMO, and WCC programs were the investigative programs most affected by the reprioritization and reprogramming. Our analysis of agent utilization reductions at the FBI investigative classification level, as well as at the FBI program level, is consistent with their statements. The reductions in these matters are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

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Casework – We reviewed our original universe of cases worked during our review period to isolate those falling within the top 30 decreasing classifications. We identified 121,798 cases that met these criteria, reflecting 30 percent of the original sample. We then reviewed the data and found that bank robbery investigations (Classification 091A) accounted for 41,336 of these cases, by far the largest number of cases in any single classification.⁴⁴ The next largest classification, violent fugitive investigations (Classification 088A), accounted for 31,788 cases. When combined, these two classifications accounted for 60 percent of the 121,798 cases identified as being part of this sample.

Using our sample of 121,798 cases, we determined the total number of cases opened and closed during each fiscal year of our review period. We found that within these classifications, in addition to opening fewer cases in each subsequent fiscal year of the review period, the FBI opened over 17,000 fewer cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. Case closings reflected a similar downward trend, with a 44 percent reduction between FYs 2000 and 2003. These results are presented in Exhibit 3-16.

EXHIBIT 3-16
TOTAL CASES OPENED AND CLOSED IN
THE TOP 30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE
GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data


⁴⁴ Case counts for the top 30 decreasing classifications are found in Appendix VI.

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We then reviewed the data to determine how specific case openings changed before and after 9/11. Exhibit 3-17 highlights, for the 30 classifications experiencing the largest AOB reductions, the most significant reduction in the number of cases opened occurred in the investigations of violent fugitives (088A), where the FBI initiated 11,617 fewer cases in FY 2003 than it did in FY 2000. No other reductions in openings were as significant. The result for bank robbery cases (091A) was notable because although the FBI reduced its utilization of resources in this classification by 26 percent during our review period, the FBI actually opened 485 more cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000.

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EXHIBIT 3-17
CHANGES IN CASE OPENINGS IN THE TOP 30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING
THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Chapter Summary

Overall, our assessment of utilization rates by program areas confirms that the FBI focused its field agent resources according to its stated priorities. In addition, the FBI used considerably more field agents in terrorism-related matters than it had projected in FY 2003. In fact, the FBI overburned field agent resources in areas related to its top three priorities – counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. Conversely, resources dedicated to criminal investigative matters did not reach the allocated staffing levels; during FY 2003, the FBI utilized significantly fewer field agents than it had allocated in criminal investigative matters.

We designed a portion of our analyses to identify the specific investigative classifications most affected by the FBI's shift in effort during our review period. The majority of the top 30 classifications that experienced the greatest increases in field agent utilization were related to terrorism. Conversely, most of the top 30 classifications that experienced the largest reductions in agent utilization were related to the FBI's more traditional, criminal investigative efforts. Only 3 of the 30 classifications in which agent usage decreased the most focused on terrorism-related matters.

Our specific analyses of casework data revealed that the greatest decreases in case openings occurred in traditional criminal areas where the FBI stated it planned to reduce its efforts, while increases in case openings occurred mainly in programs related to terrorism. Specifically, our analysis of all cases in our universe revealed significant increases in case openings in national foreign intelligence and domestic terrorism matters between FYs 2000 and 2003, and significant decreases in case openings in both violent crime and white-collar crime investigations for the same timeframe.


As noted in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 2, the FBI primarily reduced its investigative efforts in three traditional crime areas: organized crime/drugs, violent crime, and white-collar crime. In Chapter 4, we discuss the changes that occurred in the allocation and utilization of field agent resources within these three program areas, as well as direction given to field offices in these areas by FBI management.

CHAPTER 4: REDUCTIONS IN FBI PROGRAMS

The reprioritization efforts within the FBI called for a shift in resources from traditional criminal investigative areas to terrorism-related initiatives. According to the FBI, officials looked at various factors in deciding from which programs the resources should be taken, including whether the criminal area was one that the FBI exclusively worked. For example, given that other law enforcement agencies conducted drug investigations and that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was the primary federal agency for handling drug investigations, the FBI decided that resources could be taken from its Drug Program.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division experienced significant reductions in the number of allocated field agent positions. In particular, three CID program areas had fewer agents assigned to field offices in FY 2003 than in FY 2000: Organized Crime/Drugs, Violent Crime, and White-Collar Crime. Exhibit 4-1 illustrates changes in field agent allocation that have occurred in these areas during our review period.

EXHIBIT 4-1
FIELD AGENT FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS
IN SELECTED FBI PROGRAM AREAS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003⁴⁵



Source: OIG Analysis of FBI Resource Management and Allocation Data

⁴⁵ Because of the transfers of several sub-programs between VCMO and CEI in FY 2003, to obtain a more realistic view of what occurred to the number of funded positions for *all* violent crime investigations, we combined FSLs for VCMO and CEI.

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Besides the decline in allocated agent positions, these three program areas also experienced significant reductions in the actual utilization of agents. In fact, 26 of the 30 investigative classifications we identified in Chapter 3 as having experienced the greatest reductions in on-board agents between FYs 2000 and 2003 were part of these 3 program areas. In this chapter we discuss the changes that occurred in the allocation and utilization of field agent resources within these program areas, as well as direction given to field offices in these areas by FBI management.

Organized Crime/Drug Matters

The Organized Crime/Drug (OC/D) Program, which is divided into separate components for organized crime and drugs, targets large criminal organizations. The Drug Section investigates organizations involved in illegal drug trafficking, while the Organized Crime (OC) Section investigates other organized criminal enterprises. The OC Section did not experience any reduction in allocated resources during the FBI’s reprogramming. However, investigative efforts related to drug trafficking were significantly affected by the FBI’s reprioritization efforts. Therefore, we focused our attention on drug-related matters.

Resource Allocation and Utilization – The FBI allocates OC/D resources into three areas: Organized Crime, Drugs, and OCDETF.⁴⁶ As shown in Exhibit 4-2, reductions in agent Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs) allocated to Drugs accounted for nearly all of the change within OC/D between FYs 2001 and 2003, while agent resources allocated to Organized Crime and OCDETF remained at virtually the same level.

EXHIBIT 4-2
FIELD AGENT FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS
ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUG PROGRAM
FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2003

<u>Component</u>	<u>FY 2001</u>	<u>FY 2002</u>	<u>FY 2003</u>
Drugs	890	326	335
Organized Crime	700	697	698
OCDETF	488	488	488


Source: FBI Resource Management and Allocation Office

⁴⁶ The FBI’s FY 2000 FSL allocations only distinguished between OC/D and OCDETF; in FY 2001 it split OC/D into two distinct categories (Organized Crime and Drugs).

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Similar to the reductions in allocated agents, we found significant decreases in the number of on-board agents utilized within the OC/D Program between FYs 2000 and 2003. As evidenced in Exhibit 4-3, both FSLs and on-board agents generally decreased in each successive fiscal year. The only exception to this occurred in FY 2003, when FSLs increased by 10 positions. Field agent FSLs in OC/D decreased by 758 positions, or nearly 35 percent, from FY 2000 to FY 2003. During the same period, the number of on-board agents utilized on OC/D matters declined by 1,032 agents, or 44 percent. These results suggest that decreases in field agent utilization within OC/D matters exceeded even the FBI's planned reductions.

EXHIBIT 4-3
COMPARISON OF ALLOCATED TO ACTUAL FIELD AGENT RESOURCES
ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUG PROGRAM
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003⁴⁷



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

⁴⁷ The FSLs include allocated positions for Drugs, Organized Crime, and OCDETF. Because OCDETF FSLs are not separately allocated to OC/D-OCDETF sub-program and the VCMO-OCDETF sub-program, we incorporated the OCDETF-VCMO on-board agent data in this analysis to provide a valid comparison of allocated-to-actual field agent resources.

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Investigative Classifications – From our identification in Chapter 3 of the individual investigative classifications that experienced the greatest reductions in field agent utilization, we found that 12 involved OC/D investigative matters.⁴⁸ Moreover, 11 of these 12 classifications related to matters involving drugs.⁴⁹ These 12 classifications and their on-board agent reductions are detailed in Exhibit 4-4.

EXHIBIT 4-4		
GREATEST AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION CHANGES IN ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUG CLASSIFICATIONS FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003		
Classification Name	Classification	AOB Change
Organized Crime/Drug Investigation (OC/DI) Classifications		
OC/DI – Mexican Organizations	281C	-119
OC/DI – La Cosa Nostra and Italian Organizations	281A	-103
OC/DI – Other Major Criminal Organizations	281F	-76
OC/DI – Central/South American Organizations	281B	-44
OC/DI – Caribbean Organizations	281I	-43
OC/DI – Asian Organizations	281E	-40
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Classifications		
OCDETF – Mexican Organizations	245C	-123
OCDETF – Other Major Criminal Organizations	245F	-62
OCDETF – Central/South American Organizations	245B	-61
OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs	245D	-37
OCDETF – Caribbean Organizations	245I	-31
Racketeering Enterprise Investigations (REI) Classifications		
REI – Mexican Organizations	092C	-28
Total		-767

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

We conducted further analyses of the classifications in Exhibit 4-4 and identified trends in FBI field offices most affected by agent utilization reductions in these investigative areas. For example, on-board agent reductions in matters involving Central/South American organizations tended to impact larger field offices. In other instances, we observed that the most significant impacts in certain classifications occurred in distinct geographic

⁴⁸ Classification 245D (*OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs*) was transferred from the VCMO Program during FY 2002 and assigned to the Criminal Enterprise Investigations Program in FY 2003. Although this is the only OCDETF related classification not assigned to the OC/D Program, we include Classification 245D in our discussion of OC/D matters in order to keep all OCDETF-related classifications together.

⁴⁹ The one classification not specifically related to drug investigations is 092C, which involves racketeering enterprise investigations.

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areas, such as matters involving Mexican drug organizations primarily affecting offices along the nation's southwest border. These additional analyses of OC/D classifications are contained in Appendix VII.

Direction to Field Offices – The mission of the FBI's Drug Program is to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations posing the greatest threat to the United States and its citizens. In 2002, the Department of Justice generated the Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list, which is updated regularly and identifies the most significant money laundering and drug trafficking organizations worldwide. Although the FBI's Program Plans encouraged SACs at FBI field offices to use their discretion in addressing the significant drug problems within their jurisdictions, any investigation of an organization *not* on the CPOT list required approval from FBI Headquarters. According to the FBI, if a field office had a pending investigation with a non-CPOT organization at the time of the FBI's reprioritization, that office had to make an attempt to transfer the investigation to another law enforcement agency or else close the case.

In accordance with the FBI's top priority, the Drug Section was to allocate resources to first target those organizations with a credible link to terrorist cells and to involve FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces in any such investigations.⁵⁰ The FBI also planned to establish a Drug Program/Counterterrorism working group to promote coordination among these programs and enhance each program's expertise.

The FBI's March 2004 strategic plan provides additional guidance for drug investigations. The plan notes that the DEA is the primary federal agency for combating drug trafficking, and that the FBI should complement the DEA's efforts through an integrated approach while increasing the co-location of FBI drug investigative resources with the DEA. The plan also indicates that the FBI should leverage its resources by combining its efforts with state and local law enforcement agencies through increased participation in OCDETF and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) initiatives.

Violent Crime Matters

According to the FBI, its overall mission for violent crime matters is to deter significant violent crime and make society a safer place. In its

⁵⁰ FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are multi-agency, counterterrorism working groups made up of representatives from the FBI and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. As of July 2004, there were 84 JTTFs throughout the United States.

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
March 2004 strategic plan, the FBI noted that although general violent crime rates have fallen in recent years, murder rates in the United States have risen since 1999, especially rates in the northeastern portion of the country. The FBI attributes this, in part, to a resurgence in the number of violent street gangs in major metropolitan areas, including Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles.

According to the FBI, the nature of significant violent crime incidents usually requires an immediate response by the FBI, and it is vital that the FBI continues to combat violent crime matters across the country. The FBI has two programs that concentrate on violent criminal matters: the Violent Crime/Major Offenders (VCMO) Program and the Criminal Enterprise Investigations (CEI) Program. Specifically, VCMO is responsible for investigating a wide variety of criminal incidents, such as bank robberies, extortions, and kidnappings; while CEI is concerned with violent gangs and criminal enterprises involved in major thefts.

Resource Allocation and Utilization – Based upon data obtained from the FBI, field agent resources allocated to violent crime matters have been reduced significantly since FY 2000. Specifically, we found a reduction of 294 violent crime positions during our review period, an almost 15 percent decrease in resources. Further, we determined that the FBI utilized 413 fewer agents on violent crime matters in FY 2003 than in FY 2000.

In addition to reductions in funded agent positions, FBI officials commented that the FBI was significantly underutilizing its violent crime agent resources. Exhibit 4-5 compares agent utilization to FSL figures for all violent crime matters for FYs 2000 through 2003. As shown, during FYs 2000 and 2001 the FBI overutilized its agent resources in the investigation of violent crime matters. However, in FYs 2002 and 2003, the FBI underutilized its agent resources in this area. During our review period, the greatest difference between allocated agent levels and actual agent utilization occurred in FY 2002, when the FBI utilized 310 fewer on-board agents than it was allocated.

EXHIBIT 4-5
COMPARISON OF ON-BOARD AGENTS TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS
IN VIOLENT CRIME MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003⁵¹



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and Resource Management and Allocation Office data

Investigative Classifications – The results of our analysis show that the FBI is devoting fewer field agent resources to violent crime investigations. We found that 6 of the 30 investigative classifications that experienced the most significant reductions in on-board agents from FYs 2000 to 2003 are related to violent crime matters.⁵² Three of these fall into the VCMO Program, while the others are located within the CEI Program. As shown in Exhibit 4-6, these 6 classifications accounted for a reduction of 285 on-board agents.

⁵¹ Since FSLs are separately allocated to CEI, we included the FSL data and on-board agent data figures for the CEI sub-programs in FYs 2002 and 2003. However, FSLs are not specifically allocated to the Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI) sub-program. As noted, IINI was an area that was moved from the VCMO Program to the Cyber Crime Program during FY 2002. In order to accurately compare FSL figures to agent utilization figures in FYs 2002 and 2003, the on-board agent data for IINI was removed for this analysis.

⁵² Actually, 7 of the 30 classifications experiencing the most significant reduction in on-board agents fall within the VCMO and CEI programs. However, Classification 245D (OCDETF – VCMO Gangs), located within the CEI Program, is an OCDETF classification that we discussed in the OC/D section of this chapter, along with the other OCDETF classifications.

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**EXHIBIT 4-6
GREATEST AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION CHANGES
IN VIOLENT CRIME CLASSIFICATIONS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003**

Program	Number	Classification Name	AOB Change
VCMO	088A	Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence	-101
VCMO	091A	Bank Robbery	-81
VCMO	244	Hostage Rescue Team	-24
CEI	087B	Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - \$25K+	-29
CEI	026B	ITSMV (Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle)–Commercial Theft or Chop Shops	-29
CEI	015B	TFIS (Theft From Interstate Shipment) – Loss of \$25K+; Weapons, Explosives	-21
Total			-285

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

The reductions in violent crime resources identified in Exhibit 4-6 affected field offices differently. For instance, on-board agents investigating bank robberies significantly declined in several field offices, but we found no common variable in field office size or location among the affected offices. Conversely, reductions in agent utilization for fugitive-related matters (Classification 088A) mostly affected larger field offices. Appendix VIII provides additional analyses of violent crime investigative efforts for these classifications at the field office level.

Direction to Field Offices – According to FBI officials, written direction was provided to the field detailing changes within the violent crime program necessitated by the FBI’s reprioritization. This direction took the form of electronic communications and announcements of investigative initiatives related to specific types of violent crime. Additionally, the FBI incorporated aspects of its reprioritization into the program plans it issues annually to the field. We reviewed the program plans related to violent crime matters for FYs 2001 and 2003 and found that field offices were given a list of national priorities for violent crime matters as a guide for prioritizing investigations. These priorities are based upon the violent crime problems identified by each field office. Although we observed slight changes in the priority list between the two fiscal years, as shown in Exhibit 4-7, the FBI’s national priorities for violent crime matters have essentially remained the same since FY 2001. This implies that the nation’s violent crime problems have not changed.

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EXHIBIT 4-7	
NATIONAL VIOLENT CRIME PRIORITIES	
FY 2001	FY 2003
Violent Gangs	Violent Gangs ⁵³
Major Theft Enterprises	Major Theft Enterprises ⁵³
Crimes Against Children	Violent Incident Crimes
Violent Incident Crimes	Crimes Against Children
Indian Country	Indian Country
Violent Fugitives	Violent Fugitives
Special Jurisdiction Crimes	Transportation Crimes
Transportation Crimes	Special Jurisdiction Crimes
Other Matters	

Source: FY 2001 and FY 2003 FBI Program Plans

The FBI's program plans further noted that the FBI's violent crime strategy was to take a proactive approach to identifying and preventing the emergence of crime trends while also maintaining a strong reactive capacity in responding to violent crimes. As was the case with other criminal investigative programs, the FBI's violent crime program was directed to leverage its limited resources. Specifically, according to an FBI memorandum, field offices were to concentrate their violent crime efforts primarily on criminal enterprises. Additionally, SACs were advised to keep the FBI's national priorities in mind while directing their limited violent crime resources to matters that were most problematic within their jurisdictions.

White-Collar Crime Matters


The FBI's White-Collar Crime Program (WCC) is responsible for investigating and preventing major frauds committed against individuals and businesses, as well as with protecting the financial markets of the United States. In its March 2004 strategic plan, the FBI predicted that major white-collar crime would impact the United States economy over the next five years, and that crimes, such as money laundering and health care fraud, would increase in the near future.

Resource Allocation and Utilization – From FYs 2000 to 2003, the FBI experienced a reduction of 157 allocated WCC field agent positions, reflecting a 6 percent decrease. Besides the allocation reductions, we also found that the FBI was using, on average, 20 percent fewer agents on white-collar crime investigations in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. In FY 2000, 2,426 on-board agents were involved in such investigations. In FY 2003, the number dropped to 1,952.

⁵³ These were the top priorities listed under CEI for FY 2003. As previously mentioned, CEI did not exist in FY 2001.

We compared the field agent utilization to FSL figures for FYs 2000 through 2003 for WCC. As shown in Exhibit 4-8, the FBI underutilized its agent resources in the investigation of white-collar crime matters in each fiscal year of our review period. However, the magnitude of the underutilization increased during FYs 2002 and 2003 (*i.e.*, after the reprioritization). For example, the FBI utilized only 83 percent of its funded white-collar agents during FY 2003, compared to 99 percent in FY 2000.

EXHIBIT 4-8
COMPARISON OF ON-BOARD AGENTS TO FUNDED STAFFING LEVELS
IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003⁵⁴



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and Resource Management and Allocation Office data

Investigative Classifications – Among the 30 classifications that experienced the greatest reductions in on-board agents, 8 pertained to white-collar crime matters (see Exhibit 4-9). Included in these eight investigative classifications were those related to health care, telemarketing, and insurance fraud. Combined, the eight classifications listed in Exhibit 4-9 accounted for over 60 percent of the overall utilization decrease in WCC

⁵⁴ FSLs are not specifically allocated to the Intellectual Property Rights (IP) sub-program. As noted, IP was moved from the WCC Program to the Cyber Crime Program during FY 2002. In order to accurately compare FSL figures to agent utilization figures in FYs 2002 and 2003, the on-board agent data for IP was removed for this analysis.

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during our review period. The changes that occurred in each of these classifications at the field office level are detailed in Appendix IX.

EXHIBIT 4-9 GREATEST AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION CHANGES IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME CLASSIFICATIONS FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003

Classification Number	Classification Name	AOB Change
Financial Institution Fraud:		
029C	FIF - \$25K - \$99,999 Fed-Insured Bank	-50
Health Care Fraud:		
209A	Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program	-89
209B	Health Care Fraud – Private Ins. Program	-32
Other Fraud Investigative Areas:		
196A	Telemarketing Fraud	-37
196D	Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes	-35
196B	Insurance Fraud	-28
049A	Bankruptcy Fraud \$50K+ /or Court Officer	-26
Environmental Crimes:		
249A	Environmental Crimes	-25
Total		-322

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Direction to Field Offices – As part of the reprioritization, FBI senior management provided field offices with written direction concerning the financial crime areas on which to focus their investigative efforts. In August 2002, field offices were notified of the current WCC national priorities, which were reiterated to field offices again in October 2002. In particular, the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division emphasized that field offices should evaluate their current investigations to ensure that they are actively pursuing the top four priorities within WCC: 1) Public Corruption, 2) Corporate/Securities and Commodities Fraud, 3) Health Care Fraud, and 4) Financial Institution Fraud (FIF). In addition to these four priority areas, WCC's FY 2003 Program Plan identified Money Laundering and Governmental Fraud as two additional areas that were particularly important. Although SACs have discretion in determining which crimes to investigate and how to utilize their resources, FBI management reminded the SACs to address white-collar crime matters in priority order.

One of the most significant changes that has occurred within WCC since the reprioritization pertains to FIF matters. In the past, field offices were allowed to investigate FIF cases in which losses exceeded \$25,000 without approval from FBI Headquarters. In August 2002, field offices were informed that the dollar threshold on initiating FIF cases had been raised to \$100,000, and the investigation of any FIF matter falling under this

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threshold required pre-approval from FBI Headquarters. Since this policy was initiated, FBI management has reminded field offices on several occasions of this new requirement.

Conclusion

Of the three program areas reviewed in this chapter, OC/D experienced the greatest decrease in funded agent positions in the FBI's post-9/11 reprioritization, a reduction of nearly 35 percent from FY 2000 to FY 2003. During the same period, OC/D experienced a nearly 45 percent decrease in agent resource utilization, predominantly within the area of drug investigations (where the FSL for field agents dropped by 62 percent between FYs 2001 and 2003). Moreover, 12 of the 30 classifications we identified as having experienced the greatest reductions in on-board agents during our review period originated in OC/D.

FBI investigative activity in violent crime matters has also reduced by approximately 15 percent from FY 2000 to FY 2003. In particular, in the 6 investigative classifications identified in Exhibit 4-6, the FBI experienced a reduction of 285 on-board agents between FYs 2000 and 2003. Moreover, after utilizing more agents than it had allocated for violent crime matters in FYs 2000 and 2001, the FBI utilized fewer violent crime agents than allocated in FYs 2002 and 2003.

Our analyses of on-board agent data indicated that there were approximately 20 percent fewer agents investigating white-collar crime matters in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. In addition, 8 of the 30 decreasing investigative classifications identified involved white-collar crime matters. Specifically, we noted that the most significant agent utilization reductions occurred in telemarketing fraud, health care fraud, and insurance fraud. We also noted reductions in classifications pertaining to financial institution fraud, environmental crimes, bankruptcy fraud, and wire fraud. In terms of allocated positions, the FBI reduced the number of funded agent positions assigned to investigate white-collar crime in the majority of field offices. From FYs 2000 to 2003, the FSLs for the WCC Program decreased by 157 agent positions.

The reassignment of agent resources has had an effect on FBI field offices. In some cases, offices in particular geographic locations and offices of particular sizes were more affected than others. Detailed information related to the 30 investigative classifications experiencing the greatest reductions in on-board agents between FYs 2000 and 2003 is located in Appendices VII through IX. Detailed information on individual field offices is located in Supplemental Appendices I through III.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

In direct response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI Director initiated a transformation of the FBI that, among other things, established a new set of priorities and formally shifted a significant number of agents from traditional criminal investigative work to counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters. According to the Director, each of the changes was designed to reshape the FBI into an organization better able to combat terrorism and to prevent another large-scale terrorist attack against the United States.

Many of the FBI officials we interviewed remarked that the FBI had shifted its attention from traditional criminal areas (e.g., drugs and violent crime) to terrorism-related matters. Specifically, they indicated three investigative areas that were negatively impacted as a result of the reprioritization: drugs, violent crime, and white-collar crime. In determining from which areas to shift resources, one of the factors FBI management considered was whether the FBI exclusively worked on particular investigative matters. For example, other agencies are involved in the investigation of illegal drug trafficking, particularly the DEA.

The results of our analyses of the allocation and utilization of agents coincide with these officials' comments. In particular, between FYs 2000 and 2003, the FBI increased its agent utilization within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) by about 1,400 agents. Conversely, agent utilization in the Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D), White-Collar Crime (WCC), and Violent Crime/Major Offenders (VCMO) programs combined was reduced by 1,871 agents. This indicates that the FBI significantly shifted its agent utilization from traditional criminal investigations to matters related to terrorism.


The changes in actual agent utilization were consistent with the changes in the FBI's Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs), or human resource allocation. The FBI allocated a larger number of agent resources to terrorism-related matters in FY 2003 than in FY 2000, while reducing the number of positions allotted for organized crime/drugs, violent crime, and white-collar crime during the same time period. Specifically, more than 560 additional field agent positions were allocated to terrorism-related areas in FY 2003 compared to FY 2000. In turn, the FBI reduced its funded agent resources in the noted traditional crime areas by 1,035. The majority of this reduction occurred within the Organized Crime/Drugs Program, which lost a total of 758 positions during our review period. Thus, the FBI reprogrammed resources to target its top priorities (e.g., counterintelligence and counterterrorism) by transferring resources from its traditional crime programs (e.g., drugs and violent crime).

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As evidenced by FY 2003 data, the FBI's shift in agent resource utilization exceeded the number of positions it intended to transfer from traditional criminal investigative matters to terrorism-related areas. The FBI used 845 more agents than it had allocated for terrorism matters, while it utilized 879 fewer agents than planned in traditional crime areas.

Concomitantly, in our review of casework, we found that by FY 2003 the FBI opened fewer cases in traditional criminal areas and more in areas related to terrorism. Specifically, the FBI opened 70 percent more NFIP cases and over 50 percent more DT cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. For the same period, the FBI opened more than 50 percent fewer organized crime/drug cases, 40 percent fewer violent crime cases, and more than 25 percent fewer white-collar crime cases.

**EXHIBIT 5-1
COMPARISON OF ALLOCATED TO UTILIZED AGENTS
FISCAL YEAR 2003**




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK and RMA Office data

In terms of terrorism and non-terrorism related matters, the FBI opened 25,431 terrorism-related cases in FY 2003 compared to 15,799 in FY 2000, an increase of 61 percent. Conversely, during the same timeframe the number of non-terrorism related cases the FBI opened decreased from 64,281 to 40,603, reflecting a reduction of 37 percent.

In addition to evaluating resource utilization and allocation changes, we performed analyses at the FBI's investigative classification level. Of the 30 classifications experiencing the greatest increase in agent utilization between FYs 2000 and 2003, 24 of those classifications were associated with terrorism matters. Conversely, we identified the FBI's 30 investigative classifications with the greatest reductions in agent utilization. Of these, 12 pertained to organized crime/drug matters, such as Classification 245C (*OCDETF – Mexican Organizations*); 6 related to violent crime matters, including Classification 088A (*Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence*); and 8 pertained to white-collar crime matters, such as Classification 209A (*Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program*). Combined, the FBI used 1,374 fewer on-board agents in these investigative areas in FY 2003 than in FY 2000.

EXHIBIT 5-2
AGENT UTILIZATION CHANGES WITHIN PROGRAM AREAS
FOR THE 30 CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING
THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

After analyzing how the reprioritization has affected the FBI's resource utilization in specific investigative areas, we plan to conduct further analyses to determine how the FBI's shift in priorities and operations has affected outside entities. We hope to discuss these effects with federal, state, and local officials in those geographical areas most affected by the reduction in the FBI's traditional criminal investigative efforts. By doing this, we hope to provide useful and comprehensive feedback to aid future operational policy decisions and to assist the FBI in its reprioritization decisions.

This report contains comprehensive, data-driven analyses of the changes in the FBI's use of resources as a result of its shift in priorities and allocation of staff. These types of analyses can be useful to FBI executive management and program directors for evaluating progress in meeting goals and obtaining a data-based view of the status of FBI operations.

Recommendation

We recommend that the FBI:

1. Consider developing evaluation models similar to the ones presented in this report to assist in managing FBI programs.

APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Audit Objective

The objective of this audit was to identify internal operational changes in the FBI resulting from the FBI's ongoing reorganization and reprioritization effort, including the types of offenses that the FBI is no longer investigating at pre-September 11, 2001, levels.

Scope and Methodology

We performed our audit in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and included such tests of the records and procedures that we considered necessary to accomplish the audit objective. The informational nature of our audit objective did not require that we perform testing of the FBI's compliance with laws and regulations.

We conducted work at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the FBI Academy and FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia; and at the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facility in Aquia, Virginia. We interviewed over 40 officials from the FBI, including the Executive Assistant Directors for Administration, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement Services, the Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Special Assistant to the Director for Strategic Planning. We also interviewed FBI officials from the Finance Division, the Resource Management and Allocation (RMA) Office, and the Automated Case Support (ACS) system, as well as numerous Section Chiefs and Unit Chiefs representing FBI programs, the FBI Laboratory, and the FBI Academy. Through these interviews and our review of documents and records pertaining to the audit objective, we obtained an understanding of the plans set forth in the FBI's post-9/11 reorganization, reprioritization, and reprogramming, as well as the reality of their implementation.

To achieve the audit objective, we used computer-processed data maintained in FBI information systems. To examine the FBI's human resource utilization, we reviewed data from the TURK system, a module of the FBI's payroll system, for the period of September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003. The TURK system contains work hour and Average On Board data for most FBI agents and support involved with investigative matters. To examine the numbers and types of cases in its various criminal programs, we reviewed data from the Automated Case Support (ACS) system, which assigns unique case identifiers to all investigations and contains case-related material, for the same period.

Because we had assessed the reliability of the computer-processed data provided by the FBI during the recently-completed audit of FBI Casework and Human Resource Utilization, and we were utilizing the same systems to obtain data for analysis, we did not repeat this process.⁵⁵ In the prior audit, for data from the TURK and ACS systems, we performed tests to establish reliability and obtained confirmation from FBI officials as to the data's reliability. For both systems, we reviewed management controls and we performed data validity tests at the FBI Field Office in Chicago, Illinois. Based on our test results and the information we obtained, we concluded the data was sufficiently reliable to achieve our audit objective.⁵⁶

Data Analysis

We performed analyses of FBI resource allocation and utilization data, as well as casework data, to identify trends in the FBI's operations from September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003. In total, this data amounted to 1,864,141 records.

Funded Staffing Levels – In our analyses involving agent and support resource allocation, we used the FBI's Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs) that are established by the RMA Office. We obtained field office FSLs for each program and fiscal year, both for agents and support personnel for FYs 2000 through 2003. We also received FSLs for FBI Headquarters, organized at the Division level, for the same period. The FSLs we obtained represented the final allocations set for each fiscal year, which reflected any mid-year adjustments. The two sets of data amounted to 5,453 records.

Average on Board - TURK generally records percentages of time worked for both agents and support personnel in the FBI's 56 field offices (Headquarters personnel do not record their time in TURK). TURK data collection is divided into 13 TURK periods per fiscal year; each TURK period is 4 weeks. Each agent (or support employee) records the percentage of time worked each day according to FBI investigative classifications (the percentages are based on a 10-hour day for agents and an 8-hour day for support personnel).⁵⁷ These percentages are recorded and the result is

⁵⁵ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report number 03-37, "Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Utilization," dated September 2003.

⁵⁶ FBI field agents are responsible for reporting the proportion of their time worked in FBI investigative classifications. Therefore, the data derived from the FBI TURK system are only as valid as the information reported by FBI field agents.

⁵⁷ The FBI assigns each of its cases to an investigative classification based on the nature of the case. The investigative classification is the greatest level of detail for which the FBI tracks resource utilization. Each classification is assigned to a program and, if appropriate, a sub-program.

averaged to show time worked in a specific classification equivalent to a full-time employee, which the FBI calls Average on Board (AOB).

For example, if two agents within a particular field office each worked half their time (50 percent) on *Bankruptcy Fraud* – FBI investigative Classification 49 - within a given TURK period, the AOB for that field office, in classification 49, within the TURK period, would be equal to 1 agent AOB (100 percent of 1 agent-equivalent). The FBI considers the TURK system's AOB data to be the best way to assess the actual time worked by FBI employees in specific FBI investigative programs, sub-programs, and classifications. For the purposes of this report, we use the term AOB and on-board employee (agent or support) interchangeably.

We received two data runs of AOB data, for both agents and support personnel, for the period of September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003 (covering FYs 2000 through 2003 in the TURK system). The first data run was provided in a text file, which we imported into a database file. The data run contained 670,791 records, each containing the following fields:

- Field Office: City of FBI Field Office
- Employee Indicator: Agent or Support
- Fiscal Year: 2000 through 2003
- Turk Period: 1 through 13
- Program: Numeric Indicator
- Sub-Program: Alpha Indicator
- Classification: Alpha-Numeric Indicator
- Average On Board: AOB for the program/sub-program/classification designated

We compared the annual AOB figures at the program level to the figures verified by the FBI in the *Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation* report issued September 2003.⁸⁶ Through this comparison, we discovered that the figures we developed did not match those affirmed by the FBI. We learned that the FBI retroactively adds employee leave and miscellaneous time into the TURK record of each employee at the program/sub-program level. The FBI does this through use of an automated Investigative Program Allocator, which prorates the data back into each record based on that employee's activity in the previous six pay periods. Because we requested data down to the classification level – a more detailed level than the program level – employee leave time was not included in our AOB analyses; therefore, our results did not match actual totals. Hence, this first data run only was used to conduct analyses at the classification level.

A second data run, in the same format as the first, but only down to the program/sub-program level, was requested to conduct analyses of AOB at such specification. Again, we received this file in a text file and exported it into a database file for testing. The second data run possessed 339,180 records, each containing the following fields:

- Field Office: City of FBI Field Office
- Employee Indicator: Agent or Support
- Fiscal Year: 2000 through 2003
- Turk Period: 1 through 13
- Program: Numeric Indicator
- Sub-Program: Alpha Indicator
- Average On Board: AOB for the program/sub-program designated

Agent Utilization – We elected to analyze AOB data by fiscal year. To do this, we totaled the AOB for all TURK periods within each fiscal year for each investigative program, sub-program, or classification. Next, we divided this total by the number of TURK periods (13) to obtain the average agents (or support personnel) working a particular program, sub-program, or classification in a given fiscal year.

Analysis at the Program/Sub-Program Level – The data universe used to conduct analyses at the program/sub-program levels, and for the FBI as a whole, included subtotals for each program. In order to perform our analysis, we first removed all subtotals, and then calculated AOB for each fiscal year. For the FBI as a whole, we reviewed AOB data for FYs 2000 through 2003.

The audit objective was to identify internal operational changes in FBI investigative efforts occurring as a result of the FBI’s reprioritization and internal reorganization. Therefore, to assess the change in agent utilization, we focused our analysis on comparing AOB totals between FYs 2000 and 2003.⁵⁸ This approach afforded a view of AOB both before and well into the FBI’s reprioritization efforts, revealing the areas of greatest change in actual agent (and support personnel) time worked. Thus, at the program level, and, when necessary, at the sub-program level, we conducted analyses of the AOB change between FYs 2000 and 2003.

However, in order to accurately compare the change in agent utilization at the program level, we had to account for sub-programs that transferred programs for FY 2003. The Cyber Crime Program (CCP) and the Criminal Enterprise Investigations (CEI) Program began tracking resource utilization in the TURK system in FY 2003. As detailed in the following table,

⁵⁸ The rationale for this decision is contained in Chapter 1.

sub-programs in VCMO and WCC were moved to CCP and CEI beginning FY 2003. Therefore, to accurately assess the *change* in the FBI's investigative efforts at the program level, we added the FY 2003 AOB totals for these sub-programs back into their previous program.

SUB-PROGRAMS TRANSFERRED BETWEEN PROGRAMS		
<u>Sub-program</u>	<u>FY 2000 – FY 2002 Program</u>	<u>FY 2003 Program</u>
Intellectual Property Rights	WCC	CCP
Innocent Images Initiative	VCMO	CCP
OCDETF – VCMO	VCMO	CEI
Major Theft	VCMO	CEI
Violent Gangs	VCMO	CEI
Source: FBI Finance Division		

Analysis at the Investigative Classification Level – Besides conducting analyses of resource utilization at the program/sub-program levels, we also performed analyses down to the classification level. First, we first computed the change in agent AOB for each classification between FYs 2000 and 2003. Next, we determined which investigative classifications experienced the greatest change in resource utilization, both positive change and negative change. In line with our objective to analyze the impact on investigative effort, we did not include classifications related to training or administrative matters. In addition, we eliminated any classification that changed or one that did not exist in both FYs 2000 and 2003.⁵⁹

Classifications Experiencing a Reduction in Resource Utilization – We identified the 30 classifications that endured the largest decrease in AOB between FYs 2000 and 2003.⁶⁰ Classifications that were eliminated from our analysis are included in the following table.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Classification numbers that embodied disparate classification names for FYs 2000 and 2003 were not included in our analysis. Additionally, some classifications were eliminated, while others were created between FYs 2000 and 2003, making it impossible to accurately compare resource utilization changes within these areas.

⁶⁰ Exhibit 3-14 in Chapter 3 contains a list of the 30 classifications that experienced the largest AOB reductions.

⁶¹ We only note those classifications that, unless eliminated, would have been included as one of the 30 classifications experiencing the greatest reduction in AOB.

INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS ELIMINATED FROM ANALYSIS OF CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST AOB REDUCTION		
Classification Number	Classification Name	Reason for Elimination
001A	Training – FBI Personnel (FY 2000) & Training – Training Coordinator (FY 2003)	Training
001B	Training-Other Fed., State, County & Local LE personnel (FY 2000) & Training	Training & Not in FY 2003
197	Civil Suits and Claims (FBI Programs)	Not in FY 2003
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		Not in FY 2003
232A	Training Received – White-Collar Crime	Training
240	Training Received – Other	Training
Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data		

Classifications Experiencing an Increase in Resource Utilization – We also identified the 30 classifications that endured the largest increase in AOB between FYs 2000 and 2003, eliminating classifications using the same methodology as we did in the top 30 decreasing classifications.⁶² The classifications that were eliminated and the reason for the elimination are detailed in the following table.⁶³

⁶² Exhibit 3-11 in Chapter 3 contains a list of the 30 classifications that experienced the largest AOB increases.

⁶³ We only note those classifications that, unless eliminated, would have been included as one of the 30 classifications experiencing the greatest increase in AOB.

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APPENDIX I

INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS ELIMINATED FROM ANALYSIS OF CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST AOB INCREASE		
Classification Number	Classification Name	Reason for Elimination
001G	Domestic Terrorism – Training Received	Not in FY 2000
001I	FCI – Training Received	Training
001K	International Terrorism – Training Received	Not in FY 2000
001L	International Terrorism – Training Provided	Training
001M	NIPCIP-Computer Intrusion – Training Received	Training
001Q	OC/DP – Drugs – Training Received	Training
001U	Training VCMOP	Not in FY 2000
001W	WCC – Training Received	Training
001Y	Firearms/Legal/Other – Training Received	Training
001Z	Firearms/Legal/Other – Training Provided	Training
063B	HQ Use Only – TURK Not Recorded	Administrative
066F	Admin. Matters Other	Administrative
089G	Attorney General Protection Detail	Not in FY 2000
196E	Internet Fraud	Not in FY 2000
197A	Civil Litigation	Not in FY 2000
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED		Not in FY 2000
		Not in FY 2000
		Not in FY 2000
209C	Health Care Crime (Non-Insurance)	Not in FY 2000
245K	OCDETF – Money Laundering - Drugs	Not in FY 2000
288B	National Collection Directive (FY 2000) & Targeting the National Info Infrastructure (FY 2003)	Change in name
295E	Copyright Infringement/Signal Theft Matters	Not in FY 2000
300H	CT Preparedness – WMD Preparedness	Not in FY 2000
305B	Innocent Images National Initiative Training (FY 2000) & IINI – Travelers/Enticement (FY 2003)	Training
305C	IINI – Producers CP	Not in FY 2000
305D	IINI – Possessors of CP	Not in FY 2000
308A	ERT Administrative Matter	Administrative
308B	ERT Training Received	Training
308K	ERT Crime Scene – Other	Not in FY 2000
314	Intelligence Base/Infragard	Not in FY 2000
Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data		

FBI Casework – For our analyses of the FBI’s casework, we received two data runs from the Automated Case Support (ACS) system containing all FBI cases worked during our review period. We discarded the first data run due to omissions and data organization errors prior to receiving the final one. The information was provided in a database file containing 848,717 records, separated into the following fields:

<u>Field Name</u>	<u>Field Description</u>
▪ Office Code:	2 digit alpha designation for office of origin
▪ Case ID:	Universal Case File Number (UCFN)
▪ Class:	Classification of case
▪ Subclass:	Subclassification of case
▪ Program Name:	Name of program
▪ Sub-program Name:	Name of sub-program
▪ Open Date:	yyyymmdd format
▪ Close Date:	yyyymmdd format
▪ Days Pending:	Number of days the case is open
▪ Destroyed Case:	“D” designation when case is destroyed
▪ Previous Class:	Previous classification of case if reclassified

In reviewing the data, we noted that instead of containing only cases from September 26, 1999, through September 20, 2003, as we had requested, the data run contained cases that closed after the final day of FY 2003 and up to and including December 2, 2003. We determined that it was not necessary to request a new data run to correct for this inaccuracy; these FY 2004 cases are not included in any of our analyses.

In addition, we discovered 4,977 cases in the database that were designated as having been destroyed. Of these 4,977 cases, we found 339 that contained opening and closing dates. We determined that we could include these 339 cases in any analyses involving case opening and closing dates, while we needed to eliminate those that contained no open and close dates. We therefore retained the 339 destroyed cases containing open and close dates, and eliminated the remaining 4,638 cases that did not contain open and close dates. These 4,638 cases reflected one percent of the remaining database of 404,318 cases on which we performed our analyses.

We confined our casework analysis to the data we obtained from the ACS system, and did not review individual case files to determine the actual level of effort expended on any single case. Thus, if a case was open during a particular timeframe, we considered it to be worked during that period.

APPENDIX II: DESCRIPTIONS OF FBI PROGRAMS

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) – the FBI's foreign counterterrorism and counterintelligence work is concentrated within this program. Sub-programs found in NFIP include Foreign Counterintelligence, FBI Security, and International Terrorism.

National Infrastructure/Computer Intrusion Program (NIPCIP) – work performed in this program involves protection of computer networks and critical infrastructures. Work in this program includes Computer Intrusion Criminal Matters and Protection of Transportation Facilities. In FY 2002 the National Infrastructure Protection Center was moved to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). What remained after this transfer was the Computer Intrusion Program, which was moved into the Cyber Division.

Domestic Terrorism Program (DT) – the FBI's resources directed towards "home-grown" terrorists are captured in this program. Sub-programs include Counterterrorism Preparedness and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

White-Collar Crime Program (WCC) – FBI investigations related to most economic-based crimes, including money laundering, government fraud, public corruption, and antitrust matters are captured by this program.

Organized Crime/Drug Program (OC/D) – FBI investigations that identify, dismantle, or disrupt major international and national organized criminal enterprises fall within this program. Cases in this program target large organized crime and drug organizations, as well as OCDETF activities.

Violent Crime/Major Offenders Program (VCMO) – Cases that target the most significant violent crime, including crimes against children, fugitives, and transportation crimes, are categorized under this program.

Civil Rights Program (CR) – Examples of crimes investigated within this program are hate crimes, color of law violations, and involuntary servitude/slavery issues.

Cyber Crime Program (CCP) – Created in FY 2002, cyber crime involves investigating and preventing cyber attacks by foreign adversaries and terrorists, and the investigation of all computer-based crime, such as Internet-based child pornography, sexual predators, and Internet fraud. The sub-programs that make up the CCP came, in part, from both the White-Collar Crime and Violent Crime/Major Offenders programs.

Criminal Enterprise Investigations (CEI) – The sub-programs that make up CEI originated in the Violent Crimes and Major Offenders Program and involve investigations related to OCDETF gang investigations, major theft, and violent gangs.

Applicant Program (APP) – FBI administrative work involving the selection and processing of new agent and support personnel, as well as background investigations for new and current hires, federal judges, and white house staff is categorized under this program.

Training (TRAIN) – Training involving FBI employees, as well as state and local personnel, falls within this program.

Miscellaneous Matters (MISC) – FBI administrative matters are mostly captured by this program, including Freedom of Information Act requests, accidents involving FBI vehicles, and public relations matters.

**APPENDIX III: CROSSWALK OF FBI PROGRAMS AND SUB-PROGRAMS
FYS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FBI PROGRAMS	FY 2000 SUB-PROGRAMS	FYS 2001 & 2002 SUB-PROGRAMS	FY 2003 SUB-PROGRAMS
National Foreign Intelligence (NFIP)	CI-Foreign Counterintelligence SC-FBI Security TI-International Terrorism	CI-Foreign Counterintelligence SC-FBI Security TI-International Terrorism	CI-Foreign Counterintelligence SC-FBI Security TI-International Terrorism
National Infrastructure Protection/ Computer Intrusion (NIPCIP)	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	CP-Computer Intrusion FP-Infrastructure Protection
Domestic Terrorism (DT)	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	CT-Counterterrorism Preparedness DT-Domestic Terrorism Operations WM-Weapons of Mass Destruction	CT-Counterterrorism Preparedness DT-Domestic Terrorism Operations WM-Weapons of Mass Destruction
White-Collar Crime (WCC)	AT-Antitrust BF-Bankruptcy Fraud EN-Environmental Crimes FI-Financial Institution Fraud GF-Fraud Against the Government HF-Health Care Fraud IF-Insurance Fraud IP-Intellectual Property Rights ML-Money Laundering PC-Public Corruption SF-Securities/Commodities Fraud TM-Telemarketing Fraud ZZ-Other Matters	AT-Antitrust BF-Bankruptcy Fraud EN-Environmental Crimes FI-Financial Institution Fraud GF-Fraud Against the Government HF-Health Care Fraud IF-Insurance Fraud IP-Intellectual Property Rights ML-Money Laundering PC-Public Corruption SF-Securities/Commodities Fraud TM-Telemarketing Fraud ZZ-Other Matters WF-Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes	AT-Antitrust BF-Bankruptcy Fraud EN-Environmental Crimes FI-Financial Institution Fraud GF-Fraud Against the Government HF-Health Care Fraud IF-Insurance Fraud ML-Money Laundering PC-Public Corruption SF-Securities/Commodities Fraud TM-Telemarketing Fraud ZZ-Other Matters WF-Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes
<p>Green script indicates creation of a new sub-program Blue script indicates a WCC sub-program transferred to CCP in FY 2003 Red Script indicates VCMO sub-programs transferred to either CCP or CEI in FY 2003</p>			

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APPENDIX III

FBI PROGRAMS	FY 2000 SUB-PROGRAMS	FYS 2001 & 2002 SUB-PROGRAMS	FY 2003 SUB-PROGRAMS
Organized Crime/Drugs (OC/D)	AC-Asian Criminal Enterprise CO-Columbian/Caribbean DD-Community Outreach Program DE-OCDE Task Force LC-La Cosa Nostra MC-Mexican Criminal Syndicates RE-Russian/Eastern European/Eurasia OM-Other Matters	AC-Asian Criminal Enterprise CO-Columbian/Caribbean DD-Community Outreach Program DE-OCDE Task Force LC-La Cosa Nostra/Italian O.C./Labor Rack MC-Mexican Criminal Syndicates RE-Russian/Eastern European/Eurasia OD-Other Matters-Drugs OM-Other Matters-Organized Crime	AC-Asian Criminal Enterprise CO-Columbian/Caribbean DD-Community Outreach Program DE-OCDE Task Force LC-La Cosa Nostra/Italian O.C./Labor Rack MC-Mexican Criminal Syndicates RE-Russian/Eastern European/Eurasia OD-Other Matters-Drugs OM-Other Matters-Organized Crime
Violent Crimes and Major Offenders (VCMO)	CA-Crimes Against Children DF-OCDE-Task Force-VCMO FU-Fugitives IC-Crimes in Indian Country II-Innocent Images Initiative MT-Major Theft SJ-Special Jurisdiction Matters TC-Transportation Crimes VC-Violent Incident Crimes VW-Victim Witness Assistance ZV-Other Matters VG-Violent Gangs	CA-Crimes Against Children DF-OCDE-Task Force-VCMO FU-Fugitives IC-Crimes in Indian Country II-Innocent Images National Initiative MT-Major Theft SJ-Special Jurisdiction Matters TC-Transportation Crimes VC-Violent Incident Crimes VW-Victim Witness Assistance ZV-Other Matters VG-Violent Gangs	CA-Crimes Against Children FU-Fugitives IC-Crimes in Indian Country SJ-Special Jurisdiction Matters TC-Transportation Crimes VC-Violent Incident Crimes VW-Victim Witness Assistance ZV-Other Matters
Civil Rights (CR)	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>
<p>Green script indicates creation of a new sub-program Blue script indicates a WCC sub-program transferred to CCP in FY 2003 Red Script indicates VCMO sub-programs transferred to either CCP or CEI in FY 2003</p>			


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APPENDIX III


FYS 2000-2002 PROGRAMS	FY 2000 SUB-PROGRAMS	FYS 2001 & 2002 SUB-PROGRAMS	FY 2003 SUB-PROGRAMS
Applicants (APP)	BP-Background Investigations ON-Other Non-Reimbursables OR-Other Reimbursables RP-Recruitment and Processing	BP-Background Investigations ON-Other Non-Reimbursables OR-Other Reimbursables RP-Recruitment and Processing	BP-Background Investigations ON-Other Non-Reimbursables OR-Other Reimbursables RP-Recruitment and Processing
Training Matters (TRAIN)	FE-Federal ST-State & Local	FE-Federal ST-State & Local	FE-Federal ST-State & Local
Miscellaneous (MISC)	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>
Cyber Crime Program (CCP) ⁶⁴	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	IN-Internet Fraud ID-Identity Theft IP-Intellectual Property Rights II-Innocent Images National Initiative
Criminal Enterprise Investigations (CEI) ⁶⁴	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	<i>No Sub-programs</i>	DF-OCDE Task Force MT-Major Theft VG-Violent Gangs
Green script indicates creation of a new sub-program Blue script indicates a WCC sub-program transferred to CCP in FY 2003 Red script indicates VCMO sub-programs transferred to either CCP or CEI in FY 2003			


⁶⁴ Both the Cyber Crime and Criminal Enterprise Investigations programs were created in FY 2003.

APPENDIX IV: FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

 = component existing prior to reorganization effort that began in December 2001

 = component created in reorganization of December 2001


 = original reorganization component receiving final approval on March 4, 2004



Source: <http://www.fbi.gov> from March 2004

APPENDIX V: FBI PRE-9/11 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Approved on 07/23/99



Source: FBI FY 2001 Authorization and Budget Request for the Congress

APPENDIX VI: CASEWORK IN TOP CLASSIFICATIONS (U)

**(S) NUMBER OF CASES WORKED IN
THE TOP 30 INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS
EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN ON-BOARD AGENTS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

Investigative Classification	Cases
091A Bank Robbery	41,336
088A Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution - Crime of Violence	31,788
196D Other Wire and Mail Fraud Schemes	8,097
029C FIF - \$25K - \$99,999 Fed-Ins. Bank	6,051
282A Civil Rights - Color of Law - Force &/or Violence	5,817
209A Health Care Fraud - Government Sponsored Program	4,742
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	3,641
087B Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - \$25K+	1,852
281F OC/DI - Other Major Criminal Organizations	1,646
281C OC/DI - Mexican Organizations	1,642
015B TFIS - Loss of \$25K+; Weapons, Explosives	1,553
209B Health Care Fraud - Private Insurance Program	1,489
049A Bankruptcy Fraud \$50K+ /or Court Officer	1,451
196B Insurance Fraud	1,153
300A CT Preparedness - Special Events	1,147
196A Telemarketing Fraud	1,044
245C OCDETF - Mexican Organizations	981
281A OC/DI-LCN and Italian Organizations	919
245F OCDETF - Other Major Criminal Organizations	783
249A Environmental Crimes	733
026B ITMSV - Commercial Theft or Chop Shops	706
281E OC/DI - Asian Organizations	664
281B OC/DI - Central/South American Organizations	539
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	510
245D OCDETF/VCMO - Gangs	494
245B OCDETF - Central/South American Organizations	424
281I OC/DI - Caribbean Organizations	296
245I OCDETF - Caribbean Organizations	242
092C REI - Mexican Organizations	54
244 Hostage Rescue Team	4
TOTAL	121,798

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data and NFIP Manual

**NUMBER OF CASES WORKED IN
THE TOP 30 INVESTIGATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS
EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST INCREASES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

Investigative Classification	Cases
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	3,140
266A AOT-DT-VC-Predicate Offense	2,653
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	2,430
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	2,119
196C Securities/Commodities Fraud	1,748
089B Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer	1,624
164C Crime Aboard Aircraft - All other	1,293
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	1,098
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	1,015
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	1,002
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	912
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	878
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	695
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	507
253A Fraud & Rel Activity - Ident Documents (FRAID) - Terrorists	314
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	261
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	245
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	231
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	220
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	174
174D Bomb Technician Activities	125
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	78
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	70
306 Serial Killings	53
300B CT Preparedness - Aviation Security	46
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	31
067D Support Applicant Investigations	15
261G Security Officer Matters - Other	12
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REDACTED	4
067B Special Agent Applicant Investigations	0 ⁶⁵
TOTAL	22,993

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data and NFIP Manual

⁶⁵ No 067B-Special Agent Applicant cases are present because we only reviewed cases originating in FBI field offices. All 067B cases in our data set originated at FBI Headquarters.

APPENDIX VII: ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUG MATTERS

As discussed in Chapter 4, we identified 12 investigative classifications related to Organized Crime/Drug (OC/D) matters that were among the 30 classifications that experienced the greatest field agent resource reductions between FYs 2000 and 2003.⁶⁶ Moreover, 11 of these 12 classifications involved drug-related matters.⁶⁷ These 12 classifications and their on-board agent reductions are presented in the following exhibit.

ORGANIZED CRIME/DRUG CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003		
Classification Name	Classification	AOB Change FYs 2000 – 2003
Organized Crime/Drug Investigation (OC/DI) Classifications		
OC/DI – Mexican Organizations	281C	-119
OC/DI – La Cosa Nostra and Italian Organizations	281A	-103
OC/DI – Other Major Criminal Organizations	281F	-76
OC/DI – Central/South American Organizations	281B	-44
OC/DI – Caribbean Organizations	281I	-43
OC/DI – Asian Organizations	281E	-40
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Classifications		
OCDETF – Mexican Organizations	245C	-123
OCDETF – Other Major Criminal Organizations	245F	-62
OCDETF – Central/South American Organizations	245B	-61
OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs	245D	-37
OCDETF – Caribbean Organizations	245I	-31
Racketeering Enterprise Investigations (REI) Classifications		
REI – Mexican Organizations	092C	-28
Total		-767

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

We conducted additional analyses for each of these 12 OC/D-related classifications based upon the type of criminal organization that the

⁶⁶ Classification 245D (*OCDETF – VCMO – Gangs*) was transferred from the VCMO Program during FY 2002 and assigned to the Criminal Enterprise Investigations Program in FY 2003. Although this is the only OCDETF related classification not assigned to the OC/D Program, we include Classification 245D in our discussion of OC/D matters in order to keep all OCDETF-related classifications together.


⁶⁷ The one classification not specifically related to drug investigations is 092C, which involves racketeering enterprise investigations.

investigative classification targeted. These analyses, presented in the following sections, identify the FBI field offices experiencing the greatest agent utilization reductions in these specific investigative areas.

Mexican Organizations

Among the 12 classifications related to OC/D matters, three were specifically involved Mexican organizations: Classification 281C (*OC/DI – Mexican Organizations*), Classification 245C (*OCDETF – Mexican Organizations*), and Classification 092C (*REI – Mexican Organizations*). The following exhibit presents field agent utilization for the entire FBI within these classifications for FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Field Offices – We reviewed data at the field office level and determined that the majority of FBI field offices saw reductions within these classifications. The following three exhibits present these results and highlight those field offices that experienced the most significant changes in on-board agents.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
281C (OC/DI – MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
245C (OCDEF – MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
092C (REI – MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

As shown in the previous three exhibits, most of the offices experiencing the greatest on-board agent reductions within classifications related to Mexican organizations oversee territory along or near the southwest border of the United States. In fact, the San Antonio and Phoenix field offices, both of which contain jurisdiction on the southwest border, experienced significant reductions in each of the three classifications reviewed.

In addition to our review of on-board agents, we also analyzed casework data from the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system. Specifically, for each classification related to Mexican organizations, we compared the number of cases opened in each field office in FY 2000 to the number opened in FY 2003. After determining both the number and percentage change for each field office, we identified those offices experiencing the greatest reductions for each classification. The following three tables highlight those field offices that experienced the greatest reductions in the number of cases opened within each classification. As in our analysis of on-board agent reductions in these classifications, several of the field offices in our casework analyses are on or near the southwest border of the United States.

281C (OC/DI – MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
LOS ANGELES	42	6	-36	-85.71%
ALBUQUERQUE	22	1	-21	-95.45%
CHICAGO	37	19	-18	-48.65%
KANSAS CITY	18	1	-17	-94.44%
PHOENIX	16	2	-14	-87.50%
DETROIT	13	2	-11	-84.62%
SAN FRANCISCO	12	2	-10	-83.33%
EL PASO	23	14	-9	-39.13%
HOUSTON	14	5	-9	-64.29%
SAN ANTONIO	8	1	-7	-87.50%
SALT LAKE CITY	8	1	-7	-87.50%
ATLANTA	7	1	-6	-85.71%
MINNEAPOLIS	7	1	-6	-85.71%
CHARLOTTE	5	0	-5	-100.00%
PORTLAND	6	1	-5	-83.33%
SEATTLE	5	0	-5	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

245C (OCDETF – MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
SAN ANTONIO	19	3	-16	-84.21%
LOS ANGELES	13	3	-10	-76.92%
KANSAS CITY	9	0	-9	-100.00%
CHARLOTTE	9	1	-8	-88.89%
CLEVELAND	6	0	-6	-100.00%
HOUSTON	7	1	-6	-85.71%
INDIANAPOLIS	5	0	-5	-100.00%
OMAHA	5	0	-5	-100.00%
SACRAMENTO	5	0	-5	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

092C (REI – MEXICAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
SAN FRANCISCO	2	0	-2	-100.00%
ALBUQUERQUE	1	0	-1	-100.00%
CHARLOTTE	1	0	-1	-100.00%
DALLAS	1	0	-1	-100.00%
LAS VEGAS	1	0	-1	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Central/South American Organizations

Two classifications involving Central/South American organizations were among those investigative areas with the greatest reductions in agent utilization: Classifications 281B (*OC/DI – Central/South American Organizations*) and 245B (*OCDETF – Central/South American Organizations*). As illustrated in the following exhibit, agent utilization for these two classifications decreased in each year from FY 2000 through FY 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Field Offices – The following two exhibits contain field office-level analyses of changes occurring within these classifications. Unlike our analysis of Mexican organizations, we found no geographic commonality among those field offices experiencing the greatest reductions. However, we did determine that the most significant reductions related to Central/South American organizations generally occurred within the FBI’s larger offices.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
281B (OC/DI – CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
245B (OCDETF – CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

As with Mexican organizations, we reviewed casework data for those classifications related to Central/South American organizations.

281B (OC/DI – CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
CHICAGO	7	1	-6	-85.71%
LOS ANGELES	5	0	-5	-100.00%
NEWARK	8	3	-5	-62.50%
MIAMI	13	9	-4	-30.77%
CHARLOTTE	3	0	-3	-100.00%
PITTSBURGH	3	0	-3	-100.00%
BALTIMORE	2	0	-2	-100.00%
NEW HAVEN	2	0	-2	-100.00%
NEW YORK	9	7	-2	-22.22%
TAMPA	3	1	-2	-66.67%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

245B (OCDETF – CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
MIAMI	10	3	-7	-70.00%
HOUSTON	3	0	-3	-100.00%
TAMPA	3	0	-3	-100.00%
ALBANY	2	0	-2	-100.00%
CHICAGO	2	0	-2	-100.00%
LOS ANGELES	2	0	-2	-100.00%
PHILADELPHIA	3	1	-2	-66.67%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Caribbean Organizations

The following exhibit illustrates on-board field agent utilization in the two Caribbean-related classifications listed among those investigative areas with the greatest reductions in on-board agents: Classification 281I (*OC/DI – Caribbean Organizations*) and Classification 245I (*OCDETF – Caribbean Organizations*).


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Field Offices – The following two exhibits illustrate on-board agent changes experienced by each FBI field office from FYs 2000 through 2003 in matters related to Caribbean organizations.

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
2811 (OC/DI -- CARIBBEAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
2451 (OCDETF -- CARIBBEAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Similar to matters involving Central/South American organizations, the decrease in agent utilization in classifications associated with Caribbean enterprises occurred within some of the FBI's larger field offices, New York City, Washington, and Miami.

Our analysis of casework in matters related to Caribbean organizations revealed that several of the offices experiencing the greatest reductions in case openings did not open any 281I and 245I cases in FY 2003.

281I (OC/DI -- CARIBBEAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
SAN JUAN	11	4	-7	-63.64%
BOSTON	9	4	-5	-55.56%
MIAMI	9	5	-4	-44.44%
PITTSBURGH	4	0	-4	-100.00%
PHILADELPHIA	4	1	-3	-75.00%
WASHINGTON	3	0	-3	-100.00%
ALBANY	2	0	-2	-100.00%
COLUMBIA	2	0	-2	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

245I (OCDEF -- CARIBBEAN ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
BOSTON	6	0	-6	-100.00%
NEW YORK	6	0	-6	-100.00%
HOUSTON	3	0	-3	-100.00%
ALBANY	2	0	-2	-100.00%
ATLANTA	2	0	-2	-100.00%
COLUMBIA	2	0	-2	-100.00%
CLEVELAND	3	1	-2	-66.67%
JACKSONVILLE	2	0	-2	-100.00%
LAS VEGAS	2	0	-2	-100.00%
MIAMI	4	2	-2	-50.00%
NEWARK	2	0	-2	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

La Cosa Nostra and Italian Organizations

Only one of the OC/D investigative classifications we identified involved organizations related to La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and Italian enterprises: Classification 281A (*OC/DI La Cosa Nostra and Italian Organizations*). The following exhibit presents field agent utilization within this classification for FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – As shown in the following exhibit, by far the most significant on-board agent reductions within LCN and Italian organization matters occurred in the New York City and Newark field offices. According to FBI program documents, investigations involving these organizations are concentrated in the New York City Metropolitan area; thus, these results were not surprising.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
281A (OC/DI – LA COSA NOSTRA AND ITALIAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Our review of 281A case openings, which follows, showed no significant reductions.

**281A (OC/DI – LA COSA NOSTRA AND ITALIAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
BOSTON	8	1	-7	-87.50%
KANSAS CITY	7	0	-7	-100.00%
NEWARK	11	4	-7	-63.64%
PHILADELPHIA	6	1	-5	-83.33%
NEW HAVEN	7	4	-3	-42.86%
NEW ORLEANS	3	1	-2	-66.67%
ATLANTA	1	0	-1	-100.00%
BUFFALO	1	0	-1	-100.00%
CHICAGO	9	8	-1	-11.11%
DALLAS	2	1	-1	-50.00%
HOUSTON	1	0	-1	-100.00%
PHOENIX	1	0	-1	-100.00%
SAN FRANCISCO	1	0	-1	-100.00%
TAMPA	3	2	-1	-33.33%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Asian Organizations

As with LCN and Italian organization matters, only one classification associated with Asian organizations experienced the most significant reductions in on-board agents between FYs 2000 and 2003. The following exhibit reveals the field agent resource utilization for this classification: 281E (*OC/DI – Asian Organizations*).

**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – As illustrated in the following exhibit, the majority of the FBI’s field offices experienced a decrease in onboard agents in Classification 281E between FYs 2000 and 2003. Although the most significant agent utilization reductions were not concentrated in a specific geographic area, they generally occurred within the FBI’s larger field offices. In fact, five of these field offices, including New York City and Los Angeles, are among the FBI’s ten largest offices.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ In addition to the Los Angeles and New York City field offices, these offices include the Houston, San Francisco, and Washington field offices.

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
281E (OC/DI – ASIAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

As shown in the following exhibit, almost every field office that experienced the greatest reductions in Asian organization matters contain territory that borders either the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean.

281E (OC/DI – ASIAN ORGANIZATIONS)
FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
SAN FRANCISCO	18	4	-14	-77.78%
LOS ANGELES	18	5	-13	-72.22%
ANCHORAGE	9	0	-9	-100.00%
BALTIMORE	6	0	-6	-100.00%
HONOLULU	7	2	-5	-71.43%
NEW YORK	8	3	-5	-62.50%
SEATTLE	6	1	-5	-83.33%
MINNEAPOLIS	6	2	-4	-66.67%
NEWARK	12	8	-4	-33.33%
BOSTON	4	1	-3	-75.00%
WASHINGTON	3	0	-3	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Other Criminal Organizations

Of the 30 classifications with the most significant agent utilization reductions, three investigative areas did not pertain to a specific type of criminal organization: Classification 245D (*OCDETF – VCMO Gangs*), Classification 281F (*OC/DI – Other Major Criminal Organizations*), and Classification 245F (*OCDETF – Other Major Criminal Organizations*). The following exhibit illustrates the agent utilization within these classifications for FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Field Offices – We discerned no similarities among the field offices with the greatest reductions in agent utilization within these classifications. As shown in the following exhibit, the offices affected were large, medium, and small with no geographic connectivity among them.

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
245D (OCDETF – VCMO - GANGS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
281F (OC/DI – OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
245F (OCDETF – OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

The following three tables provide information about reductions in case openings within matters involving other criminal organizations.

245D (OCDETF – VCMO - GANGS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
MIAMI	4	0	-4	-100.00%
ATLANTA	3	0	-3	-100.00%
DALLAS	3	0	-3	-100.00%
DENVER	3	0	-3	-100.00%
MILWAUKEE	3	0	-3	-100.00%
OKLAHOMA CITY	3	0	-3	-100.00%
SACRAMENTO	3	0	-3	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

281F (OC/DI – OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
DETROIT	30	4	-26	-86.67%
PHILADELPHIA	28	2	-26	-92.86%
SPRINGFIELD	18	2	-16	-88.89%
BIRMINGHAM	14	0	-14	-100.00%
PITTSBURGH	12	0	-12	-100.00%
NORFOLK	12	1	-11	-91.67%
INDIANAPOLIS	11	1	-10	-90.91%
JACKSON	11	1	-10	-90.91%
LOUISVILLE	14	4	-10	-71.43%
ALBANY	11	2	-9	-81.82%
DALLAS	10	1	-9	-90.00%
NEWARK	11	2	-9	-81.82%
SALT LAKE CITY	11	3	-8	-72.73%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

245F (OCDETF – OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
CHARLOTTE	9	1	-8	-88.89%
MEMPHIS	7	0	-7	-100.00%
ATLANTA	7	1	-6	-85.71%
NORFOLK	6	0	-6	-100.00%
INDIANAPOLIS	5	0	-5	-100.00%
PHILADELPHIA	5	0	-5	-100.00%
COLUMBIA	5	1	-4	-80.00%
DETROIT	4	0	-4	-100.00%
PITTSBURGH	4	0	-4	-100.00%
ST. LOUIS	5	1	-4	-80.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

APPENDIX VIII: VIOLENT CRIME MATTERS

Six of the 30 investigative classifications that experienced the most significant reductions in on-board agents from FYs 2000 through 2003 fall within the realm of violent crime.⁶⁹ Three of these fall into the Violent Crime/Major Offenders (VCMO) Program, while the others are located within the Criminal Enterprise Investigations (CEI) Program.

VIOLENT CRIME CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003

Program	Number	Classification Name	AOB Change FYs 2000 – 2003
VCMO	088A	Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence	-101
VCMO	091A	Bank Robbery	-81
VCMO	244	Hostage Rescue Team	-24
CEI	087B	Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - \$25K+	-29
CEI	026B	ITSMV (Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle)–Commercial Theft or Chop Shops	-29
CEI	015B	TFIS (Theft From Interstate Shipment) – Loss of \$25K+; Weapons, Explosives	-21
Total			-285

Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


As was the case with OC/D matters, we identified trends in the field offices most affected by agent utilization reductions in these violent crime classifications. Additionally, we reviewed changes in the number of case openings for each of the six violent crime classifications at the field office level between FYs 2000 and 2003. Our analyses of agent utilization and case openings are presented in the following sections.

⁶⁹ Actually, 7 of the 30 classifications experiencing the most significant reduction in on-board agents fall within the VCMO and CEI programs. However, Classification 245D (OCDETF – VCMO Gangs), located within the CEI Program, is an OCDETF classification that was discussed in Appendix VII, along with the other OCDETF classifications.

Violent Fugitives

Classification 088A (*Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution – Crime of Violence*) involves the investigation of fugitives charged with a violent crime. The following exhibit details the general decline in field agent resources utilized within this classification for FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – The following exhibit shows the changes that occurred within all FBI field offices. As shown, several offices experienced significant resource utilization reductions in this fugitive area, many of which were among the FBI’s larger offices.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
088A (UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION – CRIME OF VIOLENCE)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Besides the reductions in field agent utilization, this investigative area experienced the greatest reduction in case openings, by far, of any other classification identified in the top 30 decreasing classifications. The FBI opened 13,384 violent fugitive investigations in FY 2000, but reduced that to only 1,767 in FY 2003. This significant drop in case openings amounts to a decrease of 87 percent. The following table lists the field offices that experienced a reduction of at least 25 case openings. As seen from the list, 42 of the FBI's 56 field offices opened significantly fewer violent fugitive cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. Notably, the New York City Field Office, after opening 376 violent fugitive cases in FY 2000, opened none in FY 2003.

088A (UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION – CRIME OF VIOLENCE)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
NEWARK	1,130	22	-1,108	-98.05%
MIAMI	867	23	-844	-97.35%
LAS VEGAS	802	67	-735	-91.65%
WASHINGTON	650	26	-624	-96.00%
BOSTON	594	8	-586	-98.65%
BALTIMORE	575	20	-555	-96.52%
ST. LOUIS	499	77	-422	-84.57%
PHILADELPHIA	576	155	-421	-73.09%
ALBUQUERQUE	400	1	-399	-99.75%
NEW YORK	376	0	-376	-100.00%
SAN ANTONIO	370	5	-365	-98.65%
DETROIT	523	184	-339	-64.82%
CHARLOTTE	352	25	-327	-92.90%
CHICAGO	387	62	-325	-83.98%
SEATTLE	303	12	-291	-96.04%
SAN FRANCISCO	333	45	-288	-86.49%
PHOENIX	291	29	-262	-90.03%
INDIANAPOLIS	253	10	-243	-96.05%
MILWAUKEE	247	7	-240	-97.17%
NEW HAVEN	261	40	-221	-84.67%
LOS ANGELES	294	74	-220	-74.83%
DENVER	232	15	-217	-93.53%
SALT LAKE CITY	234	17	-217	-92.74%
MOBILE	207	6	-201	-97.10%
PITTSBURGH	206	8	-198	-96.12%
CLEVELAND	487	298	-189	-38.81%
SACRAMENTO	197	27	-170	-86.29%
CINCINNATI	158	7	-151	-95.57%
NORFOLK	157	15	-142	-90.45%
JACKSONVILLE	133	7	-126	-94.74%
MINNEAPOLIS	189	65	-124	-65.61%
HOUSTON	85	0	-85	-100.00%
DALLAS	93	10	-83	-89.25%
ATLANTA	144	67	-77	-53.47%
PORTLAND	100	23	-77	-77.00%
RICHMOND	74	5	-69	-93.24%
SAN DIEGO	77	13	-64	-83.12%
BIRMINGHAM	61	4	-57	-93.44%
JACKSON	62	6	-56	-90.32%
MEMPHIS	33	3	-30	-90.91%
OMAHA	28	2	-26	-92.86%
NEW ORLEANS	31	6	-25	-80.65%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Bank Robbery

Between FYs 2000 and 2003 the number of agents working on bank robbery investigations significantly dropped. The following exhibit provides an overview of the on-board agents involved in such investigations during this period.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – Changes in agent utilization of all field offices in 091A matters are highlighted in the following exhibit. As shown, virtually every office had some sort of on-board agent reduction. Furthermore, many of the significant utilization declines occurred in the FBI’s larger field offices, like Chicago and Los Angeles.

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
091A (BANK ROBBERY)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

In our review of casework in 091A matters, we found that although 3 field offices opened at least 111 fewer cases in FY 2003 than FY 2000, 091A case openings in the majority of FBI field offices increased during this timeframe. Field offices experiencing the greatest reductions in cases openings in this classification are highlighted in the following exhibit.

091A (BANK ROBBERY)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
LOS ANGELES	689	561	-128	-18.58%
CINCINNATI	238	113	-125	-52.52%
PHOENIX	220	109	-111	-50.45%
TAMPA	242	182	-60	-24.79%
SEATTLE	288	229	-59	-20.49%
NORFOLK	64	16	-48	-75.00%
ALBANY	64	29	-35	-54.69%
SACRAMENTO	197	165	-32	-16.24%
OMAHA	98	70	-28	-28.57%
LAS VEGAS	151	126	-25	-16.56%
KANSAS CITY	114	93	-21	-18.42%
INDIANAPOLIS	121	103	-18	-14.88%
COLUMBIA	124	112	-12	-9.68%
MINNEAPOLIS	83	71	-12	-14.46%
MILWAUKEE	90	83	-7	-7.78%
SAN JUAN	21	16	-5	-23.81%
WASHINGTON	55	52	-3	-5.45%
DENVER	123	121	-2	-1.63%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Hostage Rescue Team

Another violent crime classification that experienced a reduction in field agent resource utilization was Classification 244 (*Hostage Rescue Team*). The following exhibit illustrates the decline in the number of on-board agents involved in these investigative matters between FYs 2000 through 2003.

**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – When analyzing the resource utilization changes at the field office level, we found that no office experienced significant fluctuations (whether increasing or decreasing) in on-board agents. Instead, the majority of the utilization reduction in 244 matters occurred within the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), which provides tactical support to FBI field offices for incidents ranging from hostage rescue to fugitive apprehension. Thus, it was not surprising that CIRG accounted for a large portion of the overall reduction in this investigative classification.

Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property

Resource utilization for investigations involving the transportation of stolen property across state lines valued at \$25,000 or more are tracked in Classification 087B (*Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property - \$25K+*). This violent crime area was also among the 30 classifications experiencing significant field agent resource utilization reductions. The following exhibit provides the on-board agents utilized in this investigative area between FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – The following exhibit represents the agent resource utilization changes among FBI field offices. As illustrated, the majority of offices experienced on-board agent reductions involving investigations of 087B matters. Additionally, the greatest agent utilization declines occurred in the FBI’s larger field offices: Baltimore, Dallas, New York City, Phoenix, and Washington.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
087B (INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY-\$25K+)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

As shown in the following exhibit, three of the field offices experiencing the greatest reductions in 087B case openings (Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dallas) were among the largest FBI field offices.

**087B (INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY-\$25K+)
FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
CHICAGO	18	6	-12	-66.67%
LOS ANGELES	13	2	-11	-84.62%
DALLAS	17	8	-9	-52.94%
LAS VEGAS	9	0	-9	-100.00%
CINCINNATI	9	1	-8	-88.89%
NEWARK	12	5	-7	-58.33%
BIRMINGHAM	9	3	-6	-66.67%
LITTLE ROCK	6	0	-6	-100.00%
LOUISVILLE	9	3	-6	-66.67%
OKLAHOMA CITY	6	0	-6	-100.00%
BALTIMORE	5	0	-5	-100.00%
DETROIT	12	7	-5	-41.67%
INDIANAPOLIS	7	2	-5	-71.43%
MINNEAPOLIS	7	2	-5	-71.43%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles

Classification 026B (*ITSMV – Commercial Theft or Chop Shops*) was another investigative area involving violent crime that experienced a significant reduction in field agent resource utilization. The overall number of on-board agents working on these matters from FYs 2000 through 2003 is shown in the following exhibit.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – Changes in agent utilization within each FBI field office are highlighted in the following exhibit for investigations involving 026B matters. Although some field offices actually had utilization increases in this area, the changes were nominal. In turn, the majority of the offices experienced on-board agent reductions, with the most significant declines occurring in larger offices with the exception of El Paso and Knoxville.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
026B (ITSMV – COMMERCIAL THEFT OR CHOP SHOPS)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Within 026B investigative matters, we determined that the greatest reduction in case openings in any one field office was only eight. However, nearly all of the offices listed as experiencing the greatest reductions in case openings did not open any 026B investigations in FY 2003.

026B (ITSMV – COMMERCIAL THEFT OR CHOP SHOPS)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
LAS VEGAS	8	0	-8	-100.00%
LITTLE ROCK	6	0	-6	-100.00%
JACKSONVILLE	5	0	-5	-100.00%
NEW ORLEANS	6	1	-5	-83.33%
CHARLOTTE	4	0	-4	-100.00%
CHICAGO	4	0	-4	-100.00%
BIRMINGHAM	4	1	-3	-75.00%
DALLAS	4	1	-3	-75.00%
HONOLULU	3	0	-3	-100.00%
KNOXVILLE	3	0	-3	-100.00%
NEWARK	3	0	-3	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Theft From Interstate Shipment

Of the six violent crime classifications experiencing significant field agent resource utilization reductions, the final one identified was Classification 015B (*TFIS – Loss of \$25K+; Weapons, Explosives*). The following exhibit illustrates the on-board agents involved in this investigative area from FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – We found that several FBI field offices experienced some sort of reduction in on-board agents from FYs 2000 to 2003, as depicted in the following graph. Many of the changes were nominal; however, we did note that four of the FBI’s six largest field offices experienced the most significant field agent utilization declines.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
015B (TFIS – LOSS OF \$25K+; WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Our analysis of Classification 015B revealed that the FBI overall opened 241 fewer cases in FY 2003 than in FY 2000. The following exhibit details those field offices with the greatest reductions in case openings in 015B matters.

**015B (TFIS – LOSS OF \$25K+; WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES)
FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS – FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
CHICAGO	74	9	-65	-87.84%
DALLAS	33	3	-30	-90.91%
NEWARK	36	12	-24	-66.67%
NEW YORK	29	9	-20	-68.97%
INDIANAPOLIS	15	2	-13	-86.67%
SAN FRANCISCO	13	0	-13	-100.00%
COLUMBIA	10	0	-10	-100.00%
MEMPHIS	14	4	-10	-71.43%
LOS ANGELES	10	1	-9	-90.00%
KANSAS CITY	6	0	-6	-100.00%
PORTLAND	6	0	-6	-100.00%
HOUSTON	8	3	-5	-62.50%
TAMPA	8	3	-5	-62.50%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

APPENDIX IX: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME MATTERS

As noted in Chapter 4, of the 30 FBI investigative classifications that experienced the greatest field agent resource utilization reductions from FYs 2000 through 2003, 8 pertained to white-collar crime matters and are listed in the following exhibit. Included in these eight classifications are those related to health care fraud, telemarketing fraud, and insurance fraud; all of which are crime areas that an FBI official thought would see a growth in the near term.

WHITE-COLLAR CRIME CLASSIFICATIONS EXPERIENCING THE GREATEST REDUCTIONS IN AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003

Classification Number	Classification Name	AOB Change FYs 2000 - 2003
Financial Institution Fraud:		
029C	FIF - \$25K - \$99,999 Fed-Insured Bank	-50
Health Care Fraud:		
209A	Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program	-89
209B	Health Care Fraud – Private Insurance Program	-32
Other Fraud Investigative Areas:		
196A	Telemarketing Fraud	-37
196D	Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes	-35
196B	Insurance Fraud	-28
049A	Bankruptcy Fraud \$50K+ /or Court Officer	-26
Environmental Crimes:		
249A	Environmental Crimes	-25
Total		-322


Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

We conducted additional analyses of each of these classifications and identified any trends in the FBI field offices most affected by field agent resource utilization reductions in these investigative areas. In addition, we performed analyses of case openings at the field office level for each classification. Our analyses are presented in the following sections.

Financial Institution Fraud

We identified one investigative area related to financial institution fraud (FIF) that experienced a significant reduction in field agent resource utilization: Classification 029C (*FIF – \$25K - \$99,999 Fed-Insured Bank*). As shown in the following graph, the overall number of on-board agents involved in these investigations declined in each year from FY 2000 through FY 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – The following exhibit shows field agent utilization changes among all FBI field offices. As shown, every office, except for one, experienced on-board agent reductions in O29C matters from FYs 2000 through 2003.⁷⁰ Although an FBI official speculated that changes in this area would have a greater impact on smaller field offices, we found that the most significant declines primarily occurred in the FBI’s larger field offices.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
O29C (FIF – \$25K - \$99,999 FED-INSURED BANK)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

⁷⁰ The San Juan Field Office was the only office that had an increase in the number of on-board agents handling Classification O29C matters from FY 2000 to 2003; however, this increase only amounted to 0.01 on-board agents.

We found that overall the FBI opened only 230 new 029C cases in FY 2003 compared to the 1,456 it opened in FY 2000, reflecting a reduction of 1,226 case openings. Among individual field offices, we identified several that reduced their openings of 029C investigations by at least 22 cases.

029C (FIF - \$25K - \$99,999 FED-INSURED BANK)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
DETROIT	97	14	-83	-85.57%
CHICAGO	67	1	-66	-98.51%
CLEVELAND	65	5	-60	-92.31%
PHILADELPHIA	61	7	-54	-88.52%
OKLAHOMA CITY	56	7	-49	-87.50%
DALLAS	58	10	-48	-82.76%
SEATTLE	46	4	-42	-91.30%
PHOENIX	40	1	-39	-97.50%
CINCINNATI	43	6	-37	-86.05%
NEW ORLEANS	45	9	-36	-80.00%
MINNEAPOLIS	39	4	-35	-89.74%
MILWAUKEE	34	0	-34	-100.00%
WASHINGTON	37	4	-33	-89.19%
KANSAS CITY	32	2	-30	-93.75%
LOUISVILLE	34	5	-29	-85.29%
PITTSBURGH	30	1	-29	-96.67%
ATLANTA	39	11	-28	-71.79%
DENVER	29	1	-28	-96.55%
SAN ANTONIO	33	5	-28	-84.85%
BOSTON	33	7	-26	-78.79%
CHARLOTTE	27	1	-26	-96.30%
HOUSTON	28	3	-25	-89.29%
SALT LAKE CITY	27	4	-23	-85.19%
INDIANAPOLIS	26	4	-22	-84.62%


Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Health Care Fraud

Although the FBI expects the incidence of health care fraud to dramatically increase over the next decade as the general population ages and health care spending increases, two of the eight white-collar crime classifications experiencing significant field agent resource utilization reductions involve health care fraud matters: Classifications 209A (*Health Care Fraud – Government Sponsored Program*) and 209B (*Health Care Fraud*)

– *Private Insurance Program*). The following exhibit presents the on-board agent data utilized in each of these classifications from FYs 2000 through 2003.


**TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Field Offices – The following two exhibits identify field agent utilization changes among FBI field offices for 209A and 209B matters. As illustrated, the majority of the offices experienced a decrease in onboard agents in each of these health care fraud areas. Although the most significant agent utilization reductions were not concentrated in a specific geographic area, they generally occurred within the FBI’s larger field offices. We did, however, note that the Tampa and Washington field offices had considerable on-board agent declines in both 209A and 209B investigative matters.

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
209A (HEALTH CARE FRAUD – GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAM)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
209B (HEALTH CARE FRAUD – PRIVATE INSURANCE PROGRAM)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Besides the on-board agent reductions, we identified the changes in case openings at the field office level for both health care fraud areas. As shown in the following two exhibits, 209A matters, overall, experienced greater decreases in case openings within field offices than did 209B matters.

209A (HEALTH CARE FRAUD – GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAM)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
SACRAMENTO	132	23	-109	-82.58%
DETROIT	49	16	-33	-67.35%
CHICAGO	31	10	-21	-67.74%
BALTIMORE	24	4	-20	-83.33%
TAMPA	22	4	-18	-81.82%
DENVER	21	5	-16	-76.19%
WASHINGTON	20	4	-16	-80.00%
MIAMI	35	20	-15	-42.86%
BOSTON	20	6	-14	-70.00%
SAN FRANCISCO	18	4	-14	-77.78%
PITTSBURGH	22	9	-13	-59.09%
NEW YORK	27	15	-12	-44.44%
RICHMOND	22	11	-11	-50.00%
BIRMINGHAM	14	4	-10	-71.43%
COLUMBIA	11	1	-10	-90.91%
PHILADELPHIA	13	3	-10	-76.92%
PORTLAND	11	2	-9	-81.82%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

209B (HEALTH CARE FRAUD – PRIVATE INSURANCE PROGRAM)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
WASHINGTON	19	3	-16	-84.21%
CLEVELAND	15	6	-9	-60.00%
PHILADELPHIA	19	10	-9	-47.37%
MINNEAPOLIS	10	2	-8	-80.00%
NEW ORLEANS	11	3	-8	-72.73%
PITTSBURGH	9	1	-8	-88.89%
BOSTON	8	3	-5	-62.50%
NORFOLK	5	0	-5	-100.00%
SAN DIEGO	7	2	-5	-71.43%
NEW YORK	17	13	-4	-23.53%
PHOENIX	4	0	-4	-100.00%
CHARLOTTE	4	1	-3	-75.00%
DENVER	4	1	-3	-75.00%
SAN FRANCISCO	3	0	-3	-100.00%
TAMPA	5	2	-3	-60.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Other Fraud Investigative Areas

We identified four other fraudulent classifications in which the FBI's agent utilization significantly decreased. Specifically, these were: Classifications 196A (*Telemarketing Fraud*), 196B (*Insurance Fraud*), 196D (*Other Wire & Mail Fraud Schemes*), and 049A (*Bankruptcy Fraud \$50K+ /or Court Officer*). The following exhibit provides an overview of the field agent resource utilization within each of these four classifications from FYs 2000 through 2003.


TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data


Field Offices – As depicted in the following four exhibits, the majority of the field offices experienced field agent utilization reductions of some kind in each of these other fraud-related areas. We further noted that the most significant on-board agent declines primarily occurred in the FBI’s larger offices and were located in offices dispersed throughout the United States.

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
196D (OTHER WIRE & MAIL FRAUD SCHEMES)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
196A (TELEMARKETING FRAUD)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003




Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
196B (INSURANCE FRAUD)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
049A (BANKRUPTCY FRAUD \$50K+ /OR COURT OFFICER)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

The following four tables list the greatest reductions in case openings among field offices for the other fraud related investigative matters.

196D (OTHER WIRE & MAIL FRAUD SCHEMES)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
SALT LAKE CITY	76	24	-52	-68.42%
NEW YORK	68	34	-34	-50.00%
KNOXVILLE	33	2	-31	-93.94%
LOS ANGELES	75	44	-31	-41.33%
BOSTON	70	40	-30	-42.86%
CLEVELAND	46	18	-28	-60.87%
SEATTLE	41	17	-24	-58.54%
CHICAGO	65	44	-21	-32.31%
RICHMOND	33	13	-20	-60.61%
DENVER	27	9	-18	-66.67%
OKLAHOMA CITY	41	23	-18	-43.90%
JACKSON	21	4	-17	-80.95%
ATLANTA	58	42	-16	-27.59%
CHARLOTTE	33	17	-16	-48.48%
DALLAS	61	45	-16	-26.23%
HOUSTON	28	13	-15	-53.57%
INDIANAPOLIS	34	19	-15	-44.12%
NEWARK	36	21	-15	-41.67%
NEW ORLEANS	46	31	-15	-32.61%
PORTLAND	26	11	-15	-57.69%
BIRMINGHAM	19	8	-11	-57.89%
OMAHA	20	9	-11	-55.00%
SAN ANTONIO	27	17	-10	-37.04%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

196A (TELEMARKETING FRAUD)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
LOS ANGELES	31	11	-20	-64.52%
SAN DIEGO	12	1	-11	-91.67%
MIAMI	10	0	-10	-100.00%
LAS VEGAS	7	0	-7	-100.00%
TAMPA	7	1	-6	-85.71%
DENVER	5	0	-5	-100.00%
SEATTLE	6	1	-5	-83.33%
BUFFALO	7	3	-4	-57.14%
BIRMINGHAM	4	0	-4	-100.00%
HOUSTON	4	0	-4	-100.00%
KNOXVILLE	4	0	-4	-100.00%
PHILADELPHIA	6	2	-4	-66.67%
PHOENIX	9	5	-4	-44.44%
SACRAMENTO	4	0	-4	-100.00%
SALT LAKE CITY	6	2	-4	-66.67%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

196B (INSURANCE FRAUD)

**FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
BOSTON	16	4	-12	-75.00%
OKLAHOMA CITY	13	2	-11	-84.62%
DETROIT	13	4	-9	-69.23%
LOUISVILLE	8	0	-8	-100.00%
CLEVELAND	8	1	-7	-87.50%
NEW YORK	8	1	-7	-87.50%
PHOENIX	7	0	-7	-100.00%
ATLANTA	8	2	-6	-75.00%
BIRMINGHAM	7	1	-6	-85.71%
CHARLOTTE	7	1	-6	-85.71%
SAN ANTONIO	7	1	-6	-85.71%
CHICAGO	7	2	-5	-71.43%
LOS ANGELES	5	0	-5	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

049A (BANKRUPTCY FRAUD \$50K+ /OR COURT OFFICER)

FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003


FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
LOS ANGELES	135	13	-122	-90.37%
CHICAGO	20	1	-19	-95.00%
BOSTON	20	2	-18	-90.00%
BUFFALO	13	1	-12	-92.31%
DALLAS	13	1	-12	-92.31%
SALT LAKE CITY	12	1	-11	-91.67%
NEW YORK	9	0	-9	-100.00%
ATLANTA	8	0	-8	-100.00%
MINNEAPOLIS	8	0	-8	-100.00%
OMAHA	8	0	-8	-100.00%
PHILADELPHIA	9	1	-8	-88.89%
DENVER	7	0	-7	-100.00%
SEATTLE	11	4	-7	-63.64%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

Environmental Crimes

Classification 249A (*Environmental Crimes*) was another investigative area among the eight white-collar crime classifications experiencing significant field agent utilization reductions. The following exhibit identifies the number of on-board agents involved in this investigative area from FYs 2000 through 2003 and shows that the utilization of field agents handling such matters decreased in each fiscal year.


TOTAL FBI FIELD AGENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

Field Offices – As illustrated in the following exhibit, virtually every field office experienced reductions in the utilization of field agents on 249A matters. However, only three offices (Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans) had an on-board agent decrease that was greater than one.

**CHANGES IN ON-BOARD AGENTS IN FBI FIELD OFFICES
249A (ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES)
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003**



Source: OIG analysis of FBI TURK data

The following table shows reductions in the number of environmental crime investigations opened in field offices from FY 2000 through FY 2003. Although we observed no common factors between field offices experiencing the greatest reductions, we did note that most of them revealed in our analysis experienced reductions of 100 percent.

249A (ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES)

FIELD OFFICE CASE OPENINGS
FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2003

FIELD OFFICE	FY 2000 Cases Opened	FY 2003 Cases Opened	Number Change	Percentage Change
HOUSTON	14	0	-14	-100.00%
KNOXVILLE	13	1	-12	-92.31%
DETROIT	9	0	-9	-100.00%
TAMPA	9	0	-9	-100.00%
LOUISVILLE	8	0	-8	-100.00%
BALTIMORE	7	0	-7	-100.00%
ANCHORAGE	6	0	-6	-100.00%
MOBILE	7	1	-6	-85.71%
WASHINGTON	7	1	-6	-85.71%
CINCINNATI	5	0	-5	-100.00%
CLEVELAND	6	1	-5	-83.33%
NEWARK	5	0	-5	-100.00%
PHILADELPHIA	5	0	-5	-100.00%
SAN DIEGO	5	0	-5	-100.00%
SAN FRANCISCO	5	0	-5	-100.00%

Source: OIG analysis of FBI ACS data

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE

S E C R E T



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

September 10, 2004

Ms. Carol S. Taraszka, Regional Audit Manager
Chicago Regional Office
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
500 W. Madison Street, Suite 3510A
Chicago, IL 60661-2590

Dear Ms. Taraszka:

In connection with the audit, The Internal Effects of the FBI's Reprioritization Efforts, attached is the FBI's response to the audit report. The FBI has conducted classification and sensitivity reviews. Attached is the audit report with portion markings.

In addition, the Criminal Investigation Division provided the following comments:

First page (i):

The second paragraph is not fairly stated considering the number of proactive investigations being pursued against organized criminal enterprises, white collar crime, and public corruption. The paragraph, as written, would be fine if we were only engaged in violent crimes and civil rights.

Page 12:

The chart is missing data for the Organized Crime/Drug Program.

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Page 37:

Exhibit 3-11 reflects an AOB change for 196C cases with numbers reflected as 73 and 54. CID could not determine the significance of these numbers. AOB for 196C cases were as follows: 159 in 2000, 177 in 2001, 182 in 2002, and 250 in 2003. Overall, the purpose of the last column of numbers is suspect.

Pages 40 and 46:

Case classifications and names are not readable.

Page 49:

Exhibit 4-2 should reflect 491 agents for the Drug Program in FY 2002.

Page 50:

Exhibit 4-3 should reflect 1677 for the 2002 FSL (not considering the FSL for CEI).

Page 55:

Exhibit 4-6 is incomplete.

Page 55:

"According to FBI officials, little written direction was given to the field with regard to the reprioritization and the specific impact it would have on violent crime investigations. Rather, FBI incorporated aspects of this reprioritization and the program plans it issues annually to the field.....Although we observed slight changes in the priority list between the two fiscal years, as shown in Exhibit 4-7, the FBI's national priorities for violent crime matters have essentially remained the same since FY 2001."

This paragraph seems to implicitly criticize that our priorities within the program have not changed as a result of 9-11, and that we should have reprioritized based on their resource utilization analysis. This is incorrect. Priorities

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-2-

S E C R E T

are based on the crime problem and not resource utilization. All of our intelligence and latest crime survey indicates that the crime problems identified as priorities have not changed and, thus, the priorities should not be changed.

The paragraph also seems to imply criticism about the lack of written direction given to the field based on input from (unnamed) FBI officials. The program plan contains specific direction and courses of action for the field in the SAC Guidance section for each goal and objective. In addition to the program plan and the field guidance ECs on the list previously provided, CID also issued guidance regarding priorities in EC dated 10/21/2003, 66F-HQ-A1246974-A, Serial 582. In addition to previous guidance VCS recently issued updated guidance on appropriate response to bank robberies in same file, Serial 963. There are other specific ECs regarding on specific initiatives such as the Child Prostitution Initiative, Retail Theft Initiative, Violent Cities Initiative, as well as guidance ECs related to dealing with FAMS and TSA.

Page 56:

"As was the case with other criminal investigative programs, FBI officials stated that the FBI's violent crime efforts would focus primarily on the "big players". However, SACs were advised to use their discretion in allocating limited violent crime resources to matters that were most problematic within their jurisdiction."

This is also misleading. First of all, CID did not issue guidance of this kind to SACs, as stated. SACs are supposed to establish priorities based on the national priorities and the crime problem identified in their divisions, and allocate resources accordingly. This guidance is also contained in the program plan.

The final recommendation:

"Consider developing evaluation models similar to the ones presented in this report to assist in managing FBI programs."

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The CID already does this in a variety of ways. That said, the CID concurs with the recommendation.

We appreciate the efforts of the OIG to assist the FBI in adapting to the post 9/11 environment and the significant changes the organization has undergone. Should you have any further questions please contact me at (202) 324 2901 or Ms. Robin Dinerman at (202) 324-6389.

Sincerely,



Donald W. Thompson, Jr.
Acting Assistant Director
Inspection Division

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S E C R E T

-4-

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT DIVISION
ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY
TO CLOSE THE REPORT**

In its response to our draft audit report, the FBI concurred with our recommendation and stated that its Criminal Investigative Division (CID) was already performing the detailed reviews that we recommended (Appendix X). In addition to responding to the recommendation, the FBI expressed some disagreement with nine specific areas of the draft report, as noted in Appendix X. The first part of this appendix is a response to those comments made by the FBI. The second part analyzes the FBI's response to the recommendation and summarizes actions necessary to close the recommendation.

Part I – OIG Response to FBI Comments

In its response, the FBI questioned certain data values we obtained in our analyses, disagreed with information contained in three paragraphs, and expressed problems with three exhibits. The following are our responses to each of the FBI's comments.

Executive Summary

The FBI commented on the second paragraph found on page i of the Executive Summary of the draft audit report, which stated:

Prior to 9/11, the FBI was a more traditional, reactive law enforcement agency; a crime occurred and the FBI investigated it. According to the FBI, since the reprioritization it is striving to incorporate more proactive, intelligence-based tactics and operations into its procedures, particularly in terrorism-related matters.

The FBI's response states:

The second paragraph is not fairly stated considering the number of proactive investigations being pursued against organized criminal enterprise, white collar crime, and public corruption. The paragraph, as written, would be fine if we were only engaged in violent crimes and civil rights.

In order to clarify the meaning of the paragraph in question, we have altered it slightly. Our changes are noted in bold text, as follows:

Prior to 9/11, the FBI **utilized more of its field agent resources to investigate traditional criminal activity than to investigate matters related to terrorism.** According to the FBI, since the reprioritization it is striving to incorporate more proactive, intelligence-based tactics and operations into its procedures, particularly in terrorism-related matters.

Incorrect Data Values

The FBI claimed that certain OIG-determined AOB values in Exhibit 3-11 on page 37 of the draft audit report are incorrect. The FBI response states:

Exhibit 3-11 reflects an AOB change for 196C cases with numbers reflected as 73 and 54. CID could not determine the significance of these numbers. AOB for 196C cases were as follows: 159 in 2000, 177 in 2001, 182 in 2002, and 250 in 2003. Overall, the purpose of the last column of numbers is suspect.

Using FBI source data, we determined the AOB for 196C cases to be 135 in FY 2000 and 208 in FY 2003. We contacted the FBI's TURK Program Manager, and she confirmed that the values we computed were correct. As to the purpose of the last column of the exhibit being "suspect," its purpose is to provide additional information on the percentage change in AOB from FY 2000 through FY 2003. We believe that such an analysis is valid and consistent with our audit objective.

The FBI also questioned the accuracy of FSL data presented in Exhibits 4-2 and 4-3 on pages 49 and 50, respectively. The FBI states, "Exhibit 4-2 should reflect 491 agents for the Drug Program in FY 2002," and "Exhibit 4-3 should reflect 1677 for the 2002 FSL (not considering the FSL for CEI)."

We reviewed our analyses of FSL data and determined the discrepancy the FBI notes in its response resulted from the FBI reviewing material from a different data set. For all of our analyses, we utilized the final adjusted FSLs for each fiscal year, provided to us by the FBI's Resource Management and Allocation Office. The FBI, on the other hand, appears to have utilized the initial FSLs established for each fiscal year. In order to clarify this issue, we spoke to an official in the Resource Management and Allocation Office, who

advised that, essentially, both data sets could be considered correct. Because we consistently utilized the final adjusted FSLs throughout our report, we did not make the change that the FBI suggested. However, in order to clarify this issue, we added footnote 12 on page 9 of the report, stating that we utilized final adjusted FSLs in every analysis we have included in our report.

Missing, Unreadable, and Incomplete Materials

In its response, the FBI noted that four exhibits in the draft audit report were either missing data, were unreadable, or were incomplete. The FBI states that on:

- page 12, "The chart is missing data for the Organized Crime/Drug Program;"
- pages 40 and 46, "Case classifications and names are not readable;"
- page 55, "Exhibit 4-6 is incomplete."

We reviewed these issues and found that on page 12, data for the Organized Crime/Drug Program is listed as the second entry under the **Field Agent FSL Subtotal** header. Additionally, we were able to read the classifications and names in the exhibits on pages 40 and 46, as were other FBI personnel who performed a line item sensitivity and classification review on both charts. Finally, while the FBI states Exhibit 4-6 on page 55 is incomplete, it provides no further details to explain what the exhibit is missing. We believe the exhibit contains all necessary and pertinent data.

Violent Crime Program

The FBI noted that some of our statements on page 55 of the draft audit report regarding the FBI's violent crime program are inaccurate. The relevant paragraph on page 55 of our report states:

Direction to Field Offices – According to FBI officials, little written direction was given to the field with regard to the reprioritization and the specific impact it would have on violent crime investigations. Rather, the FBI incorporated aspects of this reprioritization into the program plans it issues annually to the field. We reviewed the program plans related to violent crime matters for FYs 2001 and 2003 and found that field offices were given a list of national priorities for

violent crime matters as a guide for prioritizing investigations. Although we observed slight changes in the priority list between the two fiscal years, as shown in Exhibit 4-7, the FBI's national priorities for violent crime matters have essentially remained the same since FY 2001.

In its response, the FBI states:

This paragraph seems to implicitly criticize that our priorities within the program have not changed as a result of 9-11, and that we should have reprioritized based on their resource utilization analysis. This is incorrect. Priorities are based on the crime problem and not resource utilization. All of our intelligence and latest crime survey indicates that the crime problems identified as priorities have not changed and, thus, the priorities should not be changed.

The FBI further disagrees with information in the same paragraph on page 55. The FBI response states:

The paragraph also seems to imply criticism about the lack of written direction given to the field based on input from (unnamed) FBI officials. The program plan contains specific direction and course of action for the field in the SAC Guidance section for each goal and objective. In addition to the program plan and the field guidance ECs on the list previously provided, CID also issued guidance regarding priorities in EC dated 10/21/2003, 66F-HQ-A1246974-A, Serial 582. In addition to previous guidance VCS recently issued updated guidance on appropriate response to bank robberies in same file, Serial 963. There are other specific ECs regarding on specific initiatives such as the Child Prostitution Initiative, Retail Theft Initiative, Violent Cities Initiative, as well as guidance ECs related to dealing with FAMS and TSA.

In order to clarify the meaning of our statements, we have altered the paragraph in question. Our changes are noted in bold text, as follows:

Direction to Field Offices – According to FBI officials, **written direction was provided to the field detailing changes within the violent crime program necessitated by the FBI’s reprioritization. This direction took the form of electronic communications and announcements of investigative initiatives related to specific types of violent crime. Additionally,** the FBI incorporated aspects of its reprioritization into the program plans it issues annually to the field. We reviewed the program plans related to violent crime matters for FYs 2001 and 2003 and found that field offices were given a list of national priorities for violent crime matters as a guide for prioritizing investigations. These priorities are based upon the violent crime problems identified by each field office. Although we observed slight changes in the priority list between the two fiscal years, as shown in Exhibit 4-7, the FBI’s national priorities for violent crime matters have essentially remained the same since FY 2001. **This implies that the nation’s violent crime problems have not changed.**

The FBI also disagrees with aspects of the following portion of a paragraph found on page 56 of the draft audit report:

...As was the case with other criminal investigative programs, FBI officials stated that the FBI’s violent crime efforts would focus primarily on the “big players.” However, SACs were advised to use their discretion in allocating limited violent crime resources to matters that were most problematic within their jurisdictions.

The FBI’s response states:

This is also misleading. First of all, CID did not issue guidance of this kind to SACs, as stated. SACs are supposed to establish priorities based on the national priorities and the crime problem identified in their divisions, and allocate resources accordingly. This guidance is also contained in the program plan.

Based on the material we collected and information we obtained during the audit, we continue to stand behind our statement that SACs were to use their discretion in allocating violent crime resources to the most problematic areas in their jurisdictions. Specifically, our support includes: 1) the FBI's 2003 Program Plans, 2) an EC issued by the Criminal Investigative Program Management and Coordination Unit, and 3) a statement made by the Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division during an interview with OIG personnel. In order to further clarify our statements, we have altered the relevant portion of the paragraph in question. Our changes are noted in bold text, as follows:

...As was the case with other criminal investigative programs, **the FBI's violent crime program was directed to leverage its limited resources. Specifically, according to an FBI memorandum, field offices were to concentrate their violent crime efforts primarily on criminal enterprises. Additionally, SACs were advised to keep the FBI's national priorities in mind while directing their limited violent crime resources** to matters that were most problematic within their jurisdictions.

Part II – Status of Recommendations and FBI Actions Necessary to Close the Audit**Recommendation Number:**

1. **Resolved.** The FBI stated that it concurs with our recommendation to consider developing evaluation models similar to the ones presented in our report, and in that the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division (CID) already does this in a variety of ways. In order to close this recommendation, please provide us with examples of the evaluation models CID utilizes to manage its programs. These models should contain information regarding OC/D, VCMO, and WCC activities at the investigative classification level, the same level of detail to which our analyses extended. Additionally, please provide us with examples of how other, non-CID programs, such as the National Foreign Intelligence Program, Domestic Terrorism Program, and the National Infrastructure Protection/Computer Intrusion Program, utilize information at this level to assist in the management process.