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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: USAID'S ROLE

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ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION
This study identifies areas in which USAID can contribute to civil-military relations programming. The report reviews past activities implemented with donor assistance, and identifies current issues. The authors, who have extensive knowledge of civil-military relations and U.S. foreign policy, provide thoughtful recommendations. We trust this publication contributes to a better understanding of the contributions USAID can offer in this important field.

Comments regarding this study and inquiries regarding USAID's ongoing work in the area of civil-military relations should be directed to

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ABOUT THE CENTER
The Center for Democracy and Governance is the U.S. Agency for International Development's focal point for democracy and governance programming. The Center's role is to provide USAID and other development practitioners with the technical and intellectual expertise needed to support democratic development. It provides this expertise in the following areas:

- **Rule of Law**
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The Center would appreciate your comments as to the appropriateness and utility of this handbook. Please contact the Center with any comments or suggestions.

FOREWORD

The Center for Democracy and Governance aims to increase the impact of U.S. Government democracy assistance programs. We seek to understand the issues democratizing countries face and evaluate the impact of USAID's programming to ensure that democracy and good governance are being advanced.

The relationship between civilian authorities and the military establishment is a critical element of democratic governance. Yet in too many transitional countries, the balance of knowledge and power weighs heavily in favor of the military establishment, allowing the military to exercise inordinate political influence. Where the military is able to operate with a large degree of autonomy, without transparency or civilian oversight, it is nearly impossible to delimit its role in national politics and to ensure it operates within democratic parameters.

The Center commissioned this report to identify areas in which USAID could contribute to civil-military relations programming, approaching the subject from a civilian vantage point and looking to broaden civil society participation. The report reviews past activities implemented with donor assistance and identifies current issues. The authors, who have extensive knowledge of civil-military relations and U.S. foreign policy, provide thoughtful recommendations. We trust this publication contributes to a better understanding of the contributions USAID can offer in this important field.

We invite your careful review and look forward to your comments and suggestions.

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July 27, 1998

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: USAID'S ROLE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a country. Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule face particularly onerous challenges in making their military establishments politically neutral and subject to the types of control necessary for meaningful democracy. Countries emerging from civil wars also pose a particular problem to the wider discussion of civil-military relations. Balancing internal security needs for reconstruction with appropriate civil-military relations creates a tension in governance that makes difficult a national dialogue on the roles and missions of the armed forces.

USAID plays a special role in analyzing and improving civil-military relations. Its approach to civil-military relations has been to fit them within the broader objectives of democracy-building. It has not made a major analytical effort to relate civil-military relations with the basic precondition for development—security. Civil-military relations appropriate to democratic settings can not be based solely, or even primarily, on the voluntary restraint of the military. The challenge for any civil-military relations program is to address ways in which an appropriate balance can be achieved, where freely elected civilians can ultimately regain control of their countries.

In general, the authors recommend that USAID take a regional approach in developing civil-military relations programs, with knowledge of the salient issues within each geographic area dictating, to a substantial extent, the nature of programming. However, since there is a core of common elements in civil-military relations, successful steps should be shared among bureaus and other USG agencies.

USAID must clarify its internal policy in regards to incorporating active-duty military into programming that encourages understanding between civilians and the military. Using funds to support only the civilian side will not engender the positive and interactive relationships that are required to support a truly democratic relationship among elected leaders, military officials, and civil society. USAID must also address the role played by security in the development of a democratic state. In the creation of a country or regional strategy, the importance of who in the state controls the armed institutions is central to the ability to advance other types of programming. USAID should assume that in most transition countries, the military will continue to play a paternalistic and self-interested role in the affairs of state.

Before developing an in-country program, a mission should devise a "ripeness" test for the democracy portfolio to determine whether a country is ready for encounters between civilian and military officials. A civil-military relations assessment could be the first step in deciding the appropriateness of any programming. This type of assessment can be done through a combination of civilian and military assets, in collaboration with country experts. Such an assessment should also bring into play the view of nongovernmental organizations, whose support will be needed for any sustainable programming. Without an adequate understanding of existing patterns of civil-military cooperation, or without a comprehension of the level of political will of national players for such a dialogue or programming, attempts to advance a civil-military relations program will be lost.

I. INTRODUCTION: SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

A. Cold War vs. Post-Cold War Periods

Global political transformations in the late 1980s and early 1990s opened the prospect that democracy, reduced international military competition, and market systems would characterize almost all states. The euphoria that accompanied this acceleration of the "third wave" of democratization meant claims of inevitable change were often exaggerated by policymakers and the popular media alike. It was hoped that rapid economic and political development would enhance the quality of life everywhere. In 1998, a more sober view is being taken. Change has been extensive. Institutional adaptation is essential, but possible program directions for the United States Government (USG) and for USAID need to be situated in a realistic context. This is the overarching objective of this report.

The new security agenda of the post-Cold War period requires a review of civil-military relations that goes beyond the traditional notion of subordination of the armed institution to elected civilian leaders. The increasing use of the world's militaries in non-combat roles is a phenomenon of the last decade that has significant fiscal and governance implications.[1] There is an urgent need to bring civil-military relations into the development dialogue.

The challenges of the new civil-military relations include such issues as dealing with the professional mercenaries working for international consortia to keep order and allow for the extraction of wealth. Challenges also include paramilitaries that are often subsidized by official military organizations who use these groups to perform acts of terror and repression that they can not perform due to their concern

with public opinion. In some parts of the world, dismantling the armies of the post-conflict period challenges the whole subject of civil-military relations as thousands of newly released soldiers are reintegrated into civilian life. There are also the growing ranks of peacekeepers, civilian police, and international monitors who are part of the new civil-military relations dynamic.

In a state that has undergone a recent transition to democracy, it may be premature to assume that the armed forces will be willing to take a back seat to civilian institutions which are still in their formative stage. When militaries remain the major presence of the state outside the capital city, the question is how to develop transitional steps to allow them to withdraw from these broad roles and return to the more appropriate role of defending the state from foreign enemies. Similarly, the use of military forces must not become the long-term solution for controlling internal enemies, when civilian police could be developed as a credible force to safeguard citizen security.

Security during humanitarian operations has always been a given. Saving lives requires a neutral force to protect innocent civilians during times of crises or during complex emergencies. The presence of international peacekeepers or regional security forces has been an essential component of such operations. But once the crisis has passed, security and development are perceived as distinct. Maintaining peace during the subsequent stages of development is still a challenge, because of the conflicting demands of short-term security and of long-term stability and development in countries emerging from war. At the end of the 20th century, victims of war no longer have the luxury of finding new homes in other parts of the world and starting anew. Indeed, a feature of the complex crises of the post-Cold War period has been that the winners and losers in internal conflicts must again live together in the same space. Such coexistence requires an environment where the security of the losers is as important as security of the winners. It also implies that a victorious

military force must be kept from terrorizing citizens in the process of its reorganization and its reformation. In transition situations, weak institutions are often incapable of protecting citizens. It is within the context of the relationship between security (of citizens and of civilian institutions) and freedom of movement and assembly that civil-military relations issues must be addressed after the Cold War.

B. USAID's Niche and Advantages

USAID emphasizes the "civilian" side of civil-military relations. It works with NGOs, government institutions, and the media in training and building institutional capacity. USAID can work to train civilians in particular issues, as well as to teach them how to use such information in the context of their institutions (e.g., formulating defense policy, overseeing the development and implementation of military budgets, lobbying for changes in laws, or informing the public). USAID also works to create sustainability in several ways and involving persons from a variety of sectors.

By contrast, as indicated later in this report, the Department of Defense (DOD) concentrates on the "military" side of civil-military relations—notably through the Extended International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET). The DOD has developed a variety of programs that are well-funded in comparison with USAID efforts. These are complementary to the types of programs USAID should develop, building on its current range of responsibilities.

USAID DG programming has included work to strengthen institutions such as the legislature, the courts, and offices of the executive branch (e.g., financial, development, and housing ministries). The Agency has also worked at the level of civil society to improve the management of non-governmental organizations and to educate citizens about ways in which advocacy can increase democratic voice. The premise of institutional programs is simple: trained civilians

who understand the concepts of urban planning, sound financial management, standard budget practices and accounting, not to mention court administration and case organization, will better serve the citizens. Similarly, programs that work at the grassroots or individual level are also significant in creating an awareness of issues that need to be addressed and of the policy dialogue necessary to increase citizen participation. These types of programming can complement the existing DOD work in civil-military relations *if an effort is made to customize the best types of training and technical assistance so they meet the needs of civilians engaged in defense-sector management. Among U.S. government agencies, USAID is uniquely qualified to support this type of integration of institutional strengthening efforts with programs directed at improving civilian control of the military.*

Until now, any integration that did take place was more the result of serendipity than of co-ordinated or strategic planning. As new efforts to support programs in civil-military relations are designed, an opportunity exists for USAID to build on its previous democracy programs to move toward supporting civilian competence in the security field. What does this mean in practice? *It means that before embarking on specific programs in civil-military relations, USAID missions should take stock of existing democracy programs, as well as of civil-military relations needs. They could then develop an integrated programming strategy that culls the best from the democracy portfolio to support new efforts in the civil-military relations field.* This report is intended to provide guidelines for this major effort.

Traditionally, USAID has approached civil-military relations within the context of broader democracy-building objectives. It has not made a major analytical effort to relate civil-military relations with security—perhaps the most basic of preconditions for development. While it is implied that civilian control of the armed forces is central to democratic governance, there has been no systematic statement on why or how

civil-military relations, or related security needs, fit into the development paradigm. This report seeks to fill this gap. Other similar activities related to civil-military relations, such as demobilization and reintegration programs (the latter handled under emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation programs) have also remained isolated from the efforts at democracy-building activities within the Agency.

The context has changed in this decade. In the years preceding the end of the Cold War, the transitions from authoritarian to civilian rule in Southern Europe and in Latin America gave rise to a need to support fragile civilian regimes by providing a wide range of programs in governance. The assumption was that by rehabilitating the institutions of a democratic state, or indeed creating such institutions where none functioned before, it would be possible to lay the foundation for a strong civilian control of the security apparatus of the state. This notion, while theoretically correct, was imperfect in practice. Institution-building was central to this type of development assistance, so that USAID concentrated funds on legislative strengthening, support for judicial systems, and the creation of stronger civil society organizations that could provide appropriate advocacy for change. These were the preconditions that led USAID to award the first grant in support of promoting civilian-military dialogue to American University in 1986.

In most areas undergoing transitions to a more open society in the post-Cold War world, the state is weak, or sometimes nonexistent, outside the capital. Its strengthening—often a necessary concomitant of democratization—can not be overlooked. But where the state has been weakened by some form of authoritarian regime, security is a complex issue. Security in this context implies dual roles for the military—*internal* (for public safety) and *external* (for national defense). In transition states with weak civilian control, discussion of these roles runs the risk of challenging the status quo, in the absence of specific attempts to reduce the armed forces' role in internal policing. Coups d'etat or

undue military pressure on the government could result. Accordingly, *a more propitious setting for civilian control of the armed forces must be consciously built.* There is tension between the need to have the military focus on its mission of external security (notably where history and constitutional provision press the armed forces into internal security activities) and the need to have the military fill the gap where government capacity to deliver services or maintain internal security is low.

C. Enabling Environments for Civil-Military Relations

Evidence is emerging of the positive impact of democratization on civil-military relations—at least in countries where economic development has lifted per capita GNP above $1,000. As Huntington recently pointed out, civil-military relations present "a dramatic exception to the lackluster performance of [new] democracies in so many other areas."[2] In countries where per capita GNP is over $1,000, coup attempts are not successful. In countries where the GNP is over $3,000, they do not even occur, he observes.[3] *Thus, improved civil-military relations can be an indirect result of USAID's principal goal of enhancing the level of economic development of societies.*

The apparent correlation between rising per-capita GNP and increased civilian and govern-mental control over the armed forces is important in terms of the "ripeness" test addressed later in this report. Unfavorable conditions for coup attempts or for successful coups should not lessen the awareness that civil-military relations can be skewed or non-supportive to democracy and thus require USAID to make efforts to improve them. Different strategies will be required depending on the base conditions, to be examined and determined in mission-by-mission assessments. Thus, while there are general principles of "good" civil-military relations, examined in the following section, the specific steps to attain them rest to a substantial extent on efforts tailored to country needs, weighed within

regional contexts, and based on cooperation
among institutions.

II. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Definitions of Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations refer broadly to interactions between armed forces as institutions and the sectors of society in which they are embedded. Most commonly, civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a country. They involve, as one specialist recently wrote, a process in which civilian control is measured and evaluated by weighing "the relative influence of military officers and civilian officials in decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defense, and military policy (that is, the shape, size, and operating procedures of the military establishment)."[4] Civil-military relations exist within the context of particular political systems. Though civilian control of the military as an aspect of democracy has attracted the attention of policymakers around the globe, it is difficult to achieve and maintain.

The civil-military relations literature (and most developed nations) view armed forces as institutions geared at defending the state against *external* threats. Moreover, the control of the armed institutions is vested in the executive branch, which is a symbol of the contract between elected officials and voters. Containing within the state an institution whose main business is its franchise on violence is one of the most important functions of a democracy.

This being said, the perspective of more developed nations, which view the military's mission as a purely external one, is not universally accepted in less developed nations. Often, constitutions mandate that militaries play an internal security role. Frequently, militaries are used to perform civic action programs, from building roads to providing rural health care to performing police duties outside the capital city.

Thus, any program being developed which calls attention to the relationship between civilians and the military must also be respectful of constitutionally mandated roles that may greatly affect the content and messages being conveyed. For example, military police often provide internal security in countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America. In Thailand and Indonesia, to consider another geographic region, military programs often work on infrastructure projects.

All of this implies that civil-military relations are a matter of who has the final say on what becomes a national priority. Elected leaders should be the ones directing the scope of the military's missions, not the armed forces. The issue is not so much about whether the mission is appropriate. Rather it concerns the process through which the mission was decided. In this regard, it is important to be aware of *commonalities* and *contrasts* of civil-military relations around the globe, discussed in the following section.

This report is predicated on a fundamental point. Countries with recent histories of authoritarian rule face particularly onerous challenges in making their military establishments politically neutral and subject to the types of control necessary for meaningful democracy. Training of government officials (and, to a lesser degree, NGO personnel) is essential for effectiveness. "Competent, effective and courageous civilian officials are indispensable to civilian control," one specialist concludes.[5] Civil-military relations appropriate to democratic settings cannot be based solely, or even primarily, on the voluntary restraint of the military, based on its internal mechanisms. Despite assertions that "objective civilian control" can be established by maximizing the professionalism and autonomy of the armed forces,[6] the reality is more complex. *Only by training and engaging government officials in an informed, active, and continuing dialogue with military officers can democratic patterns of civil-military relations be established and perpetuated. Only by promoting broader knowledge through society about the*

appropriate roles of armed forces can democratization succeed, especially in countries where there is a lengthy history of military involvement in politics. Accordingly, it is important for USAID to enhance its role in civil-military relations in its efforts to promote democracy and governance. USAID can bring important perspectives to this issue in a fashion other USG agencies can not.

In most countries, the armed forces carry out extensive roles. Often, they constitute the only presence of the state outside of the national capital. This means that, for the average citizen, there may be no civilian counterpart to the army official when it comes to seeking services or favors. Civilian politicians cannot muster the material goods, the manpower, the force, or the deterrence delivered by the armed forces. But so many times it is this armed presence that has gone awry to become the source of repression, human rights violations, and corrupt practices. Do these constitute a lack of professionalism? And on whose part? The role of the state to support its defense, to pay its troops, and to feed and shelter them is part of the obligation of maintaining an army. When bankrupt or corrupt civilian regimes no longer provide soldiers with pay or allow soldiers to become local entrepreneurs, the risk of creating an institution without accountability is high. Thus, soldiers serving commanders loyal only unto themselves form the basis for the rise in impunity, the ongoing suffering of civilians, and the continued lack of development in so many societies around the globe. Civil-military relations thus impact directly on economic development.

The challenge for any program in civil-military relations is to address ways in which an appropriate balance can be achieved, so freely elected civilians can ultimately regain control of their countries. This will require civilians to devise a strategy that includes the gradual reduction of an armed presence as the only state-run agency responsible for key aspects of internal security and development. It will require political leaders to create a civilian police, provide local security, and support the gradual

civilianization of activities that are not necessarily those of the armed forces (e.g., customs, immigration, mail service, road construction, and health care).[7] It will require strengthening a variety of institutions.

Discussion of civil-military relations as a subject for USAID program support should be articulated around two perspectives: the *administrative* aspects of the program that are required for a successful outcome and the *programmatic* components that are essential to integrating the subject into the democracy arena. Both these aspects will be discussed below, following a review of major civil-military relations issues.

B. Major Issues in Civil-Military Relations

Whatever approaches may be adopted, all programs in civil-military relations must grapple with a common set of problems. These can be divided, in turn, into matters that are *common* to *all* militaries, and those that are *specific* to certain armed forces.

Examples of civil-military relations issues *common to all militaries* include the following:

! **The generally *high cost* of maintaining modern militaries and its consequences for national development**—It is widely accepted that although technological modernization and social integration can be achieved through the armed forces, the fiscal tradeoff relative to expenditures for education, public health, or private sector-led development favors military reduction rather than expansion. However, cuts in military budgets that are carried out at rates or in manners that infringe substantially on what traditionally have been regarded as the institutional prerogatives of the armed forces risk serious backlash. One of the most frequent causes of coups d'état has been rapid reductions in military budgets, resented by the military.

- **The "*boundaries*" between civil society and the armed forces**—Armed forces traditionally have tried to maximize their policy autonomy, while social groups and civilian-led governments have attempted to maximize their control over the military through a variety of measures. "Who will guard the guards themselves" remains a central question, just as when it was posed by the Roman author Juvenal two millennia ago.

- **Variables affecting the nature and scope of *military participation in politics***—The concept of a "totally apolitical military" flies in the face of reality. Even in democratic systems that pride themselves on the subordination of the armed forces to civilian oversight, considerable scope for military political action exists. The challenge is to move the armed forces toward using the "regular" channels for national decision-making rather than resorting to blackmail or the threat of vetoing policies.

- **The balance between "*legitimacy*" and "*coercion*" found in individual political systems**—The more a government disposes of the former, the less it needs to draw upon security forces to maintain its own control. Accordingly, it stands to reason that when political leaders are unsure of their popular support (as is often the case in developing or recently democratized countries) they will be tempted to lean upon their security forces for support. And since democratization risks arousing previously submerged ethnic, regional, or religious tensions, a government's reliance on force may increase, particularly at times of widespread political uncertainty (e.g., during election campaigns).

- **The balance between *externally and internally oriented security* measures**—Throughout the developing world, and in many developed countries, the armed forces not only defend national boundaries and project state power externally, but also frequently supplement or even supplant the police in dealing with domestic disturbances. Thus, almost all militaries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the NIS, and Latin America and the Caribbean face the possibility of extensive involvement in what, in the United States, are considered essentially police and, only in the last resort, National Guard or military responsibilities. One of the most important steps in ensuring civilian control over the armed forces is professionalization of the police function.

- **Military "*professionalism*" of different types and levels**—If professionalism includes a strong sense that officers should limit themselves to offering expert advice on policy matters, the likelihood of forcible intervention and the possibility of successful democratization respectively fall and rise. But if professionalism includes a wide-ranging assertion of the unique capacities of the armed forces to determine aspects of the national interest, governmental control is undercut.

- **Effectiveness of major *means of governmental control***—These include legislative budget appropriation, formal control over appointments/promotions of military officers to the highest ranks, designation of elected civilians as the constitutional heads of state, etc. In systems marked by significant governmental control over the armed forces, these are strongly buttressed by a widespread sense within the military of the appropriateness of such policy oversight, as suggested above.

- **Recruitment, training, and demobilization of members of the military**—All countries must determine the best means of recruiting rank-and-file and officers. While universal conscription results in armed forces that reflect all major national groups, considerations of cost, efficiency, and political advantage may dictate selective recruitment. Training of military personnel

involves clarifying assumptions about the roles they will play since these assumptions are not readily apparent in transition settings. Demobilization involves other complex issues. Periods of protracted internal conflict (as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa) result in swollen armed forces, whose members require special assistance for reintegration into civilian pursuits.

! **Depoliticization of officers who have played leading roles in juntas**—Democratization and effective civilian control may well require political neutralization of high-ranking military leaders, taking note of potential risks.

Examples of *disparate* issues and heritages include

! **The *historical roles* of armed forces**— Take, for example, the achievement of independence: the military played central roles in parts of Latin America, peripheral roles in most of sub-Saharan Africa and newly independent ex-Soviet states, and differential roles in South and Southeast Asia.

! **The *constitutional roles* defined formally for militaries**—These range from broad mandates [*estado militar*] to tight restrictions on armed forces' formal autonomy. Although the dynamics of civil-military relations are defined by many factors other than constitutional prescriptions, they provide an important starting point for analysis.

! **Contrasts in terms of *external links*, with consequent impacts on civil-military relations**—For example, does a particular country have a formal alliance with the United States, dependence on the U.S. for training and materiel, and similar links? Does it have close ties with other global military powers (France, United Kingdom, Russia)? By contrast, relative independence

from armed forces of any single developed country and/or multiple sources of training, supply, and materiel dictates different arrangements for civil-military relations.

! **The nature and level of the military's utilization in *internal security* operations**—For example, gendarmeries supplement police in many states (particularly those with French colonial backgrounds); these units form integral parts of the national security apparatus and are controlled through the ministry of defense, yet have no function outside national borders.

! **In some states, the extensive "*privatization*" of security functions**—Civil-military relations are especially complex in "failed" states (as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where firms such as Executive Outcomes have been engaged to carry out basic military protection of a government), or where private (guerrilla) armies linked to drug trafficking (as in parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia) exercise control over parts of countries.

! **Contrasting relationships between *societal divisions* and norms, *and military isolation* and autonomy**—Armed forces in some developing countries exemplify marked disparities: dominated by personnel from specific groups, these militaries fall far short of the democratic ideal that they should reflect, in at least a rough way, the ethnic, racial, religious, or other social distribution of these societies. Tensions rise in civil-military relations based on such disparities.

! **The heritage and nature of *political leadership***—The nature of political transition is affected substantially by the background of leaders. Transitioning states whose presidents come from military backgrounds may be able to expect higher degrees of obedience from their comrades-in-arms, but lesser trust from civilians, for example.

! **Levels of *economic development* and of *military expenditures***—Obviously, contrasts exist along a broad spectrum between highly industrialized and well-off, and primarily subsistence agriculture and poor. The burden of heavy military expenditures will be more serious in countries that have yet to "break through" to middle-income status. Many governments spend well above the figure of three percent of GDP recommended by numerous specialists on their armed forces. Yet, as is readily apparent, rapid reductions of military expenditures may invite backlash. Though a seeming target for cuts, armed forces' budgets may in fact need some degree of protection in order for democratization and improved civil-military relations to become firmly established.

The country-by-country assessments suggested in this report must be sensitive to local particularities—but must also keep in sight the overall problems of civil-military relations previously identified.

C. Regional Review of Civil-Military Relations

The authors of this report recommend that, in general, USAID adopt a regional approach in developing civil-military relations programs. Following this method, the salient issues within each geographic area dictate, to a substantial extent, the nature of programming. However, since there are common elements in civil-military relations in different regions, lessons learned should be shared among bureaus.

Too often democracy assessments have overlooked the role of the military in transition societies. From the Southern Cone of Latin America to Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, a thin layer of civilian government often masks a reality that eludes many analysts. The reality is that the armed institutions of these developing states often form one of the few nationwide institutions that is present outside the capital city. But beyond the mere physical presence of

soldiers, militaries have frequently acted as the main tools of the state to deliver such services as health care, infrastructure repair, and even educational services. With resources, logistical support, and readily deployed, disciplined labor, the military remains an ever-present reminder of how far many states need to travel to gain full civilian control of all branches of government.

USAID can help civilian leaders address all aspects of the transition to civilian control of the military by supporting dialogue between members of the military and political and non-governmental leaders. The sooner civilian leaders govern the capital as well as the secondary cities and countryside, the weaker the involvement of the armed forces will be on the internal security of the state. Polling data from Latin America collected in the last year supports the observations of researchers who have argued that the high degree of confidence of civilians in the armed forces in underdeveloped societies is directly related to the degree to which civilian governance remains underdeveloped. As part of its democracy programming, USAID should support programming *that encourages the disengagement of the military from traditional civilian roles*, but with sensitivity to the sovereign norms of the state and with an eye toward future transition.

These general remarks are now elaborated on by specific regions.

1. Africa (primarily sub-Saharan)

In Africa colonial legacies often dictate current civil-military relations. Existing national forces, in many instances, are direct lineal descendants of colonial armed forces. Many of these were recruited from ethnic groups reputed to exemplify martial values. As a result, the rank-and-file historically did not represent the population at large. Until very late in decolonization, commissioned officers were almost exclusively drawn from the colonial power. Africanization of the officer corps occurred hastily, with limited time to inculcate "professional" values of military political neutrality. Although several

hundred thousand Africans served in British and French forces in the world wars, the colonial armies were designed primarily to maintain internal security. Unquestioning obedience was stressed. With the notable exceptions of the former Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe, where guerrilla armies fought against the Europeans, relatively little reconstitution was carried out following independence, save the change of complexion of commissioned officers. (Obviously, when an incumbent government was ousted as a result of civil war, the victorious military replaced the vanquished.)

The coups d'état that started in late 1965 and continued to roughly 1990—more than 75 successful military seizures of power over the course of 25 years—transformed what had been seemingly apolitical armies under governmental control into the leading contenders for political power. Militaries in sub-Saharan Africa made their way to the center of the political stage. The quickest route to the presidential palace, it was quipped, lay in bullets—not in ballots. This resulted in a high degree of politicization of the officer corps.

The pervasive sense that the armed forces hold the key to power—and the fact that certain privileged officers have profited significantly from their inside positions in government—have complicated the quest for greater democratization. How willing are significant numbers of the military establishment to reduce voluntarily their political roles and economic rewards? Although in the 1990s the incidence of coups d'état has been far lower than in earlier decades, officers in sub-Saharan Africa remain major political actors.

As already noted, in some African countries, the armed forces were substantially reconstituted following independence, as a result either of successful guerrilla warfare against the colonial power (e.g., Frelimo in Mozambique) or of civil war won by insurgents (e.g., followers of President Museveni in Uganda, the RPF in Rwanda, the EPRDF in Ethiopia). Explicitly organized to win power, these "new" militaries

obviously have high stakes in retaining control. Their composition draws heavily from opponents of the former regime, thus they are not necessarily more broadly based socially than those they displaced. Imbued with a sense of having "saved" their countries, such armies may be more rhetorically than really committed to effective democratization.

Much attention was given to the "second independence" events of 1990 to 1991, marked by "sovereign national conferences" in several Francophone countries, competitive elections in many, and the military ousting of some long-standing dictators. Perhaps even more significant was South Africa's peaceful transition to majority rule. An opening for democracy initiatives appeared in the region. Efforts to demobilize fighters were initiated in many countries and the re-establishment of peace also permitted the start of demining campaigns. Dialogues on civil-military relations, organized by the African-American Institute, were held with partial USAID support in Burundi, Benin, and Mozambique. But besides such indicators of success, problems were still evident. The perceived failure of UNOSOM II (Somalia) and the long-term problems of ECOMOG (Liberia) slowed the momentum of "peace enforcement" efforts. It became all the more important to nip internal conflict in the bud and to find indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. The very slow progress made in establishing, funding, training, and deploying the OAU mechanism on conflict prevention, management, and resolution discouraged its supporters. The occurrence of a coup d'état in Gambia, regarded as one of the most democratic countries in Africa, disheartened many.

Finally, and unlike much of Asia and Latin America, worsening economic conditions continue to complicate democratization in sub-Saharan Africa. Donor fatigue is apparent. Heavy debt, stagnant or declining world prices for many primary products, continued government and private sector inefficiencies, the slow implementation of structural adjustment programs, and endemic corruption undercut both

internal and external efforts at civil-military relations restructuring. Foreign aid was also necessary for building or rebuilding infrastructure, coping with the AIDS epidemic, dealing with food shortages, or resettling the victims of internal wars. The long-term problems inherent in politicized, often self-serving militaries (as in Nigeria or Togo) and in narrowly based civilian governments unwilling to permit free elections (as in Cameroon, Gabon, or Kenya), means "Afro-pessimism" remains alive and well.

More than anywhere else in the world, Africa presents severe issues related to "failed states." Civil-military relations as defined at the start of this report do not exist: both governments and armed forces are chaotic collections of competing individuals and groups lacking a transcendent sense of the common good and of national interest. While humanitarian assistance is essential, but purveyors of aid often become targets in factional conflicts. Somalia is the leading example of such a Hobbesian setting. In such cases reconstruction of society and its institutions must first be based on the rees-tablishment of basic security.

In summary, the most important issues of civil-military relations in sub-Saharan Africa continue to include the extensive politicization of most officer corps, the narrow base of popular support for many "democratic" governments (entailing reliance on coercion rather than legitimacy), serious economic conditions resulting in declining standards of living for many (but rarely for the politically privileged), endemic corruption undercutting the professionalism and effectiveness of police and other internal securi-ty forces, and in some instances the failure of states and the collapse of militaries. These combine to make the reestablishment of security the overriding immediate need. The "second independence" and the massive political changes in South Africa have not altered the major elements of the civil-military relations equation in most sub-Saharan states.

2.   *Asia and the Near East*

With nearly half the world's population, extraordinary cultural and political variety, and widely divergent levels of economic affluence, the Asia-Near East (ANE) region presents greater contrasts in civil-military relations than any other region treated in this report. Some of the armed forces are lineal descendants of former colonial militaries, with recruitment skewed to favor the reputed "martial races." Others were born through revolutionary struggle and embody nationalist fervor, strong political commitment, and rapidly aging officers tested in earlier guerilla struggles and/or civil war. Still others have been consciously modeled on highly professionalized western militaries. Thanks to abundant government revenues and the perception of regional threats, they have become strong fighting machines only presumably loyal to their governments. Civilian control of the military is presently contingent, to a large extent, on the manipulation of political, ethnic, and economic rewards for the armed forces. Although the development of civil society has been rapid in many ANE states—the result of rapid increases in per capita GNP (despite recent setbacks in several countries), growing openness to market forces, and pressures from below—public awareness of the appropriate roles of armed forces in democratic societies remains confined to relatively small sectors. Parliamentary bodies exercise little oversight over defense matters. The armed forces remain the ultimate backstops for domestic order, which is threatened in several countries.

Within this vast region, significant contrasts exist. A brief survey of various sub-regions should make this clear.

Within Southeast Asia, the following regularities can be noted.

!   Extensive involvement of senior members of the military establishment (or their close relatives) in economically strategic positions has given some officers strong political and

economic stakes in the existing distribution of power. (Indonesia and Thailand are particularly strong examples.) "Professionalization" of the armed forces, in the sense of reducing their current "business" roles, might be grudgingly accepted; it might also occasion serious tensions.

! Recent economic turmoil notwithstanding, development has been rapid. Harmony in civil-military relations has been assured in part by growing appropriations for materiel and salaries. However, armed forces have long heritages of direct involvement in both domestic politics and maintenance of security. An intersection of economic, ethnic, and religious tensions could be explosive.

! Although ethnic and religious differences appear to be less salient than in other regions (sub-Saharan Africa, for example) they could be activated and could result in strong internal pressures. Military fragmentation seems unlikely. However, serious domestic disorder could erupt, increasingly drawing the armed forces into politics—especially if disorders occur in capital cities, rather than in the countryside.

! Furthermore, under many of the quasi-authoritarian governments of the region, ethnic and religious tensions have been contained rather than resolved. For example, Indonesia illustrates disturbing signs of potential turbulence, with demonstrations against Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs, and with mosques becoming centers of increased political discussion—both signs of the constricted nature of civil society.

USAID has done almost no programming on its own in civil-military relations in this vast region. While there is ample opportunity to begin serious work in places like the Philippines, Pakistan, and possibly Cambodia, there has been very limited interest in this area. Recently, USAID supported the U.S. NGO, Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT), to

begin programming in civil-military relations in Indonesia. As the crisis in that region unfolds, it will be even more important to work on this subject since the military is the underlying support to Suharto's continued control, as it will be for future leaders should a succession occur. Similarly, there is need to look at civil-military relations programs in Cambodia, and possibly Burma, should changes in regimes take place in those countries.

Within South Asia, the armed forces have played direct political roles through seizing power, notably in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Even in India and Sri Lanka, both reputed for periodic free elections, these democratic facades conceal substantial domestic conflict, in which the armed forces can be (or currently are) embroiled. The military is central to internal security, and thus can dramatically expand its roles. Ethnic or religious violence—in short, the result of communalism—could lead to massive armed forces' involvement in political life. Hence, the following issues appear crucial in this sub-region:

! **The heritage of prior coups d'état**—Having served in senior political roles, or having observed earlier generations of officers embroiled in domestic politics, numerous flag-rank officers distrust civilian leaders, but recognize the negative impacts of extensive political involvement on military professionalism.

! **Simmering (and, at times, boiling) communal tensions**—Endemic violence seems difficult to resolve in several areas (northern Sri Lanka and the Sind province in Pakistan, among others). "Society" and "army" are subject to similar divisive pressures.

! **Threats to military professionalism, which has been based on the relative isolation of the armed forces from internal conflict**—The seeming primacy of civilian control, especially in India, is a waning British heritage. A recent historical

study says, "The separation of the army from Indian society that preserved its strength and prevented its corruption is breaking down…. The more often the army is used [to resolve local disputes], the harder it is to maintain its professional isolation." [8]

Within the Near East, a combination of oil wealth, intra-regional tensions, close economic and political links with arms suppliers, and the recent procurement of expensive weapons systems indicate that countries in this region spend large amounts on their armed forces, both absolutely and as a percentage of their national budgets.

Many have asserted that the strong Islamic heritage of most of the region—the tradition of the *Ghazi*—has provided a socio-cultural foundation for a strong, direct role for the military in politics. Democratization has not proven easy to establish. Earmarking of economic assistance funds for Egypt and Israel is intended to reward their efforts not to enter war with each other. And, as the locus of the most serious interstate conflicts since World War II (with the partial exception of the Korean War), the Near East presents complex problems in civil-military relations, including

! Marked intra-regional tensions result in proportionally the highest military budgets in the world and armed forces that are poised (at least theoretically) to fight all-out wars.

! Sophisticated, high-cost arsenals necessitate close economic and training links with Western militaries and suppliers, but it is not clear that concepts of civilian control can be transferred as readily as equipment.

! Limited experience with competitive democracy is the regional norm, with direct consequences for civilian oversight of major defense issues.

! Religious and historical traditions, as already noted, legitimate significant social and political roles for the armed forces.

For the above reasons, the "ripeness" of many countries in this region for major programs in civil-military relations is problematic. Tensions, both domestic and international, can press the armed forces into central political roles. On the other hand, the close ties of many states in the region with American military doctrine could potentially pave the way for greater U.S. influence in establishing democratic patterns of civil-military relations. Detailed attention (to reinforce a central point) must be given to the constellation of pressures within individual countries. Appropriate opportunities should be seized, building upon USAID's experiences.

3. *Latin America/Caribbean*

The strong initial emphasis of USAID civil-military relations programs on Latin America arose from the transitions of the 1980s which ended decades of military rule and returned the government to civilians. But the optic of the transition—elections, freedom of the press, the expansion of civil society—did not necessarily foster improved civil-military relations development in all of the region's countries. For example, the expansion of the U.S. military counter-narcotics mission in the region, and with it the growth of assistance to the region's military in support of anti-narcotics training, sent mixed signals to the civilians and military leaders about U.S. priorities. On the one hand, subordination of the military to civilian authority was being preached, while on the other the need for martial law to catch drug traffickers was being exhorted. While progress has been great in some of the region's countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), it is based more on an identity crisis in the armed forces than on affirmative acts by civilian leaders to ensure that military subordination to civilian rule remains a given.

In Central America, where much progress in civil-military relations is an outgrowth of the

Peace Accords which ended decades of fighting in El Salvador and Guatemala, there is still a tendency to rely on the armed forces to provide for citizen security, even after the creation of an independent civilian police force. This is the case in El Salvador, and more so in Guatemala, where vetting of the former military for the new civilian police has yet to occur more than a year after the Peace Accords were signed in December 1996.

All of the above points to specific needs that *require policy to precede program*. Effective programming in civil-military relations cannot be done in a vacuum. Indeed, without clear guidance as to the objective of such programming, dialogue for the sake of dialogue will not bear fruit. In Latin America (Central America especially), where a tutelary tradition remains a strong suit among the elite, deferring to the military for both internal as well as external security is a legacy yet to be overturned by current events.

Civilians in Latin America still remain unschooled on security issues. Creating a role for civilian expertise, developing the mechanisms necessary to train civilians, and guaranteeing that those trained will become the planners for the next generation are all necessary steps. The Center for Hemispheric Studies, recently inaugurated by the USG in Washington, D.C., was created to train and cultivate civilian experts on defense and security matters. This was a small step toward the goals outlined above. But in the meantime, military experts who are part of the armed forces continue to call the policy shots in the ministries.

4. *Europe and Newly Independent States (ex-Soviet)*

Our focus in this section is on those states born from the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states that are democratizing following decades of communist rule.

Civil-military relations in the New Independent States (NIS) countries have been bedeviled by several factors:

! The presence in some NIS countries of large Russian populations, many of whose members are nostalgic for their previous power over those countries.

! Substantial albeit decaying weapons supplies, giving some NIS states (at least on paper) some of the most significant armories in the world.

! Habits of thought cultivated under the previous communist regimes that, while subordinating the armed forces to civilian control, did so in terms of the explicit politicization of senior officers.

! Ethnic factionalism which has exploded into serious violence, both internally and in some cases externally, and which has severely affected security.

! Overlapping and occasionally conflicting agencies charged with security.

! Massive pressures for corruption, particularly given the decline in standards of living for most sectors, including the military establishment.

The result of the factors is confusion in civil-military relations. While the old Communist model remains an ideal to some senior military officers and political leaders, their numbers are dwindling rapidly. Yet the proponents of a new order or type of civil-military relations have yet to agree on what this should entail. Here, as elsewhere, dialogue is essential. A key point of this report is that *discussion between leading military and political figures is essential.* Training efforts cannot be focused solely on one of these sectors when the matter in question is the basic pattern for civil-military relations.

USAID has done little on the subject of civil-military relations in the NIS. This is, in part, be-

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cause the subject has been central to the work of NATO and the Partnership for Peace program, developed to support the expansion of NATO. Similarly, the George C. Marshall Center in Germany, run by the Department of Defense, offers training for civilians and militaries in transition states in Europe, Central Asia, and the Russian federation. But since USAID's comparative advantage is different than that of DOD, USAID would do well to revisit its programs for the NIS to see whether some form of civil-military relations dialogue could be incorporated into some of its efforts to strengthen institutions of state. It might also be worthwhile to support nongovernmental organizations that would like to develop more expertise on the subject of civil-military relations and security. This latter type of effort is not supported through the Marshall Center programs.

As the potential for military instability grows in Russia and the NIS, it is vital that the insecurity of soldiers and citizens who have lived in the shadow of the military engage in programs that encourage greater confidence in a more open system of governance. USAID should also play an active role in supporting the economic reforms that help to restructure the former Soviet military. Currently low morale, failure to pay soldiers in a timely manner, and lower esteem of the armed institutions need to be openly discussed rather than swept under the table. USAID, along with other international and national partners, could help foster a serious dialogue on this subject before things get out of hand.

D. An Alternative Conceptual Differentiation

Preceding pages have delineated civil-military relations in terms of characteristics most prominent within specific geographic regions. This section suggests an alternative approach. "Regional" and "conceptual" approaches to civil-military relations are both important. Comparisons could be made globally *by type of regime* as well as *by region* to determine the

most appropriate format for programming in civil-military relations. That is, identifying the type of regime will help determine the best mix of activities with which to construct a program in a given country, as discussed more fully in the subsequent section on "ripeness" criteria. Here is a four-fold classification, in which each category requires distinctive handling:

Failed States—Although it is unlikely, USAID missions would not be able to mount major programming in civil-military relations in such settings (other than humanitarian assistance) until basic security is re-established. The needs are immense. They include restoration of order (including separating rival, armed groups); provision of food, medical, and communication assistance; and re-establishment of fundamental governmental capacity. OTI is tasked with such responsibilities far more than G/DG. Nonetheless, if separation and demobilization of opposing forces can be initiated, subsequent fuller civilian control over a smaller military may be facilitated.

Post-civil War States—Opportunities for creative efforts in civil-military relations need to be seized with care—but also with speed. *Assuming that* the result of the end of internal conflict is not a near-total collapse of basic infrastructure and public trust, serious steps toward democratization and improved civil-military relations can be initiated. The early months of transition, when a triumphant military and leaders proclaim their intention for more transparent governance, can be significant. For example, the victory of the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front) opened the way for establishing new initiatives in democratization, human rights, civil-military relations, downsizing of the armed forces, and constitution drafting.

Liberalizing Former Authoritarian States— Much here depends on whether the head of state comes from a military background, accordingly enjoying the trust of key officers, or from a civilian background, accordingly benefiting from broader support of popular sectors. *It is*

within this category that the prospects for significant beneficial impact of USAID-sponsored and/or -directed programs in civil-military relations will be greatest. The widespread disruptions of governmental collapse (the "failed states") or civil war do not exist. However, wide knowledge gaps exist between military and civilian sectors, with few substantial bases for dialogue and limited trust. Building understanding—in both the technical sense of comprehending basic facts, and in the more psychological sense of appreciating different points of view ("empathy")—can be advanced significantly at this point.

Relatively Established Civilian Governments, (but with strong and/or restive militaries)—In this category, concern is not as much with *establishing* understanding between civil society and the armed forces, as with *deepening* this understanding.

The above classification is based on qualitatively different issues of civilian control of the military presented in each. "Failed states" face immediate crises, with demobilization and reintegration of hostile forces a sine qua non for further advance. Downsizing of the military "establishments" (militias, bandit groups, and ethnic or religious partisans that constitute these armed groups) must come first. Obviously, civilian control can be more readily established with cantonment, payment of regular salaries, instilling of discipline, and isolation. More promising is the situation in "post-civil war states," in which the victorious army is, by definition, a chief supporter of the new government, and which may have the legitimacy and foresight to transform the nature of civil-military relations. The euphoria of the end to war offers a major opportunity. However, triumph in civil war does not mean a full reestablishment of peace or elimination of the tensions that resulted in conflict. Nor is it always likely that "Western" models of civil-military relations will be accepted. Programs initiated in such states thus operate in highly politicized contexts. Despite substantial risk, they should be seriously considered by USAID. The

"liberalizing former authoritarian states" appear to offer creative opportunities for USAID programming, as noted above. An obvious danger exists, nonetheless, in the uncertain commitment of senior politicians and military officers to serious reform. And, finally, the "relatively established civilian governments" can benefit from <u>intensified</u> as contrasted with <u>new</u> efforts to build understanding.

In regional terms, categories 1 and 2 seem most common in Africa; category 3 in parts of Central and South America, sections of Asia and the Near East, and in the Newly Independent States; and category 4 primarily in South America. The detailed country-by-country analyses can best determine where in this alternative conceptualization individual states might fall— and, consequently, what strategies would be most effective.

III. CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PROGRAMMING

A. Inside USAID

Two types of programs have addressed the complexities of civil-military relations within USAID. Since 1986, USAID's Office of Democratic Initiatives in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) supported a program on the subject as part of a wider effort to support the transitions from military to civilian rule in the hemisphere. A grant to the American University launched a project that resulted in a region-wide collaboration among scholars, practitioners, and government officials to discuss the role of the military in these transitions and the relationship it would have within the context of newly elected civilian governments. The project, which ran almost a decade, created the baseline methodology for engagement between civilian and military actors and reached a wide audience of practitioners in the region and cross-regionally. Among the most visible manifestations of the American University program were publications and the creation of networks of scholars and practitioners—from civilian and military backgrounds—who became involved in understanding how harmonious civil-military relations are essential for democratic governance.

In the early 1990s, USAID has expanded its efforts in this field to include Africa. Three regional conferences, which were co-sponsored by the African-American Institute and local NGOs, took place in Burundi, Benin, and Mozambique. These dialogues were not sustained efforts, though they provided important fora to discuss the importance of civilian control of security matters in emerging democracies. At the country level, USAID has supported civil-military relations programs in Nicaragua, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Indonesia.

Presently, the Global Bureau's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG) is developing a cooperative agreement, set to begin in the summer of 1998, to implement a set of activities that will promote programming in civil-military relations at a global level. The focus of the program is to produce a knowledge base of country-level activities that promote democratic civil-military relations and emphasize both the direct involvement and the responsibility of indigenous actors in program ownership and design. Activities will take place in all four regions. Other activities will include regional and global conferences, information collection and dissemination, and research.

In the wake of the cold war, USAID also became involved in another form of civil-military relations—the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in some of the world's most contentious and bloody conflicts. Through the Office of Transition Initiatives (BHR/OTI), created in 1994, USAID has provided support to demobilization and reintegration efforts in El Salvador, Angola, Guatemala, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Haiti. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (BHR/OFDA) also supported many of the reintegration activities in countries emerging from war. In countries where there were USAID Missions, such as Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mozambique, close coordination was central to the ongoing development programming that ensued.

In the post-conflict period, the civil-military nexus in terms of cooperation is more complex. Military programs provide the principal source of support for actual demobilization; civilian programs are more likely to be useful in the area of training, micro-enterprise and credit, and general reintegration. Moreover, demobilization programs in transition societies serve dual purposes: helping support internal security by providing a place for former fighters to train and work, while also laying the foundation for a peaceful transition from military to civilian governance.

USAID has paid for many civil-military programs in the USG. In recent years, however, the Department of Defense has expanded its reach in this area through the use of expanded IMET programming. Certainly in the area of democracy building and governance, USAID has a comparative advantage over other government agencies in its experience in this area and its reach to civil society. While close coordination is essential between DOD programs and those provided through USAID, it is without doubt that the need for civilian control can only be fortified through programs that are managed by civilian agencies.

B. Department of Defense and Civil-Military Relations: Implications for USAID Programming

Since the late 1980s, the Department of Defense has sought ways to expand its role in supporting enhanced civil-military relations as part of its changing mission in the world. As the cold war waned, democratization movements flourished, and DOD was especially involved in using this opening as a way to support the field training of foreign soldiers and civilians in the ways of democracy. In the Latin America region, the end of sub-regional wars in Central America opened a new chapter in inter-American cooperation, which included an expanded role for U.S. officers in the region. In addition to the IMET program, which is administered by the Department of Defense (in FY1998, DOD will probably receive $50 million worldwide for this program), each of the regional commands has embraced democracy building, and hence, civil-military relations, through programming customized for regional needs. This support is done through traditional commander-in-chief initiative funds, which can be used by each command as the CINC sees fit. Thus, a relatively easy way to support additional programming would be through the regional commands. Such funds can pay for conferences and travel, and are also important for responding to rapidly changing opportunities in the field.

Perhaps the most interesting trend within the Department of Defense is its search for new and non-traditional missions, in the wake of the cold war. The power vacuum that has left the U.S. as the only global superpower has also created new demands within the Department of Defense to respond to non-military threats. DOD has made education about democracy and training of civilians a centerpiece of its new approach to states undergoing transition. Since the late 1980s, and more so today, the Department of Defense and the respective military services provide ongoing training in civil-military relations to U.S. officers, and to foreign military and civilian leaders. The Defense Security Assistance Agency's *Expanded IMET Handbook*, February 1997,1-003058/97, contains the most up-to-date listing of all DOD-sponsored courses funded through the IMET program with outreach to civilian students.

The International Military Education and Training program, or IMET, is a program funded through an appropriation to the Department of State, and administered by the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs and the Department of Defense's Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). This program provides funding to bring foreign military personnel—officer and enlisted—to the U.S. to take short-term and longer-term courses designed primarily for U.S. military personnel. The program gives foreign students exposure to U.S. military professionalism within the context of American life and culture. In FY1990, Congress amended the IMET program to include foreign civilian personnel who worked in security-related positions as a class eligible for such foreign training. The Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program has become the basis for greater Department of Defense involvement in training civilian personnel in a much more far-reaching program focused on improved civil-military relations.

The *Naval Post-Graduate School* in Monterey, California, has developed country-specific training on civil-military relations that involves the deployment of mobile teams to specific

countries requesting such assistance. Mobile teams of civilian and military trainers visit host countries to conduct one to two-week-long seminars on civil-military relations. These seminars incorporate local military, government, and civilian leaders. In recent years, there have been efforts to bring in local NGOs as part of the integration effort that is envisioned in the E-IMET program. Funding of these courses comes through the expanded IMET program. The *Naval School of Justice*, in Newport, Rhode Island, provides training for foreign government officials from the military, police, legislature, the judiciary, and civil service. All service staff colleges also have courses that address civil-military relations issues, which are offered to both U.S. and foreign students in attendance. The *Air Force* offers courses on defense acquisition, but also supports lectures on democracy and the military. The *Coast Guard* also provides extensive programming relating to policing, along with training in issues in procedures and nautical skills. The *Army*, through its staff colleges, teaches courses on civil-military relations.

Starting in 1993 the Department of Defense, in response to the end of the cold war, inaugurated the *George C. Marshall Center* in Garmisch, Germany, as the centerpiece of its strategy for retooling former soldiers and civilians from the former Soviet Union and its satellite states. It functions as a conference center for the armies of Central Europe, bringing together NATO members and NIS military staff to attend a wide range of courses on defense management, civil-military relations, and technical subjects. Both civilians and military officials are included in the classes offered at that institution.

The new *Center for Hemispheric Studies* at the National Defense University will focus on training civilians and military personnel in defense management skills, civil-military relations training in democracy, and will, in three-week modules, give individuals involved in defense policy a window on how the U.S. system of defense spending and budgeting operates. The Asian counterpart to this effort,

located in Hawaii, has a similar mandate. A proposed center in Africa is under discussion as of this writing.

Whether DOD is the best vehicle for training civilians on civil-military relations issues is an open question, but one where it appears that history is on the side of civilians offering the education. DOD became involved in civilian training, in part because USAID and USIA did not take into account the need to redefine civil-military relations when working with civilian and military officials engaged in joint activities in traditional development projects. While DOD can easily put together curricula on democracy, provide technical assistance on how to write a defense budget, or develop courses on how to write doctrine, this is not necessarily the most appropriate way to educate civilians from other countries about the issue. The U.S. military relies on civilian expertise in a wide range of subject matter and issues. This expertise contributes to the U.S. military institutions' training programs. *But the U.S. military offering democracy training to civilians ignores the unique contribution that USAID has made to this part of the transition programming menu.* It also sends what might be interpreted as the wrong signal to foreign militaries: that military officials and not civilians know best when it comes to issues of governance.[9]

One can conclude several things from this effort on the part of the Department of Defense to move in the direction of greater civilian training in security matters. It has identified an important niche in the post-Cold War setting, and it has the resources necessary to fill it. Since civilian agencies, namely the State Department, USAID, and USIA, have been unwilling to make the commitment to support directly this type of essential programming in transition states, DOD has filled the vacuum. While the courses offered vary in quality and content it is clear that the DOD will remain in the business of civil-military relations training for many years to come. This leads to a related issue—is this a healthy arrangement, given USG policy to maintain civilian control and a civilian optic in

its support of civilian control of security? Without some appropriate coordination of programs among agencies and integration of efforts, the long-term outlook for such intensive DOD involvement in training could augur poorly for the overall objective of civilian control. Nevertheless, in the absence of any long-term serious efforts on the part of the development community to reach out and take on the role of mentor to civilians in this area, no other alternative will exist.

C. Other USG Entities

United States Information Agency—As part of its programming for international visitors, USIA has developed a special emphasis on bringing civilians and military officials from other countries to the U.S. in support of greater understanding of democratic civil-military relations. Similarly, USIA public affairs officers in embassies around the world also have supported programs that have addressed the subject of civil-military relations through public programs, conferences, and dialogues between civilian and military sectors. USIA has also used its worldwide television program, WORLDNET, to develop a series on civil-military relations which was aired overseas. Frequently these programs have been televised at U.S. embassies, with local officials invited to participate in programs with U.S. officials after the show. Resources for this program come from the USIA budget, and USIA has frequently piggybacked its programming with other USAID events in a given country. Thus, in Latin America, USAID-sponsored programs or conferences on civil-military relations were also of benefit to USIA since speakers invited to those events often provided additional programming for local USIA efforts. A similar situation unfolded in the Africa region. USIA also used its traditional lecture programs, which include bringing U.S. experts to a particular country to provide lectures, seminars, and public events for programming in civil-military relations.

United States Department of Justice—The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) is the primary USG program for training of police forces worldwide. Because police are often part of the military establishment in countries going through a transition, the importance of ICITAP training to improved civil-military relations is often underestimated. Yet the creation of a professional, civilian police force to safeguard citizens from abuse is central to good civil-military relations. Moreover, armed forces are institutions that should provide for the external defense of a state and only work on internal matters in times of emergency.

Since the end of the cold war, ICITAP has become an important tool in creating civilian police in states emerging from conflict, or states moving toward democratic governance. Starting with Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala, ICITAP was a central force in the creation of the Haitian National Police after the Haitian military was demobilized in 1995. In Eastern Europe, ICITAP also works to support a civilian police ethic.

A shortcoming of the ICITAP training is its isolation from the mainstream civil-military relations programming. Few developing states have made distinctions between the internal police powers of their armies and civilian police functions. Yet the programming provided by ICITAP glosses over this distinction. It also reflects the absence of a clear USG policy on the role of U.S. assistance to police forces in new and emerging democracies. As the GAO reported in March 1992, the USG lacks both clearly defined program objectives and coordination of programming, and thus, little policy coherence with overall USG interests in a given country.[10]

The Department of Justice also operates a training program for prosecutors that recently merged its activities with ICITAP. This innovative decision reflects a more realistic approach to the link between police

investigation and civilian criminal prosecutorial systems.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)—Since the early l990s, ACDA has been involved with a series of programs on confidence-building measures between militaries in the Latin American region. An outgrowth of earlier work done by ACDA with former Soviet military officials, this programming was focused on the Southern Cone of South America, and on Chile and Argentina in particular. Confidence-building programs are a form of civil-military relations and an important concept in developing trust and professional behavior between military and civilian counterparts.

National Endowment for Democracy (NED)— The NED, a quasi-governmental organization that funds programs that openly support democracy through grants to states in transition, receives its money from Congress through the budget of the United States Information Agency. NED, whose core grantees include the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), has supported civil-military relations programming through specific grants to both party institutes. USAID's mission in Nicaragua supported an NDI program in that country. All other NDI programs, including a recent assessment of civil-military relations in Francophone Africa,[11] were carried out through NED rather than USAID money.

United States Institute for Peace (USIP)— USIP, an independent government think-tank, has supported research, conferences, and other types of programming on civil-military relations world-wide. Its grant programs have provided funds for cutting-edge research on a wide range of issues, in which civil-military relations (including demobilization) figure prominently. USIP supports U.S. and foreign scholars in this field. It has also bridged the gap between the traditional discussion of civil-military relations issues and the post-conflict peacekeeping field. USIP can have active duty military officers in residence, and has provided a forum for civil-military relations issues for international leaders

as part of its broader mandate to support research on peace.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—This USG-supported center at the Smithsonian Institution has several regional institutes that provide venues for U.S. and foreign scholars to research a wide variety of themes. The Latin American Center has been most active in looking at security issues and has worked with the American University program and other organizations in providing a forum for dialogue on security matters. Currently, the Wilson Center's Latin America program is engaged in a multi-year study of citizen security; civil-military relations are on the agenda as a key issue. The Russian Institute of the Wilson Center has also focused on security issues as they relate to Russia and its former components. Grants from the Wilson Center are used to support research, not field programming.

D. Outside the USG

World Bank—Although the Bank has traditionally avoided matters of security, claiming that the subject is outside its mandate, this has changed in recent years. The internal conflicts in Africa and Central American, and the Southeast Asian recovery have all led the Bank to take a more serious look at the problems of demobilization and reintegration of armies and former combatants.

Since its 1992 seven-country comparative study of demobilization and reintegration experiences,[12] the World Bank has been engaged in supporting both grants and loans to countries restructuring their military, or demobilizing both regular and irregular forces. While these programs are a form of civil-military relations programming, they are very operational in content. They include efforts both to support country defense ministries' plans for downsizing and to work with international organizations (the UN family and sub-regional organizations) to advance the demobilization and reintegration process.

The Bank views demobilization and reintegration programs as an important part of the larger concern that exists for protecting social capital. Former fighters who are capable of working, or who are willing to accept training, are important for development. Thus, investing in demobilization and reintegration programs can be justified in terms of reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-torn societies.

The Bank has recognized that reducing the size of militaries through support of demobilization and reintegration programs can result in a significant shift of resources in the public sector. Such programs also conform to the work of the International Monetary Fund, which has viewed military expenditures as something that must be addressed if development is to take place. Not only does a demobilization and reintegration program support short-term post-conflict

security needs, but it also helps to refocus public sector expenditures on other key areas such as health, education, housing, and other infrastructure needs. World Bank programs have been developed for Uganda, Namibia, Ethiopia, and, more recently, for Chad and Rwanda. Programs were also initiated in Cambodia.

International Committee for the Red Cross **(ICRC)**—As part of its historical mission, the ICRC has taught militaries about international humanitarian law. Over the last few years it has made an even greater effort to train military and civilians on the appropriate roles that both militaries and police must play in wartime, be it an internal war or an external one. ICRC courses are taught by and in militaries around the world and form the basis of some of the most important lessons of human rights for men and women soldiers.

United Nations—Specific programming on civil-military relations is addressed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which provides worldwide efforts to support development activities. UNDP has sponsored programs, seminars, and conferences on the subject of civil-military relations, and in recent years, has been more actively engaged in the relationship between the military-civilian population and peacekeeping in post-conflict environments. Because of UNDP's greater focus on governance, the subject of civil-military relations is an obvious component of its work.

Other United Nations programs touch upon the subject of the military. In particular, the United Nations Human Rights Center has recently developed a training module about police and the creation of police forces which includes certain aspects of civil-military relations.

E. Potential USAID Programs in Civil-Military Relations

The suggestions in this section should be regarded as tentative—as meant to stimulate discussion rather than prescribe specific steps. Different mixes of strategies will be appropriate at separate points in the same country's move toward stronger civilian control. Civil-military relations are not static. Phases should be expected, and might be weighed in light of the "ripeness" discussed below.

! Effective programs in civil-military relations cannot be carried out with civilians alone, nor exclusively with military personnel.

! Training of higher levels of civilian expertise in military-related areas, including persons covered under extended IMET, is a sine qua non. In the absence of in-depth knowledge on the part of civilians, civil-military relations dialogue is unlikely to be productive, mutually respectful, or candid.

! Training of journalists and other media reporters, focused upon the military's appropriate role in democratic settings, is highly appropriate.

! Analysis of military promotion and retirement policies, to ensure that officers who are the professionally best-trained and most receptive of civilian control advance in the ranks, may be in order.[13]

! In-region conferences should be held in which countries with "successful" civil-military relations serve as models. The underlying concept here is that advice can be accepted far more readily from peers within the same geographic region than from a far richer, industrialized, and militarily powerful country. It is a strategy pioneered by the American University program, and extended through the conferences organized by the African-American Institute.

! Complementary to the above, facilitating exchanges of staff between regions, involving indigenous personnel from both, should be considered. For example, if either Jamaica or the Philippines has a "successful" pattern of civil-military relations relative to its size, level of economic development, and defense needs, could it be compared to Madagascar? As a general rule, however, an initial and primary (but not exclusive) focus on intra-regional consultations is favored.

! Similarly, transfer among regions for USG officials should be seen as a benefit. USAID personnel tend to remain within a single geographic region, while U.S. military personnel are more likely to rotate between commands. The respective advantages of each relative to the mission should be re-examined.

! Clarification of police-military relationships is essential. The likelihood that both military and police form part of the national security apparatus, but differ in mission (including presumptions that police are extensively trained in the use of non-lethal force, and are community-based rather than moved extensively inside and outside the particular country) must be stressed. USAID must emphasize the "civil" side, but cannot neglect the national security aspects.

! Sponsorship of education and research programs in civilian universities on national security policy (directed primarily but not exclusively at civilians) to enhance expertise, would be highly appropriate.

! Development of curricula that emphasize the complementarity of high proficiency in technical and professional military roles with civilian authority should be considered at senior military establishments (war colleges).

! Conscious incorporation of civilians into war college courses seems appropriate.

! Careful examination of the extent of the military's involvement in major sectors of the economy, with subsequent encouragement of reduction of the economic sectors in effect reserved for the armed forces, is also in order.

! Review of legislative statutes and constitutional strictures on the armed forces (particularly those allowing or mandating the military to play a "guarantor" role vis-à-vis the constitution itself) is essential.

! Analysis of recruitment and promotion policies, notably as these impact upon specific ethnic or regional groups within societies, should be undertaken, although the political sensitivity of such issues must be noted.

F. Legal Considerations and Administrative Constraints

USAID has been reluctant to expand work in civil-military relations because of concern over legal impediments to support such programming. Yet, the post-Cold War world has brought the development community and the military into close contact because of the interdependent roles played by the military forces and civilian agencies in complex humanitarian emergencies.

As noted in this report, the DOD carries out a large part of a critical aspect of democracy building—namely training of civilians in defense policy and democratic governance. *However, the primacy of security issues as they relate to development in many less-developed countries makes it urgent that USAID rethink its efforts in civil-military relations and develop appropriate legal guidelines which support rather than restrict programmatic design.* One need only look at the internal wars that have wreaked havoc on many nations of sub-Saharan Africa, or the ethnic conflict of the Balkans, to understand how lack of internal and external security inhibits other forms of development assistance from taking root. Dealing with the

military is a first order of business. In many of the world's least developed nations, it is the military and not civilian governments that remain central to the governance of the state.

Therefore, to move its general democracy enhancement activities forward, *USAID needs to examine relationships among democratization, development, and security more thoroughly in view of having its legal authorities construct a policy that would permit more latitude in civil-military relations programming.* Civil-military relations efforts should not be viewed as training for a "military purpose," but rather need to be characterized as part of a strategy for democratization to bring the military under civilian control. Since the United States affirms the importance of civilian control, it should support training that empowers citizens to speak the language of security, thus strengthening democratic institutions.

USAID should clarify its internal policy about how it can incorporate active duty military in programming that touches on a subject that purports to encourage understanding between civilians and military. Using funds to support only the civilian side will not engender the positive and interactive relationships that are required to support a truly democratic relationship between elected leaders, military officials, and civil society.

At this point in time, a wide range of legal opinion exists within USAID, varying from bureau to bureau, which relates to the extent to which USAID program money can support attendance of active duty military at USAID-sponsored programs. *While it is clear that early restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act were drafted to prevent USAID from training the military, there is now a need to distinguish between training and participation in a dialogue (a one-time event) versus a program geared to teach a specific subject matter (a lengthy process).* Recommendations should include revised legislation that allows changes in participation to reflect changes in the post-Cold War world. In particular, as thought is being

given to redrafting language related to police-civilian relations, civil-military relations must also be part of any new drafting efforts on Capitol Hill.

IV. PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS FOR USAID

A. Assessments of Security and Development

USAID must address the role that security plays in the development of a democratic state. USAID's ability to develop and to advance a diverse DG program depends in part on who in the state controls the armed institutions.

USAID programs should start with the assumption that the military often plays a major role in a country undergoing transition. Thus, designing a civil-military relations program that brings in the actors who are most vital to the process, the leadership of the armed forces, is central to promoting communication and reviewing goals and objectives of governance efforts.

USAID should assume that, in most transition countries, the military will continue to play a rather paternalistic and self-interested role in the progress toward democratic governance. This is in part a recognition of how important an institutional presence the military is in most developing countries. While it may be important to discuss the primacy of civilian rule as part of an effort to support democracy, the military may be the only institution in a weak state that has the capacity to deliver basic services, especially in areas outside the national capital.

Certain specific actions might help guide USAID in the field of civil-military relations:

! Each mission should perform an assessment of country security needs and the relationship that such needs have to other development programming. This assessment should be used to integrate civil-military relations into the mission strategy paper.

! Existing dialogues on civil-military relations should be incorporated into other types of governance programming, especially as this programming relates to legislative and rule of law assistance.

! Demobilization and reintegration programs need to be integrated with mission micro-credit and micro-enterprise development activities. This should be done in collaboration with the actual entities working on demobilization at the earliest possible time.

! Exploring partnerships with other governments, international organizations and NGOs in support of civil-military relations should be an ongoing role of democracy officers in every mission. This would be one way to reduce duplication of programming, especially by USG entities, and to develop more effective, targeted efforts to improve civilian security expertise.

B. Civil-Military Relations Dialogue as Part of Good Governance

Among the key challenges for states undergoing a transition from authoritarian forms of government to more open, transparent systems is how to get defense right after years of military rule. This means how, in societies emerging from repressive rule, internal war, or even chaos (failed states), to foster a debate on such matters as the future role of the armed forces or the resources required by a state for both internal and external security.

In spite of an increasing acknowledgment by those in the development community of a connection between security and development policy, there is little coherence in defining security needs within a development strategy. This has become even more apparent since the waning of the Cold War. Certainly, there is coordination between security needs and development in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Civil-military relations in times of complex emergencies have become a growth industry. At the end of the crisis, however, any coordination between civilian and military

authorities about appropriate post-conflict security needs is abandoned. Instead, security needs and development strategy often take separate tracks, resulting in programs that address governance, the rule of law, and citizen security in the absence of significant discussion about the future role of the armed forces or the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civilian life.

How a state addresses the threshold issue of creating an enabling environment for democratic governance must include a dialogue about security needs. This is where civil-military relations programs must begin. *A public dialogue must bring into the picture key military and civilian leaders, and sometimes external interlocutors, who can provide lessons from other transitions as a way of stimulating internal debate.* In addition to this step, USAID must develop concrete plans to ensure that: 1) military doctrine reflects changes in civilian governance needs; 2) internal security is not an isolated subject, devoid of democratic content; 3) rule of law programs do not leave out considerations of military justice; and 4) impunity, which is often the status quo, becomes part of the discussion. The dialogue must also address the question of how much defense is enough. Resource allocation in a weak or developing state requires hard decisions about appropriate expenditures for both internal and external security, civilian input and oversight of expenditures, and public knowledge about how resources are allocated. It is not enough for international financial institutions to dictate the nature and levels of military expenditures in the absence of genuine internal discussion.

C. Demobilization and Reintegration Programs

With the end of the Cold War, downsizing armies and demobilizing combatants have become central to the process of military reform.[14] And certainly reform of the military is central to promoting civilian control of government in transition states. Whether conflict ended through a peace accord, or whether a government made the tough choices of reducing military expenditures, there is universal agreement in the developed world that too many soldiers, with no clear missions, inadequate training, and few resources lead to instability.

This said, the development community has not developed a coherent strategy for dealing with the subject of demobilization and reintegration *as part of a wider program of democratic reform.* Often the mechanical aspects of demobilization are handled by a combination of international peacekeeping operations—usually the UN or other regional force—together with an international humanitarian organization (e.g., the United Nations Development Program, the International Organization for Migration, or the International Labor Organization) to pursue the reintegration components of demobilization. What is missing from these operational components is how such an important process supports civil-military relations and capacity-building.[15] In practice, the demobilization and reintegration aspects of military reform are often left out of mission democracy strategies.

Demobilization and reintegration programs have two goals. First, in the short-run, demobilization of former combatants or soldiers provides an important window of time for the improvement of on-the-ground security. It also gives newly elected governments or interim governing arrangements a chance to emerge without the threat of military repression or the need to spend scarce resources on a process that is quite expensive.[16] The international donor community has recognized the immediate short-run needs of demobilization, thus explaining why the World Bank, the UN, and other bilateral donors see demobilization and reintegration efforts as good investments. What is overlooked are the medium-term and long-range aspects of the second goal of demobilization: giving former fighters a new start by returning them to civilian life. This last process needs greater consideration in democratic programming and is vital to the development of any process of promoting improved civil-military relations.

Demobilization of regular and irregular forces has been central to several African state transitions in recent years. The massive demobilization of irregular troops in Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, Namibia, and Ethiopia, to mention just a few, is perhaps the most significant movement of human capital of its time in these states. Demobilization not only impacts on a nation's security, but also affects the way in which a nation's pool of workers can be reintegrated into civilian society after years of fighting. The challenge of civilian governance programs is finding ways to incorporate former combatants and former soldiers in a meaningful way into programming that already addresses the needs of civil society.

It is in this latter area that USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance (G/DG) could be effective. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives has developed functional expertise in designing programs that address demobilization in a timely fashion. Using leveraged resources that permit this process to go forward, G/DG input and planning should be integrated into the post-conflict DG strategy to ensure that demobilization programs eventually incorporate the wider goals of building a more stable and capable government. In the short run, joint planning seems to be essential, not only within USAID, but also with other donors, bilateral and multilateral alike.

Most important, discussions of USAID-supported civil-military relations programs in countries where a demobilization has occurred, the subject must be raised *as part of a national dialogue* which might include such additional subjects as reconciliation, prevention of future conflicts, and citizen security.

USAID has supported demobilization programs in Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, and other countries where the presence of a large, unskilled but armed military made the demobilization a challenge not only to security, but also to the absorptive capacity of the economy. As these programs grow, and most certainly they will

grow in the NIS countries and in Africa, the need for greater collaboration and coherent policy will increase.

It is useful to note that other bilateral donors are facing similar questions with regard to their support for demobilization and reintegration programs. In addition to the United States, Canada (through the Pearson Center and CIDA), Great Britain (Sierra Leone), the Nordic countries (Angola), Spain (El Salvador and Guatemala), and the European Community (Liberia, Guatemala, Sierra Leone), have all been engaged in such efforts. NATO, through the USG-funded Marshall Center in Germany, has made the reintegration of former soldiers from the NIS countries a priority, and has focused on civilian integration of officer corps. The United Nations Development Program also administers demobilization programs, though the quality and type of programming vary on a case-by-case basis. The World Bank has been most active in the demobilization and reintegration of combatants in sub-Saharan Africa, with the emphasis focusing on programs which address retraining and reintegration. Because demobilization programs per se, and security programs in general, are high-ticket items, it is important that the Bank has made the leap toward supporting these types of threshold programs. The Organization of American States has also been engaged with specific demobilization efforts, mainly supported through USG-transferred funds for work in Nicaragua (CIAV) and for education and training in Guatemala (through USAID/OTI). These programs, like those described above, fail to connect the security dimension with that of a sustainable development strategy.

D. Partnerships with Other Entities

While the USG has usually discussed civil-military relations as a part of its broader foreign policy efforts to promote democracy, in the post-Cold War era it has worked in partnership with other governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations in the areas

of citizen security, demobilization, and reintegration programming and civilian police training. Part of the cooperation stems from the resource intensiveness of this part of rehabilitation and reconstruction of societies that are in transition. With the exception of Haiti, where the USG picked up the total cost of the reintegration program for the former Haitian military, the USG has not had the resources available to work by itself in the massive area of defense sector reform. Nor should it be the USG's unique responsibility to do so. In many countries, working in concert with the United Nations has been one means of promoting such cooperation. Similarly, USG work in the post-conflict environment has sparked a more cooperative approach to security issues, especially as it relates to the former Yugoslavia, with NATO taking the lead, or in Africa, where the British, French, and certain private voluntary organizations support the security and development issues.

There is room for greater partnering in this field, though it should be noted that the U.S., as the lone superpower, is often placed in a difficult position in countries where once the U.S. had other security interests. Indeed, it may be that U.S. promotion of good civil-military relations should be addressed at two levels—directly through our own military-to-military channels for specific defense sector needs, and more collaboratively, with other donors, in the area of good governance. Perhaps the only danger in this respect is that bifurcating roles between civilian and military interests in support of democratic civil-military relations runs the risk of sending two messages to militaries in need of reform. In the interests of stronger programming in this area, it is important to move toward more open and direct discussion with the relevant defense agencies to provide the best programs with the limited resources available.

V. OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Principles, Readiness, and Strategy

Lessons learned in the history of democracy programming have demonstrated the importance of timing. There are few "democratic moments." Having the resources available to respond rapidly to opportunities of change, where military institutions are willing to be introspective and move with the course of political change is critical to a program's success. For example, USAID was relatively agile in its willingness to support a grant to the American University in the mid-1980s when civil-military relations were a central issue in the democratic transitions in Latin America. However, other funding vehicles allowing for rapid response in other parts of the world have not been available. The absence of an appropriate funding vehicle to support important dialogue in civil society was filled by other institutions—the NED, in a limited way, and the Department of Defense, through its vast education and training network worldwide. While the contribution of DOD is important, it did not bring in the enormous experience of the development world, nor did it engage civil society in its programs. Thus, USAID will have some significant "catch-up" to do if it is to be competitive globally with others in this field. To advance this response, some operating principles are suggested.

! USAID missions should include civil-military relations on their checklist when designing DG sector programs. Close coordination with the DOD and USIA could help coordinate messages as well as leverage resources to support civil-military relations programs in a timely fashion.

! USAID's approach to the rule of law must take into consideration the role of the military in all aspects of governance. When the military is the only state actor, what is written in legal codes matters little in practice. Thus, reform of the legal system must face the practical consequences of how the rule of law is respected by the armed forces as they relate to civilians. Are there parallel legal systems that try to bring civilians under military jurisdiction? Do police training programs reflect the military missions that their governing institutions also require of them? A more careful analysis of the overlap of sectors is important.

! In many states there is scant difference between the military leaders who call the shots behind the scenes and the weak civilian leaders who are supported by the development community. A baseline reality check is important to fully understand the political context of who is really governing. This is especially true in transitional situations. It does not rule out civilian-military dialogue. It merely provides a point of departure for what can be an expected outcome of such a program.

! Partnerships with others, especially indigenous NGOs interested in the security sector, are important. USAID has only begun to address this type of support, but, this might in fact be the most fruitful area for dialogue. It is the local groups that will ultimately be the ones that address the subject matter in ways that resonate for the community. International support can provide resources and information, but reform must come from within.

B. Threshold Questions/"Ripeness"

Before any programs are devised for a given country, a mission should devise a "ripeness" test for the democracy portfolio that would view whether or not a country is ready for encounters

between civilian and military officials. Because ranges of programmatic alternatives in civil-military relations exist, country-specific assessments are essential to identify the most appropriate activities for given contexts. Such assessments should evaluate the environments within particular countries, to ascertain whether a civil-military relations program is *politically feasible* and *likely to have measurable impact*.

Countries with opportunities for effective programming may be described as "ripe." By ascertaining the degree of ripeness, programmers can identify activities most appropriate to specific situations. For example, if a country is emerging from a war, external or internal, what is foremost in people's minds is the ability to rebuild and survive. Thus, immediate transition environments have a need for civil-military understanding, but it is more operational in na-ture. Civilian police forces are needed, hence relationships with peace keepers and peace builders are in order. Decisions must be made about the fate of the army. Will there be a demobilization, if this was an internal war? What will happen to irregular fighters? These are types of operational decisions that must be dealt with in the stages immediately following a conflict and prior to moving to more normative considerations.

If a country is in a more consolidated status (i.e., if there has been an election, a legislature exists, and there is an emerging civil society), then the question of civil-military relations is more appropriate, or ripe. (The "liberalizing authoritarian" regimes could fall into this category.) For example, it may well serve a country to have a clearer understanding of the role of a legislature in formulating defense policy, by setting the limits on military expendi-tures. But to achieve such a role will require a good deal of education, training, and observation.

A country might be ripe for defining the future roles and missions of the armed forces. Or, if a country has gone to transition based on the terms of a peace accord, the implementation of that

accord may require the political will to carry out legislative changes. What role can a program serve in this case?

A civil-military relations assessment might be the first step in deciding the appropriateness of any programming. This type of assessment can be done in conjunction with a military counterpart from an embassy, or it can be done with the assistance of U.S. military mobile teams. However, it is important that such an assessment bring into play the view of non-governmental organizations whose support is needed for any sustainable programming.

Without an adequate vision of civil-military cooperation, or without any comprehension of the political will of national players for such a dialogue or programming, any attempt to advance a civil-military relations program will be lost.

If an assessment reveals sufficient interest to support additional civil-military relations programming, then lessons applied from previously supported USAID activities suggest the importance of seeking local sponsorship for such activities. Support must be multilateral—including civilian government institutions, the defense ministry, and local groups, including think tanks, civic organizations, and others rele-vant to any national dialogue. In particular, the need for local support of programs becomes the basis for an internationally supported program close-out, with an output being the creation of local entities to pursue dialogue, training, and development, both within and outside the host government.

C. Guidelines for Assessments

USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance has developed an assessment framework for designing DG program strategies. The assessment methodology was designed to help missions identify the most favorable targets for intervention. However, for reasons described above, such assessments tend not to sufficiently

focus on security issues or on civil-military relations programming. The country-specific civil-military relations assessments called for in this study would invoke an innovative analytical dimension heretofore unexplored in a systematic fashion by USAID.

The development of a comprehensive civil-military relations assessment methodology is beyond the scope of this study. Yet the civil-military literature is sufficiently rich to identify key guidelines for what might be included for examination in such assessments. These "ripeness" assessments would ideally encompass consideration in the following illustrative areas:

! *Defense sector:* Questions regarding the defense establishment and procedures would focus on the role of civilians in security issues. Is the operative authority structure a civilian defense minister reporting to a civilian cabinet? Is the minister of defense supported by civilian employees with education and expertise on defense matters? Does a country's military doctrine reflect a cogent vision of the role of the armed forces within the state?

! *Legislature*: Parliaments potentially provide a critical check on the dictates, authority, and roles of military establishments and structures. Are there specific legislative committees that address defense matters, with appropriate staffing to support their functions? Is the legislative environment conducive to public hearings on defense issues, including budget, training, and procurement matters?

! *Executive:* The nature of the relationship between the executive branch and the military can help determine the prospects for the role of the military not impinging upon the transition towards democracy. Does a civilian leader exist with commander-in-chief authority over the armed forces, rather than a parallel authority? To what extent are state functions for civilians managed by executive agencies rather than the defense

sector (e.g., health programs in rural areas handled by health ministry, road-building performed by interior ministry, etc.)?

! *Oversight process*: The question of oversight of defense budgets is one of the most revealing about the nature of civil-military relations. Are defense budgets transparent and subject to national debate by civilian institutions such as the legislature?

! *Constitutional and legal provisions*: Civil-military relations assessments should gauge the extent to which civilian institutions have authority over potential excesses by the armed forces. Are members of the military who are arrested for criminal activities outside the scope of their duty, or who perpetrate crimes on civilians, subject to the jurisdiction of civilian courts? Are the police functionally separate from the armed forces? To what ministry do police report?

! *Citizen security*: Assessing perceptions by citizens regarding their security needs can help shed light on the relative importance of external versus internal threats. Do citizens feel safe and protected from external threats? Is there confidence in the level of police protection against internal threats?

! *Civil society*: The extent to which civil society is permitted or wants to engage in defense or security-related issues can be a barometer of a country's ripeness for civil-military relations programming. Are there nongovernmental organizations, run by civilians, that address defense and security issues? Are security studies a subject of inquiry at local universities?

D. Funding/Resources

At the present time, USAID alone has scant resources to support the improvement of civil-military relations. Thus, the potential for partnering with other USG agencies or with international organizations, bilateral donors, and

the private sector is noteworthy. The issue will be how programs developed with other donors reflect USG/USAID interests in a meaningful way. There are many ways in which USAID missions might want to seek out opportunities. As discussed in other parts of this report, it is recognized that the USG alone cannot support total demobilization and reintegration packages, but the USG brings to the table an important degree of leverage, expertise, and clout that cannot be overlooked. In recent times, for example, USAID has been able to engage the World Bank in support programs for donors about country-specific civil-military relations issues (e.g., Guatemala and Liberia). Similarly, there have been opportunities to collaborate with the Department of Defense in the early phases of post-conflict rehabilitation. *The success of USAID civil-military relations programs will ultimately depend not so much on its resources alone, but on the ability to leverage resources from a wide range of actors to create a critical mass of support for good governance and civil-military relations.*

E. Special Needs of "Failed States"

The establishment of stable civil-military relations, as has been emphasized in this report, requires a reasonable foundation of internal peace. Countries in which rival armed groups continue to vie for control constitute special cases in which the usual assumptions on which USAID operates do not exist, or are present in attenuated form.

The establishment of democracy requires both functioning political institutions and (most important for this report) a foundation of security. Absent basic law and order, or a sense of reasonable social stability, the primary concern of citizens will be personal safety. A modicum of internal security must exist. Otherwise, the notorious Hobbesian "state of nature" prevails.

The country assessments advocated in this report must include attention to basic security. The roles and effectiveness of various "official"

institutions dedicated to security—police, gendarmerie, "regular" armed forces under direct governmental control, other special protective agencies controlled by the government—must be clarified. How capable are they of establishing and maintaining public order? Other, "non-official" coercive groups must be examined—for example, militias linked to political parties; to ethnic, religious, or regional groups; or to figures in the political opposition. How likely are they to turn to fighting as contrasted with peaceful protest?

These issues and questions are critical. Programming in civil-military relations and democratization cannot be effectively established without a minimal level of public safety. More basic efforts in creating and enhancing security must come first.

VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section summarizes the major points made above, integrating them into an approach considered appropriate to USAID at this juncture. It is recognized that some recommendations may require action by other agencies. Since other parts of the USG have developed programs touching on important yet varied parts of civil-military relations, their experience and expertise must be recognized. Similarly, the experiences of non-USG entities, such as the World Bank, merit recognition and study.

USAID faces a fundamental decision. It can—and should—undertake programming in civil-military relations. Such programming must recognize certain constraints:

! The agency aims at establishing a stronger foundation for economic growth and democracy, but recognizes that basic security is essential for both.

! Civil-military relations need to be brought into the development dialogue.

! Conditions vary widely through the world, and significantly within regions; thus, it is appropriate to work from the bottom up in developing specific steps.

! Distinctions between external and internal security, or between the roles of military and police, while common in developed countries, are far less common in developing countries.

! Although democracy has made significant advances globally, armed forces remain very significant political actors within almost all countries with USAID missions.

! Careful reconsideration must be given to Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act, for narrow interpretation may preclude creative, appropriate USAID programming.

! The broad roles armed forces play have not always been integrated into mission democracy strategies; civil-military relations must be consciously included in assessments and planning.

Specific steps to be taken include the following:

! Individual missions within USAID must carry out careful assessments of civil-military relations and development.

! "Ripeness" tests should be devised, following these assessments.

! Coordination with other development agencies, and certainly with other parts of the USG, is a sine qua non for governance programs.

! Leveraging funds through cooperation with other entities is essential.

APPENDIX A: STEPS SCHOLARS SUGGEST FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Huntington's guidelines for how democratizers can curb military power and promote professionalism:

1. Promptly purge or retire all potentially disloyal officers.
2. Ruthlessly punish leaders of attempted coups.
3. Clarify and consolidate the chain of command over the armed forces.
4. Make major reductions in the size of the armed forces.
5. Use the funds thus saved to increase salaries, pensions, and benefits, and to improve living conditions.
6. Reorient military forces to military missions.
7. Drastically reduce the number of troops stationed in or around the capital.
8. Give them "toys."
9. Seize every opportunity to identify themselves with the armed forces.
10. Develop and maintain a political organization capable of mobilizing supporters in the street if a military coup is attempted.[17]

Notably lacking from the above list are 1) enhancing the expertise of civilian officials in military matters; 2) bolstering the effectiveness of lightly-armed police and gendarme units for internal security; and 3) ensuring external grants and loans to ensure the maintenance of adequate standards of living for politically significant groups.

In his book *Civilian Control of the Military,* Welch argues that "the best measure of the strength and extent of civilian control of the military is governmental ability to alter the armed forces' responsibilities." He sets forth short- and long-range strategies for (re)establishing governmental control over armed forces, after examining major "givens." [18]

Factors not readily or rapidly changeable by government action include major redrawing of its frontiers at the expense of another state; major improvement of economic circumstances (barring discovery and exploitation of valuable natural resources or whole capital transfers); long-standing patterns of extensive military involvement in politics (although defeat in war may facilitate rapid transitions, as shown by Argentina); latent social differentiations (e.g., ethnicity); and levels of governmental legitimacy.

Strategy 1 focuses on the military as an institution, and attempts to reduce the likelihood of future intervention in politics. In essence, it involves reducing the armed forces' direct political influence. Major steps include (re)establishment of "integral" boundaries between military and civilian institutions, greater international rather than domestic orientation of the military, active encouragement of disengagement (a theme taken up by Welch in his later book, *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), emphasis on greater structural differentiation (including police and gendarmerie units focused on domestic security, and specific policies on recruitment and socialization to reduce marked social gaps that may exist between society and military.

Strategy 2, a longer-term strategy, achieves civilian control by enhancing the authority of the controllers themselves…[through] recognition that civilians exercising power do so rightfully, as a consequence of their position within government." In essence, this strategy requires the deliberate enhancement of governmental legitimacy. Ultimately, the most effective barrier against coups d'état is not the absence of military desire to exercise power, but the recognition that such power cannot be seized and exercised

effectively over a long period. To make civilian control of the military work, it must be favored by officers, political leaders, and the populace alike.

APPENDIX B: SCHOLARLY WORKS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Books

Abrahamsson, Bengt. *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972). Differentiates between two forms of socialization and transformation; traces their consequences for the political roles military leaders seek; raises general points about the "military mind" and corporate solidarity; focuses on Western European and North American examples, but has broader applicability.

Colton, Timothy J. *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). In order to explain the armed forces' political quiescence, develops a framework for military participation in politics, differentiating the role of officers (none, few, some, most), the scope of issues (internal, institutional, intermediate, societal) and means used (official prerogative, expert advice, political bargaining, force).

Danopolous, Constantine P., ed. *Military Disengagement from Politics* (London: Routledge, 1988) and *From Military to Civilian Rule* (London: Routledge, 1992). Two collections of case studies, with limited attempts at comparison and generalization about successful transformations.

Finer, Samuel E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962). Vigorously disputes Huntington's assertion that military intervention in politics is contrary to professionalism, arguing from numerous historical examples that greater professionalism enhances the likelihood of coups d'état; distinguishes among countries on the "level" of their political cultures.

Goodman, Louis W., Johanna S.R. Mendelson and Juan Rial. *The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990). One of the first major products of the USAID-funded Democracy Project at American University; provides a variety of theoretical, historical and practical perspectives on the difficulties of reorienting military officers and revising civilian attitudes.

Horowitz, Donald L. *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Using unique interviews with leaders of a failed coup d'état, tests different theories of the motives for military intervention in politics (personalistic, corporate, social systemic and political); has important implications for steps toward democratization.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy* 6, (1995), 9-17. Overall, democratization has resulted in improved civil-military relations, marked by limitations of the armed forces' political involvement, their restructuring toward military missions, reductions in size, and enhanced professionalism. The relative success of coup attempts depends on economic development and modernization: unsuccessful in countries with per capita GNPs between $1000 and $3000, successful with GNPs below $500.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Sets forth an ideal, and much-debated, model of "objective" and "subjective" control, based on "autonomous military professionalism," followed by detailed historical recounting of American civil-military relations.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. and J. Samuel Fitch. *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986, revised edition). Selected previously published essays with general approaches, case studies, and some attention to democratization and extrication from military rule.

Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Argues that social divisions are becoming increasingly important in the contemporary Indian military; the separation of the armed forces from Indian society that had preserved its strength and prevented its corruption is breaking down, thereby transforming the pattern of civil-military relations established under British rule and maintained in the early decades of independence.

Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Examines the historical "moderating pattern" of military involvement in Brazilian politics prior to 1964; discusses the behavior of officers in political roles up to 1968.

Stepan, Alfred. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Takes the story of Brazil through the initial years of its transition toward democracy, giving special attention to the armed forces' prerogatives ("a sense of their legitimate role that entails deep, permanent involvement in managing conflict in the polity"—p. 131).

Welch, Claude E., Jr. "Civil-Military Relations," in *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 507-11. Summary of major issues.

Welch, Claude E., Jr., ed. *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). Suggests that a "spectrum" of civil-military interactions exists in all countries, with "military participation in politics" (as contrasted with "governmental control of the military" or "military control of the government") is characteristic of a broad range of developing countries; recommends both short- and long-term strategies to enhance governmental control over the armed forces.

Welch, Claude E., Jr. *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America* (Boulder CO: Westview, 1987). Utilizing case studies of Bolivia, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Peru, illustrates obstacles and incentives for post-coup withdrawals to the barracks; indicates major contrasts and similarities in civil-military relations for the regions of West Africa and Andean Latin America.

Other Resources

Armed Forces & Society (published quarterly by Johns Hopkins University Press for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society)

Foreign Affairs (published bimonthly by the Council on Foreign Relations)

Foreign Policy (published quarterly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington)

International Security (published quarterly by MIT Press)

Journal of Democracy (published quarterly by Johns Hopkins University Press)

Millennium (published quarterly by the London School of Economics)

Parameters (published quarterly by the US Army War College)

Survival (published quarterly by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London)

NOTES

[1.] For example, see *Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, edited by James R. Graham (Washington, DC, National Defense University, 1993).

[2.] Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (October 1995), p. 11.

[3.] Ibid., p. 15.

[4.] Richard H. Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military," *Journal of Democracy* 8 (October 1997), p. 143. Note should be taken of the narrowness of this definition, although "internal security" potentially covers a variety of complex issues, including levels of development.

[5.] Ibid., p. 152.

[6.] Most notably, by Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[7.] It is recognized, to be certain, that significant threats to internal security surpass the capacity of many police forces. Insurgent groups, narco-traffickers with private armies, party militias, or mafias are examples where the military has been necessarily, and appropriately, involved in domestic action. The dividing line that is clear in theory—or at least in the minds of many Western analysts—is challenged in the field.

[8.] Stanley Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 262-63.

[9.] See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. "The Military Coup of 2012", *Parameters* 22 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 2-20.

[10.] GAO. *Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance* (Washington, DC: USGAO, March 1992, GAO USAID92-118.

[11.] "Report of the Civil-Military Relations Assessment Mission, West and Central Africa" (Washington: National Democratic Institute, 1998).

[12.] Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies, October 1992

[13.] It is interesting to note that a leading analyst of democratization has a far simpler formula. See the first of Huntington's recommendations (Appendix 1).

[14.] Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars,* Adelphi Paper 303**,** IISS, London, 1996.

[15.] Kim Mahling Clark, Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants (PN-ABY-027), Research and Reference Services, USAID, March 1996.

[16] Office of Transition Initiatives, Haiti Demobilization: Evaluation, Center for Naval Analysis, 1997.

[17.] Samuel P. Hungtington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 251-253.

[18.] Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), pp. 313-327.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
DOD	Department of Defense
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
E-IMET	Extended International Military Education and Training
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
G/DG	Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research, USAID
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
ICITAP	International criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

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