Session Summary
The "neutral" or "humanitarian space" concept suggests that those working to provide humanitarian relief, and more recently development assistance, in times of conflict, are not partisans in the conflict, and thus should be able work without fear of being assaulted or impeded in their mission. We inherit the principle from the 19th century establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (1863) and the work of Henri Dunant. It was reinforced and elaborated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. For a variety of reasons, that space - which provides a comfort zone for contemporary humanitarian and development workers - is shrinking. In particular we at USAID can no longer find comfort in this declining neutral space - because since 9/11 U.S. foreign assistance has been aligned closely and self-consciously with U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. national security policy in particular.
Although this may appear to be an anomaly related to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in fact consistent with the history of U.S. foreign assistance. Since the Marshall Plan was established in 1947 U.S. foreign assistance has been an element of U.S. national security policy. The first recipients of Marshall Plan assistance were not the defeated and destroyed axis countries or our closest World War II allies, but rather Greece and Turkey, which were both facing internal communist threats. As the Cold War emerged U.S. foreign assistance was often used to shore up allied countries in the developing world to keep them from alliance with the Soviet Union.
USAID's role in Vietnam in the 1960's was a paramount example of the nexus between assistance and national security. There U.S. defense, diplomacy and development personnel worked closely to accomplish overtly national security goals. The CORDS (Community Outreach and Revolutionary/Rural Development) program actually went so far as to integrate civilian and military efforts in development under a single command structure. Although the war in Vietnam was ultimately lost, the CORDS program was generally considered successful and innovative.
While the 1970s saw a separation of development assistance from national security, they were rejoined - if less intimately - during the 1980s. The national pre-occupation with Latin, and particularly Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua) of that decade was national security driven. Accelerated economic development and improved rule of law were pursued as remedies to the threat of communist states being established in our own hemisphere.
With the demise of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new link was forged between foreign assistance and national security. USAID initiated substantial new programs in the former communist countries to ensure that they followed the path of democracy and market economics - so that they would never again pose a threat to U.S. national security.
So the events of 9/11/01, and the refocusing of all tools of national power on protecting national security, merely continued and reinforced a central principle of U.S. foreign assistance; foreign assistance is one of the elements of national power to be applied in the protection of national security. September 11 was but a reminder of the multi-dimensionality of the threats to national security.
What is indeed new is the lethality of the environments in which humanitarian and development workers operate, and the dramatic increase in the risk and danger that these workers face. Why are they so much more at risk today? Various explanations have been offered; because they are working in more militarized/lethal environments? because of the more politicized nature of their work? because of the co-mingling and cooperation between development and military personnal? because of the practices of humanitarian/development organizations themselves? Recent research suggests the most salient factor is the politicization of their work itself in conflict-prone settings.
Although uncomfortable for some in the development and humanitarian communities there are persuasive arguments in favor of a strong linkage between development and defense, between foreign assistance and national security, between USAID and the U.S. military. The first argument is utilitarian; as development workers are at risk in conflict environments, the military can provide protection and support. A second argument is instrumental; there can be no effective humanitarian relief or development in the absence of security, and security can only be provided by the military. Moreover the military can provide a range of technical support, mobility and lift capacity to improve the delivery of assistance. A third argument in favor of close cooperation is the opportunity for each community, military and developmental, to learn from each other. The development community has much to offer the military in terms of refining its understanding of the national security threats we face. The development community can likewise learn a great deal from the military in terms of planning, logistics, and technology.
The main national security threats to the U.S. today are terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and global criminal networks. These threats all thrive in weak, failing and failed states. The US must engage those states more effectively. The key official documents that articulate the national response to these new threats include;
The National Security Strategy of the U.S., first released in September 2002, acknowledged the threat to the U.S. posed by weak and failing states. To meet this challenge it states that diplomacy, defense and development (the three "D"s) must all work together and proposes that America's national security institutions must be transformed to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
The purpose of NSPD-44 was to create a plan for managing inter-agency coordination in reconstruction and stabilization situations. It establishes a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization to oversee and help integrate all DOD and civilian contingency planning. It specifies that the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should take the lead in integrating the efforts and capabilities of all departments and agencies, civilian and military, for reconstruction and stabilization purposes. S/CRS is tasked with developing strategies and identifying states which may become unstable and may require stabilization and reconstruction. In addition to coordinating the overall USG response, S/CRS is responsible for coordinating with foreign countries, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. Finally S/CRS is tasked with developing a strong civilian response capacity for reconstruction and stabilization operations.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR, 2006) is meant to operationalize DOD defense strategy and shape the future force over next 20 years. The findings of the most recent QDR led to the conclusion that DOD capabilities must be reoriented to address a wider range of challenges (non-traditional, asymmetric warfare). It emphasizes interagency partnership as a key to success. For the first time the QDR requires the DOD to assist civilian agencies in seeking support from the Congress related to civilian agency capacities. This year's QDR identifies four priorities;
- Defeat Terrorist Networks
- Shaping choices of countries at strategic crossroads
- Defending the homeland
- Preventing enemy from acquiring/use of WMD
USAID can play a significant role in at least the first two. It can help defeat terrorist networks by supporting the development of effective civil societies, by broadening cooperation across the entire USG, and by building and leveraging host country partner capacities. USAID can contribute to shaping choices of countries at strategic crossroads, helping them to become constructive actors and stakeholders in international system.
Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 (released 11/28/05) is the Pentagon's response to the multi-dimensional challenges of reconstruction and stabilization. The directive elevates reconstruction and stabilization operations to the same level of priority as major combat operations - an unprecedented change in the DOD world-view. Henceforth reconstruction and stabilization considerations must be included in all plans. The directive acknowledges that many of the tasks and responsibilities associated with reconstruction and stabilization operations are not ones for which the military is necessarily best-suited, however in the absence of civilian capacity to carry out these tasks, the capabilities will be developed within the military. To do so, DOD will work closely with other USG entities, foreign governments, IOs, NGOs, private sector, etc.
USAID is currently in the process of adapting to these new challenges. The first step was the establishment of the Military Policy Board, chaired by the Assistant Administrator of PPC. The Board is focused on developing the long-term relationship with DoD, and USAID positions on national security issues. Early last year the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was created in the DCHA bureau to serve as focal point for USAID-DoD engagement and to forge effective working relationships, including NGO-military interface.
OMA is currently working at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level OMA is informing DOD doctrine development. OMA serves as the USAID contact for DOD 3000.05 and QDR implementation, and for the military/civilian joint Congressional engagement strategy. It is the point of contact for USAID policy engagement with DOD, and for the recent DOD Transfer Authority (Section 1207 Authority). Operationally, OMA along with the State Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs is working on terms of reference for POLAD/Senior Development Advisors posted to the military Combatant Commanders (COCOMS), while establishing liaison exchanges with the Joint Staff and the COCOMs. At the tactical level OMA is coordinating USAID's participation in integrated planning and execution with the Coalition Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa. It is developing Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and Agency surge capacity in addition to its work on a tactical Conflict Assessment Framework and programming guide.
National security decision making is a rapidly evolving and dynamic process. USAID can have a significant impact if it plays its part in making sure that three "D"s are synchronized effectively. To do so USAID must build its own capacity to play a constructive role alongside the military. Secretary Rice as told us, "We can and must do better!"
Question and Answer Session
Question: I am somewhat concerned with the fact that in the recent past Congress has trusted the military to do development and humanitarian assistance (HA) programs more than it has trusted the organizations created and mandated to carry out that type of program, such as USAID.
- This concerns me because the DOD has very minimal accountability and no requirement to report on the HA programs they carry out.
- I see in this recent development a serious disconnect, the tendency to give such large quantities of money to the military, an organization not designed to carry out these types of projects or be held accountable for their implementation.
Response: DOD doesn't necessarily know what it is that they don't know.
- When DOD professionals see something that needs to be done (such as HA) and they are given the funds, they will carry it out to the best of their abilities.
- They are also, however, fully willing to create structures to do it more effectively.
- The DOD is filling roles they don't necessarily want to fill, but until others have the capacity to fulfill those needs they will continue to step up.
- There is no hesitation from the military to partner with aid organizations.
- The DOD is redesigning itself - Directive 3000.05 is symptomatic. It states that what civilians don't provide, the DOD will develop.
Comment: The Military is extremely thirsty for information about State and AID programs and how they work.
" The Military has edicts to accomplish certain set tasks, and when they get an edict, they accomplish the task quickly. Throughout this process they welcome input and assistance, but realistically they have the personnel and institutional capacity to do it faster.
Question: How can we maximize, improve, and expand our collaboration with DOD on top of everything else we have to do here. I am from a fairly small USAID office dealing with gender issues. We would love to have the capacity to adequately respond to all of the requests of the DOD, but we just don't have the resources.
Response: The military itself is trying to develop long-term training and capacity building programs with and for the civilian agencies - they are in development.
- In the absence of national guidance from the top down, commanders are looking for AID and State help on their own initiatives and not necessarily in any organized or centrally coordinated manner.
- In March of 2005 the Office of Military Affairs (DCHA/OMA) was created to help the coordination efforts.
- DCHA/OMA is working to create something like focal points for functional imparities, individuals who can coordinate knowledge sharing and transfer as well as communications.
Question: I am concerned about the lack of cultural mapping; there is some effort within the military to fulfill this need through Foreign Area Officers, but there seems to be nothing within USAID that is meeting the very real necessity for it in the field. Can the State Department or USAID come up with some sort of capacity building personnel training exercise to fulfill this need?
Response: While both State and USAID have been re-building their staffs after years of decline, it is important to also keep in mind the extensive expertise residing in private, non-governmental organizations with which both State and USAID work.
- USAID in particular works extensively with specialized non-governmental organizations which provide much of the implementation capacity needed for development.
Question: Development work with our partners is tricky. How does this new relationship with the military affect our partnerships and working relationships with the donor community and the NGOs? Will some be reluctant to cooperate with USAID if it means closer relations with the U.S. military?
Response: Donor coordination is an excellent principle - in principle. However it is important to acknowledge that different donors have different objectives, different methods, different constituencies, and different work paces. Coordination is not therefore always easy - nor is it always possible.
- USAID for example is a U.S. governmental agency whose top priority must always be to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security. That is an over-riding objective that is not shared by other donors. The best posture is to work together on shared objectives realizing that other donors cannot be coordinated to meet objectives they do not embrace.
- There is no doubt that closer interaction with the U.S. military is uncomfortable for some NGOs. They may indeed be reluctant to work with USAID if it means working alongside the military. Indeed many NGOs will not accept any funding from USAID or other governmental agencies as a matter of principle to protect their independence. That is a choice for individual NGOs to make, and we are aware that some may choose to withdraw from USAID support. Thankfully there have not been many that have done so.
Comment: In Southern Philippines our lab has worked and coordinated with the Pacific Command and USAID. As a result of that coordination we were able to reduce the number of Philippine military battalions stationed there from 15 to only 2 military battalions stationed there, and the situation went from roaming terrorists to fast food restaurants on corners.
Question: The issues associated with the differences in available resources, both personnel and money, between DOD and the civilian agencies, in particular USAID, and the associated capabilities are certainly valid concerns.
- Cultural mapping comes in different flavors. It's not just about mapping the cultures of the countries we are working in, but also within the State Department, USAID, and the Pentagon. Each of these institutions has its own internal culture and they don't necessarily know how the others operate.
Response: Through the QDR, we are trying to improve and retool National Defense University, shifting it to become National Security University. This will include more of those involved in Defense, Diplomacy and Development (the three Ds) as well as others involved in implementation overseas.
- We are trying to develop a core cadre of national security officers who are equipped to handle challenges in all of the Ds.
- Part of understanding organizational culture involves developing a shared vocabulary and commonly-understood expectations. Traditionally, terms like "operational" and "strategic level planning" have different meanings for each agency. And they play out differently. Recently, for a NATO colleague, "collaborate on a presentation tomorrow" was understood to be a directive, whereas the USAID partner heard it as a first step in a process. There is much to learn from this, as we go forward.
Question: Do countries receiving assistance from the USG have increased hesitation about accepting that aid as the perception grows that US led development is subservient to US national security interests? Same question regarding NGOs.
Response: One point of this presentation is that U.S. foreign assistance has always been given in the context of U.S. national security and that the historical context shows that the current environment is really not unique or different.
- Beneficiaries of our assistance are not naïve and know that we give money according to our interests. The recent move towards greater cooperation with the military does not appear to have had an impact on the willingness of developing countries to accept U.S. foreign assistance.
- In the past developing countries have been opportunistic about accepting U.S. assistance, generally accepting it when they perceive a shared purpose.
- The NGO community may be uncomfortable with our new proximity to the military, but it is that proximity that gives us the opportunity to help the military define and refine their own perception of the challenges they face.
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