Detailed Information on the
Navy/Marine Corps Air Readiness Assessment

Continuing to evaluate the implementation of the FRP with relation to the air operations program to ensure proper readiness levels are maintained and that global presence requirements are being met for the war-fighting commanders.

Continuing to provide adequate funding to support the FRP goals so that the Nation has the capability to surge six carrier strike groups and their air wings in 30 days, and one additional carrier strike group and air wing within 90 days.

Capture and evaluate the level of indirect funding required to support air operations meeting FRP goals.

Integrate Air Operation with the Defense Readiness Reporting system (DRRS) providing near real-time capabilities based readiness assessments.

Continuing to evaluate base operations as an individual program in the future. It was included in this PART due to its role in enabling operations.

Measure: Flying Hours (000s)

Explanation:TACAIR/Support/FRS Hours Flown

Measure: Readiness Level T-rating takes into account the average number of hours per month flown by crews for various aircraft types, and compares them to notional standards. Lower T-ratings relate to higher levels of readiness.

Explanation:T-rating

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The program is unambiguous in terms of its purpose and mission -- to provide expeditionary air power in support of national security objectives: to deter potential adversaries, support allies, defend freedom of navigation, and to strike and defeat adversaries without the need to rely on foreign bases. Air Operations provides resources for the active general-purpose forces (Navy and Marine Corps), reserve aviation forces (Navy and Marine Corps), and Strategic Communication forces. General-purpose forces have been further sub-divided into the components of Tactical Aviation (TACAIR), Fleet Air Support (FAS), and Fleet Air Training (FAT). These resources are provided for four major claimants: Commander Atlantic Fleet (COMLANTFLT), Commander Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), Commander Naval Forces Europe (COMNAVEUR) and Commander Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR).

Evidence: The missions of the air operations program are consistent with the statutory charges to the DoD and Navy to deploy forces in pursuit of the Nation's security objectives. The particular purposes of this program are documented in the Navy's Posture Statement and the Naval Aviation Vision statement. The purposes funded are described in detail in the Congressional Budget Justification Book for the Operation and Maintenance, Navy account.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: It is in direct support of the Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP), which balances the allocation of Naval forces (principally carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups) to our regional Combatant Commanders in furtherance of U.S. national security objectives, including training with allies, detering potential adversaries, and striking enemies.

Evidence: The flying hour program supports the ability of the Navy to meet the GNFPP (classified), and fullfil its roles pursuant to the DoD's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the Quadrenniel Defense Review (QDR) .

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Navy/Marine Corps Air Operations are unique maritime/expeditionary missions that support joint operations from deployable, sovereign U.S. assets (i.e. aircraft carriers and amphibious assult ships).

Evidence: The Navy's "Sea Power 21" document outlines the Sea Basing concept which states that enhanced support for joint forces will be provided by networked, mobile, secure and sovereign platforms (e.g. aircraft carriers and amphibious assult ships) operating from the sea. The DOD Directive 5100.1 specifies that a primary mission of the Navy is to organize, train and equip aviation forces for the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. The flying hour program provides the qualified, capable, proficient pilots that are essential for fullfilling this mission. No other program within the Federal Government trains pilots for these naval aviation combat missions.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Navy/Marine Corps air operations Flying Hour Program (FHP) is designed to support pilot readiness that is directly linked to combat effectiveness.

Evidence: Quarterly and monthly readiness reports to Congress indicate that the FHP is effectively producing trained pilots and ready squadrons.

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: Air Operations mission funds are fenced within the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&M) appropriation such that appropriated funds must be spent in support of the program. This program is one of the Navy's top priorities and ensuring that it is properly resourced is of paramount importance. DOD and the Navy also perform a mid-year review to evaluate the execution of the program against the planned performance, and to ensure that it is properly resourced.

Evidence: Budget appropriation and execution data including 1002 reports and the Navy Financial Management Regulation, the 3013, support this position. Navy utilizes an air operations model to formulate its budget requests so that the units will be properly resourced to achieve their performance goals which contribute to readiness levels.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The program performance is measured by tracking the number of hours flown per crew per month, and comparing that against notional requirements for the pilots of various types of aircraft. The hours flown contribute to a training, or "T" rating. These measures are used by combatant commanders and each Service to assess the readiness of units and also by congress to assess if program resources are being applied correctly by the Services.

Evidence: The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for FY2004-2009 and the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) establish desired outcomes for the Flying Hour Program. Specifically, the FHP must be able to provide carrier air wings to meet the Navy's "6+2" goal; being able to deploy 6 carrier strike groups within 30 days of notice and to follow on with 2 additional strike groups within 90 days of notification. The POM establishes the planned level of resources needed in the FHP to meet the FRP goals looking out at least five years into the future. Achieving and maintaining the correct number of ready forces is the desired output of the program, deterring or winning conflicts is the desired outcome.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: Targets for the FHP are based on readiness goals established by each Service that meet training requirements for combat and other critical missions. These targets are based upon anticipated future mission/training requirements and are revisited in an iterative process as doctrine, force structure, mission requirements, and the global security situation evolves.

Evidence: Targets for the next 5 years are identified in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and are adjusted every two years as part of the DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) System.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The Department annually publishes Air Operations performance measures in exhibits which are used to support the President's Budget, including the number of flying hours funded by the program. Execution of the Flying Hour Program is reported monthly/quarterly/annualy and measured against the planned program.

Evidence: Measures can be found in the Department of the Navy OP-5 budget exhibits and annual Budget Highlights book.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Baselines and targets are determined by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Readiness goals. The targets are developed in light of known missions, historical data and force structure requirements.

Evidence: The targets are identified in the POM and presented in justification materials to Congress. In addition, there are quarterly and monthly readiness reports to congress.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The Department of Defense's planning, programming and budgeting process requires that all stakeholders coordinate on final program position each year. In addition to Navy budgeting guidance, the FHP is coordinated by the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Process (NAVRIIP).

Evidence: The NAVRIIP charter memo.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: In addition to Navy's internal accrediation reports, external evaluations are conducted periodically by the Center for Naval Analysis, the Navy Audit Service, GAO and Congressional committess via hearings and questions for the record (QFRs). These audit agencies are independent and of high quality.

Evidence: Within the Department of the Navy, the directorate for program assesments, N81, performs accreditation reports and external to the Navy various audits by GAO and the Center for Naval Analysis.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Budget requests are built based on program requirements that are generated by a model which directly links program to desired levels of performance in terms of hours flown per crew, per aircraft type-model-series. The DoD Program Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) requires budgeting based upon a determination of the resources needed to achieve the required flying hours and flying OPTEMPO within the overall flying operational program based on the approved mission requirements.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Justification Books, including the OP-20 exhibit, and the Air Operations Model. The President's Budget justification materials identify the performance goals and the resources necessary to accomplish them. These goals match the requirements that were generated by the Flying Hour Model. These justification materials also provide the actual execution for the fiscal year two years prior to the budget request. The data on previous year resource execution in the justification books is verified by the Defense Finance and Accounting report 1002s.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The Navy reviews on a continuous basis its past and current operations and future requirements for the flying hour program. Since 2001 no fewer than seven Navy forums have focused senior leadership on identifying and proposing solutions to strategic planning deficiencies in the Air Operations program.

Evidence: The Navy has formed executive steering groups that make strategic decisions such as NAVRIIP. The Propulsion Management Board demonstrates the Navy's commitment to effective strategic planning.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Data are collected by various sources daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually by several automated and manual systems. This information is analyzed and recommendations are made to Navy and DOD senior leadership for execution and programmatic decisions.

Evidence: Weekly execution reports to senior Navy leadership. Specifics may be classified, but e.g. reduced readiness in a certain warfare area may indicate that funds be realigned to address shortcomings. Also, performance data is systematically collected and reported in Budget Operation Reports, Naval Aviation Logistics Computerized Management Information System (NALCOMIS), Standard Accounting and Reporting System (STARS), DFAS reports, Flying Hour Cost Reports and Readiness reporting.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Navy's Senior leaders are required to testify in front of Congessional committess on every aspect of the program. The Fleet and Type Commanders are responsible for ensuring that units under their command are employing resources properly to achieve their program objectives.

Evidence: DOD Directive 7045.14 specifies that Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process will involve centralized planning and oversight and decentralized execution. This process allows the Navy, at a corporate level, to manage the process. However, it lays responsiblity on all subordinate "partners" to perform in order for the entire program to achieve its desired results. The NAVRIIP process provides another level of review and accountability within the Navy for the Naval aviation program. Execution of the program is monitored for each fleet and compared to the planned program and will be reviewed by Navy and DOD leadership.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: Since O&M is 1-year money, the program must obligate it in a timely manner. Restrictions on below-threshold-reprogrammings (no more than $15 M in a SAG) prevent funds from being used for purposes other than for which they have been appropriated. In addition to routine monthly reviews of execution by financial personnel at the unit, command, Fleet and Navy Comptroller levels, a comprehensive mid-year execution review is undertaken. Navy, DoD and OMB participate in the review which monitors the major programs' obligation rates and determines what corrective actions are required to properly align remaining resources with projected needs for the balance of the year.

Evidence: 1002 Reports show the actual level of obligation for this program activity.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Budget execution data are compared to readiness output and deficiencies are brought to the attention of Naval leadership.

Evidence: Weekly execution reports to senior Navy leadership. Specifics may be classified, but for example, reduced readiness in a certain warfare area may point to a need to redistribe funds within the program. NAVRIIP holds monthly leadership forums to assess program performance, incentivize efficiencies and provide guidance for improvement.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: While the Navy coordinates extensively with other military aviation organizations through the Joint Aeronautical Commander's Group (JACG), which has representatives from all five branches of the Armed Forces plus the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, and NASA, the Navy Flying Hour Program is independent of these other actors. The programs are complimentary in nature, but not collaborative.

Evidence: The FY2004-2009 Program Objective Memorandum incorporates coordinated positions.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The DoD, while making strides to improve its financial management systems, can not produce an unqualified audit opinion.

Evidence: DoD Financial Management Regulations and Navy financial regulations.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: Since 2001 no fewer than seven Navy forums have focused senior leadership on identifying and proposing solutions to strategic planning deficiencies in the Air Operations program. The Navy continues to evolve its warfighting doctrine to meet the requirements of the day. The FRP represents a major effort by the Navy to more effectively manage its fleets of aircraft and ships to place more combat capabilities at the Nation's disposal on short notice, which is a major departure from the management of the program when it was oriented along Cold War lines.

Evidence: The Fleet Response Plan concept was effectively implemented in FY 2004. This was demonstrated by summer 2004exercises, in addition to papers and modified guidance stemming from these CNO forums.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: While the Department continues to struggle with challenges due to aging aircraft issues and high operating tempo in support of the Global War on Terror, it has made great strides in achieving performance goals despite these challenges.

Evidence: FY2005 President's Budget OP-5 Performance Criteria and the CNO's Readiness Book.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: While the Department continues to struggle with challenges due to aging aircraft issues and high operating tempo in support of the Global War on Terror, it has made great strides in achieving performance goals despite these challenges.

Evidence: Navy can show actual vs. planned levels of hours/per crew/per month over a 3 year period

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: While routine increases in cost-per-hour are to be expected, (due not only to inflationary factors, but significantly in some cases due to the aging of the aircraft fleet and to the addition of new combat systems to various weapons platforms) the Navy has created a working group called the Joint Council on Aging Aircraft (JCAA) to address the issues related to cost and aging. Navy continues to tackle other issues within its control through the NAVRIIP and the Integrated Readiness Capability Assesments (IRCA). Through the NAVRIIP and IRCA, the Department has been able to identify several hundred million dollars of annual cost mitigation initiatives which have restrained the rates of program cost growth.

Evidence: Information from the IRCA process demonstrates hundreds of millions of dollars in increased efficiencies in the FHP over the past few years.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation:  

Evidence:  

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Naval aviation units routinely assess how their training, equipment, and personnel can meet the requirements of real-world military missions. These assessments are reported to Congress on a quarterly basis and show that in FY2003, these units were ready to meet their military missions.

Evidence: The most recent Quarterly Readiness Reports demonstrate that naval aviation maintains the ability to meet its real-world military missions.