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**Jackson County,  
Missouri,  
COMMUNITY-  
Backed Anti-  
Drug Tax  
(COMBAT)  
Evaluation**

**FINAL REPORT**

**March 31, 2000**

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# Contents

Preface .....	xi
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Organization of the Report .....	2
<b>CHAPTER 2: EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
Key Points .....	5
The Study Examines COMBAT's Achievement of Seven Objectives .....	6
Impact Evaluation Methodology .....	7
The Process Evaluation Methodology .....	8
<b>CHAPTER 3: COMBAT: SYNOPSIS AND HISTORY .....</b>	<b>11</b>
Key Points .....	11
COMBAT Is an Integrated Cluster of Many Discrete Initiatives .....	13
The Prosecuting Attorney's Office .....	15
The COMBAT Commission .....	19
The County Executive .....	22
Police Department Participation .....	22
Family Court Involvement .....	23
COMBAT Provides 10 Entities with a Fixed Percentage of the Tax Revenues .....	24
COMBAT Has Changed Significantly Over Time .....	24
Jackson County Pre-COMBAT (1986 – 1988) .....	34
Initiation and Early History (1989 – 1992) .....	35
Changes from 1993–1995 .....	38
Since Passage of the Second Referendum (1996–1998) .....	41

<b>CHAPTER 4: EVALUATION RESULTS</b> .....	45
Key Points .....	45
<b>OBJECTIVES</b> .....	47
<b>Objective 1: Did COMBAT Lead to Increased Jailing of Dangerous Offenders?</b> .....	47
Key Points .....	47
Summary of Findings .....	47
Data Sources .....	48
Agencies which Support Increasing Jail Time for Dangerous Offenders .....	49
Docket O .....	49
Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney Office’s Anti-Drug Unit .....	49
Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) .....	51
Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) .....	53
Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) .....	54
Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force (Drug Task Force) .....	58
Jackson County Jail .....	59
COMBAT Funding Is Responsible for Much of the Increase in Law Enforcement Activity .	60
The Impact of COMBAT Programs on Increasing the Number of Offenders Jailed .....	63
KCPD Arrests .....	63
Drug Case Filings in Court .....	65
Number of Offenders Sentenced to Jail or Prison .....	68
Prison Admissions .....	70
Assessing COMBAT’s Contribution to Jailing Dangerous Offenders Is Complex .....	70
National Trends .....	72
Jail Crowding Was a Major Barrier to Increasing Jail Time in Jackson County .....	77
COMBAT May Have Displaced Some Drug Activity .....	79
<b>Objective 2: Did COMBAT Increase the Treatment of Nonviolent Offenders Who Want to Get off Drugs?</b> .....	83
Key Points .....	83
Summary of Findings .....	83
Data Sources .....	84
COMBAT Increased the Amount of Treatment Available .....	85
COMBAT Commission Funding for Existing Treatment Providers .....	87
COMBAT Grant Match Awards to Existing Treatment Providers .....	92
Treatment for Drug Court Participants .....	93
The Jail Anti-Drug Movement (J.A.M.) .....	99
Funding for Family Court .....	101

Funding of Minority Counselor Substance Abuse Training .....	103
Estimating the Increase in Treatment Opportunities .....	105
COMBAT Increased Referrals to Treatment .....	107
Drug Court Referrals to Treatment .....	108
Family Court Assessments and Referrals .....	113
Community Action Network (CAN) Mobilizers .....	114
Detoxification Provider Referrals .....	116
Probation and Parole Referrals .....	116
Estimating the Number of Referrals COMBAT Generated .....	116
COMBAT Has Taken Steps to Improve the Quality of Treatment .....	117
Treatment Expansion Would Not Have Been as Extensive without COMBAT .....	121
<b>Objective 3: Did COMBAT Increase the Prevention of Drug Experimentation among Youth? .....</b>	<b>125</b>
Key Points .....	125
Summary of Findings .....	125
Data Sources .....	126
What Kansas City Teens Report in Student Surveys about Drug Use: 1988–1996 .....	127
COMBAT Increased the Number of Prevention Initiatives Significantly .....	130
Prevention Providers .....	130
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) .....	136
Other Prevention Initiatives .....	139
COMBAT-Supported Prevention Initiatives Reached Several Thousand Youth .....	143
It Is Impossible to Determine Whether COMBAT Prevented Drug Experimentation ....	145
Barriers to Evaluating Drug Prevention .....	145
The Lack of Rigorous Independent Evaluations .....	147
<b>Objective 4: Did COMBAT Support Innovative Programming Which Might Not Otherwise Have Been Funded? .....</b>	<b>155</b>
Key Points .....	155
Key Findings .....	155
Data Sources .....	155
COMBAT Supported a Number of Innovative Initiatives .....	156
Grant Match Program .....	156
Community Action Networks (CANs) Link Neighborhoods and the Police .....	161
Full Employment Council .....	165
Landlord-Related Initiatives .....	166
COMBAT Sponsored Still Other Innovations .....	168
COMBAT Was a Catalyst for Most of the Innovations .....	170

<b>Objective 5: Did COMBAT Enhance Communication and Collaborative Action among Organizations, Programs, and Jurisdictions?</b>	175
Key Points	175
Summary of Findings	175
Data Sources	176
Several Major COMBAT Initiatives Involve Collaboration	177
Paseo Corridor Initiative	177
Law Enforcement Collaboration	188
Community Prosecution	189
Collaborative Initiatives Treated under Other Objectives in this Chapter	191
COMBAT Promoted Collaboration between Traditionally Hostile Groups	193
Communication between the Treatment Community and the Criminal Justice System	193
Collaboration between Police and Prosecutors	196
COMBAT Increased Communication in Other Respects	199
COMBAT Was Responsible for Much of the Increased Communication and Collaboration	200
COMBAT's Role in Promoting Collaboration	200
Obstacles to Further Collaboration	204
 <b>Objective 6: Did COMBAT Promote Economic Development Activities?</b>	 209
Key Points	209
Summary of Findings	209
Data Sources	209
COMBAT Has Generated Some Economic Development in the Paseo Corridor	210
It Is Impossible to Measure COMBAT's Impact on Economic Development	212
 <b>Objective 7: Is There Community Support for COMBAT and Its Programs?</b>	 215
Key Points	215
Summary of Findings	215
Data Sources	216
Many Jackson County Residents Are Aware of COMBAT	216
Survey Sample	216
Knowledge of COMBAT and COMBAT Programs	217
How Safe Do Jackson County Residents Feel? What is Their Perception of the Magnitude of Problems Related to Drug Use and Other Crimes?	218
How do Residents Rate the Police and the Courts?	221
Other Evidence of Community Support	224
Increasing Community Information	227

<b>CHAPTER 5: HAVE COMBAT'S ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS BEEN EFFECTIVE?</b> .....	231
Key Points .....	231
Summary of Findings .....	231
Data Sources .....	233
Until 1996, Evaluations of COMBAT Were Unsystematic and of Uneven Quality .....	235
Lack of an Early Comprehensive Evaluation .....	236
The Quality of COMBAT-Supported Evaluations .....	240
Implementation of Evaluation Recommendations .....	244
Quality Control of the Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Law Enforcement Agencies, and County Executive Has Been Rudimentary .....	249
The Prosecuting Attorney's Office .....	249
Law Enforcement .....	253
The County Executive .....	254
Quality Control of Prevention and Treatment Providers Has Improved .....	254
The RFP and Contract Award Process .....	254
Award Criteria .....	258
Quality Control: The Provider MIS .....	270
Quality Control: Provider Reports .....	272
Steps Taken to Improve Provider Accountability .....	281
Auditing of COMBAT-funded Criminal Justice Agencies Has Been Adequate .....	287
Budget Submission Process .....	288
Disbursement of COMBAT Funds .....	290
Auditing Procedures .....	290
Audits of Prevention and Treatment Providers Have Identified Some Problems .....	294
Auditing Procedures .....	294
Problems Auditors Have Identified .....	301
Remedies for Problems Identified .....	305
Gaps in Budget Information .....	308
COMBAT Has Prospered Since 1992 Despite Some Management Shortcomings .....	309
 <b>CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS</b> .....	 311
Key Points .....	311
Summary of Findings .....	311
Data Sources .....	312
COMBAT Is Achieving Important Objectives .....	312
Three Overriding Themes Pervade COMBAT .....	313
A Holistic Approach .....	313
Evolution, Not Revolution .....	321
Promoting Accountability .....	325

The COMBAT Model Is Applicable in Other Jurisdictions . . . . .	326
Recommendations for Planning and Operating a COMBAT-Type Program . . . . .	326
Little Rock's COMBAT-Type Program . . . . .	333
COMBAT is Replicable . . . . .	337

**Appendixes . . . . . 339**

Appendix A: COMBAT Participants and Observers Interviewed . . . . .	341
Appendix B: Four Case Studies . . . . .	347
Appendix C: The Arrest Process . . . . .	367
Appendix D: Summary and Assessment of COMBAT Evaluations . . . . .	369
Appendix E: Implementation of Evaluation Recommendations . . . . .	381
Appendix F: Survey of Community for Evaluation of COMBAT Initiative 1998 . . . . .	387

**List of Exhibits**

**Chapter 1**

Exhibit 1-1: Report Organization . . . . .	3
--	---

**Chapter 2**

Exhibit 2-1: COMBAT Activities Observed . . . . .	10
---	----

**Chapter 3**

Exhibit 3-1: COMBAT Organizational Funding Relationships . . . . .	14
Exhibit 3-2: Locations in this Report Where Individual COMBAT Initiatives Are Discussed . . . . .	16
Exhibit 3-3: COMBAT Prosecuting Attorney's Office Functions . . . . .	17
Exhibit 3-4: 1998 COMBAT Budget Allocation . . . . .	25
Exhibit 3-5: Dollar Amounts Expended by Each COMBAT Component . . . . .	26
Exhibit 3-6: Total COMBAT Revenues Collected and Expended . . . . .	31
Exhibit 3-7: COMBAT's Percentage of Agencies' Total Budgets in 1998 . . . . .	32
Exhibit 3-8: Chronology of Selected COMBAT Milestones . . . . .	33

**Objective 1**

Exhibit OBJ1-1: Summary of Agencies and Units COMBAT Supports Designed to Increase Jail Time for Dangerous Offenders . . . . .	50
Exhibit OBJ1-2: COMBAT Funding for Criminal Justice System Entities . . . . .	51
Exhibit OBJ1-3: Summary of Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) Activity 1992- 1997 . . . . .	53
Exhibit OBJ1-4: Street Narcotics Unit Summary Statistics by Year . . . . .	55

Exhibit OBJ 1-5: KCPD DRUG ENFORCEMENT UNIT, Drug Seizure Summary 1989–1998 and KCPD Drug Narcotics Unit, Drug Activity Summary 1990–1998 .....	56
Exhibit OBJ1-6: Jackson County Drug Task Force 1997 Annual Statistics .....	60
Exhibit OBJ1-7: KCPD Drug Arrests by Year .....	64
Exhibit OBJ1-8: Drug Arrest Rates by Year: Kansas City vs. Other Weed and Seed Cities .....	66
Exhibit OBJ1-9: Drug Cases Filed in Circuit Court .....	67
Exhibit OBJ1-10: Circuit Court Drug Cases Resulting in Jail/Prison Sentence .....	69
Exhibit OBJ1-11: Missouri State Prison Drug Case Admissions from Jackson County .....	71
Exhibit OBJ1-12: Number of Persons Held in State and Federal Prisons, and in Local Jails, 1985, 1990-97 .....	73
Exhibit OBJ1-13: Estimated Number of Arrests in the United States by Offense Charged ..	75
Exhibit OBJ1-14: Arrest Rates per 100,000 Population in Missouri for Juveniles and All Ages by Three Types of Crimes, 1987–1997 .....	76
Exhibit OBJ1-15: Anecdotal Evidence For and Against a Displacement Effect from the Paseo Corridor .....	80

**Objective 2**

Exhibit OBJ2-1: Characteristics of Increased Treatment Attributable to COMBAT .....	86
Exhibit OBJ2-2: Jackson County COMBAT Commission 1997 Treatment Funding .....	88
Exhibit OBJ2-3: 1997 Drug Treatment Data Summary: Facility, Population Served .....	89
Exhibit OBJ2-4: 1997 Drug Treatment Data Summary: Facility, Level, Services .....	90
Exhibit OBJ2-5: COMBAT Funding for Drug Court .....	93
Exhibit OBJ2-6: Drug Court Initial Eligibility Determination .....	95
Exhibit OBJ2-7: 1998 Day Report Center Budget .....	97
Exhibit OBJ2-8: COMBAT Funds For Family Court .....	102
Exhibit OBJ2-9: Approximation of the Increased Treatment COMBAT Funded in 1997 ..	106
Exhibit OBJ2-10: Case Flow through Jackson County Drug Court .....	109
Exhibit OBJ2-11: Number of Cases Processed by Drug Court over Time .....	111
Exhibit OBJ2-12: Approximation of the Number of Individuals Referred to Treatment in 1997 as a Result of COMBAT Funding .....	118

**Objective 3**

Exhibit OBJ3-1: 30 Day Use of Alcohol and Marijuana by 12th Graders .....	128
Exhibit OBJ3-2: Life Prevalence of Use of Cocaine by 12th Graders .....	129
Exhibit OBJ3-3: Selected Features of COMBAT-Supported Prevention Initiatives .....	131
Exhibit OBJ3-4: Jackson County COMBAT Commission Drug Prevention Agencies 1997-1998 .....	133
Exhibit OBJ3-5: Number of Clients and Participants Who Received Each of 13 Types of Services July-December 1997 from 38 Prevention Providers Funded by the COMBAT Commission .....	135



Exhibit OBJ3-6:	COMBAT Commission: Prevention Data Survey: Neighborhood Organizations: July-December 1997	137
Exhibit OBJ3-7:	COMBAT 1997 D.A.R.E. Disbursements by Participating Law Enforcement Agencies	139
Exhibit OBJ 3-8:	COMBAT Commission: Prevention Data Survey — Direct Service Providers: July –December, 1997	144
Exhibit OBJ3-9:	Barriers to Evaluating COMBAT’s Prevention Initiatives	146
Exhibit OBJ3-10:	PASS Project: Comparison from Spring 1995 to Fall 1995 (At-Risk Students; Court Clients)	150

**Objective 4**

Exhibit OBJ4-1:	Features of Selected Innovations Supported by COMBAT	157
Exhibit OBJ4-2:	Selected Organizations Awarded COMBAT Grant Matches, along with Funded Activities and Amounts, 1990–1997	160
Exhibit OBJ4-3:	Other Funding Sources for Selected 1997 COMBAT Grant Match Recipients	173

**Objective 5**

Exhibit OBJ5-1:	Selected Features of COMBAT Initiatives That Involve Collaboration	178
Exhibit OBJ5-2:	Types of Organizations Involved in COMBAT-Supported Initiatives Involving Collaboration	181
Exhibit OBJ5-3:	Part of Paseo Corridor Partnership Meeting Notes of February 1998	183
Exhibit OBJ5-4:	Arrests for Seven Offenses in the Paseo Corridor, 1994-1997	187
Exhibit OBJ5-5:	Offenses in Kansas City Housing Authority Paseo Corridor Properties, 1994–1992	187
Exhibit OBJ5-6:	Sample Summonses on which Officers Have Identified the Case as Having Originated in the Paseo Corridor	190

**Objective 6**

Exhibit OBJ6-1:	COMBAT-Generated Economic Development in the Paseo Corridor	211
-----------------	---	-----

**Objective 7**

Exhibit OBJ7-1:	Knowledge of Specific Initiatives and Perception of Service	218
Exhibit OBJ7-2:	Percent of respondents who said they feel “Very Safe” or “Somewhat Safe” out alone after dark	219
Exhibit OBJ7-3:	Percent of respondents who said they feel “Very Safe” or “Somewhat Safe” out alone during the day	220
Exhibit OBJ7-4:	Perception of the Extent and Status of Problems Related to Drug Use and Crime	221
Exhibit OBJ7-5:	Percent who said illegal drug sales were a “Small problem” or “No problem”	222

Exhibit OBJ7-6: Percent who feel the police are doing a “very good job” or a “good job” in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs . . . . .	223
--	-----

**Chapter 5**

Exhibit 5-1: Principal COMBAT-Sponsored Evaluations: Selected Characteristics . . . . .	237
Exhibit 5-2: Evaluation Report Recommendations and Combat Response . . . . .	245
Exhibit 5-3: COMBAT Goals 1997 – 1998 Monitoring Report . . . . .	251
Exhibit 5-4: 1997-1998 COMBAT Strategic Plan . . . . .	252
Exhibit 5-5: Sample COMBAT Commission Proposal Reviewer Guidelines . . . . .	257
Exhibit 5-6: COMBAT Commission RFP Evaluation Criteria . . . . .	257
Exhibit 5-7: COMBAT COMMISSION Contract Compliance – Prevention 1997–1998 .	260
Exhibit 5-8: COMBAT COMMISSION Program Outcomes – Prevention 1997–1998 . .	261
Exhibit 5-9: COMBAT COMMISSION Prevention Providers Monthly Compliance Month of February, 1998 . . . . .	262
Exhibit 5-10: Improvements (1994–1998) and Ongoing Problems with Provider Contracting . . . . .	264
Exhibit 5-11: Ongoing Problems and Improvements with Provider Reports . . . . .	273
Exhibit 5-12: Sample Treatment Provider Monthly Service Delivery Summary . . . . .	279
Exhibit 5-13: COMBAT Commission Community Drug Treatment Services Monthly Data Report . . . . .	282
Exhibit 5-14: COMBAT Commission Data Survey for Prevention Providers . . . . .	283
Exhibit 5-15: Monthly Report Narrative for Prevention Providers . . . . .	285
Exhibit 5-16: Example of Useful Evaluation Data Submitted by a Provider . . . . .	286
Exhibit 5-17: 1998 COMBAT Budget Allocation . . . . .	289
Exhibit 5-18: Jackson County, Missouri Schedule of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund Balance. for Year Ended December 31, 1996. . . . .	291
Exhibit 5-19: COMBAT Procedures for Auditing Providers, Problems Identified, and Solutions Applied . . . . .	295
Exhibit 5-20: Audit Cycle for COMBAT Commission Contractor . . . . .	297
Exhibit 5-21: Prevention Contracts Standard Audit Programs . . . . .	298
Exhibit 5-22: Audit Plan: Treatment Providers . . . . .	299

**Chapter 6**

Exhibit 6-1: Summary Scoresheet for Entire Evaluation . . . . .	314
Exhibit 6-2: Three Guiding COMBAT Themes . . . . .	319
Exhibit 6-3: Management Guidance Scale . . . . .	323
Exhibit 6-4: Guidelines for Replicating COMBAT . . . . .	327

# Preface

## About Abt Associates

The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, selected Abt Associates Inc. in 1996 through a competitive procurement process to evaluate COMBAT. Founded in 1965, Abt Associates is a private, employee-owned company with a full-time permanent staff of over 800 who provide applied research and consulting services to governments and businesses worldwide. Abt Associates has offices in Cambridge and Amherst Massachusetts; Bethesda, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois, Cairo, Egypt; and Johannesburg, South Africa.

Abt Associates has conducted research for the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal agencies involved in substance abuse research for over 25 years.

- The company's Law and Public Policy Area, consisting of 59 professionals and support staff, has prepared over 250 reports, most of them published, for the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) promoting the replication of promising criminal justice system practices; recently completed a national evaluation of conditions of incarceration in juvenile facilities for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP); and is currently completing the national evaluations for NIJ of the U.S. Department of Justice's Weed and Seed Initiative and the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative.
- In the area of substance abuse, Abt Associates has conducted multi-site evaluations of HIV demonstration programs for drug users in seven states and developed and conducted an experimental study of non-traditional treatment approaches for substance abusers for the National Institute on Drug Abuse; carried out long-term follow-up studies of in-person drug treatment participants; and coordinates the data collection and analyzes quarterly data from 35 sites in the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring project for the National Institute of Justice.

This report is based on the work of the following staff over a two-year period.

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# Executive Summary

## Introduction

This report is a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation and impact of the Jackson County, Missouri program called COMMunity Backed Anti-Drug Tax (COMBAT). Funds for COMBAT are derived from legislation authorizing the use of a quarter of one percent increase in the county sales tax to fund prevention, treatment and law enforcement initiatives to fight substance abuse.

COMBAT consists of a wide range of initiatives designed to address the substance abuse problems of Jackson County, Missouri. COMBAT's funding was approved by the voters in 1989 for seven years and approved again in 1995 for another seven years. The tax has generated from \$14–18 million each year. Both the unique funding mechanism and the ambitious goals of the COMBAT effort have received considerable attention outside of Jackson County.

It is important to bear in mind when reading this report that the development of COMBAT was an iterative process; that is, the early years of the program laid the foundation (and provided the needed experience) for the more mature program structures which are evident in the later years. "Implementation" is an inaccurate descriptor for the process in that it implies putting into place a finished plan or design. In this case, the form of the program clearly evolved over time with later stages built on the success or failures of earlier ones.

Though it was part of the original COMBAT planning, the program underwent only limited evaluation efforts early in its history. In 1996 the National Institute of Justice and the Kauffman Foundation jointed forces to solicit proposals for a full evaluation of COMBAT. Abt Associates won that procurement and began work on the evaluation in the fall of 1996. The evaluation mandate was to examine seven objectives for COMBAT. The first three were objectives identified for COMBAT in the original legislation. The other four were goals identified by NIJ in the RFP.

**Objective 1: Did COMBAT lead to increased jailing of dangerous offenders?**

**Objective 2: Did COMBAT increase the treatment of non-violent offenders who want to get off drugs?**

**Objective 3: Did COMBAT increase the prevention of drug experimentation among youth?**

**Objective 4: Did COMBAT support innovative programming which might not otherwise have been funded?**

**Objective 5: Did COMBAT enhance communication and collaborative action among organizations, programs and jurisdictions?**

**Objective 6: Did COMBAT promote economic development activities?**

**Objective 7: Is there community support for COMBAT and its programs?**

#### **Evaluation Strategy and Sources of Data**

The evaluation consists of two components: evaluation of program process and implementation, and evaluation of program impact. We define the process evaluation task as a primarily qualitative and descriptive one; that is, Abt's role was to determine whether the program was operationalized as planned and to describe how the resultant program configuration operates to meet those planned goals.

The **program process and implementation evaluation** included developing a history of the program, tracking program elements over time, reviewing all fiscal and administrative arrangements and examining measures of quality control and administrative efficiency. The data for evaluation of process and implementation are derived from:

- **extensive interviewing conducted on site and by telephone with 82 program participants and observers, representing all areas of COMBAT programming and selected areas of community involvement;**
- **observations of 21 COMBAT meetings; and**
- **extensive review of program materials, fiscal records, media information and county reports.**

Abt's approach to the **evaluation of COMBAT's impact** was to look at the total effect of the program in a particular objective area (law enforcement, treatment and prevention) in producing broad based change. COMBAT is by definition a county wide effort which seeks to coordinate many services to attack drug problems. The work of any single agency would not be expected to have significant impact on broader objectives like "jailing more dangerous offenders." However, the concerted effort of the police, courts and corrections *can* be held accountable to achieving that objective. Therefore, we have used county wide statistics or indicators where available in determining changes in the status of COMBAT related activities.

An impact evaluation needs baseline data from which to gauge the magnitude of change. In some cases those data were available; in many others they were not. To assist with our analyses, we have drawn on data from other geographic areas to compare both trend information and current data to that available for Jackson County. The impact analyses are derived from the following sources:

- **law enforcement reporting systems in Jackson County and Kansas City for arrests and drug seizures from 1989 to 1997;**
- **Circuit Court records;**
- **the management information system developed for the prosecutor's office (INFORMER);**
- **a telephone survey conducted by Abt of a random sample of county residents;**
- **schools surveys of drug use conducted by Kauffman Foundation researchers from 1986-1996;**
- **law enforcement and community survey data developed the NIJ evaluation of six Weed and Seed cities.**

#### **A Brief History of COMBAT**

COMBAT was enacted in 1989 as a result of evidence of a serious substance abuse problem in Jackson County. In the early stages of COMBAT, the county's response to the problem was not well coordinated, resulting in early criticism of program focus and operations. While the program had begun with greater emphasis on law enforcement issues, the role of treatment and prevention programming gradually came to share equal status.

COMBAT's early administrative arrangements derived directly from the prosecutor's office. COMBAT changed leadership in 1993 with a new prosecuting attorney and with the appointment of a full time program administrator, a public health professional with strong treatment and prevention interests. Voters approved COMBAT for another seven years in 1995. At that time, there was a change in program structure, a new procedure for awarding prevention and treatment contracts, and changes in the county executive's role in the program operations. The new structure provided a greater balance of authority in distribution of funds. The new legislation also changed the policy of giving a fixed dollar amount each year to COMBAT components to a formula based on a percentage distribution of the funds.

COMBAT underwent prior evaluations. The first, conducted in 1990, when the program was barely operational, produced a number of recommendations, some of which were implemented when the program reorganized two years later. These other evaluations were also quite different in that they looked at smaller segments of COMBAT programming rather than any total effect.

There are three basic foci of COMBAT programming: law enforcement, treatment and prevention. Approximately one-third of funding goes to each component. In addition, excess or unused funds are designated for a grants match program in which local funds can be used to leverage funding from foundations, State or national sources rather than returned to county coffers for use in expenditures not related to substance abuse issues.

## Evaluation Results

### Objective 1 Did COMBAT Lead to Increased Jailing of Dangerous Offenders?

COMBAT funded in part or entirely several justice system initiatives designed to increase the jailing of dangerous offenders. These initiatives include:

- **Docket O**, which is designed to increase prosecutorial efficiency by calendaring all drug cases, and the **Anti-Drug Prosecution Unit** have increased the ability to prosecute drug cases. Since their implementation, the number of drug cases filed in court increased 387%.
- The **Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)**, a multiagency, prosecutor-led attack on drug activity in residences and commercial buildings, since its inception has been responsible for
  - 1,893 properties posted or vacated,
  - 412 evictions, and
  - 63 forfeitures/nuisance abatements.
- The Kansas City police department's **Street Narcotics Unit (SNU)**, which targets street-level drug dealing, through 1997 made 5,992 arrests and through 1996 seized 2,678 firearms.
- The police department's **Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU)**, which targets mid-level drug traffickers, contributed to the 164% increase in felony drug arrests from 1989 to 1997.
- The **Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force**, a multiagency unit, closed 280 cases in 1997, including 92 methamphetamine laboratories, resulting in the

conviction of 88 offenders and the incarceration of 65 offenders. Unfortunately, accurate data are not available for previous years.

- The **Jackson County Jail** completed a 250-bed expansion in 1998, increasing total capacity. Although the size of the county jail has been a barrier to jailing some offenders, prison admissions for drug charges from Jackson County increased three times faster from 1992–1997 than for all other Missouri counties.

Taken as a whole, the number of arrests made by city and county law enforcement agencies of serious drug offenders has increased substantially; it is a rate comparable to or higher than what is found in other jurisdictions and a rate which has been sustained over the entire COMBAT period.

COMBAT funding was responsible entirely for the institution and support of Docket O and the Anti-Drug Unit, and for most of the work of DART. COMBAT's direct financial responsibility for the jail expansion is unclear. COMBAT funding also enabled the Kansas City police department to turn what was a temporary task force into a permanent Street Narcotics Unit and enabled a shaky Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force, started by a philanthropist, to become institutionalized and to expand. It is not possible to attribute increases in arrest activities to the availability of COMBAT support for the police. Over the same time period there have been notable increases in law enforcement funding which have results in increases in arrest activity almost everywhere. However, comparisons with other jurisdictions provide a compelling argument for COMBAT. Similarly, while increased jailing of dangerous offenders occurred nationwide, in Missouri, Jackson County has made remarkably large, vigorous contributions to the State prison population, as well as keeping the county facility operating at over-capacity levels.

## **Objective 2 Did COMBAT Increase the Treatment of Nonviolent Offenders Who Want to Get Off Drugs?**

**COMBAT increased the amount of treatment available.** While it is impossible to estimate the number of increased treatment slots COMBAT generated due to serious data reporting limitations, the program appears to have funded treatment available for nearly 4,500 individuals in 1997 alone. Data for earlier years are not available or incomplete.

COMBAT increased *treatment opportunities* in five principal ways:

- providing funds to up to 28 existing treatment providers by means of annual awards by the COMBAT Commission;
- funding two new treatment programs (a Day Report Center, which serves Drug Court participants, and the Jail Anti-Drug Movement [J.A.M.] );



- funding the training of selected Family Court staff; funding three anti-drug Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs), seven other DJOs, and 20 youth workers; and paying institutional care fees for committed juveniles;
- establishing and funding a program to train minority counselors to become certified substance abuse counselors; and
- expanding opportunities for drug-involved offenders: of the 1,400 defendants eligible for drug court treatment services from 1993 to April 1998, 54% had completed or are still in treatment.

COMBAT contributed to increased *referrals to treatment* through four initiatives:

- Drug Court;
- the transfer of minor drug offenses from city court to Circuit Court;
- referrals by DJOs to treatment; and
- referrals by community mobilizers.

It is not possible to calculate the number of persons referred to treatment or the number completing treatment through COMBAT-funded programs. Providers have not reported to COMBAT in adequate detail in their monthly and annual reports to make those calculations. This is a serious limitation to any process or impact evaluation, as well as a serious problem for monitoring compliance with COMBAT objectives.

However, COMBAT appears to have increased *the quality of treatment* through its support of efforts like the Day Report Center, which tailors treatment to drug court participants' specific needs and provides in-house support services which were not available to offenders prior to COMBAT.

The increase in treatment opportunities and referrals would not have occurred as extensively without COMBAT. However, there are insufficient data to determine whether the increased treatment, referrals, and quality of services that COMBAT generated have reduced relapse or recidivism among clients. To draw those conclusions, a separate, controlled followup study of program participants is needed, or a method of linking treatment data with client-level sources of outcome data, such as arrests.

### **Objective 3 Did COMBAT Increase the Prevention of Drug Experimentation among Youth?**

Trends in school-based surveys of drug use among 12th graders suggest no significant change during COMBAT years. Local trends are similar to those found nationwide.

**COMBAT increased the number of prevention initiatives in Jackson County in three ways:**

- by contracting with up to 40 prevention providers to increase or add to their services;
- by providing funds for Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) programs (averaging about \$1 million per year);
- by initiating, stimulating, or coordinating other prevention programs, including programs involving
  - placing Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs) in schools,
  - truancy prevention,
  - alternative schools,
  - safe summer activities, and
  - serving children of substance abusing families.

COMBAT does not have reliable data regarding the number of individuals its prevention initiatives have served over the life of the program. However, we can estimate that prevention initiatives that COMBAT supported reached several thousand youth. COMBAT funded school-based DJOs serve about 250 clients each year, and in 1996 alone, almost 10,000 youths participated in D.A.R.E.

It is impossible to determine whether COMBAT reduced drug experimentation because of barriers to conducting drug prevention evaluation in general and because of lack of adequate information from COMBAT prevention providers or independent evaluations of their activities. As with treatment provider reporting, lack of detailed, consistent reporting by prevention providers makes evaluation or monitoring their performance difficult at best.

#### **Objective 4 Did COMBAT Support Innovative Programming Which Might Not Otherwise Have Been Funded?**

Perhaps the most innovative aspect of COMBAT is the scope of its programming. From the more traditional efforts like Drug Court to more unusual efforts like the Fathering Program, COMBAT approaches drug use from a holistic perspective; that is, it attempts to address precursors of drug use (like parenting), accelerators of use (like school problems), and sequelae of use (like crime), through coordination of literally hundreds of separate initiatives.

**COMBAT initiated, coordinated, or funded a number of significant innovative initiatives, including:**

- a multi-million dollar Grant Match Program that attracts an estimated \$4 for each \$1 in COMBAT matching funds;
- Community Action Networks (CANs) that link neighborhood organizations, prosecutors, and the police to solve local crime problems;
- job preparation and placement services for substance abusers in treatment through the Full Employment Council;
- landlord-related initiatives for dealing with substance abusing and drug trafficking tenants.

**Objective 5 Did COMBAT Enhance Communication and Collaborative Action among Organizations, Programs, and Jurisdictions?**

COMBAT's *overall* philosophy and approach is one of collaboration among prevention providers, the treatment community, and the criminal justice system. Many COMBAT initiatives involve collaboration among a wide range of organizations, programs, and jurisdictions.

- The Paseo Corridor initiative involves several government agencies, the Kansas City police department, and neighborhood groups.
- COMBAT's Law Enforcement collaboration brings together representatives from local and Federal law enforcement agencies; city, county, and Federal prosecutor offices; the courts; and the State Liquor Control Board.
- The five assistants who make up the prosecuting attorney's Neighborhood Prosecutor Program work closely with the city police department and neighborhood groups.
- Although its primary focus is treatment, Drug Court is an important example of COMBAT collaboration of treatment and law enforcement program areas.

COMBAT has promoted considerable collaboration

- between the treatment community and the criminal justice system;
- between law enforcement agencies and the prosecuting attorney's office;
- among Federal, State, and local agencies; and
- within the treatment community, the prevention community, and the law enforcement community.

## **Objective 6 Did COMBAT Promote Economic Development Activities?**

**COMBAT initiatives have not created many new jobs.** However, economic development—the creation of new jobs—has not been a significant COMBAT goal.

The Paseo Corridor Partnership's efforts to make the neighborhood safer and less disorderly appear to have encouraged several groups to open enterprises in or near the corridor, including a nursing facility, a Postal Service distribution center, and a recycling plant. These enterprises provide modest employment opportunities for some Paseo Corridor residents. While it is impossible to estimate the exact number of jobs COMBAT may have helped generate, the modest increase in job opportunities anticipated in the Paseo Corridor would not have occurred without COMBAT's contribution to making the area safer and less disorderly.

## **Objective 7 Is There Community Support for COMBAT and Its Programs?**

Generating community support is essential if COMBAT is to survive. Every seven years the public must vote to approve the Anti-Drug Tax continuation.

Approximately half of a random sample of Jackson County residents surveyed are aware of COMBAT. While most COMBAT participants and observers believe that most residents are not familiar with the program, name recognition is good, and among those with program contact, satisfaction with program services is very high. The community survey indicates the greatest recognition is found for youth initiatives and the Eastern Jackson County Task Force.

In contrast, COMBAT participants felt that much of the public is misinformed about COMBAT, especially in terms of erroneously believing that

- COMBAT's only or primary mission is to "kick in crack houses" and
- the prosecuting attorney's office runs the entire program.

COMBAT may not have taken adequate steps to make its services widely known to the public. Partly as a result, COMBAT has received less attention from the local media than it might have. The media tend to ignore COMBAT unless the program is having financial problems or is involved in exciting initiatives, such as raiding crack houses, though COMBAT is constantly taking steps to improve the program's visibility.

## **Summary**

COMBAT is a unique program which has been successful in most part in achieving the goals it outlined for itself in its original legislation. It has made gains in opening treatment and prevention opportunities to residents, particularly those persons not previously reached or eligible. During COMBAT years, all areas of law enforcement and prosecutorial activity

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

- **This report is a comprehensive process and impact evaluation of the Jackson County, Missouri, COMMunity-Backed Anti-Drug Tax, or COMBAT, which has used a one-quarter of one percent increase in the county sales tax to combat illegal drug use in Jackson County communities since 1989.**
- **The report's main evaluation findings are presented in chapter 4.**
  - Chapters 1-3 prepare readers for the evaluation findings by introducing the report, presenting the report's evaluation objectives and methodology, and providing a synopsis and history of COMBAT.
  - Chapters 5-6 offer additional analyses of the program related to COMBAT's administrative arrangements and replicability.
- **Readers can locate where each COMBAT initiative and focus is discussed in the report by examining**
  - the table of contents;
  - the boxed Key Points that precede each chapter; or
  - the list of initiatives in exhibit 3-2 on page 24 of chapter 3.
- **The report presents findings which fall under three categories: COMBAT's achievement of seven goals; its administrative arrangements; and its replicability.**
- **Overall, the findings suggest that COMBAT is a worthwhile endeavor that is achieving many of its objectives.**
- **The findings suggest specific lessons for replicators, policy makers, researchers, and COMBAT administrators.**

*The Jackson County, Missouri, COMMunity-Backed Anti-Drug Tax, or COMBAT, uses a one-quarter of one percent increase in the county sales tax to fund prevention, treatment, and law enforcement initiatives to fight substance abuse.* The program has received attention and recognition not only at the local level but nationally as well. Indeed, a number of national organizations and agencies have been following COMBAT's progress closely and

are interested in learning whether it has achieved its goals. Staff of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Join Together community substance abuse initiative, the National Association of Drug Courts, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), and the U.S. Department of Justice have all visited Jackson County to observe the program. The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, provided half the funding for the present outcome and impact evaluation.

## Organization of the Report

The report has six chapters. Exhibit 1-1 displays the contents of each chapter. Three background chapters prepare readers for the evaluation findings:

Chapter 1, Introduction, describes *how the report is organized*, explains how readers can locate discussions of each COMBAT initiative and focus, and presents salient evaluation findings.

Chapter 2, Evaluation Objectives and Methodology, describes *how data were collected and analyzed* for the report.

Chapter 3, COMBAT: A Synopsis and History, provides an *overview* of the entire program and a summary of its *history*.

***Chapter 4 presents a complete discussion of how well COMBAT achieved its objectives.***

Traditionally, reports present process evaluation findings in one chapter and impact evaluation findings in another chapter. This report presents both sets of findings together in chapter 4 to provide readers with a complete picture in one place of how COMBAT achieved each objective.<sup>1</sup> The discussion of each objective


- begins with a set of boxed Key Points presenting the *major findings* and data sources for the objective;
- presents the available *impact and process findings* related to the objective; and
- considers the extent to which achievement of the objective *can be attributed to COMBAT*.

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<sup>1</sup> For some objectives, there are significant process *and* impact findings. If the report had separate chapters devoted to process and impact findings, readers would need to read both chapters to learn whether these objectives were achieved. For other objectives, there are *very few* or *no* impact findings. If the report had separate process and impact chapters, readers interested in objectives with no impact findings would have to be referred in the impact chapter to the process chapter for each of these objectives.

# Exhibit 1-1

## Report Organization



Two other chapters offer additional analyses of the program:

- Chapter 5 describes and evaluates COMBAT's *administrative arrangements*.
- Chapter 6 summarizes the program's achievements, reviews three underlying COMBAT themes, and considers *whether other jurisdictions can replicate a COMBAT-type program*.



# CHAPTER 2

## EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

### Key Points

- **The study examines seven COMBAT objectives.**
  - COMBAT established three objectives for itself in its original public information materials:
    - jailing dangerous offenders;
    - increasing treatment opportunities; and
    - preventing drug experimentation among youth.
  - The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) established four other objectives for the evaluation:
    - expanding innovative programming;
    - increasing collaboration among agencies;
    - promoting economic development; and
    - generating community support for COMBAT.
- **The impact evaluation methodology relies primarily on**
  - data from Jackson County law enforcement agencies
  - comparable data from other jurisdictions covering the time period of COMBAT
  - circuit court data from 1980 to 1997
  - National high school surveys and Kansas City high school surveys 1986–1997
- **The process evaluation involved**
  - interviews on site and by telephone with 82 COMBAT program participants and observers;
  - observation of 21 COMBAT meetings; and
  - an extensive review of program materials.

This chapter describes the objectives of the COMBAT evaluation and the methods used to assess their achievement.

## The Study Examines COMBAT's Achievement of Seven Objectives

*The evaluation examines the extent to which COMBAT achieved three objectives which the prosecuting attorney's office established for the program in 1993:*

*Objective 1: Did COMBAT lead to the increased jailing of dangerous offenders?*

*Objective 2: Did COMBAT increase the number of nonviolent offenders who want to get off drugs?*

*Objective 3: Did COMBAT increase the prevention of drug experimentation among youth?*

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in its Request for Proposals to evaluate COMBAT required the winning contractor to examine whether COMBAT achieved **four additional objectives**:

*Objective 4: Did COMBAT support innovative programming which might not otherwise have been funded?*

*Objective 5: Did COMBAT enhance communication and collaborative action among organizations, programs, and jurisdictions?*

*Objective 6: Did COMBAT spawn economic development?*

*Objective 7: Is there community support for COMBAT and its programs?*

The National Institute of Justice identified **two other COMBAT objectives**: *Are COMBAT's administrative arrangements effective?* and *Is the COMBAT model applicable in other jurisdictions?* There is a great deal of information to address regarding COMBAT's administrative arrangements. In addition, the topic is not a program "objective" in the same sense as the other objectives—programs do not define their missions as implementing effective administrative arrangements, even though they all strive to incorporate them. As a result, the report addresses COMBAT management procedures, and their strengths and weaknesses, separately in chapter 5, COMBAT Administration.

Similarly, replication is not generally a program goal—most programs do not define their mission as making it possible for other jurisdictions to accomplish what they have set out to do. Rather, replicability is a concern for NIJ and other jurisdictions. As a result, the report addresses COMBAT's replicability as part of chapter 6, Conclusions.

## Impact Evaluation Methodology

COMBAT is a community-wide effort, unique in the amount of money generated each year and in its reach into all corners of the community. While other community efforts with smaller target areas (a single neighborhood or confined geographic area) or specifically targeted populations (like programs for youth or women) might not be expected to impact county-wide indicators, COMBAT can be fairly held to the broader test. Over 14 million dollars each year since 1989 has been generated from the sales tax; these funds have been focused on a wide range of programs in law enforcement, prevention, and treatment in Jackson County. Similarly, the goals of COMBAT are far-reaching in nature. For example, the program states that its goal is not just to improve arrest statistics through putting more police on the street, but also to impact the total process of arrest and conviction in “increased jailing of dangerous offenders.” Therefore, we look to county-wide statistics where available to determine the impact of COMBAT, rather than looking only at data on a specific program.

To determine whether COMBAT “works” or has an impact on critical indicators of drug use in the county, we ideally need to be able to look at what would have occurred absent COMBAT programming. This can be accomplished analytically two ways, both of which are less than satisfactory. First, we can look at trends in outcomes for the historical time period prior to initiation of COMBAT, during implementation, and post implementation to determine if changes represent extensions of existing trends or significant deviations from the existing trends. This type of analysis relies on a complete panel of historical data. This was not available in this case. While some data systems are complete and in electronic form for the time period of interest, most are not.

The second approach is to look at available trend data in the targeted area in comparison to the same measures in a comparable city or county area which did not have the initiative. This approach assumes that apart from the programming under study, other factors influencing change are reasonably equivalent. Such things would include demographics, immigration patterns, and availability of drugs. Needless to say, having the happy circumstance of matched or even similar areas—one with the program under study and one without—is highly unusual. As in most instances, there is no equivalent county or city which can logically serve as a control group to the COMBAT experiment in Jackson County. Therefore, our approach is to look at changes in indicators over time where available and to compare those trend lines to several other jurisdictions where the same data are available. It is important to understand that neither design allows us to attribute causality directly to COMBAT; other unknown and unmeasured variables could be producing observed changes. It would, however, provide support for the role of COMBAT, should we find similar trend patterns across other areas but appreciably different ones in Jackson County.

This is the approach we have taken in looking at COMBAT’s impact. The relevant indicators available for analysis are changes in law enforcement effectiveness or reach (numbers of arrests,

changes in types of arrests); changes in prosecutorial effectiveness (increased successful prosecutions; successful diversion programming); changes in successful incarceration of offenders; and changes in treatment or prevention program capacity or effectiveness. Other important variables like recidivism or relapse of those processed through a COMBAT-influenced system are not possible to calculate.

As discussed later in this report, some of the systems like the large database used by the Circuit Court or the prosecutor's office MIS were designed primarily to track individual cases. They are less useful, however, in generating information across cases, making it difficult to determine accurately the number of cases (or individuals ) that have moved through the system over time. In other instances, like data on treatment outcomes, information was simply not there to be used.

The data used in impact analyses are derived from:

- the Uniform Crime Report
- arrest data of the Kansas City Police Department (ALERT)
- prosecutor management information system (INFORMER)
- circuit court records data
- Missouri Department of Corrections.

## Process Evaluation Methodology

The process evaluation examined all seven objectives. The principal data collection methods were

- *interviews* conducted on-site and by telephone with 82 COMBAT participants and observers who were identified by COMBAT administrators and interested outsiders (see the list of respondents in appendix A);
- telephone interviews with 16 COMBAT *Grant Match recipients*;
- telephone interviews conducted by two Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation interns during the summer of 1997 with 22 COMBAT-funded *prevention and treatment providers* asking for examples of innovation, collaboration, and economic development, and asking whether they had experienced administrative problems with their COMBAT contracts;
- extensive examination of *program materials*, such as evaluation reports, activity descriptions, progress reports, contracts, and minutes of meetings; and

- *observation* of 21 COMBAT-related planning and other meetings (listed in exhibit 2-1).

Collectively, evaluation staff spent over two person months on site collecting data, and over 275 hours conducting telephone interviews.

A problem encountered in the process evaluation came from discrepancies in the amounts of COMBAT funds allocated to different components. These discrepancies occur for three reasons.

- In some years, COMBAT awards Grant Match Program funds to components (e.g., the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force, Drug Court) above and beyond what the components are entitled to according to the percentage formula for disbursing COMBAT funds.
- The amount some components actually spend sometimes differs from their annual allocation, in which case the unexpended amounts revert to a COMBAT surplus fund.
- In some years, components receive more than their allocated percentages because unexpended surpluses from previous years have been disbursed. These surpluses represent
  - monies components did not spend from their previous year's allocations;
  - excess revenues received from the tax beyond the expected amounts; and
  - interest accrued on the unexpended COMBAT monies.

As a result of these conditions, chapters 2 and 3 do not always identify the same dollar amounts for some COMBAT components.

## Exhibit 2-1

### COMBAT Activities Observed

- COMBAT Commission Meetings (2)
- Community Action Network (CAN) meetings (2)
- Day Report Center (2)
- Drug Court (3)
- Drug Court executive meeting
- Drug Court graduation ceremony
- Drug Court staffing meetings (2)
- Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force Board Meeting
- Jail Anti-Movement Program (J.A.M.) class
- Law Enforcement Collaboration (2)
- Research Committee meeting
- Strategic Planning Committee meetings (2)
- Treatment Providers Coalition meeting

## CHAPTER 3

### COMBAT: SYNOPSIS AND HISTORY

#### Key Points

- **COMBAT—the COMMunity-Backed Anti-Drug Tax—is the name for a wide range of initiatives designed to address the substance abuse problem in Jackson County, Missouri.**
  - COMBAT's initiatives are funded by a one quarter of one percent increase in the county's sales tax approved by the voters in 1989 for seven years and approved again in 1995 for another seven years (until 2004).
  - The tax has generated from \$14 million in 1990 to over \$18 million in 1998.
  - COMBAT's goals, as stated in its publicity materials, are to increase the jailing of dangerous offenders, increase treatment opportunities, and decrease drug experimentation among youth.
  - Ever since a Grant Match Program using surplus COMBAT funds began operation in 1993, about half of COMBAT funds have been devoted to prevention and treatment initiatives. However, much of the treatment funding is provided through the criminal justice system (e.g., through Drug Court and Family Court).
- **As of 1996, the prosecuting attorney's office, a COMBAT Commission, and the county executive shared the administration of COMBAT.**
  - The prosecuting attorney's office plays the most significant leadership role, administering a COMBAT-funded prosecutorial unit dedicated exclusively to processing drug cases, a community prosecution program, a Drug Abatement Response Team (DART), a deferred prosecution program (Drug Court), and a Grant Match Program.
  - The COMBAT Commission supervises contracts it awards to prevention and treatment providers through a competitive request for proposal (RFP) process (\$1,650,000 for prevention providers in 1997 and \$2,800,000 for treatment providers in 1998). The commission also distributes COMBAT-generated Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) monies (\$1,146,268 in 1997).

— COMBAT provides the county executive with funding for a substance abuse treatment program in the jail (\$176,890 in 1997) and provided funds for constructing an addition to the facility (\$20,200,00 in 1996–1997).

- **Law enforcement agencies use COMBAT funds to increase personnel devoted to arresting drug offenders and investigating drug-related offenses (\$3,439,000 in 1998).**

- **COMBAT enables Family Court to provide increased prevention and treatment services to at-risk and court-supervised juveniles (\$2,172,000 in 1998).**

- **COMBAT was enacted as a result of well documented evidence of serious substance abuse problems in Jackson County.**

- The county's response to the problem in the late 1980s had been uncoordinated and lacked leadership.

- From the outset, COMBAT attempted to implement a coordinated and holistic response to the problem, including enforcement, prevention, and treatment efforts.

- The program experienced significant start-up problems, all of which it attempted to address.

- COMBAT secured effective leadership when Claire McCaskill was elected prosecuting attorney in early 1993 and when she appointed James Nunnally—a public health administrator—to run the program.

- Voters approved COMBAT for another seven years in 1995 along with changes in program structure, that included

transferring the process of recommending and supervising prevention contracts from the prosecuting attorney's office to the newly created COMBAT Commission whose members were appointed by the county executive but made funding recommendations (for treatment as well as prevention providers) to the county legislature for approval;

providing guaranteed funding (non-competed) for the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program, enacted into law as part of the Grant Match Program, and



switching from giving fixed dollar amounts to various COMBAT components to a percentage formula.

- **As of 1998, COMBAT seemed to be well-institutionalized.** However, its long-term survival may depend on its ability to avoid separation among its components and its ability to document that it is continuing to reduce the substance abuse problem in Jackson County.

## COMBAT Is an Integrated Cluster of Many Discrete Initiatives

*The COMmunity-Backed Anti-Drug Tax, or COMBAT, is the name given to a wide range of initiatives designed to address the substance abuse problem in Jackson County, Missouri* (see exhibit 3-1). COMBAT's initiatives are funded by a one-quarter of one percent increase in the county sales tax<sup>1</sup> approved by the voters for seven years in September 1989 and renewed by the voters in November 1995 for another seven years—until 2004. Specifically, the Jackson County Code

“hereby impose[s] in Jackson County, Missouri, a countywide sales tax (COMBAT) at the rate of one-quarter of one percent solely for the purpose of arrest and prosecution of drug related offenses, the prevention of such offenses, and the incarceration, rehabilitation, treatment, and judicial processing of adult and juvenile violators of drug-related offenses . . . .”


The tax has generated from \$14 million to over \$18 million each year, with all the money deposited in a special trust fund to be used exclusively for funding substance abuse initiatives in the county.<sup>2</sup>

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1 The additional tax raised the combined State and city tax to 6.5 percent in Kansas City and to about 6 percent elsewhere in Jackson County.

2 COMBAT does not address alcohol problems, except among juveniles, for whom drinking is illegal. (See chapter 5, COMBAT Administration, for a discussion of some treatment providers' attempts to bill COMBAT for treating clients' alcohol abuse.)

# Exhibit 3-1: COMBAT Organizational Funding Relationships



Legend: dotted lines represent ex officio membership on COMBAT Commission.

1 The County Executive approves the judicial branch's budget.  
 2 The Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force is now a creature of the Prosecutor's Office, not an entity chartered by the county. It was originally started with private funding.

## Jackson County, Missouri

Jackson County is an area of 625 square miles located on the western Missouri border. The county includes Kansas City, which is 331 square miles. The county is 73 percent white and 22 percent black. One-half of Jackson County's population of 635,000 lives in Kansas City; most of the other residents live in the county seat, Independence (110,000), Lee's Summit (61,300), Blue Springs (44,700), and Grandview (24,000) and Raytown (29,400).

Several COMBAT features are especially noteworthy:

- COMBAT's overall programmatic mission is *very broad*, including prevention, treatment, enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, and incarceration.
- COMBAT incorporates a *public health perspective* that includes focusing on promoting close collaboration between the treatment and prevention communities and the criminal justice system.
- Responsibility for COMBAT *is shared* among three entities, the prosecuting attorney's office (which has the major share), a commission appointed by the county executive, and the county executive.

*Since 1996, the prosecuting attorney's office, a COMBAT Commission, and the county executive have shared administration of the COMBAT initiatives.* Exhibit 3-1 and the discussion below provide a synopsis of each of these group's responsibilities for administering the program. The discussion below also provides capsule descriptions of the principal COMBAT initiatives each entity administers. Exhibit 3-2 indicates where in the remainder of this report readers will find extended discussions of these and other COMBAT initiatives.

### The Prosecuting Attorney's Office

*The Jackson County prosecuting attorney is responsible for most COMBAT management.* Exhibit 3-3 shows the prosecuting attorney office's COMBAT functions. As shown, the office divides its COMBAT responsibilities into three units: the Anti-Drug Prosecution Unit, the Neighborhood Justice Program, and the Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division.

**Anti-Drug Prosecution Unit.** Funded entirely by COMBAT, the unit consists of 14 to 17 lawyers (the number has varied over time depending on tax revenue levels and office priorities) *who prosecute only drug offenses*. The unit makes use of a special docket in the Jackson County Circuit Court, known as "Docket O," also funded entirely by COMBAT, that calendars all drug cases. The unit also operates a *deferred prosecution program*, called

**Exhibit 3-2**


**Locations in this Report Where Individual COMBAT Funded Programs Are Discussed<sup>3</sup>**

Alternative Schools	Objective 3 (Prevention)
Anti-Drug Unit (Prosecutor's Office)	Objective 1 (Jail)
Child Advocate	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Community Action Networks (CANs)	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Community Prosecution	Objective 5 (Collaboration)
County Court Services	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Counselor Certification Training	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Day Report Center	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs)	Objective 3 (Prevention)
DJO Certification Training	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Docket "O"	Objective 1 (Jail)
Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)	Objective 5 (Collaboration)
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.)	Objective 3 (Prevention)
Drug Court	Objective 3 (Prevention)
Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU)	Objective 1 (Jail)
Drug Task Force	Objective 1 (Jail)
Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force	Objective 1 (Jail)
Family Court	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Family Drug Court	Chapter 7 (Conclusions)
Fathering Program	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Full Employment Council (FEC)	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Grant Match Program	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Hospital Case Manager	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Jail Anti-Drug Movement (J.A.M.)	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Landlord Initiatives	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Law Enforcement Collaboration	Objective 5 (Collaboration)
Legislative Initiatives	Objective 4 (Innovation)
Minority Counselor Training	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Neighborhood Justice Unit	Chapter 3 (Synopsis & History)
Paseo Corridor Initiative/Partnership	Objective 5 (Collaboration)
Prevention Providers	Objective 3 (Prevention)
Research Committee	Chapter 5 (Administration)
Safe Summer Program	Objective 3 (Prevention)
SAFE-TYES Program	Objective 3 (Prevention)
Strategic Planning Committee	Objective 5 (Administration)
Street Narcotics Unit (SNU)	Objective 1 (Jail)
Treatment Providers	Objective 2 (Treatment)
Truancy Program	Objective 3 (Prevention)
Youth Courts	Objective 3 (Prevention)

<sup>3</sup> These programs are often funded in partnership with other agencies.

Exhibit 3-3

COMBAT: Prosecuting Attorney's Office Functions (1997)



*Drug Court*, that offers first-time, nonviolent substance abuse offenders a chance to avoid criminal prosecution if they complete a rigorous and carefully monitored treatment program. Drug Court has its own commissioner (judge). A single outpatient treatment provider assesses all Drug Court candidates and makes all treatment decisions. Drug Court's own in-house COMBAT-funded Day Report Center provides outpatient treatment for 40 percent of participants.

**The Neighborhood Justice Program.** This unit has two COMBAT-funded components:

- *A community prosecution section*, funded entirely by COMBAT, consists of one assistant assigned to each of the four Kansas City police department patrol divisions as community prosecutors, and a supervisor.
- *A Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)*, for which COMBAT provides matching funds, identifies and investigates drug activity in residences and commercial buildings and then develops strategies for closing them, including civil abatement and forfeiture actions. The DART team includes two attorneys, an investigator, a paralegal, and a city and State code inspector.

**The Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division.** This division consists of an administrator, James Nunnely, a deputy administrator, a grants administrator, three coordinators, and clerical assistants—all funded by COMBAT. *The division is the nerve center for COMBAT, and it provides supervision and direction for the entire program.* Because of its centrality to the effort, when COMBAT participants and observers—and when this evaluation report—refer to “COMBAT staff” or “COMBAT administrators,” it is this division that is being discussed.

The Anti-Drug Administration Division has several COMBAT responsibilities:

- *County Court Services*, Drug Court's in-house assessment and outpatient treatment provider, which operates the Day Report Center.
- *A Grant Match Program* that makes use of interest collected from unused Anti-Drug Tax revenues and from revenues collected in excess of expectations to fund community-based and other organizations (e.g., the Kansas City police department, Drug Court) that need a local match in order to qualify for State, Federal, or private funds.
- *Evaluating COMBAT's effectiveness*, which involves collecting process and impact data on COMBAT's achievements and commissioning or supporting evaluations of individual initiatives and the program as a whole.

- Developing short-term and long-range *plans for COMBAT* and seeing to it that the plans are put into action by the other COMBAT participants.
- *Public relations* for COMBAT, including operating an automated telephone call-in service and an Internet site, and publishing a newsletter.
- Initiating and providing technical assistance to *Community Action Networks*, or CANS, throughout Kansas City. Each CAN is made up of representatives from the police department (two police officers) and representatives of neighborhood groups and a codes administrator from the city, who meet monthly to address quality of life issues in their areas.
- *Promoting collaboration* among—and within—COMBAT's three major components (enforcement, treatment, prevention) and across jurisdictions. For example, staff coordinate and run
  - the Law Enforcement Collaboration, which brings together representatives from local and Federal law enforcement agencies, city, county, and Federal prosecutor offices, and the courts to plan coordinated attacks on drug-related crime; and
  - the Strategic Planning Committee, which monitors the progress of each COMBAT initiative. The committee consists of high ranking representatives from law enforcement, Drug Court, Family Court, the COMBAT Commission (see below), and the jail's substance abuse treatment program.
  - the Research Committee

### **The COMBAT Commission**

*The COMBAT Commission is responsible for making recommendations to the county legislature for using anti-drug tax revenues to fund prevention and treatment programs, and it awards tax dollars for D.A.R.E. programs to nine local law enforcement agencies.* The commission uses a formal RFP process for awarding prevention and treatment contracts but acts only as a pass-through for disbursing D.A.R.E. monies.

**Membership.** The COMBAT Commission has seven voting members, including representatives of treatment, prevention, and business organizations or agencies that neither receive nor seek COMBAT funding. Members include a retired public school teacher, CEO of a mutual fund company, employee of an investment firm, director of student support services at a community college, banker (supervisor of loan officers), Ewing Marion Kauffman

Foundation researcher, and treasurer of the state firefighters' association. Among the members are the former supervisor of clinical and night staff of a 30-bed residential substance abuse treatment program), an MBA, and an attorney.

The county executive appoints commission members, who receive an honorarium of \$100 per meeting. Members select the commission chair, who serves for one year and may be reelected. By statute, the commission must meet at least quarterly, but in practice it meets monthly. Treatment, prevention, and D.A.R.E. subcommittees meet periodically. Most commission members devote between five and ten hours a month to their responsibilities, although two members estimate they each spend 15-20 hours a month on commission work.

**Ex-officio members.** The commission has three ex-officio nonvoting members: the chief prosecuting attorney, the Kansas City police chief (represented by a deputy chief), and the chairperson of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force (see below). While the prosecuting attorney has no voting rights, commission board members and executive staff often call on her for guidance based on her comprehensive grasp of the COMBAT and other county budgets. As an elected official (the only one on the commission), she also has the most intimate familiarity with county government (see the box "The Prosecutor's Office Participates in Commission Activities").

### **The Prosecuting Attorney Participates in COMBAT Commission Activities**

The COMBAT Commission has legal authority for providing the county legislature with recommendations for funding prevention and treatment services and monitoring the delivery of the services. Nonetheless, Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, remains an active, if officially powerless, participant in the commission's work. As the only elected official on the commission, McCaskill commands respect as someone who is accountable directly to the electorate and who has the best understanding of county politics and government on the commission. Furthermore, the COMBAT ordinance requires commission staff to "cooperate with the anti-drug staff of the prosecuting attorney's office to ensure coordination of all the county's anti-drug initiatives." To promote this coordination, McCaskill asked James Nunnely, the Anti-Drug Tax programs administrator in her office, to attend all commission meetings. Susan Griffler, the commission's executive director, reported that she (Griffler) talked frequently with Nunnely, especially for help resolving knotty problems, such as those described below.

- A detoxification provider told the commission that it would have to discontinue providing services unless the commission furnished it with more money. James Nunnely negotiated with the provider, which agreed to spend its remaining COMBAT money providing services before stopping work.



- During commission meetings, Nunnely sits at a table with the executive director. At the April 1997 commission meeting, he pointed out an article in that day's newspaper that discussed a provider program but made no mention of COMBAT, which funded the program. Nunnely talked about the need for prevention providers to mention COMBAT when talking with media. As a result, a board member observed that "Taxpayers paid for this program, and they need to know what their money was used for." The board member then instructed the commission's executive director to send a letter to every provider executive director requesting that he or she mention COMBAT funding in all interviews with the press. Nunnely also
  - reviews prevention proposals to make sure they are consistent with COMBAT's goals, completing the same rating sheet the independent reviewers fill in so that commissioners and commission staff can consider his evaluations; and
  - meets with commission subcommittees to assist them in drafting each year's prevention and treatment requests for proposals (RFPs).

The two police representatives on the commission take a role in the discussions. They have a vital interest in the commission's funding of the D.A.R.E. program, which represents 19 percent of COMBAT money (see below). Along with the prosecuting attorney, the presence of the Kansas City police department representative (a deputy chief) also provides continuity for the changeover from the Fiscal Commission which the COMBAT Commission replaced since both were voting members of the previous body. The prosecuting attorney and police representative, along with the police chief representing the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force board of directors, are the key individuals responsible for public safety in the city and the county.

**Responsibilities.** The COMBAT Commission is responsible for issuing annual prevention and treatment RFPs, evaluating proposals, negotiating contracts, and submitting as many as 65 recommended awards to the county legislature for approval. The commission funds both established traditional and non-traditional treatment providers to expand their outpatient, residential, and social detoxification services, and prevention providers primarily to initiate educational, counseling, and mentoring services to youth and parents.

The commission monitors the providers' effectiveness in achieving their goals and (in conjunction with others) the fiscal soundness of their use of COMBAT funds. The commission has five staff members, including an executive director, two compliance monitors (one each for prevention and treatment providers), an administrative assistance who handles D.A.R.E. and other financial issues, and a clerk.

## The County Executive

*The county executive administers the jail's COMBAT-funded drug treatment program (J.A.M.) and COMBAT monies for building and staffing an addition to the jail.* On paper, the entire county judicial branch is under the authority of the county executive. In fact, the only authority the county executive has is to approve the Circuit Court (and therefore the Family Court) budget; she exercises no actual management control over the court.

## Police Department Participation

As noted above, two law enforcement entities participate in COMBAT: the Kansas City police department and the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force. The Anti-Drug Tax legislation stipulates that each receive 9.5 percent of the revenues.

### Coordination among the Three COMBAT Administrative Bodies

While the three COMBAT administrative bodies—prosecutor's office, COMBAT Commission, and county executive—do not meet together, COMBAT participants and observers raised no objections to this tripartite system for managing COMBAT nor suggested the need for closer organizational ties. When a particular issue requires cooperation, the involved parties meet.

- The county executive's manager of administration joined with representatives from the prosecuting attorney's office, the Kansas City police department, and other agencies to form a committee to oversee implementation of the recommendations the Special Advisory Panel to the legislature in 1993 (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration).
- Claire McCaskill, the prosecutor's attorney, and Kathryn Shields, the county executive, met together to decide how COMBAT might be able to make up the shortfall after voters failed to approve a use tax to help fund the jail expansion (see Objective 1, Jail). McCaskill agreed to using an additional \$9 million in COMBAT funds for the construction from COMBAT's unallocated surplus and interest accruals, although most of the \$9 million was already earmarked for the jail. In return for the additional COMBAT funds, Shields agreed to add 50 beds.

There is the opportunity for coordination between the COMBAT Commission and the prosecuting attorney's office and police agencies by means of the prosecutor's and police departments' ex officio representation on the commission. (See the previous box "The Prosecuting Attorney Participates in COMBAT Commission Activities.")

**Kansas City Police Department.** The police department uses its COMBAT funds primarily to increase the staff of two units.

- COMBAT funds 15 of 32 positions in the department's Street Narcotics Unit (SNU), which attacks low-level street drug dealing. COMBAT has also paid for three of the unit's drug dogs.
- COMBAT funds 14 of 42 positions in the department's Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU), which attacks mid-level drug traffickers who supply neighborhood drug dealers.

**Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force.** The task force consists of officers from 13 law enforcement agencies in the eastern part of Jackson County, outside the jurisdiction of the Kansas City police department. The task force is authorized as a quasi-governmental entity through a written cooperative agreement among the participating cities, the county, and the sheriff's department. The task force qualifies under Missouri statute and case law as a quasi-governmental entity because it performs a traditional government function (law enforcement), is created by governmental entities, and reports to them and to the taxpayers. The task force has increasingly targeted illegal methamphetamine laboratories.

### **Family Court Involvement**

Family (Juvenile) Court uses COMBAT funds for several purposes, including

- substance abuse certification training for Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs—juvenile probation officers);
- hiring 13 DJOs to work in
  - Family Court residential facilities,
  - satellite Family Court units, and
  - six middle schools;
- hiring 20 youth care workers to provide counseling in residential centers; and
- Purchasing private residential bed space for juvenile offenders sentenced by the court to treatment.

## COMBAT Provides 10 Entities with a Fixed Percentage of the Tax Revenues

Total revenues from the tax were \$18,100,000 in 1998. Exhibit 3-4 shows the percentage of that amount and actual dollar amounts allocated to of COMBAT's 10 components that year.<sup>4</sup> The overall distribution is

<i>prosecuting attorney's office:</i>	25.5%
<i>law enforcement agencies:</i>	19%
<i>county executive (including funding for Circuit Court and Family Court:</i>	27%
<i>COMBAT Commission:</i>	28.5%.

However, all of the COMBAT funding for Drug Court (6 percent of all COMBAT funding) and Family Court (8 percent), and approximately two-thirds of the Grant Match funds (6.6 percent), are used for prevention and treatment. As a result, *the total proportion of COMBAT funds devoted to prevention and treatment is about 50 percent.*

Exhibit 3-5 shows the dollar amounts each COMBAT component has expended (not necessarily been allocated) each year that Anti-Drug Tax dollars have been collected. Exhibit 3-6 shows the total tax revenues collected and expended from 1990 to 1998. Exhibit 3-7 shows the percentage of selected agencies' total budgets COMBAT funds provide.

The description of COMBAT above is a snapshot of the program as it existed in early 1998. However, both organizationally and in terms of the initiatives it has funded, COMBAT has always been in a state of evolution. A short history of the program's initiation and metamorphosis follows.

## COMBAT Has Changed Significantly Over Time

COMBAT's history can be divided into four periods:

- Jackson County before COMBAT began (1986-1988);
- initiation and early history (1989-1992);
- changes after the election of Claire McCaskill (1993-1995); and
- activity since passage of the second referendum renewing the program (January 1996-May 1998).

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<sup>4</sup> These dollar amounts do not include additional revenues allocated to each component in 1998 as a result of the distribution of unallocated surpluses from 1995 and unspent monies in 1996. (Any portion of their allocations that agencies do not spend in a given year remains in the COMBAT account and is reallocated to those agencies the following year.) When these funds are included, total COMBAT allocations in 1998 were \$21,591,169.

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**Exhibit 3-4****1998 COMBAT Budget Allocation <sup>a</sup>**


	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Allocation</b>
Prosecuting Attorney's Office	9.5	\$ 1,719,500
Drug Court	6.0	1,719,500
Grant Match Fund	10.0	1,810,000
Kansas City Police Department	9.5	1,719,500
Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force	9.5	1,719,500
Circuit and Family Courts	12.0	2,172,000
Corrections (County Executive)	15.0	2,715,000
Prevention (COMBAT Commission)	7.5	1,357,500
Treatment (COMBAT Commission)	15.0	2,715,000
D.A.R.E.	6.0	1,086,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>\$ 18,100,000</b>

<sup>a</sup> These dollar amounts do not include additional revenues allocated to each component in 1998 as a result of the distribution of unallocated surpluses from 1995 and unspent monies in 1996. (Any portion of their allocations that agencies do not spend in a given year remain in the COMBAT account and is reallocated to those agencies the following year.) When these funds are included, total COMBAT allocations in 1998 were \$21,591,169.

Exhibit 3-8 provides a chronology of selected COMBAT milestones. The text below presents a brief synopsis of COMBAT's history.


Dollar Amounts Expended by Each COMBAT Component

Corrections Department (a)




a) Excludes funds for jail construction  
 Source: CAFR

Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force




Source: CAFR

Treatment




Source: CAFR

Kansas City Police Department




Source: CAFR

Family Court Expenditures



Source: CAFR


Circuit Court (excluding Family Court) Expenditures



Source: CAFR




Prosecuting Attorney (Criminal Drug Prosecution)



Source: CAFR


Prevention



Source: CAFR

Exhibit 3-5, continued

Drug Court <sup>1</sup>



1) A deferred prosecution program, which operated from 1990–1993, was replaced by Drug Court in October 1993.

Source: CAFR

Exhibit 3-6

Total COMBAT Tax Revenues Collected and Expended






Exhibit 3-7

COMBAT's Percentage of Agencies' Total Budgets in 1998



## Exhibit 3-8


### Chronology of Selected COMBAT Milestones



## Exhibit 3-8

### Chronology of Selected COMBAT Milestones

(continued)



#### Jackson County Pre-COMBAT (1986 – 1988)

Throughout the 1980s, the citizens of Kansas City, Missouri, and nearby communities in Jackson County—like residents in many other urban areas throughout the country—felt increasingly besieged by drug abuse and drug-related crimes. “Crack cocaine had become an epidemic,” recalled the Reverend James Tindall, chairman of the Jackson County Legislature. Cocaine and other illicit drugs such as methamphetamine, PCP, heroin, and marijuana were openly traded on street corners. Drug houses were springing up overnight on many blocks of Kansas City and drug-related homicides were on the rise. One out of every two people arrested was a drug user; 80 percent of all crime involved illegal drugs. The tide of drug abuse was spilling over into the schools. The statistics in the box “Evidence of the Severity of Jackson County’s Drug Problem in 1989” document the seriousness of the problem.

There was a consensus among observers that the response to the substance abuse problem in Kansas City and Jackson County before COMBAT—as in many other communities in the nation—was uncoordinated and that there was an absence of leadership committed to solving

the crisis. There was also fragmentation among the agencies, both public and private, that provided treatment to substance abusers. Treatment professionals operated in isolation from other agencies combating the substance abuse problem.

### **Initiation and Early History (1989 – 1992)<sup>5</sup>**

No single event prompted the public outcry in Jackson County over drug abuse. The person most instrumental in launching the idea of an anti-drug sales tax was the then prosecuting attorney, Albert Riederer, who in November 1988 had been elected to a third four-year term as Jackson County prosecutor. During his reelection campaign, Riederer had been confronted repeatedly by citizens angered over the seeming inability of police and the courts to control drug trafficking. These exchanges convinced Riederer that not only was better coordination necessary among community groups, the criminal justice system, and agencies of city and county government, but also more resources were needed.

After the election, Riederer sought to identify a source of funds that could be dedicated solely to a coordinated approach to funding substance abuse programming. An increment to the existing sales tax seemed the most palatable approach. Although the sales tax was regressive (it collected a higher percentage of income for low-income taxpayers), it was already in place and required no new organizational machinery. It was a straightforward, visible, and locally controlled funding mechanism. Riederer presented the idea privately among law enforcement administrators, community leaders, and elected officials. The reaction was favorable, reflecting the mounting groundswell of grassroots support for concerted action in the fight against drugs.

Before submitting the sales tax to county voters as a referendum issue, the first step was to obtain authorization from the Missouri State Legislature. A bill, introduced in January 1989 and enacted in April 1989, authorized a 0.25 percent increase in the sales tax, which was expected to yield about \$14 million annually.

Initially, the bill was drafted as a law enforcement initiative to fund additional police investigations and deferred prosecution for nonviolent drug offenders. However, leaders in the church community, community health centers, and other civic organizations had been asserting that the drug problem should be viewed not simply as a law enforcement issue—adding more police and prosecutors—but also as a public health issue. As a result, during the legislative debate that ensued, the bill was broadened to include prevention and treatment programs, as well as corrections and Circuit Court operations.

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5 The first six paragraphs in this section have been taken from Gregory Mills, *COMmunity-Backed Anti-Drug Tax: COMBAT in Jackson County*, Missouri, Program Focus. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, July 1996.

## Evidence of the Severity of Jackson County's Drug Problem in 1989

- Through the first seven months of 1989, arrests in Kansas City for possession of illegal drugs rose 81 percent compared with the same period in 1988. Arrests for sales of illegal drugs had increased 113 percent.
- The Missouri Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse tracks the number of admissions of Jackson County residents to publicly funded treatment centers. From 1986 to 1989, trend lines for heroin, barbiturates, amphetamines, marijuana, inhalants, PCP, tranquilizers, and hallucinogens generally remained flat. Total admissions continued to rise, however, with the greatest growth attributed to alcohol and cocaine.

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>increase</u>
alcohol	3,752	4,915	5,555	6,436	72%
cocaine	72	203	347	726	908%
total admissions	4,966	6,030	6,762	8,232	66%

- The Narcotics Division of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department reported the following totals for illegal drugs seized in Kansas City. The dollar figures are based on price per gram with the price held constant over time:

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u> (through May)
Value	\$740,000	\$1,500,000	\$3,200,000	\$1,500,000

- According to the Homicide Division of the Police Department, 43 percent of all homicides in 1988 were unquestionably drug-related. Officers believed that an additional 40 percent of homicides had some drug-related connection.
- Truman Medical Center is the primary provider of health services to low-income individuals in the central city. Of more than 400 babies a year served by the newborn intensive care unit, about 40 percent had mothers who admitted to cocaine use. In August, 1986, 16 percent of the women receiving care at the high-risk obstetrical unit admitted to current or past drug use. In August, 1988, that figure had risen to 25 percent of 237 patients. The drug of choice was crack cocaine.
- Before 1988, the Visiting Nurses Association had not seen any "crack babies." During 1989, the agency received five to ten referrals per month for such cases from pediatricians and social workers.
- In July, 1989, the National Institute of Justice released a 14-city study of drug use among persons arrested for serious crimes in the last quarter of 1988. Urinalysis indicated that 54 percent of the men and 70 percent of the women in the Kansas City sample tested positive for drug use. Of that group, 41 percent of the men and 57 percent of the women had used cocaine.



- The State Department of Mental Health Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse reported that there were an estimated 13,200 persons in Jackson County in need of treatment for drug addiction, of whom 7 percent were served with State funds in 1990, leaving 93 percent, or more than 12,000 individuals, unserved.

Source: State of Missouri Report: *Extent and Nature of Drugs and Violent Crime*. January 3, 1997. Missouri Departments of Mental Health and Corrections.

The debate shifted to the county in August 1989, where the nine-member county legislature's approval was necessary to place the issue on the November ballot. The prosecutor's office organized a campaign to promote the tax, enlisting the support of business, labor, church, and community leaders. However, the role of the prosecutor's office was a key element in a contentious debate in the county legislature. Some legislators were wary of placing the responsibility for administering the tax entirely in the hands of the county prosecutor. The prosecutor's office itself was wary; it expected to face political pressures on the funding of local programs. As a result, the administration of the tax was split equally (\$7 million each) between the office of the prosecuting attorney and a newly created Fiscal Commission (see below). The county legislature added a sunset provision, calling for the tax to expire automatically on March 31, 1997.

The county legislature unanimously passed the revised measure on September 12, 1989, designating it as Question No. 1 on the November ballot. In a separate supporting resolution unanimously adopted on October 17, the legislature specified that the tax revenues would be allocated among eight different program areas: investigations, prosecution, deferred prosecution (or drug court), crime prevention, corrections, treatment, Family Court, and Circuit Court. In early November, 63 percent of the voters approved the increase. The tax became effective on April 1, 1990, and the State began distributing the revenues to the county in June 1990.

As shown in exhibit 3-8 tax monies were first spent by the prosecuting attorney's office, police department, and courts in November 1990. The first expenditures for treatment occurred in January 1991, and the Circuit Court created Docket O in April 1991.

Mr. Riederer's office administered COMBAT's prosecution and prevention components. The newly created Fiscal Commission administered the half of the tax revenues allocated to corrections, treatment, and the Circuit and Family Courts. The Fiscal Commission consisted of the presiding judge of the Circuit Court, the director of the county corrections department, the Kansas City police chief, the chairman of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force (representing police departments in the suburban and rural areas of the county), and the directors of two major drug treatment facilities. However, because the prosecuting attorney chaired the Fiscal Commission, Riederer—and, later, his successor, Claire McCaskill (see below)—effectively controlled the commission's funds as well the prosecutor office's

COMBAT money. The county executive played no role in COMBAT since the county was banking the portion of COMBAT funds allocated to jail construction, and the jail treatment program (J.A.M.) had not yet been initiated. As a result, *the prosecuting attorney's office had principal responsibility for supervising all of COMBAT until almost the end of 1995.*

During this period, there was considerable uncertainty about how to spend prevention and treatment funds. For example, several hundred thousand dollars were spent on improving the security of some Family Court juvenile residences. A deferred prosecution program was floundering. In addition, the three COMBAT components—prevention, treatment, and the criminal justice system—were not engaged in serious collaboration.

Finally, there was a significant increase in the prosecuting attorney office's drug caseload. Until 1993, the Kansas City prosecutor handled most minor drug offenses (simple possession) because the Jackson County prosecutor's office lacked the staff to handle the large volume of misdemeanor cases. The city court judge frequently instructed offenders to seek treatment and made it a condition of probation, but there was no money to pay for treating indigent offenders and insufficient staff to monitor compliance.

The city council removed criminal provisions related to possession of small amounts of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana from the municipal code in 1993. As a result, police officers had to take these cases to the county prosecutor. It appears that the city took the action in part because it was inundated with drug cases but in part because it felt it was being treated unfairly when COMBAT funds were not made available to the city prosecutor's office.

### **Changes from 1993–1995**

Claire McCaskill replaced Albert Riederer as prosecuting attorney in January 1993 and began what became COMBAT's current phase. In March she hired James Nunnely, a former public health administrator, as COMBAT administrator. (See the case study "The Benefits of Having a Public Health Professional Administer COMBAT" in the appendix.) The prosecuting attorney continued her position as chair of the Fiscal Commission and gave Nunnely responsibility for implementing the entire program subject to her direction, support, and approval.

During 1993, the prosecuting attorney's Anti-Drug Programs Administration division began the process of systematizing the distribution of prevention and treatment funds and of generating collaboration among the three COMBAT components. An important and widely publicized report issued at the end of 1993 lent support and urgency to their efforts. In its December 1993 report, the Legislature's Special Advisory Panel (see chapter 3, COMBAT Administration) criticized the role of the Fiscal Commission—as had other observers—asserting that two major drug treatment providers who were commission members had a conflict of interest in deciding how COMBAT funds would be distributed while at the

same time receiving COMBAT funds. The panel called for modifying the Fiscal Commission “. . . to assure nongovernmental persons and organizations, directly benefiting from funding decisions, are not involved in the funds allocation process . . . .” As a result, in September 1995, *the legislature included a provision substituting a COMBAT Commission for the Fiscal Commission* in the November 1995 referendum to renew the sales tax.

The referendum led to two other significant changes:

- The new legislation gave the county executive administrative authority over the use of COMBAT funds to expand the jail and establish and operate a new jail substance abuse treatment program. The county executive was also given authority to approve the Circuit Court and Family Court COMBAT budgets and to appoint the COMBAT Commission members.
- The new legislation switched the distribution of funds to the principal COMBAT components from a fixed dollar amount to a percentage formula (see exhibit 3-4). In the past, excess revenues from the tax were deposited in an unappropriated surplus account. Each year, program administrators allocated the previous year’s surplus. As a result, COMBAT recipients felt they either had to use their year’s allocation or possibly lose it. Furthermore, COMBAT administrators became concerned that the county legislature might decide to use the surpluses for non-drug related purposes. As a result, the prosecuting attorney, the legislature and county executive agreed to the change to a percentage distribution.

These changes—in particular the increased authority residing in the new COMBAT Commission and the added responsibilities of the county executive—reduced the role of the prosecuting attorney’s office in the overall management of COMBAT. Nevertheless, for several reasons, the prosecuting attorney’s authority for COMBAT remained significant. Overall management of the program remained in the prosecuting attorney’s office because Claire McCaskill had made a concerted effort to bring the disparate components together. In addition, her office alone had an Anti-Drug Tax Programs Administration Division with several staff paid full time with COMBAT funds devoted to improving, expanding, coordinating, and monitoring COMBAT’s various initiatives. McCaskill remained as an ex officio member of the COMBAT Commission, where, under her authority, James Nunnally continued to play an active role in the COMBAT Commission’s activities in the prevention and treatment fields (see the box above, “The Prosecuting Attorney Participates in COMBAT Commission Activities”). Finally, through its administration of the Grant Match Program, the prosecuting attorney’s office continued to exert influence in the prevention arena (and, to a lesser extent, in the treatment field) by choosing carefully the types of programs for which it provided matching funds.

As discussed in detail in chapter 5, COMBAT Administration, the program encountered some serious problems

- In 1993, the initial deferred prosecution program was scrapped and reconfigured.
- Until 1993, there was no plan for how to spend treatment and, especially, prevention monies. As a result, COMBAT funded some initiatives that were only indirectly related to COMBAT's mission.
- Many prevention and treatment providers balked at meeting even the most basic reporting requirements, lacked the expertise and time to do so, or were concerned about how the data might be used.
- Most of the public either remained ignorant of COMBAT or developed the misconception that its only function was to close down drug houses and break up methamphetamine laboratories.
- Early on, there were individuals and organizations in the eastern part of the county that felt resentful that Kansas City was apparently receiving too large a share of the COMBAT funds.
- An effort to commission a comprehensive evaluation of COMBAT in 1992 failed. COMBAT was not successful in arranging another evaluation until 1996.

COMBAT administrators recognized these deficiencies and sought to address them by setting up a new Drug Court in 1993 with its own treatment provider; continuously narrowing the criteria for awarding prevention and treatment contracts and increasing the reporting requirements for grantees; attempting to get the local media to report on COMBAT's prevention and treatment initiatives; and, beginning in 1994, starting to arrange for a comprehensive process and impact evaluation. Claire McCaskill mounted a special campaign through the press and speeches to make clear that more than one-third of the tax revenues were being used to fund programs in Eastern Jackson County. In addition, McCaskill reminded voters that "From day one, Eastern Jackson County has gotten 50 percent of all law enforcement money [through the Drug Task Force]." Furthermore, beginning in 1994 COMBAT awarded a larger proportion of education and prevention contracts to organizations outside the city. McCaskill was assisted in resolving these problems by virtue of her position as chairperson of the Fiscal Commission, by being able to point to the need to take seriously the recommendations of the legislature's Special Advisory Panel, and by spending an average 60 to 65 percent of her time on COMBAT.

### Since Passage of the Second Referendum (1996–1998)

Voters approved a seven-year continuation of the sales tax—and the reorganization of COMBAT (see above)—in 1995, two years before its scheduled expiration date. The second tax is scheduled to expire, unless voters approve another extension, in 2004. There have been no significant organizational or operational changes in COMBAT since the renewal of the COMBAT legislation. However, *the program has continued to expand, establishing a number of significant new initiatives*, the most important of which have been

- the initiation of the Paseo Corridor Partnership, a multi-agency, multipronged effort to rid the corridor of drug dealing and its associated crime and disorder, culminating in a \$250,000 Federal grant to improve the corridor still further;
- construction of a 250-bed jail addition with COMBAT funds begun in 1996, with opening scheduled for the fall of 1998; and
- arranging, in 1996, for the National Institute of Justice to partially fund and, after a competitive procurement, issue a contract for a comprehensive process and impact evaluation of COMBAT—which this report represents.

COMBAT administrators continued to work to improve the program's public relations efforts and to increase collaboration among beneficiaries of the tax. They redoubled their efforts to stimulate innovation among prevention providers.

The COMBAT Commission hired Susan Griffle as its executive director in October 1996, giving COMBAT for the first time someone with management experience who could devote full time to monitoring of COMBAT-funded prevention and education providers, especially in terms of data collection. Griffle instituted new management information systems for collecting data from providers that could form the foundation for evaluating their performance and improving their accountability.

Important staff left the program in 1998, including Pat Glorioso, deputy administrator of the COMBAT Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division in the prosecuting attorney's office; and Major David Barton, a committed manager in the Kansas City police department participating in COMBAT and a supporter of the concept even before the first referendum passed. Claire McCaskill was expected to resign if she won her election for state auditor in the November 1998 elections, though she is expected to retain some advisory involvement. (See the box "Claire McCaskill Played a Critical Role in COMBAT's Operations.")

## **Claire McCaskill Played a Critical Role in the Second Phase of COMBAT's Operations**

Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney from 1993 to 1998, played a decisive role in COMBAT's development.

- As chairperson of the Fiscal Commission, and later, to a much lesser extent, as an ex officio member of the COMBAT Commission, McCaskill exercised considerable authority over the direction COMBAT took in the prevention and treatment arenas.
- In large part because McCaskill hired a public health professional, James Nunnally, to head the prosecuting attorney office's Anti-Drug Programs Administration Unit, COMBAT was able to begin to bridge the gap between the prevention and treatment community, on the one hand, the criminal justice system, on the other hand.
- With considerable previous hands-on experience in fiscal matters as a legislator on county and State budget committees, an unusual grasp of budgetary procedures, and a good memory for figures, McCaskill made sure that COMBAT avoided fiscal irregularities and any taint of scandal.
- She was willing to move beyond the traditional prosecutor's role to focus on the prevention and treatment of substance abuse.
- McCaskill was willing to devote an enormous amount of time to COMBAT—approximately 60 percent of her time, on average, she estimated. Why? In her own words,

I saw an opportunity in COMBAT to make an impact and do something different. Opportunities to do exciting, innovative things don't usually exist on the criminal side of the [prosecutor's] office—the chance to be visionary and figure out how to fix things. My experience of being prosecuting attorney in terms of accomplishments would have been very different without COMBAT.

By the summer of 1998, assured of its existence at least to 2004—a total of 14 years—COMBAT appeared to be institutionalized in Jackson County. A number of organizations, agencies, and voters that seemed to feel they had benefitted substantially from the tax dollars were likely to fight vigorously any attempt to dilute or scuttle the program. Furthermore, some of the agencies and individuals involved in COMBAT initiatives may have concluded that the benefits of collaboration in fighting Jackson County's drug problem outweigh the pre-COMBAT approach of every agency operating independently of each other—and sometimes in competition with.

The danger exists, however, that the single, partnering approach that COMBAT represents for attacking substance abuse may crumble without specific leadership, with the attack reverting

to the pre-1989 fragmented approach. *COMBAT's survival for the long term is likely to require three principal ingredients:*

- (1) *ongoing independent positive evaluations* that the program is reducing the drug problem in order to maintain voter backing and support from the involved parties;
- (2) *a "succession" plan* that ensures that the individuals who replace key players are equally committed and talented.
- (3) *a permanent structure in place* that can help ensure that the program will outlive key individuals who come and go. The tripartite structure involving the prosecuting attorney's office, COMBAT Commission, and county executive appears to be well established. However, how effectively this structure serves to keep the other principal agencies involved—law enforcement, Circuit Court, Family Court—remains to be seen and may not be known until a year or two after the turnover among key staff has been completed.

# CHAPTER 4

## EVALUATION RESULTS

### Key Points

#### Overview

- **Separate sections, each with its own Key Points, address seven COMBAT objectives.**
- **Each discussion includes both a process evaluation and, where feasible, an impact evaluation.**
- **Because many COMBAT initiatives contribute to the achievement of more than one objective, each initiative is treated primarily under only one objective.**
- **References to “COMBAT administrators” refer to the prosecuting attorney office’s Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division staff.**

The sections that follow discuss whether COMBAT achieved seven objectives. Readers should be aware of the following considerations in order to understand this chapter.

- COMBAT established the first three objectives. The National Institute of Justice established the remaining four objectives. This is an important consideration in deciding how much weight to give to COMBAT’s achievements or shortcomings in relation to each objective. (See chapter 2, Evaluation Objectives and Methodology.)
- Many COMBAT initiatives contribute to the achievement of more than one objective. Rather than repeating the descriptions of the same initiatives when they contribute to the achievement of more than one objective, the chapter treats each initiative in detail *under only one objective* and refers the reader to that single discussion as needed throughout the rest of the chapter. For example, Drug Court is intended to further Objective 2, increasing treatment of nonviolent drug offenders. Drug Court is also an example of Objective 5, increased collaboration. However, the chapter treats Drug Court in detail only in the discussion of the increased treatment objective. Exhibit 3-2 in chapter 3 indicates where the principal discussion of each component occurs in the text.



- The chapter includes an *impact assessment* of how well COMBAT achieved the seven objectives and a *process evaluation* of how effectively COMBAT went about attempting to achieve these goals. However, a process evaluation can serve two other purposes: explaining outcome data and helping to determine the extent to which intermediate program goals that are prerequisites to achieving the seven ultimate objectives have been achieved.
- To maintain confidentiality, the report frequently does not identify interviewees by name or title but instead refers to “participants” or “observers.” *Participants are individuals who receive COMBAT funding*—that is, they are part of the COMBAT program. Participants include assistant prosecutors, law enforcement administrators and officers, public officials, and prevention and treatment providers. *Observers are individuals who have paid very close attention to COMBAT’s progress* but as of 1998 were not receiving COMBAT funding. Observers include journalists, community leaders, elected officials, and former COMBAT participants. Appendix A lists the names and positions of the participants and observers interviewed for the evaluation.
- The Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division is a team of individuals in the prosecuting attorney’s office whose salaries are funded entirely by the Anti-Drug Sales Tax. (See chapter 3, COMBAT Synopsis and History.) The unit tries to provide the vision for the entire COMBAT program as well as promoting coordination among its various components. As a result, whenever the text refers to “COMBAT” or “COMBAT staff” as having taken an action, unless specified otherwise *this refers to the COMBAT Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division.*

# Objective 1: Did COMBAT Lead to Increased Jailing of Dangerous Offenders?

## Key Points

### Summary of Findings

- **COMBAT funded in part or entirely several justice system initiatives designed to increase the jailing of dangerous offenders:**
  - **The Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)**, a multi-agency, prosecutor-led attack on drug activity in residences and commercial buildings, took action in 1997 that resulted in
    - ▶ 439 properties being posted or vacated after inspection,
    - ▶ 47 evictions, and
    - ▶ 24 forfeitures/nuisance abatements.Comparable figures for DART activity from 1992 through 1997 are
    - ▶ 1,893 properties posted or vacated,
    - ▶ 412 evictions, and
    - ▶ 63 forfeitures/nuisance abatements.
  - **The Kansas City police department's Street Narcotics Unit (SNU)**, which targets street-level drug dealing, made 915 arrests in 1997 and seized 451 firearms in 1996; from 1990, when it first received COMBAT funding through 1997, SNU effected 5,992 arrests and, through 1996, seized 2,678 firearms.
  - **The police department's Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU)** which targets mid-level drug traffickers, seized drugs from pedestrians or drivers on 1,336 occasions in 1997 and on 206 occasions at airports or bus or train stations. From 1990 through 1997, the DEU made 8,695 seizures under these circumstances.
  - **The Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force**, a multi-agency unit, closed 280 cases in 1997, including 92 methamphetamine laboratories, resulting in the conviction of 88 offenders and the incarceration of 65 offenders. (Accurate data are not available for previous years.)
  - **The Jackson County Jail** completed a 250-bed expansion in 1998.
- **Starting in 1992, the number of felony drug arrest has increased at a markedly faster rate than both non-felony drug arrests and non-drug felony arrests. The SNU and the DEU contributed significantly to the volume of this activity.**

- **Comparisons with data from six other U.S. cities shows that only Kansas City sustained a long-term significant increase in its drug arrest rate over the COMBAT period.**
- **The number of drug cases filed in court from 1989 to 1998 increased 387%. Prosecutorial efficiency was enhanced by the Anti-Drug Unit and Docket O.**
- **Between 1989 and 1995, the number of drug cases filed which resulted in jail or prison increased 163%.**
- **State prison admissions for drug charges increased three times faster from 1992 to 1997 in Jackson County compared to all other Missouri counties.**

#### **Data Sources**

- Uniform Crime Report
- Informer, Circuit Court Data, Alert
- Program materials and hard copy records
- Interviews with COMBAT participants and observers

The first of the three objectives that COMBAT administrators established for the program was *to jail more dangerous offenders than had been incarcerated in the past.*<sup>1</sup> The rationale for this objective was that more jail time should incapacitate offenders for the period of time they are incarcerated, deter them from committing additional crimes after release, and discourage would-be criminals from getting involved in illegal drug activity. The objective was also important because COMBAT's principal message to the public in trying to muster support for passage of the referendum authorizing the Anti-Drug Sales Tax was that the additional funds would be used primarily to improve and increase law enforcement efforts. While treatment was included in the original referendum language, COMBAT's proponents felt that initially the public would not support the tax increase unless the law enforcement component was given the greatest prominence. While over time prevention and treatment have become equally important COMBAT focuses, elected officials and the public are likely to continue to hold COMBAT administrators strictly accountable for achieving this initial and popular objective.

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<sup>1</sup> By "dangerous," program administrators mean offenders engaged in drug trafficking and illegal manufacturing—who create obvious danger for others—as distinguished from simple possession—which on the surface does not endanger other people.

## **Agencies which Support Increasing Jail Time for Dangerous Offenders**

Exhibit OBJ1-1 lists the agencies and units that COMBAT supports along with information about COMBAT's role in the entities' initiation and ongoing funding. Exhibit OBJ1-2 summarizes the funding COMBAT has provided to each criminal justice system entity from 1990 to 1998. The discussion below identifies the criminal justice system entities that COMBAT has funded, their functions, COMBAT's role in their creation or continuation, and their achievements in jailing dangerous offenders.

### **Docket O<sup>2</sup>**

This special docket in the Jackson County Circuit Court calendars all drug cases in the county. Created in 1991, the docket is a management tool for expediting the processing of drug cases. The Circuit Court judge who does arraignments hears all Docket O cases.

*COMBAT support.* COMBAT funds are the principal support for Docket O. In 1998, COMBAT provided \$713,579 for rental space for three State-funded private defense attorneys (because there is no room for them in the courthouse), for the salaries of a bailiff, court reporter, and clerk to staff the docket, and for supplies, furniture, and other costs.

### **Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney Office's Anti-Drug Unit**

Begun in 1990, the Anti-Drug Unit consists of 17 attorneys in two trial teams in the Kansas City courthouse that prosecute only felony drug crimes. One member of the unit, stationed in the Independence, Missouri, courthouse, handles all felony drug cases in Eastern Jackson County, including cases referred by the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force (see below).

*COMBAT Support.* COMBAT funds the entire unit, providing \$2,087,046 in 1998.

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2 Because he was in charge of criminal dockets at the time Docket O was being designed, Judge John O'Malley was asked to name the docket. He named it after the first initial of his last name.

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**Exhibit OBJ1-1**

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**Summary of Agencies and Units COMBAT Supports Designed to Increase Jail Time for Dangerous Offenders**

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Agency or Unit	Parent Agency	Function	Date initiated	Extent Supported by COMBAT <sup>1</sup>
Docket O	Circuit Court	Calendars all drug cases, expediting their processing	1991	• funds (100%)
Anti-Drug Unit	Prosecuting Attorney's Office	Prosecutes all felony drug crimes	1990	• funds (100%)
Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)	Prosecuting Attorney's Office	Multiagency unit that investigates drug activity in residences and commercial buildings and closes them through civil abatement or forfeiture actions	1990	• partly funds (25%)
Street Narcotics Unit (SNU)	Kansas City Police Department	Targets low-level or street drug dealing	1989	• partly funds (about 50%)
Drug Enforcement Unit (DUE)	Kansas City Police Department	Targets mid-level drug trafficking	1986	• partly funds
Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force (Drug Task Force)	Prosecuting Attorney's Office	Multiagency unit investigates drug trafficking in the eastern part of the county	1986	• mostly funds (87%)
Jackson County Jail (expansion)	County Executive's Office	Houses pretrial and sentenced offenders	1996	•partly funded (%NA)
Jackson County Jail (inmate boarding expenses)	County Executive's Office	Boards some inmates in other jurisdictions due to overcrowding in Jackson County	1995-1997	• funds (100%)

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<sup>1</sup> Based on COMBAT's role in initiating and funding the activity

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**Exhibit OBJ1-2****COMBAT Funding for Two Criminal Justice System Entities**

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<b>Year</b>	<b>Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)</b>	<b>Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force</b>
1990	67,000	1,125,000
1991	75,844	1,150,000
1992	81,313	1,150,000
1993	85,562	1,150,000
1994	93,197	1,150,000
1995	65,610	1,825,000 <sup>2</sup>
1996	80,758	1,953,044 <sup>2</sup>
1997	98,365	2,071,846 <sup>2</sup>
1998	99,190	2,016,265 <sup>1,2</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>746,839</b>	<b>11,638,111</b>

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<sup>1</sup> Includes previous surplus allocations from 1995, unspent 1996 allocation, and percent of available 1996 surplus allocation in 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Includes grant match.

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**Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)**

The Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) is a multiagency prosecutorial unit run by an assistant prosecuting attorney that includes a second attorney, an investigator, and a paralegal from the prosecutor's office, a Kansas City housing code inspector, and a Missouri fire inspector. The team works closely with police officers from the Kansas City police department's Street Narcotics Unit (see below). Several Kansas City municipal departments volunteer their services to the team, as needed, including the health, public works, water, and animal control departments. The team identifies and investigates drug activity in residences and commercial buildings and then develops strategies for closing them, including making controlled buys, serving search warrants, conducting health and fire code inspections, notifying property owners of their delinquency, and pursuing civil abatement and forfeiture actions.

*Combat support.* The DART team began in 1990 with a \$200,000 grant from the State of Missouri and \$67,000 from the Anti-Drug Sales tax. In 1998, COMBAT provided \$99,190, representing 25 percent of the unit's funding. (This percentage will increase to 40 percent in

1999.) The COMBAT funds serve as the match for DART to qualify for the \$295,094 in Federal funding that makes up the balance of its 1998 \$393,458 operating budget. The DART budget includes \$55,994 to pay for Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) officer overtime to assist in DART Team operations; \$36,000 for a city housing code inspector to inspect properties; \$5,000 for a fire marshall inspector to inspect properties; and \$10,000 for manuals for educating retailers concerning dangers and practices of methamphetamine manufacturing.

### **DART Convinces a Landlord to Mend His Ways**

Because forfeiture cases take a year to complete, and the property will lie abandoned during that time period, DART prefers to motivate owners to mend their ways and continue to rent their properties to law-abiding tenants. After numerous complaints and undercover buys, DART filed, but did not serve, an abatement and forfeiture petition against a landlord who owns 60 low-income properties in Jackson County that rent for \$200 to \$300 a month. When a woman telephoned DART to report a drug problem with yet another of his properties, DART's head called the owner into his office and told him that he would not serve the petition if the owner would evict the tenants at the property. The property owner did so within 10 days and re-rented the property to law-abiding tenants. Since then, his name has appeared much less frequently among the complaints reported to DART.

From October 1992 through December 31, 1997, DART had 1,893 properties posted or vacated, effected 412 evictions, and completed 63 nuisance abatements or forfeitures. In 1997, DART activity led to 396 properties being posted or vacated after inspection, 20 evictions, and 63 forfeitures or nuisance abatements. As of early 1998, DART was filing one forfeiture every two or three months.

**Exhibit OBJ1-3**

**Summary of Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) Activity 1992- 1997**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Total Actions<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Properties Posted or Vacated<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Evictions<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Nuisance Abatements and Forfeitures Completed<sup>4</sup></b>
1992 <sup>a</sup>	63	63	0	0
1993	489	262	222	5
1994	370	293	70	7
1995	498	440	53	5
1996	512	439 <sup>b</sup>	47 <sup>b</sup>	26 <sup>b</sup>
1997	436	396	20	20
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,368</b>	<b>1,893</b>	<b>412</b>	<b>63</b>

<sup>a</sup> October, November, and December only.

<sup>b</sup> Data for December not available.

- 1 The Drug Abatement Response Team takes other actions in addition to those tabulated in the exhibit, such as sending notice letters informing home owners of illegal drug activity at their properties and requesting corrective action, and conducting fire and housing inspections. The actions included in the exhibit represent successful completions of DART initiatives.
- 2 A property designated as posted (only after an inspection) restricts any person from inhabiting or entering the property. Any person found on the premises is subject to arrest for trespassing.
- 3 Evictions occur when a property owner, after DART has notified the person of confirmed illegal activity, files formal eviction proceedings against the tenant and the court has granted the request.
- 4 A nuisance abatement is a declaration by the Circuit Court that a property constitutes a public nuisance. The court orders that the structure be secured and boarded for a period of up to a year. A DART attorney may file a forfeiture action against a property if the attorney has notified the owner of confirmed illegal activity and the problem continues. If approved by the court, the State of Missouri becomes the owner of the property.

**Street Narcotics Unit (SNU)**

A unit within the Kansas City Police Department's Narcotics and Vice Division, SNU was formed in 1989 to attack street-level drug dealing. The unit has six squads: two tactical squads (that conduct raids and open air buy/bust operations); two undercover squads (that set up the tactical units); one gang squad; and one administrative staff squad (that reviews and completes case files, presents evidence in court, and deals with prisoners).

*COMBAT support.* In 1998, COMBAT funded 15 of SNU's total of 32 positions—one of the two undercover units, one of the two tactical units, the administrator, and the two clerical staff. (See the budget figures under Drug Enforcement Unit below.) COMBAT contributes matching funds (\$55,994 in 1998) to enable the department to secure Federal funding for SNU officers' overtime pay. COMBAT also paid for vehicles and equipment (e.g., guns,



ammunition, office supplies, body armor) to equip the sworn personnel and paid for their training. COMBAT provides SNU's "buy" money. Over the years, COMBAT has provided \$7,000–\$10,000 for each of three drug dogs, including their purchase, a dog run, and training of the handlers. Early on, COMBAT paid the cost of purchasing an automated gas chromatograph to replace the manual machine the department had been using.

Exhibit OBJ1-4 shows the nature and level of SNU activity from 1989 through 1997. As shown, the number of narcotics arrests for selling and possession resulting from search warrants and buy/bust operations declined from 1990 to 1992 and then, with the exception of arrests from search warrants, increased steadily. From 1990 through 1998, the unit made a total of 5,992 drug-related arrests. From 1990 through 1996, the unit also seized 2,678 firearms, including 226 assault weapons.

### **Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU)**

A second unit within the Kansas City Police Department's Narcotics and Vice Division, the DEU was formed in 1986 to attack mid-level drug traffickers who supply neighborhood drug dealers. The DEU's 42 personnel investigate persons engaged in the trafficking of illegal drugs. The DEU develops cases in cooperation with Federal, State, and county agencies, and develops court cases in the State and Federal systems. The unit includes financial investigations, interdiction, undercover, and administrative sections.

*COMBAT funding.* In 1998, COMBAT funded 14 DEU positions—one sergeant, nine detectives, and four civilians—representing one-third of SNU's personnel. The drug tax legislation requires that 9.5 percent of COMBAT funds be disbursed to the department. COMBAT provided \$1,565,398 in 1998 to fund 14 DEU staff, the 15 SNU positions (see above), and two chemists. COMBAT also paid \$277,909 for a number of police department contractual services related to staffing SNU and DEU, such as \$112,000 for investigation expenses (e.g., money for drug buys, informant fees) and \$35,400 for supplies (e.g., \$12,000 for gasoline).

**Exhibit OBJ1-4**  
**Street Narcotics Unit Summary Statistics by Year**

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Totals 1990- 1997
Narcotic Purchases	372	497	789	1,363	1,208	799	967	1,067	1,175	7,865
Narcotic Sales Arrests	0	560	388	235	270	141	115	148	158	2,015
Narcotic Possession Arrests	161	548	172	194	227	271	387	417	458	2,674
Weight of Cocaine Seized (oz)	3	4	85	64	77	148	77	291	NA	746
Value of Purchased and Seized Narcotics	\$19,993	29,776	423,134	320,223	417,502	888,458	488,988	1,519,326	NA	\$4,087,407
Value of Currency	\$4,152	8,737	97,881	166,715	105,445	296,431	264,475	267,320	NA	\$1,207,004
Firearms Seized	10	28	339	565	449	403	433	451	NA	2,668

## Exhibit OBJ 1-5A

**KCPD DRUG ENFORCEMENT UNIT  
Drug Seizure Summary, 1989-1998**

Category	Activity										Totals 1990-1998
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	
Field Possession Arrests <sup>1</sup>	1,708	663	1,016	684	835	1,115	1,225	1,206	1,336	1,354	11,142
Cases Filed as a Result	557	234	137	223	371	563	651	929	1,108	1,043	5,816
DEU Possession Arrests	238	106	85	98	85	46	62	355	415	303	1,793
DEU Sales Arrests	145	74	82	105	114	124	31	59	49	38	821
Cases Filed as a Result	167	164	86	103	124	110	36	282	280	212	1,564
Interdiction Arrests <sup>2</sup>	0	16	53	55	51	107	119	220	124	140	885
Cases Filed as a Result	0	16	47	54	51	96	116	220	124	140	864
<b>Total # of Drug Arrests</b>	<b>2,061</b>	<b>859</b>	<b>1,236</b>	<b>942</b>	<b>1,085</b>	<b>1,266</b>	<b>1,437</b>	<b>1,840</b>	<b>1,924</b>	<b>1,835</b>	<b>14,485</b>
<b>Total # Cases Filed</b>	<b>573</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>769</b>	<b>803</b>	<b>1,431</b>	<b>1,512</b>	<b>1,395</b>	<b>8,003</b>
Drug Purchases	297	153	168	195	249	235	63	98	82	87	1,627
Search Warrants <sup>3</sup>	81	67	44	48	53	75	53	96	136	146	799
Interdictions <sup>4</sup>	0	17	90	100	84	193	204	348	223	258	1,517
Other Drug Contacts <sup>5</sup>	35	10	20	14	4	5	2	0	3	0	93
<b>Total # Drug Contacts</b>	<b>413</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>542</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>4,036</b>

1 Patrol officer makes a car stop or a pedestrian check and then makes a seizure.

2 Undercover officer assigned to one of the drug units makes a purchase of narcotics in preparation for a case.

3 Officers assigned to the drug unit have applied for warrants to search and seize drugs.

4 Arrests and searches and seizures made at airports and at bus and train stations.

5 E.g., deliveries of drugs through the mail, drugs found in an abandoned apartment in an apartment complex.

## Exhibit OBJ 1-5B

**KCPD DRUG NARCOTICS UNIT**  
**Drug Activity Summary, 1990-1998**

Category	Activity									Totals 1990-1998
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	
Possession Arrests <sup>1</sup> /Search Warrants	548	172	194	227	271	387	417	458	337	3,051
Sales Arrests/Search Warrants	560	338	235	270	141	115	148	158	159	2,174
Possession Arrests/Buy Busts	16	33	4	14	8	30	53	60	55	273
Sales Arrests/Buy Busts	51	55	42	126	120	135	156	239	248	1,172
<b>Total # of Drug Arrests</b>	<b>1,175</b>	<b>684</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>667</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>915</b>	<b>839</b>	<b>6,670</b>
<b>Cases Filed as a Result</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>509</b>	<b>376</b>	<b>693</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>882</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>648</b>	<b>691</b>	<b>5,821</b>
All Other Arrests from Search Warrants and Buy Busts	326	443	866	702	599	810	1,141	1,022	1,114	7,023
Recovered Firearms	353	339	565	449	403	435	451	399	289	3,683
Drug Purchases	497	789	1,363	1,208	799	967	1,067	1,175	1,261	9,126
Search Warrants <sup>3</sup>	340	403	739	752	500	583	656	559	607	5,139
Buy Busts	82	37	50	92	93	121	189	243	212	14,265
<b>Total # Drug Contacts</b>	<b>919</b>	<b>1,229</b>	<b>2,152</b>	<b>2,052</b>	<b>1,392</b>	<b>1,671</b>	<b>1,912</b>	<b>1,977</b>	<b>2,080</b>	<b>15,384</b>

1 Patrol officer makes a car stop or a pedestrian check and then makes a seizure.

2 Undercover officer assigned to one of the drug units makes a purchase of narcotics in preparation for a case.

3 Officers assigned to the drug unit have applied for warrants to search and seize drugs.

4 Arrests and searches and seizures made at airports and at bus and train stations.

5 E.g., deliveries of drugs through the mail, drugs found in an abandoned apartment in an apartment complex.

Exhibit OBJ1-5 shows the nature and level of DEU activity from 1989 through 1997. As shown, there are no trends in the number of field possessions, buy/busts, search warrants executed, interdictions at airports, train and bus stations, and other activities (e.g., drugs found in an abandoned apartment). There was a consistent upward trend in the number of units buys from 1990 through 1993 and then a decline from 1993 through 1997.

### **Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force (Drug Task Force)**

The Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force investigates drug crimes in the parts of Jackson County that are outside the jurisdiction of the Kansas City police department. These crimes are offenses which local law enforcement agencies lack the personnel or expertise to target effectively. The task force consists of a board of directors composed of the chiefs of each of 13 participating law enforcement agencies; four executive staff (an administrator, chemical analyst, private attorney, and fiscal officer who manages grants but is also a police officer); 23 officers; and two clerical staff. Six of the 13 law enforcement agencies in Eastern Jackson County contribute the sworn personnel. The task force is authorized through a written cooperative agreement among the participating cities, the county, and the sheriff's department as a quasi-governmental entity under Missouri statute and case law. The Drug Task Force began by focusing on drug trafficking but, beginning in 1995, began paying more and more attention to the methamphetamine manufacturing laboratories that for unknown reasons were springing up all over Eastern Jackson County.<sup>3</sup>

*COMBAT support.* The 1995 legislation authorizing COMBAT specifies that "[The] County shall provide funding to Drug Task Force in an amount not to exceed 9.5 percent of the annual distribution of the Anti-Drug Sales Tax." COMBAT provided \$2,016,265 of the Drug Task Force's \$2,320,265 million budget in 1998 (87 percent). The Missouri Department of Public Safety provided the task force with \$304,000 in Federal Byrne Narcotics Control Assistance Program (NCAP) grant monies for which, since 1995, COMBAT has provided the match (\$34,998 in 1998). The Drug Task Force budget is also used to lease office space and vehicles, as well as to pay for officers' salaries, who receive 10 percent extra pay for working on the task force. Monies from forfeitures have paid for the telephone system, computers, and equipment. The Federal Government's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program (HIDTA) pays for disposing of the chemicals from seized methamphetamine laboratories.

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<sup>3</sup> For reasons of civil liability related to the danger of explosion resulting in potential injury and environmental contamination whenever amateurs are manufacturing methamphetamine, the Drug Task Force has to make every methamphetamine laboratory case a priority. As a result, the organization devotes about one-third of its time to just this problem. Because of the training the Task Force officers and some members of the Kansas City Police Department received from the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), until 1998 the Drug Task Force in Jackson County has had the primary responsibility in handling methamphetamine cases. In 1997, the Kansas City police department also began developing an in-house methamphetamine unit with assistance from the Drug Task Force.

Drug Task Force activities for 1997 are shown in exhibit OBJ1-6. As shown, the unit closed 280 cases, including 92 involving methamphetamine laboratories, resulting in the conviction of 88 offenders and the incarceration of 65 offenders, 46 in State prison and 19 in Federal prison. Of the 280 cases presented in court—a case nearly every working day—only four were dismissed (1.4 percent). The Drug Task Force had closed another 15 laboratories during the first three months of 1998. Compared with 14 convictions in 1996 and 88 in 1997, during the first five months of 1998, the task force obtained the convictions of 110 offenders with a drug incarceration rate of 47 percent—the highest rate of any law enforcement agency in the State (data not shown). Because it did not collect data systematically until late 1996, the task force's achievements before 1997 cannot be documented.

### **Jackson County Jail**

The county jail houses pretrial defendants and offenders sentenced in the Jackson County Circuit Court to less than one year. Sixty-eight percent of the jail's inmates were pretrial detainees in 1998. The jail was operating under a Federal consent decree that prohibited it from housing more than 624 inmates at any one time.

*COMBAT support.* From 1996 to 1998, COMBAT furnished the county executive with over \$20 million for constructing a new wing in the jail and renovating the existing facility. Approximately \$9 million represented an accumulation of COMBAT money earmarked for the county executive but never expended. The remaining \$11.2 million included \$2.1 million in unappropriated 1996 corrections revenue generated by the Anti-Drug Tax, \$3.8 million in interest and unspent funding since 1995, and \$5.3 million in surplus revenue generated by the tax between 1990 and 1995. Future surpluses will pay for the needed additional personnel to staff the new wing after the jail has been expanded. In 1995 and 1996, COMBAT also contributed a total of \$640,162 to the cost of housing inmates in other jurisdictions. COMBAT made this contribution because it was felt that a certain portion of the overpopulation in the jail was the result of increased drug arrests that the program had generated.

## Exhibit OBJ1-6

### Jackson County Drug Task Force 1997 Annual Statistics

#### Cases

- 288 cases presented – Federal 8; State 280
- 4 dismissals – Federal 1; State 3
- 206 investigation cases opened
- 280 investigation cases closed
- 92 methamphetamine laboratory cases closed

#### Convictions

- 19 offenders convicted and *incarcerated* in Federal Court
- 46 offenders convicted and *incarcerated* in State Court
- 42 offenders placed on probation – Federal 1; State 41
- Asset forfeitures received – \$18,563.45

#### Seizures

- 71 weapons
- \$30,740 in currency

In 1998 the jail adds 82,000 square feet to provide 250 new beds—a 40 percent increase in capacity. Only four to six additional staff will be needed to operate the new wing, however, because the unit will involve direct supervision.<sup>4</sup> Construction began in August 1996, and completion was in the summer of 1998.

## COMBAT Funding Is Responsible for Much of the Increase in Law Enforcement Activity

*Most participants believe that most of the increase in law enforcement activity in the 1990s in Jackson County would not have occurred without COMBAT.*

### Anecdotal Evidence Also Suggests the Drug Task Force Is Jailing More Offenders

- Drug Task Force undercover agents purchased case lots of pseudoephedrine (called “mini thins”), an ingredient used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, at the five top retailers in the county, tape recording all the purchases. While merchants know that the only purpose for purchasing the drug in such large quantities is to manufacture

<sup>4</sup> Direct supervision requires fewer staff than normal jails need because the architectural design permits direct contact between staff and inmates without physical barriers (bars, glass, doors). Typically, one or two correctional officers staff a desk within the unit and circulate as needed.

methamphetamine, the Drug Task Force needed incriminating evidence of this knowledge. Fortunately, the owner of one of the establishments, a liquor store in Independence, was taped telling an undercover officer, "I know what you're doing with this. So I'll give you a break on the price if you give me some product [i.e., methamphetamine]." Later, the Drug Task Force made arrests at all five establishments on the same day. The attorney for the owner of the liquor store recommended a plea bargain. However, the new prosecuting attorney in Independence insisted on his losing his liquor license, which costs \$1,000, and the judge agreed. As a result, according to Michael Shanahan, the task force head, some of the other retail stores have pulled the product from their inventory.

- Jeffrey Valenti, the assistant prosecuting attorney in Independence wrote the Drug Task Force executive director a letter in which he said, "... I spoke with one of our defendants about the production of methamphetamine . . . . [The defendant was in prison and had several masters degrees, as well as a Ph.D. in chemistry from [the University of California at] Berkeley. This guy clearly knew what was what in the meth world. He told me that we had done a good job in limiting mom and pop meth labs by shutting down the supply of pseudoephedrine."
- Jeffrey Valenti asked the judge for very high bail in one case for a defendant who had already been arrested three times on murder charges—and released each time on his own recognizance. The Task Force provided the basis for the request, and the judge agreed. The offender remained in jail pending trial and is now in prison.
- An illegal methamphetamine manufacturer whom the Drug Task Force turned over to the U.S. Attorney pled guilty in Federal court and was being held without bond because Federal courts allow prevention detention. In the past, he had been able to post bond in State court in excess of \$3.4 million.

- **Docket O** would not have been instituted without COMBAT. According to Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, her office needed to segregate drug cases in order to prove to the county legislature and the taxpayers that Anti-Drug Tax monies were not being used for processing nondrug cases. In addition, she could not have staffed the docket unless COMBAT funds had been available for hiring additional attorneys.
- The Prosecuting Attorney's **Anti-Drug Unit** would not have existed without COMBAT funding for additional attorneys.
- The **Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)** would have existed without COMBAT, but its reach would have been considerably reduced if no other funding source had been found to help pay staff salaries and pay SNU officers to work overtime on DART-related undercover and tactical activities. Furthermore, COMBAT funds represented the match that enabled the unit to secure Federal funding.



- The **Street Narcotics Unit** would have been 50 percent smaller without the funding COMBAT provided to hire additional officers. Before COMBAT began providing monies, the police department had concluded that, to reduce the drug problem, it needed to attack both retail (street-level) drug sales and also mid-level traffickers. The department had the funds to address only one of these problems—the mid-level dealers. It had established only a temporary task force to deal with retail level sales. COMBAT funding enabled the department to turn the task force into a permanent unit—SNU—and to expand the mid-level unit—the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU).
- The **Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force** existed before COMBAT, started with seed money from a local philanthropist. However, participants believe that, without COMBAT funds, it would either have fallen apart or have had to drastically curtail its activities. If COMBAT were to vanish today, the smaller departments that contribute officers would have to lay off some of their own officers in order to bring the Drug Task Force officers back into their ranks. The larger departments might be able to keep the Drug Task Force afloat.
- The **Jail**, according to several participants including some county legislators and the county executive, would have been expanded without COMBAT funding because a Federal court order required the county to develop and submit a plan for addressing the overcrowding problem that would involve the addition of at least 200 new beds. However, it would have been difficult to raise the money. There was no guarantee that the voters would have approved a bond, and the State requires voter approval of any increase in local taxes. Indeed, in August 1996 the voters had already rejected a use tax to fund jail construction. According to one legislator, “We would have been in trouble” if COMBAT had not provided the money. The county would either have had to have floated a general obligation bond on the public debt market to finance the construction—and paid off the interest on the bonds from general tax revenues—or gone back to the voters for a tax increase after mounting a more compelling campaign for the money. While it appears likely that the increase of 250 beds will make it possible to provide additional jail space for some dangerous drug offenders, participants predict that the beds will be filled immediately and not resolve the crowding problem. Furthermore, it is not known how many of the additional beds will be occupied by dangerous drug offenders as opposed to other defendants or offenders.

## The Impact of COMBAT Programs on Increasing the Number of Offenders Jailed


This section reports the data available to address COMBAT Objective 1. These analyses are based on a variety of data sources. The main data sets that Abt Associates obtained and processed for this analysis include:

- **Kansas City Police Department arrest data.** The KCPD provided arrest-level information (e.g., date of arrest and the arrest charge) on all felony arrests made by KCPD officers from 1989 through 1997. In addition, annual counts of all drug arrests, including misdemeanors, were obtained. While KCPD arrests constitute the vast majority of arrests made in Jackson County, not having county-wide arrest data is obviously a limitation of our analysis. In addition, geographic identifiers were not available for each arrest and, thus, it was not possible to separate Jackson County from non-Jackson County KCPD arrests.
- **Arrest data from comparison cities.** Arrest information from five cities that were part of Abt Associates' national evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed—Hartford (CT), Pittsburgh (PA), Salt Lake City (UT), Seattle (WA), and Shreveport (LA)—were used to place the KCPD drug arrest trends in some perspective. This study was conducted for the National Institute of Justice.
- **Circuit Court data.** The 16<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court provided charge-level information (e.g., the charge type, disposition type, and sentence imposed) on all cases filed at the court from 1980 through 1997.
- **Prison admissions.** Annual admissions for drug offenses to the Missouri State Penitentiary, broken down by the county where the offender was convicted, were also obtained.

### KCPD Arrests

An increase in the number of drug arrests combined with prosecutorial efficiency can result in an increase in the jailings of serious offenders. Exhibit OBJ1-7 shows, for the KCPD, the total number of all drug arrests and felony drug arrests by year from 1989 to 1997. As the exhibit shows, there has been a steady increase in these arrests starting around 1992, approximately two years after the start of COMBAT. The number of felony drug arrests has increased at a significantly faster rate than both non-felony drug arrests (roughly three times faster) and non-drug felony arrests (roughly four times faster), as the summary table below shows:

## Exhibit OBJ1-7 KCPD Drug Arrests by Year



Category of KCPD Arrests	Number in 1989	Number in 1997	Percent Change
All Drug Arrests	4,277	8,120	90%
Felony Drug Arrests	1,470	3,887	164%
Non-Felony Drug Arrests	2,807	4,233	51%
Non-Drug Felony Arrests	7,315	10,281	41%

Unfortunately, as noted earlier, corresponding figures for other law enforcement agencies in Jackson County were not available, so that it is unclear whether arrests in towns like Independence show similar dramatic increases.

How do these data stack up against trends in other cities? Drug arrest trends in Kansas City differ from other U.S. cities that were part of Abt Associates' national Weed and Seed evaluation. Exhibit OBJ1-8 shows the number of drug arrests per 1,000 persons in Hartford, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Shreveport, in addition to Kansas City. The exhibit shows that of these six cities, Kansas City was the only one to experience any significant sustained increase in the drug arrest rate.<sup>5</sup> Beginning in 1993, arrest rates began to rise in five of the six cities, but continued to increase steadily only in Kansas City.

## Drug Case Filings in Court

Arrests need to turn into prosecutions. Given the substantial increase in KCPD drug arrests, particularly felony drug arrests, one would expect to see a similar increase in drug case filings at the 16<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court.


Exhibit OBJ1-9 shows the annual number of drug cases filed in the court from 1980 to 1997. The number of filings increased from fewer than 250 per year throughout the 1980s to over 2,000 in 1997. In fact, the number of drug cases filed has increased even faster than the increase in KCPD drug arrests noted above. Whereas the number of KCPD felony drug arrests increased 164 percent from 1989 to 1997 and the number of all KCPD drug arrests increased 90 percent over that time period, the number of drug cases filed increased 387 percent over that same period. Although clearly there are law enforcement agencies other than the KCPD contributing cases to the court (some of whose drug arrest rates may have increased even faster than the KCPD's), these data suggest that the fraction of drug arrests that get filed in court has been increasing during the 1990s. That is, a lower percentage of

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<sup>5</sup> In considering this exhibit, it is important to understand that Weed and Seed was not a city-wide initiative like COMBAT but was instead implemented in a small geographic region of the city. In these five cities Weed and Seed drug arrests accounted from anywhere from 5 percent to 25 percent of the city's total number of drug arrests. Thus, Weed and Seed was not necessarily expected to impact significantly the city-wide drug arrest rates.


## Exhibit OBJ1-8

### Drug Arrest Rates by Year: Kansas City vs. Other Weed and Seed Cities



# Exhibit OBJ1-9

## Drug Cases Filed in Circuit Court



drug arrestees are being released prior to an initial court appearance. Thus, not only are more drug arrests being made, but a higher fraction of them are actually being prosecuted in the courts.

The summary table below suggests that the increase in drug cases filed in the 16<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court since just before the start of COMBAT is almost entirely responsible for the overall increase in cases filed with the court.

Type of Case	Number Filed in 1989	Number Filed in 1997	Percent Change
All Cases	6,348	8,047	27%
Drug Cases	484	2,355	387%
Non-Drug Cases	5,864	5,692	-3%
Non-Drug Felony Cases	3,967	4,053	2%

Similar data from other Missouri Circuits was not available for analysis, so we could not determine the extent to which these patterns were unique to the 16<sup>th</sup> Circuit.

## Number of Offenders Sentenced to Jail or Prison

Given the substantial increase in the number of drug cases filed in the 16<sup>th</sup> Circuit, one would expect to see a concomitant increase in the number of cases which result in either a jail or prison sentence. And, as shown in Exhibit OBJ1-10, this in fact occurred. The exhibit shows the number of drug cases resulting in a jail or prison sentence for each year between 1980 and 1995.<sup>6</sup> The chart shows three distinct time periods: between 1980 and 1988 the number of sentenced offenders remained essentially constant; between 1988 and 1989 the number of sentenced offenders nearly tripled; and since 1989 (i.e., the last complete year prior to the start of COMBAT) the number of sentenced offenders has steadily increased. Between 1989 and 1995, the number of drug cases resulting in a jail or prison sentence increased 163 percent. As shown in the table below, the corresponding figure for non-drug cases is only 23 percent.


Again, the extent to which similar patterns existed in other Missouri Circuits could not be determined.

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6 Although the Circuit Court database provided to Abt Associates contained all case filings through the end of 1997, a significant number of cases filed in 1996 and 1997 did not have final dispositions and are therefore not included in the analysis.

# Exhibit OBJ1-10

## Circuit Court Drug Cases Resulting in Jail/Prison Sentence





Type of Case	Number of Cases Receiving Jail or Prison Sentence in 1989	Number of Cases Receiving Jail or Prison Sentence in 1995	Percent Change
All Cases	2,306	3,291	43%
Drug Cases	322	848	163%
Non-Drug Cases	1,984	2,443	23%
Non-Drug Felony Cases	1,599	1,499	-6%

## Prison Admissions

Finally, prosecutions need to turn into penalties. Data were obtained on the number of admissions to the Missouri State Penitentiary system. Note that this analysis does not include offenders sentenced to other facilities, such as the Jackson County jail, that were included in the analysis of court case outcomes.

Exhibit OBJ1-11 shows the annual number of offenders convicted on drug charges in Jackson County that entered the prison system. While pre-COMBAT figures were not available, the annual number of admissions increased 66 percent from 1992 to 1997. This level of increase compares to a 21 percent increase in prison admissions contributed by all other Missouri counties combined. That is, prison admissions for drug charges increased three times faster from 1992 to 1997 in Jackson County compared to the rest of the State.


Figures were not available on actual time served in prison.

## Assessing COMBAT's Contribution to Jailing Dangerous Offenders Is Complex

COMBAT was responsible for a considerable amount of increased law enforcement activity in Jackson County intended to increase the jailing of dangerous offenders. For example, it is clear that the dollars that make it possible for SNU, DEU, and the Drug Task Force to hire additional police officers result in an increase in drug-related arrests. The prosecuting attorney's office could not have handled the increased caseload without the Anti-Drug Unit, and the Circuit Court could not have handled the expanded volume of cases—without Docket O and Drug Court.

# Exhibit OBJ1-11

## Missouri State Prison Drug Case Admissions from Jackson County



Unfortunately, limitations in the available data preclude making more definitive assessments of the extent to which there was an increase in dangerous offenders who have been jailed since COMBAT began, and the extent to which any increase that has occurred can be attributed only to COMBAT. These limitations are summarized briefly below.

- The ability to connect criminal justice data systems in the county is limited by varying construction of definitions across systems, lack of common identifiers, incomplete records, and differing historical start points.
- In the case of jailings of methamphetamine manufacturers, there are no “baseline” data with which to compare the Drug Task Force’s achievements in jailing offenders because the problem did not exist until the mid-1990s—that is, there were no manufacturers who needed to be jailed. As a result, it is possible that at least some of these criminals would have been caught and jailed without COMBAT.
- Most entities merged their COMBAT funds with monies from other sources, making it difficult to distinguish COMBAT’s contribution to the agency’s or unit’s achievements. For example, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which COMBAT funding for SNU and DEU resulted in increased arrests, much less jailing, of dangerous offenders, because there are no aggregate data that distinguish arrests by COMBAT-funded personnel from non-COMBAT funded personnel. Only the effects of the entire units can be examined. Furthermore, comparing arrests before and during the period of COMBAT funding is misleading because the police department gained and lost other sources of funding during that time period which influenced staffing levels and drug enforcement activities independently of COMBAT’s contribution.
- In the absence of complete and valid data on incarceration rates, it becomes necessary to rely on intermediate measures of increased jailing, such as arrests and case filings. However, these proxy measures do not prove that there was an increase in the number of drug dealers who were actually incarcerated.

### **National Trends**

Jail populations have increased dramatically throughout the country during the years COMBAT has been in existence. As shown in exhibit OBJ1-12 total inmates in custody in State and Federal prisons, and in local jails, increased from 1,148,702 in 1990 to 1,725,842 as of June 30, 1997, representing a total increase of 5.9 percent and an annual average increase since 1990 of 6.5 percent. The jail population increased from 405,320 in 1990 to 567,079 in mid-1997, representing a total increase of 9.4 percent and an annual average increase of 4.9 percent. Since the number of incarcerated individuals increased nationwide from 1990 to

<b>Exhibit OBJ1-12</b>					
<b>Number of Persons Held in State and Federal Prisons, and in Local Jails, 1985, 1990-97<sup>a</sup></b>					
Year	Total Inmates in Custody	Prisoners in Custody		Inmates Held in Local Jails	Jackson County Jail Population <sup>b</sup>
		Federal	State		
1985	744,208	35,781	451,812	256,615	518
1990	1,148,702	58,838	684,544	405,320	630
1991	1,219,014	63,930	728,605	426,479	579
1992	1,295,150	72,071	778,495	444,584	603
1993	1,369,185	80,815	828,566	459,804	558
1994	1,476,621	85,500	904,647	486,474	650
1995	1,585,586	89,538	989,004	507,044	548
1996	1,646,020	95,088	1,032,440	NA	NA
1997 (June 30)	1,725,842	99,175	1,059,588	567,079	617
Percent change 12/31/90 – 6/30/97	5.9%	6.4%	4.1%	9.4%	1.1%
Annual average increase, 12/31/90 – 6/30/97	6.5%	8.4%	7.0%	4.9%	NA
<p>Note: Jail counts are for midyear (June 30). Counts for 1994-97 exclude persons who were supervised outside of a jail facility. State and Federal prisoner counts for 1990-96 are for December 31.</p> <p><sup>a</sup> Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 1997," U.S. Department of Justice, January 1998, p. 2.</p> <p><sup>b</sup> Source: Laura Dec, MIS specialist, Jackson County Jail, personal communication, July 14, 1998.</p>					

1997, it is difficult to conclude that COMBAT alone was responsible for the increase in jailings of dangerous offenders in Jackson County. The same factors that are thought to be responsible for the increased numbers of incarcerated individuals in other parts of the country may have accounted for increased jailings in Jackson County, including stiffer sentences by judges, increased mandatory prison legislation (e.g., for driving under the influence, illegal possession of firearms), three-strikes-and-you're-out legislation, and the criminalization of previously noncriminal offenses and activity. However, the rate of incarceration in Jackson County compared to the rates in other Missouri counties provides compelling descriptive data.

In addition, several COMBAT participants and observers reported that, with one exception, these conditions did not exist in Missouri or Jackson County. Judges may have independently decided to mete out more severe sentences, require bail more often, or set higher bail in recent

years in response to a perception that the public was increasingly criticizing the courts for being too lenient with drug offenders. Even in this case, however, participants believe that it was COMBAT administrators who educated judges to the importance of jailing dangerous drug offenders. For example, the head of the Drug Task Force met with the judge in Independence, Missouri, to request stiffer sentences, and Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney played a role in changing some judges' behavior by stimulating public demand for the need for strict law enforcement.

The number of drug arrests increased nationally both before and during the period of COMBAT's operation.

- Examination of the numbers of arrests for all crimes, violent crime, and drug abuse violations nationwide shows consistent increases from the mid-1980s through 1997 (see Exhibit OBJ1-13).
- As shown in exhibit OBJ1-13, except for decreases in two years, total arrests and arrests for drug abuse violations for *juveniles* per 100,000 population<sup>7</sup> increased dramatically in Missouri from 1987 to 1997. Increases for violent crimes varied from 1987 to 1996, rising some years and declining in others.
- As shown in exhibit OBJ1-14, except for decreases in two years, total arrests and arrests for drug abuse violations for *all arrestees* per 100,000 population increased dramatically in Missouri from 1987 to 1997. Arrest rates for violent crimes varied from 1987 to 1996, rising some years and declining in others.

Taken together, these trend data suggest that national trends may have been responsible for some of the documented changes in arrests in Jackson County and that we should offer cautious conclusions as to the causal links between COMBAT and change. The data showing dramatic increases in KCPD arrests is still compelling, however, particularly in comparison to increases in other similar cities.

A similar situation has occurred with regard to *convictions and prison sentences* for drug trafficking.

- From 1986 to 1988, the volume of felony convictions for drug trafficking in the 75 largest urban counties in the country increased by 61 percent (and by 46 percent in State courts overall).<sup>8</sup>

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7 Direct comparisons of arrest totals should not be made with prior years for State-level data because the totals represent different numbers of State law enforcement agencies reporting data each year to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Comparisons of arrest rates per 100,000 population of the agencies represented are less subject to distortion.

8 Patrick A. Langan and John M. Dawson. *Felony Sentences in State Courts*, 1988, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, December 1990.

**Exhibit OBJ1-13**

**Estimated Number of Arrests in the United States by Offense Charged**

Year	Total <sup>1</sup>	Violent Crime <sup>2</sup>	Drug Abuse Violations
1986	12,487,500	553,900	824,100
1987	12,711,600	546,300	937,400
1988	13,812,300	625,900	1,155,200
1989	14,340,900	685,500	1,361,700
1990	14,195,100	705,500	1,089,500
1991	14,211,900	718,890	1,010,000
1992	14,075,100	742,130	1,066,400
1993	14,036,300	754,110	1,126,300
1994	14,648,700	778,730	1,351,400
1995	15,119,800	796,250	1,476,100
1996	15,168,100	729,900	1,506,250
1997	<i>Data not available</i>		

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States*, Uniform Crime Reports, 1986-1996, table 29. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

<sup>1</sup> Includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

<sup>2</sup> Includes murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

Note: Numbers are based on official reporting areas and estimates for unreported areas.

- The approximate likelihood of an arrest for drug trafficking leading to a felony conviction rose from 39 percent in 1988 to 52 percent in 1994.<sup>9</sup>
- From 1986 to 1988, the likelihood of convicted drug traffickers going to prison rose from 37 percent to 41 percent in the 75 largest urban counties in the nation (and from 37 percent to 41 percent in State courts overall). From 1988 to 1994, the percentage of felons convicted of drug trafficking who received a prison sentence rose still further, from 41 percent to 48 percent in State courts overall.<sup>10</sup>

These data, again, point to the need to consider any increases in the number of drug traffickers convicted in Jackson County during COMBAT's existence, and increases in the percentage

<sup>9</sup> Patrick A. Langan and Jodi M. Brown. *Felony Sentences in State Courts*, 1994, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, January 1997.

<sup>10</sup> Patrick A. Langan and John M. Dawson. *Felony Sentences in State Courts*, 1988, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, December 1990; Patrick A. Langan and Jodi M. Brown. *Felony Sentences in State Courts*, 1994, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. department of Justice, January 1997.

of convicted traffickers going to prison, in the context of national data showing a similar upward trend.

**Exhibit OBJ1-14**

**Arrest Rates per 100,000 Population<sup>1</sup> in Missouri for Juveniles and All Ages by Three Types of Crimes, 1987-1997**

<b>Juveniles</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of Agencies Reporting</b>	<b>All Index Crimes<sup>1,2</sup></b>	<b>Violent Crimes<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>Drug Abuse Violations</b>
1987	159	880	60	—
1988	158	954	56	—
1989	184	963	54	—
1990	288	791	53	—
1991	172	1,053	64	34
1992	131	1,013	65	—
1993	182	987	56	43
1994	178	1,162	63	—
1995	155	1,156	67	78
1996	162	1,275	57	91
1997	Data Not Available			

<b>All Ages</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of Agencies Reporting</b>	<b>Rate Per 100,000 Population</b>	<b>Rate Per 100,000 Population</b>	<b>Rate Per 100,000 Population</b>
1987	159	623	299	—
1988	158	683	312	—
1989	184	692	346	—
1990	288	640	349	—
1991	172	770	395	360
1992	131	583	349	—
1993	182	793	310	428
1994	178	849	425	—
1995	155	832	224	634
1996	162	880	319	739
1997	Data Not Available			

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States*, Uniform Crime Reports, 1986-1996, table 44 or 45. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

<sup>1</sup> Only arrest rates are shown. Direct comparisons of arrest totals should not be made with prior years because the totals represent different numbers of State law enforcement agencies reporting data each year. Comparisons of arrest rates per 1000,000 population of the agencies represented are less subject to distortion.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes traffic offenses.

<sup>3</sup> Includes murder and forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

**Exhibit OBJ1-14, continued**

**Number of Arrests per 100,000 Population<sup>a</sup> in Kansas City, Missouri, and St. Louis, Missouri, 1990-1997**

Year	All Index Crimes <sup>1</sup>		Murder	
	Kansas City	St. Louis	Kansas City	St. Louis
1990	56,308	58,199	121	177
1991	57,834	64,103	135	260
1992	55,033	59,579	150	231
1993	55,165	64,438	153	267
1994	55,112	63,839	142	248
1995	52,575	59,736	107	204
1996	52,300	56,588	104	166
1997	Data not available			

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States*, Uniform Crime Reports, 1986-1996, table 8. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

<sup>a</sup> Kansas City's population ranged from 434,829 to 440,216 from 1990-1995; St. Louis' ranged from 358,916 to 396,685.

<sup>1</sup> Includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, theft, and motor vehicle theft.

## **Jail Crowding Was a Major Barrier to Increasing Jail Time in Jackson County**

Most observers and participants reported that *COMBAT has been hampered in its effort to increase the jailing of dangerous offenders primarily because of overcrowding in the county and Kansas City jail and in the State prison.* As a result, they said, judges are reluctant to set high bond that would result in pretrial detention or to sentence convicted drug offenders to serve time, instead relying on probation, suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), or suspended execution of sentence (SES), even with felony level offenses.

As noted above, the county jail has operated under a Federal consent decree since August 1986 (as a result of an inmate suit) limiting its daily population to 520 and since April 1994 to 624—and the jail is always filled to capacity. The court order makes provision for fining the county \$10,000 every day the jail violates the cap. As a result, whenever a new defendant is jailed, the facility must release another inmate. (The jail coordinator provides the judge with a daily inmate count to help him decide how many defendants he may imprison that day.) Furthermore, the jail MIS specialist reports that while the number of admissions has increased significantly in recent years, the average stay is shorter. This suggests the possibility that some dangerous drug offenders incarcerated in the jail while awaiting trial are now being released sooner than they would have in previous years. As a result, while COMBAT may have been responsible for jailing more dangerous offenders, some of these offenders may be



servicing less time. Alternatively, the court may be jailing more nonviolent offenders than previously, and their shorter sentences (compared with the sentences of violent offenders) may be bringing down the average length of stay.

### **Anecdotal Evidence Suggests that Jail Overcrowding Limits COMBAT's Ability to Jail Offenders**

Law enforcement administrators consistently confirmed the impact of overcrowding on the court's ability to impose jail time:

- "Yes, more drug dealers are getting jailed, but because of the jail and prison crowding problem, a lot of street sellers keep getting back on the streets, making it difficult to impact the problem. It's not the prosecutor's fault—it's the court's."
- "Not many people are going to the Pen in Jefferson City. So this limits COMBAT's effectiveness. We need stricter sentences and less crowding."
- "The city jail is maxed out, too. We're trying to get the city [prosecutor and judge] to send people [drug offenders] to jail and have beds set aside for them. The Street Narcotics Unit arrests so many people, but a lot are given probation or a suspended imposition of sentence."

Even the police administrator who said that offenders are receiving more jail time also reported that "Jail crowding is a big problem. It's frustrating; they get out quickly. It's a revolving door. And State judges won't set high bond because of jail crowding."

Another barrier to increasing offenders' jail time is a Missouri statute that requires judges to offer bail to all accused defendants. However, participants felt that in most instances pretrial defendants were being released not because judges set low bond but because judges know that jailing a defendant will only result in the release of other inmates to accommodate the new detainees. According to a COMBAT participant, "Lack of no-bond isn't the problem; crowding is. It's very frustrating. For example, it limits our ability to escalate the punishment when Drug Court participants fail to go to treatment. We need to be able to jail these individuals for a week [rather than do nothing or bind them over for criminal processing] to give them a second chance."

Until 1998, another impediment to imprisoning drug traffickers was that Missouri had no conspiracy statute (just an "acting in concert" statute) for trying several cases together for methamphetamine laboratories. As a result, prosecutors had to try each case separately. Many defendants still avoid jail by pleading out to lesser charges that carry lower sentences.

## COMBAT May Have Displaced Some Drug Activity

As with many law enforcement crackdowns, it is possible that the drug activity which COMBAT may have suppressed or prevented simply moved to other areas. If displacement did occur, policy makers within and especially outside Jackson County can reasonably wonder whether, while COMBAT may have improved conditions within Jackson County—or within certain parts of the county—the program should be considered a success in its law enforcement objective if it only moved drug offenses to other communities.

Most participants agree that *at least some of the drug activity that COMBAT targeted for increased enforcement, prosecution, and sanctions has been displaced to other neighborhoods within Kansas City or Jackson County, or to contiguous counties.*

However, with one exception (see below) it was impossible to obtain definitive evidence of displacement by comparing changes in arrest rates across jurisdictions. Even if arrest data suggested that drug-related crime had increased in non-COMBAT jurisdictions surrounding Jackson County, it would be impossible to determine whether other factors besides COMBAT had led to the increases, such as stepped-up enforcement efforts or a rise in drug-related offenses stemming from increases in “indigenous” drug activity. As a result, the evidence for a displacement effect, although suggestive, is primarily anecdotal and often second hand.

Exhibit OBJ1-15 lists the evidence for and against a displacement effect. The one set of empirical data suggests that COMBAT’s Paseo Corridor initiative in Kansas City (see Objective 5, Collaboration) has not displaced crime into neighborhoods that border the corridor. A comparison of calls for service in 1997 from the Paseo Corridor and from the rest of the police department’s Central Patrol District of which the corridor is a part showed no consistent pattern of decreases or increases either in the Paseo Corridor or in the rest of the patrol district. Calls from the Paseo Corridor remained at between 12 and 14 percent of the district’s entire number of calls. A comparison of total reported crime for 1997 between the corridor and rest of the patrol district showed a similar lack of consistent patterns, with reported crimes from the corridor ranging unsystematically from 6 to 8 percent of the district’s calls each month. However, these analyses are complicated by the fact that a police-community initiative often results initially in an increase in citizen calls as residents gain confidence that the officers will do something about their complaints and as their fear of retaliation from offenders declines.

**Exhibit OBJ1-15**

**Anecdotal Evidence For and Against a Displacement Effect from the Paseo Corridor**

<b>For Displacement</b>	<b>Against Displacement</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• According to an officer assigned to one of the Community Action Networks (CANs), "There is a displacement effect: people in other neighborhoods complain, 'We're getting the prostitutes, now.' We [the police] are sending the prostitutes and the drug dealers back and forth across Central and East Patrol divisions, with each group of residents saying, 'Don't sent them over here.'" Another CAN member reported that "We're sending people back and forth across the Paseo."</li> <li>• A police administrator reported that, while drug activity has been displaced from the Paseo, it has not gone to the other concentrated hot spots within the same police patrol sector because officers arrest them at their new location and displace them yet again. However, he added, the dealers eventually set up shop outside the sector.</li> <li>• An officer in the Kansas City, Missouri, police department's east patrol division reported a 35 percent increase in crime over the past few years.</li> <li>• Major Louis Johnson, head of the Kansas City, Kansas, police department's investigations bureau, was reported in the <i>Kansas City Star</i> as having stated that "some believe Missouri-side cops were so successful in closing drug houses that many pushers crossed the state line" [the newspaper's statement, not Johnson's]. 'Just a theory,' he says. (When an Abt Associates evaluator telephoned Johnson, he would not identify his sources, indicating they had provided him with the information in confidence.)</li> <li>• According to a police source, officers in agencies in Kansas that border Kansas City, Missouri, report a 15 to 20 percent increase in crime from 1994 to 1998.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A long-time community activist and resident in the Paseo Corridor reported that, while residents from neighboring areas ask her how <i>they</i> can get rid of drug dealers and prostitutes, they have not complained that COMBAT has pushed these offenders from the corridor into their neighborhoods.</li> <li>• Kristin Rosselli, COMBAT chief of planning and development and the coordinator of the Paseo Corridor initiative, reports that displacement has not occurred. She attributes this to the fact that the Paseo provides an unusually receptive environment for drug dealing compared with contiguous areas: it is bounded at either end by highways which provide easy access and escape routes and which city police officers do not patrol. In addition, several hourly rate motels were concentrated in the corridor.</li> <li>• A comparison of calls for service in 1997 from the Paseo Corridor and from the rest of the Central Police Patrol District of which the corridor is a part showed no consistent evidence of an increase in the rest of the district. A comparison of total reported crime for 1997 between the corridor and rest of the district showed a similar lack of consistent increases in the rest of the district.</li> <li>• The Kansas City, Kansas, police department's chief reported that there was no solid evidence that displacement was taking place. If there had been an increase in drug activity, he said, it would be difficult to attribute it to COMBAT rather than to the efforts of community groups in Kansas City, Missouri, such as the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime. (The chief did report that homicide rates in his city had increased from 48 in 1996 to 63 in 1997, and that there had already been 15 murders in the first two months of 1998 [a rate of 90 for the year], many of them committed by residents of Kansas City, Missouri).</li> </ul>

- Chris Karpinski, the former head of DART, believes that whenever his unit closes down a crack house, the dealers will set up their business somewhere else nearby. As a result, his goal is to eliminate drug dealing from entire three-block areas that are not already in total decline. That way, neighbors will be sure to report any renewal of drug dealing, and property owners will be careful not to re-rent their vacated properties to other drug dealers.
- Michael Shanahan, executive director of the Drug Task Force believes that displacement has occurred. For example, because the task force has prevented the retail sale of large quantities of pseudoephedrine in Eastern Jackson County (see above), manufacturers looking for another source for methamphetamine ingredients are committing more robberies just over the State line in Johnson County, Kansas. Shannon has also heard that some manufacturers have been driving to Arkansas to buy the ingredients. Informants have told him that manufacturers are saying, "Who needs the hassle of trying to buy in Jackson County; we'll go elsewhere."
- A Jackson County legislator reported hearing complaints about displacement from police departments in contiguous jurisdictions but could not identify the individuals making the complaints. Another county legislator reported that "Statistically, the programs recommended [i.e., funded] by COMBAT are having an impact on drug-related crime, but we are aware that criminal activity moves to areas where law enforcement is less intensive and judicial sentencing is less severe."
- During a city council community hearing aired on television, a council member from a county north of Jackson County complained about an increase in drug dealing there. Politicians from neighboring Clay and Clark Counties have also complained about displacement into their communities. In fact, they tried to enact COMBAT-type legislation in their jurisdictions, but voters rejected any increase in their sales tax. A staff member of the regional Housing and Urban Development (HUD) office said that property owners in the two counties have complained to her about increased drug problems on their properties as a result of COMBAT.

- Page Bellamy, the prosecuting attorney in Lafayette County, which borders Jackson County, reported that his office has experienced a large increase in drug cases, especially methamphetamine manufacturing. However, Bellamy could not conjecture whether the increase was a result of COMBAT's efforts—in particular, the activities of the Drug Task Force—or the result of offenders moving into rural areas to avoid detection in general.

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- There has been a displacement effect, according to Joseph Burkhardt, office-in-charge of the Lafayette County Sheriff's Department Narcotics Unit in Lafayette County, which borders Jackson County. His unit seized 2 methamphetamine laboratories in 1995, 2 in 1996, 5 in 1997, and 9 as of the middle of 1998. While he attributes part of the increase to better investigative approaches on the part of his unit, he has found that at least some of the laboratories have been operated by individuals from Jackson County. For example, in 1998 he arrested eight individuals in connection with a laboratory all of whom had moved the month previously from Independence and Raytown into Lafayette County only the month before. He arrested two other individuals in connection with another laboratory who had also recently moved from Jackson County into Lafayette County.

Some COMBAT participants reported that, even if the overall level of drug-related crime in the city has not diminished as a result of increased enforcement, drug dealing is less visible and, as a result, less disruptive to law-abiding citizens. For example, according to a police administrator, "The Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) is a quality of life operation; it makes life easier for the family living next door to a drug dealer. Yes, there's a lot of displacement, but SNU improves the quality of life for some citizens for a while." A county legislator observed that ". . . the fact that activity is shifting demonstrates that our efforts are having an impact." A Community Action Network (CAN) member reported that "Yes, there is a lot of displacement going on, but I can't see any other way of doing things unless all of the neighborhoods were very strong."

Finally, Jan Roehl, president of the Justice Research Center in Pacific Grove, California, argues that ". . . displacement is more a mark of success than failure, and spending precious research dollars on its measurement may be unwarranted in some situations."<sup>11</sup>

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11 "What Do We Do Next? Research Questions and Implications for Evaluation Design," in What Can the Federal Government Do to Decrease Crime and Revitalize Communities? Panel Papers. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, October, 1998, p. 100.

## Objective 2: Did COMBAT Increase the Treatment of Nonviolent Offenders Who Want to Get Off Drugs?

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **COMBAT increased the *amount of treatment available*.** While it is impossible to estimate even roughly the number of increased treatment slots COMBAT generated, the program appears to have made treatment available to at least 4,376 individuals in 1997. Data for earlier years are incomplete.
- **COMBAT increased *treatment opportunities* in six principal ways:**
  - providing funds to up to 28 existing treatment providers by means of annual awards by the COMBAT Commission;
  - funding existing providers through the Grant Match Program;
  - funding County Court Services to provide outpatient treatment to Drug Court participants;
  - funding the Jail Anti-Drug Movement [J.A.M.], which allows expansion of services to criminal justice populations;
  - funding the training of selected Family Court staff; paying the salaries of three anti-drug Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs), seven other DJOs, and 20 youth workers; and paying institutional care fees for committed juveniles; and
  - establishing and funding a program to train minority counselors to become certified substance abuse counselors.
  - funding non-traditional providers not otherwise eligible for funding.
- **COMBAT contributed to increased *referrals to treatment* through the following initiatives:**
  - Drug Court: As of April 1998, 1,409 defendants made an initial appearance for Drug Court, 441 were graduated, 315 were currently still enrolled, and 653 were terminated or dropped out;
  - referrals by DJOs to treatment;
  - referrals by community mobilizers;
  - referrals interagency collaboration; and
  - referrals from detoxification programs

- It is impossible to calculate the number of individuals COMBAT-supported initiatives referred to treatment due to lack of adequate reporting systems. However, it appears that COMBAT was responsible for referring at least 707 substance abusers in 1997, 255 of whom are known to have entered treatment.
- COMBAT took steps to improve *the quality of treatment*, particularly through its tailoring of treatment to the needs of each Drug Court participant and providing in-house support services not available to offenders prior to COMBAT as well as through mandatory training and development of provider skills.
- The increase in treatment opportunities and referrals would not have occurred as extensively, if at all, without COMBAT.
- There are insufficient data to determine whether the increased treatment, referrals, and quality of services that COMBAT generated have reduced relapse or recidivism among clients.

#### Data Sources

- Informer
- interviews with COMBAT participants and observers
- treatment provider materials
- COMBAT Commission materials

Increased treatment for substance abuse is the second objective COMBAT established for itself. The theory behind the societal benefit of providing treatment to substance abusers posits a domino effect: rehabilitating substance abusers reduces the demand for illicit drugs, which results in less drug-motivated crime (e.g., burglaries, robberies) and decreased human service needs among users (e.g., emergency health care, welfare benefits). Decreased drug use also puts drug dealers out of business, which in turn reduces drug trafficking and trafficking-related crime (e.g., shootings). Studies have supported these theories by demonstrating that—despite relatively low success rates—drug treatment has a very high cost-benefit ratio.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, C.P. Rydell and S. Everingham, *Controlling Cocaine*, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California: 1994, which compares the costs of reducing cocaine consumption through treatment and enforcement. A 1998 report released by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found that one in five of 1,800 individuals were still clean and sober five years after treatment, resulting in a reduction in such crime as burglary, fraud, larceny, and prostitution by as much as 38 percent. The study found that treatment did not help adolescents to stop using crack cocaine.

The discussion below examines three questions related to COMBAT's efforts to increase substance abuse treatment:

- Did COMBAT contribute to making additional treatment opportunities available—that is, were there *more treatment slots available* than previously as a result of COMBAT?
- Did COMBAT generate additional *referrals* to the treatment system?
- Did COMBAT improve the *quality* of treatment and the *accountability* of treatment providers?

Exhibit OBJ2-1 summarizes COMBAT's achievements in each of these three areas. The text below discusses these achievements in detail. As the exhibit and discussion make clear,

- **COMBAT made at least 4,376 new treatment slots available in 1997;**
- **COMBAT generated at least 707 referrals to treatment in 1997 (at least 258 of whom are known to have entered treatment); and**
- **COMBAT took steps that are likely to have improved the quality of treatment and accountability of providers.**

## **COMBAT Increased the Amount of Treatment Available**

*COMBAT has attempted to increase treatment opportunities in six principal ways:*

- COMBAT Commission funding of existing traditional and non-traditional and non-traditional treatment providers to increase their services;
- COMBAT Grant Match Program funding of existing treatment providers to enable them to secure other funding;
- funding treatment for Drug Court participants;
- funding the Jail Anti-Drug Movement (J.A.M.);
- funding the training and paying the salaries of selected Family Court staff; and
- paying for a program that trains minority counselors to become certified substance abuse counselors.



## Exhibit OBJ2-1

## Characteristics of Increased Treatment Attributable to COMBAT

Goal	Methods	Results for 1997	COMBAT Funding in 1997	% of Total Funding
Increase treatment availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• fund existing treatment providers through the COMBAT Commission</li> <li>• fund existing providers through the Grant Match Program</li> <li>• fund Drug Court's County Court Services</li> <li>• fund the J.A.M. program in the jail</li> <li>• fund Family Court               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— pay for DJO certification training</li> <li>— fund 7 residential center DJOs</li> <li>— fund 20 youth workers</li> <li>— pay for private residential care</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3,099 clients served</li> <li>• 100 clients</li> <li>• 118 graduates</li> <li>• 120 graduates (estimate)</li> <li>• 436 clients (estimate)</li> <li>• 560 clients</li> <li>• 200 clients (estimate)</li> <li>• 151 clients</li> </ul>	\$2,605,000 \$402,435 \$1,747,100 \$176,890 \$1,688,802 Includes entire COMBAT funds for Family Court.	100% <25% data not available 100% 8%
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• fund training of minority counselors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 150 clients (estimate)</li> </ul>	\$25,000	100%
	<b>Total</b> <b>Total adjusted for possible errors in estimate</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4,937 clients</li> <li>• 4,376 clients</li> </ul>	\$5,694,033	—
Increase referrals into treatment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• fund Drug Court</li> <li>• fund Family Court</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 150 new participants</li> <li>• 480 referrals by 10 certified DJOs (estimate)</li> <li>• 400 referrals by other trained staff (estimate)</li> <li>• 9 referrals by 3 school-based DJOs</li> </ul>	\$2,886,144 \$1,611,519	71% 8%
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• accept referrals from probation and parole officers</li> <li>• detoxification providers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NA</li> <li>• NA</li> </ul>	none \$600,500	NA 100%
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support CAN mobilizers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• referred 108 neighbors</li> </ul>	NA*	25%
	<b>Total</b> <b>Total adjusted for possible errors in estimates</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1,147</li> <li>• 707</li> </ul>	\$5,098,163	—
Increase the quality of treatment  * COMBAT provided a \$150,000 match for Project NeighborHOOD's entire program, of which Community Mobilizers are only one component.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• fund County Court Services</li> <li>• fund training of minority counselors</li> <li>• imposes requirements on funded providers</li> <li>• funds continuing education for providers</li> <li>• requires providers to acquire State certification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Day Report Center's 6 differentiated treatment levels make client matching and tailoring possible</li> <li>• on-site support services integrated into treatment</li> <li>• reports results to Drug Court judge</li> <li>• sets tone for accountability for all treatment providers</li> <li>• increase pool of qualified counselors beyond those just in recovery</li> <li>• detoxification providers must assure clients enter next treatment step</li> <li>• must qualify for State certification (2 did)</li> <li>• staff required to attend continuing education classes</li> <li>• involves having credentialed staff</li> </ul>	\$423,000  \$25,000 NA	data not available  100% NA none

## COMBAT Commission Funding for Existing Treatment Providers

The COMBAT Commission (and, before it, the Fiscal Commission) increased treatment opportunities by contracting annually with 22 to 28 existing treatment providers to increase their outpatient, inpatient, and detoxification services. Over the life of the program, COMBAT has averaged approximately \$2.6 million to treatment providers. Exhibit OBJ2-2 shows the 20 treatment providers the COMBAT Commission funded in 1997 along with their contract dollar amounts and contracted treatment services. In addition to the providers in the exhibit, the commission awarded \$600,500 to two providers of detoxification services. Total COMBAT funding for all providers was \$3,205,050 in 1998.

Exhibit OBJ2-3 shows that the 23 providers that COMBAT funded in 1997 served 3,099 clients excluding clients receiving detoxification. At the extremes, Catholic Charities served 3 clients, and Research Mental Health served 494 clients. Seven providers served between 50 and 60 clients each, two served between 100 and 200, and seven served more than 200. As shown, 894 clients (29 percent) were juveniles (including 59 under the age of 13), 28 percent were women, 48 percent were African American; 46 percent Caucasian, 5 percent Hispanic, and 1 percent other ethnicities or races. In addition two COMBAT funded organizations provided detoxification services to 1,662 individuals in 1997 (data not shown). Similar data are not available for other COMBAT years.

**Types of services provided.** Exhibit OBJ2-4 shows the type of services the 3,099 clients received in 1997. As shown, 1,872 clients received Level IV services (regular outpatient); 1,160 received Level V services (continuing care—e.g., self-help groups, job training); and 631 received Level II services (inpatient or intensive day report center). The services clients received<sup>2</sup> were:

- individual counseling (1,931 clients);
- group counseling (1,729 clients);
- case management (1,564 clients);
- family counseling (159 clients);
- individual codependency counseling (131 clients); and
- group codependency counseling to (131 clients).

Similar data are not available for other COMBAT years.

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<sup>2</sup> The same clients may have received more than one of these services.

**Exhibit OBJ2-2**  
**Jackson County COMBAT Commission 1997 Treatment Funding**

Name of Agency	Type of Agency	Service Provided <sup>1</sup>	Funding
Benilde Hall	community-based organization (CBO)	Levels IV-V outpatient drug treatment and reintegration program for adult men	\$100,000
Comprehensive Mental Health Center	mental health center	Levels II-IV residential and outpatient treatment program for adults and adolescents	\$344,000
Sunshine Center	CBO	day care services for children of drug treatment patients	\$50,000
Crittenton	CBO	outpatient intervention program for children and their families	\$40,000
DeLaSalle	alternative school	Level IV and V outpatient drug treatment program for adolescents	60,000
Guadalupe Center	Latino CBO	Level IV-V bilingual outpatient program for adults and adolescents	75,000
Hope House/Newhouse	women's shelter	Level IV and V outpatient drug treatment program for women	75,000
Kansas City Community Center	substance abuse treatment center	Level I-V drug treatment services for adults	150,000
KC PACT	medical center	Level V perinatal substance abuse case management program	70,000
Full Employment Council	CBO	Level V employment training and placement program for adults	80,000
Ozanam Home/Marillac	substance abuse and mental health adolescent treatment center	Level IV outpatient drug treatment for adolescents (OZANAM) and Levels II-IV drug treatment	150,000
Park Lane Community Hospital	hospital	Level I social detoxification services	140,000
Renaissance West	substance abuse treatment center	Level II-IV drug treatment services for adults	140,000
Research Mental Health Center	mental health center	Level III-IV drug treatment services for adults	255,000
Rose Brooks Center	women's shelter	Level IV-V outpatient services for women and their children	42,000
Samuel V. Rodgers	community health center	Level III-IV outpatient services for adults	104,000
Swope Parkway Health Center	health center	Level II-IV drug treatment services for adults	340,000
TMC Behavioral Health	medical center	Level III-V outpatient drug treatment services for adults	150,000
TMC East	medical center	Level IV outpatient drug treatment services for adults	190,000
Whatsoever Community Center	CBO	Level IV outpatient drug treatment services for adults and adolescents	50,000
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>\$2,605,000</b>

Level I = detoxification; Level II = inpatient or intensive day care; Level III - intensive outpatient; Level IV = regular outpatient; Level V = continuing care (e.g., self-help groups, job training)

1997  
Drug Treatment Data Summary

	New (Unduplicated)	Continuing	Relapse	Total Clients	Age 0-12	Age 13-17	Age 18-21	Adult	Female	Male	African-American	Caucasian	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	Native American	Other
Benilde Hall	40	45	31	45				45		45	24	17	2			
Catholic Charities	3		1	3		3			3		3					
Children's Mercy Hospital																
Children's Place	11	3		14	14				6	8	14					
Comprehensive Mental Health	90	210	29	329		7	27	295	111	218	37	277	11	1	3	
Crittenton	56	43		56	6	50			25	31	29	29	1	1		
DeLaSalle	59			59		40	19		13	46	55	4				
Full Employment Council	230			230		3	81	146	76	154	161	66	3	1		
Guadalupe Center	42	32	16	90		7	10	73	4	86	22	11	57			
Hope House	16			16			6	10	16		12	3	1			
Marillac	34	10		44		40	4		10	34	19	22				3
Ozanam	35	431		431	10	421				431	132	290	9			
Park Lane Medical Center	58			58			1	57	17	41	27	28	1	2		
Renaissance West	83	55	1	139			9	130	38	101	95	41	3			
Research Mental Health	240	217	37	494			37	457	137	357	310	170	4			10
Resource Development Institute		42	29	47			6	41	6	41	35	12				
Rose Brooks	69	38	33	140			17	123	140		74	56	5		3	2
Samuel Rodgers	93	138	5	236			7	229	66	170	171	54	11			
Swope Parkway Health Center	44	62	42	148			3	145	39	109	110	30	5			
Sunshine Center	15	32	2	49	29			20	25	24	19	30				
TMC - Behavioral Health	214		7	221			2	219	67	154	127	88	3		1	2
Truman Medical Center - East	220		20	220			22	198	73	147	22	195	3			
Whatsoever Community Center	30			30		5	8	17	4	26	2	4	24			
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1682</b>	<b>1358</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>3099</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>576</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>2205</b>	<b>876</b>	<b>2223</b>	<b>1500</b>	<b>1427</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>

Exhibit OBJ2-4

1997

Drug Treatment Data Summary

	Level I	Level II	Level III	Level IV	Level V	Individual Counseling	Group Counseling	Group Education	Intervention	Family Counseling	Case Management	Outreach	Therapeutic Daycare	Child Care	Ind. Codependency	Group Codependency	Recreational therapy
Benilde Hall			45			45	45	45	45		45	45					
Catholic Charities				3													
Children's Mercy Hospital																	
Children's Place				14							14		14				
Comprehensive Mental Health		50		239	40	329	329			20	329						
Crittenton				56	56	56	56	56	15	24	56				53	31	
DeLaSalle					59	59	59				59						
Full Employment Council					230							230					
Guadalupe Center				83	7	90	85	85			90						
Hope House				16		16	15		12		13						
Marillac		3		41	44	3	44	3		3	44						
Ozanam				431	192	132	48	156			84				60	192	
Park Lane Medical Center	58																
Renaissance West		136	3			1	4				2						
Research Mental Health		294	211	34		197	144	169		8	203						
Resource Development Institute				37	14	47	47	47			47						47
Rose Brooks				128	12	128	124	124	31		128	70					
Samuel Rodgers				236	236	236	236			3	6						
Swope Parkway Health Center		148	72	43	43	43	72										
Sunshine Center				40	29			20		20	20			29			
TMC - Behavioral Health				221		221	221		70	68	75				15		
Truman Medical Center - East				220	198	220	200	20			220	220			3	1	
Whatsoever Community Center				30		108				13	129	111					
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>631</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>1872</b>	<b>1160</b>	<b>1931</b>	<b>1729</b>	<b>725</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>1564</b>	<b>676</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>47</b>

Level 1 = detoxification; Level 2 = inpatient or intensive day care; Level 3 = intensive outpatient;  
 Level 4 = regular outpatient; Level 5 = continuing care (e.g., self-help groups, job training)

1997  
Drug Treatment Data Summary

	New (Unduplicated)	Continuing	Relapse	Total Clients	Age 0-12	Age 13-17	Age 18-21	Adult	Female	Male	African-American	Caucasian	Hispanic	Asian/Pacific Islander	Native American	Other
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**Social Detox**

Renaissance West	83	55	1	139			9	130	38	101	95	41	3			
Salvation Army	1019	124	415	1523			3	1523	395	1131	1058	436	24	2	6	
<b>TOTALS</b>	1102	179	416	1662	0	0	12	1653	433	1232	1153	477	27	2	6	0

## **COMBAT Makes It Possible to Treat Indigent, Uninsured Substance Abusers**

COMBAT funds to inpatient providers may not literally increase the number of beds available to substance abusers in need of residential services. Rather, COMBAT monies enable providers to fill empty beds with clients who cannot afford to pay for treatment and lack insurance coverage. For example,

- Medicaid does not reimburse residential treatment for male substance abusers, but COMBAT will.
- Managed care and Medicaid limit the number of inpatient days they will pay for. However, if a provider wants to keep these clients longer to improve their chances of recovery, COMBAT will pay for the extra days of care.

Managed care and Medicaid limit the amount of *outpatient* treatment substance abusers can receive. By contrast, there is a generous number of reimbursable visits COMBAT-funded clients can make. In addition, national welfare reform has eliminated reimbursement for treatment services for many serious drug users, notably persons convicted of a felony. For example, unless a State affirmatively opts out, it must deny Federal benefits to any applicant who has been convicted of a post-1996 drug felony. Using COMBAT funds, programs can be reimbursed for treating these individuals. As the gap widens between what is allowable for funding under increasingly stringent rules and treatment needs in a population which is often criminally involved, the role COMBAT plays becomes critical.

### **COMBAT Grant Match Awards to Existing Treatment Providers**

For several reasons, the Anti-Drug Sales Tax has generated more money than expected. As a result, COMBAT initiated a Grant Match Program that uses the excess funds to provide the local match for prevention, treatment, and law enforcement agencies in Jackson County. The Grant Match Program is discussed in detail under Objective 4, Innovation.

Through the Grant Match Program, COMBAT provided grant matches worth \$921,212 from 1994 through 1997 primarily to two treatment providers that have, in turn, secured roughly three times that amount of money from other funding sources to increase their treatment capacity. The two providers have used their grant matches and the other funding the matches have helped to secure to

- offer long-term culturally sensitive residential substance abuse treatment to pregnant and post-partum, dually-diagnosed women; and
- provide intensive case management services to addicted ex-offenders who have received treatment while incarcerated, including ongoing substance

abuse treatment, employment and training services, housing assistance, and mental health services.

### Treatment for Drug Court Participants

COMBAT established a deferred prosecution program, known as Drug Court, in October 1993. In exchange for dropping criminal prosecution, participants must complete a comprehensive and regimented treatment program that includes regular progress reports to the court.

Drug Court's 1998 budget was \$2,886,144, including \$458,400 for the Day Report Center. COMBAT provided 71 percent of these funds—slightly over \$2 million. A U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) grant provided \$230,524, an Enhancement Grant from the U.S. Department of Justice Drug Courts Office provided \$229,512, and Federal and local law enforcement block grant funds provided \$395,512. The COMBAT contribution also provided the local match without which the prosecutor's office court would not have received other funding.

**The concept.** Drug Court represents an interdisciplinary program model which, under the authority of the prosecuting attorney's office (not the Jackson County Circuit Court<sup>3</sup>), integrates a specific treatment provider (County Court Services), the case management resources of the Missouri State Probation and Parole Department, and health education and job skills training. A Drug Court Executive Committee, consisting of the Drug Court administrator, two Drug Court assistant prosecuting attorneys, the chief of the diversion managers (probation officers), and the commissioner, meet monthly to oversee the operation of the court.

Exhibit OBJ2-5	
COMBAT Funding for Drug Court	
Year	COMBAT Funding
1994	870,412
1995	916,411
1996	943,393
1997	975,221
1998	2,060,976 <sup>a</sup>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,766,413</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes external funding in this year.

<sup>3</sup> Drug Court operates under the prosecuting attorney's authority to dismiss the charges against criminal defendants. However, concerned that the presiding judge might take away the Drug Court judge (technically a commissioner) if the Circuit Court became shorthanded or overloaded with cases, Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, asked the county legislature to enact a statute authorizing the court with COMBAT paying for its commissioner.



Drug Court's specific objectives are to

- reduce the demand for illegal drugs through intensive treatment;
- reduce recidivism;
- reserve jail space for violent offenders by diverting less serious offenders away from jail sentences;
- save the county money through coordination of services; and
- improve participants' quality of life.

Exhibit OBJ2-6 identifies the conditions that qualify and disqualify arrestees for Drug Court. In general, these are not yet serious offenders. To be eligible, arrestees must

- not be charged with—or have ever been convicted of—a violent offense or an offense against the person;
- not be charged with drug trafficking; and
- not be a gang member.

The Drug Court program is designed to be completed in one year to eighteen months. Participants may be considered for graduation when they meet several requirements, including

- remaining in the program for at least a year;
- maintaining sobriety for a minimum of six months;
- if not on Supplemental Security Income (SSI), being employed for at least four months or enrolled in school or vocational training;
- completing 40 hours of community service; and
- having paid all outstanding warrants, fines, and court costs.

Exhibit OBJ2-6

DRUG COURT
INITIAL ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION

Accused \_\_\_\_\_ Charges \_\_\_\_\_
New Filing Active Case Case Number \_\_\_\_\_

QUALIFYING CHARACTERISTICS:

An individual charged w/the following is presumed to be a drug user.

This list is not all inclusive

- Possession or Attempt to Possess a Controlled Substance,
Sale of a Controlled Substance,
Fraudulent Prescriptions.
Nonviolent property, checks, fraud w/ admission of drug problem,
The individual states to the police &/or bond investigator that he/she uses drugs. Family or friends report drug use.
The individual test positive for drug at time of arrest.

DISQUALIFYING CHARACTERISTICS:

- The individual is not a resident of Jackson County.
The individual is charged with a violent offense, crime against person.
The individual displayed or had a gun on or about his person.
The individual is charged with the following:
Class A Trafficking 1st or 2nd degree, Sale of Controlled Substance Within 1000 feet of a School (must be tied to the school) ,
Manufacture or Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine.
The individual is charged with three or more felony counts.
The individual has had any of the following convictions:
Murder 1st, or 2nd, Voluntary & Involuntary Manslaughter,
Robbery 1st, ACA, Assault 1st or 2nd, or two if a misd., Weapons Offenses- all felonies, two if misd., Sexual offense, such as Rape, Sodomy, Child Sexual Abuse, Arson 1st.
The individual has two or more felony convictions.
The individual is under Federal, State probation or parole supervision.
The amounts possessed or sold are outside the guidelines listed below.
The individual is Gang involved.

SUBSTANCE AMOUNT POSSESSED AMOUNT SOLD
Equal to or less than

Table with 3 columns: Substance, Amount Possessed, Amount Sold. Rows include Marijuana, Methamphetamine, Cocaine Hydrochloride, Cocaine Base, LSD, PCP, Psilocybin, and Miscellaneous Pills.

ELIGIBLE INELIGIBLE
SCREENED BY DATE

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## Drug Court Has Several Distinctive Features

The Jackson County Drug Court is different from many or most other drug courts in a number of respects.

- The court is run by the prosecutor's office, which alone decides which defendants will be diverted to the court.
- Each participant is assigned a clinical treatment team that includes a diversion manager, counselor, and client advocate (who negotiates with the other team members on behalf of the client and links clients with support services).
- An assistant prosecutor participates full-time on the court's treatment team.
- The court does not refer participants to outside treatment services but connects them directly to a single service provider, County Court Services, that assesses every participant, alone provides them with outpatient treatment, and refers those needing residential care to qualified outside providers.
- County Court Services also operates an outpatient therapeutic community exclusively for appropriate Drug Court participants who have difficulty adjusting to regular outpatient treatment but do not require residential care.
- Employment training and job placement are mandatory and are an integral part of the treatment process.
- Treatment staff and diversion managers provide information about each participant directly to the judge in a real-time computer link at the bench, in addition to verbal reports.
- The commissioner<sup>1</sup>—as is commonly done in most drug courts<sup>2</sup>—does not rotate, giving him an opportunity to get to know participants, follow trends, and provide continuity for them.
- The commissioner runs a daily 9:00 a.m. staffing meeting at which a COMBAT-funded public defender, a counselor, a diversion manager, and the Drug Court assistant prosecutor meet for an hour to discuss the status and progress of each Drug Court participant.
- No adversarial activity occurs in the courtroom because the prosecutor has made an agreement with the defense bar that the Drug Court attorney will use treatment information only for making treatment decisions, not as evidence or as leverage against defendants in the legal outcome.

1 In the state of Missouri, court commissioners act as judges, granting child custody, transferring property, settling wills and divorce matters, and handling some criminal cases. Judges are appointed by the Governor, and commissioners are appointed by the Judiciary.

2 Caroline Cooper, Drug Court Clearinghouse, American University, personal communication, September 2, 1998.

In a competitive procurement, COMBAT hired County Court Services (CCS), an existing local treatment provider, to assess and provide outpatient treatment services to offenders whom COMBAT's Drug Court diverts into treatment. As of mid-1998, CCS, with offices in Kansas City and Independence, was the only outpatient provider for Drug Court.

After the client's first appearance before the Drug Court judge, the person goes to County Court Services for a comprehensive, week-long assessment. Based on the assessment results, County Court Services staff recommend placement in one of six levels of treatment. One of these treatment levels is a Day Report Center, established from scratch by the Prosecutor's Office, 60 percent funded by COMBAT (see exhibit OBJ2-7).

<b>Exhibit OBJ2-7</b>			
<b>1998 Day Report Center Budget</b>			
<b>Use</b>	<b>COMBAT Funds</b>	<b>Grant Funds</b>	<b>Total</b>
salaries/fees		\$220,062	\$220,062
treatment costs	\$366,400		\$366,400
rent		\$50,000	\$50,000
miscellaneous		\$31,526	\$31,526
employment assistance	\$50,000		\$50,000
urinalysis testing	\$42,000		\$42,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$458,400</b>	<b>\$301,588</b>	<b>\$759,988</b>

(The box "Drug Court Offers Six Treatment Levels" describes the other five levels.) The Day Report Center serves about 40 percent of all Drug Court clients. County Court Services provides other outpatient services to the other participants (see the box) or refers them for inpatient treatment.

The Day Report Center operates as an outpatient therapeutic community. Participation occurs in three stages:

- Stage 1: *Main treatment:* clients report daily for four months and must complete a strict set of performance requirements such as program attendance (75 percent or better) urinalyses (drop in schedules, 75 percent or better), petition to enter therapeutic community, and daily attendance in activities in the therapeutic community.
- Stage 2: *Transition period:* clients report five days per week for four months and complete other program requirements such as participation in a

community circle, conducting peer led groups, conducting orientations for new clients, and community service.

Stage 3: *Cadre*: clients attend a weekly "Winner's Circle" meeting and a 12-Step group in the community for three months; in addition they complete program requirements such as mentoring another Day Report Center participant and participating in a community activity.

Normally, the Day Report Center serves 30 to 40 clients at any one time, while the evening program serves 60 to 70. An estimated 47 Drug Court clients participated in the Day Report Center in 1997. Nine were graduated in 1997 and 16 more as of May 1998.

### **Drug Court Offers Six Treatment Levels<sup>1</sup>**

- (1) *Education and 12-step groups.* At this lowest level of supervision, participants attend substance abuse education classes and 12-step group meetings. They also undergo periodic drug testing.
- (2) *Weekly group and monthly individual counseling;* clients also attend one 12 step group meeting per week.
- (3) *Intensive outpatient program at County Court Services.*
- (4) *Short-term residential treatment lasting at least 1-3 months.*
- (5) *A Day Report Center, operated by County Court Services as an outpatient therapeutic community.*
- (6) *Long-term residential treatment for 90 days or more.* County Court Services refers participants needing inpatient treatment to COMBAT-funded residential treatment agencies. Although these providers give priority to Drug Court clients, there is a dearth of inpatient substance abuse treatment slots for this population. As a result, at times there is a waiting list for inpatient services.

<sup>1</sup> Initially, all Drug Court participants participated in the same number of counseling groups. However, this provided too much structure for some participants and too little for others. As a result, COMBAT used a Federal Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) grant to restructure the treatment system to provide the present six levels of supervision.

Because Drug Court has its own outpatient treatment provider—County Court Services—most participants do not have to wait to receive services. The ability to involve Drug Court participants quickly in treatment—including the Day Report Center—is an important feature of the program, because early intervention is thought to help minimize relapse. In addition, all

outpatient participants are provided a variety of on-site support services also intended to reduce their chances of relapsing. (See the box "Support Services Are Available to Outpatient Drug Court Participants" and appendix A.)

The court mandates the levels in which participants will participate, but the choice of levels is based on the clinical judgment of the counseling team. As a result, the decision represents the merger of enforcement and treatment—a court mandate based on clinical judgment.

### **The Jail Anti-Drug Movement (J.A.M.)**

COMBAT initiated and funds entirely a substance abuse treatment program operating in the Jackson County jail. In a competitive procurement, the county executive awarded a share of her COMBAT funds to a local treatment provider, which, in turn, hired Petra Peper, the administrator of the jail's mental health program, to develop and run a substance abuse program. Of the \$233,000 that COMBAT provided the program in 1997, \$176,890 (76 percent) pays for 70 percent time of the program administrator's time. The remaining funds pay for three counselors and a secretary. Criminal Justice Program interns from the University of Kansas City, Missouri, observe group sessions and do intakes. Since many J.A.M. participants have previous criminal records, the program serves one of the groups of substance abusers—convicted felons—who, under Federal 1996 welfare reform legislation, would otherwise not be eligible for free treatment.

### **Support Services Are Available to Outpatient Drug Court Participants**

In order to graduate from the Drug Court program, clients (if not receiving financial support from the Federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program) must be employed full-time or enrolled in school or vocation training. To assist Drug Court participants in meeting this requirement, vocational and educational services are offered on-site at the Day Report Center. A full-time COMBAT-funded employment and training consultant from the Full Employment Council provides pre-employment assessment, and employment counseling and information, to Drug Court clients at the Day Report Center. Drug Court program participants are also encouraged to take advantage of the General Education Diploma (GED) preparation course offered at the center, which emphasizes the development of basic math and verbal skills.

A COMBAT-funded physician's assistant employed by the Swope Parkway Health Center goes to the Day Report Center one afternoon a week, usually accompanied by an intake specialist, to assess Day Court participants' eligibility for free care through the Health Care for the Homeless Program. The physician's assistant also provides clients with a basic health screening. If the physician's assistant determines that the client needs additional evaluation, such as laboratory tests, he refers the individual to a local health center. Finally, an HIV educator periodically comes on site to lecture about a variety of health issues related to the risk of developing AIDS. Appendix A, "Four Case Studies," provides additional information about these support services.

The only drug program in the 624-bed Jackson County Detention Center, J.A.M. involves three hours of training a day, five days a week, for three weeks, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. Each enrollee also participates in one individual counseling session a week with a counselor. (See the box "The Jail's J.A.M. Program in a Nutshell.") With a capacity of 24 inmates at any one time, J.A.M. treats an average of nearly 50 inmates a month; an average of 10 inmates complete the program each month. In March 1998, 4 participants were dismissed from the program, 5 stopped attending on their own, and 8 were released from the jail before the course ended. Fourteen participants were graduated. Participants must attend 28 of 30 sessions to graduate, although they can make up missed classes. There is a one-week wait to enter the program.

### **The Jail's J.A.M. Program in a Nutshell**

J.A.M.'s goal is to motivate participants to accept responsibility for their substance abuse and for avoiding relapse in preparation for further, more intensive, post-release treatment. Course content includes discussing the disease concept of substance abuse; errors in thinking that facilitate drug use and promote relapse; addictive family systems; building self esteem; self-help groups; and dealing with guilt and shame.

Inmates are eligible for J.A.M. if they have a substance abuse problem that includes other drugs besides alcohol, do not have reading or writing problems, can commit to the three-week course, and are not inmate workers. Participants sentenced to at least 120 days receive "good time" for participating that reduces their period of incarceration. However, mirroring the jail's population, more than 85 percent of participants are pretrial inmates. Furthermore, participants who do not take an active part in the program get an unfavorable discharge summary.

Most inmates enroll on their own initiative by submitting a Request for Admission sheet. The Drug Court judge sentences some deferred defendants who are not meeting their treatment goals to three weeks in the jail and mandates participation in J.A.M. as a means of motivating them to "shape up."

**The program has not yet been able to establish a post-release relapse prevention component.** Staff do come from a local mental health center every month to recruit J.A.M. participants into its outpatient relapse prevention program following release. However, Petra Peper notes, "It is difficult to get community organizations to come to the jail to set up appointments for aftercare because, with the inmates' release date unknown, the organizations cannot plan for their arrival." Nevertheless, she managed to secure the agreement in principle of a large treatment provider to keep five slots open in the organization's standard aftercare program for J.A.M. graduates who are released from the jail. The provider will also be responsible for outreach to locate and recruit the releasees. As of April 1998, Peper was in the process of writing a contract, after which COMBAT had assured her it would fund the provider. However, Peper resigned from the jail in July 1998.

There is a second obstacle to providing J.A.M. participants with continuity of care: a number of participants are released before the program ends. It has not proven possible to link these individuals seamlessly with treatment providers after release that could continue the therapeutic process where J.A.M. leaves off. In addition to losing the therapeutic benefits of completing the entire program, early releasees—if they fail to benefit from their short-circuited participation—waste staff time, since each intake requires an hour to process.

### **Funding for Family Court**

Exhibit OBJ2-8 shows COMBAT funds provided to Family Court by year.<sup>4</sup> As shown, COMBAT gave the court a total of \$12,579,910 from 1991 through 1998. In the first two years, Family Court used some of these funds to purchase additional equipment and to provide extra security in the court's group homes and other facilities. Family court also used COMBAT funds to refurbish and increase security (through the construction of a \$190,000 fence) at one of the court's inpatient cottages. The court has used few COMBAT funds for capital improvements since 1994.

COMBAT provided the Jackson County Family Court with \$1,611,519 in 1997–98, representing 8 percent of its \$20 million budget, for the following purposes:

- (1) substance abuse counseling certification training for 25 Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs);
- (2) salaries of
  - seven residential center DJOs,
  - three “anti-drug” DJOs, and
  - 20 youth workers; and
- (3) institutional care fees.

The text below describes how each of these of COMBAT-funded activities results in increased treatment services.

**DJO certification training.** Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs) are Family Court probation officers with a caseload consisting of juveniles. As of early 1998, COMBAT had paid \$2,700 for each of 25 DJOs to receive training to become certified substance abuse

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<sup>4</sup> According to David Kierst, Family Court administrator, COMBAT originally established a cap of \$1.5 million for Family Court. However, beginning in 1996, Kierst has submitted budget requests that have exceeded this cap, but the Circuit Court, COMBAT Commission, and county legislature have nevertheless approved the amounts.



**Exhibit OBJ2-8**

**COMBAT Funds For Family Court<sup>a</sup>**

Year	Dollar Amount	Funded Staff		
		DJOs	Youth Workers	Others <sup>b</sup>
1991	1,456,963	NA	NA	NA
1992	1,464,681	9	14	10
1993	1,507,967	7	18	9
1994	1,519,140	7	18	9
1995	1,592,177	10	20	7
1996	1,627,177	10	20	7
1997	1,688,602	10	20	9
1998	1,723,203	10	20	7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,579,910</b>			

- a. The information above was developed from non-automated historical records and does not represent information based on a complete audit of records. The information is based primarily upon annual budget requests represents the best information available.
- b. Clerical staff, cook, maintenance workers, security staff, case supervisor, substance abuse coordinator, and attorney.

counselors (CSAC IIs)—a total of \$67,500. Ten had already been certified. COMBAT also paid for the tests, the officers' 30 hours of mandatory annual continuing education, and their \$180 recertification fees. Once certified, these DJOs are able to provide a higher level of professional treatment to families and juveniles, whom in the past they would have had to refer to other providers with uncertain availability and results. One certified DJO reported that "in the past, I had to refer probationers to outside agencies for individual outpatient counseling; now I can do some of the counseling myself." In addition, he introduced group counseling sessions for juveniles which meet weekly for six weeks. Finally, while he had always run two-hour mandatory group sessions for parents, "my training enables me to focus much more extensively on drug issues during the sessions."

**Family Court staff salaries.** COMBAT funds pay for three types of Family Court staff.

*Residential center DJOs.* COMBAT funds seven certified substance abuse counselors who work in Family Court residential centers serving incarcerated juveniles or in field

units serving juveniles on probation but living at home. Each counselor has a 40-person caseload, which turns over about twice a year.

### **Family Court**

Juveniles (persons under the age of 18) are generally referred to Family Court, a division of the Circuit Court housed in a separate building. Staff conduct an initial screening for each case referred by the police and enter the information in the Family Court information system. The case may then be dismissed or referred to the Family Court legal unit for a court hearing. If the youth is adjudicated delinquent, the offender is either placed in a court facility, in public or private facility, or on probation. If the offender is given probation, he or she is placed under the supervision of a Deputy Juvenile Officer, or DJO.

*Anti-drug DJOs.* COMBAT pays the salaries of three substance abuse certified DJOs who work in satellite Family Court units and carry a caseload of about 60 drug-involved juvenile offenders. These DJOs do not normally provide treatment themselves. However, their contribution is discussed below under COMBAT's role in improving treatment quality.

*Youth workers.* COMBAT funds 20 Family Court youth care workers in residential centers who provide group and individual counseling. Since juveniles are not committed for a specified period of time but only until they have completed treatment, the increased intensity of services these youth workers provide at the one court residential facility where most of them work has resulted in faster turnover. This more rapid turnover has reduced the waiting period for other juveniles to enter the facility.

**Private residential care.** COMBAT provided Family Court with \$338,000 in 1997 for private residential care. At \$125 a day, this represents 3,000 residential days a year. Family court contracts for private care because in Jackson County—like most of the rest of the nation—there is insufficient publicly funded inpatient treatment for adolescents.

COMBAT also pays for Family Court's urinalysis testing (discussed below under increased referrals) and the salaries of three school-based DJOs (discussed under Objective 3, Prevention).

### **Funding of Minority Counselor Substance Abuse Training**

Since 1995, COMBAT has funded a minority counselor preparation program through the University of Kansas Addiction Technology Transfer Center to prepare primarily minority men and women to become certified substance abuse counselors. The center, one of 11 Federally-funded centers in the country that provide training and develop curriculum for

professionals who work in the substance abuse prevention or treatment fields, assesses trainees' levels of preparation, provides training and educational scholarships, provides test preparation and mentoring, and assists them in securing internships with local treatment agencies. Students must live and agree to work in Jackson County. As of early 1998, the program had enabled 26 persons of color to obtain State-level certification all of whom were working in COMBAT-funded agencies. (The program also arranged for approximately 40 individuals to obtain certification as Recognized Associate Substance Abuse Counselors [RASACs], indicating they were not certified but were in training to become certified. All were working in COMBAT-funded agencies.)

### **COMBAT Cannot Fill All the Gaps in Treatment Availability**

COMBAT participants and observers reported that, despite COMBAT funding, substance abuse programs are in short supply in Jackson County for all types of substance abusers. However, several individuals agreed that there was an especially critical need for certain specialized treatment services:

- lack of aftercare, including day treatment, respite care for children and adults, and transitional living, especially for women and children;
- inpatient programs for women with young children;
- treatment for adolescents, especially long-term residential treatment; and
- treatment for the dually diagnosed.

It is unrealistic to expect COMBAT to have filled—or to ever be able to fill—all these gaps. However, the COMBAT Commission has been making a conscious effort to address them. For example, based on anecdotal information that there were not enough day treatment and residential beds in the county, and insufficient services for adolescents, the commission has tried to fully-fund treatment providers that submit proposals to provide these services and serve these populations. When negotiating the actual budgets with these providers, the commission requires that the bulk of these agencies' COMBAT funds be devoted to these services and target groups.

Commission staff are also beginning to work on a treatment needs assessment. According to Susan Griffie, the commission's former executive director, "We want provider data now and information on community needs before making decisions on where to put our money. Our theme is: we have very few data, but we're evolving to get more and more data for driving our funding decisions."

COMBAT does appear to have filled gaps in service delivery at least in part by funding specialized services that were not previously available or were in short supply:

- COMBAT's contract with Hope House funds a substance abuse counselor to provide services to victims of domestic violence who are substance abusers.

- A Family Court administrator reported that COMBAT's support for community mental health centers has increased treatment options available for juveniles.
- The same administrator said that "Accessibility in rural areas has improved with COMBAT funding because the COMBAT money is spread out across the county rather than being confined to just the inner city."

### Estimating the Increase in Treatment Opportunities

While the discussion above makes clear that COMBAT increased treatment opportunities in Jackson County, it is difficult to quantify the increase, especially over time. State-level reporting systems for treatment contain the number of slots for many programs in the county, but COMBAT programs that do not receive State or Federal funding are not included in the State's database for Jackson County. In addition, some treatment providers merge their COMBAT funding with funding from other sources to provide services. Exhibit OBJ2-9 provides an estimate of the increase in treatment opportunities for 1997 by summing the data from each of the initiatives discussed above.<sup>5</sup> According to this calculation, as many as 4,934 individuals may have received treatment in 1997 as a result of COMBAT funding. If the numbers of clients treated that represent only rough estimates are reduced by 50 percent to account for possible overestimates in the computations that led to the figures, and if the number of individuals treated by recipients of a COMBAT Grant Match is reduced by 25 percent (since the match accounted for only about one quarter of the recipients' funds), it is still possible to conclude that **COMBAT funding resulted in the treatment of at least 4,376 individuals in 1997.** In addition to this estimate of increased treatment, COMBAT provided detoxification services to 1,662 individuals in 1997. Because some of these data—in particular, for the COMBAT Commission-funded providers—are unavailable for previous years, it is impossible to compare the number of individuals for whom COMBAT funding provided treatment across years.

This calculation does not prove that these individuals would not have received treatment without COMBAT funding. It is possible that treatment opportunities might have expanded in COMBAT's absence—indeed, COMBAT's absence might have stimulated other funding

<sup>5</sup> The exhibit excludes individuals who received COMBAT-funded detoxification services because detoxification is not considered a form of treatment; it must almost always be followed by outpatient, residential, or other forms of treatment for individuals to achieve recovery. "Detoxification, unlike the previous modalities [methadone maintenance, therapeutic communities, outpatient nonmethadone treatment, chemical dependency treatment] is not a treatment for drug-seeking behavior. Rather, it is a family of procedures for alleviating the short-term symptoms of withdrawal from drug dependence. . . . The major procedure is observation (because withdrawal is self-limiting and ordinarily not life-threatening, although it can be uncomfortable)." Gerstein, D.R., and H.J. Harwood (eds.), *Treating Drug Problems*, volume 1, *A Study of the Evolution, Effectiveness, and Financing of Public and Private Drug Treatment Systems*, Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 174.

## Exhibit OBJ 2-9

### Approximation of the Increased Treatment COMBAT Funded in 1997

While it is impossible to determine exactly how many clients obtained treatment services as a result of COMBAT funding, it is possible to derive a very rough estimate of the number served based on the following considerations:

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Clients Served in 1997</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>COMBAT-funded providers</i> excluding detoxification providers (see exhibit OBJ2-4 above)</li> </ul>	3,099
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>Grant Match Program</i> recipients' clients</li> </ul>	100 (exact number, but COMBAT provides only matching funds)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>Drug Court</i> graduates (not participants or early terminators)</li> </ul>	118
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>J.A.M. program</i> graduates—about 10 participants per month according to the former program director</li> </ul>	120 (estimate)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>10 Deputy Juvenile Officers certified as substance abuse counselors</i> supervised 200 different clients X 66 percent with a drug problem X 33 percent treated for substance abuse by each DJO [as opposed to referring them]</li> </ul>	436 (estimate)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>Seven COMBAT-funded residential center DJOs</i>, each with a caseload of 40 clients which turns over two times a year</li> </ul>	560 (estimate)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <i>Youth Care Workers</i>—by creating more rapid turnover among residents, each of the 20 COMBAT-funded Family Court youth care workers in residential centers may have made it possible for the centers to admit an additional 10 juveniles who received treatment</li> </ul>	200 (estimate)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Family Court's increased residential care budget provided for 3,000 <i>additional residential days</i> a year, with an average stay of nearly 200 days per juvenile</li> </ul>	151
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Twenty-six counselors certified as substance abuse counselors through the <i>minority counselor training program</i>; assume six were employed full time for the entire year and each one treated 25 different clients during the year</li> </ul>	150 (estimate)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,376<sup>a</sup></b>

a This number is not the sum of the number of clients served presented above. The calculation instead represents the sum of (1) the figures representing exact numbers and estimates, (2) one-half of each rough estimate (e.g., 218 individuals served by the 10 DJOs), and (3) one-quarter of the 100 Grant Match Program recipients' clients (since COMBAT provides a maximum of 25 percent of each recipient's total funding).

sources to step in to fill some of the gaps that COMBAT partially filled. However, as discussed below, COMBAT participants and observers were in agreement that treatment capacity in Jackson County would not have expanded significantly, if at all, without COMBAT. It is also possible that some clients treated as a result of COMBAT funding might have obtained treatment from other existing providers if the increased capacity COMBAT created had not materialized. However, COMBAT participants and observers agreed that there was a shortage of treatment capacity among other providers before and after COMBAT's implementation. These calculations do not, of course, indicate in any way whether the treatment that resulted from COMBAT was effective or cost effective.<sup>6</sup>

## COMBAT Increased Referrals to Treatment

Increasing the availability of treatment is a meaningless achievement unless substance abusers take advantage of the increased capacity to seek help. *COMBAT contributed to five activities that have increased the number of substance abusers who have been referred for treatment:*

- (1) Drug Court referrals to treatment;
- (2) referrals by DJOs to treatment;
- (3) referrals of local residents to treatment by community mobilizers;
- (4) efforts by COMBAT-funded detoxification providers to ensure that clients enter follow-up treatment;
- (5) referrals of clients to treatment from probation and parole officers.

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6 In addition to the evidence presented above that COMBAT increased treatment services, it would be possible theoretically to document decreases in waiting lists to enter treatment among COMBAT-funded providers (and other providers, as well), and decreases in the waiting period before individuals on the lists could enroll, as further evidence that COMBAT increased treatment capacity. The fact that providers funded by the COMBAT Commission failed to bill for as much as \$125,000 in 1997 suggests that they had unfilled slots in contrast to the waiting lists they experienced previously. However, information was not collected that indicates that the providers who underbilled were providers who previously had waiting lists. Furthermore, most providers do not have documentation regarding changes in waiting lists and waiting periods over the years. While some providers reported that their waiting lists or waiting periods have declined, these estimates are subject to distortion. The estimates are also usually not keyed to specific periods of time other than the recent past. Even if reductions in waiting lists and waiting periods could be documented, other events may have been responsible for the changes. For example, changes in welfare eligibility enacted by Congress in 1996 may have reduced waiting lists and time by disqualifying large numbers of people from free treatment. At the same time, one agency that reported that its waiting list had declined from five to two weeks observed that the decrease at least in part reflected a change in staff schedules and a new policy to discontinue treatment for clients who chronically fail to make appointments. Finally, COMBAT may have temporarily *increased* waiting lists as DJOs and Drug Court added to the number of referrals to treatment. It is conceivable that over time the number of additional referrals to treatment as a result of COMBAT always exceeded the increased treatment capacity that COMBAT was simultaneously creating.

- (6) referrals of clients from detoxification programs;
- (7) interagency collaboration and referral; and
- (8) funding of non-traditional treatment not otherwise eligible for funding.

### **Drug Court Referrals to Treatment**

As explained above, County Court Services, a treatment provider hired by COMBAT, is the primary provider of outpatient services to Drug Court participants. As noted, CCS increased treatment opportunities. However, *Drug Court itself represents an important example of how COMBAT has also increased referrals—the number of substance abusers referred for treatment.* The court's raison d'être is to divert individuals with substance abuse problems from the normal prosecution process into treatment in an effort to resolve some of the problems that led to their criminal activity and prevent their reoccurrence.

To be sure, many Drug Court participants, had they been processed in the normal fashion, would have received probation or a suspended imposition of sentence—including a referral to treatment. However, it is unlikely that many of these offenders would have entered treatment since the responsibility for finding a suitable provider and showing up to enroll rests entirely with the offender. Probation officers typically failed to monitor clients' entry into treatment because the primary criterion of successful completion of probationers' sentences—and the primary concern for overburdened probation officers—is avoiding rearrest. According to Molly Merrigan, COMBAT's former chief Drug Court prosecutor and current Drug Court Commissioner—and a former probation officer for 20 years—


We always dealt with the most needy cases and therefore neglected the types who are now in Drug Court until they messed up—and then we intervened. With probation-mandated treatment, it could be weeks before the officer realizes a client has relapsed or otherwise messed up. And while clients often did get treatment, it wasn't as good quality [as with Drug Court] because it wasn't tailored to their individual needs.

Furthermore, some offenders on probation who might have sought treatment might also have been turned away by providers that were full. However, providers receiving funds from the COMBAT Commission agree in their contracts to "take referrals . . . from Drug Court and assist the prosecutor in devising a viable permanent plan for treatment services for drug court referrals."

Exhibit OBJ2-10 indicates the flow of cases screened for drug court from October 1993 to April 1998. As shown, of 1,967 defendants screened to be eligible, a high proportion (71%) made an initial court appearance and signed a Drug Court contract or agreement to

## Exhibit OBJ2-10

### Case Flow through Jackson County Drug Court





participate. Only about 30 percent decided to continue on through traditional prosecution. Of the just over 1,400 defendants who signed up for drug court, over half have either successfully completed the program or are still in the program. Most traditional treatment programs have far higher rates of dropping out—generally more than half treatment clients drop out in the first three months of treatment.

A common question asked about Drug Court is whether these cases would be prosecuted absent Drug Court, in that they often involve charges of use or minor possession of drugs. This is a question we can not fully answer. However, of those participants who were terminated or of those who chose not to participate from the beginning, only 169 were defendants whose cases were dismissed, that is, they would not have been further processed through the system. Other cases retained enough severity to be candidates for plea bargain agreements or full prosecution. There is a relatively small number of defendants (14 percent), however, who failed to appear either at Drug Court hearings or for initial court appearances, and for whom prosecution was not pursued.

Exhibit OBJ2-11 indicates the cases moving through the prosecutorial system from 1993 to 1997 and the fraction which Drug Court cases represent. As the figure shows, an increasing number of all cases filed were diverted into the Drug Court system and a steadily increasing number were accepted into the treatment regimen, relieving the jail and community corrections systems of having to monitor these defendants and placing treatment within the reach of a large number of offenders.


The impact of Drug Court is as yet untested. As mentioned above, there are no comparison data available to determine the rearrest and relapse rates of drug court participants; in addition, coordinated data across criminal justice systems for tracking both Drug Court participants and any comparison groups are also not yet available.

***Three features of Drug Court's operations limit its effectiveness in referring defendants for substance abuse treatment.*** First, ten percent of eligible defendants refuse to participate in Drug Court before the assessment period because they object to the level of supervision both in terms of participation in treatment and periodic returns to court for progress reviews. Other defendants think they can win their cases in criminal court or, even losing, receive a less time-consuming penalty.

Jail crowding is a second limitation on Drug Court's effectiveness. The judge sometimes threatens to jail participants who fail to comply with their program requirements. On some occasions, he locks them up for few days—handcuffing them right in the courtroom—as a form of “shock therapy” to get them to comply with the program. However, crowding in the jail prevents him from incarcerating more than a few participants a month. As a result, according to one prosecutor, “Crowding takes the teeth out of failing Drug Court.” According to a police administrator, “What makes Drug Court work is the stick [of a possible

Exhibit OBJ2-11

# Number of Cases Processed by Drug Court over Time



jail sentence or felony conviction for failure to comply with diversion management], but it's partly weakened by crowding. Bad guys know about the crowding." The judge can—and does—use the less onerous (and perhaps less effective) alternative of requiring participants to spend Friday evening, all day Saturday, and Sunday morning at a local community center where they participate in a weekend counseling program.

### **Drug Court Is Attractive to Most Defendants**

Despite the relatively high level of supervision, most defendants have compelling reasons to prefer Drug Court to a conviction or even a suspended imposition of sentence—which is still a conviction.

- After successfully completing Drug Court treatment, participants' records show they were arrested but that the case was dismissed. As a result, they can keep their jobs while they participate and can legitimately tell employers after graduation that they have no convictions. While their arrest records are not expunged, only law enforcement officials have access to the records.
- Drug Court offers more intensive and individualized substance abuse treatment than is available to defendants placed on probation. It also provides job search assistance, health services, and other support services.
- Successful participants are rewarded. The judge praises participants who are making progress and asks everyone in the courtroom to applaud and congratulate them. Using participant fees, the judge can reward participants who are doing well with free movie passes. Observation of participants in court suggests that they are proud of this recognition.
- Some defendants are influenced to enter Drug Court as a result of pressure from family members who sometimes feel that the program offers the type of intensive supervision that will enable their loved ones to recover.

A third Drug Court limitation is the significant delay that still occurs before most defendants are invited to participate. Prosecutors try to file cases that are eligible for Drug Court as fast as possible to get defendants into treatment before they have the chance to go back to using drugs or committing new crimes.<sup>7</sup> However, a series of obstacles has slowed down the time between arrest and enrollment. Efforts to speed up the process have encountered several as yet insuperable barriers. (See the box "Barriers to Processing Drug Court Cases Swiftly.")

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7 "The period immediately after an arrest . . . provides a critical window of opportunity for intervening and introducing the value of AOD [alcohol and other drug] treatment. Judicial action, taken promptly after arrest, capitalizes on the crisis nature of the arrest and booking process." The National Association of Drug Court Professionals, *Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Courts Program Office, 1997.

## Barriers to Processing Drug Court Cases Swiftly

Missouri statute allows arrestees to be detained for only 20 hours unless they have been charged in court. Furthermore, the State does not allow arrests for probable cause in drug cases without a warrant (judges will not permit police officers or prosecutors to issue summons). To charge an individual, the arresting officer turns over the case to a Kansas City police department Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) detective who must then get all the necessary paperwork to the prosecutor in time for the prosecutor to hand it to the judge to sign an arrest warrant within 20 hours of the arrest. Otherwise, the arrestee must be released—and then may be back on drugs before he or she can be brought before Drug Court.

Detectives are usually unable to meet the 20-hour deadline for several reasons:

- The Kansas City Police Department is “detective driven”: street officers do not process felony cases; a detective takes control. But 600 street officers turn their drug cases to 42 DEU detectives. These detectives cannot process all the paperwork for all the drug cases they get within 20 hours, so they tackle the most important cases first—such as major trafficking—which are not the cases that are eligible for Drug Court.
- Detectives also lack the time to get offenders to Drug Court quickly because officers handle serious offenders in three other Kansas City counties, and these other cases involve extensive travel time. Investigations of methamphetamine laboratories, which also take a long time, further reduce the time to process Drug Court-type cases.
- One COMBAT participant reported that some detectives sabotage the system—that is, deliberately avoid processing Drug Court cases within the 20-hour period—because they oppose giving offenders the opportunity for treatment instead of criminal processing.

## Family Court Assessments and Referrals

The previous discussion explained how the certification training of Deputy Juvenile Officers that COMBAT has funded has increased the *availability* of substance abuse treatment. However, DJOs have also increased the number of *referrals* into treatment.

- In the past, Family Court contracted with a provider to do urinalysis testing (UAs), but, with less and less money to pay for testing, DJOs were forced to request fewer UAs. Since 1991, COMBAT has paid for all of Family Court’s UA testing, enabling staff to test every youth who is held in detention or who goes on probation, as well as every juvenile in residential treatment who returns from a home visit. In 1995, Family Court conducted 3,711 tests. The figures for 1996 and 1997 were similar. The increased number of tests that

COMBAT funds makes it possible to identify additional juveniles with substance abuse problems whom DJOs can then refer for treatment.

- Even without testing, because of their COMBAT-funded training DJOs can detect drug problems more effectively than in the past and, again, refer clients with substance abuse problems for treatment. According to one DJO, "I have definitely treated and referred clients who, if I had not been certified, I would not have realized had a drug problem, so the problem would have gone unrecognized." Another DJO reported that certification training has enabled him to put his clients more at ease, with the result that they are more inclined to reveal a substance abuse problem for which he can then refer them.
- A DJO said that before his office received a second, COMBAT-funded, DJO, his caseload of 60 to 70 clients had been unmanageable. With such high caseloads, "I was always just putting out fires, leaving too little time to assess clients' problems, supervise them, and make referrals." With the second DJO, his caseload has been reduced to 42, leaving him adequate time to make referrals.
- The three COMBAT-funded anti-drug DJOs conduct written drug assessments of every juvenile who has a positive UA or appears to have a drug problem. In addition to confirming a substance abuse problem, these tests distinguish among juveniles who are emotionally disturbed, high on drugs, or both. This information enables DJOs to refer the juveniles to the proper type of treatment (e.g., psychological counseling versus drug treatment). The three anti-drug DJOs prepared 73 written substance abuse assessments during the first three months of 1998 when they first began performing this function. Other staff certified with COMBAT funding prepared 113 written assessments during that period.
- COMBAT-funded Family Court staff have trained the court's 400 other staff to identify drug problems and refer clients for assessment and treatment.

### **Community Action Network (CAN) Mobilizers**

Until 1998, Project NeighborHOOD, a Kansas City community-based organization, assigned a trained "community mobilizer" to each Community Action Network (CAN) to serve as the link between substance abusers and drug treatment providers. The mobilizers were part of a larger Project NeighborHOOD initiative funded with a \$4 million, five-year Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant to address crime and substance abuse problems in troubled Kansas City neighborhoods. In 1992, COMBAT worked with Project NeighborHOOD to write the

grant application and provided the local match the organization needed in order to apply for the grant. After renewing the grant in 1997—again with a \$150,000 COMBAT match—the foundation provided the agency with another \$600,000.<sup>8</sup>

One of the mobilizers' principal responsibilities was to refer members of their communities with substance abuse problems to treatment providers. A mobilizer gave an example of a referral he had made:

I worked with a woman who had four children, one of them on PCP. I got the boy into a treatment program, which he completed successfully. I worked with the mother to get a job, and she was able to go off welfare. I knew the older daughter wanted to go back to school, so I got her into a GED [General Education Diploma] program. I actually escorted each of them to these programs because they were too intimidated to go themselves.

Project NeighborHOOD established the mobilizer positions based on the observation that mainstream early intervention and treatment programs largely miss culturally isolated inner-city populations. As NeighborHOOD residents, the mobilizers were expected to be in a position to know, or be able to find out, who in their communities had substance abuse problems. Mobilizers could implement a personalized approach that would be effective in motivating their neighbors to seek treatment whereas more generalized public awareness campaigns might be ignored.

In 1996, the University of Missouri-Kansas City's Cookingham Institute of Public Affairs conducted an analysis of Project NeighborHOOD's treatment referral and coordination service. It found that the mobilizers collaborated with 22 agencies to provide substance abuse and alcoholism treatment services to residents in need. From mid-1992 through January 1995, approximately 280 residents made at least an initial contact with an agency concerning treatment services, and, by the end of 1994, mobilizers had placed 177 residents in treatment programs. The remaining individuals did not follow through on the mobilizers' referral. Of the 177 placed residents, 49 percent were referred for detoxification services, 32 percent to residential services, 9 percent to outpatient services, and 10 percent to other treatment modalities. Almost none of the individuals who entered residential services participated in outpatient care or aftercare after discharge.

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<sup>8</sup> In 1997, Project NeighborHOOD replaced the mobilizers with "community system specialists" and "NeighborHOOD centered initiative facilitators." However, the individuals holding these titles continue to refer residents to treatment providers.

Information on client outcomes was largely missing from treatment referral case files. Partial information was obtained on 75 former clients by asking mobilizers to provide any information they could recall about their clients. The mobilizers believed that 17 of the 75 had remained drug-free since treatment, 3 were considered to be occasional or social users, and 11 were reported to have relapsed one or two times but to have returned to sobriety.

### **Detoxification Provider Referrals**

In an effort to increase accountability, COMBAT Commission contracts with its two detoxification providers require them to ensure that clients enter follow-up treatment after they have been detoxified. Even though detoxification providers are required to refer and follow-up clients, there are insufficient data to estimate how many of the 1,662 COMBAT-funded clients whom the detoxification providers served in 1997 actually entered treatment—and would not have entered follow-up treatment on their own. One of the providers reported that staff refer 91 percent of detoxified clients to follow-up treatment, but the provider does not have the resources to determine how many clients accept the referral and actually enter treatment (which includes self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous).

### **Probation and Parole Referrals**

COMBAT has provided partial funding to the University of Missouri Addiction Technology Transfer Center to provide training in treatment topics to combined groups of allied health professionals, treatment professionals, and probation and parole officers. Topics have included the substance-abusing offender, cultural competency, criminal thinking, offenders with dual diagnoses, the hostile or resistant offender, and mobilizing resources for the substance abusing offender. These sessions are designed not only to increase the counseling skills of the officers but also to motivate and enable them to refer clients to appropriate sources of more intensive treatment. However, COMBAT funds only part of this training, which the center offers statewide. In addition, the department of probation and parole was unable to estimate the number of clients whom probation and parole officers refer to treatment.

### **Estimating the Number of Referrals COMBAT Generated**

While the discussion above makes clear that COMBAT increased the number of referrals to treatment in Jackson County, it is difficult to quantify the increase, especially over time. However, the program may have been responsible for generating at least 1,147 referrals (exhibit OBJ2-11). If the number of individuals referred that represents only a rough estimate is reduced by 50 percent to account for possible overestimation, it is still possible to conclude that ***COMBAT funding resulted in the referral of at least 707 individuals to treatment in 1997, 258 of whom are known to have entered treatment as a result of the referral.*** This is

an unusually high proportion of referred individuals who actually enter treatment. There are insufficient data for estimating the number of COMBAT-generated referrals for previous years.

## **COMBAT Has Taken Steps to Improve the Quality of Treatment**

It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess whether COMBAT improved the quality of the *clinical treatment* of substance abuse in Jackson County. An evaluation of treatment quality would have entailed observing treatment sessions before and after COMBAT's existence and obtaining relapse data over time. However, it is possible to conclude that *COMBAT took structural steps that are likely to result in improved treatment quality.*

COMBAT's most important contribution to changing the structure of treatment was to contract with County Court Services to provide specific types of treatment services tailored to the needs of individual Drug Court participants. As discussed above, after careful assessment, County Court Services matches each participant with one of six types of treatment levels—the one most suitable to his or her clinical needs. Furthermore, the Day Report Center itself matches clients assigned to this modality with the specific level of supervision and treatment they need. This matching is an approach that most other providers do not have the resources to implement as effectively or at all. Nevertheless, COMBAT administrators hope that voluntary treatment providers in Jackson County will eventually emulate County Court Service's approach to matching specific services with specific clients (and including support services as a normal part of treatment), thereby improving the quality of *their* treatment delivery. Indeed, COMBAT has tried to improve the effectiveness of treatment on a more global scale—by matching treatment services to client needs through the support of a variety of venues, including the jail, the courts (Drug Court), and throughout Jackson County (among voluntary providers), in an effort to reach substance abusers in whatever context that can bring about recovery.

COMBAT has attempted to improve County Court Services' treatment services still further by funding several support services designed to enhance treatment effectiveness. (See the case study "Support Services for the Drug Court Client" in the appendix B.) Furthermore, these support services, especially in the area of education and employment, are offered as a normal part of the treatment *process*, not after treatment has concluded, an approach that, by erasing the line between treatment and aftercare, is intended to enhance treatment success still further.

COMBAT has attempted to improve the quality of care in other respects:

- COMBAT contributed to improving the quality of treatment through its funding of the three anti-drug DJOs. The court refers the most difficult cases to these DJOs, each of whom had a caseload of about 60 juveniles in 1997. These officers are generally the primary provider of assessment, treatment



**Exhibit OBJ2-12**

**Approximation of the Number of Individuals Referred to Treatment  
in 1997 as a Result of COMBAT Funding**

<u>Initiative</u>	<u>Estimated Number of Referrals</u>	<u>Number Known to Have Entered Treatment</u>
• Drug Court enrolled 150 defendants in 1997—in effect, “referring” them to treatment. These referrals include defendants whose cases would have been heard in city court had not minor cocaine and heroin possession cases been transferred to Circuit Court.	150 (number)	150
• Two Deputy Juvenile Officers certified as substance abuse counselors each estimated he probably refers four clients to treatment whom he would not have referred without training as certified substance abuse counselors. Extrapolating this number to all 10 certified DJOs suggests that collectively they increased the number of referrals by about 480.	480 (estimate)	NA
• COMBAT-funded court staff trained 400 other Family Court staff to identify when to refer clients to substance abuse assessment and treatment. It is impossible to estimate exactly the number of additional individuals these 400 other Family Court staff generate each year. However, if a conservative estimate of one additional referral per staff member each year is used, 400 additional referrals would be made each year.	400 (estimate)	NA
• The three COMBAT-funded school-based DJOs estimated that three of the students they referred to treatment during the 1996-1997 school year entered treatment.	9 (estimate)	9
• Community mobilizers placed 177 residents in treatment between mid-1992 through mid-January 1995—an average of 9 individuals per month or 108 per year.	108 (number)	108
• COMBAT-funded detoxification providers treated 1,662 individuals in 1997.	NA	NA
• Probation and parole officers referred an unknown number of clients to treatment in 1997.	NA	NA
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>707<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>258</b>

<sup>a</sup> This number is not the sum of the number of clients referred presented above. The calculation represents the sum of (1) the figures representing exact numbers and reliable estimates, (2) one-half of each rough estimate (e.g., 240 individuals referred by the 10 DJOs), and (3) one-quarter of the referrals made by the 10 Grant Match Program-funded certified Deputy Juvenile Officers.

planning, and aftercare for their clients. Because of them, Family Court is able to provide a level of attention, supervision, and skill to the most problematic juveniles that would not otherwise be available if regular DJOs had to add these cases to their regular caseloads.

- COMBAT has required COMBAT-funded treatment providers to gain State certification, which involves meeting specific safety standards, having credentialed staff (not just counselors whose primary qualification is being in recovery), and developing policies and procedures to guide their operations. As a result, two COMBAT-funded providers that were not certified made the necessary changes to secure certification.
- COMBAT has funded the University of Missouri Addiction Technology Transfer Center to offer four free training events a year to which COMBAT providers must send their COMBAT-funded staff for 10 hours as a form of continuing education beyond the training required for certification. The training has focused on such topics as effective interview techniques, culturally responsive counseling, and the effects of drugs on the brain. COMBAT also paid Comprehensive Mental Health Services to set aside slots in its seminars on continuing treatment education for staff in COMBAT-funded treatment providers.
- The COMBAT Commission has funded the Full Employment Council (FEC) to provide employment assessments and job search and placement assistance to clients whom COMBAT-funded treatment providers refer to the agency. COMBAT administrators expect that this type of support service will help prevent relapse among substance abusers in recovery.
- As noted above, COMBAT has funded the Addiction Technology Transfer Center to prepare minorities to become certified substance abuse counselors. In addition to increasing opportunities for treatment, COMBAT's funding for training minority counselors may improve the quality of treatment in two respects. First, it adds to the cadre of individuals who are certified counselors, rather than lay counselors whose only qualification is that they are in recovery. Second, the training may improve treatment outcome by increasing the number of minorities available to treat the large proportion of African Americans in need of treatment in Jackson County, because counselors who are of the same ethnic background as their clients may be better able to establish rapport and understand the particular role ethnicity may play (and not play) in their clients' substance abuse.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Peter Finn, Addressing the Needs of Cultural Minorities in Drug Treatment, *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment*, 1994, 11(4): 325-337.

- COMBAT also awarded contracts to three treatment providers that specialize in serving substance abusers who are minorities, including African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. Again, the cultural congruity between the funded minority counselors and their clients may improve treatment outcome.
- COMBAT arranged for distinct staff in a centralized location physically separated from any treatment facility to conduct all assessments of Drug Court participants. This approach is expected to improve the assignment of clients to appropriate treatment alternatives by highlighting the importance of the process (rather than downplaying it by making it an adjunct to treatment) and letting neutral individuals conduct the assessments (not individuals who also do treatment).
- By funding urinalysis testing for all juveniles in Family Court, COMBAT makes it possible for court staff to tailor treatment to the particular level of sobriety of each youth.

There is no way to measure the extent to which COMBAT has actually improved treatment quality absent baseline and follow-up recidivism data (which are unavailable) or actual before-and-after observation of treatment delivery (which was infeasible). However, the administrator of one treatment organization reported in 1997 that “COMBAT hasn’t done a lot to ensure accountability and good outcome measures [among providers funded by the COMBAT Commission]. I’m only required to report the number of admissions and the number of successful and unsuccessful completions. I have to be more accountable to my own internal administration, including length of stay, employment measures, and educational attainment of clients.” The administrator added that COMBAT’s accountability had improved in recent months (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration). Recent attempts by COMBAT to increase accountability include the following:

- In the past, the only information judges received about sentenced offenders was word that “The guy is doing OK.” By contrast, County Court Services must furnish Drug Court with urine test results, attendance records, and other reports of client progress. As a result, COMBAT administrators can track and make public the results of the treatment provider’s efforts.
- COMBAT has tried to set the tone for accountability for all treatment providers by monitoring the attendance, drug use (through urine screening), and recidivism of County Court Service’s Drug Court clients.
- The COMBAT Commission has instituted a number of reporting requirements designed to increase providers’ accountability (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration).

- As of 1997, the COMBAT Commission's requests for proposals to provide detoxification services began requiring bidding organizations to establish formal linkages between their agencies and the other treatment services funded by COMBAT providers so that clients have access to and receive the next level of treatment services. Detoxification providers were already reporting in their monthly progress reports for 1998 the name of the facility to which each client had gone for ongoing treatment. Based on the providers' performance in getting patients to the next level of treatment, the following year the commission may decide to increase or decrease their funding. Merely requiring detoxification providers to submit information on whether their clients go on to the next level of care may enforce improved record keeping. Keeping better records, in turn, may raise providers' level of consciousness regarding their ongoing responsibility to patients beyond simply detoxifying them—rather than blaming the client for relapsing after having been detoxified.

## **Treatment Expansion Would Not Have Been as Extensive without COMBAT**

COMBAT expanded treatment capacity in Jackson County. In addition, it appears that *the expanded treatment capacity would not have occurred at all or as significantly without COMBAT*. Although the evidence is only anecdotal, it is consistent.

- According to William Session, who headed the Special Advisory Panel to the legislature's Anti-Drug Committee,

The establishment of treatment and law enforcement programs was entirely due to COMBAT funding. There would have been no expansion or creation of new initiatives to deal with the substance abuse problem in Kansas City absent COMBAT.

- Most COMBAT participants agree that the backlog in Circuit Court would have forced the county to establish a Drug Court without COMBAT. Indeed neighboring Lafayette County established a drug court without any anti-drug tax revenues. However, without COMBAT funding it would have taken longer for the Jackson County Drug Court to have come into existence, and the court would probably not have had its own treatment provider—County Court Services—or a modified therapeutic community—the Day Report Center. As a result, *the increased treatment capacity County Court Services provides would not have occurred without COMBAT*.

- Claire McCaskill, Katheryn Shields (the county executive), Petra Peper (the former J.A.M. director), and other COMBAT participants and observers agreed that the J.A.M. program would not have been funded without COMBAT. However, data suggest that the number of jail inmates participating in drug treatment programs nationwide increased significantly during the period of COMBAT's operation—from 394,808 in 1989 to 502,105 in 1996 (an increase of 27 percent).<sup>11</sup> More importantly, the Federal consent order of June 1992 with the county mandates that the county provide a jail substance abuse treatment program for as long as the Anti-Drug Tax is collected. Nevertheless, the court might not have mandated a program if COMBAT had not been available to fund it. In this light, it becomes fair to say that *COMBAT can take credit for J.A.M.'s initiation and continued existence.*
- Most of the treatment providers funded by the COMBAT Commission reported that, without Anti-Drug Tax money, *they would not have been able to find other sources of income with which to expand services.* According to one provider, "There would have been no special effort to address the drug problem locally other than traditional revenue-based budgets—that is, taxes." It is unlikely that COMBAT preempted the contributions of still other potential funding sources.
- *It is unlikely that Family Court would have increased its capacity to treat juveniles significantly without COMBAT funding.* According to Jeffrey Gosney, the court's substance abuse coordinator, "Direct treatment within the court system wouldn't have existed without COMBAT funding, or at least would have been minuscule without COMBAT funding." According to Denny Atherton, the court's director of field services, "Before COMBAT began funding inpatient services, we had to send some kids out of the county for residential care." David Kierst, the court administrator, said that, without COMBAT funding, no DJOs would have become certified as substance abuse counselors who could then provide professional treatment to clients. The positions for the three anti-drug DJOs would probably not have been created.
- *The increased services provided by the minority counselors whose certification COMBAT paid would not have occurred without the anti-drug tax monies.*

It appears likely that many of the referrals to treatment that COMBAT generated would also not have occurred if the program had not existed. For example, without COMBAT's assistance in preparing its grant application and providing the local match, Project NeighborHOOD would not have secured its foundation grant that made possible the hiring of

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<sup>11</sup> Caroline Wolf Harlow, *Profile of Jail Inmates 1996*, Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 1988.

community mobilizers. According to the agency's executive director, "We would not have even received money from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation . . . were it not for COMBAT." By contrast, referrals would have increased with any type of drug court the county established.

Finally, because of the range of supervision levels it affords and its integration of support services into the treatment process, County Court Services has probably improved the quality of treatment in the county. According to COMBAT participants and observers, it is also unlikely that the other structural steps COMBAT supported intended to increase the clinical quality of treatment services would have been funded without COMBAT money, including its funding of the three Family Court anti-drug DJOs and urinalysis testing, the minority counselor training program, continuing education for certified counselors, the Full Employment Council's employment-related support services, and minority treatment providers.

*There are insufficient data for assessing whether the increased treatment, referrals, and quality of services that COMBAT generated have reduced relapse or recidivism rates among clients.* Only an evaluation of recidivism among Drug Court participants provides suggestive evidence that the program may have reduced recidivism.<sup>12</sup> (See the box "A Suggestive But Inconclusive Study of Drug Court Recidivism.")

### **A Suggestive but Inconclusive Study of Drug Court Recidivism**

For 77 inmates who graduated from Drug Court between January and July 1995, just under 25 percent relapsed—that is, were reincarcerated in the jail—within one year of release. The relapse rate for all inmates in the jail was 39 percent in 1995. More recent data collected and examined by an independent evaluation firm found that, among 74 participants who could be tracked and who complied with the program, four percent were rearrested within five months after formally entering treatment in 1997.

The evaluators compared this rate with the 60 percent recidivism rate among State prison inmates after a three-year period and a 50 percent recidivism rate among probationers after three years. Self-reported drug use declined by half compared with baseline rates, and urine testing showed that 90 percent were "clean" after 10 months in the program.

Methodological weaknesses in the evaluation, discussed in detail in chapter 5, COMBAT Administration, including the lack of a valid control or comparison group, limit the confidence that can be placed in these findings. Inclusion of a comparison group is critical to determining the court's role because it is likely that defendants who are most motivated to succeed are the substance abusers who are

<sup>12</sup> Proposals that Petra Peper said she submitted for funding to follow J.A.M. participants after release were rejected.

eligible for and choose to participate in Drug Court. These individuals might have become sober without participating in Drug Court.

Although the evaluation results are inconclusive, Drug Court has received considerable recognition outside Jackson County.

- Drug Court administrators participated as panelists in the National Association of Drug Court Professionals' conference on how to meet the needs of young African-American males.
- Claire McCaskill served as the chairperson of the association's board of directors, and the association conferred a leadership award on her at the 1998 annual conference.
- Drug Court is one of four drug courts in the country that the National Institute of Justice has singled out for individual, comprehensive process and impact evaluations by two independent contractors.
- The Federal Drug Courts Program Office chose the court as a Mentor Court, resulting in the county hosting three large trainings for 350 individuals representing jurisdictions awarded Federal drug court planning and start-up grants.
- Teams from Great Britain, Brazil, Peru, and jurisdictions within the United States have visited the court for guidance.

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\* Resource Development Institute. Drug Court Enhancement Evaluation: Process and Outcome Evaluation. Kansas City, Missouri. February 1998.



## Objective 3: Did COMBAT Increase the Prevention of Drug Experimentation Among Youth?

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **Trends in school-based surveys of drug use among 12th graders in Jackson County suggest no significant change in the level of drug use among teens over the past eight years.** This pattern is almost identical to the national patterns among youth over the same time period.
- **COMBAT increased the number of prevention initiatives in Jackson County substantially.** COMBAT increased prevention initiatives in three ways:
  - by contracting with prevention providers to increase or add to their services—for example, the COMBAT Commission awarded contracts worth nearly \$1.7 million to 40 providers in 1997;
  - by providing funds for Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) programs—including over \$1.1 million in 1997.
  - by initiating, stimulating, or coordinating other prevention programs, including programs involving
    - placing Family Court Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs) in schools,
    - truancy prevention,
    - alternative schools,
    - safe summer activities, and
    - servicing children of substance abusing families.
- **COMBAT does not have reliable data regarding the number of individuals its prevention initiatives have served over the life of the program. However, prevention initiatives that COMBAT supported reached an estimated several thousand youth.** For example,
  - COMBAT Commission providers served 2,858 clients in 1997.
  - In 1996, 9,751 students participated in D.A.R.E. classes.



- COMBAT-funded school-based DJOs serve about 225 clients each year.
- the truancy prevention, safe summer, and child abuse programs served a total of 2,067 youth in their first year of operation.

- **It is impossible to determine the effectiveness of prevention programming because of barriers to conducting drug prevention evaluation in general, lack of adequate information from COMBAT prevention providers, and lack of rigorous independent evaluations of their activities.**

#### **Data Sources**

- **Monitoring the Future, National Institute on Drug Abuse**
- **Kauffman Foundation school surveys**
- **Abt Associates telephone interviews with prevention providers**
- **Abt Associates community survey**
- **interviews with COMBAT participants and observers**
- **prevention provider materials**
- **local evaluations of prevention initiatives**

The third and final objective COMBAT established for itself was to prevent youth from experimenting with drugs. COMBAT established this goal because of the belief that drug use prevention, if done correctly, should be considerably more cost effective than drug treatment, given both the addictive power of illicit drugs and the relatively low success rates treatment programs nationwide have been able to achieve. Preventing drug use is therefore an extremely important COMBAT goal.

Data for assessing achievement of this goal include:

- an annual substance abuse survey of high school youth conducted by the Kauffman Foundation;
- the National Institute on Drug Abuse, School Survey, Monitoring the Future;
- a special survey Abt Associates conducted as part of its evaluation of the COMBAT program; and
- descriptions and evaluations of COMBAT-supported prevention initiatives.

## What Kansas City Teens Report in Student Surveys about Drug Use

In the ten years since COMBAT has been in operation, there have been significant changes in the patterns of drug use among youth across the nation. From peak years of marijuana use in the 1980s to a gradual decline and rise again in the 1990s, America's teens as a whole have changed their minds repeatedly about the attractiveness of illegal drug use. Why patterns change is difficult to untangle. They may respond to prevention, availability of certain drugs, or even simple fads of use. In addition, the impact of important factors like prevention programming is difficult to measure in that it is a measurement of what did not happen rather than a change in behavior. We have tried to look at the drug and alcohol use of Kansas City teens as reported in the Kauffman surveys of youth from 1988 to 1996 compared to the national data as reported in the National Institute on Abuse's Monitoring the Future study. Both studies represent surveys of 12th graders in a school based setting. All data in both studies are anonymous and confidential and both samples are selected on a probability basis. Kauffman surveys look at metropolitan Kansas City as well as county. We present these data as part of a descriptive discussion only; that is, a look at how Kansas City school teens have fared over the time COMBAT was in place compared to national trends over the same time period.


While a small percentage of teens use drug like cocaine or opiates, the drugs most commonly consumed by teens are marijuana and alcohol. Exhibit OBJ3-1 shows the prior 30 day consumption of alcohol and marijuana by Kansas City metropolitan area 12th graders, Jackson County 12th graders, and the national 12th grader sample for selected years from 1986 to 1996. As this table indicates, thirty day alcohol use by Kansas City metropolitan area and Jackson County sample seniors has remained essentially the same over the COMBAT programming period, a trend reflected in the national sample, although at slightly higher overall use levels. Thirty day use of marijuana, on the other hand, has increased slightly everywhere over the eight year period.

Cocaine and hallucinogen use are fairly infrequent events among 12th graders both nationally and in the local seniors samples. As Exhibit OBJ3-2 shows, even lifetime prevalence rates are low. Again, Kansas City seniors show a slight decrease in reporting that they have ever used LSD. A similar trend is found with reports of having ever used cocaine.

As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to attribute success or failure to COMBAT prevention initiatives based on data available. National trends in teen drug use follow similar patterns as those reported among Kansas City teens, though at a somewhat higher overall level. It is impossible to determine whether prevention programming contributed to lower overall rates of reported use and/or whether the Kansas City trend line would have been higher absent COMBAT programming. If individual prevention programs were able to provide information on the scope of their programming or tracking data on persons involved it may be clearer as to their unique effect.


# Exhibit OBJ3-1

## 30 Day Use of Alcohol and Marijuana by 12th Graders



# Exhibit OBJ3-2

## Lifetime Prevalence of Use of Cocaine and LSD by 12th Graders



Abt Associates Inc. Objective 3: Did COMBAT Increase Drug Prevention Among Youth?

## **COMBAT Increased the Number of Prevention Initiatives Significantly**

To have contributed to the reduction in drug experimentation among youth, COMBAT had to have been the catalyst for the expansion of old prevention initiatives or the creation of new ones. There is convincing evidence that *COMBAT contributed significantly to the expansion of prevention activities in Jackson County*. COMBAT increased prevention activities in three respects:

- (1) by contracting with prevention providers (schools, neighborhood organizations, community and mental health organizations) to increase their existing services or offer new programs;
- (2) by providing funds for Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) programs; and
- (3) by initiating, stimulating, or coordinating other prevention programs, often through the Grant Match Program (see Objective 4, Innovation).

As shown in exhibit OBJ3-3, COMBAT awarded funds in contracts to community-based prevention providers, to D.A.R.E. programs, and through the Grant Match Program. A discussion and the findings from available evaluations of each major initiative follow.

### **Prevention Providers**

Each year, through a competitive RFP (request for proposal) process, the county legislature, based primarily on recommendations by the COMBAT Commission, funds from 28 to 40 organizations and agencies to provide prevention services. Exhibit OBJ3-4 identifies the 40 prevention agencies COMBAT funded in 1997 for the fiscal year July 1, 1997, to June 30, 1998. Contracts ranged from \$11,045 to \$121,506. The mean contract award was \$42,475. Total funding was \$1,699,002. The proportion of each organization's total funding represented by COMBAT's funding varies tremendously. For example, COMBAT provides \$30,000 to enhance the \$367,125 budget of an existing activity within one organization that has a \$5 million overall budget. The \$30,000 that COMBAT provides another organization represents one-third of its total budget of \$90,000. COMBAT funds some provider activities entirely and other activities in part. As a result, sorting the program's unique impact becomes problematic.

Most of the prevention programs the Prosecutor's office and COMBAT Commission have recommended funding involve case management and educational, tutoring, counseling, or mentoring activities for youth or parents. Exhibit OBJ3-5, compiled by the COMBAT

**Exhibit OBJ3-3****Selected Features of COMBAT-Supported Prevention Initiatives**

<b>Initiative and Dates of Operation</b>	<b>Nature</b>	<b>COMBAT Role</b>	<b>Clients</b>	<b>Impact<sup>1</sup></b>
Initiation or Expansion of Prevention Activities by Community Prevention Providers (1990 – present)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily case management, education, tutoring, counseling, and mentoring</li> <li>Some other activities, such as job training, youth courts, and recreation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provided funding via RFP process</li> <li>Provided \$1,699,002 to 40 organizations in 1997/98</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>During 6-month period in 1997, providers formally assessed and furnished a service or referral to 2,858 clients</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No reliable or valid outcome data are available</li> </ul>
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Police officers teach substance abuse classes to 5th grade students</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provided grant matches to 9 departments until 1995</li> <li>Provides partial funding to 8 departments and two-thirds funding to the Kansas City police department—a total of \$1,146,269 in 1996/97</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9,751 students attended classes in 1996</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No local impact data are available</li> <li>National evaluations of D.A.R.E. have found no long-term behavioral effects</li> </ul>
Other Prevention Initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>School-based Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJOs) (1995-present)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DJOs counsel middle school probationers and high-risk students, and provide drug education to students, teachers, and parents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pays salaries of 3 entry-level DJOs so court can reassign 3 experienced DJOs to work in schools</li> <li>Provided \$102,201 in 1998</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>DJOs counsel about 225 students each year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Absences and office referrals for misconduct declined considerably</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Sources of impact results are provided in the text.

## Exhibit OBJ3-3, continued

## Selected Features of COMBAT-Supported Prevention Initiatives (Continued)

Initiative and Dates of Operation	Nature	COMBAT Role	Clients	Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Truancy Prevention Program (1997)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An attendance clerk and parent-school liaison at each of 6 middle schools work with children and parents to eliminate absenteeism among students with high absenteeism rates</li> <li>Prosecuting attorney threatens uncooperative parents with criminal action if they do not accept offered help</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiated and coordinates</li> <li>Provides one-sixth of the funding—\$86,000 in 1997/98</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>School-based staff had worked with over 500 students as of mid-1997</li> <li>Prosecuting attorney threatened legal action against 37 parents, all but one of whom then contacted their school liaisons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>223 students with absenteeism problems returned to school in 1997-1998</li> <li>Attendance rose more in targeted schools than in nonparticipating schools</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Alternative Schools Network Association (1997)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensures that expelled and suspended students are placed quickly in an alternative school</li> <li>Establishing alternative schools in community-based organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiated</li> <li>Arranged funding for 1998 with from local law enforcement block grant</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Too soon to develop count of participants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Too soon to evaluate</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safe Summer Program (1997)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides youth with a safe place within walking distance to spend summer weekdays</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiated and coordinates</li> <li>Provides no money</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Enabled 1,393 youth to have access to a safe place in 1997</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>58% of participants said they felt "much" safer than the previous summer</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SAFE-TYES Program (1995)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides crisis intervention and case management services to children of substance abusing families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provided partial funding for three years: 1991-\$100,000 1992-\$100,000 1995-\$ 88,235</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Served 174 families in 1995</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There was a statistically significant reduction in violence in the participating families' homes</li> </ul>

**Exhibit OBJ3-4**

**Jackson County COMBAT Commission Drug Prevention Agencies 1997-1998**

AGENCY	AMOUNT
49/63 Neighborhood Coalition	\$28,680
Ad Hoc Group Against Crime	75,000
Big Brothers/Big Sisters	34,293
Blue Springs Youth Outreach Unit	64,403
Boys & Girls Clubs of Eastern Jackson Cty.	36,565
Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater KC	67,056
Child Abuse Prevention Assn.	30,146
Comprehensive Mental Health	70,069
Crittenton	50,819
DeLaSalle/Guadalupe	116,199
Don Bosco	41,195
Eastern Jackson County Youth Court	35,715
Full Employment Council	55,000
Genesis School	41,250
Greater KC LINC	35,100
Heart of America Family Services	30,143
Hope House	29,167
Indep. School District	52,605
Jackson Cty Schools Collaborative	55,000
KC Youth Court	11,045
KCMC Child Development	59,951
Mattie Rhodes Counseling & Arts Center	25,137
Natl. Council on Alcoholism & Drug Dependency	27,140
Niles Home	15,000
Old Northeast	42,718
Operation Breakthrough	28,091
Ozanam Home	18,356
Pan Educational Institute	53,039
Research Mental Health Services	121,506
Rose Brooks Center	48,400
The Children's Place/Rose Brooks	19,250
Together Grandview	11,638
Troost Midtown Association	17,550
Troost Midtown Community Center	14,652
United Inner City Svs/Break & Build	55,250
Visible Horizons	27,500
WEB DuBois Learning Center	62,667
Whatsoever Community Center	26,226
*****	45,375
YWCA	20,106
TOTAL: 40 agencies	\$1,699,002



Commission, shows that in 1997<sup>1</sup> 1,252 clients received case management services, 1,417 received counseling, 1,899 received education or literacy services, 816 were mentored, and 425 received job training. Many clients received more than one of these services. Teacher training was provided to 561 teachers and parent training to 121 parents.

The following goals cited in provider contracts illustrate the educational, counseling, and mentoring initiatives that the COMBAT Commission funded in 1996.

- “Match a minimum of 75 high-risk youth with adult mentors in which mentors will provide various types of supportive services.” (Ad Hoc Group Against Crime)
- “Provide peer counseling to 50 female youth [at] high risk for teen pregnancy by youth who have undergone training by agency staff and volunteers.” (Ad Hoc Group Against Crime)
- “Provide parenting skills to 35 families to help build support for their children.” (Boys and Girls Clubs)
- “Increase parents’ involvement with their children’s education. Provide parents with information about education, health, and drugs. Provide opportunities for parents, child care staff, and children to engage in social and cultural activities together.” (Child Development Corporation)
- “Involve 35 youth in neighborhood community activities, such as painting of houses and cleanups.” (Boys and Girls Clubs)
- “Increase knowledge of harmful effects of drug use and increase skills in avoidance of drug use. Increase the self-esteem and positive attitudes of at-risk youth.” (Comprehensive Mental Health Services)
- “Establish a tutoring program that will increase the students’ grade point average based on individualized goals established by the student.” (Della Lamb Community Services)
- “Serve 640 alternative school students with a drug use prevention media-based library to be shared among seven alternative school settings.” (Fort Osage R-1 School District)

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<sup>1</sup> COMBAT did not collect similar information in previous years.

**Exhibit OBJ3-5: Number of Clients and Participants Who Received Each of 13 Types of Services July-December 1997 from 38 Prevention Providers Funded by the COMBAT Commission**

Activities: <i>(indicate all that apply)</i>	Clients		Participants	
	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date
Case Management		1252		216
Counseling/psycho-Educational		1417		132
Crime Prevention		670		357
Neighborhood and Community Mobilization		829		638
Education		1049		2851
Literacy		850		1093
Mentoring		816		264
Presentations		71		3974
Social/sports		282		925
Job training		425		22
Parent training		121		154
Teacher training		561		853
Youth training		64		238

**Definitions:**

**Client:** Person who undergoes formal assessment with a need identified and service provided/referred.

**Participant:** Person who participates in an education or awareness program.

- “An estimated 2,400 students per year will attend presentations about dating violence, date rape, violence in the home, and substance abuse. High-risk students who need individualized support and therapy will be identified and referred to a school counselor or other appropriate service provider.” (Hope House)

The COMBAT Commission also funds neighborhood organizations to conduct crime prevention and community improvement activities. Exhibit OBJ3-6 shows the number of these activities and the number of participants for the period July 1997 through December 1997. (Data are unavailable for other time periods.) The box “COMBAT Has Funded Two Youth Courts” describes a different type of initiative the COMBAT Commission has funded. The discussion under Objective 4, Innovation, identifies still other prevention activities the commission has funded that are especially creative.

### **Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.)**

Police departments throughout the country use D.A.R.E. funds to send uniformed officers into middle schools to teach students to recognize and resist the pressures that may influence them to experiment with alcohol and other drugs. When D.A.R.E. began, it was an entirely Federally funded program that required a local match. Until 1995, COMBAT provided the match to the Kansas City police department and eight departments in Eastern Jackson County. Federal funding was discontinued in 1995, shortly before the referendum to renew the Anti-Drug Sales Tax. As a result, the police chiefs asked the prosecuting attorney to include D.A.R.E. funding as a COMBAT initiative in the new referendum language. In part, the language was inserted to gain the support of residents in the eastern part of the county, some of whom felt COMBAT prevention funding was going disproportionately to Kansas City.

With the new referendum, COMBAT also switched from providing a fixed matched grant to each police department to a percentage formula for distributing the money—6 percent of all Anti-Drug Tax revenues for the entire D.A.R.E. allocation to all departments. The COMBAT Commission distributes the funds among the individual agencies based on a formula for sharing the money developed—but not made public—by the chiefs. COMBAT picked up most of the D.A.R.E. funding for the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department and for some of the smaller county municipal police departments.

Exhibit OBJ3-1 above shows the annual amounts COMBAT has provided to the D.A.R.E. programs. Exhibit OBJ3-7 shows the percentage of the total COMBAT D.A.R.E. allocation (six percent) that each of the nine agencies received and the dollar amount each received in 1997. As shown, COMBAT provided \$407,344 for D.A.R.E. to the Kansas City Police Department and \$738,925 to nine police departments in the rest of the county.

## Exhibit OBJ3-6

### COMBAT Commission Prevention Data Survey - Neighborhood Organizations July - December, 1997

	Total clients year-to-date:		Total participant year-to-date:		Activity/Action	Participants	
	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date		This month	Year to date
	Total clients this months:		Total participants this month:		<b>Activities:</b> <i>(indicate all that apply)</i>		
	Clients		Participants		<b>CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES:</b>		
<b>Age:</b>	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date	Abated Location of Drug Activity	6	
0-4				1	Community/Neighborhood Mobilization		93
5-9				28	Mobile Crime Watch		46
10-14				68	Volunteer Training		
15-19				3	<b>PROPERTY RELATED ACTIVITIES</b>		
Adult				126	Codes Referrals	379	
<b>Gender :</b>	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date	Community/Neighborhood Mobilization		93
Male				122	Neighborhood Betterment (graffiti removal, clean-ups, etc.)	3	69
Female				104	Vacant Properties	14	
<b>Ethnicity:</b>	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date	<b>MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES</b>		
African American				122	Newsletters, Flyers, Brochures Distributed	10	
Caucasian				98	Presentations	7	
Hispanic				6	Social/Sports		59
Asian/Pacific			0	0	Tutoring/PC Instruction		59
Native American			0	0	Total Residential Informational Contacts	112	
Other			0	0	Special events-neighborhood rallies, parties, etc.		4300

## COMBAT Has Funded Two Youth Courts

Several youth courts in Eastern Jackson county arrange for local attorneys to train volunteer students, aged 13 to 19, from local schools to act as judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, bailiffs, and jurors in a courtroom which makes binding decisions regarding students who have broken the law for the first time (including misdemeanors, status offenses, and minor assaults) and have agreed to abide by the court's rulings. If found guilty, offending students are "sentenced" to make restitution for their actions, including community service, as determined by a jury of their peers. If the students complete their sentence, their Family Court record is expunged.

The principal objective of the courts is to deter future offenses by holding students accountable for their very first offense. Furthermore, many of the cases do not rise to a level that justifies police action—for example, neighborhood squabbles—yet, if they go unaddressed, they may in time become serious enough to require police intervention. The courts may also help to prevent substance abuse by involving at-risk students in running the court. By learning about criminal behavior from the perspective of the justice system, the students may develop or reinforce a commitment to upholding the law.

Each youth court is distinct in that it is tailored to the unique needs of the community in which it is located.

The Eastern Jackson County Youth Court, one of two youth courts COMBAT supports, is a nonprofit organization begun in 1989 and incorporated in 1990 that is located in the sheriff's office but not funded by any law enforcement agencies. COMBAT has provided funding for the court since 1994, including \$42,000 in 1997—54 percent of the court's entire budget. About 50 students participate in running the court at any one time. The students decide what roles they want to play.

The director estimates that 10–15 percent of the court's cases involve substance use, mostly drinking or possession of small amounts of marijuana. The Youth Court refers defendants charged with a substance abuse offense to a COMBAT-funded treatment provider for free counseling. The court has agreements with community-based organizations like the Boys and Girls Club to coordinate community services for defendants "sentenced" to community service.

Student court personnel donated a total of 1,224 hours of volunteer time during the 1996-97 school year. (The average volunteer's involvement lasts three years.) Ten attorneys each donated approximately 60 hours of time. The court processed 73 juveniles and referred another 22 to Family Court. The court referred only 7 juveniles to Family Court for noncompliance. Only 10 percent of juveniles found guilty in Youth Court were later found guilty in Family Court or again in Youth Court. (Recidivism data include juveniles convicted at any time before their 17th birthday.) More recent data show that only 4 percent of convicted juveniles are recidivating. The vast majority of defendants are found guilty. In 1997, the court ordered convicted juveniles to serve 1,051 hours of community service; 997 hours were completed.

**Exhibit OBJ3-7**

**COMBAT 1997 D.A.R.E. Disbursements by  
Participating Law Enforcement Agencies**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Funding</b>
Blue Springs	5	\$60,563.20
Buckner	1	\$12,113.29
Grain Valley	0	\$11,000.29
Grandview	4	\$49,550.98
Independence	30	\$357,881.08
Jackson County (Sheriff)	5	\$5,562.00
Kansas City	35	\$407,344.25
Lee's Summit	16	\$193,802.84
Raytown	4	\$48,450.96
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>\$1,146,268.89</b>

**Other Prevention Initiatives**

Through its Grant Match program and other means, COMBAT has supported several other prevention initiatives independently of the COMBAT Commission awards.

*DJOs in the schools.* Family Court juvenile probation officers are known as deputy juvenile officers, or DJOs. COMBAT provides Family Court with \$102,201 for hiring three entry level DJOs, which enables the court to reassign three experienced DJOs to work full-time in Kansas City middle schools. COMBAT staff did not initiate the school-based DJO program; David Kierst, director of Family Court, did. Family Court began stationing DJOs in the schools with one staff member working part-time in one suburban high school in January 1994. Family Court moved the program to the middle schools during the 1996-1997 school year because it appeared that the DJOs could intervene more effectively to improve school attendance and performance with younger youth. Family Court itself funds five additional school-based DJOs in addition to the three COMBAT-funded DJOs.

The DJOs become a part of the school staff, functioning as adjunct faculty members. Each school structures its own DJO program, but schools are not permitted to use the staff as truant officers. Each of the eight DJOs spends two and one-half days a week at each of two schools counseling children on probation as well as providing in-service teacher training,

assistance to teachers working with troubled students, drug education to students and parents, and referrals for parents for long-term services for their children. The DJOs are also the on-site contact at each school for students under Family Court supervision.

The DJOs deal with all kinds of student problems, not just drug use, with the ultimate goal of reducing suspensions and expulsions that are thought to be a key risk factor associated with the development and perpetuation of delinquent behavior (see below). Family Court considers the program a prevention and diversion effort that can help youngsters avoid violating their terms of probation and help at-risk youth avoid going to court in the first place.

### **Only Seasoned DJOs Work in the Schools**

Family Court selects DJOs to work in the schools who have extensive previous experience in individual and group process, family counseling, and working with substance-involved youth. As a result, students, parents and teachers get the benefit of seasoned counselors. For example, one school-based DJO has worked for over 20 years in the juvenile court. Before his assignment to a school, he had been the operations manager of a juvenile residential program with the Field Services Division of Family Court.

During the 1996-1997 school year, the eight DJOs handled 3,446 referrals, 36 percent of which were for truancy and 41 percent for other behavioral problems. The remaining referrals represented family or peer conflicts. Collectively, the DJOs met 692 times with a total of 391 students in just May of 1997 alone.

### **Anecdotes Suggest the School-based DJOs May Reduce Suspensions**

- One DJO defused a potential fight between two groups of girls. He had them assemble in separate areas of the gym and brought in parents and police officers to resolve the disagreement.
- One school wanted to expel ten students; instead, the DJO mentored them, and seven ended up graduating.
- A Muslim DJO defused the anger of some black students when the school banned "gansta rap" clothing by telling them, "I don't wear kafta, so you can stop wearing gansta clothing."

*Truancy Prevention Program.* COMBAT has coordinated and provided one-sixth of the funding (\$86,000) for the Kansas City In-School Truancy Prevention Project, which is designed to reduce attendance problems among children in six middle schools with especially poor attendance records and achievement. COMBAT funds pay for a part-time prosecutor



and for some of the parent liaisons' salaries (see below). The remaining program funding comes primarily the Mayor's office, a grant from the Missouri Department of Public Safety, and the Kansas City school district. The program is a collaborative initiative of all four agencies.

Begun in February 1997, the program funds an attendance clerk and parent liaison in each school whose function is to identify truant students, find out why they are not in school, and take remedial action including telephoning students, notifying parents, and visiting the home. A student is considered truant if his or her attendance falls below 70 percent during the month and the student has at least one period of non-excused absences for three or more consecutive days.

In addition to telephoning the student, the parent-school liaison meets with the student to assess the reasons for the truancy. The liaison sends the student to the Truancy Assessment Center at Family Court, which schedules a meeting with the student and parents to evaluate the student's educational skills and conditions at home and in the community, and to determine factors that are contributing to the student's truancy.

If parents miss two scheduled appointments for no valid reason, the Jackson County prosecuting attorney's office contacts them to offer assistance and threaten legal action. As of May 15, 1997, the prosecutor's office had written 46 parents notifying them of their legal responsibilities in ensuring their children's attendance and offering support in overcoming barriers to school participation by putting them in touch with the parent-school liaison at the schools in which their children were enrolled. The prosecutor informed the parents that failure to contact the liaisons within a week could lead to criminal action under the State's compulsory attendance statute, including fines, community service, or jail. In a second letter, the prosecutor instructed the 17 parents who failed to respond to attend a meeting with an assistant prosecutor. The office was preparing to file a criminal complaint against the one parent who refused to show up for this meeting but did not file it because the student was suspended for 90 days. A case study on the truancy program in appendix B provides additional information about the initiative.

The prevention theory behind the truancy program is that youngsters who are not in school are more likely to get involved in using drugs and committing other crimes, including break-ins, than if they were safely occupied in the classroom. They are also more vulnerable to being victimized by crime than if they were in school. However, the program was also initiated to avoid losing State school aid. Because the Kansas City school system had a serious problem with daily attendance, it was in danger of losing considerable funds because the State school funding formula is based on daily enrollment.



*Alternative schools.* Four of the County's alternative schools usually have a two-year waiting list. As a result, there is a large number of suspended and expelled students who typically have no daytime activities to occupy them, increasing their susceptibility to getting involved in drugs, gangs, and crime. To address this problem, COMBAT initiated a meeting with the Kansas City school system to set up a countywide system of alternative schools for meeting the needs of suspended and expelled students. COMBAT arranged for the use of local Federal law enforcement block grant monies to fund a network of community-based alternative schools and an association to train and monitor them.<sup>2</sup> Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, and James Nunnally, COMBAT administrator, met with the Mayor and police department administrators to suggest the city divert a portion of its block grant—\$411,000—from funding additional police computers and officers to *preventing* crime through the alternative schools initiative. The city agreed to this diversion of funds. One half of the program's other funding comes from private sources (United Way, Hallmark Cards) and the rest from public sources such as Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) funds. Of the \$411,000 in block grant funds, \$64,000 were used in 1997 to fund a two-day professional development conference, \$97,000 to staff an Alternative Schools Network Association (which ran the conference), and \$250,000 to pay for teachers at each of five "SchoolNET" sites.

SchoolNET is a network of alternative schools to be run by community-based organizations to which at-risk youths will be sent for assistance with emotional problems, substance abuse, and remedial work with the goal of returning them to the regular schools. Each school will have one teacher for about 25 students, but, with half the students attending in the morning and half in the afternoon, class size will be only 12 or 13 students. Community agencies submit applications to the Network Association to run the schools. Four schools had begun operation as of mid-1998.

Central intake staff working for the Network Association will decide whether students, who can be referred directly by the public schools as well as from community agencies and the truancy prevention project, should be referred to a Kansas City School District school. The community-based schools will provide students with a place to go when existing alternative schools are full or other options are not in their best interests. Association staff will visit the schools to monitor progress.

*Key to a Safe Summer program.* COMBAT and a local foundation funded for YouthNet, a Kansas City community-based organization, to run a Safe Summer Program in 1997. YouthNet arranged for community-based agencies to provide developmental activities in various schools throughout the city as a means of providing young people with access to a safe haven within walking distance from their homes, an opportunity to connect with caring adults, and developmental activities such as career preparation, life skills, and learning skills

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<sup>2</sup> COMBAT also contributed to funding the alternative schools insofar as it provided the local match of \$250,000 for the county to be eligible to receive a \$2.5 million local law enforcement block grant.

activities. The program, which served 1,392 youth, was a COMBAT initiative designed to enlist youth-serving agencies in providing services in the city's public schools.

*SAFE-TYES child abuse program.* Along with financing from other groups, COMBAT funded a consortium of community agencies known as SAFE-TYES in 1991, 1993, and 1995 to provide crisis intervention, assessment, case management, and survival skills to children of substance abusing families referred by Family Court. Other services included a grandparent support group for individuals caring for grandchildren, a summer youth employment program to aid in the future employment of the youth, and a referral service that matched the families' needs with available community resources. The program served 174 families in 1995. COMBAT did not provide funding for the program after 1995.

## **COMBAT-Supported Prevention Initiatives Reached Several Thousand Youth**

It is impossible to quantify accurately by year or in total how many youth received prevention services as a result of COMBAT. As discussed in chapter 5, COMBAT Administration, many COMBAT-funded prevention providers failed to submit regular monthly progress reports (very few submitted an annual report) and the reports they did submit often failed to document the number of youth who received services. When providers did furnish information regarding youth who received services, it was unclear which youth were "clients" who received an actual prevention service (e.g., tutoring, classroom discussion of drugs) and which youth were simply "participants" who attended an event that more accurately could have been described as general awareness or outreach. In addition, it is impossible to tally the number of "COMBAT" clients when Anti-Drug Tax monies pay for only a portion of the initiatives as is the case with the Safe Summer Program and the SAFE-TYES initiative.

Despite these limitations, the available data suggest that *COMBAT-supported prevention initiatives reached several thousand youth.*

- A COMBAT Commission compilation of clients and participants served from July 1997 through December 1997 based on 38 providers' monthly progress reports shows that the organizations had used their COMBAT funds to serve **2,858 clients** (persons formally assessed and provided a service or referral) and 8,192 participants (persons who were involved in an awareness program). Exhibit OBJ3-8 displays these numbers by client and participant age, gender, and ethnicity, and by activity.
- An independent study of client satisfaction with prevention and treatment initiatives funded by the Fiscal Commission in 1996 asked current commission-funded providers to estimate the number of clients they were serving. Prevention providers estimated that they were serving **4,361 clients** (excluding D.A.R.E. students).

**Exhibit OBJ 3-8**

**COMBAT Commission: Prevention Data Survey — Direct Service Providers: July –  
December, 1997**

	Total clients year-to-date: 2858		Total participants year-to-date: 8192	
	Total clients this months:		Total participants this month:	
	Clients		Participants	
<b>Age:</b>	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date
0-4		124		174
5-9		312		637
10-14		989		3631
15-19		798		1470
Adult		635		2280
<b>Gender :</b>	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date
Male		1362		3874
Female		1496		4318
<b>Ethnicity:</b>	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date
African American		1548		2357
Caucasian		1029		5227
Hispanic		156		366
Asian/Pacific		12		54
Native American		94		53
Other		19		135

**Definitions:**

**Client:** Person who undergoes formal assessment with a need identified and service provided/referred.

**Participant:** Person who participates in an education or awareness program.

- The same study reported that *9,751 students* were participating in D.A.R.E. classes.
- Family Court records show that the eight school-based DJOs serve about 600 ongoing clients (students and parents) each year. If each DJO has approximately the same caseload, the three COMBAT-funded DJOs serve *225 clients* each year. The three DJOs also handled approximately 1,300 referrals.
- In 1995, the SAFE-TYES Child Abuse Program served over *174 families*; the Truancy Prevention Program had worked with *3,282 students* as of mid-1998 as well as threatened legal action against 37 parents; and the Safe Summer Program served *1,393 youth* in 1997.

## **It Is Impossible to Determine Whether COMBAT Prevented Drug Experimentation**

Offering expanded prevention programming and enrolling large numbers of youth in the initiatives are only a means—albeit an essential prerequisite—to the ultimate goal of reducing drug experimentation. Unfortunately, *there are serious obstacles to determining whether COMBAT reduced drug experimentation among youth.*

### **Barriers to Evaluating Drug Prevention**

Serious barriers to evaluating prevention programming in general make it difficult to assess whether COMBAT helped prevent drug experimentation among youth.<sup>3</sup> Exhibit OBJ3-9 summarizes each of these barriers, while the discussion below elaborates on them.

*General barriers to prevention evaluation.* One reason it is difficult to evaluate prevention programming is that it is more difficult to measure whether drug use did not occur than it is to measure its prevalence. One solution to this difficulty is to develop a control or comparison group. However, developing control or comparison groups is often expensive, impractical, or unethical in drug prevention research. Even with a valid control or comparison group, it takes many years for some prevention programs to definitively show or fail to show results.

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<sup>3</sup> For further discussion of these issues, see, for example, three National Institute on Drug Abuse publications: William J. Bukowski, (ed.), *Meta-Analysis of Drug Abuse Prevention Programs*, 1997, NIDA Research Monograph 170; Linda M. Collins and Larry A. Seitz (eds.), *Advances in Data Analysis for Prevention Intervention Research*, 1994, NIDA Research Monograph 142; and Carl G. Leukefeld and William J. Bukowski, (eds.), *Drug Abuse Prevention Intervention Research: Methodological Issues*, 1991, NIDA Research Monograph 107 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Rockville, Maryland).

## Exhibit OBJ3-9

### Barriers to Evaluating COMBAT's Prevention Initiatives

Two types of barriers make it difficult to evaluate the extent to which COMBAT prevented drug experimentation among youth: difficulties evaluating drug prevention initiatives in general and difficulties peculiar to COMBAT.

#### Barriers to Evaluating Drug Prevention in General

- Measuring behavior that does not occur can be more difficult than measuring behavior that does occur.
- It is often difficult or impossible to develop control groups or comparison groups that are necessary in order to attribute changes in drug experimentation to a particular intervention.
- The results of prevention efforts can take years to materialize.
- Other events occurring before and during the period of a drug prevention program's operation may have been responsible for reducing experimentation.

#### Barriers to Evaluating COMBAT's Prevention Initiatives in Particular

- Few prevention providers submitted adequate data by which to judge their success; very few evaluated their own efforts.
- External evaluations of specific COMBAT-supported prevention initiatives were methodologically weak, used invalid proxies for measuring experimentation, or showed mixed results.

As is true in most communities that implement drug prevention initiatives, there were also events<sup>4</sup> that took place in Jackson County during the 1980s and 1990s which, independently of COMBAT's activities, may have helped raise resident's awareness and concerns about drug problems and, as a result, contributed to a reduction in drug experimentation:

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<sup>4</sup> A 1988 Robert Wood Johnson Fighting Back grant involved the planning and, in 1991, the initiation of a major community effort to reduce alcohol and drug abuse called Project NeighborHOOD. The program is reported to have eventually reached 150,000 of city's population of 435,000 (34 percent). However, Project NeighborHOOD administrators believe they would not have received the Fighting Back grant without the local funding contribution from the COMBAT Grant Match Program.

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- In 1985, the killing of two girls as a result of a drug-related shooting resulted in the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime, a community-based organization devoting attention to ridding neighborhoods of crack houses that was still very active in 1998.

It is impossible to separate the contribution of these events (and possibly others that are unknown) from the contribution COMBAT may have made to reducing drug experimentation. Furthermore, in addition to local conditions that may have increased or decreased drug experimentation in Jackson County, national trends may have played a part. For example, the national high school surveys for several years have found that fewer youth are experimenting with certain drugs in many jurisdictions, suggesting that declines that occurred in Jackson County may not be attributable to COMBAT's prevention initiatives, but rather to national trends.

*COMBAT-specific barriers to prevention evaluation.* Lack of adequate information from prevention providers is a significant local barrier to assessing whether COMBAT reduced drug experimentation. As discussed in chapter 5, COMBAT Administration, few prevention providers submitted complete descriptions of their activities and even fewer evaluated their initiatives.

Not only have providers themselves largely failed to conduct in-house evaluations of their COMBAT-funded initiatives, independent evaluations of selected COMBAT-funded prevention initiatives have weaknesses, making it difficult to know whether experimentation has declined and, if so, whether the change can be attributed to COMBAT.

### **The Lack of Rigorous Independent Evaluations**

*Evaluations of specific COMBAT-supported prevention initiatives showed mixed results, lacked methodological rigor, or examined only intermediate outcomes that have not been validated as being associated with reductions in experimentation with drugs.*

- *Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.).* A private consulting firm contracted by COMBAT conducted a client satisfaction survey of selected participants in COMBAT-funded prevention initiatives, including D.A.R.E. students. Eighty-percent of students surveyed in six D.A.R.E. programs reported they would tell other students to participate in D.A.R.E., and 99 percent reported they were more likely to stay off drugs as a result of their participation. However, at least one quarter of the participants in four of the six programs reported that programs they participated in elsewhere were better than the D.A.R.E. program. In addition, some of the sampled schools administered the survey randomly, while others asked D.A.R.E. program officers to go into classrooms and ask students to

volunteer to fill out the forms. More importantly, national evaluations of D.A.R.E. have concluded that the program does not reduce drug experimentation.<sup>5</sup>

- *DJOs in the schools.* An internal Family Court evaluation found absences among 27 court clients declined from 222 during the second semester of the 1994-95 school year to 158 during the first half of the 1995-96 school year, and office referrals for misconduct declined from 146 to 62. Among 62 at-risk students, the comparable figures were 894 absences to 403, and 392 referrals to 317. (See Exhibit OBJ3-10) No tests of statistical significance were presented. Academic achievement for court clients was unchanged and for at-risk students declined, probably because students who in the past would have been expelled brought down the average by remaining in school. A similar study of the DJOs' effects in the middle schools documented mixed results. The evaluators attributed these disappointing findings in part to the facts that the program was not implemented at the same time in all the schools and the data did not distinguish between excused

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5 A report from Research Triangle Institute that analyzed eight studies of D.A.R.E. involving 9,500 children concluded that D.A.R.E. has a "limited to essentially non-existent effect" on drug use. While DARE was found to have a positive effect on children's knowledge and attitudes about drugs and added to their social skills needed to say no to drugs, the program was not as effective as other drug prevention programs on these measures of effectiveness. Christopher L. Ringwalt *et al.*, *Past and Future Directions of the D.A.R.E. Program: An Evaluation Review* (Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: Research Triangle Institute, September 1994). See also, Richard R. Clayton, Anne M. Cattarello, and Bryan M. Johnstone, The Effectiveness of Drug Abuse Resistance Education (Project DARE): 5-Year Follow-Up Results, *Preventive Medicine*, 1996, 25: 307-318, which concluded that "No significant differences were observed between intervention and comparison schools with respect to cigarette, alcohol, or marijuana use during the 7th grade, approximately 1 year after completion of the program, or over the full 5-year measurement interval." According to William Modzeleski, the highest ranking drug official in the U.S. Department of Education, "Research shows that DARE hasn't been effective in reducing drug use." *U.S.A. Today*, October 11, 1993. In response to the studies, the COMBAT Commission has raised questions about D.A.R.E.'s effectiveness with its law enforcement members, but the chiefs remain committed to the program. It is well known that many police departments throughout the country like D.A.R.E. because it creates good will for officers among students. According to former Albuquerque police chief Joseph Polisar, "There are studies that say that the D.A.R.E. program has no statistically significant impact on whether kids are going to use drugs or not. I really don't give a rat what statistics show. I've got 20 officers in my department who do nothing but teach D.A.R.E. full time. If nothing else, they're providing positive role models to our youth." A LEN Interview with Joseph Polisar, *Law Enforcement News*, December 15, 1997, p. 10. Notes from a COMBAT Commission staff meeting in March 1998 observe that "The DARE study, completed by the University of Illinois-Chicago, was released recently. This research basically says that DARE is not effective the way it currently exists in most schools (targeting 5th grade students only). The response from DARE is that it is effective when using [i.e., used in conjunction with] a K-12 curriculum and other support services. Rather than challenge the study, our position is that DARE is part of the ordinance that enables COMBAT to be in existence, and the COMBAT prevention and treatment components offer a continuum of support services to accompany the DARE program." Ralph Lockridge, a spokesman for D.A.R.E. America, the Los Angeles-based organizations that provides assistance to D.A.R.E. programs nationwide, is quoted as having said that "We don't disagree with his findings at all in terms of long-term effectiveness." *Law Enforcement News*, 24(487), April 15, 1998.


and unexcused absences. Furthermore, an internal Family Court report dated August 22, 1997, reported that the court had to rotate some DJOs because some Kansas City school administrators were not using them according to the program's objectives and were overlooking operational problems with DJOs for fear of losing the program. Finally, the evaluators raised the possibility that the DJOs were less effective with middle school students than with high school students because older youth, since they are generally less impulsive and more mature than younger students, may respond better to the DJOs' efforts to get them to think through potential consequences before they act.

- *Truancy Prevention Program.* Data suggest that this initiative may be helping to reduce drug experimentation. As of June 1997, parent/school liaisons had worked with over 500 middle school students, resulting in 223 students returning to school and 384 targeted for intervention. Attendance had risen 10.1 percent, 6.5 percent, and 4.2 percent in each of three project schools compared with only 4.1 percent, 2.6 percent, and .1 percent in each of three nonparticipating middle schools. The evaluation did not report whether these differences were statistically significant or whether other events independent of the program's contribution may have contributed to the changes in attendance rates. There was no comparison group of students with absenteeism problems in nonparticipating schools with which to compare the return-to-school numbers for participating students.
- *Safe Summer Program.* An independent evaluation found that this program enabled 1,393 youth to have access to a safe place in 1996, with 58 percent of the surveyed youth reporting that they felt "much" safer than they did the previous summer. No assaults or violent acts were reported all summer at the participating schools. The report does not indicate whether the youth interviewed represent a random sample of participants and does not include the survey instrument. At some sites, almost all the participating youth were driven to the sites in buses or vans, or by their parents, rather than walking which was the type of access the program was designed to test. The program used an unvalidated proxy measure—participants' reports that they felt staff liked them "much" or "lots"—to assess whether the program provided youth with an opportunity to connect with caring adults. The program only partially engaged youth in positive, developmental activities because there was inadequate time for agencies to plan an appropriate program—for example, find instructors to teach computer skills.




# PASS Project: Comparison from Spring 1995 to Fall 1995 (At-Risk Students)


## Absences



## Office Referrals/Misconduct




## Grade Point Average




**PASS Project: Comparison from Spring 1995 to Fall 1995**  
(Court Clients)


**Absences**



**Office Referrals/Misconduct**



**Grade Point Average**



- *SAFE-TYES program.* COMBAT, along with two other agencies, funded an independent process and impact evaluation of this program. The study found that after a year there was a statistically significant reduction in violence in the participating families' homes. While the researchers identified four families that did not participate in the program to serve as a comparison group, the study did not compare violent incidents between the participating families and comparison families. The study found that a year after the families' participation ended, there were no telephone calls to a child abuse hotline to report child abuse among the participating families, while there were seven calls regarding the four families in the comparison group. The report did not indicate whether these differences were statistically significant.

***Most of the prevention efforts COMBAT initiated or supported would not have materialized if Anti-Drug Sales Tax monies had not been available.***

- In a telephone survey of prevention providers that Abt Associates conducted, 20 of 31 providers reported that their organizations would not have secured funding elsewhere for the activities COMBAT funded. Seven other providers reported that it would have been very difficult to have secured other funding. Only four providers reported they would have been able to find other funding.
- COMBAT participants and observers felt that, without Anti-Drug Tax monies, the number of D.A.R.E. officers would have declined significantly in most of the police departments that receive COMBAT funding for the program. The only other funding source would have been the towns' general budgets, and it is unclear whether legislators would have made up the difference in the loss of COMBAT funding. Of course, by providing funding for D.A.R.E., COMBAT did not increase prevention activities in Jackson County since the Federal Government had already been funding the program. However, without COMBAT funding, the preexisting level of D.A.R.E. activity would probably have declined significantly.
- It is very unlikely that the alternative schools initiative and the Safe Summer Program would have been developed without COMBAT. According to a letter written by Beth Gottstein, administrative assistant to the director of the Kansas City Neighborhood and Community Services Department, “. . . [W]hen writing the bylaws of the Alternative Schools Network Association, it was the County's [i.e., COMBAT's] participation and assistance that drew the participating Alternative Schools to the planning table, and has kept them there since.”
- Even though Family Court was able to fund five school-based DJOs from its own budget, court administrators report they could not have afforded to pay for the salaries of the three DJOs whom COMBAT funds.

- Some of the other COMBAT-supported prevention activities might have been initiated in the absence of Anti-Drug Tax funds. In particular, school officials report that, without COMBAT funding, they would have attempted to obtain funding for the attendance clerks and parent liaisons in the Truancy Prevention Program, but they were not certain they would have received any money.

While COMBAT contributed significantly to the increase in prevention initiatives and activities undertaken in Jackson County, some of this expansion might have taken place in COMBAT's absence. The 1990s have been a time of considerable attention to prevention initiatives throughout the country. As a result, it is possible that prevention activities would have increased in Jackson County without COMBAT. However, at a minimum, *it is unlikely that the county would have experienced the variety, number, innovativeness, and collaborative nature of the prevention initiatives that were implemented had COMBAT not provided millions of dollars of support and thousands of hours of staff involvement.*

*Nevertheless, it is impossible to determine whether these activities helped prevent drug experimentation among youth.* The lack of evidence does not suggest that reductions did not occur; rather, for reasons explained above, the available data do not make it possible to determine the impact of COMBAT's initiatives on the prevention of drug experimentation among youth.

## Objective 4: Did COMBAT Support Innovative Programming Which Might Not Otherwise Have Been Funded?

### Key Points

#### Key Findings

- **COMBAT initiated, coordinated, or supported financially a number of significant innovative initiatives, including**
  - a multi-million dollar Grant Match Program that attracts an estimated \$4 for each \$1 in COMBAT matching funds;
  - Community Action Networks (CANs) that link neighborhood organizations and police officers to solve local crime problems;
  - job preparation and placement services for substance abusers in treatment through the Full Employment Council;
  - landlord-related initiatives for dealing with substance abusing and drug trafficking tenants; and
  - a variety of other initiatives, including a “fathering” program for men who are delinquent in their child support payments; the appointment of a child advocate; the drafting of legislation to facilitate the elimination of drug dealing; and encouragement to prevention providers funded by the COMBAT Commission to implement creative interventions with youth and parents.
- **Most of these innovations would not have materialized without COMBAT funding or support.**
- **The wide range of program types that COMBAT has funded or initiated is in itself highly innovative.**

#### Data Sources

- provider reports
- interviews with COMBAT participants and observers
- telephone interviews with 16 Grant Match program recipients

## COMBAT Supported a Number of Innovative Initiatives

There will always be some disagreement about what constitutes an “innovative” initiative. As a result, it is important to note that the discussion of creative activities presented below omits what may seem to be unusual initiatives because they have in fact been implemented in numerous other jurisdictions. They are, however, new and innovative in Jackson County. For example, the discussion excludes Drug Court as an innovation (although it has a number of innovative features), because, while at the time the court was initiated in 1993 there were only 28 drug courts in the country, by mid-1998 almost 300 drug courts had been implemented throughout the United States.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the Jackson County and the Kansas City youth courts are not treated as innovations because there were at least 280 teen court programs operating in 31 States as of November 1996.<sup>2</sup> The definition of “innovative” in this context implies initiatives which are not in widespread use or initiatives which use techniques or approaches not typically employed in this context.

*Using this framework, we found that COMBAT organized, funded, or otherwise supported a number of significant innovations.* Exhibit OBJ4-1 summarizes these initiatives. The text below discusses them in detail. It is noteworthy that these initiatives represent considerable diversity in their focus, participants, and strategies, with prevention, treatment, and enforcement goals all well represented.

### Grant Match Program

The original Anti-Drug Sales Tax set aside prescribed amounts of money for each COMBAT component (prevention, treatment, enforcement) totaling \$14 million.<sup>3</sup> However, over time, surplus funds built up because tax revenues exceeded expectations—and the prescribed allocations. In addition, \$1.5 million for Drug Court expenses remained in the bank for a year because the court did not become operational on schedule. Similarly, because expansion of the jail did not begin until 1996, \$2.5 million in annual construction funds also remained unspent, accumulating interest.

Over time, the prosecuting attorney’s office became concerned that the county legislature might want to spend the surplus money—whose use was unspecified in the Anti-Drug Tax legislation—on something other than drug prevention, treatment, or enforcement. In

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1 American University, Drug Courts Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project: Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts,” Washington, D.C., June 1998.

2 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Discretionary Competitive Program Announcements and Application Kit: FY 1997, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1997, p. 19.

3 This process changed in 1995. Today, COMBAT receives projections of the tax revenue each year, and each component may then budget up to a percentage of the total revenue projection. Components also receive any excess funds accrued the previous year. See chapter 2, COMBAT Synopsis and History.

**Exhibit OBJ4-1**

**Features of Selected Innovations Supported by COMBAT**

<u>Innovation</u>	<u>COMBAT Role</u>	<u>Date Initiated</u>	<u>Focus</u>	<u>1997 COMBAT Funding</u>	<u>Status Without COMBAT</u>	<u>Selected Achievements in 1997</u>
Grant Match Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>coordinates</li> <li>funds</li> </ul>	1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prevention</li> <li>treatment</li> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	\$1,840,000: 1997	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>leveraged \$24 million in outside support</li> <li>made many prevention and treatment initiatives possible</li> </ul>
Community Action Networks (CANs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>assists</li> <li>partially funds</li> </ul>	1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>treatment</li> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	\$79,000	uncertain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conducted landlord training</li> <li>promoted neighborhood rehabilitation</li> </ul>
Full Employment Council Job Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>partially funds</li> </ul>	1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>treatment</li> </ul>	\$205,000	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>assisted 214 substance abusers to find jobs</li> </ul>
Landlord initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>coordinates</li> </ul>	1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	none	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>trained 558 landlords and property managers</li> <li>trained over 3,700 individuals in methamphetamine laboratory recognition</li> </ul>
<u>Other Innovations</u>						
Fathering program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> </ul>	1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>treatment</li> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	none	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>only just begun</li> </ul>
Child advocate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> </ul>	1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prevention</li> </ul>	none (provided staff)	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>only just begun</li> </ul>
Legislative initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>undertook</li> </ul>	1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	not applicable	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>facilitated law enforcement activities</li> </ul>
Hospital case manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> </ul>	1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	NA	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>only just begun</li> </ul>
Prevention provider innovations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>funds</li> </ul>	1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prevention</li> </ul>	NA	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>not available</li> </ul>

**Exhibit OBJ4-1, continued****Features of Selected Innovations Supported by COMBAT, continued**

<b>Innovation</b>	<b>COMBAT Role</b>	<b>Date Initiated</b>	<b>Focus</b>	<b>1997 COMBAT Funding</b>	<b>Status Without COMBAT</b>	<b>Selected Achievements in 1997</b>
Innovations discussed under other objectives						
Safe Summer Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>coordinates</li> </ul>	1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prevention</li> </ul>	none	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>helped 1,392 youth find safe day-time haven (Objective 3, Prevention)</li> </ul>
Truancy Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>coordinates</li> <li>funds partially</li> </ul>	1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prevention</li> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	\$86,000 match	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>223 students returned to school</li> <li>attendance rose at 3 project schools more than at 3 comparison schools</li> <li>45 of 46 parents agreed to seek help (Objective 3, Prevention)</li> </ul>
Alternative Schools Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>partially funds</li> </ul>	1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prevention</li> </ul>	none	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>obtained block grant funding (Objective 3, Prevention)</li> </ul>
Paseo Initiative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>coordinates</li> </ul>	1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	none	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>reduced crime significantly (Objective 5, Collaboration)</li> </ul>
DJO certification training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>funds</li> </ul>	1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>treatment</li> </ul>	\$67,500	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8 DJOs have been certified (Objective 2, Treatment)</li> </ul>
Training of minority counselors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>initiated</li> <li>funds</li> </ul>	1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>treatment</li> </ul>	\$25,800	would not exist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>26 minorities have been trained (Objective 3, Treatment)</li> </ul>
Community prosecution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>funds partially</li> <li>coordinates</li> </ul>	1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>enforcement</li> </ul>	\$208,624	uncertain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>not evaluated (Objective 5, Collaboration)</li> </ul>



addition, some COMBAT administrators saw the money as an opportunity to provide additional funding for innovative and collaborative prevention and treatment initiatives and for leveraging outside sources of money to help fight substance abuse in Jackson County. As a result, in 1993 Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, recommended that the legislature authorize a Grant Match Program for spending the accumulated surplus each year by distributing the money to organizations seeking a local financial commitment in order to obtain outside funding from Federal, State, or private sources. The legislature enacted the program into law in 1993. With the passage of the second drug tax referendum in 1995, the Grant Match Program became a permanent COMBAT initiative.

Originally, half of each year's Anti-Drug Sales Tax surplus was allocated to the prosecutor's office and half to the Fiscal Commission for further disbursement through the Grant Match Program. However, because the prosecuting attorney chaired the Fiscal Commission, she in effect controlled the entire program. A grant match committee consisting of members of the prosecutor's COMBAT staff and an auditor reviewed applications and sent them to the legislature for approval. After the COMBAT Commission replaced the Fiscal Commission in 1995, the Grant Match Program was placed entirely in the prosecutor's office. Since then, COMBAT staff in the prosecutor's office have screened applications for matching funds and approved them in consultation with Claire McCaskill. COMBAT administrators themselves may initiate grant match offers to community agencies if they discover bidding opportunities in the Federal Register, in other grants publications, or on the Internet. For example, COMBAT provided a \$23,000 grant match to the Boys and Girls Club in 1997 to teach violence prevention in four middle schools. COMBAT staff helped write the grant application that the club submitted to the Missouri Department of Public Safety for the \$100,000 balance of the funding.

Matches, while awarded technically for only a year, may last up to five years. The COMBAT match is limited to 25 percent of the total program budget, although exceptions are made for programs that have a total program budget of \$25,000 or less.

Exhibit OBJ4-2 identifies selected grantees from 1990 to 1998, their award amounts, and the services they provided with the funds. The total dollar value of outstanding grant matches in 1998 was \$1,074,402. The average amount of funding per grantee that year was \$67,034. The average percentage of total funding for the initiatives for which COMBAT provided a grant match was 19 percent in 1998 (lower than the maximum 25 percent COMBAT allows). From 1990 to 1998, COMBAT's matches added \$24 million to Jackson County from outside sources. Excluded from these figures are ongoing matching grants COMBAT provides to two major COMBAT initiatives, the Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) and the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force. Objective 5, Collaboration, discusses DART, and Objective 1, Jails, addresses the Drug Task Force.

**Exhibit OBJ 4-2**

**Selected Organizations Awarded COMBAT Grant Matches, along with Funded Activities and Amounts, 1990-1997**

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Grant Match Award</u>	<u>Total Value</u>
CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocates)	Fund a court-appointed special advocate, trained in dealing with the protection and well-being of a child that has been taken from the home because of abuse or neglect by the parent	1993 - \$21,600 1994 - \$18,000 1995 - \$10,000	\$49,600
Grace United Church	Work with African-American and Hispanic street gangs in the Northeast community	1995 - \$12,000	\$12,000
Grandview Police Department	Purchase drug dog	1993 - \$9,900	\$9,900
Kansas City Crime Commission	Develop prime time television program on drug abuse	1990-91 - \$100,000	\$100,000
Kansas City Housing Authority	Set up a network of residents, law enforcement officials, and treatment providers to reduce drug activity in the projects	1993-94 - \$110,000	\$110,000
Kansas City Youth Court	Arrange for youth to adjudicate non-violent, generally first-time status offenses and juvenile delinquency cases	1995 - \$12,500	\$12,500
Missouri Department of Mental Health	Professionally assess the needs of individuals whose driver's licenses are suspended or revoked as a result of a violation in which substance abuse was involved in order refer them to appropriate education or treatment	1994: \$40,000 1994: \$40,000 1998-99: \$132,990	\$212,990
Project NeighborHOOD	Through collaboration among several organizations, improve neighborhoods' capacity to prevent and treat substance abuse	1992: \$140,808 1993: \$157,000 1994: \$150,000 1995: \$185,000 1996: \$100,000 1997-98: \$300,000	\$1,032,808
Project NeighborHOOD	Fight crime and substance abuse problems in Kansas City	1992 - \$149,808 1993 - \$78,750 1994 - \$75,000 1995 - \$110,000	\$413,558
Resource Development Institute	Offer black substance abusers a culturally specific African-American drug treatment program	1993 - \$50,000 1994 - \$50,000 1995 - \$50,000	\$150,000
Renaissance-West	Offer a long-term culturally sensitive residential substance abuse treatment program for pregnant and post-partum, dually-diagnosed women	1994 - \$198,211 1995 - \$100,000 1996 - \$155,122 1997 - \$22,850	\$476,183
Swope Parkway Medical Center	Take services to 30 Kansas City homeless sites and provides substance abuse counseling on the streets	1994 - \$50,000 1995 - \$50,000 1996 - \$50,000	\$150,000
Visible Horizons	Reduce risk factors and establish or reinforce protective factors related to substance abuse and crimes among Native Americans	1994 - \$5,000 1995 - \$25,000	\$30,000
YouthNet	Address risk factors for youth ages 11-17 through intensive outreach, counseling and alternative activities in neighborhoods and schools	1994 - \$50,000 1995 - \$100,000 1996 - \$150,000 1997 - \$150,000	\$450,000

## Community Action Networks (CANs) Link Neighborhoods and the Police

At the urging of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation through Project Neighborhood, in February 1994 Claire McCaskill, the Mayor of Kansas City, the Kansas City police chief, and over 25 other city and county representatives, their expenses paid by a charitable organization, traveled to Little Rock, Arkansas, to observe a program of police centers that linked elements of the criminal justice system and neighborhoods into a community policing effort targeting local crime. After a tour of the program, the group met in their hotel lobby to brainstorm the basics for the concept for Community Action Networks, or CANs, as a community policing strategy for Kansas City designed to link substance abusers with treatment and get residents involved in reporting drug houses.

COMBAT staff wrote a CAN Request for Proposals (RFP) and urged neighborhoods to apply for funding. The city issued the proposals and COMBAT administrators, among others, reviewed them. Twelve neighborhoods applied; seven were awarded grants.

The RFPs never referred to “community policing,” and the CANs partnered citizens, and the police. However, applicants had to explain how they would work with the police and identify “hot spots” where police and citizens could collaborate to deal with problems of crime and disorder. The process prevented neighborhoods from simply asking for more police officers, instead requiring citizens and neighborhood organizations to become part of a team effort to solve their local problems. COMBAT worked with the city to identify additional money to fund police officers to assign to the CANs.

COMBAT contributed leadership and technical assistance to the CANs both during their initiation and on an ongoing basis thereafter (see below). COMBAT paid for the initial purchase of bicycles for the police officer members of each CAN and has funded one member of each of two CANs (see below). The CANs secured most of the remainder of their funds from the city—\$7,000 each as of 1997—for utilities and incidental expenses such as food for volunteers engaged in graffiti removal and bicycle safety rodeos. Some CANs receive modest contributions from private businesses and postsecondary institutions.

Each CAN has included two police officers, a housing codes inspector, an assistant prosecutor, representatives from other local and city agencies, representatives of neighborhood associations, and a neighborhood mobilizer.

- *The police officers* assigned to each CAN establish a visible, uniformed presence in the community by walking the beat or riding their bicycles. The officers are based in the CAN center, which is centrally located in the community. When needed, the officers call on the services of their department’s locally assigned Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) personnel or Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) personnel, or the prosecutor’s Drug Abatement Response Team (DART).

- Each CAN's part-time *mobile crime watch coordinator*, a local resident, organizes volunteer block-level crime watch groups and relays information about suspected drug activity that the volunteers observe to police and CAN members.
- Project NeighborHOOD, a COMBAT grant match recipient, trained and assigned a *neighborhood mobilizer* to each CAN to link drug-using individuals in the community with drug treatment providers.
- The prosecutor's office assigned an *assistant prosecutor* to each CAN with responsibility for prosecuting all drug cases in the community and keeping the CAN informed about their progress.

Each CAN determines its neighborhood's needs and then meets weekly to develop individual and collaborative strategies for reducing drug-related crime. Each CAN also meets once a month separately with the local landlord association and with residents. The box "One CAN's Typical Activities" illustrates one group's initiatives.

### **One CAN's Typical Activities**

The Old Northeast, Inc., CAN serves six neighborhoods in northeastern Kansas City with a population of over 30,000 on the northern edge of the urban core. Members of the CAN feel the residents are engaged in a war of survival against poverty, crime, and prostitution. The CAN's goal is to revitalize Northeast Kansas City by motivating and helping residents to take action to solve these problems. One of the two police officers assigned to the CAN full-time was voted as its chairman, but the group operates more in a collegial fashion. Because the officers do not answer 911 calls, they can spend all their time addressing drug-related problems in the area.

The officers work closely with code enforcement representatives, as well. In the past, one officer reported, "The code people would have had to call KCPD [Kansas City police department] to post a watch on a house every time there was a problem; now they can call me. One time I did this and was able to go in and arrest six prostitutes."

The officer offered examples of the CAN's work:

- One officer and another CAN member conduct training to help landlords to learn how to screen applicants to keep drugs out of their properties. Both went through a three-day training course to become certified to offer the training. They do two trainings a month in different parts of county. One week 10 landlords showed up; another week 50 attended. The officer arranged to obtain about \$900 for airfare and per diem from his department to attend the training in Baltimore.

- Before the CAN was set up, police officers ignored the Mobile Crime Watch. Now, the two CAN officers help train them on what to do and not to do, what to watch for, and when to back off. The officers report they need the neighborhood's Mobile Crime Watch to do surveillance—for example, filming dealers in action. COMBAT pays the salaries of the part-time mobile crime watch person who serves on the CAN.
- The Mobile Crime Watch identified a house as involved in drug dealing. The officer arranged for DART to seize the house. A radio station then bought the house for \$13,000, held a telethon to raise money from residents to recover the money, and arranged for Old Northeast, a nonprofit community development corporation, to renovate and sell it. The corporation will use any profits from the sale to rehabilitate other seized houses.
- The CAN officers concentrate heavily on prostitution in the area because, according to one officer, “robberies and assaults result from prostitution, and if there's prostitution, drugs follow.” In addition, the officers target prostitution because neighbors complain it reduces property values even if it has no connection with drugs. As a result, another CAN goal is to improve the image of community, for example, by orchestrating Saturday graffiti removal groups who are rewarded with a barbecue after the clean-up.

COMBAT staff, in particular Kristin Rosselli, in charge of COMBAT planning and development in the prosecuting attorney's office, provided the CANs with ongoing assistance.

- When a CAN asked for help eliminating a prostitution ring in the community, Rosselli visited the CAN to assess the problem and then used the clout of the prosecutor's office to work with a State representative to draft legislation to make “persistent” prostitution a class D felony, rather than a misdemeanor. The stiffer penalty was intended to motivate prostitutes to enter treatment by making jail time a realistic threat.
- A CAN arranged for a school to print the organization's newsletter (with the educational benefit of forcing the students to read the articles as they print them). Rosselli linked the school with an advertising agency, which she telephoned to request a pro bono contribution in the form of technical assistance to the students in designing the newsletter layout in exchange for good publicity. The school is now hoping to obtain internships for students at the agency.
- Another CAN wanted a basketball facility for youth. Rosselli obtained agreement from an elementary school to make its gym available, but the school wanted the CAN to hire a security guard. Rosselli won them over by explaining that a CAN officer had persuaded his commander to recruit a sergeant to sponsor the games.

- When a radio station came up with the idea of purchasing and rehabilitating a seized drug house, the station manager called Rosselli for assistance. Rosselli telephoned the CAN to identify a suitable house. The CAN also worked with the radio station to arrange for Old Northeast to do the rehabilitation, sell the house, and keep any profits (see the box “One CAN’s Typical Activities”).
- Rosselli helped initiate a training program to help landlords screen applicants and maintain their properties drug-free (see below). Two members of one CAN, after attending a three-day training session, now offer the training to landlords in their community twice a month (see the box “One CAN’s Typical Activities”).

According to Kristin Rosselli, for a CAN to be successful it must operate in a neighborhood that is sufficiently organized to get things accomplished. According to Rosselli, CANs must also take full advantage of the talent and influence available to them; for example, one successful CAN has a probation and parole officer member, while the same CAN and another flourishing CAN each has a code inspector as a member. The CANs must treat “their” police officers as partners, not as servants. And they must keep the neighborhoods they represent involved, for example, through safety rodeos and graffiti removal days.

Most CANs have been unable to meet these stringent requirements. Two never got off the ground or were short lived because they lacked neighborhood support. One participant observed, “Their success depends on neighborhoods taking responsibility for their problems, and there may not be leaders dedicated to doing that.” Coordinators of two CANs failed as the conduit between police, residents, code enforcers, and other members, but COMBAT did not have the authority to remove them. Instead, COMBAT arranged to replace the police officer representatives on the CANs. COMBAT also arranged to remove police officers permanently from one CAN because of a neighborhood squabble. According to some COMBAT participants, community leaders in some neighborhoods have tried to turn the CAN police officers into their personal law enforcement agents, thereby alienating the command staff. Partly as a result, the police department in 1998 was beginning to devote less emphasis on the CANs and more on placing groups of community-oriented police officers in every district to work with the community.

Because of these difficulties, COMBAT participants and observers report that, as of 1998, only two of the original CANs remain truly active and organized. The mobile crime watch member of one of these CANs is still funded by COMBAT (\$43,000), as is the coordinator of the other CAN (\$36,000).

## Full Employment Council

Substance abusers in recovery may be less likely to relapse if they can find employment.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the Fiscal Commission (the COMBAT Commission's predecessor) awarded a contract to the Full Employment Council (FEC), a private, nonprofit organization that works in partnership with local business, government, organized labor, community-based organizations, and educational organizations. The council's mission is to create jobs for the unemployed and difficult-to-employ. The FEC's 1998 contract pays the salaries of three council staff to offer alternatives to substance abuse and crime through the provision of job assistance, training, and placement services to participants on-site at Drug Court's Day Report Center and to clients referred by counselors from other COMBAT-funded treatment providers. COMBAT provides FEC with \$120,000 for its Day Report Center services and \$85,000 for serving referrals from other treatment providers.

COMBAT's relationship with FEC is innovative because not many drug treatment programs have a contractual arrangement with a job preparation and placement services provider. Furthermore, FEC staff at the Day Report Center are part of the treatment team, and they begin the process of assisting participants while the clients are still in treatment, not after they have been discharged. The agency's Drug Court services are described in more detail in Objective 2, Treatment, and in the case study, "The Day Report Center's Support Services" in appendix B.

Full Employment Council employment specialists conduct an initial interview with both types of interested participants to collect information about their educational level, work experience, skill training, barriers to employment, and personal needs. At a subsequent meeting, the specialist explains FEC's services, administers the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE), and develops an individualized action plan that may include basic education, classroom training, on

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<sup>4</sup> There have been several attempts to reduce recidivism among ex-offenders by providing them with job preparation and placement services. Importantly, many of these ex-offenders are also former substance abusers in recovery. Unfortunately, a review of labor markets and crime risk factors found that "even after 30 years of trying . . . no program—in-prison training, transitional assistance (both in-kind and monetary assistance), or pretrial diversion—has consistently shown itself capable (through a rigorous random assignment evaluation) of decreasing recidivism through labor market-oriented programs, inside or outside of prison." However, the review observes that "the intuition of . . . [postrelease transitional income supplement] programs is still valid. . . . Ex-offenders with jobs commit fewer crimes than ex-offenders without jobs, and those with higher earnings commit fewer crimes than those with lower earnings." Bushway, S., and P. Reuter. "Labor Markets and Crime Risk Factors." Chapter 6 in L.S. Sherman, D. Gottfredson, D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S. Bushway. *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997), pp 6-17. Supporting this intuition, a 1992 study of Project RIO—a statewide program run by the Texas Workforce Commission that provides job placement services to more than 15,000 parolees each year—found that after 1 year, 69 percent of program participants had secured employment, compared with only 36 percent of a group of parolees who did not enroll in Project RIO. Furthermore, during the year after release, 48 percent of high-risk RIO participants were rearrested, compared with 57 percent of nonparticipating high-risk parolees; 23 percent of the RIO participants were reincarcerated, compared with 38 percent of nonparticipants. Although parolees in the study were not assigned randomly to control and treatment groups, the two groups of ex-offenders studied had similar demographic characteristics and risks of reoffending. Menon, R., C. Blakely, D. Carmichael, and L. Silver, "An Evaluation of Project RIO Outcomes: An Evaluative Report," College Station: Texas A&M University, Public Policy Resources Laboratory, July 1992.

the job training, or job search activities. The specialist follows up each client every 30 days for 13 weeks and again after 24 months.

In 1996, staff delivered on-site recruitment presentations to 514 individuals—414 more than the council's contractual obligation—at 33 different agencies. In addition, FEC staff:

- assessed 271 of these individuals (the contract mandated assessing 80) to determine their basic skills, occupational goals, and job interests;
- placed 263 in the council's own job training or job search assistance programs; and
- placed 171 (of a required 55) clients in jobs at an average wage of \$7.24 an hour at a time when the minimum wage was \$4.75 an hour.

In 1997, Full Employment Council employment specialists at the Day Report Center assessed 230 Drug Court participants, enrolled 48 in education or training programs (e.g., Adult Basic Education, on-the-job training, internships), and assisted 79 to find jobs at an average hourly wage of \$6.93. Forty-eight of the 79 clients with job placements stayed on the job 30 days; 28 of the 79 stayed on the job 60 days; and 19 stayed on the job 90 days.

### **Landlord-Related Initiatives**

Beginning in August 1996, COMBAT has undertaken several innovative initiatives related to landlords. The initiatives also represent an important example of COMBAT's collaborative endeavors (see Objective 5, Collaboration).

- A COMBAT-sponsored free, day-long Jackson County Landlord Training Program offers landlords, once or twice a month, practical tips on how to prevent and put a stop to illegal activity on their rental properties. COMBAT staff arranged for The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance to certify 18 Kansas City police officers as trainers for the initiative. Trainers make use of a videotape and a 137-page training manual. During 1997, 558 landlords and property managers, including the managers of every privately owned rental property in the county, attended one of 22 seminars.
- COMBAT worked with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regional office to develop screening techniques for making sure applicants for public housing are not substance abusers, because HUD had been unable to prevent dealers evicted from one housing development from moving into another development.



- Working with HUD Section 8 landlords, an assistant prosecutor trains exterminators and maintenance people to detect drug dealing and drug use on the landlords' properties and to report what they find.
- COMBAT staff linked the Missouri Department of Parole and Probation with the local HUD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to develop a procedure for pre-screening future addresses of inmates being released on probation to assisted and public housing properties to ensure that the inmates can be legally included on the lease and are not taking advantage of government-supported housing. Already some inmates have been denied release to such housing.
- COMBAT's program on Early Methamphetamine Laboratory Recognition Training for community front-line workers has trained over 700 individuals to recognize clandestine methamphetamine manufacturing and precursor chemicals. Participants include individuals in positions that might expose them to the production dangers of the drug and also might enable them to report what they have seen. The training has included postal workers, school social workers, pest exterminators, housekeepers, trash collectors, probation and parole officers (so that if a client whose home they visit is manufacturing methamphetamine they can file for revocation), fire fighters, and department of social service workers (so they can avoid placing youngsters back into homes where drugs are being manufactured).<sup>5</sup> The regional HUD office has also hosted the seminar for all its asset and on-site property managers. COMBAT, in collaboration with the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force and the Kansas City Missouri police department's Drug Enforcement Unit, sponsors the trainings and pays the training team coordinator and most of the fees of the team's two detectives. The Drug Task Force has conducted additional training sessions for more than 3,000 participants on methamphetamine laboratory recognition throughout the State and in other States, including 41 sessions in 1997 and 50 sessions during the first six months of 1998. The training includes an actual set-up of a miniature methamphetamine laboratory, along with the simulated stages of the manufacturing process and the display of the common precursor chemicals.

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5 The Community Development Supervisor of the City of St. Joseph's Community Services Department wrote a letter to Claire McCaskill in which he observed that "Recently, the knowledge gained from the training became particularly advantageous for one of my staff members . . . . During the repossession of a vacant Urban Homestead property, [he] . . . was able to notice the signs of a possible methamphetamine lab. The training gave [him] . . . the ability to recognize the clues that illegal activity had occurred on the property. Without the training provided by COMBAT, this could have been an extremely volatile and life-threatening situation."

## COMBAT Sponsored Still Other Innovations

COMBAT, along with the assistant prosecutor in the prosecutor's office, supported other innovative initiatives, several of which were just getting under way in early 1998.

- In May 1998, COMBAT and the family support unit of the prosecutor's office jointly initiated a pilot test of a "*fathering*" program that, similar in concept to Drug Court, will enable fathers charged criminally with being delinquent in child support payments to have the charges deferred and eventually dropped if they participate successfully in the program. Participating in the program is expected to enable most fathers to meet their child support obligations because many of the men may be delinquent primarily because they are using their money to support a drug habit or because their substance abuse problem interferes with their acting responsibly. After the men have gone through an assessment process that includes not only substance abuse evaluation but also an employment, education, and mental and physical health assessment (as do Drug Court participants), the 6-month program will enroll in treatment those fathers who have a drug problem. A counselor from a COMBAT-funded prevention provider (the Full Employment Council) will assist the men with employment training and job placement. To be eligible, the fathers must be first-time offenders, be under 40 years of age, and have arrearages of three to 12 months. Participants will meet at least once a month with a special Family Court commissioner assigned to the program for an update on their status. If they are not complying with the program, the commissioner will terminate them from the program and refer them for criminal court processing. In addition to improving payments, the program is expected to reduce the huge backlog of child support cases in Family Court. Early results from the evaluation of the pilot test suggest that participants are spending increased time with their children—which may help reduce the potential for substance abuse among these youngsters. In addition, 27 of the first 37 participants enrolled in the program are already employed.
  
- Still *other innovative initiatives* that COMBAT was initiating in 1998 included
  - a Family Drug Court patterned after Drug Court that will enroll women charged with child abuse or neglect because mothers who commit these offenses are often substance abusers;
  
  - mapping crime hot spots with housing code violations and landlord training seminars to evaluate the effectiveness of the training;

- negotiating with the Kansas City Power and Light Company to explore how utilities can work with individuals in recovery who are having difficulty paying their electric bills;
- providing a matching grant to enable Project NeighborHOOD to secure a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to place a full-time case manager at the city hospital to address patients whose medical problems appear to be related to substance abuse; and
- plans to place a detoxification unit in the city hospital.
- The COMBAT Commission has *encouraged prevention and treatment providers to include innovative approaches* in their proposals for funding. Interviews that Kauffman Foundation summer interns conducted for Abt Associates with selected COMBAT prevention providers suggest that at least a few providers have already implemented innovative initiatives. (See the box “Innovations Initiated by COMBAT Commission-Funded Providers.”)
- The prosecutor’s office *drafted and vigorously supported legislation designed to facilitate the elimination of drug dealing*. New statutes now
  - make persistent prostitution a felony offense (see above);
  - eliminate the temporary restraining order (TRO) stage for getting rid of methamphetamine houses;
  - enable landlords to file for a 10-day, as opposed to 30-day, eviction of tenants who allow the illegal on-premises possession, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance;
  - create a conspiracy offense that can be used to charge everyone involved in methamphetamine manufacturing, not just the actual manufacturer;
  - reduce the amount of methamphetamine needed for a felony charge; and
  - make it a criminal offense for an individual who is HIV positive to put another individual at risk of contracting the disease.

## COMBAT Was A Catalyst for Most of the Innovations

*Most of the innovative initiatives identified above would not have been developed without COMBAT's funding or support.* The Grant Match Program's existence of course depended on having surplus funds from the Anti-Drug Sales Tax to expend. While it was a series of unpredicted events—delays in starting Drug Court and the jail expansion, and higher than anticipated tax revenues—that made the money available for grant matches, the program would not have come into being unless the prosecutor's office had conceived of the concept of providing matches as a feasible and positive approach to distributing the accumulated funds.

Most of the initiatives funded through the Grant Match Program would not have come into existence without the COMBAT contribution because the other funding sources required a local match. During telephone conversations in 1997 with 16 current Grant Match Program recipients, 10 recipients reported they would not have been able to obtain the required local match from some other source if COMBAT had not provided it; only one recipient reported it could have secured a match elsewhere (see exhibit OBJ4-3). Three of the 16 current grantees reported they would not have even tried to secure a local match elsewhere had COMBAT not been available to provide the match. Other sources may have been especially willing to give money to these initiatives because the proposals had the COMBAT "seal of approval."

### **Innovations Initiated by COMBAT Commission-Funded Providers**

- DeLaSalle Education Center implemented a literacy program focusing on students whose reading levels are below a 6th grade level. Students are put in an intensive environment with two instructors for every 12 students. Methods to improve reading levels include providing in-service sessions and additional support services for the classroom teachers, volunteers, and counselors at the students' schools.
- The Guadalupe Center established a diversion program that uses interactive counseling to target youth who are not attending school or who do not participate in structured school-related activities such as sports and clubs. The center opened its gym to older adolescent boys to play basketball and for girls to play volleyball. While the adolescents are sitting on the bench waiting to play, staff discuss sexual relationships, drug use, gang activity, and other issues with them. The center has started a soccer league for middle school students, but the children must bring and complete their homework before going to practice or games. Tutors are available to help them, if needed. As with the teenagers, staff talk about controversial issues while the children are waiting to play.
- The Blue Hills Homes Corporation established an organization of current tenants who help new tenants get started in the community (e.g., offer job placement tips and orientations to community events and other local organizations). The organization has also set up a phone line that tenants can call to report drug activity in the neighborhood.

- The Whatsoever Community Center organized a week-long computer class for youngsters that involves disassembling and reassembling a computer and learning how to troubleshoot computers for problems. Students get to keep the computer at the end of the week.
- Genesis School helps students develop an anti-drug marketing brochure with sales potential through radio, print, and television; conducts ten community cultural tours in the school's Hip Hop Van with information researched and presented by youth; publishes 50,000 tour guides of youth-generated art and writings on youth issues and things to do in Kansas City; and sets up anti-drug prevention messages through song, dance, and writers' troupes and conducts ten performances.

### Other COMBAT Innovations Are Treated Elsewhere in This Chapter

Several other COMBAT innovations not discussed under this objective are addressed under other objectives:

- Key to a Safe Summer program (Objective 3, Prevention);
- Truancy Prevention Program (Objective 3, Prevention and appendix B);
- Alternative Schools Program (Objective 3, Prevention);
- Paseo Corridor Partnership (Objective 5, Collaboration);
- Deputy Juvenile Officer (DJO) certification training (Objective 2, Treatment);
- training of minority counselors for substance abuse counseling certification (Objective 2, Treatment); and
- community prosecution (Objective 5, Collaboration).

While no longer innovative in itself, Drug Court incorporates several innovative features (see Objective 2, Treatment), including development of an in-house treatment program, the program's application of the therapeutic community concept to an outpatient setting, and the integration of a variety of on-site support services into the program (see appendix B).

*By expending the surplus monies in a Grant Match Program, COMBAT was able to leverage additional dollars in the campaign against substance abuse.* COMBAT staff estimate that the program attracts \$4 for each \$1 in COMBAT matching funds. COMBAT staff calculate that by the end of 1995, the program had provided \$6 million in matching funds that had leveraged \$23 million in other funds. Because two thirds of the other funding has come from the Federal Government, the program does not create cost shifting within the State, county, or city. Moreover, only 10 percent of the remaining non-COMBAT funds have come from the State; the rest represent private dollars (e.g., funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation). As a result, the program increased private spending for the campaign against substance abuse.

Claire McCaskill, the driving force behind the CANs, feels her office would have initiated them without COMBAT because she had been aware that they could help reduce the drug problem and improve her office's relationships with law enforcement and the community. However, other COMBAT participants hold a different opinion.

- Another member of the team that visited Little Rock and came up with the CAN concept believes that the group made the trip largely because of COMBAT's mission to look at new ways of dealing with crime. According to the participant, "COMBAT was the ball carrier for innovation at that time." The coordinator of another CAN felt that if COMBAT had not funded her position, the center would not have lasted (although it might continue today if the program stopped funding her position).
- Even if the CANs might have developed on their own, some important CAN features might not have been incorporated without COMBAT funding. Project NeighborHOOD would probably not have secured funding to pay for the community mobilizers without the COMBAT matching grant. A CAN mobile crime watch coordinator reported that his activities expanded enormously because of COMBAT funding. Previously, he had received a \$2,500 grant from a community development corporation, but that shoestring budget—since discontinued—only provided for radios and a VCR. With \$43,550 in COMBAT funding, he is paid to spend 80 hours a month supervising, training, assigning, and monitoring volunteer mobile crime teams. He can also take the time to identify troubled areas of the community to target with crime watches. The COMBAT funds enable him to pay someone else to do some of his regular job (he is self-employed), giving him more time to devote to crime watch activities. COMBAT also funds a half-time crime watch program assistant and pays for the program's telephone bills and educational materials. To date, the crime watch organizer has trained 170 volunteers, with 20 current regulars.

As discussed under other objectives, the Truancy Prevention Program, Paseo Corridor initiative, Deputy Juvenile Officer (DJO) certification program, and training of minority counselors for substance abuse certification would probably not have occurred without COMBAT funding. While some of the new legislation might have been enacted as a result of a broad concern to improve the processing of drug cases, other legislation probably would not have even been proposed without COMBAT's need to enhance its initiatives—for example, the prosecutor's focus on training landlords and the Drug Task Force's frustration trying to jail methamphetamine manufacturers. The community prosecution initiative would likely have been undertaken even without COMBAT because of McCaskill's interest in the approach.

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**Exhibit OBJ4-3****Other Funding Sources for Selected 1997 COMBAT Grant Match Recipients**

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<b>Organization</b>	<b>Other Funding Sources</b>	<b>Availability of Other Matching Funds<sup>a</sup></b>
Boys and Girls Club of Greater Kansas City (prevention)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Missouri Department of Public Safety</li></ul>	no; would have abandoned program
Children's Mercy Hospital (family program)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Federal Government</li><li>• American Academy of Pediatrics</li><li>• Department of Health and Human Services</li></ul>	no; would not have been able to obtain local match from other sources
Genesis (treatment)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Kauffman Foundation</li><li>• Full Employment Council</li><li>• foundations</li><li>• businesses</li></ul>	no; no other place to get match
Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce (anti-drug initiative)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Corporations</li><li>• Chamber of Commerce</li></ul>	don't know; would have sought funding from other places but difficult
Guadalupe Center (treatment for youth)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• United Way</li><li>• State of Missouri</li><li>• KC School District</li></ul>	don't know; maybe would have asked Kauffman Foundation or the Hall Family Foundation
Project Neighborhood (community mobilization)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Robert Wood Johnson Foundation</li><li>• Kauffman Foundation</li><li>• Greater Kansas City Community Foundation and Affiliated Trust</li></ul>	no; would not have even received money from the agencies were it not for COMBAT
Prosecuting Attorney's Office (DART)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• U.S. Department of Justice</li></ul>	no; no other funding out there
Renaissance West (treatment)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Federal Government</li></ul>	do not know
Rose Brooks (Project SAFE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• General funding campaign and contributions</li></ul>	yes; local annual fund
Swope Parkway Comprehensive (health care for the homeless)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Federal McKinney Grant</li></ul>	don't know; do not know where they would look
Truman Medical Center (KC Pact)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Hall Family Foundation</li><li>• State of Missouri Department of Health</li></ul>	no; would not have been able to obtain other funds—would have sought but probably would not find

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<sup>a</sup> Text represents statements from organizational head in interview.

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COMBAT's support for innovative programming among prevention providers appears to have been slow in coming. For example, the Special Advisory Panel to the Legislature concluded in its December 1993 report that "The Fiscal Commission . . . has suffered from the absence of a consensus vision about the right 'mix' of programs necessary to rid our community of drug-related problems . . . . COMBAT should blend "tried and true' anti-drug strategies while devising and implementing **new and innovative** substance abuse prevention and treatment programs." (emphasis in the original). The committee did observe that some recently implemented COMBAT innovations represented a trend that should be continued. However, the COMBAT Commission felt that most prevention providers continued to fail to exercise the creativity the Commission was expecting.

The discussion above makes clear that *COMBAT can take credit for introducing a large number of innovative initiatives in Jackson County*, many of them representing significant endeavors.

Several overall aspects of COMBAT's innovativeness are especially noteworthy.

- COMBAT has initiated innovations not for innovation's sake but in response to documented needs—for example, addressing the problem of school drop-outs who are exposed to drugs and crime on the streets (truancy program) and targeting the substance abuse problem among fathers behind in their child support payments (child support program).
- COMBAT tries to use existing resources to accomplish its goals—that is, avoid the need for spending additional funds. COMBAT initiatives that rely primarily or entirely on the in-kind services of participating agencies and individuals include the landlord initiatives, fathering program, and legislative initiatives discussed above; the Safe Summer Program described under Objective 3, Prevention; and the Paseo Corridor initiative addressed under Objective 5. Collaboration.
- Although not susceptible to documentation, several COMBAT participants and observers reported that COMBAT's own innovative initiatives contributed to a climate of innovation in Jackson County that has encouraged still other entities to introduce innovations of their own.
- Finally, the enormous range of program types that COMBAT has funded or initiated is in itself innovative. Compared to other collaborative efforts across the country designed to address the substance abuse problem (see the examples listed in Objective 5, Collaboration), COMBAT's programmatic scope alone has extended dramatically the concept of innovation in fighting substance abuse.



## Objective 5: Did COMBAT Enhance Communication and Collaborative Action among Organizations, Programs, and Jurisdictions?

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **COMBAT's overall approach is one of collaboration among prevention providers, the treatment community, and the criminal justice system.**
- **Many COMBAT initiatives involve collaboration among a wide range of organizations, programs, and jurisdictions.**
  - The Paseo Corridor initiative involves several government agencies, the Kansas City police department, and neighborhood groups.
  - COMBAT's Law Enforcement Collaboration brings together representatives from local and Federal law enforcement agencies; city, county, and Federal prosecutor offices; the courts; and the State Liquor Control Board.
  - The five assistants who make up the prosecuting attorney's Neighborhood Prosecutor Program work closely with the city police department and neighborhood groups.
  - Several other COMBAT initiatives treated under other objectives in this chapter also involve collaboration, including the

Strategic Planning Committee

Community Action Networks (CANs)

truancy prevention, fathering, and child advocate projects

alternative schools program

school-based Deputy Juvenile Officer (DJO) program

landlord/property owner initiatives

youth courts

safe summer program

Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)

Drug Abuse Resistance Education program (D.A.R.E.).

— Although discussed under Objective 2, Treatment, Drug Court is an important example of COMBAT collaboration.

- COMBAT has promoted collaboration most notably by linking the treatment community with the criminal justice system. COMBAT also fostered collaboration
  - between law enforcement agencies and the prosecuting attorney's office;
  - among Federal, State, and local agencies; and
  - within the treatment community, the prevention community, and the law enforcement community.
- COMBAT was responsible for much of this increased collaboration. Moreover, most of the collaboration is unlikely to have occurred without COMBAT. However, obstacles to better integrated collaboration remain.

#### Data Sources

- interviews with COMBAT participants and observers
- observation of COMBAT meetings
- COMBAT program materials

Collaboration is essential in the fight against substance abuse because no one agency or organization by itself can solve the problem. According to Claire McCaskill, the Jackson County prosecuting attorney, as quoted in the July 5, 1997, issue of the *New York Times*,

This is such a multilayered problem that you've got to cover the waterfront. We've let the public think that we [in the criminal justice system] can take care of the problem. I understand the seductiveness of telling people what they want to hear, but the criminal justice system is not equipped to take care of the underlying causes of crime and drugs.

Because of this recognition, COMBAT's *overall* approach has been one of collaboration among prevention providers, the treatment community, and the criminal justice system. Reflecting this orientation, *COMBAT has worked diligently to combine the resources of many agencies and organizations in a coordinated attack on the substance abuse problem.* The program has promoted collaboration both within the COMBAT family—that is, among the components and agencies receiving COMBAT funds—and outside of COMBAT—among groups that have no formal COMBAT affiliation.

The discussion below begins by describing the most important collaborative initiatives COMBAT has stimulated. The text then addresses relationships between treatment providers

and the criminal justice system, and relationships between law enforcement agencies and the prosecuting attorney's office. The discussion concludes with an assessment of the extent to which these increases in communication and collaboration can be attributed to COMBAT.

## Several Major COMBAT Initiatives Involve Collaboration

*Many COMBAT initiatives involve collaboration among a wide range of organizations, programs, and jurisdictions.* Exhibit OBJ 5-1 lists the most significant collaborative endeavors, including COMBAT's role in their development and perpetuation, and the groups involved. Exhibit OBJ 5-2 highlights the types of groups involved in each collaboration. Brief discussions of the initiatives follow.

### Paseo Corridor Initiative

The Paseo Corridor is a 15-block area in the urban core of Kansas City surrounding a four-lane divided boulevard that cuts through the entire city from north to south. The corridor is bounded by Interstates 70, 29, and 35. Five public housing developments and nine Section 8<sup>1</sup> assisted housing developments in the corridor house about 5,000 of the area's 7,500 residents. All census tracts in the zone have a poverty rate of at least 20 percent. The corridor has had a long history of crime, most of it—such as assaults and prostitution—related to ubiquitous drug dealing and drug use.

In the past when drug dealers were evicted from their apartments in the Paseo, they were able to relocate from one housing development to another because property managers did not share information about tenants. The Paseo had several active neighborhood associations composed of property owners, but they, too, ignored each other—and ignored renters. According to Florina Jones, a community activist, "People were looking out for themselves. Only COMBAT got people interested in their communities and in each other."

In 1995, the Kansas City police department's central patrol division and Kristin Rosselli, COMBAT's chief of planning and development in the prosecuting attorney's office, started working with residents to clean up a single housing complex in the Paseo Corridor that was particularly infested with drugs and crime. Because they were partially successful, they decided to expand their collaboration to the entire corridor—and to get the entire community involved. In June 1996, Rosselli brought together community residents and the police

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<sup>1</sup> Section 8 refers to a U.S. Housing and Urban Development-funded program operated by local public housing authorities. The Section 8 program provides qualified individuals with certificates and vouchers which they can use to assist with paying the rent in a privately owned house or apartment. Local housing authorities make payments to private property owners on behalf of eligible tenants.

**Exhibit OBJ 5-1****Selected Features of COMBAT Initiatives That Involve Collaboration**

<u>Initiative</u>	<u>Lead Group</u>	<u>Dates of Operation</u>	<u>COMBAT's Role</u>	<u>Other Groups Involved</u>	<u>Where Discussed</u>
<i>Initiatives Treated under Objective 5</i>					
Paseo Corridor Initiative	COMBAT	1996-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> <li>• community organizations</li> <li>• city and Federal housing authorities</li> <li>• property owners</li> <li>• local businesses</li> </ul>	Objective 5
Law Enforcement Collaboration	COMBAT	1996-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> <li>• U.S. Attorney's office</li> <li>• Federal law enforcement agencies</li> <li>• municipal court</li> <li>• State Liquor Control Board</li> </ul>	Objective 5
Neighborhood Prosecution Program	prosecutor's office	1991-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initiated</li> <li>• coordinates</li> <li>• funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> <li>• neighborhood organizations</li> </ul>	Objective 5
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>					
<i>Initiatives Treated Under Other Objectives in Chapter 4</i>					
Strategic Planning Committee	COMBAT	1996-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> <li>• Circuit Court</li> <li>• Family Court</li> <li>• Jail</li> </ul>	Objective 4

**Exhibit OBJ 5-1****Selected Features of COMBAT Initiatives That Involve Collaboration (continued)**

<b>Initiative</b>	<b>Lead Group</b>	<b>Dates of Operation</b>	<b>COMBAT's Role</b>	<b>Other Groups Involved</b>	<b>Where Discussed</b>
Community Action Networks (CANs)	none	1994-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• funds partially</li> <li>• assists</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> <li>• neighborhood organizations</li> <li>• city and State code enforcement agencies</li> </ul>	Objective 4
Truancy Prevention Program	COMBAT	1996-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• partially funds</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Kansas City School District</li> <li>• Mayor's office</li> <li>• Missouri Department of Public Safety</li> </ul>	Objective 3
Fathering Program	COMBAT	1998-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• coordinates</li> <li>• funds?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Family Court</li> <li>• treatment providers</li> </ul>	Objective 4
Child Advocate Program	COMBAT	1998-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Circuit Court</li> <li>• treatment providers</li> </ul>	Objective 4
Alternative Schools Program	COMBAT	1997-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• partially funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• schools</li> <li>• Family Court</li> </ul>	Objective 3
School-based Deputy Juvenile Officer (DJO) Program	Family Court	1994-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• schools</li> <li>• treatment providers</li> </ul>	Objective 3
Landlord/Property Owner Initiatives	COMBAT	1996-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> </ul>	Objective 4
Youth Courts	individual courts	1985-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• partially funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Family Court</li> <li>• schools</li> <li>• police agencies</li> </ul>	Objective 3

**Exhibit OBJ 5-1****Selected Features of COMBAT Initiatives That Involve Collaboration (continued)**

<u>Initiative</u>	<u>Lead Group</u>	<u>Dates of Operation</u>	<u>COMBAT's Role</u>	<u>Other Groups Involved</u>	<u>Where Discussed</u>
Safe Summer Program	COMBAT	1986-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initiated</li> <li>• partially funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• schools</li> <li>• community-based organizations</li> </ul>	Objective 4
Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)	COMBAT	1991-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• partially funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kansas City police department</li> <li>• city code enforcement agencies</li> <li>• neighborhood organizations</li> </ul>	Objective 1
Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) <sup>1</sup>	local police departments	1985-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• partially funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• schools</li> </ul>	Objective 3
Drug Court	COMBAT	1993-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• organized</li> <li>• largely funds</li> <li>• coordinates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prosecutor's office</li> <li>• treatment providers</li> <li>• Circuit Court</li> <li>• State Probation and Parole Department</li> </ul>	Objective 2
<i>Internal Collaborations</i>					
Treatment Coalition	COMBAT	1994-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initiated</li> <li>• funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NA</li> </ul>	Objective 5
Prevention Provider Meetings	COMBAT	1994-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• initiated</li> <li>• funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NA</li> </ul>	Objective 5
Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force	Drug Task Force	1988-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• mostly funds</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NA</li> </ul>	Objective 1

<sup>1</sup> COMBAT did not initiate the D.A.R.E. program, but the programs it funds might not have been able to survive without COMBAT funding.

## Exhibit OBJ 5-2

## Types of Organizations Involved in COMBAT-Supported Initiatives Involving Collaboration

Initiative	Type of Collaborating Organization						Jurisdictions Involved		
	Prosecutor's Office	Law Enforcement	Court <sup>1</sup>	Treatment	Prevention	Community	City	State	Federal
Paseo Corridor Initiative	X	X	X			X	X	X	X
Law Enforcement Collaboration	X	X	X				X		X
Neighborhood Prosecution	X	X				X			
Strategic Planning Committee	X	X	X	X	X	X			
Community Action Networks	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
Truancy Program	X	X	X		X				
Fathering Program	X		X	X	X				
Child Advocate Program	X		X	X		X			
Alternative Schools Program	X		X		X				
School-based DJOs			X	X	X				
Landlord/Property Owner Initiative	X	X							X
Youth Courts		X	X	X	X				
Safe Summer Program	X				X	X			
Drug Abatement Response Team	X	X				X	X		
Drug Court	X	X	X	X	X				X

<sup>1</sup> Municipal, Circuit, or Family.

<sup>2</sup> Excludes Kansas City police department.

department to discuss how law enforcement, the prosecutor's office, and Paseo residents could work together to improve conditions in the corridor. As the group identified the nature of the problem and possible solutions, it became clear that other agencies and organizations needed to become involved. As a result, *the formal agreement that the 60 members of the newly named Paseo Corridor Drug- and Crime-Free Community Partnership signed in February 1997 included property managers or owners of the housing communities (including the city housing authority and the local U.S. Housing and Urban Development [HUD] office), the mayor's office, the city attorney's office, churches, several neighborhood associations, and a local liquor store, inn, and motel.* Over time, the committee, which meets monthly, established six standing subcommittees that meet between full committee meetings.

The text below presents selected features of the partnership's initiatives that illustrate COMBAT's role in promoting collaboration.<sup>2</sup> Exhibit OBJ5-3 illustrates the breadth of the partnership's activities.

- The partnership worked with prosecutors and judges to set bond for people arrested in the corridor. Normally, drug dealers would be released without bail. The presiding municipal judge, a member of the Law Enforcement Collaboration (see below), agreed to set bail after other members of the group asked him to do so.
- Representatives from the Kansas City police department agreed to test a program to have officers write "Paseo Corridor" at the top of every general ordinance summons or ticket they write related to trespassing, narcotics, and prostitution to ensure that prosecutors pay special attention to these cases.
- Officers "kicked butt," according to one participant—confronted trespassers and drug dealers telling them they were no longer welcome in "my" neighborhood. Police also increased towings of abandoned cars in the corridor, patrols, and arrests.
- The police department distributed fliers and business cards with an anonymous hotline number for Paseo residents to report tips on drug dealing and other crime (see below). According to community leader Florina Jones, "COMBAT leveraged community policing by arranging for the officers to get to know the residents and vice versa. Now, residents will call the police to report drug activity and the police welcome the calls." According to police department records, while calls for service within the entire Central Patrol Division where the corridor is located

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<sup>2</sup> The issue of whether the partnership's initiatives have displaced criminal activity into other neighborhoods and counties is discussed under Objective 1, Jail.



## Exhibit OBJ5-3

### Part of Paseo Corridor Partnership Meeting Notes of February 1998

**1:25-2:50 Successes & Updates -- Phase I: Safety, Security & Stability &  
Phase III: Community Development Through Economic Empowerment**

#### Presentation on Positive Changes to the Paseo Corridor:

**Jim Wiss, Homkor**

- Presentation on renovation of the former University Hospital to a senior living facility.

**Ed Newsome, President, Kansas City, Missouri School Board**

- Presentation of the transition plan for Woodland Elementary School to a neighborhood-based school.

**Dave Smith, Executive Director, Boys & Girls Club**

- Brief overview of the activities available at the Clymer Center Boys & Girls Club.

**Dwayne Crompton, Executive Director, KCMC Child Development**

- Brief overview of HeadStart program at Clymer Center and new partnership with Boys & Girls Club.

**Councilwoman Teresa Loar, 1st District, City Council**

- Brief comments on success of "John TV" and 1st District improvements.
- Announcement of grant opportunity to beautify vacant lots -- deadline is January 30, 1998.
- Announcement of "Hut 2. 3...Touchdown!" program which offers paid internships to area high school graduates and college students ages 18 to 24, with 10-14 weeks of on-site training in restaurant management. Program is sponsored by Tricon Inc. and the Mayor's Office. Tricon Inc. is the parent company of Pizza Hut, Taco Bell and KFC restaurants. Young people interested in applying should call 763-6987 between 8 AM and 5 PM weekdays.

**Daryl Gilmore, Assistant, Councilwoman Williams-Neal, 3rd District, City Council**

- Brief comments on 1st District improvements.

**Sgt. John Frazier, KCPD - Central Patrol Division**

- Brief comments on the change in types of complaints by residents and business owners in the Paseo Corridor.
- Brief comments on KCPD's efforts in the Paseo Corridor, specifically areas outside of public housing.
- Update by officers assigned to HAKC properties. (PO Schriever, KCPD - CPD)
- Brief update on Police Athletic League at Clymer Center -- the current sport, # kids participating, average age, where kids live, # officers participating, next game day.

**2:50-2:55 Updates from Community/Agency**


**2:55-3:00 Resident Participation Award**

**Welcome & Thank New Paseo Corridor Partners -- Please be sure to sign-in.**

**Next meeting is Tuesday, 3/3, 1:15-3:00 PM, Theron B. Watkins.**

**Thank you again to Theron B. Watkins for hosting this month's meeting.**

rose almost 15 percent in 1997 compared with 1996, within the Paseo Corridor alone calls increased almost 92 compared with 1996, within the Paseo Corridor alone calls increased almost 92 percent.



- The Law Enforcement Collaboration (see below) initiated a Prostitution Repeat Offender Program designed to establish a prostitute-free zone within the Paseo Corridor. COMBAT arranged for the municipal court, prosecutor's office, and Kansas City police department to agree to impose geographic restrictions on prostitutes as a condition of probation. The agencies developed a procedure that allows police to cite a prostitute for violating the conditions of her probation and set a court date for a revocation hearing. The city agreed to reserve space in the city jail for the prostitutes. COMBAT participants report that the initiative has eliminated prostitution from the corridor.
- The prosecutor's office arranged for a legislator to submit a bill, subsequently enacted in 1998, that makes any person convicted of "persistent prostitution," defined as conviction of two or more prostitution-related offenses, guilty of a class D felony. These offenders will be prescreened for inclusion in Drug Court and undergo a substance abuse assessment. The legislation also gives the court discretion to require any person arrested for prostitution with a prior conviction of a prostitution-related offense to undergo HIV testing. COMBAT is working with the health department so that the prostitutes are tested for HIV and, if they test positive and are rearrested, are charged with the more serious offense of endangering others. Although targeted at the entire city, the impetus behind the legislation was the prostitution activity taking place in the Paseo Corridor.
- Because the prosecutor worked with the legislature to make hourly motel rates illegal, motel owners have been renting less often to prostitutes because of the

threat of being shut down.<sup>3</sup> One inn voluntarily agreed to discontinue hourly rentals. In addition, to avoid code violations that could also get them closed, some owners have brought in cleaning crews to spruce up their properties.

- The partnership worked with a liquor store that sold drug paraphernalia and allowed dealers and users to congregate around the store to fence in his property, post no loitering signs, add more groceries to his stock, and change the name of his store from "A & J Liquors" to "A & J Market." Now, the owner attends partnership meetings and raffles off \$25 of groceries at every meeting.
- After an investigation revealed that everyone living in the Paseo Corridor had parking available to them behind their buildings, Kristin Rosselli asked the partnership members to survey Paseo residents to find out if they would like to have a six-block stretch of the Paseo near the downtown area and another area of the Paseo north of the city turned into no parking/stopping/standing zones. Two hundred and fifty residents, along with several businesses including a liquor store, signed a petition that COMBAT took to two city council members, who effected the change in two weeks.
- Kansas City Power and Light agreed to put bullet-proof glass around street lights because people had been shooting out the lights. The department also improved lighting to increase the visibility of drug dealing and reduce dealers' avenues of escape.
- The city Parks and Recreation Department has fenced in the park area of the corridor, cleaned up the litter, planted trees and flowers, and enforced park ordinances prohibiting alcoholic beverages, glass, and littering.
- The city council made it a priority to demolish 25 abandoned building in the corridor.
- A recycling center opened in the corridor to reduce the number of smashed bottles on sidewalks and playgrounds (see Objective 6, Economic Development).

Using data provided by the Kansas City police department, exhibit OBJ 5-4 compares the number of arrests in the corridor for six offenses from 1994 to 1997. Between 1996 (the year the Paseo Corridor Partnership became operational) and 1997 there were declines in murders (from 4 to 0), robbery (from 223 to 126), assault (from 625 to 476), burglary (from 199 to 139), and stealing (from 603 to 441). However, the number of auto thefts remained nearly the

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<sup>3</sup> One COMBAT participant reported that the ordinance is unenforceable because it stipulates only that motels cannot re-rent a room for less than eight hours if they have just rented it for one hour.

same, and rapes increased (from 22 to 47). Furthermore, arrests for murder and burglary were already declining consistently starting in 1994. The most convincing declines in 1997 were therefore for robbery, assault, and stealing (which had increased steadily the previous three years).

The data shown in exhibit OBJ 5-5 from the Housing Authority of Kansas City suggest that arrests for several types of crime may have declined in the authority's five public housing sites in the Paseo since the partnership got going. As shown, auto thefts, robbery, burglary, larceny, and assault all declined considerably in 1997 compared with 1996—all, with the

### **Several Housing Initiatives Target the Paseo Corridor**

Both the Housing Authority of Kansas City and the regional U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) office, both represented on the Paseo Corridor Partnership, have introduced measures to reduce crime and substance abuse in the corridor.

- **COMBAT staff worked with the city housing authority and HUD office to establish common screening techniques for rental applicants and for sharing information about applicants so that an applicant turned down by one development cannot apply and be accepted by another. In addition, police officers provided property managers with a new form which secures information on applicants' criminal records that the previous forms had failed to capture.**
- **Rentor screening forms used by the housing authority, HUD office, and private property owners had required applicants to identify "convictions," resulting in applicants recording only traffic violations. At Kristin Rosselli's suggestion, the police department changed the forms to read "criminal convictions."**
- **The city housing authority agreed to triple the number of investigators working in the housing developments in the corridor.**
- **The city housing authority is enforcing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's so-called "One Strike and You're Out" policy<sup>4</sup> that authorizes evicting tenants in assisted housing who engage in or harbor drug dealers. During the first five months of 1997, the authority evicted 59 individuals from eight of its properties, including the five properties in the Paseo Corridor, for drug-related activity. At the same time, the authority agreed to provide a "carrot" to go along with the eviction "stick"—forging a linkage with a local treatment facility for tenants willing to enter treatment.**
- **Managers of Section 8 housing communities agreed to lock their back doors to prevent dealers from entering or exiting from the rear and make it easier for police officers and residents to observe people going in and out the front entrances.**

- The owners of private multifamily properties agreed to adopt a uniform lease agreement, rules, and regulations.

<sup>4</sup> In March 1996, the President issued a directive ordering the eviction of public housing tenants who are arrested for drug-related or violent crimes. The policy, known informally as "one strike, you're out," calls for tenants to be evicted if they, their relatives, or their guests are arrested for crimes committed on public housing properties regardless of whether they are ultimately convicted.

exception of auto thefts, to levels below those of 1994 and 1995. Crime that is directly drug-related, including arrests for possession and recovered property, increased during this time period (data not shown), but this may be the result of heightened enforcement efforts.

#### Exhibit OBJ5-4

##### Arrests for Seven Offenses in the Paseo Corridor, 1994-1997

Offense	1994	1995	1996	1997
Murder	8	6	4	0
Rape	21	30	22	47
Robbery	199	248	223	126
Assault	716	725	625	476
Burglary	248	213	199	139
Stealing	468	541	603	441
Stolen Auto	210	218	236	235
TOTAL	1,870	1,981	1,912	1,464

#### Exhibit OBJ5-5

##### Offenses in Kansas City Housing Authority Paseo Corridor Properties, 1994-1992

Offense	1994	1995	1996	1997
Auto Thefts	34	43	61	43
Robbery	45	39	37	20
Burglary	72	82	56	16
Larceny	73	76	120	71
Assault	91	90	170	74

In 1998, Kansas City received a \$250,000 Federal Safe Neighborhood Grant to improve the corridor still further. The Paseo Corridor initiative was also designated as the recipient of the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Pioneer Award.

### **Law Enforcement Collaboration**

Begun in July 1996, the Law Enforcement Collaboration is a COMBAT-sponsored and chaired group whose original purpose was to enable the principal justice system agencies in Jackson County to deal with hotels that were hotbeds of drug dealing in the Paseo Corridor—a one-issue meeting. However, the participants realized the problem was citywide. They also learned that many of them shared other seemingly intractable problems, such as prostitution. They concluded that, instead of pushing criminal activity back and forth among their respective jurisdictions, they should work together to eliminate the problems for good.

As a result, what began as an ad hoc committee became a permanent committee with subcommittees, all run by the prosecuting attorney office's COMBAT administrator. The current purpose of the collaboration is to "strengthen the communication among law enforcement agencies in order to more effectively leverage resources against common problem areas . . . ." *The collaboration focuses on collaborative, operational strategies for dealing with:*

- open-air drug markets;
- street-level prostitution, and prostitution and drug activity at motels;
- crowd control after 1:00 a.m. outside establishments that serve alcohol;
- drug and gang activity in public and Section 8 housing; and
- community support and improved communications with the community.

The group meets for an hour each month to review progress and eliminate barriers to achieving goals in each of the above areas. In addition to representatives from the Kansas City police department, participants include the assistant prosecuting attorney in charge of the Drug Abatement Response Team (DART), who chairs the meeting; a deputy U.S. Attorney and an assistant city attorney; representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and Drug Enforcement Administration; and staff from the HUD Office of the Inspector General, Missouri Probation and Parole Department, State Liquor Control Board, and the Kansas City municipal court.

Participants typically raise concerns which the group then attempts to resolve.

- At one meeting, several police members reported that hotels and motels in the Paseo Corridor that were renting rooms to prostitutes by the hour were causing

crime and disorder. As a result, the group arranged for DART to raid two of the worst offenders. At the same time, the prosecuting attorney summoned five hotel and motel owners to meet with her to inform them of her powers of civil abatement if they did not change their rental practices. The collaboration then waited to see what changes the owners would make. The Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) monitored the owners' behavior with undercover officers doing buys and the vice unit checking on prostitutes. At the same time, the prosecutor worked with legislators to have stronger statutes enacted against prostitution (see above).

- Drug dealers arrested for trespassing on private property (e.g., housing authority developments) had been routinely given signature bonds, and prostitutes had been normally placed on probation. At meetings of the Law Enforcement Collaboration, the city prosecutor agreed to train his staff to request bond (typically \$100) for these offenders and to ask the judge to sentence prostitutes arrested in the corridor to jail time. Many assistant city prosecutors have implemented these changes. Because the municipal judge is also a member of the collaboration, he agreed to a year-long test of setting bond and providing jail time for prostitutes. When, six months later, the police department presented the group with data suggesting that crime had declined in the corridor by 25 percent, the judge agreed to continue the test for another year.
- It was at a collaboration meeting that representatives from the Kansas City police department and the city prosecutor's office agreed to test a program to have officers write "Paseo Corridor" at the top of every general ordinance summons and uniform traffic ticket they write related to trespassing, narcotics, and prostitution in the corridor in order to bring to the attention of the detention unit and city prosecutors that the related arrest has an impact on the corridor initiative. The sample summonses in exhibit OBJ 5-6 suggest that the officers are carrying out the policy. The participants also agreed not to give signature bonds to these offenders.

### **Community Prosecution**

Community prosecution began in 1991 in Jackson County as a pilot program in eight neighborhoods. Known as the Neighborhood Prosecutor Program, the program later expanded into 12 other communities. The prosecuting attorney assigned an assistant attorney to each geographic area to administer the program. The assistants were responsible for vertically prosecuting all drug cases generated from their assigned neighborhoods. The prosecutor required them to take a proactive approach by attending community meetings and becoming familiar with police officers assigned to their neighborhoods. The arrangement involved collaboration among the prosecutor's office, the Kansas City police department, and neighborhood organizations. The cooperative relationship led to the closing of several drug houses and the demolishing of a multi-unit, HUD-owned apartment building.

Sample Summonses on which Officers Have Identified the Case as Having Originated in the Paseo Corridor

**PASEO CORRIDOR**

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI } ss  
 KANSAS CITY, MUNICIPAL DIVISION }  
 On or About 3-23-1998 In Kansas City, Missouri }  
 At or Near (Location) 1116 PASEO At About (Time) 1830 Last Name MURRAY First EMIKO Middle L INFORMATION NO. **16 125 311**

Address 10004 HARDESTY City and State KANSAS CITY MO Age 21 DOB 1-9-77 State of Birth MO Race B Sex F Hgt 5'4 Wgt 120 Eyes BRN Hair BRN

SSN 492-78-2081 Employer \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Relative Name \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_

DID UNLAWFULLY WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS COMMIT THE FOLLOWING OFFENSE:  
Intentionally inflict bodily injury upon P.O. Stephanie Helenek #4054 R-#172, by kicking her several times with her feet in the face and head, causing soreness & redness to her right ear.

In Violation of the Code of General Ordinances of Kansas City, Missouri Chapter 50 Section 169 Penalty Chapter \_\_\_\_\_ Section \_\_\_\_\_  
 Above Complaint Is True As I Verily Believe

COMPLAINANT: P.O. Helenek 4054 OFFICER: P.O. [Signature] Serial No. 4407 Unit CPD Pac. Area 121

Case Report Number 98-630469 Date, Time & Location Of Arrest If Other Than Above: \_\_\_\_\_ Assistant City Counselor Filed \_\_\_\_\_  
 Companion Case Name: 16125 309 Searched By \_\_\_\_\_

Bond No.	Bond Amount	Property No.	Court Date	Time	Place	Room	Without Admitting Guilt, I Promise to Appear At the Time Indicated Hereon	Searched By
	<u>500</u>	<u>80195</u>	<u>6-1-1998</u>	<u>9:00A</u>	<u>1101 Locust Street</u>	<u>A</u>		

Defendant's Signature \_\_\_\_\_

16125311

**PASEO CORRIDOR**

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI } ss  
 KANSAS CITY, MUNICIPAL DIVISION }  
 On or About 03-23-1998 In Kansas City, Missouri }  
 At or Near (Location) 1116 PASEO At About (Time) 1830 Last Name MURRAY First EMIKO Middle L INFORMATION NO. **16 125 312**

Address 10004 HARDESTY City and State KANSAS CITY MO Age 21 DOB 01-09-77 State of Birth MO Race B Sex F Hgt 5'4 Wgt 120 Eyes BR Hair BR

SSN 492-78-2081 Employer \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Relative Name \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_

DID UNLAWFULLY WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS COMMIT THE FOLLOWING OFFENSE:  
DID INTERFERE WITH A KANSAS CITY MAST PARAMEDIC IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES TO WIT: SHOVED HIS ARMS AWAY FROM A PATIENT IN NEED OF MEDICAL TREATMENT AND YELLING AT HIM "LEAVE HIM ALONE"

In Violation of the Code of General Ordinances of Kansas City, Missouri Chapter 50 Section 446A Penalty Chapter \_\_\_\_\_ Section \_\_\_\_\_  
 Above Complaint Is True As I Verily Believe

COMPLAINANT: \_\_\_\_\_ OFFICER: P.O. [Signature] Serial No. 4407 Unit CPD Pac. Area 121

Case Report Number 98-630469 Date, Time & Location Of Arrest If Other Than Above: \_\_\_\_\_ Assistant City Counselor Filed \_\_\_\_\_  
 Companion Case Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Searched By \_\_\_\_\_

Bond No.	Bond Amount	Property No.	Court Date	Time	Place	Room	Without Admitting Guilt, I Promise to Appear At the Time Indicated Hereon	Searched By
	<u>500</u>	<u>80195</u>	<u>06-01-98</u>	<u>9A</u>	<u>1101 Locust Street</u>	<u>A</u>		

Defendant's Signature \_\_\_\_\_

16125312

**PASEO CORRIDOR**

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI } ss  
 KANSAS CITY, MUNICIPAL DIVISION }  
 On or About 03-23-98 In Kansas City, Missouri }  
 At or Near (Location) 1116 PASEO At About (Time) 1830 Last Name MURRAY First EMIKO Middle L INFORMATION NO. **16 125 309**

Address 1116 PASEO City and State KCMO Age 21 DOB 01-09-77 State of Birth MO Race B Sex F Hgt 5'4 Wgt 120 Eyes BR Hair BR

SSN 492782081 Employer \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_ Relative Name \_\_\_\_\_ Address \_\_\_\_\_

DID UNLAWFULLY WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS COMMIT THE FOLLOWING OFFENSE:  
INTENTIONALLY INFLECT BODILY INJURY UPON DAVE HESTER 6740 EASTWOOD, KANSAS CITY, MO. BY KICKING HIM IN THE LEFT LEG CAUSING SORENESS

1612



In late 1997, the prosecuting attorney reorganized the program to form a COMBAT Neighborhood Justice Team consisting of a chief assistant prosecutor, four Neighborhood Justice Prosecutors, the Drug Abatement Response Team (DART), a child protection liaison, a truancy program coordinator, and COMBAT's chief of planning and development, Kristin Rosselli. *One Neighborhood Justice Prosecutor is assigned full time to each of the police department's four patrol divisions with offices at their respective patrol divisions.* One prosecutor is assigned to the Eastern Jackson County police departments. While the assistants continue as in the past to work with police and community groups, they no longer maintain a caseload that would prevent them from working full time with police and the community.

In addition to the five neighborhood prosecutors paid for by COMBAT (\$208,624 in 1998), the Neighborhood Justice Team includes specialists, as noted above, who develop multidisciplinary strategies with the community to meet the specific needs of the neighborhoods that need the most help. For example, the child specialist interacts with children's services, schools, family services and the Missouri Department of Social Services. With the exception of the child specialist, the team is funded totally by COMBAT.

The community prosecution effort has encountered obstacles. One impediment is that, while property crimes are handled by local police officers in each of four city patrol divisions, a centralized detective unit handles all violent crimes. As a result, there is no one police contact person for neighbors or assistant prosecutors. Another obstacle is that some prosecutors "still worship at the altar of trials," according to Claire McCaskill. "They hold the same 'lock-'em-up' orientation as do many police officers," whereas, with community prosecution, assistants need to adopt the cooperative problem-solving approach that community-oriented policing entails—including making use of noncriminal remedies. Moreover, as in most prosecutor offices across the country, assistants hope to "go to trial" on as many serious felony cases as possible to gain valuable courtroom experience and advance their careers. As a result, McCaskill offered assistant prosecutors who would volunteer as Neighborhood Justice Prosecutors a salary increase, and she allows them to continue to prosecute three or four high profile cases a year of their choice from their jurisdictions. (The result was competition among assistants for the positions.)

### **Collaborative Initiatives Treated under Other Objectives in this Chapter**

Exhibit OBJ5-1 above identifies other collaborative efforts that COMBAT initiated or supported. Chapter 3, COMBAT Synopsis and History, also discusses the role of the COMBAT Commission, which represents collaboration among the private sector, law enforcement, and prosecution. The collaborative nature of Drug Court, a COMBAT component treated in detail under Objective 2, Treatment, requires special explanation.

*Drug Court is in some respects the most significant example of COMBAT collaboration.*

The very nature of Drug Court—like that of other drug courts across the country<sup>4</sup>—embodies close collaboration. At a minimum, any drug court needs the cooperation of (1) the prosecutor to divert cases from the regular criminal justice system process, (2) providers to treat the deferred defendants, and (3) the court to require treatment as condition of not being prosecuted—and to revoke the deferred status of defendants who fail to cooperate with treatment. However, collaboration extends much more broadly and deeply than this in the Jackson County Drug Court:

- Before each Drug Court session, the judge, COMBAT prosecutor, defense attorney, and one or more diversion managers meet to discuss each participant's status in a collegial manner focused on rehabilitating the participant until it is clear the person needs to be returned to criminal processing.
- County Court Services, which assesses participants and runs the Day Report Center, is an outpatient treatment program available exclusively for Drug Court participants. The program is a part of Drug Court, not an outside provider to which participants are referred for treatment.
- Each Drug Court participant is supervised by a team that includes diversion managers, client advocates (for some participants), and counselors.
- A counselor, diversion manager, and assistant prosecutor discuss each participant's case before recommending whether the judge should sanction a client for noncompliance.
- The COMBAT Commission's contracts with treatment providers require them to serve Drug Court participants.

Because it has these distinctive collaborative elements, Drug Court set the stage for many other COMBAT collaborative initiatives. The fathering project, for example, is explicitly patterned after Drug Court (see Objective 4, Innovation), as is a planned Family Drug Court (see chapter 7, Conclusion).

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<sup>4</sup> National Association of Drug Court Professionals, *Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997.

## **COMBAT Promoted Collaboration between Traditionally Hostile Groups**

COMBAT staff made special efforts to improve communication and promote active collaboration between two sets of groups with a long history of mutual conflict in many jurisdictions: between treatment providers and the criminal justice system, and between police and prosecutors. COMBAT's linking the treatment community with law enforcement, the courts, and corrections is perhaps its single most significant achievement in terms of promoting collaboration.

### **Communication between the Treatment Community and the Criminal Justice System**

The treatment community has typically viewed the criminal justice system as being too punitive and also insensitive to the needs of substance abusers. Many providers feel that, by failing to address the underlying problems that lead to substance abuse, police officers, prosecutors, and judges perpetuate a revolving door through which drug users are arrested again and again. By contrast, the criminal justice system has traditionally regarded treatment providers as wanting to give drug offenders an easy way out—no punishment for breaking the law. Police, prosecutors, and probation officers have also often felt that treatment does not work—or works at best for a tiny proportion of drug users.

*COMBAT adopted a variety of measures to break down barriers to collaboration between the treatment community and the criminal justice system* so that each group would see the other as an ally in the struggle against substance abuse in Jackson County. The approach was to avoid challenging officers with the observation that enforcement does not reduce substance abuse and refrain from confronting treatment providers with the finding that most clients relapse. For example, COMBAT staff spent 90 minutes every Wednesday for five months conducting interagency cross-training between the probation officers (called “diversion managers”) who would be supervising Drug Court participants and County Court Services treatment providers. The training focused on helping providers to understand the Drug Court concept, which required much more accountability and reporting than they were used to (see Objective 2, Treatment). In the past, court oversight for court-ordered treatment had simply involved telling defendants to “get treatment and come back clean.” Drug Court, however, requires providers to be an active partner with the criminal justice system in the patient’s ongoing assessment and supervision, including being present in courtroom and providing daily reports of urine test results and attendance. Diversion managers helped treatment professionals to understand that treatment services for Drug Court referrals would not be voluntary.

Treatment providers funded by the COMBAT Commission on their own organized a monthly meeting—called the Treatment Coalition—to share information and ask commission staff questions about their contractual obligations (see below). COMBAT asked Family Court staff

to attend Treatment Coalition meetings. According to a Family Court participant, the result has been that court treatment referral staff now know which providers have slots, how to pay for treatment, how to transport clients to providers, and other information for linking juvenile offenders with treatment. Family Court staff also learn about new treatment approaches and providers they can offer their clients' families.

The COMBAT Commission includes as ex officio but active members the police chief who heads the board of directors of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force and the deputy chief of the Kansas City police department. The commission provides a unique and important forum for involving the two law enforcement agencies in helping to achieve COMBAT's treatment goals. By including them, COMBAT exposes these individuals to detailed information about treatment concepts and perspectives expressed by the voting board members, commission staff, and invited treatment providers. The chiefs also can observe the efforts of the commission to improve accountability and success rates among treatment providers, which makes clear that COMBAT is aware of treatment's deficiencies and is working earnestly to correct them. At the same time, the chiefs have the opportunity to share their criminal justice perspectives and concerns with commission members and treatment providers.

COMBAT uses Drug Court to demonstrate to law enforcement that the program is committed to improving treatment's accountability (requiring providers to provide the commissioner with client progress reports) and effectiveness (sharing information about urinalysis test results and the number of graduates). To the extent that data can show that Drug Court reduces recidivism, COMBAT will be able to show law enforcement that some arrestees can recover through treatment—that treatment can reduce the revolving door. In addition, COMBAT administrators were careful to work with law enforcement in designing Drug Court by including two law enforcement representatives on the court's planning committee. For example, one in a three-and-one-half hour meeting, representatives of the Kansas City police department selected the criteria for accepting arrestees into Drug Court. As a result, the police departments were comfortable with the types of individuals who would be offered treatment instead of prosecution.

Sharing viewpoints and information is not the only—and perhaps not the most important—function of getting people from different disciplines together. According to James Nunnally, "It's not the exchange of ideas alone [that promotes active collaboration], it's that the participants get to know each other." Echoing this observation, a police administrator reported that "COMBAT facilitated and provided structure and incentives to develop personal relationships."

## Testimonials to COMBAT's Promoting Collaboration between the Treatment Community and the Criminal Justice System

Several COMBAT participants offered testimonials to COMBAT's success in reducing barriers to collaboration between treatment and law enforcement.

- "Cops' attitudes changed toward treatment—they [now] understand you can't arrest your way out of the problem; they know you can't keep people from using drugs."  
— police administrator
- "COMBAT has helped to develop and legitimize in-house treatment for juveniles within the court, jail, probation office, and community. Family Court staff now see treatment as a viable alternative to locking up some juvenile offenders—they see treatment as a stronger option." — Family Court administrator
- "Probation and Parole's goal is to keep guys out of jail and under the least restrictive supervision, so probation officers have no desire to lock them up. But [the] Probation and Parole [Department] got religion on treatment as a result of COMBAT—any type [of treatment] which will help client stay out of court and jail." — diversion manager
- "Cops and prosecutors were originally hostile to treatment for offenders—prosecute and lock them up was what they wanted. With COMBAT, they've changed their minds."  
— assistant prosecuting attorney
- "COMBAT brings treatment providers and law enforcement together. They didn't understand each other. COMBAT bridged the gap. By getting them to talk, they could see how each could enhance the other—document that some users can be saved and, if you don't [save them], they become dealers. But you need to lock up dealers. Treatment convinced law enforcement to let them treat appropriate ones."  
— Community Action Network (CAN) member

Participants and observers offered examples of concrete activities that appear to document changed attitudes:

- A Drug Court judge went to the county legislature asking for more treatment money—something previously unheard of in the county.
- Jackson County treatment providers asked Michael Shanahan, the executive director of the Eastern Jackson County Task Force, to give their clients a presentation on criminal processing of drug offenders as a scare tactic. "I was surprised they called," Shanahan said, "because treatment people don't like cops."

- The major regional hospital in Eastern Jackson County agreed to the Drug Task Force director's request to test emergency department admissions for methamphetamine and to provide him with demographic information about individuals who test positive. The director hopes that the information will be useful in knowing where to look for future targets.
- The Prosecutor's Office met with the mayor of Kansas City and the Kansas City police chief to suggest that the city allocate \$500,000 of its 1996-97 \$2.6 million Federal law enforcement block grant funds to support alternative schools. McCaskill offered to provide matching funds (\$111,111) for the \$500,000 she was requesting in block grant monies for Drug Court if everyone agreed to allocate another \$500,000 of the block grant amount for juvenile crime prevention programming.

### **Collaboration between Police and Prosecutors**

Law enforcement officers have traditionally felt that many prosecutors give up too easily on defendants, either by dropping cases or by agreeing to plea bargains that result in light sentences. Some officers also feel that prosecutors sometimes ask for too much evidence before agreeing to prosecute or unnecessarily reject evidence because it appears to be tainted. Some police find prosecutors to be inaccessible. By contrast, prosecutors often feel that officers fail to provide sufficient legally obtained evidence for them to win the case.<sup>5</sup>

***COMBAT initiated or supported a range of activities designed to break down barriers to collaboration between these two groups***, including the Law Enforcement Collaboration (see above), Strategic Planning Committee (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration), DART (see Objective 1, Jail), Community Action Networks (CANs—see Objective 4, Innovation), and the community prosecution initiative (see above).

Participants offered specific examples of improved cooperation between law enforcement and the prosecutor's office:

- "Prosecutors have to be flexible enough to file important weak cases. David Baker [the prosecuting attorney office's Anti-Drug Unit chief] filed three of these cases that I brought to him after I explained the importance of the cases to other things we were doing." — police administrator

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, William F. McDonald, *Police-Prosecutor Relations in the United States: Executive Summary*, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1982.

## Testimonials to COMBAT's Promoting Improved Relations between Police and Prosecutors

Several participants and observers attested to COMBAT's success in improving relations between police and prosecutors.

- According to a police administrator, "Our relationship with prosecutors has improved greatly in the last 1-2 years. We can call them 24 hours a day—one is always available all night and on weekends."
- According to the former head of the Street Narcotics Unit (SNU), "Before, Dave Baker [chief prosecutor of the Anti-Drug Unit] was just a prosecutor; we weren't even on a first name basis—[we were just] two business partners. Then my boss told me to go meet him when I took this job [directing SNU] six months ago because, he said, 'you need to work with him.' Baker comes out here if it's an unusual operation—like a reverse sting—so SNU can talk in advance about the operation to make sure police officers are doing it right. It's a very relaxed atmosphere [now] whenever SNU goes over there [to the prosecutor's office]."
- According to a police manager, "COMBAT has helped change prosecutor/police attitudes: [as a result of COMBAT], we train together, problem solve together, and plan together."

- According to a police administrator, "We (SNU) were asked to look into some crack houses and open air sales on 27th and Benton because a month ago a cop who had shot a dealer received some death threats. A police officer was then fired on three weeks ago. We were already prepared before this second incident to serve search warrants a week later, but I was asked at a 10:00 a.m. meeting what I could do *today* to get these dealers off the streets before one of us got killed. I had five warrants ready to serve, but they weren't signed. Claire [McCaskill] was part of the meeting, and she said to me, 'What do you need?' When I walked over all the warrants to two prosecutors, she had already told them I was coming; they reviewed the warrants immediately, and I took them right over for the judge to sign. So by 1:00 that afternoon we had 113 people serve the warrants and made four arrests. This would never have gone off that afternoon without Claire's greasing the skids."
- "We [police officers] now work together early on cases with assistant prosecutors to help each other out to make good cases," another administrator said. "Each Narcotics and Vice function has its own assigned attorney: the gang unit, SNU, and DEU. With close collaboration, prosecutors help detectives to understand the law, so the officers build a better case; when officers help prosecutors to understand police process, the attorneys file better cases."

- A police officer member of a CAN arrested two men carrying crack and a gun. The assistant prosecuting attorney on the CAN who handled the case said the police report was not well written—it failed to show that there was initial probable cause to look under the car’s hood. According to the officer, “because I learned what my mistake was, I won’t make the same error the next time around. I could have justified prosecution if I had written my report better. In the past, I would never have heard anything about the case, so I would have made the same mistake again. This time I did [hear about it], because the assistant prosecutor is a member of the CAN.”
- During lunch together, Michael Shanahan asked Claire McCaskill to draft a conspiracy statute to submit to the State legislature. McCaskill assigned an assistant prosecutor to draft it and she arranged for a legislator to submit it. As of April 1998, the senate had already passed the legislation. (The county had only an “acting under” statute that allowed charging only the actual methamphetamine manufacturer, whereas a conspiracy statute would make it possible to charge everyone involved in the manufacturing process.)

According to some COMBAT participants, the Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) was the starting point of increased law enforcement-prosecutor collaboration under COMBAT. Although DART is coordinated by the prosecutor’s office, its strategies require close collaboration with the police, city code inspectors, and neighborhood groups. The approach gives police officers a special incentive to give DART cases priority because ignoring them will result in loss of COMBAT funding that pays for the officers’ overtime work on DART cases.

Finally, although relations between police officers and judges are not typically hostile, the two groups do not normally consult on ways to reduce recidivism. However, as noted above, a judge who is a member of COMBAT’s Strategic Planning Committee agreed to set bond and provide jail time for prostitutes arrested in the Paseo Corridor. Claire McCaskill assigned an attorney to the Independence prosecutor’s office in Eastern Jackson County who refuses to plea bargain with methamphetamine manufacturers and traffickers unless they plead to the original charge. However, the attorney’s strictness is effective because Michael Shanahan met with the judge in the Independence Circuit Court to explain the seriousness of the methamphetamine problem and to ask him to give jail time to convicted methamphetamine manufacturers and traffickers. Shanahan also invited the chief judge to a task force board meeting to discuss the revolving door problem. As a result, the prosecutor gets convictions on the original felony charges and the judge tells offenders that, if he sees them a second time, he will sentence them to prison. The judge has already sentenced several offenders to 10 to 12 years without parole.



## COMBAT Increased Communication in Other Respects

*Several COMBAT initiatives increased communication and, in some cases, collaboration among Federal, State, and local agencies.* Indeed, at one of its retreats, COMBAT staff specifically discussed making a concerted effort to develop partnerships with State agencies. Increased intergovernmental collaboration occurred most prominently between the regional U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) office and other groups through the Paseo Corridor initiative and landlord initiatives, and with local and State code inspectors through DART and the CANs.

*COMBAT also promoted increased communication and collaboration within three “communities.”*

- *Within the treatment community.* The COMBAT Commission’s Request for Proposals (RFP) to detoxification providers requires them to connect formally with other COMBAT-funded treatment providers, asking for a description of “What ongoing steps the contractor will take to inform other COMBAT treatment agencies about your services and how they can be accessed” and “What procedures will be implemented to assure the client has access to and receives the next level of treatment services, i.e., explain the referral and access assurance process.” In addition, as noted above, COMBAT-funded treatment providers on their own organized a monthly Treatment Coalition meeting to share information. Although formed originally at the providers’ initiative, COMBAT Commission RFPs now require contracted providers to participate. While a provider staff member chairs the meetings, the commission executive director or treatment provider monitor attends every meeting to raise concerns and answer questions providers may have about their contractual obligations. (See the box “A Treatment Coalition Meeting.”) The COMBAT Commission also requires contracted treatment providers to send staff to participate in a minimum of ten hours per year of COMBAT-sponsored or co-sponsored continuing education and training programs. COMBAT pays for the Comprehensive Mental Health Center to set aside space in its regular course offerings for the providers’ staff. In 1994, the Missouri Department of Corrections sent the prosecuting attorney a letter commending Jackson County for its efforts to unify the area’s treatment providers.
- *Within the prevention community.* The COMBAT Commission requires prevention providers to meet quarterly to share progress and express concerns. The commission has arranged for one provider to offer training to other providers and schools on the cultural issues of Native Americans.

- *Within the law enforcement community.* The Kansas City police department's Narcotics and Vice Unit line staff communicate regularly with the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force officers so that undercover officers do not shoot each other and so that the city police department's tactical squads can prepare and execute search warrants in the city for the Drug Task Force. The Drug Task Force itself represents the collaboration of 13 law enforcement agencies in Eastern Jackson County (see Objective 1, Jail).

Finally, through the Paseo Corridor initiative, the CANs, and the community prosecution program, COMBAT has brought community groups and law enforcement agencies together in ways that have resulted in increased cooperation, mutual respect, and trust.

### **A Treatment Coalition Meeting**

COMBAT-funded treatment providers on their own organized a monthly meeting to share information. Staff from 15 different providers attended the two-hour March 1998 meeting. One member asked the COMBAT Commission staff member attending what kinds of client information the commission wanted on disk as part of the monthly progress reports. A representative from Project NeighborHOOD, a citywide crime prevention community-based organization, gave a presentation about his program and set a time for members to visit him and his staff in order to improve referrals to and from providers and his organization. Members then engaged in a discussion expressing concerns about confidentiality in releasing patient information to the commission that resulted in the formation of a subcommittee to examine the problem further.

## **COMBAT Was Responsible for Much of the Increased Communication and Collaboration**

The December 1993 report of the Special Advisory Panel to the County Legislature's Anti-Drug Committee (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration) observed that "the agencies funded by the Drug Tax do not talk or listen to each other enough." The panel recommended the formation of a community action coalition composed of representatives of the schools, workplaces, media, neighborhoods, churches, political leaders, law enforcement, prosecutors, and treatment providers. COMBAT did not establish such a group, but it did play a significant role in increasing communication and collaboration among these and other groups.

### **COMBAT's Role in Promoting Collaboration**

While collaboration might have increased in some areas without COMBAT, *COMBAT was responsible for a variety of initiatives which brought different organizations together and created the opportunity for dialogue and joint action among them.*

The collaborative groups represented by the Law Enforcement Collaboration, the Strategic Planning Committee, the Treatment Coalition, and the COMBAT Commission would not have assembled on their own. Furthermore, these bodies did not simply improve communication among participants; in every case they also engaged in concrete joint activities. COMBAT can take sole responsibility for initiating the Paseo Corridor Partnership and keeping it active. On the basis of the partnership's collaboration with the local HUD office, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development chose COMBAT as a "Best Practice Organization in the Neighborhood Transformation category" to be considered by the Secretary as a Departmental Best Practice. Indeed, Kansas City was successful in obtaining a \$250,000 Safe Neighborhood Grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development because of the partnership's initiatives, according to information HUD officials conveyed to Kristin Rosselli.

While Drug Court is perhaps the most significant collaborative undertaking COMBAT initiated and continues to fund and coordinate, it is likely that Jackson County would have established a drug court without COMBAT. Hundreds of other jurisdictions have established drug courts without an Anti-Drug Sales Tax. However, it is likely that several collaborative *features* of COMBAT's Drug Court would not have been developed without the impetus of COMBAT staff to initiate and coordinate them and COMBAT funds to pay for them—notably, the Day Report Center and the on-site support services at the center. Several other discrete COMBAT-supported initiatives that involve collaboration, including the truancy prevention, fathering, child advocate, alternative schools, and safe summer programs, and the landlord/property owner activities, would not have been developed without leadership or funding from COMBAT.

According to a police administrator, COMBAT police-prosecutor collaboration improved "because the program provided the funds to hire the additional attorneys [for the Anti-Drug Unit and the Neighborhood Justice Unit] and detectives [for SNU and DEU] who had the time to spend time with each other." By providing significant funding, COMBAT expanded substantially the scope of collaboration involved in still other initiatives, including the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force and D.A.R.E., which were established before COMBAT. The Drug Task Force in particular would have operated at a significantly reduced level of effort without COMBAT funding, while local communities might not have picked up the funding for D.A.R.E. that COMBAT took over after Federal funding was discontinued (see Objective 3, Prevention).

Much of the increased collaboration that COMBAT generated occurred because the program funded activities involving two or more entities that were *already* interested in working together but lacked the money to do so. However, ***COMBAT money also motivated previously indifferent or hostile groups to work together because they were required to collaborate in order to qualify for funding.*** Both prosecuting attorneys involved with COMBAT agreed that much of the collaboration that occurred took place because there was

money at stake. One said, “Until there’s a reason [for police and prosecution] to collaborate, they won’t. If money depends on collaboration, they will.” The other pointed to DART as a specific example of how both parties continue to collaborate because, if they do not work together effectively, the money for officers’ overtime would be cut off. The Kansas City police department may not have collaborated as willingly and extensively without the money COMBAT also gave to SNU, DEU, and D.A.R.E. Prevention and treatment providers, too, have been required to collaborate in order to secure and maintain their COMBAT funding, even if the collaboration they have actually engaged in to date has been modest (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration).

Claire McCaskill argues that a lot can be done without sales tax money.

The money has *forced* collaboration, but you can get collaboration without money—promote community-based task forces or get the agencies that are providing money *now* to force agencies to work together. Also, collaboration can grow up around drug courts, so drug court money [in other jurisdictions] can replicate the collaboration that’s being done here with COMBAT money. The exercise involved in planning a drug court is similar to the big COMBAT effort. In terms of collaboration within each constituency, a lot of government money is being spent on multi-jurisdictional drug task forces [e.g., Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance grants] that bring together smaller police departments into one unit; this could be done in rural areas in treatment and prevention with the same task force concept.

Collaboration involving the Kansas City police department appears to have benefitted from the serendipitous and simultaneous commitment by department administrators to the concept of community policing. Because police administrators were committed to infusing community policing more widely within the agency, they were already motivated to participate in such COMBAT-generated initiatives as the CANs, community prosecution, and the Paseo Corridor Partnership. As one police participant said, “Half the credit goes to COMBAT [for the Paseo Corridor Partnership] and half to the police department’s commitment to community policing: both were needed.”

Attributing the increased collaboration in Jackson County to COMBAT also needs to be tempered by the considerable increase in criminal justice system collaboration nationwide—like community policing—during the time period in which COMBAT has operated. U.S. Department of Justice Byrne monies have funded numerous law enforcement collaborative efforts across the country targeting substance abuse and violent crime. Many other forms of collaboration targeting criminal activities have also been increasing across the country, such as:

- joint activities by police, prosecutors, citizen groups, and prevention and treatment organizations as part of the Federal Government's Weed and Seed Program to eliminate crime related to substance abuse and drug dealing;<sup>6</sup>
- cooperative efforts among a wide range of criminal justice and social welfare agencies to attack substance abuse;<sup>7</sup>
- the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's communitywide Fighting Back initiatives;<sup>8</sup>
- numerous partnerships between police and communities targeting juvenile delinquency;<sup>9</sup>
- local housing authorities working with police agencies to evict drug dealers from publicly-funded housing;<sup>10</sup>
- agreements between police departments and mental health agencies to handle mentally ill misdemeanor offenders and the homeless;<sup>11</sup> and
- partnerships between law enforcement agencies and probation departments to improve enforcement against probationers.<sup>12</sup>

***Given this collaborative ferment across the country in the 1990s, it is likely that collaboration would have increased in Jackson County without COMBAT. However,***

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- 6 Terence Dunworth et al., "National Evaluation of Weed and Seed," preliminary report by Abt Associates Inc. to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, March 1998.
- 7 Jan Chaiken, Marcia Chaiken, and Clifford Karchmer. *Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement Strategies: Reducing Supply and Demand*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., December 1990.
- 8 Paul S. Jellinek and Ruby P. Hearn. "Fighting Drug Abuse at the Local Level," *Issues in Science and Technology*, 7(4): 78-84.
- 9 Marcia R. Chaiken. *Kids, COPS, and Communities*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.: June 1998.
- 10 See, for example, Peter Finn, *The Manhattan District Attorney's Narcotics Eviction Program*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., May 1995.
- 11 Peter Finn and Monique Sullivan, *Police Response to Special Populations*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., October 1987.
- 12 Dale Parent and Brad Snyder, *Police-Corrections Partnerships*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., forthcoming.

***COMBAT still deserves much of the credit for the local increase.*** First, it is unlikely that the collaboration would have been as widespread or close without COMBAT. Second, some types of collaboration COMBAT generated do not appear to be occurring as intensely in other parts of the country, in particular collaboration among law enforcement, community groups, and schools (except for D.A.R.E. and youth courts), and collaboration within the treatment community. Third, collaborative efforts of the scope of the Paseo Corridor Initiative, Law Enforcement Collaboration, Strategic Planning Committee, and training seminars for landlords, property owners, maintenance workers, janitors, and repair people do not appear to have counterparts in most, if any, other jurisdictions. Finally, as noted above, without the incentive of receiving COMBAT funding, it is unlikely that some of the participants in these and other cooperative ventures would have agreed to join together in a collaborative manner.

### **Obstacles to Further Collaboration**

Generating cooperation in Jackson County was not always easy. Police administrators initially had misgivings about Drug Court because they were uncomfortable with the idea of arresting offenders who would end up receiving no punishment. Dennis Agniel, Regional Administrator, Northwest Missouri, Department of Corrections, Board of Probation and Parole, explained that initially he was not in favor of establishing a Drug Court in Jackson County. On an operational level, it cost him four staff members. He had also had no experience with pretrial diversion programs prior to the initiation of Drug Court. However, like many members of law enforcement who were initially opposed to the idea, he is now a strong proponent of the court. Circuit Court administrators were reluctant to sign on to Drug Court in part because they were uncertain about what the court would be doing and in part because they were reluctant to accept the idea of the prosecuting attorney's office running a program in the name of the Circuit Court. The logjam was broken when a judge nearing retirement went with Jim Nunnally to visit two drug courts in California and, impressed by what he saw, promoted the concept among his colleagues.

There were other barriers to collaboration. For example, in the Paseo Corridor initiative the city judge was initially not receptive to setting a cash bond and providing jail time for Paseo Corridor prostitutes and trespassers; some police officers in the Paseo had to be transferred because they opposed doing community policing; some city officials resented the fact that they did not receive COMBAT funding yet were being asked to participate in addressing the substance abuse problem; and special effort was required to work with the city fire marshal to enforce code violations. The D.A.R.E program could become a source of conflict between law enforcement and other COMBAT components (see the box).

Collaboration has been slowest to take hold either between individual treatment and prevention providers and between the treatment community and the criminal justice system. Telephone interviews conducted for Abt Associates by two Kauffman Foundation interns in

1997 with a sample of 16 prevention providers and 7 treatment providers identified few meaningful examples of these types of collaboration. A review of selected providers' proposals and progress reports found a similar lack of genuine collaboration. Even though COMBAT Commission RFPs require collaboration (see the box "COMBAT Commission RFPs Have Increasingly Required Collaboration"), according to one participant, "for the first few years, providers balked. Now, they collaborate because they know how to and because there is more competition for funds."

### **D.A.R.E.: A Possible Source of Future Conflict**

There may be conflict in the future between law enforcement and the COMBAT Commission, the prosecuting attorney's COMBAT staff, or both, over the D.A.R.E. program. As noted in Objective 3, Prevention, national evaluations have documented that D.A.R.E. does not reduce substance abuse among students. A number of cities, including Oakland, Omaha, and Spokane, have already discontinued their D.A.R.E. programs. At the same time, however, police officials in Jackson County, like their counterparts in many other parts of the country, are pleased at the way the program improves law enforcement's image among children.

As of 1997, the prosecuting attorney supported continued COMBAT funding for D.A.R.E. However, in time, she, her successor, or the COMBAT Commission may decide the money could be put to better use. At that time, collaboration between law enforcement, the prosecutor's office, and the prevention community could be tested. However, an alternative is to think in terms of whether it is possible to build on D.A.R.E.'s popularity to develop an effective prevention program. "The question is, where do we go with D.A.R.E., not do we eliminate it," one participant said. Perhaps reflecting this view, another COMBAT participant—in keeping with the opinion of D.A.R.E. America, which provides assistance to D.A.R.E. programs nationwide—felt that the reason D.A.R.E. has not demonstrated long-term behavioral effects is that it exposes students to its messages in only one grade. If it reinforced its messages throughout a student's schooling, it might show some impact. One course of action might therefore be to extend D.A.R.E. into other grade levels.

Collaborative endeavors, especially those that require a heavy investment of time and energy from participants, run the risk of petering out. For example, some members of the Paseo Corridor Partnership are concerned that the group could disband or become moribund. After an initial burst of interest, some residents have not had the time to maintain their initially high level of involvement. In addition, as the partnership achieves some success, there may be a tendency to feel that the Corridor's problems have been solved. However, it appears that the \$250,000 HUD Safe Neighborhood Grant awarded to the city in 1998 may serve to sustain interest and activity in the partnership. The grant will be used primarily for education—training property owners and managers in methamphetamine lab detection; offering a citizen police academy; hosting two conferences on how residents can organize themselves; and supporting other prevention activities. Even without the grant, the city is



likely to retain a vital interest in maintaining the improvements in the corridor. The city is interested in revitalizing the city's 1930s jazz district that borders the Paseo Corridor but will be unable to do so unless the corridor is cleaned up to avoid discouraging patrons. Finally, if the partnership's initiatives—and all of COMBAT's other collaborative ventures—come to be seen as the normal way of doing business—like Social Security or Head Start—they will take on a life of their own and become institutionalized.

### **COMBAT Commission RFPs Have Increasingly Required Collaboration among Prevention Providers**

Prevention and treatment RFPs have more and more explicitly required collaboration among contracted providers.

- Whereas the 1991 prevention RFP referred to the need for mobilizing residents to take action “in cooperation with local police and other appropriate agencies” and “coordinate the activities of multiple organizations,” the 1992 RFP indicated that COMBAT's system design functions under the “philosophy of networking and collaboration” and noted that “strong consideration [in awarding contracts] will be given to those organizations demonstrating cooperation between agencies.”
- The 1994 RFP became even more restrictive: “Acceptable activities include such efforts as coordination of activities with two (2) of the eight (8) COMBAT initiatives and with one (1) project particularly with a law enforcement agency . . . .”
- The 1995 RFP twice refers to the need for “*formalized* linkages with treatment and law enforcement” (emphasis added), with the second reference in the context of single agency continuation programs “must include . . . [f]ormalized linkage with treatment, law enforcement and other selected entities” as well as the statement that “COMBAT is seeking proposals which incorporate coordinated prevention efforts . . . .” and “Proposals which address multiple problems . . . through the use of collaboration . . . will be given preference.” Starting with the 1995 RFP, “Commitment to collaboration and key elements” is an explicit award criterion worth 25 points (20 in 1996 and 15 in 1997) (out of 100).
- The 1997 RFP contains language that “Formalized linkages with COMBAT treatment, law enforcement, and community organizations that address these [risk] factors are a fundamental requirement for those organizations seeking funding.” As one commission member said, “The RFP this year [1997] requires collaboration, but [this time] we're asking for more than just an attachment of three or four agencies' names; we're looking for real collaboration in the proposals.”

What did all this collaboration accomplish in Jackson County—that is, did it make a difference in terms of furthering COMBAT's mission to increase jail time for dangerous offenders, provide increased treatment opportunities, and reduce experimentation with drugs?



The discussions under Objectives 1, 2, and 3 suggest that COMBAT at least partially achieved these goals. Collaboration contributed to these achievements. Jailing more dangerous offenders required collaboration in order to occur—police, prosecutors, probation officers, and judges must work together in order to jail drug traffickers and manufacturers. With regard to treatment, it was collaboration (e.g., Drug Court, Deputy Juvenile Officers) that in large part was responsible for increasing the number of substance abusers referred to treatment. While it is impossible to determine whether COMBAT prevented experimentation, it is clear that several COMBAT-supported prevention initiatives rely on collaboration to succeed, including the alternative schools program, school-based Deputy Juvenile Officers (DJO) program, and the truancy program. In sum, it appears that *the increased collaboration which COMBAT generated made an important contribution to COMBAT's efforts to achieve of all three of its objectives.*

## Objective 6

# Did COMBAT Promote Economic Development Activities?

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **Economic development—the creation of new jobs—has not been a significant COMBAT goal.**
- **COMBAT initiatives have not created many new jobs.**
- The Paseo Corridor Partnership's efforts to make the neighborhood safer and less disorderly appear to have encouraged several groups to open enterprises in or near the corridor, including a nursing facility, a Postal Service distribution center, a recycling plant, and eight other private businesses. These enterprises have already provided, or are likely to provide, modest employment opportunities for some Paseo Corridor residents.
- The increase in job opportunities anticipated in the Paseo Corridor would not have occurred without COMBAT's contribution to making the area safer and less disorderly.

#### Data Sources

- interviews with COMBAT participants and observers
- rides through the Paseo corridor

For the purpose of this evaluation, economic development includes activities that lead to the creation of new jobs, from business expansion to increases in public sector hiring. *COMBAT generated very modest economic development.*<sup>1</sup> This finding needs to be tempered with the

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<sup>1</sup> COMBAT itself has provided employment for about 100 people, including over 25 assistant prosecutors, over 35 police officers, and unknown number of prevention specialists and treatment counselors. However, many of these individuals were already employed, some do not live in Jackson County, and many are likely to have found comparable employment elsewhere absent COMBAT.

observation that economic development has never been a significant COMBAT goal. The program has had more important objectives. In addition, the strategies needed to generate jobs—aside from making neighborhoods safer and less disorderly—are very different from the approaches needed to jail dangerous criminals, increase treatment opportunities, and reduce drug experimentation, the three objectives the public expects its Anti-Drug Tax dollars to achieve. Adding economic development to its menu in a serious way would require COMBAT to divert staff, time, and money from its three principal objectives. That said, it is still of some importance for COMBAT to contribute to economic development in Jackson County because job creation, particularly in depressed areas of the county, can create opportunities for gainful employment for substance abusers in recovery that may help them avoid relapse. In addition, locally generated, attractive job opportunities might encourage some street-level drug dealers to seek legitimate employment. It is for these reasons that job creation, although not a significant overall COMBAT goal, is a major COMBAT objective for the Paseo Corridor Partnership (see Objective 5, Collaboration).<sup>2</sup>

## **COMBAT Has Generated Some Economic Development in the Paseo Corridor**

**The only area in which it is possible to document that COMBAT may have furthered economic development is the Paseo Corridor.** As a by-product of reducing crime and disorder (e.g., open air drug markets, prostitution) and thereby enabling residents and employers to feel the area is safe, COMBAT's Paseo Drug- and Crime-Free Community Partnership is expected to promote business relocation and expansion in the corridor that will create jobs for area residents. Increased employment in turn should further reduce crime and substance abuse as residents have more local opportunities for earning money by legitimate means. An economic development subcommittee of the Paseo Corridor Partnership focuses specifically on efforts to increase jobs in the corridor. The subcommittee was attempting—as of early 1998 with no success—to contact businesses that had left the Paseo Corridor (e.g., a McDonalds) to learn whether they had closed down because of the crime problem or simply because they could not make a profit.

There are indications (see exhibit OBJ6-1) that the partnership has or will create a modest number of jobs for Paseo residents.

- A private for-profit organization is turning a vacant hospital purchased by the city from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development into a 200-bed assisted living and critical care nursing facility. Observers agree that if COMBAT

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2 Economic development could also be a *measure* of COMBAT's effectiveness. If job opportunities increase in depressed areas of the county where COMBAT initiatives are in operation, it would not be unreasonable, absent other explanations, to infer that the increase occurred at least in part because COMBAT helped make the areas more attractive to businesses and public sector expansion.

were not engaged in fighting crime in the corridor, the company would not have considered buying the hospital. The owner, based in Denver, has prepared architectural plans that include space on the first floor for city offices and several shops, including a beauty shop, pharmacy, ice cream parlor, newsstand, and garden shop. The nursing facility and probably the shops will recruit employees from the Paseo Corridor.

- The Postal Service recently purchased a building within walking distance of the corridor that had been vacant for years to use as a distribution center. According to a member of a Community Action Network (CAN), the reduction in crime in the area increased the Postal Service's willingness to buy the building. A COMBAT staffer reported that the regional Post Office director had said that it had been difficult in the past even to get letter carriers to serve the Paseo Corridor because of the crime problem and prevalence of watch dogs. The Post Office has said it will recruit employees from the Paseo when the center becomes operational in 1999.
- A recycling plant opened in the corridor in 1997 and has employed two Paseo residents. The plant has also resulted in a reduction in trash in the neighborhood, including broken glass, which should improve the corridor's image still further. The former head of the partnership's economic development subcommittee and a local HUD administrator both reported that the community-based organization that runs the plant would not have located in the corridor without the partnership's presence and efforts.

**Exhibit OBJ6-1**  
**COMBAT-Generated Economic Development in the Paseo Corridor**

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Jobs Created for Local Residents</u>
conversion of vacant hospital into a 200-bed assisted living and critical care nursing facility	private, for-profit organization	unknown
conversion of vacant building into distribution center	U.S. Postal Service	unknown
construction of recycling plant	nonprofit corporation	2
8 new small private businesses	private industry	unknown
revival of jazz club district	city	10
renovation of industrial park	private industry	unknown

Since June 1997, eight small private businesses have moved into the area. The businesses include printing and binding, materials handling, sheet metal construction, and car washing. Other opportunities for job development exist in the Paseo Corridor because it borders the old jazz club district at 18th and Vine, which is enjoying a modest renaissance in terms of openings and attendance. Sprint, which opened a telephone call center in the district, has already hired some difficult-to-place individuals referred by the Full Employment Council. Work has also begun cleaning up an industrial park located in the corridor. Finally, a private owner had been about to close an apartment building that provided Section 8 housing because no one had been willing to rent apartments due to drug activity in the vicinity. Because of the reduced criminal activity, the building remained open—and is now 98 percent occupied. As a result, local merchants whom the new residents may patronize may need to hire additional employees.

Only a few other COMBAT-supported activities are likely to increase job opportunities. It is an explicit goal of at least one CAN to retain businesses in its neighborhood and encourage others to set up shop by making conditions safer. In addition, COMBAT made a conscious decision to fund two schools located in a Federal Empowerment Zone<sup>3</sup> to participate in the truancy program (see Objective 3, Prevention). The program's presence in the area may qualify the city to obtain still further Federal funding for the zone that, in turn, could result in job opportunities for local residents.

## **It Is Impossible to Measure COMBAT's Impact on Economic Development**

*It is possible that some or most of the individuals who secure work as a result of COMBAT's initiatives may have already been employed and are simply switching jobs* (see footnote 1). In addition, it is possible that some existing merchants and agencies will lose business and reduce their personnel if former customers patronize the new establishments. For example, residents who patronize the revitalized jazz district will presumably no longer spend their entertainment dollars in other parts of the city they used to frequent. However, some COMBAT-generated economic development activities are likely to represent an absolute increase in employment rather than a zero sum proposition. For example, the demand for nursing home care is likely to be so great that the Paseo's new facility will not draw residents from existing nursing home facilities but from waiting lists of individuals who have been unable to find a suitable residential care arrangement.

Many cities have engaged in economic development activities without benefit of an anti-drug tax. Kansas City itself did so long before COMBAT became operational—at least as early as

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3 The Empowerment Zone program is designed to rebuild communities in inner cities and rural areas. The program includes block grants and tax benefits to stimulate the creation of new jobs and to revitalize economically distressed areas. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development designates urban Empowerment Zones.

the mid-1970s with the Community Economic Development Program (CEDP) funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. As a result, it is theoretically possible that the increased job opportunities anticipated in the Paseo Corridor would have occurred without COMBAT's initiatives. For example, the city intends to revitalize the jazz district (and a "Riverboat" area adjoining the corridor) irrespective of COMBAT's initiatives. However, COMBAT participants and observers agree that *the job opportunities the nursing facility, Postal Service, recycling plant, and other enterprises have already or will develop would not have occurred unless the COMBAT-sponsored Paseo Corridor Initiative had created the perception and the reality of a safer, less disorderly area.*

## Objective 7: Is There Community Support for COMBAT and Its Programs?

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **Generating community support is essential if COMBAT is to survive.** Every seven years the public must vote to approve continuation of the Anti-Drug Sales Tax. The tax has passed once beyond its original referendum.
- **Forty-five percent of Jackson County residents are aware of COMBAT** and, of those, 64 percent were satisfied with COMBAT's performance.
- Knowledge of specific COMBAT programs varies, but **many programs have significant name recognition.**
- Public perception of police and court job performance is high, though not significantly higher than that found in other cities.
- Public sense of personal safety is high, also similar to levels found in other cities.
- **While the public has considerable information about COMBAT, COMBAT managers feel that much of the public is misinformed about COMBAT.**
- **COMBAT may have increased public support for drug abatement.** However, there is little qualitative evidence that COMBAT increased public support for drug treatment.
- **COMBAT has not publicized itself adequately.** However,
  - the media tend to ignore COMBAT unless the program is having financial problems or is involved in exciting law enforcement initiatives, such as raiding crack houses, and
  - COMBAT is seeking to increase the program's visibility.

### **Data Sources**

- Abt Associates July 1998 telephone survey of a random sample of Jackson County residents
- interviews with COMBAT participants and observers
- print media reports

## **Many Jackson County Residents Are Aware of COMBAT**

Assessment of community support for COMBAT involved looking at the community as a whole, not simply the information generated by those most involved in the programming. We conducted a community survey covering information about COMBAT as well as information on some of the by-products of COMBAT, like perception of safety, to determine the level of support for COMBAT.

A random digit dialing survey of Missouri exchanges was conducted by Abt Associates Telephone Survey Center in Amherst, Massachusetts, in the summer of 1998. The areas the survey covered included

- knowledge of COMBAT and its programs;
- opinion and know of substance abuse problems in Jackson County;
- victimization and experience with crime or substance abuse problems; and
- perception of risk and community safety.

These analyses describe only the reactions of respondents at the time of the interview (June and July of 1998). There are no baseline data with which to compare these responses to see if attitudes or experiences of residents have changed over time. However, some of the same questions were asked in community telephone surveys conducted as part of the National Institute of Justice evaluation of the community initiatives known as "Weed and Seed," less than one year earlier. The instrument developed for the phone survey was developed with the Weed and Seed data comparison in mind; it asks many of the same questions in the same sequence for comparability. Questions regarding COMBAT programming tried to cover the most widespread initiatives as well as individual experiences with the program.

### **Survey Sample**

The sample was drawn from 95 Missouri telephone exchanges. Exchanges were selected by Abt sampling statisticians to represent a proportionate sample of urban, suburban, and rural areas of the county. An equal probability sample of 1,343 working non-business phone numbers were drawn from the frame for initial calling. Another 2,217 working nonbusiness numbers was drawn due to high replacement calling. Of the 2,452 calls initiated, a large



number produced no completed interview. The most common reasons for replacement included refusals (16 percent); contact was a fax, beeper, or answering machine (22 percent); not in service or no reply after extended calling (15 percent); language barrier to the interview (2 percent); or not a household residence (7 percent). The final sample consisted of 341 residents representing all areas of the county.

Introductory and screening information gathered at the initiation of the calls included age of the person answering, whether the caller was the person designated in the sample as the respondent, and reaffirmation of residence. The breakdown of towns represented in the final sample of completed calls (N=350) is available upon request, as is a copy of the complete data file.

Based on a sampling plan for designated areas proportionate to size, 55 percent of the sample resided in Kansas City, 18 percent in Independence, 6 percent in Blue Springs, 4 percent in Raytown and 1 percent or less in a number of the other areas in the county. More than 80 percent of the sample had resided in their location for more than a year, but only 11 percent characterized themselves as satisfied with their area or town as a place to live. All of the sample was over 18 years old, and the median age was 44; over 83 percent reported that they either worked full time or were retired or were a full-time student or a full-time homemaker. Half of the households contained a child under the age of 18 years. The ethnic breakdown of the sample reflects the diversity of the county: 18 percent African American; 68 percent Caucasian; 3 percent Hispanic; 1 percent American Indian; 1 percent Pacific Island; 3 percent multi-racial and 4 percent some other ethnicity.

### **Knowledge of COMBAT and COMBAT Programs**

We asked these questions both in reference to "COMBAT" and as the "Anti-Drug Sales Tax", since the initiative is often referred to in this fashion. Forty five percent of the respondents had heard of COMBAT or the drug sales tax initiative; of those, 64 percent were satisfied with COMBAT's performance. Of those who knew of COMBAT, 54 percent reported that they had voted for the initiative; 31 percent of the sample did not vote at all.

Knowledge of the many components of COMBAT varies considerably, as shown in exhibit OBJ7-1 below. We asked all respondents if they had heard of the initiative by name. If they had heard of it, we asked if they had participated, and if they (or a member of their family) had participated what they thought of the program service in which they had been involved.

Knowledge of specific COMBAT agencies and/or programs by name is quite high, and, of those who participated in those programs, satisfaction with services is very high. The general population seems to be most aware of the school program, Full Employment Council, the youth court and the Eastern Jackson County Task Force. These programs may involve more

people than the criminal justice programs and, thus, have higher visibility. Some, like the Eastern Jackson County Task Force, receive more media attention than others.

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**Exhibit OBJ7-1**

**Knowledge of Specific Initiatives and Perception of Service**

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<u>Program</u>	<u>Heard of Program</u>	<u>Participated In</u>	<u>Satisfied</u>
Drug Court	24%	1%	100%
Youth Court	44%	8%	58%
Eastern Jackson Co. Task Force	51%	3%	60%
DART	36%	9%	67%
CANS	21%	16%	67%
COMBAT Commission	22%	9%	71%
Paseo Corridor Partnership	13%	50%	50%
Full Employment Council Job Assistance	53%	20%	53%
Safe Summer Program	34%	4%	80%
Alternative Schools Program	61%	13%	75%

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
**How Safe Do Jackson County Residents Feel? What is Their Perception of the Magnitude of Problems Related to Drug Use and Other Crimes?**

The survey asked a series of questions related to sense of safety and changes in that perception over the past five year period. We selected the five-year time frame both for comparability with the surveys done in other cities and to allow time for any changes COMBAT programming may have instituted to be fully implemented.

Almost all residents report that they feel “very safe” or “safe” out alone in their areas during the day (92 percent) and even out alone at night (63 percent), perceptions which appear not to have changed dramatically in recent years. Half of the sample reported that they felt no change in their sense of safety compared to five years prior; 33 percent reported feeling less safe; 10 percent felt more safe; and 6 percent either did not live in the area five years prior or did not want to answer the question. Exhibit OBJ7-2 and 3 show the percent of respondents from eight cities surveyed in a telephone survey as part of the NIJ Weed and Seed evaluation who answered the same questions about sense of safety. As these exhibits indicates, Jackson County respondents respond in an almost identical fashion to respondents in all cities except Hartford, and Salt Lake City.


## Exhibit OBJ7-2

Percent who said they feel "Very Safe" or "Somewhat Safe" out alone after dark



## Exhibit OBJ7-3

Percent who said they feel "Very Safe" or "Somewhat Safe" out alone during the day



We asked residents whether they thought each of a number of activities represented a big or small problem in their areas and if the problem had improved or worsened in the prior five years. Exhibit OBJ7-4 indicates the percent who responded in the indicated categories for the Jackson County sample.

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**Exhibit OBJ7-4**

**Perception of the Extent and Status of Problems Related to Drug Use and Crime**

<b>Problem</b>	<b>Big Problem</b>	<b>Small Problem</b>	<b>Gotten Worse</b>	<b>Gotten Better</b>
<b>Illegal drug sales</b>	48%	31%	41%	12%
<b>Drug use</b>	47%	30%	39%	7%
<b>Property crimes</b>	36%	47%	33%	10%
<b>Violent crime</b>	31%	47%	34%	12%
<b>Truancy</b>	24%	32%	24%	7%

In comparison to other areas surveyed, Jackson County residents report that illegal drug sales were a “small problem” or “not a problem” somewhat less often than residents of other cities, except Hartford. (See exhibit OBJ7-5.)


We also asked respondents about their personal experiences with drugs and crime and compared those responses to residents of other cities. While less than 20 percent of the respondents or their families been a victim of a property or violent crime in the prior two years, a remarkable 25 percent had witnessed drugs either being sold or traded in their area. These data are similar to those found in the other cities examined.

**How do Residents Rate the Police and the Courts?**

In general, county and local city law enforcement gets good marks. Almost half of respondents felt the police in Jackson County do a “good” or “very good” job in controlling street sale and use of drugs. Courts and prosecutors do somewhat poorer with 36 percent of respondents reporting that they were doing a “good” or “very good” job. Exhibit OBJ7-6 compares the reaction to the police job to reactions in other cities. Again, residents in each of these cities rate the police similarly, with the exception of those in Hartford and Shreveport.


**Exhibit OBJ7-5**

Percent who said illegal drug use in the area was a "Small Problem" or "No Problem"



## Exhibit OBJ7-6

Percent who feel the police are doing a "very good job" or a "good job" in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs



## Other Evidence of Community Support

*Most COMBAT participants and observers interviewed for this evaluation feel that most residents are not familiar with the program.* The Mayor of Kansas City observed, "People know about COMBAT's operation only to the extent that it impacts them—for example, if a relative received treatment in a COMBAT-funded program or went through Drug Court." Some participants felt the public may be more familiar with the Anti-Drug Tax than with the COMBAT program—that is, they may know that there is a sales tax whose proceeds are used to fight drug abuse but not be aware that there is a coordinated structure for spending the money. Even the tax may not be a salient issue to many residents. A survey by the prosecuting attorney's office in 1995 found that one-quarter of respondents admitted they could not remember or did not know whether they had voted for or against the tax in 1990.

Seventy-one percent of Jackson County residents voted in 1995 to extend the Anti-Drug Tax for another seven years: 72 percent voted in favor in Kansas City and 70 percent voted in favor in Eastern Jackson County. However, less than 16 percent of eligible voters in the county went to the polls. While a low turnout is commonplace in midterm elections, it means that only 11 percent of voters in the county actually approved the extension—41,461 individuals among the 373,763 eligible voters.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, while this 11 percent was obviously aware of COMBAT, it is possible that some of these voters learned about the program for the first time upon reading the referendum question.

Ironically, because COMBAT has been free of any scandals—there has been no evidence of anyone embezzling program funds or using them for other self-serving purposes (see chapter 5, COMBAT Administration)—the press has not given COMBAT the type of exposure that would have made large segments of the public aware of its existence.

In addition to our survey results, anecdotal evidence suggests that many members of the public are familiar with COMBAT.

- COMBAT's telephone Info-Line received 2,939 calls in 1995, 2,171 in 1996, and 1,225 in 1997, presumably from individuals familiar with the program. (See the box "Why People Call COMBAT's Info-Line.")
- Six participants in COMBAT's methamphetamine laboratory recognition seminar held during its 1997 Drug Awareness Month completed a written evaluation that included a question asking whether this was the first time they had heard about

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<sup>1</sup> In a national Louis Harris poll of 1,249 adults conducted in July 1994, a majority of respondents supported paying for alcohol and drug addiction treatment through either special fees collected from individuals receiving treatment (74 percent) or a special sales tax on alcohol or cigarettes (66 percent). However, only 24 percent supported increased employer taxes and only 23 percent supported increases in the personal income tax. *Cesar*, volume IV, issue 45, November 13, 1995: University of Maryland.



COMBAT. Five of the six said it was not. Ten of 18 participants at a COMBAT landlord training program wrote on an exit survey that the training was not the first time they had heard that Jackson County had a sales tax to fight drug abuse and drug-related crime or had heard of COMBAT; the other 8 participants did not respond to the questions.

- A Family Court deputy juvenile officer (DJO) reported that some family members of juveniles he serves have mentioned the program to him. “I may be trying to find treatment services for their children, and the parents bring up COMBAT.” For example, he was trying to locate a long-term residential placement for a juvenile with no provable drug involvement when the father asked, “Can’t you use one of those COMBAT programs?” (He could not.) On another occasion, the DJO was looking into treatment services for a probationer when the mother said, “Find a good private clinic by using COMBAT money; our tax money should be used for my daughter.”

COMBAT participants feel that much of the public is misinformed about COMBAT. According to one, “The people who voted on it don’t have a clue about it.” Participants said that the most common misconception is that COMBAT’s only mission is “kicking in crack houses.” A prevention provider said that the public does not realize that COMBAT plays a significant role in funding prevention initiatives.

According to James Nunnely, the prosecuting attorney office’s COMBAT administrator, “The law enforcement component of COMBAT was up and running long before prevention and treatment, which needed an RFP [Request for Proposals] system put into place before money could be transferred from the county to providers. As a result, for a long time the public saw only the law enforcement component. In addition, news broadcasts show SWAT teams breaking into crack houses but rarely show the prevention and treatment sides to COMBAT.” Michael Shanahan, the executive director of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force agrees: “The public perception is that COMBAT is cops fighting drugs.” Some prevention and treatment providers reported that most features on the news are “about the law enforcement side—crack house closings—and prevention and treatment are usually not mentioned.”

Susan Griffle, the former executive director of the COMBAT Commission, suggests that the public believes that the commission reports to the prosecuting attorney’s COMBAT staff rather than functioning independently on a parallel track. Treatment provider representatives at a monthly coalition meeting of COMBAT-funded providers repeatedly referred to the COMBAT Commission as “COMBAT” and appeared to believe that the prosecuting attorney ran the commission. A prevention provider said that James Nunnely had administrative responsibility for the entire COMBAT program. This misperception may be due in part to the fact that the prosecuting attorney’s office did fund prevention providers until the COMBAT

Commission was created in 1995. In addition, James Nunnally attends and participates in all commission meetings, and Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, serves as an ex officio but active member.

### **Why People Call COMBAT's Info-Line**

COMBAT's Info-Line, begun in 1995, is a fully automated answering system—a live person does not answer the phone. Instead, the caller hears Claire McCaskill, the prosecuting attorney, introduce herself and provide a list of extension numbers that will provide information on 20 topics, including

- what to do if the caller knows about a drug house;
- how to tell if someone is using drugs;
- the names and telephone numbers of treatment agencies serving children and adolescents;
- where to find help in keeping crime out of the neighborhood; and
- treatment agencies serving battered women.

Other extensions offer information about COMBAT, including

- how COMBAT got started;
- whether COMBAT tax dollars are working for the public;
- who decides how COMBAT monies are spent; and
- whom to call for further information about COMBAT.

COMBAT publicizes the line through COMBATLINES, its newsletter, and through neighborhood association newsletters. The number is (816) 842-6628.

In 1996, the line received the following types of calls:

- 535 calls asking what to do if someone knows about a drug house;
- 267 requests for information about treatment agencies;
- 232 calls asking about drug-fighting programs outside the county;
- 124 calls about what to do if a friend or relative has a drug problem; and
- 120 queries about how to volunteer in the fight against drugs.

More than 50 callers wanted information about keeping their children drug-free and another 50 called to find out about getting help in keeping crime out of their neighborhoods. Fifty-two callers requested information about COMBAT activities in Eastern Jackson County. Nine callers wanted to know how COMBAT got started, and seven wanted to know who decided how COMBAT monies were spent.

The Kansas City Metropolitan Bar Association and the Kansas City Bar Foundation co-sponsor Info-Line. The line uses the existing technology of the Tel-Law program, a public service that provides legal information to the public.

## Respondents to a Nonrandom Survey Gave COMBAT's Performance Average Ratings

The prosecutor's office conducted a survey of Jackson County residents in 1995 to determine their perceptions about crime and the drug problem. Question 20 asked respondents to rank on a scale of 1 (excellent) to 10 (not a very good job at all) how effective each of several public officials and private organizations had been in fighting crime and drug and alcohol abuse. Almost 22 percent of respondents rated COMBAT's performance a 1, 2, or 3. Over half (56 percent) rated it a 5 (neither good nor bad), and the median rating was also 5. However, it appears that interviewers had not yet provided respondents with an explanation of what COMBAT was. Question 34 asked the same question, this time with the explanation that COMBAT "is the name of the increased prosecution, law enforcement, and treatment program [prevention is not mentioned] funded by the special anti-drug tax." Nevertheless, this question elicited almost identical responses: 23 percent rated COMBAT's performance a 1, 2, or 3, 52 percent rated it a 5, and the median response was a 5.<sup>1</sup>

The survey may not be a reliable indicator of county residents' knowledge about or attitudes toward COMBAT or the tax because a nonrepresentative sample of the population was interviewed: a disproportionate number of respondents (42 percent) were at least 60 years of age (perhaps because they were more likely to be at home at the time the telephone calls were made).

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<sup>1</sup> Question 33 asked respondents to rate whether the tax was a good way to fight crime and drug and alcohol abuse. Just over 43 percent rated the idea a 1, 2, or 3, and the median response was a 4. However, nearly 20 percent rated the idea a 7, 8, or 9. Furthermore, COMBAT does not address drinking problems except among juveniles.

### Increasing Community Information

COMBAT staff have taken a number of community public relations actions to improve public recognition of the program and what it does. The COMBAT Commission has taken several steps designed to inform the public of COMBAT's support for prevention and education. For example, the COMBAT Commission threw the entire provider award process open to the public, including subcommittee meetings that discuss and review proposals. According to one provider, "Anyone can sit in on COMBAT proposal discussions; they are open." Under the Fiscal Commission, the press had criticized COMBAT for hiding the award process. By attending meetings, COMBAT administrators also hoped the press—and, through it, the general public—would begin to understand the differences between inpatient treatment and detoxification, and other complexities of treatment, as well as realize that COMBAT helped ensure accountability by not paying for treatment or prevention services until after they had been delivered and paid for by providers.

## **COMBAT Has Taken Several Steps to Increase Public Information About Programs**

- The last page of the prosecutor office's COMBATLINES newsletter solicits community support for the program. The newsletter has a mailing list of 6,000 individuals, including neighborhood leaders, ministers, elected officials, people who request to receive the publication, and participants in landlord training seminars.
- COMBAT's Internet web site provides the same information its Info-Line offers.
- A COMBAT sign is displayed conspicuously in the waiting area of the prosecuting attorney's office.
- There are COMBAT signs on the outside door and within the Drug Court Day Report Center.
- The COMBAT logo is on D.A.R.E. vehicles.
- From 1995 to 1998, Kristin Rosselli arranged to have a half-page notice about COMBAT and illegal drug use published on page 2 of almost every issue of *The Sports Connection*, a monthly newsletter published by The Community Betterment League and distributed to 20,000 high school students and coaches at 60 Kansas City area high schools. The October 1996 issue addressed the problem of underage drinking; the November 1996 issue publicized COMBAT's Information Line.
- The landlord training program and methamphetamine laboratory recognition seminars have made thousands of property owners, managers, maintenance workers, and other individuals aware of COMBAT.
- When in 1995 some observers complained that they were not seeing any results from the Anti-Drug Tax money, COMBAT mounted a special media campaign in conjunction with its Drug Awareness Month initiative to inform the public about how to recognize and report drug houses.
- During the 1995 campaign to promote renewal of the anti-drug tax, COMBAT provided the media with public service announcements on the program and generated several favorable newspaper stories.
- The Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force has increasingly publicized COMBAT's support for the unit, including references to COMBAT by the executive director during interviews in 1997 with *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, and CNN and ABC News. He has also discussed COMBAT in his talks with every Parent-Teacher Association in Eastern Jackson County. Local media, including the *Kansas City Star* and three television stations, linked the task force with COMBAT at least six times during 1997.
- Ever since the COMBAT Commission encouraged the press to attend its meetings, a *Kansas City Star* reporter has attended almost every meeting of the full commission. COMBAT invites the press to attend every meeting of the Paseo Corridor Partnership.

Commission Requests for Proposals have increasingly required providers to agree to publicize their COMBAT support (see the box "The COMBAT Commission Requires Providers to Publicize COMBAT"). The 1994 prevention provider RFP includes a requirement that applicants "*must commit representatives of your organization to make at least two (2) public presentations (per year) to other organizations about your organization's COMBAT prevention program.*" (emphasis in the original) The 1994 RFP also required applicants to

describe how Jackson County residents would learn about the program. Starting with the 1994 RFP, prevention contractors have been instructed that *“All materials must identify this funding source with the inscription: ‘Paid for by moneys from the Jackson County Anti-Drug Sales Tax’ and carry the COMBAT logo.”* (emphasis in the original) The COMBAT Commission also requires applicants to “agree to acknowledge receipt of COMBAT funds in the event any funded programs receive publicity or are recognized and to display the COMBAT logo in the facility and on printed materials.” Some providers appear to honor these requirements.

- A former member of the Eastern Jackson County Youth Court board of directors reported that COMBAT is always listed as a supporter of parades and public appreciation nights. The Eastern Jackson County Youth Court director mentions COMBAT in her speeches.
- The June 1995 progress report of Sunshine Center (a treatment provider) observes that “There were opportunities to promote COMBAT at the Vaile Mansion/Strawberry Festival on June 3 and at the 20th Anniversary Reunion and Open House on June 24. This was promoted by passing out flyers on the program and services.”
- A prevention provider said that COMBAT undertook “a tremendous marketing effort” before the last tax referendum. Her organization participated in two radio programs for COMBAT. The organization places the COMBAT logo on its brochure and staff bring a print of the logo to community events they attend. “We’re told to do it [associate the COMBAT logo with the organization’s COMBAT-funded initiative], and we’re happy to do it.”

### **The COMBAT Commission Requires Providers to Inform the Public about COMBAT Programs**

All providers must agree to:

- make two public presentations a year about their COMBAT-funded programs;
- identify COMBAT on all program materials as the source of their funding and include the COMBAT logo;
- acknowledge COMBAT support any time the program receives publicity;
- display the COMBAT logo in the facility; and
- participate in at least one event during Drug Awareness Month.

The COMBAT Commission also requires providers to “participate in at least one event during COMBAT’s Drug Awareness Month in order to increase the community’s awareness and



understanding of the Anti-Drug Tax and the services provided by such tax.” COMBAT’s prosecutor-based staff coordinate the event every year around a different theme (e.g., methamphetamine) expressly “to increase the community’s awareness of COMBAT, COMBAT-funded programs and agencies, and COMBAT’s impact on the overall betterment activities of the community,” as well as to provide information for reducing drug-related crime. In 1995, the event included 138 countywide about COMBAT’s prevention and treatment efforts, including a recovery picnic—held every year—for people who had been treated in COMBAT-funded programs. As many as 10,000 residents attended at least one event, and media coverage reached an estimated 106,000 people. (The case study, “Drug Awareness Month” in the appendix provides additional information about the event).

## Chapter 5

# HAVE COMBAT'S ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS BEEN EFFECTIVE?

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **COMBAT uses three approaches to monitor its operations:**
  - evaluations of program operations;
  - internal quality control mechanisms; and
  - fiscal auditing procedures.
- **The chapter devotes special attention to how COMBAT monitors and audits prevention and treatment providers** because of their inexperience, potential for engaging in initiatives that are tangential to COMBAT's mission (prevention providers), competition with each other for limited Anti-Drug Tax dollars, and potential for billing the county (i.e., COMBAT) and the State for the same services (treatment providers).
- **Until 1993, COMBAT was not well planned or administered.**
- **Until 1996, evaluations of COMBAT were unsystematic and of uneven quality.**
  - COMBAT did not begin to provide for a comprehensive process and impact evaluation until 1995.
  - Some evaluations, notably the Special Advisory Panel's report to the legislature's Anti-Drug Committee, provided valuable findings and recommendations for improvement.
  - Most other evaluations had methodological flaws that limited their usefulness.
  - COMBAT implemented most of the recommendations included in the evaluation reports that were within its authority to respond to.

- **Quality control of COMBAT initiatives implemented by the prosecuting attorney's office, law enforcement agencies, and county executive has been uneven.**
  - Systems linked by a single identifier or even databases which can be linked by a series of identifiers are not in place, making aggregation of information across systems and across time impossible. This had made evaluation of program process and monitoring activities ineffective.
  - The prosecuting attorney's office established a Strategic Planning Committee in 1995 in part to provide program direction to all COMBAT initiatives.
  
- **Quality control of prevention and treatment providers has been inadequate.**
  - Any requirement for client-level tracking of services was not enforced; the simplest counts of services provided could not be reliably made from a poorly defined MIS into which data are inconsistently entered. The result made evaluation of prevention program impacts impossible.
  - The request for proposal (RFP) and contract award process have had problems.
  - Provider progress reports have lacked the information needed to monitor the agencies' activities.
  - Although a contract requirement, most providers have not evaluated their efforts.
  
- **There have been significant improvements over the years in the procedures for monitoring prevention and treatment providers, especially after the COMBAT commission hired an executive director in late 1996. Improvements have included**
  - factoring in previous performance as a criterion for awarding continuation funding; and
  - ensuring that provider progress reports are more uniform and complete, and include some outcome data.
  
- **Fiscal auditing of COMBAT-funded criminal justice agencies has been adequate.**
  - The audits have involved four different procedures: prosecutor office review; review by a full-time COMBAT-funded legislative auditor; periodic reviews by an independent auditing firm; and audits by the COMBAT Commission's executive director.



- **Although initially inadequate, auditing procedures of prevention and treatment providers are now satisfactory.**
- **The audits have revealed**
  - requests for reimbursement for serving ineligible clients or participants,
  - requests for unallowed expenses, and
  - late billings for services.
- **With two possible exceptions, auditors believe that the agencies' fiscal problems are due to providers' sloppiness, lack of expertise, and inexperience, not fraud.**
- **No evidence of double billing has been found.**
- **COMBAT has taken steps since 1995 to improve provider fiscal accountability.**
- **There have been no scandals related to misuse of COMBAT funds among agencies and organizations that have received Anti-Drug Sales Tax monies. Two providers may have engaged in deliberate fraud.**
- **Because of key staff, COMBAT has prospered since 1992 despite some management shortcomings.**

#### **Data Sources**

- **INFORMER, ALERT, Circuit Court MIS**
- **previous process and impact evaluations of COMBAT initiatives**
- **interviews with COMBAT participants and observers**
- **COMBAT Commission requests for proposals (RFPs), selected provider contracts, and selected provider progress reports**
- **selected audits of COMBAT funding recipients**
- **observation of the COMBAT Commission, Strategic Planning Committee, Research Committee**

A program as multifaceted as COMBAT inevitably has a variety of administrative procedures and just as unavoidably has experienced problems managing its diverse components. Especially at the beginning, COMBAT exhibited a number of organizational weaknesses.

- **COMBAT's organizers did not have a plan in place for how to spend the Anti-Drug Sales Tax money. As a result, especially in terms of prevention initiatives, a number of activities were funded that were not directly intended to help achieve COMBAT's mission.**

- Similarly, the prosecuting attorney's office awarded matching grants for some activities that were only indirectly related to COMBAT's mission.
- Because of the failure to plan in advance how to spend the money, COMBAT did not award its first contracts to treatment providers until 9 months after the tax became effective and to prevention providers until 18 months.
- The first diversion program COMBAT established had to be scrapped because it appeared headed for failure by not including a treatment component within the court. Instead it relied on referring participants to treatment providers and expecting participants to follow through on their own. In addition, because of resistance to the court among assistant prosecutors, the program had difficulty recruiting participants. Narrow eligibility criteria for including defendants in the program also contributed to its failure.<sup>1</sup>
- COMBAT did not begin to provide for a comprehensive process and impact evaluation until 1995.
- The first prosecutor used \$400,000 in COMBAT funds to purchase new computers for his office, resulting in severe criticism in the press and the community that the expenditure was not designed to further COMBAT objectives.
- The first attempt at creating a management information system for treatment providers failed. Valuable time was lost until the failure could be documented and another system developed.
- Monitoring the quality of prevention and treatment provider services has been inadequate; only in 1997 was a substantial effort initiated to provide satisfactory oversight.

This chapter examines the approaches COMBAT implemented to solve these problems and to help assure that its initiatives were designed and operated in a manner that would achieve the program's objectives. The discussion focuses on three aspects of COMBAT's quality control efforts:

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<sup>1</sup> The Kauffman Foundation/University of Missouri evaluation of the Drug Court planning process found that most planning tasks were well executed. However, the evaluators reported that the court's mission statement, goals, and objectives were written too late for the steering committee to do its work effectively; a work plan with specific objectives and due dates was needed; and the committee failed to develop a management information system and written guidelines describing the consequences to participants who failed the program.

- (1) the steps it took to conduct formal *process and impact evaluations* of its initiatives;
- (2) *monitoring procedures* COMBAT implemented to help ensure program effectiveness; and
- (3) *fiscal accountability* controls.

The discussion focuses disproportionately on COMBAT's procedures for monitoring and evaluating prevention and treatment providers. There are several reasons for this emphasis.

- The principal change in COMBAT's administrative structure in 1995 from the Fiscal Commission to the COMBAT Commission (see chapter 3, COMBAT Synopsis and History) related to oversight of these providers.
- There is competition for COMBAT Commission prevention and treatment monies among a variety of community agencies and organizations. Difficult decisions must also be made regarding how the funds will be used—for detoxification, outpatient treatment, or inpatient treatment in the treatment sector, and for a host of possible interventions in the prevention sector. By contrast, most other groups that receive COMBAT funds do not compete for the program's money—only one county attorney's office prosecutes serious drug offenses in Jackson County, one court serves juveniles, one local jail locks up arrestees and minor offenders (the city jail is not a COMBAT grantee), and one law enforcement agency addresses crime in the Kansas City. A consortium approach—the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force—prevents law enforcement agencies outside Kansas City from competing for COMBAT funding.
- Since it could not fund every prevention and treatment applicant, COMBAT had to establish a formal RFP process to rank the bidders—and to ensure that only providers that directly address the COMBAT mission received COMBAT funding.
- Because some grass roots prevention and treatment organizations lacked experience documenting their use of funds in a formal manner, COMBAT felt the need to develop special monitoring approaches for these agencies. COMBAT also saw the need to develop auditing procedures to ensure that treatment providers did not double bill—that is, charge the State for the same services for which COMBAT (i.e., the county) reimbursed them.

## **Until 1996, Evaluations of COMBAT Were Unsystematic and of Uneven Quality**

One measure of the effectiveness of a program's administrative arrangements is the thoroughness with which it evaluates itself. Evaluation is essential both for learning how to improve program operations and for convincing funding sources—in COMBAT's case, the

voting public—to continue their financial support. The discussion below is limited to examining *how conscientious COMBAT's own efforts have been to commission high quality process and impact evaluations of its operations and services.*<sup>2</sup> The discussion below examines COMBAT's evaluation efforts from three perspectives:

- whether COMBAT was rigorous in its attempts to evaluate itself;
- whether the evaluations COMBAT supported were well executed; and
- whether COMBAT implemented—or at least carefully considered before rejecting—the evaluators' recommendations for improvement.

### **Lack of an Early Comprehensive Evaluation**

As summarized in exhibit 5-1 and analyzed in the discussion below, there have been several evaluations of individual COMBAT components and initiatives. However, *COMBAT did not commission or arrange for a comprehensive evaluation when it first began*, an important step in order to collect baseline and historical data that may not be accessible easily or at all later on, and to put all parties that would receive COMBAT funding on notice that they would be held accountable for achieving their goals. According to Albert Riederer, the prosecuting attorney who initiated the Anti-Drug Tax:

We had a huge problem getting an evaluation going. We never made it a separate initiative because we thought it would be easy. However, it is tough to get people to collaborate on evaluations. For example, we should have required that one percent of COMBAT funding a year be mandated in the legislation for evaluation. However, no one owned evaluation, so no one pushed it. There was inertia. In addition, no one wanted to give up one percent of their funding.

COMBAT was also hampered in conducting an evaluation by the lack of early program planning. Until COMBAT identified in writing its objectives, goals, specific program activities, and measures of success, evaluators could not develop an assessment methodology, including identifying the data they would need to collect for an evaluation. Finally, in order to ensure that any assessment would be—and would be recognized as—completely objective and independent, COMBAT administrators did not want the program to be the primary source of funding for the evaluation, and they did not want a local organization performing the evaluation. COMBAT experienced difficulty finding the outside funding for a comprehensive evaluation by a nationally recognized organization.

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2 The best way to assess the quality (but not cost effectiveness) of COMBAT's service delivery would be to measure whether agencies and organizations that received Anti-Drug Tax funds achieved their ultimate behavioral objectives—for example, whether law enforcement agencies prevented crime or put offenders in jail, Drug Court rehabilitated substance abusers and reduced jail costs, treatment providers reduced relapse and recidivism, and prevention providers reduced experimentation with drugs and drug-related offenses. The available data regarding these *outcomes* are presented in chapter 4, Evaluation Results, as part of the impact evaluation of each COMBAT objective.

Exhibit 5-1

Principal COMBAT-Sponsored Evaluations: Selected Characteristics

Evaluator	Focus	Date Completed	Funding Source	Principal Strengths	Principal Weaknesses	Where Findings Are Discussed in This Report
BOTEC Analysis Corp.	entire county process assessment	12/90	Legislature	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>described nature of drug problem in county</li> <li>many recommendations for improving county's response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>102 recommendations not prioritized</li> <li>most recommendations not pertinent to COMBAT</li> </ul>	Chapter 5, COMBAT Administration
Special Advisory Panel to the County Legislature	program process assessment	12/93	Legislature	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>used wide range of sources</li> <li>concentrated on a few very important areas needing improvement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>none</li> </ul>	Chapter 5, COMBAT Administration
Kauffman Foundation of Kansas City	Drug Court process evaluation	3/94	Kauffman Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>conducted in-depth interviews with court planners</li> <li>provided valuable picture of court's early operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>none</li> </ul>	Objective 2, Treatment
Kauffman Foundation and University of Missouri	Drug Court impact evaluation	12/94	Kauffman Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>suggested client characteristics associated with poor compliance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>only one client had graduated</li> <li>no follow-up of drop-outs</li> <li>no comparison group</li> </ul>	Objective 2, Treatment
University of Missouri	SAFE-TYES Program process and impact evaluation	5/95	COMBAT; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>used random sample of nonparticipants as control group</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>no tests of statistical significance</li> <li>only one comparison with control group</li> </ul>	Objective 3, Prevention
Research & Assessment	YouthNet Safe Summer Program impact evaluation	10/96	COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>included wide range of respondents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>respondents apparently not randomly selected</li> <li>no comparison group</li> <li>proxy measures used have dubious validity</li> </ul>	Objective 3, Prevention
Center for Management Assistance	providers client satisfaction	8/97	COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>suggestive findings regarding satisfaction levels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>comprehension level of survey too difficult for juveniles</li> <li>leading questions asked</li> </ul>	Objective 3, Prevention
Research & Assessment	limited process evaluation of COMBAT Commission providers	2/98	COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>wide range of providers consulted</li> <li>provided important recommendations regarding needed provider self-evaluation and client tracking</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>included several erroneous or misleading findings and recommendations</li> <li>recommended several actions commission already takes</li> </ul>	Chapter 5, COMBAT Administration
Resource Development Institute	Day Report Center process assessment	4/98	COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>important finding regarding increase in compliance over time</li> <li>included staff perceptions of court's strengths and weaknesses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>short (5-month) follow-up</li> <li>omitted drop-outs from analysis</li> <li>no comparison group</li> <li>could not track 49% of participants</li> </ul>	Objective 2, Treatment
Abt Associates	comprehensive process and impact evaluation	11/98	National Institute of Justice, Kauffman Foundation, COMBAT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NA</li> </ul>	Entire report

Abt Associates Inc.

Have COMBAT's Administrative Arrangements Been Effective?

237

In 1990, the legislature commissioned BOTEC Analysis Corporation in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to evaluate COMBAT, but, in the absence of any clear statement of program objectives and activities, the evaluators instead reviewed the nature of the substance abuse problem in Jackson County, reported on the activities currently being used to address it, and suggested ways to improve those efforts. The BOTEC report recommended that the county design and implement measures to support an ongoing agenda of monitoring and evaluation, including collecting necessary data from criminal justice system agencies and other sources in the community. Among the data the report highlighted as important to collect were arrest data, the number of pretrial suspects released from custody solely because of statutory incarceration time limitations, case referral and disposition data, and outcome data. Outcome data that BOTEC recommended collecting included hospital drug-related emergency ward admissions and neighborhood quality of life indicators identified through curbside evaluations regarding graffiti, citizen complaints of drug dealing activities, abandoned vehicles, and the volume of calls for police service.

In 1992, COMBAT administered issued an RFP for a comprehensive evaluation and received three bids. It selected a researcher as the winning bidder, but, because of political objections to the process by which the person was chosen, the county legislature did not issue a contract.

The need for a comprehensive evaluation plan was highlighted again in the report of an Anti-Drug Sales Tax Special Advisory Panel convened by the county legislature. Issued in December 1993, the report recommended that "a formal, ongoing evaluation process must be developed and implemented as soon as possible . . . ." The report went on to note the lack of empirical information on outcomes among the eight COMBAT initiatives:<sup>3</sup>

Monitoring systems to evaluate causal relationships between funded programs and so-called "outcomes of interest" such as reduced truancy rates, a decrease of drug-related crime statistics, or diminished delivery of "crack babies" do not currently exist . . . . Are our neighborhoods safer? Are our schools fostering a healthy learning environment? These questions are not adequately met with statistics describing **process** measures such as how many citizens "heard, saw or received anti-drug prevention messages." Instead, the question should be, "did it do any good?" (emphasis in the original)

The panel concluded that:

There must be a comprehensive independent outside evaluation of the effectiveness, impact and value of the various [COMBAT] programs and initiatives. Funds for such evaluation should be provided by the anti-drug

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<sup>3</sup> The eight initiatives at the time were police investigations, prosecution, Circuit Court, corrections, treatment, Drug Court, juvenile court, and prevention.

sales tax itself. Particular emphasis should be placed on identification of outcomes, monitoring, and accountability.

In early 1995, COMBAT administrators decided to arrange for a comprehensive program evaluation because they had developed written objectives and activity descriptions for the program, as well as collected sufficient data. In addition, there had been criticism about the lack of evaluation, and the legislation was going back to the voters in November of 1995. As a result, together with the Ewing and Marion Kauffman Foundation in Kansas City, James Nunnally met with officials of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the U.S. Department of Justice's research arm, in January 1995 to ask NIJ to contribute money for an evaluation and issue a competitive RFP. Through a competitive procurement process, NIJ awarded a two-year \$500,000 evaluation contract to Abt Associates Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts, in October 1996. COMBAT and the Kauffman Foundation each contributed \$125,000 for the evaluation, and NIJ contributed \$250,000.

In order to arrange for still other evaluations of COMBAT that could document its successes, in 1996 COMBAT established a Research Committee. The committee consists of individuals already involved in COMBAT research, including evaluators already contracted by COMBAT (see below) and individuals associated with selected COMBAT initiatives, such as the head of the Jail Anti-Drug Movement (J.A.M.) and the head of the Kansas City police department's Narcotics and Vice Unit. The committee's original objectives were to identify 100 research possibilities, establish a multidisciplinary research network, and submit to potential funders at least four research proposals by June 30, 1997. The committee had targeted the following research opportunities as of April 1997:

- a grant application to the Sloan Institute for a Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) satisfaction survey;
- the preparation of an instrument for assessing consumer satisfaction with prevention and treatment providers (see below);
- a dual diagnosis research application; and
- reestablishing Kansas City as a Federal Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) site. (The National Institute of Justice had dropped the city as a DUF site several years before.)

The Research Committee also makes sure that COMBAT-funded organizations are collecting the data that can document whether the program is meeting its objectives. More generally, the committee will help keep the participating agencies focused on the importance of conducting research, not just providing services. COMBAT funds a full-time staff person to run the committee.

## The Quality of COMBAT-Supported Evaluations

*While a few of the evaluations COMBAT has supported have been well designed and yielded useful information, most have had significant methodological flaws that limited their usefulness.* Appendix D examines each study in terms of its focus, methodology, findings, and strengths and weaknesses. The discussion below summarizes the information available in the appendix.

The legislature commissioned two early studies of COMBAT as a whole.

- (1) As noted above, in 1989 the legislature contracted with BOTEK Analysis Corporation in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to evaluate COMBAT, but, because of lack of objectives and goals, the organization instead provided an overview of the entire county's drug problems and suggested methods of improving the county's response to them. The report provided a useful description of the nature of the substance abuse problem in the county at the time, efforts undertaken throughout the county to control the problem, and deficiencies in the current response. The report included many worthwhile recommendations for improving the county's response. However, the report did not prioritize its 102 recommendations, making it difficult for local officials, with limited resources, to decide which ones to implement. Furthermore, because the study examined all Jackson County initiatives, not just COMBAT's efforts, most of the recommendations were tangential to COMBAT's mission or beyond its authority or finances to implement.
- (2) In 1993, recognizing that the legislation was near the midpoint of its seven year "trial run"—and that there had been criticisms of COMBAT's administrative structure (see above)—the Legislature's Anti-Drug Sales Tax Committee appointed an Anti-Drug Sales Tax Special Advisory Panel to assess COMBAT's progress in implementing its initial initiatives. The panel commissioned reports and heard presentations from 10 sources, including the current and previous prosecuting attorneys, the Kansas City police chief, the chair of the Drug Task Force, the presiding Circuit Court judge, and the administrator of Family Court. The panel also solicited citizen comment at a three-hour public hearing attended by over 75 people and examined unaudited sources and financial statements prepared by the county finance manager. While not intended as a comprehensive process or impact evaluation, by concentrating on a few areas of COMBAT's performance the report proposed a limited but feasible and very important set of recommendations for improving the program.



There have been four studies of Drug Court.

- (3) In 1994, a researcher from the Kauffman Foundation and a researcher from the University of Missouri at Kansas City conducted an evaluation of the planning process for Drug Court using structured but open-ended interviews with steering committee members. The report provided a useful picture of the committee's operations and presented a number of significant findings that resulted in changes in the court's operation.
- (4) In 1994, the Kauffman Foundation conducted an impact evaluation of the first year of Drug Court's operation to identify ways of improving Drug Court performance by ascertaining (a) differential compliance rates across treatment modalities and (b) client characteristics associated with poor compliance. However, outcome data were limited because the treatment program was designed to last a year, and only one client had successfully graduated from the program in its first year of operation. Furthermore, the researchers warned that the data used to form the aggregate totals might be suspect because of inconsistent records. The researchers did not measure the differential effects of support services (education, job referral); collect follow-up data on clients who dropped out of the program; or develop a comparison group.
- (5) COMBAT contracted with Resource Development Institute, a private research firm in Kansas City, to conduct a process evaluation of Drug Court focusing on identifying the characteristics of clients who completed the Day Report Center program (see Objective 2, Treatment). The report found that participants had more negative urinalyses results (UAs) the longer they remained in the program. However, the report
  - included a short (5-month) follow-up period;
  - included in the outcomes analysis only participants who completed the program;
  - did not use a control or valid comparison group;
  - could not track 49 percent of participants and could not reinterview 7 percent of the 51 percent of participants who could be tracked (resulting in the exclusion of 63 percent of the original sample); and
  - did not examine serious selection bias issues such as the possibility that motivated participants might have remained drug-free without the program.
- (6) Starting in 1996, COMBAT began asking Drug Court graduates to complete an anonymous questionnaire that asked why they had entered Drug Court and what helped them to remain in the program. The answers to a question on what was the main difference between their previous drug program experience and Drug Court was unusable because many participants who reported they had never been in another treatment program answered the question.

COMBAT supported two assessments of *COMBAT-funded prevention and treatment providers*.

- (7) The Fiscal Commission initiated, and the COMBAT Commission completed, an agreement with the Center for Management Assistance, a private consulting organization in Kansas City, to conduct a client satisfaction survey of prevention and treatment provider clients and to compare client satisfaction among individual providers. However, because the same survey instrument was administered to both adult and juvenile clients, the comprehension level of the questions was too difficult for many of the younger respondents. The D.A.R.E. clients were not a representative sample of students. The question clients were asked about their knowledge of the program's purpose was phrased in a manner that was designed to elicit the correct response: "Do you know that your prevention activities [treatment program] are [is] meant to reduce illegal drugs [sic] use [keep you off illegal drugs]?" The report warns that "great caution" should be used in examining the study findings for individual sites.
- (8) The COMBAT Commission awarded a contract to Research & Assessment, Inc., a Kansas City consulting firm, to identify effective strategies for reducing the risk of substance abuse, identify outcome measures to evaluate progress, and assess provider perceptions of the COMBAT Commission's funding and administration of provider contracts. The firm's 1998 report was based on 32 interviews with staff from 11 diverse providers, and classroom and peer teaching observation. The report identified several useful drug prevention strategies that work and made useful recommendations to improve providers' efforts to monitor and evaluate themselves. With regard to the commission's funding and contract administration procedures, several of the report's findings and recommendations were erroneous or misleading. Phase two of the study, which had not been completed as of early 1998, was expected to validate the phase one preliminary findings through written questionnaires distributed to all prevention providers.

Independent firms evaluated two COMBAT-funded *prevention initiatives*.

- (9) YouthNet, a community-based organization, commissioned Research & Assessment to evaluate whether the organization's 1997 "Key to a Safe Summer" program, initiated by COMBAT, achieved its three objectives of providing young people in Kansas City with access to a safe place within walking distance of home, providing youth an opportunity to connect with caring adults, and engaging youth in positive, developmental activities. While the researchers appear to have conducted a wide range of interviews with staff,

participants, and other individuals, the report does not indicate whether the responses represent a representative random sample of participants. No comparison group of youngsters was studied. The evaluation of each goal was flawed. For example, at some sites almost all participating youth were driven to the sites in buses or vans, or by their parents. The proxy measure used to assess whether youth were able to “connect with caring adults”—how much they “liked” the adults—has not been validated.

- (10) In 1995, COMBAT, along with the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, funded the Institute for Human Development, a program affiliated with University of Missouri-Kansas City (UMKC), to conduct a process and impact evaluation of SAFE-TYES. The program provides crisis intervention, assessment, case management, and survival skills to children of substance abusing families referred by Family Court. The evaluation examined 174 families who agreed to participate in the study. A random sample of 30 families referred to Family Court in the same manner as the participants was chosen as a comparison group. The report does not indicate whether the differences in hotline calls between participants and nonparticipants was statistically significant. With the exception of hotline calls, the report does not appear to compare any other outcomes between program participants and the comparison group.

On balance, *COMBAT's efforts to evaluate its operations have been inadequate.*

Importantly, COMBAT administrators were never afraid of being evaluated; as described above, administrators attempted to arrange for a comprehensive evaluation in 1992, and they were associated with several evaluations of individual program initiatives. However, the lack of written program objectives and activities, and the lack of complete, reliable, and pertinent data, limited the value of most of the evaluations that were conducted.<sup>4</sup> The BOTEC study, which was not a process or impact evaluation, focused on providing recommendations for all agencies in Jackson County responsible for addressing the drug problem, not just COMBAT. The Resource Development Institute, Center for Management Assistance, and two Research & Assessment evaluations, while providing worthwhile information, involved methodological weaknesses that limited their usefulness. The Kauffman Foundation impact evaluation of Drug Court's first year lacked adequate data to shape recommendations for improving its performance. By contrast, the Kauffman Foundation report on the Drug Court planning process presented significant findings that helped influence the future direction of the court. The Anti-Drug Sales Tax Special Advisory Panel also provided useful information that led to critically important changes in how COMBAT was administered and in its focus. However, the report was not a comprehensive process evaluation, did not include an impact evaluation,

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<sup>4</sup> COMBAT has allocated \$30,000 to evaluate the alternative schools program, requiring the Network to contract with an outside evaluator to conduct the analysis.

and was not prepared by trained evaluators. Finally, as noted above, the comprehensive process and impact evaluation commissioned in 1996 should have been planned before the Anti-Drug Sales Tax was enacted and implemented shortly after its passage. Without baseline information on a number of variables and consistent data collection measures in place, evaluation becomes immediately compromised.

### **Implementation of Evaluation Recommendations**

One measure of the effectiveness of program administration is the extent to which program managers implement valid recommendations provided by internal and external program evaluations. Indeed, the Legislature's Special Advisory Panel itself recommended that the legislature reconvene the committee "or some other entity within the next two years to determine [COMBAT's] progress . . . in responding to the findings and recommendations outlined in this Report." The panel report further stated that

The December 1990 BOTEK recommendations must be fully implemented. Because this analysis was paid for with Drug Tax funds, a full status report, on compliance with the recommendation, must be given to the Anti-Drug Committee of the Legislature within 60 days of issuance of this [panel] report. The update should assure that all recommendations are addressed . . . .

Overall, *COMBAT implemented most of the major recommendations for change included in the evaluation reports that were pertinent to the program.* Exhibit 5-2 reviews the principal recommendations of each evaluation indicating which suggestions were implemented and the reasons, where available, why the other suggestions were not implemented. As shown, COMBAT administrators followed the most important recommendations made in the 1993 Special Advisory Panel Report to the legislature, such as replacing the Fiscal Commission and attempting to generate more innovative initiatives. Most noteworthy, COMBAT established an Implementation Committee to see to it that the panel's recommendations were implemented. Chaired by the head of the prosecuting attorney office's Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division, and composed of the division's deputy administrator, the county executive's administration manager, the Family Court director, and representatives from the Kansas City police department and Family Court, the group met monthly for nearly a year until the members were satisfied that all of the panel's recommendations with which it agreed had been successfully implemented. The group reported periodically on its progress to the legislature. Although not shown in exhibit 5-2, Susan Griffle, executive director of the COMBAT Commission, took similar care to implement the pertinent recommendations in the Research & Assessment report on commission-funded providers and commission administrative procedures, such as requiring outcome targets in provider proposals and contracts.

## Exhibit 5-2

## Evaluation Report Recommendations and Combat Response

Report	Selected Recommendations	COMBAT Response	
		Implemented	Rejected/Reason
BOTEK (102 recommendations — most not applicable to COMBAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Propose five separate statutes to the Missouri Legislature and two local ordinances, such as a triple prescription regulatory plan for licit pharmaceuticals.</li> </ul>	partly	limited authority to recommend
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement new drug enforcement strategies for implementation by KCPD patrol divisions, such as increasing foot patrols in high density areas.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Make changes in the operations of the Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) and Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU), such as reducing delays in case filing, assigning an administrative officer as permanent liaison to the prosecuting attorney's office, and allocating additional administrative personnel.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide the prosecuting attorney's drug unit with more personnel, reduce pre-filing case review time, initiate a formal training program, restrict staff exclusively to drug cases, work with DEU, SNU, and the Drug Task Force to target specific drug trafficking areas, implement a deferred prosecution program in the Drug Unit.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement a state-of-the-art information system, including ongoing records of where defendants are in the criminal justice system and a compilation of statistical data.</li> </ul>	no	politically unacceptable to spend on money computers
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Offer a comprehensive drug treatment program to inmates at the county jail and reinstate a discontinued work release program.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arrange for the Department of Probation and Parole to obtain funding to conduct random urine testing to monitor probationers.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Design and implement an ongoing agenda of monitoring and evaluation.</li> </ul>	partly	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determine the information system needs of the policy, prosecution, court, and other organizations that handle drug abuse cases, including an action plan to identify computerization objectives and plan for integrating these new systems into existing operations with minimal disruption.</li> </ul>	underway	see text	

Report	Selected Recommendations	COMBAT Response	
		Implemented	Rejected/Reason
Special Advisory Panel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exert greater efforts to direct funds to innovative prevention and treatment programs not traditionally supported by public and private sources.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish a community action coalition to ensure more collaboration and communication among the community sectors involved in substance abuse prevention and treatment initiatives.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Place greater emphasis on prevention and treatment of persons involved in illegal substance abuse, particularly youth. Provide easier access and entry methods for individuals desiring drug treatment.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have COMBAT administrators exercise greater leadership.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Publicize COMBAT's successful activities more effectively.</li> </ul>	no	lack of resources
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure that nongovernmental organizations that benefit directly from funding decisions are not involved in the Fiscal Commission's funding allocation process.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Address root causes of drug abuse such as communitywide environmental influences.</li> </ul>	no	to costly, infeasible
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a formal ongoing evaluation process.</li> </ul>	underway	
Drug Court process evaluation (1 recommendation; several implied recommendations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Create a written, formal operating structure with clearly defined responsibilities for tasks by individual staff person and associated completion dates.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduce the committee's size to 8 to 12 members (instead of 18) and develop subcommittees to address specific parts of the plan.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop written guidelines defining the consequences to participants who fail Drug Court.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan a program component that focuses on preventing recidivism.</li> </ul>	underway	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish an ongoing evaluation plan for Drug Court.</li> </ul>	yes	

Report	Selected Recommendations	COMBAT Response	
		Implemented	Rejected/Reason
Drug Court Impact Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider a central location for program intake to reduce duplication of activities associated with intake processes of diversion management and treatment.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Investigate ways of modifying the program to retain more clients with characteristics—race, employment status, residential status—consistently associated with low levels of compliance.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Define and track the relapse status of clients as they progress through the program.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Place greater emphasis on developing an aftercare program for clients.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continue to monitor the problem of disputed urinalysis results. (The initial procedures had proven less than 100 percent reliable.)</li> </ul>	no	insignificant problem
Provider client satisfaction survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COMBAT utilize the interview instrument as a “user survey” for providers to distribute to all clients.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work with providers whose survey results suggest they may have serious program weaknesses as suggested by the percentage of clients who did not know the programs’ purposes, would not recommend it to others, or did not find it as good as other programs with which they were familiar.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consider requiring providers that failed to submit their client surveys to do so as a condition of contract renewal. Require all newly contracted providers in the future to participate fully in the survey.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resurvey programs who data raise red flags, after they have been given assistance or warning to improve, and consider terminating or not renewing the contracts of any that fail to correct their deficiencies.</li> </ul>	yes — resurvey no — termination	wrongheaded
YouthNET Safe Summer Program (not COMBAT’s responsibility to implement but to help ensure implementation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Begin the planning process much earlier than was done in 1996.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hire more qualified youth workers and provide additional training to youth workers.</li> </ul>	underway	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarify the relationship of volunteers to site directors and agencies.</li> </ul>	yes	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide agencies with assistance in planning a program for youth by furnishing them with samples of “best practices” in programming curriculum in selected areas.</li> </ul>	underway	

Report	Selected Recommendations	COMBAT Response	
		Implemented	Rejected/Reason
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a transportation plan in advance for each site and provide additional vans and buses.</li> <li>Coordinate the summer school schedules of the public schools in advance.</li> </ul>	no  yes	not feasible
SAFE-TYES report (18 recommendations) (not COMBAT's responsibility to implement but to help ensure implementation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement aftercare services in the form of support groups or continuing monthly meetings with families.</li> <li>Provide ongoing support to the children and adolescents.</li> <li>Focus more attention on helping parents to secure training or employment.</li> <li>Coordinate better with mental health services for treating families in which dual diagnosis is a problem.</li> <li>Conduct an annual needs assessment of the resources and gaps in services that support substance abuse treatment and support services in the Kansas City area.</li> </ul>	D/K <sup>1</sup>  D/K <sup>1</sup> yes D/K <sup>1</sup>  yes	

<sup>1</sup> COMBAT no longer provides the local grant match for this program.



Most of the recommendations in the BOTEC report were not COMBAT's responsibility to implement. Furthermore, none of the recommendation in the SAFE-TYES and YouthNet evaluations were COMBAT's responsibility to implement. However, because it provided the local matching funds for these programs, COMBAT did have a responsibility to try to ensure that the administrators of the respective programs implemented the recommendations.

The only significant evaluation recommendation, made in both the Special Advisory Panel and the BOTEC reports, that COMBAT did not begin to implement until 1995 was to contract for a comprehensive process and impact evaluation.

## **Quality Control of the Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Law Enforcement Agencies, and County Executive Has Been Rudimentary**

The prosecuting attorney's office, COMBAT-funded law enforcement agencies, and county executive implemented few formal quality control procedures to ensure that COMBAT-sponsored initiatives were being well run. One difficulty has been weakness in COMBAT's information systems.

### **The Prosecuting Attorney's Office**

*There are important limitations to the management information systems in place for the prosecutor's office to use both for evaluation and quality control.* The prosecutor's MIS system (INFORMER) contains drug court defendant level files with the prosecutor's record code and the identification number as well as a range of information on defendant characteristics and subsequent court events and dispositions. The police data found in ALERT contain all arrests made by the Kansas City police department with detailed information about the arrest. The Circuit Court data contain information about each case which passes through the system including disposition. However, to look at the impact on Drug Court, INFORMER is limited in that it includes drug court cases only making comparisons with non-drug court cases difficult and tracking persons who serve as comparisons cumbersome. We were able to match INFORMER cases with Circuit Court data using the Circuit Court case numbers, but had to verify the match with date of birth, race, and sex, because there were many missing case numbers. However, these fields do not match with county or city arrest data. We attempted to use several fields which might cross any two of the sources. Even those which might potentially work proved futile in that in one or more of the datasets data are not entered consistently.

Cases in INFORMER are also organized in terms of how far an individual made it through the Drug Court system; information is often entered about each case into alphanumeric fields.

If a data entry person enters comments or text other than "graduated" or "completed," the case is not routinely retrieved by the MIS as graduated and not included in those counts. We developed a calculation of the case flow of defendants through the Drug Court system by wading through case events files with multiple records per case and multiple cases per defendant. This is obviously very inefficient when there is a need to track activities in the system.

This will become critical for further evaluation of the work of the Drug Court. Comparisons of success or failure of participants are only meaningful in relation to a comparison group—persons eligible but who did not receive the service for reasons other than those related to motivation (e.g., one can not use a drop out group for comparisons). These data come from Circuit Court sources as well as from community corrections sources (probation). Similarly, administrative issues related to Drug Court cannot be addressed in the current configuration of information sources. For example, does Drug Court increase or decrease the efficiency of flow of cases through the system. We can look at aggregated data at each point in the system but have no reliable way to produced a temporally linked picture.

The prosecuting attorney's office implemented two quality control procedures: selected evaluations of COMBAT-supported initiatives (see above) and establishment of a Strategic Planning Committee. COMBAT formed the Strategic Planning Committee in 1995 to develop and implement a plan to address crime in the Paseo Corridor (see Objective 5, Collaboration). However, the committee expanded its role to provide oversight for COMBAT initiatives in compliance with a statutory requirement that COMBAT report to the legislature each year accounting for its use of the taxpayers' money. Soon thereafter, the committee metamorphosed into an internal monitoring tool for tracking progress on each of COMBAT's many initiatives.

Chaired by James Nunnally, the committee consists of other representatives from the prosecutor's office, the Drug Court judge, the executive director of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force, the commander of the Kansas City Police Department Vice and Narcotics Unit, a representative from Family Court, the executive director of the COMBAT Commission, and the director of the jail's drug treatment program. At each monthly two-hour meeting, the committee updates the monitoring report matrix shown in part in exhibit 5-3 and submits it to the legislature. The group also updates a strategic plan matrix, shown in part in exhibit 5-4. In the process of reviewing progress toward goal achievement, members identify barriers to accomplishing their goals and develop initiatives designed to overcome these obstacles.

## Exhibit 5-3

## COMBAT Goals 1997 – 1998 Monitoring Report

Combat Goals (abbreviated)	11/96	12/96	01/97	02/97	03/97	04/97	05/97	06/97	07/97	08/97	09/97	10/97	Target
<b>Local Police</b>													
1. • Feasibility study for Drug Training Academy (EJCDF & KCPD)	N	N		S									12/97
2. • Develop new methods to reduce "open air" market (KCPD)	M	S	M	S									12/98
3. • A meth video for landlords by EJCDF.	N	N		M									12/98
4. • Community drug tx services video training (500 PO) (EJCDF & KCPD)	N	N		N									12/97
5. • Establish Public Relations Officer (EJCDF)				COMPLETED									12/97
6. • Update EJCDF computer system and train all													12/97
7. • 20% increase in cases forwarded for prosecution (EJCDF)				M									12/97
<b>Deleted as a goal by Task Force.</b>													
8. • EJCDF to seize more drugs than purchased													12/97
9. • Increase number of search warrants, buy busts, knock and talks, trash pulls, by 25% (EJCDF)				N									12/97
10. • EJCDF to develop closer relationships with local law enforcement agencies				S									12/97
11. • Quality results in 90% of cases prosecuted (EJCDF)				M									12/97
12. • Establish meth laboratory entry team (EJCDF)				COMPLETED									

**Key: N – No Change, M – Minimal Change, S – Significant Change, C – Completed**

## Exhibit 5-4

## 1997-1998 COMBAT Strategic Plan

CT	Strategies/Tactics - Family & Circuit Court	Measurement	Responsible	Key Date	√
1	COMBAT will conduct two training seminars for judges and court personnel on how to use the Treatment Providers' Uniform Assessment data for decision-making.	Trainings completed.	Judge O'Malley	12/31/97	
	• Establish training schedule.				
	• Identify trainers.				
	• Follow up on usage, understanding and value of Uniform Assessment data.				
2	Deputy Juveniles Officers will expand to all of the middle schools in the Kansas City, Missouri School District, maintain services in all of the suburban school districts, and participate in the Summer School programs during the summers of 1996 - 1998.	DJOs in place.	Jeff Gosney	5/31/97	√
	• Identify schools with existing or new DJOs on staff. (Submit to COMBAT)				
3	All staff as well as other agency staff will attend a variety of ATOD (Alcohol and Other Drugs) Cross-Agency Training seminars conducted by the Substance Abuse Treatment Specialist or other professionals in the field. Family Court Substance Abuse Treatment Specialist will provide a minimum of 150 hours of ATOD training to Field and Residential staff per year, and train 10 additional staff to conduct ATOD Assessments and make appropriate treatment recommendations. (Revised goal 11/96 -- combined two)	150 training hours.	Jeff Gosney	12/31/98	
	• Set up training schedule and trainers.				
	• Keep track of training provided (topics), hours, and which groups. (Submit to COMBAT)				
4	Hilltop Co-Educational Campus will develop an ATOD Assessment, Education Groups, Individual Counseling and Prevention Program for youth and families.	ATOD program established.	Jeff Gosney	12/31/98	√
	• ATOD assessment developed.				
	• Education groups developed.				
	• Individual counseling established.				
	• Prevention program developed.				

## The Strategic Planning Committee Raises Important Issues

A member of the Strategic Planning Committee provided illustrations of how the group had identified problems and provided information that benefitted members.

- The health department learned for the first time about the jail's J.A.M. treatment program.
- Police members raised the problem of what to do with dually diagnosed individuals when mental health facilities refuse to accept them because they are substance abusers and treatment facilities turn them away because they are mentally ill.
- A Missouri Department of Welfare staff member explained that, under the new Federal welfare rules, substance abusers convicted of crime are no longer eligible for free treatment. The members discussed how the new ruling would affect them and how to inform defendants about their future ineligibility if they refuse the Drug Court option and, as a result, end up with a criminal record.

### Law Enforcement

Law enforcement agencies traditionally evaluate their effectiveness in terms of number of calls for service and, especially, number of arrests ("clearance" rates). However, this information fails to document what percentage of arrests result in convictions and prison time or whether the arrests result in displacement of criminal activity—more valid measures of police effectiveness.<sup>5</sup> Until the formation of the Strategic Planning Committee, the Kansas City police department did not appear to have monitored the quality of its COMBAT-supported initiatives beyond looking at traditional measures.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, data systems available to track cases in the county were designed for gathering information about a case rather than with the expectation of aggregating across cases or even tracking cases across systems. ALERT, the system used by the Kansas City police, collects data at the person level and records from one to eleven arrests per arrestee. With the exception of the Missouri statewide Criminal History Records System, there is not countywide repository of arrest information. These limitations make it difficult for law enforcement to clearly track the effectiveness of their efforts at the front end of the system; for example, do the arrests in Kansas City displace criminal activity into another adjacent area. We clearly found (Objective 1) that the police are very active in arresting drug involved and dangerous offenders, even more

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5 How to measure police performance has been a subject of debate for many years. As long ago as 1978, The Police Foundation reported that "The measurement of police performance has been an acute problem for administrators, researchers, and evaluators." (George L. Kelling and Mary Ann Wycoff, "The Dallas Experience: Human Resources Development," Volume II, Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1978, p. 51) Recently, the National Institute of Justice began to tackle the problem of performance measures during a one-day session involving 45 police officials and other individuals to discuss the challenges of assessing police performance. (Thomas V. Brady, *Measuring What Matters: Part One: Measures of Crime, Fear, and Disorder*. Research in Action. Washington D.C., National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, December 1996.)

involved than agencies in other jurisdictions. It would be useful to link this activity to dispositions more clearly and to be able to track county wide activity relative to specific COMBAT initiatives. The existing MIS does not allow this and the reporting mechanisms required by COMBAT for its law enforcement initiatives were not in place to provide the data otherwise.

With the exception of a flawed study of the D.A.R.E. program (see Objective 3, Prevention), the Kansas City police department—like the police departments in Eastern Jackson County that receive COMBAT funds to support their D.A.R.E. initiatives—did not conduct an impact evaluation of its use of COMBAT funds.

Until 1997, it appears that the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force also relied on traditional arrest measures as its quality control mechanism. However, with the appointment of Michael Shanahan as officer-in-charge in 1996, the task force began looking at convictions and incarcerations (both pre-trial and post-conviction) as quality control measures. (See Objective 1, Jail.) The Risk Assessment and Management Team of the Southeastern Public Safety Institute in St. Petersburg, Florida, reviewed the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force operations in late 1996. However, two different police chiefs who served as presidents of the Drug Task Force board of directors refused to share the report findings because they considered the report to be an internal work product.

### **The County Executive**

Until 1994 when the Jail Anti-Drug Movement (J.A.M.) Program began, and until 1996 when construction on the jail addition began, the county executive had access to relatively few COMBAT dollars. However, there has been no independent evaluation of the J.A.M. program or other steps taken to examine the program's quality.

## **Quality Control of Prevention and Treatment Providers Has Improved**

The COMBAT Commission is responsible for monitoring the quality of prevention and treatment provider services. The commission exercises this function through

- the request for proposal (RFP) and contract award process, and
- review of providers' progress reports.

### **The RFP and Contract Award Process**

Albert Riederer, the prosecuting attorney who initiated the Anti-Drug Tax, first developed and issued prevention and treatment RFPs in 1991. Until the COMBAT Commission replaced the Fiscal Commission (see chapter 3, COMBAT Synopsis and History), the award process involved

proposal submission, review of proposals by Riederer and his COMBAT staff person, and the prosecutor's recommendations for awards to the county legislature.

When James Nunnely was hired in 1993, he revised and, each subsequent year, modified further the RFPs and the award process. When the COMBAT Commission replaced the Fiscal Commission in 1996, the new commission initially used Nunnely's RFPs but revised them each year. Nunnely's and the COMBAT Commission's principal changes in the award process have been to

- disqualify bidders who fail to attend the mandatory pre-bid meeting;
- institute the practice of using independent proposal reviewers;
- specify more narrowly the award criteria; and
- consider bidders' previous COMBAT performance in ranking proposals for continuation funding.

*The award process. The COMBAT Commission has instituted comprehensive procedures to explain the bidding requirements to applicants.*

- COMBAT Commission staff host a three-hour mandatory pre-bid conference on the application process so that agencies know what they need to include in their proposals. Staff distribute a packet of materials at the meeting. The commission sent letters to six agencies in 1998 that said, "According to our records, your organization did not have a representative present at this mandatory meeting; as a result, your organization is ineligible to submit a proposal to the COMBAT Commission." The agencies were encouraged to partner with a bidder that did attend, serving as a subcontractor.
- In 1996 and 1997, the commission offered grant writing workshops for grass roots organizations that lacked experience writing grants proposals. The commission used COMBAT funds to hire a trainer to run the workshops, which focused on such topics as how to write objectives and how to follow the RFP outline.
- Prevention provider RFPs include as a "NOTE" the warning that "Any organization or agency who feels they do not have the technical capacity to appropriately respond to this RFP should make this known by submitting a letter to the Director of Purchasing."<sup>6</sup>

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6 When the prosecuting attorney awarded the prevention contracts, she allowed providers to present their projects verbally after the application review process had been completed in case they had failed to include something important in their written applications.

Led by a professional facilitator, commissioners and staff held internal decision-making meetings that enabled them to identify the most important ways to improve Requests for Proposals, the application review process, and improvements in program evaluation. Griffle incorporated the most frequently cited improvements into the RFP process.

In 1994, the Fiscal Commission introduced the use of independent reviewers for proposals to ensure that applicants' bids received an objective evaluation and were not judged exclusively by commissioners.<sup>7</sup> The new procedure was also intended to address critics' concerns about the commission's apparent lack of accountability and bias in awarding contracts. Susan Griffle, Claire McCaskill, James Nunnally, and others, provide the current COMBAT Commission with the names of individuals with expertise in the education and prevention field and no known association with any bidders.<sup>8</sup> Commissioners select the independent reviewers from this pool and from their own list of candidates. The COMBAT Commission gives each reviewer 6 to 10 proposals to review, paying each reviewer \$100. Some years the commission has tried to use new reviewers. Because of concerns with inconsistency among reviewers' scores, commission staff worked with a consultant to design an evaluation guide to assist reviewers in their ratings of proposals. Exhibit 5-5 illustrates some of the information provided to reviewers. In addition to the independent reviews, each commissioner also reviews 6 to 10 proposals. As a result, each proposal is reviewed and scored by two independent reviewers and two commissioners, resulting in four scores.

Commissioners and independent reviewers use the same score sheet to rate each proposal according to the number of points associated with the award criteria presented in the RFP (see exhibit 5-6). The box "The COMBAT Commission 1997 Prevention Proposal Review Process" describes the review process for that year.

For each winning provider, the legislature adopts a member's resolution "authorizing the Chair of the COMBAT Commission to enter into an agreement with [name of organization] in the amount of [award is stated] on the recommendation of the Jackson County Anti-Drug Sales Tax COMBAT Commission. Resolution #10167, introduced by Dennis Waits, County Legislator." Each contract is "by and between Jackson County, Missouri" and the organization.

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7 Initially, it was difficult to find independent reviewers who were not somehow already affiliated with the agencies whose proposals were being evaluated. However, by eventually including private sector representatives (e.g., banking officers) and community-based organization representatives among the reviewees (e.g., the Urban League), COMBAT was able not only to secure independent reviewers but also to educate additional members of the community to COMBAT's activities and mission.

8 The COMBAT Commission has discussed requiring reviewers to sign a conflict of interest statement and may ask the reviewers of treatment provider proposals to do so in the future. However, the commission may not decide to require a signature from reviewers of prevention proposals because most otherwise eligible individuals have some involvement with a school.



**Exhibit 5-5  
Sample COMBAT Commission Proposal Reviewer Guidelines**

<b>Proposal Element</b>	<b>Meets or Exceeds Expectations</b>	<b>Addresses Element but Leaves Cause for Concern</b>	<b>Unclear or Does Not Meet Expectation</b>
<b>Commitment to Collaboration</b>	Letter expresses agency commitment to each element of collaboration with roles and responsibilities outlined clearly. Also, letters submitted from other organizations make commitment to the program for the upcoming funding year	Letter expresses commitment to collaborate but does not address each element and/or roles are unclear.	Commitment to collaboration is vague and/or letters of collaboration are aged or missing.
<b>Assessment and Evaluation</b>	Assessment and evaluation is clear and concise and identifies expected outcomes, specific outcome indicators, how target population will be affected by the program, and system for collecting and analyzing information. Staff is identified.	Assessment and evaluation require clarity. Outcomes and outcome indicators are presented but are unclear. System for collecting and analyzing information is also unclear.	System for collecting and analyzing information is vague and does not indicate how assessment will assist program staff in assessing clients' needs or how evaluation will help determine outcomes.

**Exhibit 5-6  
COMBAT Commission RFP Evaluation Criteria**

<b>Prevention RFP</b>	<b>1996-1997</b>	<b>1997-1998</b>
<b><u>proposal elements (100 points)</u></b>		
need for program	10 points	15 points
target population and recruitment	15 points	15 points
approach, objectives, and outcomes	25 points	30 points
organizational structure and staff	10 points	10 points
commitment to collaboration and other key elements	15 points	10 points
innovation	10 points	0 points
evaluation	10 points	10 points
budget	5 points	10 points
compliance with previous contract achievement	0 points	50 points
program goals and outcome	0 points	50 points
<b>Treatment RFP</b>		
expertise of contractor and staff	40 points	20 points
methodology	40 points	20 points
cost	20 points	10 points

## Award Criteria

Originally the prosecuting attorney, and, currently, the COMBAT Commission, have always reviewed proposals with an eye to ensuring that

- services would be provided throughout the county,
- different populations would be served, and
- there would not be duplication of services.

### **The COMBAT Commission 1997 Prevention Proposal Review Process**

During the contract award process for prevention contracts for 1997, the commission received 55 proposals by the April 1 deadline. Griffle distributed the proposals to the independent reviewers and board members for simultaneous review. In 1997, the commission determined the cut-off score for acceptable prevention proposals by dividing the total of all proposal scores by 55 (the total number of proposals received) and dividing that figure by three (the number of reviewers). This produced an "average" evaluation score of 80. The commission added as many as five points to the scores of applicants that had received funding the previous year, had submitted a performance report (as required by the RFP), and had scored below 80. The commission then eliminated proposals that scored below 80. The commission reviewed as a group proposals that independent reviewers or commissioners had flagged as "needs discussion." The commission eliminated some of these proposals from the competition even if they scored over 80. As a result of these cuts, 41 proposals remained in the competitive range.

In 1997, the commission received \$3.4 million in requests for prevention program funding and had \$1.4 million to allocate. As a result, there were insufficient monies to fund all of the 41 bidders who made the cut. Consequently, each commissioner prioritized the proposals by ranking them on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 the poorest rating, placing 10 proposals each in the 1, 2, and 3 ranking and 11 in the 4 ranking. All the commissioners' rankings were totaled, giving each proposal a priority score.

Based on the priority scores, the commissioners grouped the proposals into three categories. The commission determined funding percentages for proposals in each category based in part on the total amount of funds requested and the funds available. Applicants scoring highest had their proposed budgets reduced by 75 percent, the next highest by 65 percent, and the lowest by 65 percent. Because there was still insufficient money, the commission reduced the budgets still further. On May 12, the commission then submitted its award and funding recommendations to the legislature. For the first time in 1997, the commission met with bidders to review the scores and negotiate a final contract.

The prosecutor's office and, subsequently, the COMBAT Commission, have also tried to avoid providing a major percentage of any organization's funding in part to force bidders to leverage COMBAT's county money to get additional private sector money. In addition, if organizations become dependent on government for most of their funding, COMBAT may inadvertently encourage cost shifting by enabling organizations to replace private

money with county funding. Commission members have considered establishing a maximum percentage of any organization's funding that they will fund, but to date they have not excluded organizations that become totally dependent on COMBAT. For example, a mobile crime watch affiliated with a Community Action Network (CAN) receives funding from no other sources. COMBAT provides more than half the funding for the Eastern Jackson County Youth Court and between one quarter and one third of the funding for two other prevention providers. A few COMBAT-funded organizations whose contracts were not renewed because of poor performance have gone out of business.

Exhibit 5-6 lists the evaluation points allocated in the 1996 and 1997 prevention request for proposals for the 1997 and 1998 program years. As shown, starting with the 1997-98 RFP cycle, the commission began to allocate 25 percent of the decision to award a continuation contract based on the provider's previous year's performance in terms of contract compliance (e.g., submission of monthly progress reports and payment requests on time) and 25 percent to the achievement of program goals. For new bidders, the commission allocates 66 percent of the evaluation to the quality of the proposal, no points, of course, to contract compliance, and 34 percent to program outcomes. Commissioners assess program outcomes for agencies not currently receiving COMBAT funding by examining reference letters from previous funding agencies that the new bidders will be required to submit with their proposals. Exhibits 5-7 and 5-8 present the new scoring sheets the commission is using for prevention providers. Exhibit 5-9 is the COMBAT Commission's record of contract compliance for February 1998 for use in awarding prevention contracts for 1998-1999.

*Problems with the COMBAT Commission's contracting process.* According to a COMBAT document, "We developed the [RFP] process by fits and starts." As a result, RFPs in the early years lacked clear or sufficient instructions—according to the same document, there were "limited specifics [in the 1991 prevention RFP] on program design and what to put in proposals . . . . No specified dollar request maximum [in the 1991 and 1992 RFPs] led to pie-in-the-sky requests for limited funding." At the same time, COMBAT was under pressure from the community to disburse the funds. As a result, for several years, COMBAT was not rigorous in awarding treatment, and, especially, prevention money because it funded some initiatives that did not address directly any of COMBAT's three goals of increasing the jailing of drug offenders, providing additional treatment for substance abusers, and preventing drug abuse among susceptible populations.

Over time, COMBAT administrators and the COMBAT Commission improved the RFP instructions and process. For example, the 1993 RFP specified maximum amounts and average awards anticipated for each of four types of programs (e.g., innovative prevention programs) and included page limits for submissions. In particular, *RFPs have included more specificity about the types of initiatives that will be funded to better reflect COMBAT's goals.* As each prevention RFP now explains, some of the priority areas have

**Exhibit 5-7**  
**COMBAT COMMISSION**  
**Contract Compliance - Prevention**  
**1997-1998**

**Agency:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

Timely submission of monthly program reports (based on reports submitted by the 15 <sup>th</sup> day of each month for the months July through February)	7 or more	5-6	4 or less
	2	1	0
Payment requests submitted (quarterly)	Current	90-180 days past due	180+ days past due
	2	1	0
Attendance at Quarterly Provider Meetings August 13, 1997 November 5, 1997 February 11, 1998	Attended All	Attended 2	Attended 1 or less
	2	1	0
Attendance/Other Mandatory Meetings, etc. Orientation, July 9, 1997 Drug Awareness Month Activity Dr. Don Vereen, December 11, 1997 Participation in survey conducted by Prevention Evaluation Consultants (Robertsons)	Attended All	Attended 2	Attended 1 or less
	2	1	0
Participation in Site Visit Visit by Compliance Monitor Visit by Prevention Evaluation Consultant (if applicable)	Met Expectations	Improvement Needed	Unsatisfactory
	2	1	0

**Total Points Received:** \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Compliance Monitor

Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Executive Director

Date

**Exhibit 5-8**

**COMBAT COMMISSION  
Program Outcomes - Prevention  
1997-1998**

**Agency:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

	<b>Met Plan</b>	<b>Moderate Progress Toward Plan</b>	<b>Minimal Progress Toward Plan</b>
Target population/recruitment (who, how, number, risk factors addressed)	2	1	0
Objectives (as set forth in the currently funded program year)	2	1	0
Activities (materials used, seminars, consultants, trips, group meetings, etc.)	2	1	0
Collaboration (with other COMBAT-funded programs)	2	1	0
Evaluation	2	1	0

**Note:** Where there are quantitative measures, we will employ the following formula:

<u>Percentage of Plan Achieved</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Progress</u>
80% - 100%	2	Met plan
60% - 79%	1	Moderate progress toward plan
59% - ↓	0	Minimal progress toward plan

Total Points Received: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Compliance Monitor

Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Executive Director

Date

**Exhibit 5-9**

**COMBAT COMMISSION**  
**Prevention Providers Monthly Compliance**  
**Month of February, 1998**

Agency	Submitted Monthly Report	Financial Reporting Current	Attended Quarterly Provider Mtg.	Attended Pre Bid Conference
49/63 Neighborhood Coalition	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Ad Hoc Group Against Crime	03/15/98	Yes	X	
Big Brothers/Big Sisters		Yes	X	
Blue Springs Youth Outreach Unit	03/06/98	Yes	X	X
Boys/Girls Club-EJC	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Boys/Girls Club-KCMO	03/16/98		X	X
Child Abuse Prevention Assoc.	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Comprehensive Mental Health	03/07/98	Yes	X	X
Crittenton	03/10/98		X	
DeLaSalle/Guadalupe	DeLaSalle Only		X	X
Don Bosco	03/30/98	Yes	X	X
Eastern Jackson Cty. Youth Court	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Full Employment Council	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Genesis School	03/16/98	Yes	X	X
Greater Kansas City LINC	03/13/98		X	X
Heart of America Family Svcs.	03/30/98		X	X
Hope House	03/16/98		X	X
Independence School District	n/a		X	X
Jackson Cty. Schools Collaborative	03/03/98		X	X
Kansas City Youth Court	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
KCMC Child Development Corp.	03/16/98	Yes	X	
Mattie Rhodes	03/13/98		X	X
NCADD	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Niles Home	03/11/98	Yes	X	X
Old Northeast	03/11/98	Yes	X	X
Operation Breakthrough	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Ozanam Home	03/05/98	Yes	X	X
Pan Educational Institute	03/04/98	Yes		X
Research Mental Health Center	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
Rose Brooks Center	03/13/98	Yes	X	X
Rose Brooks/Children's Place	03/25/98		X	X
Together Grandview	03/12/98	Yes	X	X
Troost Midtown Association	03/11/98	Yes		X
Troost Midtown Community Ctr.	03/20/98		X	X
Urban League-Break & Build	03/17/98	Yes	X	
Visible Horizons	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
WEB DuBois Learning Center	03/20/98		X	
Whatsoever Community Center	03/10/98	Yes	X	X
YWCA	03/10/98	Yes	X	X

also changed over time, especially in two areas: an increased emphasis on (a) targeting high-risk youth and high-risk neighborhoods rather than young people in general and (b) collaboration within the provider community and between providers and the criminal justice system. A prevention provider gave his perspective of these shifting priorities:

You have to read the RFP carefully because it changes every year. For example, last year there was less emphasis on jailing drug offenders and more on prevention and education. So I had to change my proposal from monitoring drug houses to working with police officers on linking kids with respite care or treatment while their mothers were being locked up. I had to identify referral resources to get these kids into treatment.

Although the COMBAT Commission has made important improvements in the process of awarding prevention and treatment contracts, as summarized in exhibit 5-10 and discussed below, problems remain.

*There are significant differences between providers' proposal budgets and final awards.* A comparison of the funds that applicants request and the budgets they are awarded shows that many ask for more money—frequently considerably more money—than both their previous years' allocation and what the commissioners actually recommend for award. For example, in 1991, Big Brothers and Sisters requested \$35,750 and was awarded \$10,000, Community Development Corporation requested \$150,550 and received \$30,000, and Guadalupe Center requested \$75,000 and received \$40,500. In 1996, Ad Hoc requested \$112,269 and was awarded \$75,000, and the Full Employment Council asked for \$100,000 and received \$55,000. There were even larger discrepancies among treatment providers. In 1993, Benilde Hall requested \$99,546 and received \$3,300, the Children's Place asked for \$32,100 and was awarded \$1,231, and Crittendon asked for \$313,090 and was awarded \$50,000. In fact, the commission cuts almost every budget.

Providers may bid high in the hopes of getting as much money as possible. The director of one commission-funded organization admitted, "I asked for \$70,000 and got \$50,000 even though they usually tell you won't get more funding [than the organization was awarded the previous year]."

*The commission reduces organizations' bids arbitrarily.* As discussed in the box "the COMBAT Commission 1997 Proposal Review Process," the COMBAT Commission reduced every organization's request that year by a percentage rather than tailoring the reduction to the amount of money each program actually needed to provide its proposed services. The commission used a formula to reduce bidders' costs because members felt the approach was objective. Because the approach did not reflect providers' actual financial

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## Exhibit 5-10

### Improvements (1994–1998) and Ongoing Problems with Provider Contracting

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Improvements	Ongoing Problems
<i>award process</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• independent reviewers hired to rate proposals</li><li>• bidders disqualified that fail to attend the pre-bid conference</li><li>• workshops offered to help organizations write proposals</li><li>• designed the COMBAT commission evaluation guide to assist reviewers</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• significant differences exist between providers' proposal and final awards</li><li>• the legislature awards contracts to some unsuccessful bidders and increases the budgets of some successful applicants without written explanation, making decisions appear less objective</li><li>• there is no <u>formal</u> process by which bidders who are dissatisfied with the COMBAT Commission's recommended award amounts or funding decisions can appeal</li><li>• the COMBAT Commission accepts late proposals</li></ul>
<i>award criteria</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RFPs limit focus to high-risk youth and high-risk neighborhoods</li><li>• RFPs require collaboration among providers</li><li>• award depends on previous compliance performance and achievement of program goals during previous years of COMBAT funding</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• funding a large number of prevention programs may spread the money too thinly to have an impact</li><li>• the commission requires providers to renew their contracts every year rather than every two years</li><li>• the commission's emphasis on evaluation and record keeping is limited</li></ul>
<i>reporting procedures</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• prevention providers must distinguish between clients and participants</li><li>• reports must document record of outcome achievement</li><li>• final monthly report must be an annual report</li><li>• separate commission prevention and treatment monitors will monitor provider performance through telephone calls and visits</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• few providers submit required evaluations of their activities</li><li>• the commission has not requested providers to submit missing evaluation reports</li><li>• providers have experienced delays in receiving reimbursement</li><li>• contract signing is often delayed two or more months</li><li>• some providers still request reimbursement for unauthorized expenditures</li><li>• some providers fail to submit reports for several months</li><li>• most providers furnish insufficient descriptions of their activities</li><li>• police departments do not provide useful information for evaluating the performance of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) officers</li></ul>



needs in order to provide their proposed services, the commission discontinued the practice in 1998. However, the problem of excessively high bids in relation to the available funding remains. In the past, when providers were awarded contracts at much lower funding levels than they had requested, their scopes of work were never changed. (See the box, "Variations between Three Prevention Provider Applicants' Proposed Budgets and Final Awards.") Instead, the providers simply failed to meet their contractual obligations to serve specified numbers of individuals or to implement specified activities, reporting that they lacked the funds to do so. When Susan Griffle became executive director, she negotiated a new scope of work individually with each provider to accommodate the reduced funding, as well as allowing the providers time to attempt to make up the difference in the reduced funding from other funding sources. However, this approach is time consuming. (Treatment providers, of course, can easily accommodate the reduced budget by decreasing the number of units of treatment—for example, individual counseling sessions—they will provide.) The commission could improve the award process by warning providers that submissions that exceed their previous year's budget by more than 5 percent will be rejected.

*The legislature awards contracts and it increases the budgets of successful applicants without providing a written explanation.* The legislature's Anti-Drug Committee can alter the COMBAT Commission's funding recommendations. This has occurred after community groups or applicants themselves have telephoned legislators to complain because their proposals were rejected on substantive grounds or because of late submission, or because the applicants wanted more money than the commission recommended. As a result, the legislature has sometimes increased these organizations' budgets or funded programs the commission has rejected. According to one provider, "Legislators funded . . . programs that are well connected and publicized by the media." The COMBAT Commission study of prevention providers reported that "The provider perception is that funding decisions are

### **Variations between Three Prevention Provider Applicants' Proposed Budgets and Final Awards**

There are considerable differences between the amount of money prevention providers request in their proposals and the amounts the COMBAT Commission recommends to the legislature.

- A 1994 proposal from the East Meyer Community Association offered for \$49,000 to establish 12 trained crime watch teams and establish 24 block clubs. The association planned to "utilize existing staff to provide guidance and manage the programs under this proposal," including 20 percent time for the current executive director and the assistant director, and 50 percent for the current neighborhood marketing specialist. The association proposed to hire a full-time crime specialist for the project. The legislature approved a contract for \$18,000, or 37 percent of the original request, funding only the crime specialist. The contract required the association to establish 6 (versus 12) crime watch teams, 12 (versus 24) block clubs—but also run 4 anti-drug prevention workshops for 100 youth. The association was therefore expected with about one-third of its original budget to do half its original scope of work and, in addition, to add

workshops. The reduction in funds was thus not commensurate with the reduction in scope of work: the association had a budget reduction that was significantly greater than the reduction in its scope of work.

- A proposal from Genesis School listed 10 activities it planned to conduct, ranging from “training . . . will be provided to the police academy” to “publish 60,000 copies of the youth-generated Tour Guide.” The original proposal requested \$59,000, including \$13,000 for a program director, \$21,000 for a performing arts costs, and \$17,000 in direct costs, ranging from student stipends to media public relations. The \$33,000 contract, as awarded, included some of the same activities but added others not in the original proposal, including a requirement to “provide an anti-drug prevention program that develops the self-sufficiency and self-esteem of students . . . through community service activities” and “provide anti-drug prevention skills training as part of applied learning curriculum in the areas of studio/engineering/reporting/interviewing skills to eight to ten students . . . once per month for twelve months.”
- A proposal from Blue Hills Homes Corporation offered to employ two full-time staff to form crime prevention tenant associations in two housing complexes. The associations would watch for criminal activity, establish a system to receive and screen complaints from residents, and disseminate information on crime prevention. The corporation submitted a budget of \$55,000 to continue its previous activities in this area (\$30,000) and establish a new site (\$25,000). The contract that was signed was for \$19,360 to continue Blue Hill’s community crime watch and drug education program for tenants in the housing complex in which it had already been active. The contracted amount eliminated funding for materials, rental costs, and other indirect expenses, and reduced personnel reimbursement from \$27,000 to \$18,825. However, despite a reduction of 37 percent for this continuation work, the contracted scope of work for the organizations’ continuing work does not seem to be significantly different than the scope described in its proposal. Since no activity was quantified (e.g., number of tenant meetings to attend), it is possible that the organization planned—and did—every originally proposed activity but at a reduced level of effort.

occasionally unfair . . . when elected officials make exceptions to the rules and procedures and change the allocations of the COMBAT Commission.” (See the box “The County Legislature’s Role in the Funding Process.”) A county legislator agreed, observing that “other members [of the legislature] override the commission’s funding recommendations because funding certain established organizations helps get them public support and votes.” Another legislator observed, however, that

the COMBAT Commission is an advisory body to the elected officials in Jackson County . . . . The legislature . . . must continue to be the governmental body which decides which programs and agencies receive funding . . . . Typically, the legislature respects the recommendations of the commission, but at times it may add or delete certain programs for reasons it believes serve the best interests of our community.

According to an observer, while the COMBAT Commission does not argue forcefully with the legislature on these funding issues, neither do the commissioners try to award contracts they think the legislature will want. Rather, commissioners adhere scrupulously to their own

### **The County Legislature's Role in the Funding Process for Prevention Providers**

Political pressure on how COMBAT awards funds to prevention programs has existed since COMBAT's inception. When the prosecutor's office was issuing RFPs and awarding contracts, the legislature did not try to fund other programs because of the prosecuting attorney's influence and ability to give legislators "cover" for not funding anyone else. However, the prosecutors themselves were under pressure from the community to fund certain local residents and groups because the prevention component was the only part of COMBAT which reached out to the whole community and which the whole community could play a part in. As a result, when COMBAT began funding citywide prevention agencies, there were complaints from some community organizations that COMBAT was "moving away from the neighborhoods"—the source of the Anti-Drug Tax votes. Neighborhood representatives said, "We passed the tax, so we want these programs." As a result, the prosecuting attorney's office funded some programs that were unlikely to directly further COMBAT's mission.

Prevention programs are the most likely COMBAT component to be subject to community pressure. On the one hand, treatment providers must have beds and certified counselors to justify an award or increased funding, and their services are fairly straightforward. On the other hand, many community-based organizations can claim they can "do prevention" even though they lack the expertise or their proposed services fall outside the scope of COMBAT's mission.

After the creation of the COMBAT Commission in 1996, the pressure from local groups to fund favorite organizations no longer fell on the prosecutor but instead landed on the legislature, since legislators, given the responsibility of approving the commission's recommendations, were in a position to adjust and make awards of their own. The legislature funded two prevention agencies in 1997 whose proposals the commission had rejected—the Jackson County Schools Collaborative for \$55,000 and the Troost Midtown Association for \$17,550. Legislators increased seven contractors' awards by an average of nearly \$14,500 each, for a total of \$101,421. In some cases, the changes represented a relatively large increase over the original award—from \$24,200 to \$41,250 in one case and from \$36,400 to \$55,000 in another. In 1998, the legislature overrode the commission's new compliance criterion (see the text). The commission reduced a provider's proposed budget from \$110,000 to \$75,000 because of its inadequate compliance record the previous year, but the legislature reinstated the full amount of the award, taking the money from a provider that had a score of 99 for compliance.

In some cases, the legislature secures the needed additional money for these programs by borrowing against the COMBAT Commission's future funding. In other cases, the Legislature uses the commission's surplus to fund them.

However, when the legislature in 1996 used money to fund three agencies which the commission had not recommended for funding, it transferred money to pay for the programs from a fund that was to have paid for evaluations of the prevention providers' activities. The legislators said that they would return the money to the evaluation pot at a later time. They did.

award criteria. Furthermore, the legislature has never rejected any of the awards the commission has recommended. A formal and public appeals process by which unsatisfied bidders could explain why they feel they deserve more money, or why they should received funding, would help to rationalize the process of the legislature's altering the COMBAT Commission's recommendations and reduce the perception among other providers that the legislature has "played favorites." By providing a formal avenue for contesting commission recommendations, an appeal process would bring the disagreements between the commission and these unhappy providers into the open, requiring both commission members and legislators to articulate the basis for their funding recommendations (commission) and decisions (legislature). Finally, when legislators fund an agency that the commission believes is organizationally not up to par, they could include requirements in the contract that specify required improvements in its procedures (e.g., accounting, oversight, reporting) and make provision for COMBAT staff to provide technical assistance in complying with the required improvements.

*The COMBAT Commission accepts late proposals despite instructions to bidders in every COMBAT RFP to "deliver [your proposal] . . . no later than 3:00 p.m. C.D.T. on [date], otherwise your bid will be **REJECTED**." [emphasis in the original]* A newspaper and the legislature criticized the commission for this practice. As a result, the commission proposed, and the legislature approved, a penalty system for late proposals: late applicants that are awarded contracts lose 10 percent of their funding; the second time organizations are late, they lose 50 percent; the third time, the proposals are not considered. Commission members explained the process to all bidders at the 1997 mandatory pre-bid conference. The commission even agreed to stamp proposals in the courthouse parking lot so bidders could not blame slow elevators for late submissions. As a result, there were no late proposals that year. However, at one commission meeting, after it was announced that the RFP process had ended, two providers who had missed the deadline asked for "emergency" funding until the next funding cycle. One agency administrator brought two recovering alcoholics and explained he would lose his halfway house beds without the funding. The commission refused to provide the funds.

This approach may not be the most desirable method of motivating on-time proposal submissions. If bidders are penalized with budget cuts, they will have to adjust their scopes of work, perform the work with inadequate compensation, or provide less quality service. In addition, accepting late proposals may contribute to the impression that the program is unfair: one provider reported that "Treatment providers believe that COMBAT funding is political. Every year some providers turn proposals in late, but they still get funded."

*Funding a large number of prevention programs may result in spreading the money too thinly to have an impact on the drug problem through any one program or type of prevention activity.* Several awards to prevention providers have been under \$10,000, including one for \$3,000. One organization refused to agree to a contract that involved cutbacks in its

proposed budget because the money being offered was too small to justify the paperwork and other administrative burdens involved in being a COMBAT contractor. In a related matter, funding several different types of prevention activities—mentoring, tutoring, remedial education, parent training, teacher training, social activities, youth courts, mobile crime watches, and so forth—may fail to bring significant results in any one of these areas because the total amount of resources given to each is too small. The commission might have more of an impact in preventing substance abuse if it provided more significant funding for fewer approaches—for example, just for truancy prevention or parental skills training.

*Forcing organizations to bid every year to renew their contracts is inefficient.* Single-year contracts give the commission extra leverage in monitoring providers and reduce the chances of wasting considerable amounts of money because the contracts in effect have “sunset” clauses. However, in 1993 the Legislature’s Special Advisory Panel report recommended “. . . the elimination of single year restrictions on funding . . . .” The director of a COMBAT-funded prevention organization reported that “Bidding annually is a problem because of the time it takes.” A treatment provider said that annual proposals were “time consuming and inefficient.” Single-year funding may also increase program instability, administration costs, and staff turnover by making it difficult for providers to develop long-range plans. In addition, conducting the award process every year consumes an enormous amount of the commissioners’ and executive director’s time that could be more profitably spent monitoring provider performance. Furthermore, as many as half the providers funded by the commission—especially, the treatment providers—have received funding for five or more years. Finally, it is difficult for providers and the commission alike to evaluate some longer-term outcomes in only a one year period. As a result, the commission was considering switching to a two-year funding cycle.

*Some providers have experienced delays in receiving reimbursement.* While many COMBAT-funded providers reported that in the past that it could take several months before the county pays them for services rendered, administrators at three of 16 prevention providers and 3 of 7 treatment providers whom Kauffman Foundation interns interviewed by telephone in August 1997 on behalf of Abt Associates reported that late payments were still a problem. One said, “Sometimes we have to ask three or four times before receiving payment.” Another said, “We weren’t paid for the first six months because we could not make contact with the audit person,” while a third reported, “It took too long to get our money during the first five months of the grant.” A staff member of one organization reported that her contract began in October 1995, but the organization did not receive its first payment until June 1996. Providers whom Abt Associates’ own staff interviewed by telephone and in person in 1997 and 1998 also reported delays, adding that tardy payments create a cash flow problem for paying their staff. For community-based agencies with little or no capital, this is a serious concern.

Several providers reported in 1997 and 1998 that payment delays had declined. As one provider said, "Initially, they [the county] were slow in paying invoices, but that's changed." Another said, "We got our first payment three months late, but the administration is better than it used to be." A review of the COMBAT Commission's records for payment request received and date paid for prevention providers from July 1997 through December 1997 shows that most bills were paid within two weeks.

COMBAT participants and observers report that the Fiscal Commission and, later, the COMBAT Commission have lacked the staff to process invoices in a timely fashion. It appears that payments are delayed at the beginning of each new contract because it takes the county several months to sign the contracts, even though providers have already begun providing services. Some payment delays occur because providers do not submit proper invoices. According to Susan Griffle, many invoices contain errors and, until providers resubmit them correctly, several weeks can transpire. For example, Griffle authorized payment for provider services or purchases only upon receipt of canceled checks indicating the service had been provided or the purchase completed, and providers sometimes do not include the checks with their reimbursement requests. Furthermore, many providers do not bill for services every month but wait two or more months before billing for all the previous months' expenses. For example, one provider submitted an invoice in January 1997 covering services provided from June through December 1996. A memorandum from Christopher Madden, the county's former internal COMBAT auditor (see below), reported that "Currently [i.e., as of July 1997], we have four providers who have not submitted final billings for 1996. One provider has not billed since May 1996." Despite efforts by Griffle and Madden's COMBAT-funded assistant, Stuart Baker, to get providers to submit bills on time with warnings that they will not be paid unless they do, some providers still submit late bills. Baker refused to pay one bill that was a year late because the COMBAT money had already gone into the untouchable unappropriated surplus. There is now a clause in the providers' contracts that indicates they may lose their money if they do not bill in timely fashion.

### **Quality Control: The Provider MIS**

The discussion below examines the two principal approaches COMBAT took to ensure quality control among prevention and treatment providers that receive COMBAT funds:

- development of an MIS system and
- requiring providers to submit progress reports.

Collecting even basic data about the number of individuals served and their demographics is essential for knowing how to improve services. For example, if the data show that 30 percent of treatment clients are receiving case management services, COMBAT may conclude this is too small a proportion and increase the case management requirements in its provider contracts. If the data show that a large number of African Americans are completing



detoxification programs, COMBAT needs to make sure there are culturally appropriate treatment providers available for the next stage of treatment. If men are dropping out of treatment, COMBAT can use this information to learn why they are discontinuing treatment and then fund approaches that improve retention rates. In short, COMBAT needs *clinical* information about what providers are doing in order to determine what they and COMBAT should be doing *operationally* to improve recovery.

Treatment programs often contest that research data are items that they can rarely afford to luxury of collecting given the immediate service needs of their clientele. We agree. However, there are pieces of information critical to both treatment delivery and research which can be collected at the same juncture. For example, assessment of the needs of a client entering treatment has long been seen as the most effective way to deliver services to that client. If the client has problems with comorbid mental illness, his or her mental health needs have to be met along with any detoxification or drug treatment needs. Consequently, most programs have developed assessment tools to be used at intake into treatment to help them better match available resources to client needs.

The data collected in assessment are, in fact, often the same data needed for monitoring treatment programming and for research and evaluation. Client characteristics can seriously affect program performance. Programs with a high proportion of dual diagnosed clients or more severely drug and crime involved clients are likely to have lower overall completion or success rates than those programs that attract a less problematic clientele. While programs often rely on anecdotal or testimonial evidence about their client base, analysis of their client profiles matched against measures of success can provide empirical evidence of true program performance. This information is not available, however, without some sacrifice of time. Intake staff need to collect data in a uniform format and update them as needed, a task often seen as cumbersome, particularly if it is identified as a "research" need. In fact, intake staff and treatment staff collect and record these data anyway, most often in the clinical notes and interview information contained in the client's file. Unfortunately, in the traditional clinical notes format, data can not be aggregated across cases for a program nor can it easily be summarized for a client to characterize his/her service participation (beyond how many times he or she came in, which is usually kept for billing purposes).

In 1995, COMBAT attempted to develop a provider-wide assessment instrumentation and follow-up data collection procedure designed to secure the same information about clients and services from every provider so that the data could be aggregated and compared. COMBAT funded a company outside the county to provide software for a needs assessment of treatment clients, process data, and descriptions of the treatment population and outcome information. While providers were able to use the instrument, lack of software supplies stalled the data collection. The contractor then delayed data analysis of the collected cases due to a disagreement with the COMBAT Commission over contract payment. When eventually

submitted, the contractor's report was simplistic and failed to provide any follow-up information.

In the final analysis, the client tracking system purchased for treatment providers was used only by a sample of providers and not consistently. According to Susan Griffle, approximately 3,000 assessments were distributed to agencies, but only 1,600 proved useful. Problems COMBAT encountered included viruses on the diskettes, limited data provided, and lack of provider identification features on the instrument. A new instrument (ISAP) has been developed and is in use.

In both cases, there is resistance from providers to participating in a system which links them to other systems. Sometimes that resistance is expressed in the form of concern over confidentiality of the data and protection of their clients' privacy. These concerns are real but can be addressed through a variety of mechanisms—stripping common data of identifiers, encoding data before transfer, to name only two. The real task is to convince providers that the exercise is not only one in which their program performance can be more fairly assessed but also one in which they can generate both client level reports and program level reports of activities and progress far more accurately and simply than they currently are able.

#### **Quality Control: Provider Reports**

As summarized in exhibit 5-11, a limited review of selected prevention provider progress reports suggests that *there have been significant deficiencies in the quality and usefulness of the reports*, including

- (1) insufficient descriptions of the providers' activities;
- (2) missing monthly and annual reports; and
- (3) failure to submit required evaluations of their activities.

*Inadequate activity descriptions.* Two Kauffman Foundation interns on loan to Abt Associates examined all available progress reports of a sample consisting of two prevention providers for 1992, three providers for 1993, two providers for 1994, and three providers for 1995 to determine whether the reports included descriptions of the providers' previous month's activities. Six prevention providers furnished activity descriptions with at least all but one of their progress reports. However, one provider did not include descriptions in two reports, two did not include descriptions in every report save one, and one did not include descriptions in any report. Progress reports frequently included numbers or lists of activities, materials, or participants without indicating the nature of the activities or how they furthered the provider's contractually stipulated objectives. The box "Many Prevention Provider Progress Reports Lack Detailed Activity Descriptions" provides illustrations of this deficiency.



## Ongoing Problems and Improvements with Provider Reports

Ongoing Problems	Improvements
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• most providers fail to provide detailed descriptions of their activities</li> <li>• many providers miss one or more monthly reports</li> <li>• most providers fail to submit annual reports</li> <li>• almost all providers fail to submit required evaluations of their activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the commission is implementing a new data collection instrument</li> <li>• a consultant has developed a uniform and improved reporting form</li> <li>• providers have been given a sample filled-in progress report</li> <li>• a grant writer provides providers technical assistance in writing acceptable reports</li> <li>• providers are required to make their final monthly progress report into an annual report</li> <li>• commission staff send reminder letters to agencies with overdue progress reports</li> </ul>

Prevention providers are supposed to complete a check list identifying the risk factors for substance abuse that their initiatives address. However, without a clear narrative discussion of how their activities address each risk factor, the form is not a useful tool by itself for monitoring providers' fulfillment of this provision of their contracts.

Some prevention provider progress reports do not indicate the nature of the services provided because activities may have been described in earlier reports or in the providers' proposals or contracts. However, each report should still refer readers to where the complete activity description may be found. Furthermore, without a detailed description in each progress report, readers do not know whether the services that were actually furnished are the same as the services identified in the contract or proposal.

### Many Prevention Provider Progress Reports Lack Detailed Activity Descriptions

The examples below illustrate the lack of activity documentation in most prevention providers' progress reports.

- Under "Document collaboration with law enforcement and other COMBAT initiatives," Genesis School's May 1996 progress report simply reports, "Genesis works with Boys & Girls Club, Family Court, Break and Build, Project Neighborhood, YMCA, YouthNet, or Genesis Communications. Genesis continues to work with Family Court youth on writing, radio, and

skill development. In April, the Media Leadership Project served 70 (unduplicated) court youth through Saturday School.”

- The April 1996 invoice from East Meyer Community Association listed 10,000 adults and 45 youth as the number of participants served or reached for the reporting month. This number appears to be based on the distribution of 8,000 fliers and 2,000 newsletters. The entire East Meyer community had a population of 21,698 according to the agency’s proposal.
- The December 1995 monthly report from the Blue Hills Homes Corporation included a list of the names and addresses of 22 organizations under the heading, “Identify and Form Relationship with Public Agencies,” without further explanation. Similarly, under the heading “interagency coordination” elsewhere in the report, the program wrote in, “Continuous collaborated effort” under Number of Activities, with the column “Type of Activity” left blank. Under the heading, “assistance in furthering the programs of Project Neighborhood,” the organization reported “On-going regular schedule activities & continuous program participation” without further elaboration.
- Many providers furnish lists of meetings staff attended. For example, a Sunshine Center progress report for June 1995 says, “During the month there were a number of meetings attended by the project coordinator—7 meetings in all. They were, The Anti-Drug Tax Provider Coalition, Fiscal Commission Meetings, the Kansas City Council on Drug Abuse, and the Independence Neighborhood Councils.” While the content and benefits of the provider and Fiscal Commission meetings are well known, there is no information regarding the benefits to COMBAT of attendance at the other meetings. There is no indication that attendance furthered collaboration and, if so, how. The September 1995 Sunshine Center progress report states that “. . . staff from Sunshine Center are collaborating with staff from the Visiting Nurses Association to help the mother learn to care properly for the child to ensure that the child is not abused again in the future.” However, the report gives no indication of what this collaboration involves.
- Under the category “Interagency Coordination,” a provider listed various types of activities (“parade,” “paper delivery,” “neighborhood meetings”) and agencies involved without indicating how the activities represent collaboration (as opposed to simply being present together at the same event).

Descriptions of services delivered are also frequently missing from treatment providers’ progress reports. The treatment RFP for 1997 specifies what the nature of individual and group counseling must be. For example, “Individual counseling must [be conducted] in accordance with the treatment plan to relieve symptoms and resolve problems related to drug abuse which interfere with the client’s ability to function in society.” However, most of the progress reports examined for this evaluation failed to document or verify the nature of the treatment provided. While the content of “counseling” sessions may seem standardized—helping clients to work through their substance abuse problems—in fact different providers use different treatment modalities, different counselors within the same organization may use different modalities, and the same counselors may use different

approaches with different clients, ranging from Rogerian client-centered "reflective" treatment to in-depth psychodynamic treatment to cognitive-behavioral approaches to here-and-now problem-solving approaches.

### **Some Progress Reports Provide Detailed Activity Descriptions**

A number of progress reports have included detailed accounts of project prevention activities.

- A progress report from the Full Employment Council lists every client served by name, employer, and hourly wage.
- A June 1993 invoice from Crittendon Chemical Dependency Program provided the following detailed explanation of program services:

The chemical dependency program continues to provide educational groups up to two times per week. These groups cover such information as: the medical aspects of chemical dependency, family roles, denial and defense mechanisms, warning signs of relapse, anger, grief and spirituality, etc. . . . Step groups are offered one time per week whereby patients are introduced to the 12 step programs of recovery and are assisted with written step work for steps 1-7.

- The Sunshine Center's progress reports for 1995 include detailed narrative descriptions of its activities for the previous month, typically one-and-one half single-space pages of text. For example, Sunshine's January 1995 progress report includes (in part) the following activity description:

During June, 1995 there was a total of 12 mothers that received services through the month. There was a lot of time devoted during the month to personal circumstances and/or crisis situations for many of those enrolled in the program. For instance, one mother had no food in the home to eat . . . The project coordinator got on the phone and helped the mother locate food assistance from the Community Services League and also helped the mother schedule an appointment at WIC (Women, Infant, Children Program) which provides vouchers for milk, juice, eggs, staples to help feed the children.

- De La Salle Education Center progress reports in 1993 provided detailed documentation of treatment services through a matrix that indicated for every client by name the number of outpatient individual counseling and case management sessions each received each month during the previous contract months. De La Salle's program report for May 1993 reports that "Individual Counseling sessions have dealt with abstinence from marijuana and alcohol, college preparation, health, life skills, and court ordered information concerning UAs, classroom behavior and attendance . . . . Group counseling sessions in May focused

on relapse prevention, P.C.P., drugs and domestic violence, and AIDS." The report then goes on to provide a case history of a student receiving services in the program.

- In addition to patient numbers, admission and discharge dates, number of relapsing clients, and demographic information, a treatment provider's January 1996 monthly report included the following narrative:

During the month of January 1996, [name of organization] provided residential services to 26 clients funded through the Anti-Drug Sales Tax. The total number of residential days was 274; average length of stay for these clients was 11 days. Eighteen clients admitted to the residential level of service completed their residential treatment and were discharged back to the community and/or into a less intense level of service. Clients served on an individual outpatient basis were 20 with an average number of outpatient visits of 3. Total clients served on an outpatient basis were 15; average number of groups per client were 12. Outpatient case management clients served were 22 and had an average number of 3.

*Missing reports.* Many prevention and treatment providers do not appear to have submitted a progress report every month. The Kauffman Foundation interns sought the 12 monthly progress reports for 10 prevention providers and four treatment providers for the years 1992-1994. COMBAT staff were able to provide all 12 reports for only seven of the 14 providers. This may be because some providers submitted progress reports for two or more previous months' activity. Submissions improved in 1995, when reports of all five providers sampled were available for every month.

COMBAT staff were unable to locate annual reports for most providers. A COMBAT participant explained that providers are not required to submit annual reports, but should be. Perhaps 10 of 50 prevention providers, the staff member said, have submitted annual reports. However, a contract with one prevention provider states that the "Organization shall submit an annual report . . . , and the 1994 prevention RFP requires contractors to submit "within 30 days of the end of the program . . . an overall accounting and activity report . . . ."

The box "Explanation for Inadequate Provider Reporting" presents reasons COMBAT participants offered for the providers' poor reporting performance, including provider inexperience, lack of resources and expertise, concerns about how the data would be used and whether they would cast the providers in a poor light, and political barriers. Because of these barriers, COMBAT administrators moved slowly and in an incremental fashion to achieve compliance with its reporting requirements, adding new reporting and evaluation conditions each RFP and contract year, and making firmer and firmer demands for the desired information.



*Lack of evaluation.* Since 1992, the COMBAT Commission has required prevention providers to submit an impact evaluation plan and evaluation.

- Prevention contracts in 1994 included a boilerplate section on Evaluation Requirements that noted that “In accordance with the advice of the Legislative Advisory Review Panel, the County shall require that evaluative outcomes be given priority status by the organization.” The contract requires the contractor to submit an “evaluation format” to the prosecutor within 60 days of the execution of the agreement.
- The 1997 prevention RFP proposal review criteria gave applicants up to five points for how well they described their evaluation plans in their proposals.
- The 1997 treatment RFP required that “The contractor shall provide an evaluation plan that will measure the outcomes of relapse, drug usage, and improved social functioning of the client. It shall measure outcomes of recidivism for those clients involved in the criminal justice system . . . . For those clients discharged, a sample of clients must be surveyed on a regular basis to determine if they have relapsed to drug use.”
- The COMBAT Commission’s 1997 request for supporting data asked contractors to “State the measurable outcome and evaluation method used for each objective” in their monthly progress reports and to “attach a copy of any program assessment/evaluation conducted during this reporting period.”

### **Explanations for Inadequate Provider Reporting**

There are several reasons many providers have had difficulty submitting detailed progress and final reports.

- Several participants and observers reported that many small providers lack the management controls, resources, and experience to submit useful progress reports. Some providers have never used a computer and were still submitting handwritten reports as of 1997 (see exhibit 5-12).
- Some providers were concerned about how the data would be used and who would have access to them in part, they reported, because of concerns about maintaining client confidentiality. However, most of the data being requested could not be linked with individual clients. At least some of the providers’ concerns may have been that the data might suggest they were not achieving the goals that COMBAT administrators, law enforcement agencies, and the public were expecting of them.

- It is politically difficult to terminate provider contracts or reject renewal requests simply because the agencies were inexperienced in preparing or reluctant to provide requested documentation. As a result, COMBAT lacked the clout of warning agencies they could lose their funding if they did not comply.
- Several COMBAT participants report they believed that the legislature's funding of agencies that the commission has not recommended for awards contributes to the providers' failure to collect and submit meaningful reports. According to these participants, legislatively-funded programs may conclude they do not have to submit progress reports because they believe the legislature will support them anyway. Even though the legislature overrides the commission to fund only one or two additional programs each year, these participants believe the action may send a message to all programs that they can act with impunity.
- COMBAT's reporting forms encouraged providers to focus on numbers to the neglect of descriptions by asking them to "Please provide data regarding the number of participants served or reached for this reporting month for each age group by the specific activity categories listed." According to another participant, "There was a numbers game: agencies reported just numbers, but the COMBAT Commission was at fault on this, too—it placed too much emphasis on collecting data. The commission needs to explain what data are needed, why, and how they will be used—there is a whole ethic in working with providers to get data."
- "COMBAT is trying to get uniform reporting," a provider observed, "but they change what they want every time we go in [for a contract renewal]." By changing the reporting forms, existing providers have to gear up to provide different data, or report them in a different manner, every year. "A uniform method of reporting is still not in place," the provider complained. The COMBAT Commission's 1997 request to providers for supporting data acknowledges in a note that "These forms are subject to change. We will be refining them as needed."
- A shortage of appropriate—or any—staff has prevented COMBAT from monitoring providers adequately. Under the Fiscal Commission, the two staff compliance monitors were service providers, when project managers might have been more effective in providing the needed oversight. During the changeover in November 1995 from the Fiscal Commission to the COMBAT Commission, the former body's staff were dismissed. Susan Griffie was not hired until October 1996, leaving the commission without effective staff for nearly a year. (A commissioner tried to fill the role of executive director during this period.) The treatment compliance monitor position remained vacant for many months at a time as at least two individuals hired for the position quit shortly after they began work. The position was vacant again as of July 1998. Even with two compliance monitors, it will be difficult to review 60 progress reports each month and provide on-site monitoring.

Despite these requirements, *many providers did not include evaluation plans in their proposals*. For example, the 1994 proposals from the East Meyer Community Association and Blue Hills Homes corporation contained no mention of evaluation approaches. The

**Exhibit 5-12  
Sample Treatment Provider Monthly Service Delivery Summary**

- COMBAT billings

Month: October 1996

PAT #	CASE MGMT.	Individual	GROUP
1142	1,1,10 (12)	94414155 (33)	446447844467774464
1445	44144 (17)	1145111 (14)	28444464748444264 44647787446448 (68)
1497	6,55 (63)	5,5, (10)	148444 (38)
1473	45,1,4,54 (68)	1415454111 (27)	666 (18)
1486			444444444
1492	17 (9)	651 (6)	4 (4)
1485			444
Hanson, M			4
1494			44444
1496			4
1487			4
1498	1 (1)	18 (9)	44444484 (40)
830	1,1,35 (37)	1,11,45 (2)	444444484444644484 46444 (108)
1481			4
1484			444
1491			44
Kenack, B			4
1495			4
C. address, R			
1498			
<b>Total UNITS</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>436</b>

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proposal from Genesis School reported that “We are requesting Division of Alcohol and Drug Abuse assistance to address the issue of evaluation. The evaluation format is to be determined but suggested components include questionnaires, focus groups, and interviews. An evaluation report will be generated . . . . The outcomes will become more specific as the leadership development process evolves.”

***Providers that did include evaluation plans generally offered methodologically inadequate approaches***, such as examining outcome measures that are in fact only intermediate or proxy measures of success. As the COMBAT Commission evaluation of providers concluded, “. . . many agencies have . . . confused staff activities or ‘outputs’ with ‘outcomes,’ which are defined as some change or benefit to the recipient.” For example, the outcome indicator for Blue Springs Youth Outreach is that 175 high-risk middle school age youth will be referred to the appropriate system for help. COMBAT may have encouraged this misuse of proxy measures as indicators of effectiveness when the prosecuting attorney office’s COMBAT administrators in their 1993 report to the Legislature’s Special Advisory Panel incorrectly defined as “outcomes” such activities as patrols, crime watches, hotlines, neighborhood betterment, training and consultation, role modeling, and “people who heard or saw lectures . . . and choral and theater productions.” Similarly, a COMBAT “Cumulative Summary of the Outcomes of the 1991 Prevention Program” included “1,915 interagency contacts affecting 9,904 people” and “18,662 recruitment, involvement, and commitment-building activities” that included “7,204 newsletter recipients.” Clearly, many providers had concepts of what is meant by the term “evaluation” that differed from the formal definition of the term.

The approaches to evaluating goal achievement that a few providers did develop have been methodologically unsound, most commonly due to lack of control or comparison groups, or the use of difficult-to-measure outcomes (e.g., increases in “self esteem” or increases in “neighborhood cohesiveness”). Few other prevention providers describe the type of meaningful and quantifiable outcomes that two providers developed: “75 percent of youth will be able to identify how the Hip Hop tour helped them to avoid using drugs” and “95 percent of youth court participants will not be arrested during the first six months after initial participation.”

***Once awarded the contract, few organizations appear to have conducted the evaluations they agreed to perform.*** Some even failed to take careful attendance among participants. The standard reporting form that the Fiscal Commission and, later, the COMBAT Commission, has furnished to prevention providers since 1992 asks them to record “Progress Toward Goals/Objectives of Your Program.” However, most providers seem to have included information under this rubric that did not provide empirical evidence of goal achievement. For example, one progress report noted that



East Meyer continues to provide positive youth activities to youth in the community. Planning and being informed of and involved with special events is very important. East Meyer [staff] have been attending the COMBAT meetings and some of the Commissioner's meetings to get more information for submission of the next proposal.

Susan Griffle, the COMBAT Commission's former executive director, reports that providers have been asked to do evaluations but have not been asked to submit them. According to James Nunnally, providers simply did not have the expertise or the money to evaluate their efforts, "so COMBAT for the time being has had to live with what they are capable of doing." COMBAT made evaluation a proposal requirement nonetheless, he said, to nudge providers along the evaluation road and to prevent the legislature from funding programs without requiring that they be evaluated.

### **Steps Taken to Improve Provider Accountability**

Observations of COMBAT Commission meetings and discussions with commission members, executive staff, other COMBAT participants, and observers indicate that the commissioners and former executive director were aware of and concerned about these reporting problems. As a result, *the COMBAT Commission has taken several steps to improve the quantity and quality of information providers submit.*

*Measures taken from 1996 to 1998 to improve providers' data quality.*

- As noted above, the COMBAT Commission had hired a systems development firm to design a data collection system for treatment providers, but problems with the provider's survey instrument and data collection procedures rendered the data useless. Once they understood the problems, the commissioners moved to terminate the researcher's contract and arrange to implement a new data collection instrument.
- Exhibit G of the 1997 evaluation RFP provides a description of the COMBAT Commission's audit policy. The exhibit indicates what the Jackson County Auditing Department looks for when auditing a COMBAT-funded treatment program, such as evidence from the diagnosis, presenting problem, drug and alcohol history, and treatment plan that the client uses illegal drugs, and a check stub, tax form, unemployment verification, Medicaid number, or other documentation showing that the client is eligible for treatment because he or she lives in Jackson County and his or her income does not exceed 150 percent of the poverty guidelines.
- In October 1997, Griffle began requiring providers to complete a new progress report form for submission each month. Exhibit 5-13 is an example of the new treatment form completed by a treatment provider; exhibit 5-14 is the new form completed by a prevention provider.

Exhibit 5-13


**COMBAT COMMISSION  
COMMUNITY DRUG TREATMENT SERVICES  
MONTHLY DATA REPORT**

Name of organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact: \_\_\_\_\_ Phone: \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Month:</b>	Total clients this month:	Total clients year -to-date:			
<b>February, 1998</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>117</b>			
<b>Category:</b>	This month	Year-to-date	<b>Level of care:</b>	This month	Year-to-date
New (unduplicated)	<b>22</b>	<b>0</b>	Level I	N/A	N/A
Continuing	<b>95</b>	<b>116</b>	Level II	N/A	N/A
Relapse	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	Level III	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Age</b>	This month	Year-to-date	Level IV	<b>22</b>	<b>33</b>
0-12	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	Level V		
13-17	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>Outpatient services:</b>	This month	Year-to-date
18-21	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	Individual counseling	<b>75</b>	<b>143</b>
over 21	<b>21</b>	<b>114</b>	Group counseling	<b>37</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>Gender:</b>	This month	Year-to-date	Group education		
Female	<b>6</b>	<b>31</b>	Intervention	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>
Male	<b>16</b>	<b>86</b>	Family counseling	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Ethnicity:</b>	This month	Year-to-date	Case management	<b>38</b>	<b>86</b>
African- American	<b>13</b>	<b>61</b>	Outreach		
Caucasian	<b>8</b>	<b>48</b>	Therap daycare -children's act.		
Hispanic	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	Child care		
Asian/Pacific Islander	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	Individual co-dependency	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
Native American	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	Group co-dependency		
Other	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	Recreational therapy		

Txprt1/092297



**Exhibit 5-14**

**COMBAT COMMISSION Data Survey for Prevention Providers**

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_ Month of: February 1998  
 Program Coordinator: \_\_\_\_\_ Phone: \_\_\_\_\_

		Total clients year-to-date: 230	Total participants year-to-date: 616			<b>Clients</b>		<b>Participants</b>	
		Total clients this month: 36	Total participants this month: 16	<b>Activities: (indicate all that apply)</b>		This Month	Year to date	This month	Year to date
				Case Management	6	57		7	
				Counseling					
				Crime Prevention	36	208		1	
				Neighborhood and Community Mobilization				1	
				Education	36	208		494	
				Literacy	36	208			
				Mentoring	36	208			
				Presentations		14	1	9	
				Social/sports					
				Job Training					
				Parent Training					
				Teacher/Tutor Training	12	115		10	
				Youth Training					
Age:	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date					
0-4	0	0		3					
5-9	12	75		96					
10-14	19	107		138					
15-19	5	48		60					
Adult			4	191					
Tutor			12	128					
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>616</b>					
Gender:	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date					
Male	15	103	6	318					
Female	21	127	10	298					
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>616</b>					
Ethnicity:	This month	Year to date	This month	Year to date					
African American	5	17		234					
Caucasian	6	36	12	303					
Hispanic	0	7	0	36					
Asian/Pacific Islander	0	0	0	9					
Native American	25	170	4	34					
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>616</b>					

Definitions:  
 Client: Person who undergoes formal assessment with a need identified and service provided/referred.  
 Participant: Person who participates in an education or awareness program.

Prepared by: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: 3/5/98

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- Exhibit 5-15 is another new form on which prevention providers are to identify measurable outcomes for the month and provide information on the nature of collaborative activities.
- The commission now gives providers a sample filled-in monthly progress report that illustrates the level of detail and type of information they expected to submit.
- Susan Griffle hired a grant writer for \$4,000 to teach prevention and treatment providers in small groups to write acceptable monthly progress reports. One provider reported she was “grateful that they [commission staff] had someone come in to tell me how to do the monthly reports.”
- Commission staff began sending reminder letters to agencies with overdue monthly reports.
- The commission is now requiring providers to make their final progress report an annual report.

*Measures taken in 1997 and 1998 to improve providers' self-evaluation.<sup>9</sup>*

- The 1997 prevention RFP requires bidders to
 

“ . . . outline specific program objectives . . . [that] focus on how the target population will benefit from the proposed [prevention] program. An example of a measurable objective is **“the grades of 100 5th graders will improve by one full grade after being placed in tutorial programs led by adult volunteers.”** **Funded programs will be required to submit quarterly benchmarks indicating progress towards stated outcome indicators . . . . All clients participating in a COMBAT-funded community drug prevention program must take a pre- and post-test to determine any changes in their awareness, understanding, actions, and attitudes.** [emphasis in the original]

Exhibit 5-16 is a page taken from the Eastern Jackson County Youth Court proposal to the COMBAT Commission that presents the type of evaluation objectives, outcomes, and measurements that are necessary to make a useful and valid assessment of the program's achievements.

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<sup>9</sup> Because these improvements are so recent and, in most cases, had not yet been implemented as of early 1998, information about the providers' implementation of the improvements could not be included in this evaluation.

# Exhibit 5-15

## Monthly Report Narrative for Prevention Providers

Month of: \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_

**COMBAT Goals:**

(that apply to your program)

- Provide services for high risk youth, particularly those services associated with literacy.
- Provide drug prevention services for Jackson County families.
- Strengthen existing community collaborations, systems, and environment to support a comprehensive community drug prevention strategy. Community collaborations include other COMBAT-funded initiatives and organizations such as drug treatment facilities and neighborhood groups, when deemed appropriate.
- Refer/place high-risk youth into appropriate community agencies so that the risk factors can be addressed successfully.

Program objectives this month (*progress toward goals & objectives as outlined in your proposal*):

Measurable outcomes this month:

Problems/opportunities encountered related to the program during this month:

Warning signs: (*please indicate warning signs addressed this month*)

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> substance abusing parents    | <input type="checkbox"/> pregnancy/has fathered a child | <input type="checkbox"/> drug houses        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> school dropout               | <input type="checkbox"/> interrupted parenting          | <input type="checkbox"/> unlit street lamps |
| <input type="checkbox"/> delinquent acts              | <input type="checkbox"/> absentee landlords             | <input type="checkbox"/> liquor stores      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> physical or mental condition | <input type="checkbox"/> codes violations               | <input type="checkbox"/> park areas         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> school failure               | <input type="checkbox"/> vacant properties              |   |

Community Collaboration (*with whom and the nature of the collaboration*):

Referrals (*include date of referral, who made referral, who was referred-gender, age, ethnicity, zip code-reason for referral, and outcome of referral*):

COMBAT meetings attended this month and feedback:

Public presentations (*please include description, date, and location*)

Exhibit 5-16

EXHIBIT A - Program Approach, Objectives & Outcomes

PROGRAM PHILOSOPHY/APPROACH (1-2 sentences only):

To improve the capacity of youth to become responsible and productive citizens

EACH program objective should be on a separate form, including identifying the appropriate COMBAT goal.

<p><b>PROGRAM OBJECTIVE:</b></p> <p>To serve as an early intervention program and to offer communities a swift response for approximately 95 first-time offenders</p>
<p><b>TARGET POPULATION:</b></p> <p>First-time offenders, between 8-17, residing in eastern Jackson County (Buckner, Grain Valley, Greenwood, Oak Grove, unincorporated areas of the Sheriff's Dep't.) who are referred [second time offenders are accepted when appropriate]</p>
<p><b>PROGRAM ACTIVITY:</b></p> <p>Court</p>
<p><b>MEASURABLE OUTCOME (outcome indicator):</b></p> <p>1) 95% of youth processed in the Youth Court program will successfully complete the program within 4 months of the date received in youth court office  2) In the calendar year 1998, 85% of convicted Youth Court offenders will not later be found guilty in the Family Court system</p>
<p><b>HOW OUTCOME WILL BE MEASURED:</b></p> <p>1) Written documentation of receipt, and closing date of the file  2) Recidivist lists will be checked by Family Court for any juvenile, under the age of 17, who has first been found guilty in Youth Court, then found guilty in Family Court</p>

WHICH GOAL DOES THE ABOVE PROGRAM OBJECTIVE SUPPORT? (check one).

- Provide services for high-risk youth through the achievement of life skills through asset-based programming.
- Provide drug prevention services for Jackson County families.
- Strengthen existing community collaborations, systems, and environment to support a comprehensive community drug prevention strategy.
- Refer/place high-risk youth into appropriate community agencies so that they will develop appropriate life skills through asset-based programming.

- As discussed above, the commission now recommends prevention agencies for continuation funding based on a formula that allocates 25 percent of the decision to the bidders' achievement of program outcomes.
- The 1998 prevention RFP will require providers to submit quarterly benchmarks indicating how well they have achieved their objectives.
- The 1997 treatment RFP specifies that
  - the contractor shall provide an evaluation plan that will measure the outcomes of relapse, drug usage, and improved social functioning of the client. It also shall measure outcomes of recidivism for those clients involved in the criminal justice system.
- The 1997-98 prevention proposal also required winning providers to distinguish between "clients" and program "participants," so that attendees at a provider presentation are considered participants in the organization's outreach efforts, not clients who received an actual program service (as in a seminar or training session).
- COMBAT Commission members and Susan Grifflie instituted a procedure by which the prevention and treatment compliance monitors will monitor provider performance through telephone calls and regularly scheduled site visits.

These forms illustrate the COMBAT's strategy of taking incremental steps toward increasing provider accountability. Other steps the COMBAT Commission has taken include requiring three separate contract deliverables—an evaluation plan, an interim progress report on its implementation, and a final evaluation report, with full reimbursement contingent on the submission of each report. A final step the commission might take is requiring providers to use a fixed amount or proportion of their program funds for evaluation purposes

## **Auditing of COMBAT-funded Criminal Justice Agencies Has Been Adequate**

Retailers pay the Anti-Drug Sales Tax to the State of Missouri, which transfers the money to the Jackson County division of finance, which segregates the money in a separate account. The discussion below first reviews how the county disburses the monies. The text then describes the auditing procedures for COMBAT's principal components. A separate section follows that examines auditing procedures for prevention and treatment providers funded by the COMBAT Commission.

Since 1995, each year, *the county finance department determines the amount of money each agency can request based on the percentage formula in the legislation.* Exhibit 5-17 shows the dollar amounts and percentage of the Anti-Drug Tax that each COMBAT component was allocated in 1997. The money includes \$3.3 million in the COMBAT surplus account, amortized over three years among all initiatives. Whereas in the past the legislature allocated the surplus after the fact, it now allocates it year by year based on a percentage of projected revenues. If the legislature collects more than the projected amount of COMBAT revenues in a given year, it adds to its budget projection for the following year. However, because the county revenue department is reported to be very conservative, COMBAT participants anticipate there will always be a surplus.

### **Budget Submission Process**

Each year, the prosecuting attorney submits its own proposed line item budget for COMBAT spending (including separate budgets for Drug Court, the Grant Match Program, the community prosecution initiative, the Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division, and the Anti-Drug Prosecution Unit) to the county executive, who in turn submits the budget to the county legislature for enactment. The prosecuting attorney also submits the budgets of the Kansas city police department and the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force to the county executive for transmission to the legislature. However, the prosecuting attorney and county executive have no actual control over how the law enforcement agencies spend their COMBAT funds, and the county executive has no control over how the prosecuting attorney spends her COMBAT funds. Circuit Court and the COMBAT Commission (which includes budgets for prevention and treatment providers and the D.A.R.E. program) submit their budgets to the county executive, as well. The county executive develops her own COMBAT corrections budget for submission to the legislature, since the jail comes under her jurisdiction.

The prosecuting attorney determines how she will use her COMBAT monies each year by asking the heads of her COMBAT-funded divisions—the Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division, Drug Court, Neighborhood Justice Program (which operates the community prosecution unit and Drug Abatement Response Team [DART]), and the Anti-Drug Prosecution Division—what their needs are for meeting their COMBAT responsibilities. Senior Kansas City police department administrators determine how they wish to use their COMBAT allocation, and the executive director of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force, with the approval of its board of directors, identifies how the task force proposes to use its allocation. The Circuit Court's budget committee approves giving about two-thirds of its allocation to Family Court, using its own one-third to fund Docket O. The director of Family Court decides how he proposes to use his COMBAT allocation. He submits his budget for approval to the governing body of the Circuit Court (all judges sitting en banc).



## Exhibit 5-17 1998 COMBAT Budget Allocation

	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>ALLOCATION</u>
<b><u>KANSAS CITY POLICE</u></b>		
	9.50%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,719,500
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		45,692
Unspent 1996 allocation		-
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		152,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>1,917,192</u></b>
<b><u>JACKSON CO DRUG TASK FORCE</u></b>		
	9.50%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,719,500
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		45,692
Unspent 1996 allocation		37,947
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		152,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>1,955,179</u></b>
<b><u>PROSECUTOR:</u></b>		
<b><u>REGULAR</u></b>		
	9.50%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,719,500
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		45,692
Unspent 1996 allocation		169,854
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		152,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>2,087,046</u></b>
<b><u>DEFERRED</u></b>		
	6.00%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,086,000
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		28,838
Unspent 1996 allocation		124,966
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		96,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>1,335,824</u></b>
<b><u>COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION</u></b>		
	7.50%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,357,500
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		36,073
Unspent 1996 allocation		32,165
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		120,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>1,545,738</u></b>
<b><u>TREATMENT</u></b>		
	15.00%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		2,715,000
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		72,146
Unspent 1996 allocation		177,904
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		240,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>3,205,050</u></b>
<b><u>GRANT MATCH FUND</u></b>		
	10.00%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,810,000
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		48,097
Unspent 1996 allocation		148,430
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		160,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>2,166,527</u></b>
<b><u>DARE</u></b>		
	6.00%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		1,086,000
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		28,838
Unspent 1996 allocation		-
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		96,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>1,210,838</u></b>
<b><u>COURTS</u></b>		
	12.00%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		2,172,000
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		57,716
Unspent 1996 allocation		131,122
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		192,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>2,552,838</u></b>
<b><u>CORRECTIONS</u></b>		
	15.00%	
Percent of 1998 revenue		2,715,000
Previous surplus alloc. in 1995		72,146
Unspent 1996 allocation		587,771
Percent of available 1996 surplus alloc. in 1997		240,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b><u>3,614,917</u></b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b><u>21,591,169</u></b>

The County executive and legislature rarely question the proposed spending plans. However, once the legislature has approved a budget, *the agency may not shift monies among line items without legislative approval*. As a result, for example, when the Kansas City police department wanted to transfer some COMBAT funds earmarked for hiring investigators to buy a new drug dog, it had to secure the legislature's approval. Similarly, when the Missouri Department of Public Safety offered to provide the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force with \$10,000 for gas masks if COMBAT would provide a \$5,000 match, the task force executive director had to secure approval from the legislature to use COMBAT funds for this purpose.

### **Disbursement of COMBAT Funds**

With one exception, none of the funded agencies receives its monies up front; rather, they bill the county for expenditures after the fact. This results in a paper trail of how the agencies have used their COMBAT monies and helps prevent unallowable expenditures. In the one exception, the legislature provides the COMBAT Commission with each year's Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) allocation up front for redistribution to participating law enforcement agencies. In another special arrangement, the prosecuting attorney's office submits requests to the legislature to make appropriations to individual grantees of the Grant Match Program, and the county pays the grantees directly.

### **Auditing Procedures**

Each year the county finance department prepares a Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) of all county government agencies. The report is prepared to inform the county executive, legislature, creditors, and general public of the county's financial condition and the financial results of its operations. As shown in exhibit 5-18, the 1996 CAFR (the most recent year for which the audit was available) lists separate balances for COMBAT revenues and expenditures. A national auditing firm, Peat Marwick LLP, conducts an independent audit of each CAFR but includes no separate discussion of COMBAT in its report. However, as discussed, there are other audits that some COMBAT-funded agencies have used. *These audits have revealed only two possible cases of fraud involving misuse of COMBAT funds by any agency or organization.*

*Prosecuting attorney's office.* As explained in detail in the following section, the county legislature's COMBAT-funded auditor, Stuart Baker, audits prevention and treatment providers funded by the county legislature. Baker reports that he is also responsible for auditing the prosecuting attorney's use of COMBAT funds but has not had time to do so. The prosecuting attorney's Grant Match Program administrator is responsible for monitoring how recipients of grant match funds spend their money. However, she does not—and is not qualified to—conduct a formal fiscal audit. The prosecuting attorney expects the principal funding source for each grant match recipient to conduct its own audit of the grantee organization, since COMBAT provides no more than one quarter of the funding. Because

## Exhibit 5-18

JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI  
 SCHEDULE OF REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE  
 BUDGET AND ACTUAL (BUDGETARY BASIS)  
 ANTI-DRUG SALES TAX FUND  
 FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996  
 WITH COMPARATIVE ACTUAL AMOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995

	1996			1995		
	ORIGINAL BUDGET	REVISIONS	FINAL BUDGET	ACTUAL	VARIANCE FAVORABLE (UNFAVORABLE)	ACTUAL
<b>REVENUES:</b>						
<b>Taxes:</b>						
Sales Taxes	\$ 16,850,190	\$ 209,810	\$ 17,060,000	\$ 17,505,691	\$ 445,691	\$ 16,930,828
Total Taxes	16,850,190	209,810	17,060,000	17,505,691	445,691	16,930,828
<b>Intergovernmental:</b>						
State Grants	-	230,883	230,883	161,833	(69,050)	118,449
Federal Grants	-	2,653,443	2,653,443	950,352	(1,703,091)	315,018
Total Intergovernmental	-	2,884,326	2,884,326	1,112,185	(1,772,141)	433,467
<b>Fines And Forfeitures:</b>						
Court Fees	13,000	-	13,000	21,309	8,309	19,193
Total Fines And Forfeitures	13,000	-	13,000	21,309	8,309	19,193
Interest	1,220,000	-	1,220,000	1,437,299	217,299	1,435,418
Miscellaneous	-	-	-	-	-	50,246
<b>TOTAL REVENUES</b>	<b>\$ 18,083,190</b>	<b>\$ 3,094,136</b>	<b>\$ 21,177,326</b>	<b>\$ 20,076,484</b>	<b>\$ (1,100,842)</b>	<b>\$ 18,869,152</b>

Continued

## Exhibit 5-18, continued

JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI  
 SCHEDULE OF REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND CHANGES IN FUND BALANCE  
 BUDGET AND ACTUAL (BUDGETARY BASIS)  
 ANTI-DRUG SALES TAX FUND  
 FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996  
 WITH COMPARATIVE ACTUAL AMOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995  
 Continued

	1996			1995		
	ORIGINAL BUDGET	REVISIONS	FINAL BUDGET	ACTUAL	VARIANCE FAVORABLE (UNFAVORABLE)	ACTUAL
<b>EXPENDITURES:</b>						
<b>Current:</b>						
General Government:						
Legislative Function:						
Legislative Auditor	\$ 48,200	\$ -	\$ 48,200	\$ 40,233	\$ 7,967	\$ 41,291
Judicial Functions:						
Family Court	1,592,177	61,192	1,653,369	1,581,471	71,898	1,497,338
Circuit Court	157,966	575,550	733,516	666,585	66,931	613,622
Prosecuting Attorney:						
Criminal	1,685,034	187	1,685,221	1,517,149	168,072	1,327,979
Prevention	-	36,628	36,628	(20,323)	56,951	366,627
Deferred Prosecution	1,205,660	189,851	1,395,511	1,195,681	199,830	1,179,863
Drug Abatement Response Team	-	-	-	-	-	382,916
Drug Court	25,198	-	25,198	25,257	(59)	24,089
Kauffman Foundation	-	125,000	125,000	-	125,000	62,500
Drug Court Enhancement Grant	-	738,260	738,260	328,779	409,481	-
Non-Departmental:						
Fiscal Commission:						
Administrative	-	18,435	18,435	(263)	18,698	262,489
Outside Agencies	-	220,963	220,963	(62,653)	283,616	2,915,919
Kauffman Foundation	-	-	-	-	-	62,500
Other	-	107,000	107,000	35,216	71,784	107,000
<b>Total General Government</b>	<b>4,714,235</b>	<b>2,073,066</b>	<b>6,787,301</b>	<b>5,307,132</b>	<b>1,480,169</b>	<b>8,844,133</b>
<b>Public Safety:</b>						
Division of Administration:						
Corrections Department	1,247,150	25,506	1,272,656	1,059,565	213,091	1,098,464
Corrections Department - Boarding	627,200	-	627,200	251,240	375,960	388,922
Jail Construction	-	-	-	(12,254)	12,254	-
Fiscal Grant Match	-	231,425	231,425	(32,595)	264,020	904,602
Drug Court Treatment	-	66,676	66,676	-	66,676	176,400
Prosecuting Attorney:						
COMBAT Treatment	2,818,949	230,376	3,049,325	2,819,350	229,975	-
COMBAT Crime Prevention	1,416,974	(55,307)	1,361,667	1,349,775	11,892	-
COMBAT DARE Program	1,121,579	(104,853)	1,016,726	1,016,726	-	-
Multi-Jurisdictional	1,501,403	200,882	1,702,285	1,663,410	38,875	1,356,501
Kansas City Police Department	1,600,000	230,000	1,830,000	1,830,000	-	1,591,253
Sheriff	83,890	-	83,890	81,921	1,969	83,017
Sheriff DARE Program	-	51,578	51,578	30,455	21,123	-
Grant Match	1,887,698	(214,662)	1,673,036	1,546,390	126,646	565,568
Criminal Justice Treatment	-	1,172,433	1,172,433	606,975	565,458	24,024
Drug Court Treatment	-	104,905	104,905	-	104,905	245,000
Substance Abuse Treatment 1994-95	-	-	-	-	-	74,121
Substance Abuse Treatment 1995-96	-	-	-	-	-	76,947
STOP 1996-97	-	142,350	142,350	86,413	55,937	-
Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force 1995-96	-	155,498	155,498	68,231	87,267	-
Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force 1994-95	-	481,903	481,903	481,900	3	462,329
Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force 1996-97	-	-	-	-	-	168,098
<b>Total Public Safety</b>	<b>12,304,843</b>	<b>3,185,377</b>	<b>15,490,220</b>	<b>12,927,454</b>	<b>2,562,766</b>	<b>7,215,246</b>
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>17,019,078</b>	<b>5,258,443</b>	<b>22,277,521</b>	<b>18,234,586</b>	<b>4,042,935</b>	<b>16,059,379</b>
<b>EXCESS OF REVENUES OVER (UNDER)   EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>1,064,112</b>	<b>(2,164,307)</b>	<b>(1,100,195)</b>	<b>1,841,898</b>	<b>2,942,093</b>	<b>2,809,773</b>
<b>OTHER FINANCING SOURCES (USES):</b>						
Operating Transfers In	-	-	-	5,000	5,000	5,000
Operating Transfers Out	(9,300,000)	(11,339,245)	(20,639,245)	(20,639,245)	-	(109,000)
<b>EXCESS OF REVENUES AND OTHER FINANCING   SOURCES OVER (UNDER) EXPENDITURES   AND OTHER FINANCING USES</b>	<b>\$ (8,235,888)</b>	<b>\$ (13,503,552)</b>	<b>\$ (21,739,440)</b>	<b>(18,792,347)</b>	<b>\$ 2,947,093</b>	<b>2,705,773</b>
<b>FUND BALANCE - BEGINNING OF YEAR</b>				<b>25,885,549</b>		
<b>ENCUMBRANCES OUTSTANDING - BEGINNING OF YEAR</b>				<b>(2,717,126)</b>		
<b>ENCUMBRANCES CANCELED</b>				<b>-</b>		
<b>ENCUMBRANCES OUTSTANDING - END OF YEAR</b>				<b>2,989,963</b>		
<b>FUND BALANCE - END OF YEAR</b>				<b>\$ 7,366,039</b>		
					<b>\$ 25,885,549</b>	

COMBAT funding for the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program was originally in the form of a grant match, it too was not audited by the prosecutor. The prosecutor continued to not audit D.A.R.E. after the legislature began funding the program directly through contracts with local law enforcement agencies.

*Kansas City police department.* The Kansas City police department has its own internal fiscal controls and external audits. The department's accounting and payroll unit, and its budget unit, isolate COMBAT funds in a separate account in order to track expenditures and reimbursements. Thomas Allen, the accounting supervisor, then examines every department invoice submitted by field officers to make sure the charge is for an approved COMBAT purpose. Allen charges the expenditure to the correct account and makes sure there is an adequate appropriation to cover it. The department's computer budget program will not allow an expenditure to be entered unless there is adequate money to cover the cost. Only Paul Kies, the department's budget administrator, can override a rejection. The department may transfer funds within line items—create a deficit in one category as long as there is money in another category to cover the expense. Line items fall into three “characters,” or major budget categories: personal services (e.g., staff salaries), commodities (e.g., everyday supplies, laboratory equipment, purchased cars), and contractual services (e.g., life insurance, travel, car rentals). The department may not move monies within characters without approval from the Police Commission. Furthermore, the computer program will not accept deficits within any one line item. Another level of fiscal control is the need for Police Commission approval of any department expenditure over \$15,000 for any commodity or contractual service, including expenditures of COMBAT funds.

State law requires the police board of commissioners to hire an independent firm to audit the department each year.<sup>10</sup> The commissioners use Arthur Anderson LLP, a national auditing firm. However, until 1998, the audit did not distinguish the department's COMBAT monies for its Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) and Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) from monies the department received from the county general fund—they were all lumped in the same pot. (The audit did break out COMBAT funds for the Drug Abatement Response Team and D.A.R.E.) The audits did not identify any problems associated with the department's use of COMBAT funds. The 1998 Arthur Anderson audit for the first time broke out COMBAT funds from the department's general funds at the request of the department's budget administrator because the Anti-Drug Tax monies are a separate, special source of revenue.

*Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force.* The Drug Task Force has its own special bookkeeping procedures. The task force hires an accountant, paid with COMBAT funds, to record the unit's financial transactions and review its financial records two times a week. The

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<sup>10</sup> The city auditor has no responsibility for auditing the Kansas City police department because the department was taken over by the State of Missouri (as was the St. Louis police department) in the 1950s after a series of corruption scandals. The city auditor has gained the legislature's backing to conduct three performance audits of the department, including one on civilianization, but none will focus on the department's COMBAT activities.

accountant provides a monthly printout of expenditures, warning the executive director if the task force is spending too much money or if any receipts are missing. According to Michael Shanahan, the executive director, it is especially important to have informants sign a receipt every time they receive money: "Police officers can get into trouble with informants; they're your entree but, if you get too close to them, you can start to become sympathetic, buy them meals, and so forth, so you have to keep it a business relationship." As a result, Shanahan requires his task force officers to obtain a signed receipt for every disbursement of funds (e.g., \$300 for identifying a meth lab), and the Drug Task Force sergeant has to approve every payment.

## **Audits of Prevention and Treatment Providers Have Identified Some Problems**

Before reviewing problems with providers that auditors have identified, it is important to review the nature of the audits.

### **Auditing Procedures**

There have been four different procedures for auditing prevention and treatment providers' fiscal operations:

- review by a member of the prosecuting attorney's COMBAT team;
- review by a COMBAT-funded county auditor;
- periodic reviews by an independent auditing firm; and
- audits by the COMBAT Commission's executive director.

Exhibit 5-19 summarizes the auditing procedures COMBAT has implemented, the problems identified, and the remedies the COMBAT Commission has implemented. The text below discusses these areas in detail.

*Prosecutor office review.* Before the COMBAT Commission was formed, Melissa Heiman of the prosecuting attorney office's Anti-Drug Programs Administration Division audited prevention providers, systematically going through their invoices to make sure there was no unauthorized use of funds. Heiman talked with each provider in person or by telephone twice a month. If she identified a clear-cut unallowable request for reimbursement, she disallowed payment. If she was uncertain about whether a charge was allowable, she solicited a second opinion from Pat Glorioso, the deputy administrator of the division. If both of them were still undecided about a billing, they consulted with Chris Madden, the county auditor, for a definitive opinion.

## Exhibit 5-19

### COMBAT Procedures for Auditing Providers, Problems Identified, and Solutions Applied

Audit Procedures	Problems Identified	Solutions Applied
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Anti-Drug Tax Programs Administration Division staff member in the prosecuting attorney's office reviewed providers progress reports and invoices until 1996.</li> <li>● COMBAT-funded county auditor reviews progress reports and invoices and conducts on-site audits of treatment providers.</li> <li>● The county legislature periodically hires an outside CPA firm to audit providers for possible double billing of COMBAT and the State for the same services. Audits were conducted in 1992, 1993, and 1995.</li> <li>● The COMBAT Commission executive director, the program monitor, and the accounting assistant review all provider invoices for appropriateness.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● There has been no evidence of fraudulent use of COMBAT funds.</li> <li>● No evidence has been found of double billing.</li> <li>● Some treatment providers have requested reimbursement for treating ineligible clients, principally               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— clients who do not live in Jackson County, and</li> <li>— clients who do not have a substance abuse problem (e.g., they had only an alcohol addiction).</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Some prevention providers have billed for unallowable costs, such as transporting youth to a swim meet.</li> <li>● Some providers submit late invoices or skip several months and then bill for the previous months' services.</li> <li>● Many providers submit inadequate documentation of services and use different formats for reporting the services they have provided.</li> <li>● Some providers provide handwritten documentation rather than computer-generated information.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The legislature, at the COMBAT Commission's or prosecutor's recommendation, has canceled contracts with six providers.</li> <li>● The COMBAT Commission has improved its oversight, including               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— disqualifying bidders that fail to attend the pre-bid conference;</li> <li>— requiring monthly agency financial statements that prove cost shifting has not occurred;</li> <li>— clarifying in contracts who is eligible for COMBAT-paid treatment services;</li> <li>— including more specific work statements in prevention provider contracts; and</li> <li>— developing a common reporting form for all providers.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● The COMBAT Commission has increased the assistance it offers providers on how to submit proper documentation, including               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— hiring a consultant CPA to help providers set up financial reporting systems; and</li> <li>— offering in writing every month to provide further assistance with reporting requirements.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

This auditing procedure was insufficient in several respects. Heiman lacked the expertise to conduct a true fiscal audit. Furthermore, she had to review the billings of many providers that, as grass roots organizations with little or no experience documenting their costs properly, required extra time, auditing expertise, and technical assistance. Finally, Heiman did not have the time to monitor carefully the approximately 500 invoices and progress reports that providers were supposed to submit every year. Heiman discontinued the audits in 1996 when the COMBAT Commission was formed, since the commission was assigned responsibility for overseeing provider contracts. However, by that time COMBAT already had two independent auditing procedures already in place to monitor the fiscal performance of COMBAT-funded prevention and treatment providers that supplemented Heiman's oversight.

*The legislature's in-house audit.* In the second auditing procedure, *the legislature's own auditor, Chris Madden, and a full-time COMBAT-funded assistant he supervised, Stuart Baker, audited provider invoices.* After Madden left the county, Baker—by then fully trained in what to do—continued to audit the providers largely on his own. Exhibit 5-20 shows Baker's audit cycle for COMBAT Commission contractors. Exhibit 5-21 shows the nine steps for prevention providers involved in the desk audit referenced in step 4 of the audit cycle. Exhibit 5-22 shows the audit plan for treatment providers. The discussion below amplifies several of these steps.

Baker (as did Madden) meets initially with every newly contracted prevention and treatment provider to explain proper billing procedures. He then matches each provider invoice as it is submitted with the provider's progress report and contract. Because direct costs are generally billed arbitrarily—that is, they are a percentage of the entire contract's phone bill, rent, and other direct costs—he checks these costs only periodically with some providers to make sure the percentages are not out of line. Baker devotes most of his time to verifying whether COMBAT is getting the units of service for which it has contracted. This is not a complex task to perform for treatment provider services, because treatment agencies bill unit costs of service—for example, 15 units of individual counseling. Auditing prevention providers can be more difficult because Baker has to keep asking such questions as, "Why are we paying for uniforms? a picnic? duplication of 1,000 fliers?"

In addition to his initial visit, Baker visits almost every treatment organization once a year to examine their invoices, canceled checks, receipts for expenditures, case notes, and other documents. During the visit he examines selected case folders to match the services delivered with the provider's bills for reimbursement. Specifically, Baker arrives with a list of the services provided and the dates of service delivery (assembled from the invoices for these clients) and compares services and dates with the information in the clients' files to make sure they match. He randomizes the month he will show up and provides contractors with a week's advance notice of the client files he will want. Baker randomly selects a four-month period for his audit, for example, the fourth quarter of the year. He selects 20 to



Exhibit 5-20  
Audit Cycle

1. **Contract for services approved and signed - JACO Counselor's Office.**
2. (a) **Contract manual prepared and distributed - Cudney, Ecord, McEnroe & Mulane**
2. (b) **1st payment on contract - JACO Finance Department**
3. **Provider prepares and submits payment request - Provider with assistance of Cudney, Ecord et al.**
4. **Anti-Drug Auditor performs desk audit on every request - Legislative Audit.**
5. **At least annually AD Auditor performs field audit on each provider - Legislative Audit and Prosecutor program personnel.**
6. **Annually, Legislature contracts with external audit firm for an agreed upon procedures engagement - Various local CPA firms.**

**What Happens When Bills Are Received**

- I. **Desk Audit - Nine Step System**
  - A. **Insures the mathematical accuracy of the payment request.**
  - B. **Helps to ensure that the agency is collecting appropriate supporting documentation.**
  - C. **Familiarizes auditor with the agency; their accounting system and expertise; and their program components.**
  - D. **Helps to identify any inappropriate expenditures.**
- II. **Field Audit - Not Standardized**
  - A. **Always examine original invoices and cancelled checks and tie back to payment requests.**
    1. **Can be very easy to do.**
    2. **Can be fairly complex.**
  - B. **Look at reasonableness of allocations where applicable.**
    1. **Finge benefits as % of Payroll**
    2. **Telephone**
    3. **Office Supplies**
    4. **Copies**

## Exhibit 5-21

### Prevention Contracts Standard Audit Programs

#### Desk Audit

- I. Vouch dollar amounts on cash disbursements spreadsheet to supporting documentation.
- II. Foot cash disbursement spreadsheet.
- III. Trace totals to expenditure report - this month.
- IV. Foot expenditure report - this month - verify category totals from expenditure report - this month to last payment request, expenditure report - YTD.
- V. Adding Category totals from expenditure report - this month to last payment request, expenditure report - YTD.
- VI. Foot expenditure report - YTD.
- VII. Trace total expenditures YTD, to request for payment section - total expenditures YTD.
- VIII. Recompute request for payment section.
- IX. Trace "This request for Payment" amount to Jackson County pr "Amount of this payment".

Audit Plan: Treatment Providers

COUNTY LEGISLATURE  
JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI



OFFICE OF THE  
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR  
(816) 881-3310

JACKSON COUNTY COURTHOUSE  
415 EAST 12TH STREET  
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106

AUDIT PLAN : TREATMENT

1. Set ranges and scope
  2. Enter billing detail on spread sheets
  3. Sort and summarize by client.
  4. Prepare summary and worksheet for on sight audit.
- On Sight:
5. Pull patient files
  6. Using financial and clinical files; obtain client name, social security number, referral source and diagnosis.
  7. Verify Jackson County residency
  8. Inpatient - verify admission and discharge dates, compute days and compare to billings.  
Outpatient - verify services provided and accuracy of quantity billed.

40 files, choosing those with the highest dollar amount or randomly selecting the files so providers do not know in advance which documents he will be examining. Because he does the necessary preparation work in advance, he is able to complete each review in two to eight hours.

Baker checks to make sure clients are eligible for COMBAT-funded treatment—for example, verifying that the diagnosis in the files is one for which COMBAT services are allowed. If he finds any “red flags” suggesting improprieties, he examines the provider’s earlier records. For example, he looks at the number of different types of handwriting in the case record because there should be four or five different types—one each for the medical person, intake specialist, clinicians, and nutritionist. There may be something amiss if everything is in the same handwriting and type of ink. Occasionally treatment providers themselves call Baker for clarification, for example, to ask whether someone who abuses alcohol but also used marijuana 18 months ago qualifies for COMBAT-funded treatment (the person would not). While Baker tries to discover whether providers are double billing COMBAT and the State for the same client’s services, he has been unable to persuade Medicare to work with him to identify double billings to COMBAT and the welfare program.

Baker does not make site visits for most prevention providers. For provider requests for reimbursement for purchases, he makes sure they have submitted canceled checks and that the item purchased is COMBAT-related.

*Independent certified public accountant. The Jackson County Legislature hired an independent certified public accountant, Ralph C. Johnson and Company, to review the invoices of selected treatment providers to check for double billing.* The legislature commissioned the audits pursuant to the first Anti-Drug Tax Statute which stipulated that “Not more than once a year and upon request of the [Fiscal] Commission, the legislature shall contract for an audit by independent certified public accountants.” Chris Madden selected five or six organizations each audit year for the CPA to audit, all of which have State as well as county (i.e., COMBAT) contracts and therefore could be engaged in double billing. He also picked providers that COMBAT staff or the legislature had heard might be experiencing fiscal problems. COMBAT paid Johnson \$20,000 per audit to conduct audits in 1992, 1993, and 1995. The legislature has not reengaged the firm’s services since 1995.

Developed in close consultation with Madden, the Johnson CPA audits include

- determining for a random sampling of clients whether *treatment* providers have billed both COMBAT and other funding sources (e.g., the State of Missouri) for the same services;

- reviewing a random selection of monthly payment requests from *prevention* providers to determine whether there have been duplicate billings to COMBAT or billings to the county and other funding sources for the same expenses; and
- determining whether the data collection procedures that the *treatment and prevention* providers follow can be relied on to accumulate the information they need to prepare invoices for COMBAT reimbursement.

*COMBAT Commission auditing.* Susan Griffle, the commission's former executive director, herself reviewed every provider invoice for appropriateness. On occasion, she finds something amiss and telephones the provider director to clarify the charge. On one occasion, Griffle called a provider director to say she was sending a commission consultant, Jack McEnroe, to review a program's accounts when it submitted invoices for some 6' X 9' rugs without explanation. While McEnroe does not normally do audits for the commission (see below), Griffle has used him in this fashion on occasion.

### **Problems Auditors Have Identified**

*None of the COMBAT audits and monitoring activities described above have found any examples of double billing.* The legislature's Special Advisory Panel reported in December 1993 that "The committee was not apprised of any fiscal abuses in connection with" COMBAT. However, the panel conducted no investigation of its own into COMBAT's auditing procedures. Repeating its conclusions from its 1992 and 1993 audits, the Johnson audit report for 1995 stated that ". . . we did not detect any instances where services provided by the contracting organization were billed to both the Anti-Drug Sales Tax Fund and the State of Missouri. Further, our review of the billing procedures followed by the selected organizations indicated that they were generally adequate to provide reliable information from which reimbursement requests could be generated." Chris Madden and Stuart Baker also reported that they had never found any provider double billing.

*Audits have identified many examples of providers seeking reimbursement for unallowed costs.* The 1992 Johnson audit concluded that "Additional parameters need to be developed for various programs to decrease the opportunity for the acceptance of ineligible clients into the programs." The 1993 audit found that of the six programs audited, two providers' internal records "did not allow for reliable allocation or accumulation of costs according to program or funding source. Thus, no assurance could be given that cost restrictions were not violated or that cost reimbursement requests were reliable." As a result, the auditor recommended that "professional assistance be retained [by the two organizations] to review and install reliable accounting, internal control, and reporting systems."

The Johnson report went on to observe that

Although we were not retained to specifically determine whether patients served were in fact eligible for the services under the Anti-Drug Sales Tax Fund program, we did not[e] two instances where services were provided to patients whose addiction was alcohol-related as opposed to substances covered by the Anti-Drug Sales Tax program. Specifically, the auditors found one patient out of four patients at Samuel U. Rodgers Community Health Center and one patient out of nine patients at Swope Parkway Health Center who were not entitled to receive COMBAT-funded services because their only substance abuse problem was alcoholism.<sup>11</sup>

Melissa Heiman, Chris Madden, and Stuart Baker reported that they, too, have found billing errors. (See the box “Selected Provider Billing Errors.”) A memorandum from Madden to the COMBAT Commission highlighted problems in three areas:

- *Violations of COMBAT residency requirements:* “The reality in the domestic violence shelters and residential adolescent treatment facilities does not meet this [residency] standard . . . . These circumstances are creating technical violations against these [residency] provisions of the RFP.”
- *Unallowed services to codependent clients:* “Several providers have been using COMBAT funds to treat nonusing spouses of drug addicted spouses even though the drug addicted spouses are not in treatment as required by the treatment provider RFP.”<sup>12</sup> (Despite a ruling from the county attorney, Stuart Baker reports that providers still are having difficulty sorting out when codependents are eligible for services.)
- *Late billings:* “Currently [i.e., as of July 1997], we have four providers who have not submitted final billings for 1996. One provider has not billed since May 1996. We feel that some date certain for submission of final billing should be established in the contract.”

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11 The identification of these two unqualified recipients of COMBAT services raises the more important issue of whether COMBAT should include individuals with drinking problems within its purview. This is a question for the legislators and COMBAT participants to address before the time comes to renew the Anti-Drug Sales Tax in 2004.

12 Susan Griffler asked the county counselor for guidance regarding the eligibility of codependent clients for COMBAT services. In a memorandum to Griffler dated August 20, 1997, a deputy county counselor confirmed that COMBAT may fund services to codependents only if their addicted spouses can document that they are enrolled in a treatment program. According to the memorandum, “If the [addicted] spouse is actually receiving drug treatment himself, then the codependency counseling may properly be viewed as an adjunct to the treatment regimen being undergone by the drug violator [i.e., COMBAT client] under the theory that an improved home environment can further treatment goals and lessen the likelihood of relapse.”

- On occasion Madden found inadequate documentation for a bill; he then reduced the provider's payments for the next three bills to make up the difference.
- Going through one provider's case folders, Madden discovered that every client was diagnosed with "bipolar disorder "or drug abuse." But because "drug abuse" was in a different handwriting and writing instrument from "bipolar disorder," Madden concluded that the diagnosis had been added later to qualify the services for reimbursement. He required the agency to refund the associated reimbursements.
- Because a battered women's shelter kept no documentation, including no records of service delivery, Madden stopped all reimbursement. (He did try to help the staff to do proper accounting, but they refused to comply.)
- A few providers have tried to request reimbursement for unallowable consultant fees.

A review by Madden of 28 of 42 files (67 percent) of one treatment provider for October, November, and December 1996 found that

- 7 clients of the 28 were nonresidents (25 percent);
- 11 were treated for codependency (39 percent) with no evidence that the users were enrolled in treatment and many of the codependency diagnoses questionable; and
- 4 patients (14 percent) were not drug users.<sup>13</sup>

A review by Abt Associates of one month's payment requests from 1991 through 1996 for selected treatment providers (8 providers for 1991; 16 for 1993; 7 for 1994; 10 for 1995; 27 for 1996; 20 for 1997) suggests that almost all the sampled providers in the early years failed to include adequate or any documentation about the number of clients served and the services they received, and the providers included few descriptions of the types of services provided. Starting in 1994, and increasingly in 1995, most of the selected providers were submitting more adequate information. They also increasingly submitted complete agency budget information designed to document that COMBAT funds were not being used to replace regular funds or to serve existing clients without initiating new services. Reports also began documenting the nature and delivery of services provided to each client.

*The county legislature has canceled contracts with six COMBAT-funded programs for noncompliance*, typically for not providing contracted services or not using the funds in the manner called for in the contract—for example, serving clients outside of Jackson County or providing only alcoholism services.

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<sup>13</sup> COMBAT funds may not be used to fund treatment services for individuals whose primary drug addiction is alcohol unless the clients are under 21 years of age (because drinking for them is illegal).

- The COMBAT Commission refused to renew a contract with an inpatient provider because of management problems. The owner of the property was on probation for misdemeanor offenses (harassing phone calls and arson charges in Kansas). As a result, she had been removed as the owner, but the board of directors allowed her to return as executive director. The entire board was then dismissed.
- Baker told one particularly sloppy provider it had to install a personal computer in order to continue to receive COMBAT funds. He also gave it the software for recording its services and invoices and offered to teach its staff to use it. However, the provider ended its contract rather than comply.

*It is not clear whether the discovery of these provider billing errors reflects diligence on the part of COMBAT auditors and the effectiveness of COMBAT's auditing procedures or the proverbial tip of the iceberg suggesting numerous other irregularities.* For example, the 1995 Johnson report in effect found that 25 percent of patients (one patient out of four) treated by one provider and 11 percent of patients treated by another provider (one out of nine) were ineligible for COMBAT services. If these percentages could be extrapolated to these two providers' clients and, worse, to all other treatment providers' COMBAT caseloads, this would suggest massive billing irregularities. Of course, the Johnson samples are much too small to permit using percentages to characterize them or drawing a firm inference regarding the pervasiveness of misreporting, but they do suggest the possibility that there may be a more widespread problem.

Baker believes that in every case but two the errors represent sloppiness on the part of providers, some of which lack computers and auditing experience. In one case he believes may have represented deliberate deception, a provider used COMBAT funds to serve nonresident clients who signed statements saying they "intended" to become residents. In another case, a provider submitted checks for services that were never delivered; under threat of a civil suit for fraud, it returned the COMBAT money it had already received. Melissa Heiman confirmed that "The biggest challenge to fiscal accountability is the lack of sophistication of grantees, who need support and hand holding, a highly structured procedure for recording and reporting data, and a commitment to being meticulous in how they spend their money."

Sometimes prevention and treatment providers simply have problems transmitting pertinent information from the actual service provider (e.g., counselor, mentor) to the organization's billing department which lead to errors in invoicing. In addition, there is frequent turnover among direct service providers and billing department personnel among education and prevention providers, resulting in errors by the new, inexperienced staff. Often, sloppy billing practices reflect management problems, not necessarily cheating.

Baker also believes that the problems he has found are not the tip of the iceberg. Normally, he finds three or four ineligible clients out of 200. Moreover, he says that *most COMBAT*



*contractors actually furnish more services than they are contracted to provide.* Confirming his diagnosis of sloppiness, he is just as likely to find during his on-site audits that providers have failed to bill COMBAT for allowed services as to find billings for ineligible clients. On one occasion, James Nunnally and the COMBAT Commission asked Baker to audit a provider they felt was paying too much for rental space and billing COMBAT for part of the rental payments. Baker found that the provider was indeed billing COMBAT per unit of service and incorporating part of its rental fees into the unit charge. However, Baker also found that, even with a portion of the rent included, the provider's per unit charge was still half the normal service rate. Furthermore, the provider was furnishing services in an area of the county in which no other providers were willing to work. Baker recommended that the commission ignore the issue.

### **Remedies for Problems Identified**

*The COMBAT Commission's fiscal oversight is adequate but needs—and is receiving—improvement.* On balance, it appears that COMBAT is probably auditing the prevention and treatment providers more diligently for fiscal irregularities than do most other government funding sources. For example, COMBAT funds a person full time within the county audit department to oversee nothing but bills from prevention and treatment providers that receive COMBAT Commission contracts. The mistakes that the auditing procedures have uncovered suggest that, while it is possible that there are more widespread unauthorized activities on the part of the providers, there is no evidence of intentional fraud. Furthermore, the auditing system appears to be doing what it is supposed to do—making sure that COMBAT does not reimburse providers for unallowable charges.

The COMBAT Commission and, in particular, its former executive director, are aware of the need for strengthening its auditing procedures and have been taking steps to improve them.

*Steps taken to help providers. COMBAT staff have already taken several steps to assist providers to improve their fiscal responsibility.*

- The Fiscal Commission and, later, the COMBAT Commission paid \$36,000 to an independent certified public accountant, John McEnroe, to set up a financial reporting system for every organization which receives COMBAT money. McEnroe visits each new contractor, discusses its budget with them, and sets up an accounting system it can use to report its expenditures to the commission. He also provides each contractor with a booklet consisting of a contract summary, agreement, invoice forms, and other documents for recording expenses and submitting invoices. Finally, at a provider's or the Executive Director's request, McEnroe will return to provide the contractor with technical assistance on reporting expenditures.

- One of the COMBAT Commission forms that providers use each month to report their progress includes a place to indicate whether they need assistance with their reporting requirements. The 1997 COMBAT cover letter that the COMBAT Commission sends to prevention providers each month states that “The Program Compliance Monitors are always willing to assist you with any concerns you may have about complying with the terms of your contract. If you need help with the monthly reports or would like a site visit, please call us at (816) 881-4613.”
- In 1994, COMBAT included language in its prevention and treatment contracts requiring that “The organization shall submit its claims for reimbursement on invoices specified by the Jackson County Accounting System utilizing procedures outlined by the Anti-Drug Sales Tax Financial Advisor.” Contractors must also “submit a monthly financial statement which demonstrates that total operational expenditures have not been decreased because of or commingled with anti-drug sales tax funding.” Finally, the contract stipulates that “the organization agrees to provide . . . , at the end of each calendar month, a report on the form attached to this agreement as Exhibit C including the Monthly Report of Program Services and the Monthly Financial Report (Payment Request).”
- A typical treatment contract now stipulates that “Funds provided for under the terms of this agreement shall not be used solely for the treatment of those who abuse alcohol or for treatment of family members of alcoholics . . . . Treatment for . . . those who abuse alcohol and drugs . . . is . . . permissible . . . .” (emphasis in the original)
- The work statements in COMBAT contracts have become increasingly specific. For example, COMBAT’s 1994 contract with Genesis School included requirements that the organization provide the names of media contacts, copies of anti-drug marketing brochures that contain the COMBAT logo, and the names of students involved for each brochure that youth developed; provide the tour route and attendance for the ten community cultural tours youth would make in the Hip Hop Van; and provide the dates, performances, copies of content material, and places of performance of each of the ten performances youth song and dance troupes would conduct. As a result, the organization’s May 1996 progress report provided detailed descriptions of activities with numbers of youth involved in each.
- The COMBAT Commission, working with a consultant, has developed new reporting forms (see exhibits 5-12 and 5-13 above).

***Additional steps needed. COMBAT needs to consider taking additional steps to expand its monitoring procedures.*** For example, the legislature and COMBAT Commission might resume the annual audits by Ralph C. Johnson or another independent auditor. In addition, the 1995 Johnson CPA report recommended that COMBAT require each contractor to

“implement a review process to assure that ineligible services are not charged to the program.” As of 1998, this recommendation had not been implemented. COMBAT might also consider moving to performance based contracting—linking payments explicitly to the achievement of specific, numerical goals—and withholding funds from, or not renewing the contracts of, providers that fail to meet their goals. COMBAT already has a performance contract with the Full Employment Council that requires it to deliver on-site recruitment presentations, assessments, and placements to specified numbers of individuals. The council’s monthly progress reports to COMBAT display the actual numbers of presentations, assessments, and placements provided next to the numbers the council is contracted to complete. Treatment providers, too, in effect already operate with performance based contracts—they stipulate in their contracts how many clients they will serve. The commission could require similar goals of prevention providers. The COMBAT Commission has already begun including goal achievement as part of its scoring of providers’ proposals for continuation funding.

Although it did terminate six contracts, for several years COMBAT was tolerant of incomplete and erroneous invoices and progress reports. In part, this was due to COMBAT’s lack of staff and expertise, and attention to other priorities. However, problems monitoring and auditing providers also need to be seen in the context of COMBAT’s wish to fund innovative programs and small providers, many of which were not accustomed to being closely supervised and held accountable. These agencies might have refused to accept COMBAT funding if forced too soon to meet stringent reporting and paperwork requirements. Stuart Baker says that he has not required every provider to use a common form for billing COMBAT because “they don’t have the money or expertise to do more than what they’re already doing; so we can’t ask too much of them.” According to Susan Griffle “We had to proceed slowly in introducing accountability [among providers because of their inexperience and tendency to rebel]. In addition, no one talked about outcomes back in 1987; now there’s a climate that supports this approach, which makes it easier for us to introduce it.” James Nunnally adds that COMBAT needed to work slowly with providers, rather than confront them in an adversarial fashion, in order to teach them to improve their fiscal accountability, including their data collection and reporting procedures. Nunnally says that because treatment providers resisted any intrusion into their professional territory, the Fiscal Commission struggled to find a way to oversee their services. Even so, it took a hard line in certain areas, such as hiring an outside auditor to examine the providers’ books and using independent reviewers for evaluating provider proposals, both of which practices were continued by the COMBAT Commission.

The proposal process still appears to be daunting to some smaller, grass-roots organizations that have not had extensive experience submitting grants to government entities. For example, one provider reported that “The grant process is very overwhelming for someone new to it. You almost need a grant writer . . . especially if it’s a program with only one or two staff.” However, large and presumably experienced providers, not just grass-roots

organizations, were also remiss in providing proper documentation. COMBAT probably waited too long before exercising more firmness, clarity, and consistency in requiring documentation from providers. According to one participant, "It took longer than it should have [to introduce accountability]. We could have done more earlier with the progress reports in terms of making sure they were submitted every month and provided the information we wanted." It appears that greater accountability should now be—and probably should have been previously—expected and required of providers, some of whose reporting of their activities and goal achievement has been very unsatisfactory.

## **Gaps in Budget Information**

Finally, there has been a problem obtaining consistent funding information regarding COMBAT initiatives. Agency reports of allocations and expenditures differed in some instances from the figures recorded in the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR). These discrepancies reflect many considerations:

- There were usually differences in the amounts of money allocated to agencies and the amounts they actually spent.
- Some allocation figures and expenditures include surpluses accumulated in previous years, while other do not.
- Some figures included Grant Match Program awards, the outside funding obtained with the grant match, or both, while other figures do not.
- Some figures are based on a calendar year, and others are based on a fiscal year.
- The CAFR separates some figures the same agency received from COMBAT into more than one category (e.g., the Sheriff Department's D.A.R.E. budget is a separate line item from the other police departments' D.A.R.E. budgets).

Because of these discrepancies, it was difficult to secure consistent and therefore reliable COMBAT financial figures. For example, there was no single compendium of COMBAT allocations available for the years before 1998 similar to the figures presented in exhibit 5-17. If it was difficult to secure these figures for this evaluation, it must be even more difficult for the general public to secure consistent information about COMBAT funding.

## COMBAT Has Prospered Since 1992 Despite Some Management Shortcomings

This chapter provides evidence that there has been inadequate management of COMBAT relating to

- initial planning,
- evaluation, and
- performance monitoring.

Reflecting all three of these weaknesses, it was difficult to obtain useful, complete, reliable, and consistent quantitative outcome and financial data on most COMBAT initiatives. The incomplete or inconsistent nature of these data, which reflected shortcomings in COMBAT's management procedures, also contributed to hampering its effective administration. Without these data, COMBAT administrators were limited in their ability to assess what COMBAT was accomplishing—and failing to accomplish—and, as a result, to identify the kinds of changes in program operations that were needed in order to improve the program's effectiveness to the fullest extent possible.

These management deficiencies raise two questions. First, why did they occur? There are several answers.

- *Lack of time.* COMBAT staff were very busy—often overwhelmed—with the day-to-day operations of the program and usually did not have the time to devote to long-range issues like devising monitoring procedures. For example, the COMBAT Commission, even when it had an executive director and compliance monitors, could not keep up with its workload.
- *Insufficient concern.* Some COMBAT administrators did not feel that monitoring or data collection and evaluation were as high a priority as focusing on other COMBAT objectives.
- *Inexperience.* Some COMBAT administrators failed to anticipate some problems, in some cases because they lacked the relevant expertise (e.g., COMBAT Commission compliance monitors) and in other cases because COMBAT was a new and multifaceted initiative that presented problems no one could have foreseen.

The management weaknesses raise a second question: How did COMBAT manage to accomplish so much (see Chapter 4, Evaluation Results) without careful early planning, effective quality control, and strong evaluations? First, there were no serious and widely publicized fiascos to distract program staff or make them overly cautious beyond the criticism

leveled at the purchase of \$400,000 worth of computers, the perceived inequitable distribution of resources to Eastern Jackson County, management irregularities among some prevention and treatment providers, and other relatively minor miscalculations and mistakes. Second, COMBAT prospered because it had a seven-year grace period in which to recover from early public relations problems and show some positive results. Most importantly, however, COMBAT had a core of dedicated, talented, and hard-working professionals who made sure that the program had many achievements despite shortcomings in these other areas of program management. In the final analysis, COMBAT's substantive achievements have outweighed its management shortcomings.

# CHAPTER 6

## CONCLUSIONS

### Key Points

#### Summary of Findings

- **Overall COMBAT is a worthwhile endeavor that is in large part achieving its objectives.**
  - The number of arrests, prosecutions and imprisonments of felony offenders increased dramatically in the years COMBAT has been in operation—and at a rate higher than found in comparison cities over the same time period. While national rates of law enforcement activity have also skyrocketed, Jackson County's activities during COMBAT years are significant both in volume and coordination across agencies.
  - The number and types of people served through the availability of COMBAT funds indicates that COMBAT increased the capacity of the county to provide treatment services to persons who want them, including persons who are excluded from access to traditional treatment resources.
  - COMBAT funding greatly expanded the scope of prevention programming. There have been no significant changes in drug use among youth over the COMBAT years, however, though prevention programs have provided a range of services to the community which may have as yet unrealized effects.

In addition,

- COMBAT promoted substantial collaboration among agencies in Jackson County.
  - COMBAT was responsible for a number of significant innovations in programming in all areas: law enforcement, treatment, and prevention.
  - COMBAT did not generate significant economic development.
  - COMBAT has generated considerable public support for its initiatives.
- **Three operational themes emerge from an examination of COMBAT's history:**
    - COMBAT represents an integrated, holistic approach to combating substance abuse.
    - COMBAT has operated as evolution, not revolution, in promoting change.
    - COMBAT has struggled to promote accountability among participating agencies and organizations.

- **Other jurisdictions can replicate COMBAT.** However, several features seem especially important to copy in order to make the program a success:
  - (1) Secure strong, top-level political leadership for the program.
  - (2) Make law enforcement a major component of the program.
  - (3) Give the program a coordinated public health focus.
  - (4) Find an exceptionally talented, experienced, and dedicated program administrator and allow him or her authority to steer the program's course.
  - (5) Make sure there is a strong foundation of accessible treatment programs.
  - (6) Earmark the tax money exclusively for fighting substance abuse and adhere to this plan.
  - (7) Plan in advance how the money will be used.
  - (8) Assign staff full-time to monitor prevention and treatment provider performance.
  - (9) Find ways to make participants feel they "own" the initiatives.
  - (10) Allocate funds for evaluating the program and begin the evaluation from the start.
  - (11) Set up a management information system (MIS) that links program participants as they move within and between the criminal justice system and treatment agencies.

#### **Data Sources**

- Interviews with COMBAT participants and observers
- Interviews with program director of the Little Rock replication

This chapter has three sections:

- (1) a synthesis of the findings presented in the entire report;
- (2) a review of three COMBAT themes that permeate the program; and
- (3) a discussion of whether COMBAT is replicable in other jurisdictions.

## **COMBAT Is Achieving Important Objectives**

*COMBAT is a worthwhile endeavor that is achieving important objectives.* COMBAT began with relatively small-scale expectations, largely centered around arresting and prosecuting more drug dealers, with modest and unsystematic attention paid to increased prevention and treatment. However, starting in 1993 COMBAT administrators began to think in more ambitious terms regarding COMBAT's potential for promoting innovation and



collaboration in the fight against substance abuse. They also began giving prevention and treatment equal emphasis with law enforcement. As a result, rather than settling largely just for more arrests and prosecutions, COMBAT's administrators took the program far beyond what anyone, including most voters, expected it to accomplish and probably would have been satisfied with.

Exhibit 6-1 provides a capsule summary of the evaluation's findings related to each of seven COMBAT objectives (three of them COMBAT's own objectives, four of them established for the evaluation by the National Institute of Justice), COMBAT's administrative arrangements, and the program's replicability. The exhibit also indicates the extent to which program staff considered each objective a priority.

### **Three Overriding Themes Pervade COMBAT**

COMBAT's history shows that three themes have helped guide its course. These themes, summarized in Exhibit 6-2 and discussed below, shed light on how COMBAT operates, but they also suggest courses of action for other jurisdictions interested in implementing a similar anti-drug tax program.

#### **A Holistic Approach**

The COMBAT program is holistic in five different respects. First, from the start, the program's planners intended to give prevention and treatment initiatives equal prominence with law enforcement, but they felt they needed to highlight criminal justice approaches to generate maximum public support. As a result, when it was first planned and implemented, COMBAT appeared to focus primarily on increased law enforcement efforts—more arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and jail sentences. Over time, *COMBAT has made prevention and treatment the clear equals of enforcement* in terms of resources and attention. In addition, COMBAT administrators have attempted to secure equal media attention on these components.

Second, in addition to its integration of treatment, prevention, and enforcement, COMBAT is a holistic approach in another sense: *Many individual COMBAT initiatives—whether they appear to be exclusively a prevention, treatment, or enforcement endeavor—themselves combine two or more of these three components for achieving their goals.*

- The Paseo Corridor initiative integrates treatment and enforcement efforts.
- Drug Court integrates law enforcement with treatment and other support services.
- The Truancy Prevention Program offers counseling to parents and children along with the threat of prosecution.

## Exhibit 6-1

### Summary Scoresheet for Entire Evaluation

Objective	Priority for COMBAT Administrators	Positives	Negatives
1. Increased Jailing	very high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Docket "O," the Prosecuting Attorney's Anti-Drug Unit, and DART contributed to focusing increased attention on drug cases and expediting their processing.</li> <li>● The Kansas City police department's Street Narcotic Unit (SNU) effected 5,992 arrests from 1990 through 1997 for substance abuse offenses.</li> <li>● The number of drug cases filed during COMBAT increased 387%, and the number which resulted in incarceration increased 167%.</li> <li>● Prison admissions in Jackson County from 1992-1997 increased three times faster compared to all other Missouri counties.</li> <li>● The Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force arrested many drug traffickers and methamphetamine manufacturers. A larger than expected proportion of these cases resulted in conviction (99%) and in a jail or prison sentence (47%).</li> <li>● Expansion of the Jackson County jail will make it possible to detain and incarcerate more dangerous drug offenders.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The county would have expanded the jail even without COMBAT funding.</li> <li>● It may be COMBAT displaced, rather than eliminated, some drug activity.</li> </ul>

Objective	Priority for COMBAT Administrators	Positives	Negatives
2. Increased Treatment	very high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● COMBAT increased considerably the amount of treatment available—at least 2,300 individuals received treatment in 1997 alone as a result of COMBAT funding.</li> <li>● COMBAT increased referrals to treatment—at least 574 individuals in 1997 alone—with many of the referrals actually entering treatment.</li> <li>● COMBAT took steps to change the structure of treatment delivery that are likely to increase the quality of treatment.</li> <li>● The COMBAT-funded drug court signed contracts with over 1,400 dependents for treatment and retained or graduated 54% of them.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● There are no data with which to evaluate improvements in the quality of treatment.</li> <li>● Data are lacking regarding how many individuals entering treatment successfully completed treatment.</li> <li>● There is no evidence available to indicate that the increase in treatment opportunities or referrals reduced relapse or recidivism rates.</li> </ul>
3. Increased Prevention	very high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● COMBAT increased the number of prevention initiatives substantially.</li> <li>● COMBAT-funded prevention initiatives served several thousand individuals in 1997 alone.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● COMBAT did not collect reliable data regarding the number of individuals its prevention initiatives served.</li> <li>● There are insufficient data to evaluate the quality or effectiveness of the prevention initiatives.</li> <li>● School surveys of high school seniors indicate no change in pattern of use during COMBAT.</li> <li>● There is no way to attribute any decrease in experimentation in Jackson County because drug use declined nationwide during the period of COMBAT's operation.</li> </ul>

Objective	Priority for COMBAT Administrators	Positives	Negatives
4. Innovation	high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● COMBAT was responsible for a large number of significant innovative initiatives, such as the Grant Match program, landlord-tenant training initiatives, and a fathering program for men delinquent in their child support payments.</li> <li>● The enormous range of program types that COMBAT initiated is in itself highly innovative.</li> <li>● COMBAT did not sponsor innovation for innovation's sake—innovations were designed to address specific substance abuse problems.</li> </ul>	None
5. Collaboration	high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● COMBAT generated a great deal of collaboration among a wide range of organizations, programs, and jurisdictions, most notably improving linkages between the treatment community and the criminal justice system.</li> <li>● Some COMBAT collaborations received national recognition, including the Paseo Corridor Partnership, Drug Court, and the landlord/property initiatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Some collaboration might have occurred anyway given the Kansas City police department's commitment to community policing and a nationwide trend to increased collaboration within the criminal justice system and between the justice system and other elements of society.</li> </ul>
6. Economic Development	low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The Paseo Corridor Partnership resulted in modest job opportunities for corridor residents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Outside the Paseo Corridor, there is little evidence that COMBAT increased job opportunities.</li> </ul>

Objective	Priority for COMBAT Administrators	Positives	Negatives
7. Community Support	medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ironically, the lack of scandals involving COMBAT funds resulted in reduced media attention.</li> <li>● Community survey data indicate considerable name recognition for COMBAT programs and high levels of satisfaction among program participants.</li> <li>● Community survey data indicate good job performance ratings for law enforcement agencies and the courts.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● COMBAT has lacked the resources to publicize the program as a whole.</li> <li>● For the most part, the local print and television media have not given COMBAT sufficient coverage or adequate recognition to the program's prevention and treatment components.</li> </ul>
8. Administrative Arrangements	high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Quality control of prevention and treatment providers has improved since 1996.</li> <li>● Fiscal auditing of COMBAT-funded criminal justice agencies has been adequate.</li> <li>● Fiscal audits of prevention and treatment providers has been adequate. Audits served to identify billing errors that were corrected.</li> <li>● There has been no evidence of fraud among prevention and treatment providers, such as billing COMBAT and the State for the same services.</li> <li>● There has been no evidence of any other fraud in the use of COMBAT funds.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● In the initial phases, COMBAT, was not well planned or administered, in part because early managers failed to put in place the type of management controls that such a diverse program requires.</li> <li>● Until 1996, evaluations of COMBAT were unsystematic and of uneven quality.</li> <li>● Quality control of prosecutor and police initiatives has been uneven. Data collection, in particular, has been weak.</li> <li>● Quality control of prevention and treatment providers has been inadequate and problematical, especially with regard to data collection.</li> </ul>

Objective	Priority for COMBAT Administrators	Positives	Negatives
9. Replicability		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● There is nothing unique to Jackson County or COMBAT that would prevent other jurisdictions from replicating the program.</li> <li>● Little Rock, Arkansas, has already replicated COMBAT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● To be successful in replicating COMBAT, other jurisdictions need to implement several crucial features of the program.</li> <li>● In particular, other jurisdictions need administrators with exceptional vision, dedication, and talent, and with a public health perspective, for the program work.</li> </ul>

## Exhibit 6-2

### Three Guiding COMBAT Themes

COMBAT has been guided by three overriding themes.

- **A Holistic Approach**

- The program unites law enforcement, prevention, and treatment approaches.
- Individual COMBAT initiatives that appear to be primarily just law enforcement, prevention, or treatment undertakings often combine two or more of these three components.
- Each of the three COMBAT components itself sometimes incorporates several strategies to achieve its goal—that is, a law enforcement initiative may involve the use of several police, prosecutorial, or court-based tactics.
- By linking “carrots” and “sticks,” several COMBAT initiatives merge positive reinforcement (offering rewards) with negative reinforcement (threatening punishment).
- COMBAT administrators attempt to address the consequences of substance abuse, the presumed causes of addiction, and the economic and psychosocial barriers to recovery.

- **Evolution, Not Revolution**

- A *stepping stone* approach treats many initiatives not only as ends in themselves but also as precursors to future initiatives—either a prerequisite to other changes or the model for future initiatives.
- A *brick-by-brick* strategy involves not trying to make progress too fast because the public needs to be educated to accept innovation and COMBAT participants need to be educated to accept collaboration.
- COMBAT administrators constantly *learn from the past* and use what they learn to improve their operations and initiatives.
- COMBAT is always *planning new initiatives* that often build on programs it has already funded.

- **Promoting Accountability**

- COMBAT administrators supported several evaluation studies designed to increase funding recipients’ accountability for producing positive outcomes.
- The restructuring of COMBAT’s organization in 1995 into a tripartite oversight system improved accountability, as did the program’s Strategic Planning Committee and Research Committee.
- COMBAT administrators have increasingly tried to hold grantees accountable for meeting their objectives.
- COMBAT could have done and still can do more by way of promoting accountability for its own activities.

- The Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) threatens property owners with abatement and forfeiture, but it also offers them training seminars.
- The Community Action Networks (CANs) incorporate prevention, treatment, and law enforcement strategies.
- The fathering project incorporates support services to fathers along with the threat of criminal prosecution if they fail to follow the rules of the diversion program.

Third, *each of the three COMBAT components itself sometimes incorporates several strategies within its own domain to achieve its goals.*

- The Paseo Corridor initiative’s criminal justice component includes a panoply of *criminal justice strategies* designed to reduce crime in the corridor, from prosecution of hourly rate motel owners to jailing prostitutes.
- Drug Court’s *treatment* services include on-site social support services, such as education, health care, and job placement.
- COMBAT’s landlord training initiative consists of a wide range of *prevention* activities, from teaching property owners to write effective leases to training maintenance workers to recognize drug dealing and drugs.

Fourth, many COMBAT initiatives—like DART and the Truancy Prevention Program—*link one or more “carrots” with one or more “sticks.”* As a result, the initiatives are comprehensive in the sense that they merge positive reinforcement—offering rewards—with negative reinforcement—threatening punishment.

Finally, COMBAT administrators try to address *three different facets of each individual’s substance abuse problem.*

- COMBAT addresses the *antisocial consequences* of substance abuse, typically, criminal behavior, through the numerous enforcement initiatives designed to discourage abusers from engaging in illegal behavior.
- COMBAT tries to eliminate the presumed *causes* of addiction, such as truancy, poor parenting, and mental health problems (like the use of drugs as a form of self-medication), through prevention initiatives that include the truancy program, the alternative schools initiative, and the fathering project.
- COMBAT seeks to eliminate the *barriers to recovery*, such as unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and, again, mental health problems, by offering support



services at County Court Services, job search assistance through the Full Employment Council, and tutoring programs funded by the COMBAT Commission.

### **Evolution, Not Revolution**

COMBAT changes every year. Its administrators expect it to keep changing—expanding and improving. This evolutionary approach manifests itself in several ways.

**Stepping stone approach.** COMBAT treats many initiatives not only as ends in themselves but also as forerunners of future initiatives. In some cases, an initiative is a prerequisite to other changes, while in other cases the initiative is the model for future initiatives.

- COMBAT administrators regard Drug Court as a mini-reorganization which set in place all the other collaborative initiatives which followed: “After Drug Court, we could remake the system,” one administrator said; “it was the stepping stone.” The planned Family Drug Court is patterned after Drug Court, as is the planned fathering pilot project.
- The successful collaboration between a COMBAT staffer and a Kansas City police major at a single public housing project became the prototype for the Paseo Corridor initiative.
- The Community Action Networks (CANs) also provided the framework for the Paseo Corridor Partnership initiative because they decentralized police officers into neighborhoods and took them out of their cruisers.

**A brick-by-brick approach.** COMBAT administrators learned that the program cannot move too quickly because the public needs to be educated to accept innovation and participants need to be educated to accept collaboration. As Denise Bruce, the supervisor of Drug Court’s diversion managers, pointed out, “Implementing a team approach requires attending numerous meetings—and that takes a lot of time. You can’t just institute a major new public health initiative; you need to do it slowly and incrementally.” James Nunnally cautions, “With innovations, you can’t appear to be tearing down the old system or even improving it. You have to innovate based on what you already have, what’s already being done.” Building a prevention network, Nunnally adds, “has to be done brick by brick; a lot of hod carrying is needed to build a foundation so the building will stand.” COMBAT includes other examples of the brick-laying approach:

- Two community-based organizations, Genesis and DeLaSalle, which COMBAT funds as alternative schools, have the potential to become charter schools. All they

need to convert to charter schools, COMBAT administrators say, is money, a principal, and a few more teachers.

- The Safe Summer Program is a step in the process of enlisting youth-serving agencies to provide services in the city's public schools. As a result, the program has begun to build a relationship between school principals and teachers on the one hand, and between neighborhood agency organization directors and staff on the other hand—groups that have failed previously to interact in Kansas City and in many cases have mistrusted and disrespected each other.
- The Safe Summer Program is also a step on the road to educating neighborhoods to expect community organizations that serve youth to do more for youngsters than they have in the past, as well as another brick in the edifice of year-round educational opportunity.

The "Management Guidance Scale" (shown as exhibit 6-3 on the following page) developed by COMBAT administrators in late 1993 illustrates graphically the breadth and complexities associated with their incremental approach to eliminating drug abuse in Jackson County.

At the same time, COMBAT has step by step tried to create an atmosphere in which innovation and collaboration become *standard operating procedure*. According to a Family Court administrator, "Whether COMBAT has a 'real' role [in Family Court's planned family drug court] doesn't matter; it's the atmosphere set up by COMBAT that has allowed this to happen. It has changed the culture; there's so much more collaboration now." According to a police administrator, "It's the whole COMBAT philosophy that is responsible [for the improvement in relations between law enforcement and prosecution]. COMBAT facilitated and provided structure and incentives to develop personal relationships [between officers and attorneys]."

**Learning from the past.** COMBAT administrators and participants have made a concerted effort to learn from their own past experiences. Examples of this improvement through experience include:

- continual modifications to the request for proposal (RFP) and bid process for prevention and treatment providers, and ongoing changes in provider oversight procedures;
- repeated, if uncoordinated, efforts to evaluate various COMBAT initiatives and to implement most of the resulting recommendations for improvement; and
- continuous changes in Drug Court from the aborted first design to the addition of in-house support services.

# MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE SCALE

## INSTITUTIONALIZATION

2000

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### IMPACT

- ◆ What Works Where ◆ Reallocation of Resources
- ◆ Integration of Unified Programs ◆ Outcome Based Decision Making
- ◆ Replication ◆ Data Driven Decisions ◆ Single Thrust ◆ Public Awareness

1997

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### BUILDING EXPERT CAPACITY

- ◆ Certification Training ◆ Grant Development ◆ Research Opportunities
- ◆ Treatment Forums ◆ Establishment of Interinitiative Programs ◆ Programs
- ◆ Prevention Training ◆ Initiative Evaluation ◆ Cross Training Criminal Justice/Treatment
- ◆ Joint Planning - Strategic ◆ Interinitiative Data Sharing ◆ Community Projects
- ◆ Data Enhancement ◆ Review of National Trends ◆ Uniform Treatment Assessments

1995

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### ACCOUNTABILITY

- ◆ Decision making Structure ◆ Goals / Objectives ◆ Vision Articulation
- ◆ Public Awareness ◆ Assignment of Tasks ◆ Audit Trails ◆ Independent Review on Grants

1993

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**Planning for the future.** COMBAT has always had a range of new initiatives, and modifications to existing initiatives, in the planning stages.

- COMBAT has used over \$200,000 in local Law Enforcement Block Grant monies it obtained when the Federal Government returned some grant match funds and interest payments to contract to bring urinalysis testing to the Drug Court treatment facility.
- Family Court is planning a Family Drug Court patterned after the prosecuting attorney's Drug Court. The court will enroll women charged with child abuse or neglect and will not prosecute them criminally if they complete a prescribed treatment program. The court will contract with a single vendor to coordinate a variety of services for the women, including legal aid, substance abuse treatment, and employment services. Like Drug Court, Family Court will also provide services to the children. The court will have a single dedicated prosecutor and judge. The county Department of Family Services will provide case managers. The COMBAT Grant Match Program will provide matching monies for Family Court to seek other funds.
- The city will be using part of the funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Safe Neighborhood Grant to provide the eight Paseo Corridor police officers with mobile phones so that neighbors and the officers can talk directly with each other. The officers will take the phones with them whenever they get out of their cruisers. Residents will be able to page the officers, leaving their telephone numbers so the officers can call them back. A log will record all calls and responses.
- Petra Peper, who ran the jail's mental health program (as well as the Jail Anti-Drug Management [J.A.M.] program), developed a release form on which she identified inmates whom she had treated for mental illness. If the inmates were willing to sign the form, she sent it to the department of probation and parole when the individuals had been released so that officers had the information they needed to refer them to the proper mental health providers for ongoing treatment. Peper developed a similar form for inmates who have participated in J.A.M. so that probation and parole officers—and the inmates' next substance abuse provider—have pertinent background information about their motivation, type of substance abuse problems, and assessment results.
- COMBAT has applied for a grant to map the actions of the Drug Abatement Response Team (DART), hot spots with housing code violation problems, landlord trainings, truancy data, and the locations of child abuse hotline calls. COMBAT will identify the overlap among these conditions in order to evaluate the

effectiveness of the landlord training. The prosecuting attorney's office will use the mapping of crime trends to support the neighborhood justice prosecutors.

- COMBAT assembled a task force that includes a representative from the Kansas City Power and Light Company to explore how utilities can assist in treatment discharge planning. Many patients find their inability to pay past and current utility bills jeopardizes their recovery and tempts them to deal drugs again. As a result, COMBAT and the utility are exploring means of easing the burden on individuals in recovery who are late in paying their bills.

### **Promoting Accountability**

COMBAT administrators have tried increasingly to hold grantees accountable for meeting their objectives. However, this has been a long and difficult process, especially with regard to prevention and treatment providers, many of which are not used to strict accountability or do not have the expertise or time to report on or evaluate their efforts. Partly as a result, COMBAT was careful not to move too fast with enforcing accountability, instead opting to help providers become more answerable for their performance in incremental steps rather than dictating a sudden and dramatic change in their way of doing business. While helpful in building support, this has limited evaluation and monitoring ability. Examples of COMBAT's promotion of accountability include the following:

- In order to hold funding recipients responsible for showing positive outcomes, COMBAT administrators have supported evaluations of several program initiatives, and they attempted early in COMBAT's history, although unsuccessfully, to arrange for a comprehensive process and impact evaluation.
- The Strategic Planning Committee and the Research Committee help keep COMBAT participants focused on achieving measurable outcomes.
- Drug Court requires increased accountability on the part of County Court Services by requiring it to keep the court informed of the results of urinalysis tests, attendance by clients, and other measures of program effectiveness.
- COMBAT has increased accountability in the prosecution arena. According to Michael Shanahan, agent-in-charge of the Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force, "I want convictions, not plea bargains, and the prosecutor in Independence agrees. This represents a philosophical change because, in the past, the prosecuting attorney never counted convictions, just filings, in measuring effectiveness."

COMBAT administrators tried to hold themselves accountable, as well, for demonstrating effectiveness and honesty. For example, administrators paid close attention to and implemented most of the recommendations included in the evaluation reports that related to COMBAT administration. The restructuring of COMBAT's organization in 1995 that resulted in the parceling out of program supervision among three entities (the prosecuting attorney's office, COMBAT Commission, county executive) represents both a response to a major Special Advisory Panel recommendation and an attempt to make the administration of COMBAT more accountable. However, COMBAT administrators could have and still can do more by way of promoting accountability for their own activities. A long-time COMBAT observer noted that

The program needs to have solid measures of accountability . . . . There is very little reporting to the public about the workings of COMBAT. The public deserves to know the specific activities and programs receiving COMBAT funding and whether these programs are effective. The public is hungry to know where the money is being allocated and if the programs do indeed work in reducing substance abuse.

## **The COMBAT Model Is Applicable in Other Jurisdictions**

Replicability is not a COMBAT objective, but it is of considerable interest to the National Institute of Justice, the Kauffman Foundation, and many professionals in the criminal justice, prevention, and treatment fields. Local legislators and government officials in other jurisdictions will also be interested in knowing whether they can implement a COMBAT-type program.

It appears that *other jurisdictions can implement a COMBAT-type program*. There do not appear to be features of Jackson County or COMBAT that would make it impossible for other jurisdictions to replicate the program. Indeed, Little Rock, Arkansas, has already implemented a similar dedicated tax (see below). However, there are guidelines that counties and cities should follow in order to help ensure that the program succeeds. Exhibit 6-4 summarizes these guidelines—and indicates which ones Little Rock also followed. The text below discusses the guidelines in detail.

### **Recommendations for Planning and Operating a COMBAT-Type Program**

*Secure strong, top-level political leadership for the program.* If the program will be funded by a countywide tax, the chief law enforcement officer must back the program unconditionally and actively because of the power of the position. (A mayor or city manager may meet this need with a city program.) Jackson County found this leadership in two prosecuting attorneys, first in Albert Riederer and then in Claire McCaskill.

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## Exhibit 6-4

### Guidelines for Replicating COMBAT

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COMBAT participants and observers in Jackson County offered the following implementation recommendations that other jurisdictions should consider following in order to help ensure that their program will be successful.

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Guideline	Implemented in	
	Jackson County	Little Rock
(1) Secure strong, top-level political leadership for the program.	Yes	Yes
(2) At the beginning, make law enforcement the most visible component of the program.	Yes	Yes
(3) Give the program a public health focus.	Yes	Yes
(4) Find an exceptionally talented and dedicated program administrator who will not promise too much.	Yes	Yes
(5) Make sure there is a strong foundation of accessible treatment programs.	Yes	No
(6) Earmark the tax money exclusively for fighting substance abuse.	Yes	Yes
(7) Plan in advance how the money will be used.	No	No
(8) Assign staff full-time to monitor prevention and treatment providers.	No	No
(9) Find ways to make participants feel they "own" the initiatives.	Yes	Yes
(10) Allocate funds for evaluating the program and begin the evaluation from the start.	No	No
(11) Set up a management information system (MIS) that links program participants as they move within and between the criminal justice system and treatment agencies.	No	No

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McCaskill in particular threw her support behind the program and gave it attention and visibility through public speeches, announcements to the media, and regular appearances at COMBAT activities such as Drug Court graduations. She estimates she spent 60–65 percent of her time on the program. Without a visible, respected, and articulate political leader regularly promoting the program among the electorate, most voters may be unlikely to approve (or reapprove) the tax increase. Furthermore, it is at least in part the unspoken power of the prosecuting attorney's office behind the efforts of COMBAT staff that makes it possible to achieve the collaboration that a COMBAT-type program requires.

*Initially, make law enforcement the most visible component of the program.* Many voters, especially those concerned about drug-related crime, will find a “law and order” focus appealing. Many voters do not understand or do not believe in what they may consider to be the “soft” approach of prevention and treatment. As a result, not only did the initiators of COMBAT pitch the program during the first referendum campaign as largely a law enforcement initiative, they placed the drug prevention component within the prosecuting attorney’s office under the guise of crime, not drug, prevention. Once a tax has been enacted, however, program leaders can begin to educate the public to the need to make prevention and treatment an equal partner with criminal justice system approaches to fighting substance abuse. Program leaders may also need to educate some of their collaborators to the importance of giving prevention and treatment equal attention. Some police administrators in Eastern Jackson County are reported to have wanted all the tax revenues to be spent on criminal justice system initiatives and had to be convinced that, as one police department administrator put it, “You can’t jail yourself out of the drug market.”

*Give the program a public health focus.* Claire McCaskill chose a public health administrator—James Nunnelly—to run COMBAT in order to ensure that prevention and treatment providers would feel positively about and therefore join the effort. Someone with a public health background can help prevent the treatment component from remaining an island unto itself in the middle of the ocean of criminal justice system initiatives.

It is important that the program administrator understand and support the goals of the criminal justice system, too. Although a public health professional, Nunnelly believes in and promotes the indispensability of law enforcement in the fight against drug abuse. For example, Nunnelly pushed to have arrested prostitutes tested mandatorily for HIV so that, if they reoffended, they could be charged with the more serious crime of endangerment.

*The program administrator needs to be exceptionally talented, experienced, and dedicated.* Simply being a competent public health professional is not enough.

The administrator also has to have no political agenda or axes to grind; he or she must be completely nonpartisan. The administrator needs to be careful not to overpromise what the program can accomplish to avoid raising unrealistic expectations.

*Make sure there is a strong foundation of accessible treatment programs* for at-risk youth and substance abusing offenders that can handle the increased referrals the program will generate. Jackson County already had an adequate number of treatment providers within reasonable travel distance for most residents in need of services. As a result, with additional funding, these providers could expand and improve their services to meet the increased number of referrals COMBAT would generate. However, James Nunnelly believes that “The number of treatment providers is not as important as having a local organization [such as the COMBAT Commission] that can make sure the network operates under uniform guidelines.”



He believes that Jackson County needed at least 10 treatment providers that were sophisticated enough to operate under common guidelines in terms of how they delivered and evaluated treatment services, such as collecting needed data, working with other parts of the treatment system to ensure a continuum of care, sending staff to participate in continuing education, and working closely with the funding agency as a partner, not just as a grantee in a funding relationship.<sup>1</sup>

*Earmark the tax money exclusively for fighting substance abuse, and segregate the money from other funds.* Otherwise, politicians and bureaucrats may find it tempting to use the money to address other crises or further their own political needs, especially during a recession. Claire McCaskill pointed out that Missouri's cigarette tax was supposed to be used for teacher salaries, but the State used the revenues to reduce the general budget. Proponents of a referendum in Massachusetts to raise \$96 million from an increase in the cigarette tax expected that the funds would be devoted exclusively to a Health Protection Fund for tobacco control (e.g., nicotine replacement therapy) and health prevention. However, legislators voted to use \$59 million for use in general health promotion, such as education in the schools, AIDS prevention, and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E) programs.

*Plan in advance how the money will be used.* COMBAT had no plan for how the rest of the money would be spent—what prevention and treatment initiatives to fund. As a result, funding decisions were made ad hoc. James Nunnally feels that COMBAT in particular “did not define prevention early enough so we could tell the public and providers what we wanted and ensure accountability among the providers we did fund.” As a result, COMBAT funded some initiatives that were not likely to directly further its goals.

Albert Riederer, the prosecuting attorney who initiated COMBAT, has mixed feelings about how much advance planning should have taken place before the tax was approved. He speculated that “advance planning might have only resulted in the idea being talked to death.” In addition, planning is a huge effort that requires front-end money from the Government or a foundation. Furthermore, the *fait accompli* of the Anti-Drug Tax' passage forced groups to talk to each other that otherwise might never have communicated, such as law enforcement and the treatment community and, within the treatment community, community mental health organizations and for-profit organizations. On balance, however, Riederer concludes that careful, early planning is the preferred approach:

We should have gotten a group of movers and shakers together and taken two months to plan what the program should look like. We needed to get a consensus among the

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<sup>1</sup> Of course, COMBAT could have funded the establishment of new treatment organizations. However, funding treatment programs from scratch is an expensive and unpredictable endeavor. A COMBAT-type program is more likely to take root if it can fund existing qualified treatment providers to expand and improve their current services, and ensure they operate under common guidelines.

players. We skipped that step. Only after the tax passed and we were faced with a *fait accompli* did we talk about what the program should look like—that is, how the money would be spent.

*Assign staff who have program supervision experience to monitor full-time the prevention and treatment providers.* As explained in detail in chapter 5, COMBAT Administration, some providers lack the experience or resources to provide detailed progress and evaluation reports or are concerned about how the information will be used; resent being monitored closely, change their contracted scope of work without permission; bill for unallowable costs; or fail to meet their responsibilities in other respects. As a result, the program needs from the outset to assign experienced staff to devote full time to monitoring the providers' performance. The monitors need to have the time not only to review the providers' use of program funding but also to provide technical assistance in such areas as reporting and evaluation.

*Find ways to make participants feel they "own" at least a piece of the initiatives.* Most participants and observers agree that it was the availability of money that helped bring the disparate parties to the table. But for the program to become institutionalized and no longer depend on money—that is, in the words of one observer, "to get commitment that goes beyond greed"—participants have to come to see that the initiatives benefit them politically with the public or other officials, or contribute to their achieving their agencies' missions. "The idea," according to James Nunnally, "is to make these initiatives as commonplace as Head Start" so that agencies will immediately and vociferously object to any incipient move to eliminate them. Michael Shanahan, the Drug Task Force's executive director, gives as an example the assistant prosecutor whom Claire McCaskill stationed in the Independence courthouse. The attorney has taken a strong position against plea bargaining most cases. "As a result," Shanahan says, "it's coming to where any new assistant [who replaced the current one] would also have to avoid plea bargains. It's gaining momentum. A member of the Kansas City police department told me, 'We want the kind of prosecutor you have.'"

*Dedicate funds—for example, at least 5 percent of the tax revenues—for evaluating the program from the very beginning.* According to a long-time COMBAT observer, a COMBAT-type program "needs to have solid measures of accountability. Most importantly, there needs to be an ongoing evaluation process in place so that the voice of the citizens . . . is reflected in the programs being funded . . ." The evaluation contract should be advertised as soon as the tax has been approved, be awarded to an independent organization with no ties to the community through a competitive RFP process, and include a comprehensive process and impact evaluation. Responsibility should be assigned to a small interagency committee for overseeing the evaluation process (e.g., writing the RFP, soliciting bids, hiring neutral reviewers). While there may not be much to "evaluate" during the first few years of the program, evaluators need to be brought on board immediately in order to

- collect baseline data,
- become familiar with and interview the key participants,
- observe the various initiatives as they develop, and
- develop a data collection plan to which participants can contribute from the outset that contains well-defined, uniform data elements and systems linked to each other through common identifiers.

Historically, most programs have been reluctant to design and implement a comprehensive evaluation methodology before beginning program operations or even shortly thereafter. They may be reluctant to divert funds from direct service delivery, fearful an evaluation will show they are not being effective or be misused against them, or lack the time to devote to data collection. However, careful evaluation is essential for convincing funding sources to continue or increase their support and for learning how the program needs to improve. In addition, a meaningful evaluation is very difficult and expensive to implement well unless data collection starts before, or least at the very beginning of, program operations.

The box “Other Recommendations for Effective Replication” presents additional suggestions COMBAT participants and observers offered to help ensure COMBAT-type programs will work in other jurisdictions.

### **Other Recommendations for Effective Replication**

COMBAT participants and observers offered the following additional tips for successfully replicating the COMBAT program in other jurisdictions.

- *Be careful not to use the funds for any purpose that the public may consider a boondoggle.* The first prosecuting attorney in Jackson County raised hackles when he used \$411,000 from the program to buy computers for his office—computers the press reported were not even compatible with those used by the police department and the Circuit Court.
- *Minimize turnover among key program staff.* Turnover results in periods of uncertainty, inefficiency, and inaction while replacements learn their jobs. It also prevents supervisors from devoting full time to their responsibilities as they spend time training new staff. This problem appeared when the COMBAT Commission hired and lost three prevention and treatment monitors. By contrast, the longevity of Claire McCaskill, as prosecuting attorney, James Nunnally as COMBAT administrator, Molly Merrigan as chief Drug Court prosecutor, David Baker, as chief drug prosecutor, Melissa Heiman as data specialist, Vicki Boyd as Drug Court treatment services director, David Kierst as Family Court administrator, and David Barton, a major with the Kansas City police department, facilitated the operation of the program considerably.
- *Document the need for a dedicated sales tax.* The community must be convinced that it has a serious drug problem so that a majority of residents will support the measure. As a result,

Albert Riederer recommends that jurisdictions conduct a needs assessment among citizens, law enforcement agencies, and the prevention and treatment communities to document the community's recognition of the problem and the need for a dramatic initiative to curb it.

- *Word and time the referendum carefully.* Riederer says that the tax should have a sunset clause in order to gain maximum voter support: "In the 1950s, we had 'emergency' taxes which remained until the 1980s, so the public is cynical about new taxes." Seven years were chosen to provide enough time to evaluate the program but not so much time that residents would not vote for it. Claire McCaskill says she deliberately presented the renewal of COMBAT on the ballot during an off year when other candidates who might make it a partisan political issue by labeling it as "soft" on drugs were not running for office. The legislature and McCaskill also put the program on the ballot for renewal two years before it was ready to expire so that, if the voters rejected it, there would still be time to present it to the voters a second time.
- *Make sure that all significant elements in the community feel that they are benefitting from the program.* Initially, some residents and organizations in Eastern Jackson County did not believe that they were getting their fair share of the tax money. As a result, COMBAT administrators were careful to include D.A.R.E. funding for several police departments in Eastern Jackson County, and the Fiscal Commission and COMBAT Commission were careful to continue to award a significant proportion of their contracts to organizations located there.
- *Take advantage of other sources of funding.* COMBAT was able to secure additional funds through its Grant Match Program. By keeping informed about new Federal initiatives, COMBAT also took advantage of opportunities for winning other grants. Claire McCaskill took advantage of her previous experience as a legislator on State and county budget committees to learn where the public monies were and how to access them.
- *Use program funds to leverage other dollars for fighting substance abuse.* COMBAT's Grant Match Program is the best example of this type of multiplier effect. However, COMBAT has also used its funding to encourage local agencies to contribute their own money in ways that simultaneously further both their and its own objectives. For example, COMBAT got the school system to invest some of its own money in fighting truancy: the school system was concerned about losing Federal funding as a result of excessively high absence rates, while COMBAT was interested in keeping young people off the streets. Similarly, COMBAT motivated Family Court to invest some of its own money in the fathering project: the court gains by reducing its enormous backlog of cases of men who are delinquent in their child support payments, while COMBAT benefits by offering treatment and improving the men's relationships with their children.
- *Be patient.* A COMBAT-type program takes months of planning and years of operation to show promising results. For example, extensive and time-consuming training and joint planning are necessary before the suspicious attitudes of treatment and law enforcement change enough to permit collaboration. COMBAT staff spent over four months working with participating Drug Court groups to get them to see eye to eye. Achieving real collaboration between police and prosecutors also does not occur overnight. In Jackson County, patience also translated into the prosecuting attorneys and county legislators exercising forbearance in allowing the program to

make mistakes without jettisoning it. At the same time, the program needs to show the public some successes in order to get the tax approved a second time. As a result, patience must be tempered with the recognition that the program needs to demonstrate success in some important areas within a few years.

Early planning for an evaluation puts every participating agency and organization on notice that it is going to be held accountable for demonstrating positive outcomes. As a result, these groups may be more diligent from the outset about collecting and reporting the kind of information that will demonstrate their effectiveness.

### **Little Rock's COMBAT-Type Program**

Only one other jurisdiction was identified that has a COMBAT-type program. Little Rock, Arkansas, has enacted a sales tax increase with part of the increased revenues dedicated to a holistic attack on substance abuse. (See the box "Other COMBAT-like Programs May Exist.") A brief description of the program follows.

### **Other COMBAT-like Programs May Exist**

It is possible that other jurisdictions besides Little Rock have also enacted legislation similar to COMBAT's that cannot be discovered without a systematic search of cities and counties across the country that was beyond the scope of this evaluation. Conversations with administrators of the Robert Wood Johnson Fighting Back program, and questions posed to COMBAT participants and observers interviewed for the evaluation, failed to identify other jurisdictions that have adopted a COMBAT-type program. However, an Internet search of articles in over 60 major city and national newspapers found the following:

- Sixteen agencies in Phoenix split \$500,000 from a half-cent sales tax approved in 1994 to provide substance abuse prevention services.
- Voters in Snohomish County, Washington, approved a sales tax increase that included an emphasis on drug abuse prevention and enforcement, including funding two additional attorneys to try drug cases.
- In 1989, voters in Sacramento, California, rejected a ballot referendum to increase the city and county sales tax by one-half cent to pay for increased efforts against drug abuse and gangs, as well as for more traditional police services. The measure was rejected 70 percent to 30 percent.
- The lieutenant governor of California floated a suggestion in 1990 that the State sales tax be increased by one-half cent to generate an estimated \$1.6 billion a year for more police and

prisons, K-12 prevention classes, and treatment programs. Proposition 133, as it was called, was defeated by a large margin.

- In 1993, the Missouri House passed a bill that would allow St. Louis and St. Louis County to ask voters for a half-cent sales tax to fight drug abuse. The bill was sent to the Senate where it died.

On December 14, 1993, during an election year, the residents of Little Rock approved by a substantial margin a one-half percent increase in the city's sale tax to fund a variety of city programs, including a public safety component that combines law enforcement, prevention, and treatment. After Little Rock was awarded one of the original 14 Fighting Back implementation grants in 1992 from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, city officials became familiar with COMBAT through participation in national Fighting Back meetings which were also attended by officials from Kansas City, another Fighting Back site. City officials, in particular, the former mayor, had already become concerned about the impact of substance abuse on public safety. At the same time, Fighting Back staff organized education and treatment leaders to lobby the mayor, city manager, and city board to include substance abuse within the already planned public safety component of the referendum. Fighting Back staff were able to use information compiled as part of the Robert Wood Johnson application to document the need for prevention and education initiatives. As a result, the mayor and other city officials visited Kansas City to learn more about Jackson County's implementation of its anti-drug tax. After the visit, the mayor included language in the referendum to allocate an unspecified portion of the money to fighting substance abuse. As in Jackson County, the referendum emphasized the anticipated law enforcement uses of the funds—the substance abuse component was called "Crime Prevention and Public Safety"—but officials planned to incorporate prevention and treatment once the money became available. Unlike Jackson County, however, the act has no sunset provision.

Known as "Future—Little Rock," the tax generates between \$14–\$16 million a year, much of it used for infrastructure improvements in the city. While the referendum language requires that money from the tax increase be used for fighting substance abuse, the language does not stipulate how much of the revenue will be devoted to this purpose. The city board makes that decision each year. However, when two new members of the city board wanted to divert some of the funds intended for prevention and treatment initiatives into the infrastructure budget, the other members passed a resolution to use the money permanently only for prevention and treatment. The money from the tax is kept separate from the city's general fund in a special projects account, and there is a separate line item for each prevention and treatment program.

As part of the crime prevention and public safety initiative, money generated by the tax has been used to hire 45 additional police officers for each of three years to increase

community-oriented policing and narcotics enforcement. Each year, \$3.2 million of the revenues have been used for treatment and prevention under the supervision of the city's Community Programs Department director. The director is a trained health administrator and a clinical social worker. In 1996, Future—Little Rock allocated \$1,814,500 to prevention and intervention programs, such as

- the development of youth employability initiatives (\$200,000);
- ten permanent sites for gang intervention programs (\$425,000);
- the expansion of community centers for year-round programming (\$250,000); and
- grants for neighborhood-based intervention and violence reduction programs (\$600,000).

Examples of neighborhood-based youth programs include comprehensive scouting adventures for 6th-to-8th grade boys living in central Little Rock (Boys Scouts of America); after-school tutoring (Little Rock Education Commission); alternative sentencing for youthful offenders in two neighborhoods (Pulaski County Prosecuting Attorney's Office); and art projects for 10-to-18 year olds (Arkansas Arts Center).

Treatment programs were given \$1,185,000 in 1995 to fund, among other initiatives,

- the development of a women's outpatient evening and weekend treatment program (\$175,000);
- treatment for adults in State-run residential treatment facilities—10 additional beds for men and 15 additional beds for women (\$335,000); and
- the design of comprehensive drug education, counseling, and intensive outpatient treatment programs for youth in need of treatment (\$500,000).

Little Rock used part of its Fighting Back grant to set up eight Neighborhood Alert Centers designed to involve law enforcement and local communities in various efforts designed to reduce substance abuse. A dedicated line item in the Future-Little Rock tax created an annual appropriation specifically for these centers. As a result, beginning in 1994, \$175,000 from the tax has been used to establish three additional centers through a competitive Request for Proposal process.

In terms of establishing the essential ingredients of a successful COMBAT-type program, Little Rock has diverged in some respects from the COMBAT model.

- The referendum—which had failed five times before because the private sector wanted money for a new arena, while community organizations opposed the use of more tax dollars for infrastructure—included the substance abuse initiative only as part of a larger package of citywide improvements.



- Little Rock did not involve the county or city attorneys in the program's planning or operation.
- The law enforcement allocation from the tax has increased each year—with some of its allocations being used to purchase helicopters and other activities unrelated to fighting substance abuse, while the prevention and treatment allocation has remained unchanged at \$3.2 million. As a result, some observers feel that the initiative is primarily a police effort.
- The tax does not fund a drug court.
- Except for the Neighborhood Alert Centers, there is minimal collaboration between other entities and the police department.

Like Jackson County, Little Rock did not develop a comprehensive, detailed advance plan for how to spend its prevention and treatment funds, although a steering committee<sup>2</sup> did identify four areas for targeting monies, including developing a citywide mentoring program for at-risk youth; extending community center hours and activities to include older youth and at-risk youth; developing a school-based ombudsman/advocate program to support high-risk students and their parents; and implementing a mediation program to address conflicts among students and reduce the number of suspensions. The city has since formed a prevention intervention and treatment advisory group and a treatment task force to decide how to spend the monies for prevention and treatment. Only in 1998 did the city begin to develop a long-range strategic plan for spending the prevention and treatment funds, such as the possible use of tax monies to fund a treatment program in the jail.

Little Rock, like Jackson County, did not incorporate a comprehensive process and impact evaluation into the initiative from the start. The mayor and city manager set up an evaluation team of 19 experts and interested citizens to assess the entire Future-Little Rock program. A paid evaluation consultant, Evaluation Forum of Seattle, works with the team. However, no evaluations of the crime prevention and public safety initiative have been produced. The community programs director was establishing an epidemiology committee to look at risk indicators and other measures of effectiveness so he can report to the city regarding the success of the prevention and treatment initiatives.

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2 The city board of directors appointed a volunteer steering committee in early 1993 to decide how the entire Future-Little Rock revenues should be spent. The committee held community-wide town meetings at sites across the city on four consecutive evenings and conducted a telephone survey of 400 randomly selected residents on their issues and concerns related to substance abuse. The city then convened 13 issue-based task force focuses of 15-20 citizen volunteers per group, each chaired by a member of the steering committee. One of the task forces was devoted to public safety and crime prevention—the substance abuse initiative.



Like COMBAT, the Little Rock program has experienced difficulties monitoring prevention and treatment contractors. The community programs director has had to provide some organizations with computers for data collection and reporting, and he has had to assist them with their budgeting. He is still struggling with getting them to provide uniform reports. Some community-based organizations have resisted evaluating themselves. He has had to cancel some contracts because organizations failed to provide the contracted services or did not provide adequate information documenting the services.

### **COMBAT is Replicable**

Little Rock's experience suggests that other jurisdictions can deviate significantly from COMBAT in how they develop, structure, and implement their anti-drug tax program. Nevertheless, the Jackson County experience, as well as the experience of Little Rock, suggest that the ten features identified above may still be important for a COMBAT-type program to succeed.

Examination of COMBAT's operations and the opinions of COMBAT participants and observers make clear that there is nothing unique to Jackson County that would prevent other jurisdictions from establishing a similar type of program. The Little Rock experience validates these opinions. Of course, the Little Rock experience does not document that a COMBAT-type program can achieve significant goals in other jurisdictions because it has not been evaluated. However, by studying the COMBAT experience, other jurisdictions should be in an excellent position to make a COMBAT-type program succeed because they can capitalize on the effective features of the Jackson County program and avoid its mistakes.

# Appendixes

## **Appendix A**

# **COMBAT Participants and Observers Interviewed**

## Appendix A

### COMBAT Participants and Observers Interviewed

#### COMBAT Administrators

Boyd, Vicki. Administrator of deferred prosecution, Prosecutor's Office  
Glorioso, Pat. COMBAT Program liaison administrator, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Nunnally, James. Anti-Drug Program Administrator, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Griffle, Susan. Executive director, COMBAT Commission  
Heiman, Melissa. COMBAT evaluation coordinator, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Rosselli, Kristin. Chief of planning and development, COMBAT, Prosecuting Attorney's Office

#### County and City Government

Baker, Stuart. Assistant anti-drug legislative auditor  
Callahan, Victor. County legislator  
Chase, Judy  
Cleaver, Emanuel. Mayor of Kansas City  
Colt, Janet. Manager of operations, office the county executive  
Flynn, Dixie. County legislator  
Holland, Jack. Chairman, COMBAT Commission  
Lloyd-McDowell, Denise. Board member, COMBAT Commission  
Madden, Christopher. Legislative auditor, Jackson County  
Session, William. Attorney, former chair, legislature's Special Advisory Panel  
Shields, Katheryn. County executive  
Waits, Dennis. County Legislator

#### Criminal Justice System

Agniel, Dennis. Regional Administrator, Northwest Missouri Department of Corrections,  
Board of Probation and Parole  
Allen, Thomas. Accounting supervisor, Kansas City police department  
Atherton, Denny. Director of field services, Family Court Services  
Baker, David. Chief drug prosecutor, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Barton, David. Commander, Narcotics and Vice Division, Kansas City police department  
Bellamy, Page. Prosecuting attorney, Lafayette County  
Biondo, Mike. Deputy Juvenile Officer, Family Court Services  
Bruce, Denise. Unit Supervisor, Board of Probation and Parole  
Cannon, Vince. Sergeant, Street Narcotics Unit (SNU), Kansas City police department  
Carey, Don. Chair, Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force  
Carroll, Dennis. Mobile Crime Watch, Northeast Community Action Network (CAN)  
Cipolla, Terri. Warrant prosecutor, Prosecuting Attorney's Office

## Appendix A, continued

### COMBAT Participants and Observers Interviewed

Crawford, Randy. Assistant prosecutor, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
DelMuro, Justine. Judge, Drug Court  
Elmer, Joel. Public defender, Missouri State Public Defender System  
Fleming, Rebecca. Sergeant, Kansas City police department  
Karpinski, Christopher. Coordinator, Drug Abatement Response Team, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Kierst, David. Director, Family Court Services  
Kies, Paul. Budget administrator, Kansas City police department  
Knouse, Craig. Captain and director, Street Narcotics Unit (SNU), Kansas City police department  
McCaskill, Claire. Prosecuting attorney, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Merrigan, Molly. Former Drug Court Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Prosecuting Attorney's Office  
Morrison, James. Director of residential services, Family Court Services  
New, Randal. Officer, Northeast Community Action Network (CAN), Kansas City Police Department  
Nunn, James. Deputy Chief, Kansas City police department  
Person, Dennis. Supervisor, Area 1, Family Court Services  
Potter, Roger. City prosecutor  
Riederer, Albert. Former Prosecuting attorney  
Roldan, Marco. Commissioner, Drug Court  
St. Omer, Denise. Assistant prosecuting attorney, truancy project  
Shanahan, Michael. Executive director, Eastern Jackson County Drug Task Force  
Watson, Rodney. Deputy Juvenile Officer, Family Court Services  
Wissman, Robert. Deputy Juvenile Office, Family Court Services

#### Treatment Providers

Chase, Judy. Treatment provider  
Crookshank, Nathan. Consultant, Full Employment Council  
Gemeinhardt, Paul. Executive director, Ozanam Home for Boys  
Gosney, Jeff. Substance abuse treatment specialist, Family Court Services  
Jasper, Loretta. Coordinator, Comprehensive Mental Health Services  
McReynolds, Daemon. Consultant, Full Employment Council  
Moon, Rex. On-Site supervisor, Day Report Center  
Mora, Mercedes. Substance abuse counselor, Guadalupe Center  
Peper, Petra. Director, Behavioral Health Jail Services, Jackson County Jail  
Popee, Mitchell. Physician's assistant, Swope Parkway Health Center  
Qualls, Margaret. Program director, County Court Services  
Randolph, Charles. Client advocate, Day Report Center  
Rathbun, Terry. Substance abuse counselor, Hope House  
Tucker, Joycelyn. Coordinator, minority counseling training program, Addiction Technology Transfer Center  
Weimer, Anna. Counselor, Comprehensive Mental Health Services  
Zimmerman, Doug. Associate director, Ozanam Home for Boys

**Appendix A-1, continued**

**COMBAT Participants and Observers Interviewed**

**Prevention Providers**

Biery, Richard. Director, Kansas City Health Department  
Boysen, Millicent. Executive director, Visible Horizons  
Brown, Keith. Director, Project NeighborHOOD  
Cleaver, Dianne. Director of Community Development, Truman Medical Center  
Dorrell, Sandy. Executive director, Eastern Jackson County Youth Court  
Graves, Carol. GED instructor, Day Report Center  
Grimaldi, Carol. Project director, Southtown Council (49-63 CAN)  
Henley, Patricia. Director, Missouri Center for Safe Schools  
Jacks, Karen. Community mobilizer, 49-63 Community Action Network  
Lesser, Anne. Director of outreach, Swope Parkway Health Center  
Lucas, C. Ricardo. Case manager, Project NeighborHOOD  
Prim, James. Leadership specialist, Kansas City Neighborhood Alliance  
Svoboda, Kellie. Resident Initiatives specialist, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development  
Wesson, Shawn. Parent-school liaison, truancy program

**Media**

Brown, Karen. Editorial writer, *Kansas City Star*

**Miscellaneous**

Colclasure, Richard. Director, Department of Community Programs, Little Rock, Arkansas  
Heimovics, Cathy. Director, Outreach and Evaluation Office, Cookingham Institute, Bloch School of  
Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri – Kansas City  
Sessions, William. Attorney, former chair, Special Advisory Panel

# Appendix B

## Four Case Studies

Four case studies follow that describe three COMBAT initiatives and one COMBAT feature:

- support services for Drug Court participants;
- a truancy prevention program;
- the hiring of a public health administrator to run COMBAT; and
- Drug Awareness Month.

All of these COMBAT initiatives and features are discussed in the text. However, these case studies afford the opportunity to describe them in additional detail.

## **The Benefits of Having a Public Health Professional Administer COMBAT**

With the election of Claire McCaskill as Jackson County Prosecutor in 1993 came several changes in the anti-drug sales tax initiative. First and foremost, the program was renamed COMBAT, for COMmunity-Backed Anti-Drug Tax, and secondly, Jim Nunnelly, an experienced public health administrator and community leader, was recruited to coordinate the wide variety of substance abuse prevention, treatment and law enforcement activities that are funded by the tax.

McCaskill reported that "I looked at the prosecutor's office and realized there was a weakness in that I was responsible for treatment contracts, Drug Court, and prevention, but no one [in my office] understood these groups and or knew their key players. Jim [Nunnelly] had a reputation in the treatment field and knew all the players. He provided a balance against our law enforcement orientation."

McCaskill wanted Nunnelly to bring together all the different programs and activities subsumed under COMBAT in a more "systematic" way. With McCaskill's full support, Nunnelly was given the responsibility to build a multi-disciplinary partnership for reducing substance abuse and related criminal activity out of a program perceived by some as no more than an enhanced law enforcement effort, and to provide overall vision to this unique initiative. Nunnelly could act as the bridge between the "soft" prevention and treatment side and the "hard" criminal justice processing side. McCaskill may have viewed Nunnelly as a risk taker who was willing to persevere in a law enforcement environment that did not believe in treatment. Finally, Jim Nunnelly was known by members of the treatment community and therefore, was in the best position to enlist its support for COMBAT.

Until recently, the drug problem was considered largely the responsibility of the criminal justice system and a great deal of available resources were channeled into the law enforcement approach. Not only did Jim Nunnelly bring a wealth of experience and expertise from the public health field to the task of integrating prevention and treatment services into the criminal justice system, but he has been quite instrumental in changing the ways law enforcement officials think about the substance abuse problem. Nunnelly gained the support of the law enforcement side of COMBAT in large measure because his approach to drug abuse is not "soft." While very sensitive to the necessity for providing substance abusers with effective treatment and support services, he is strict about enforcing the law against drug offenders. Moreover, Jim expanded the definition of treatment, making employment an integral part of a substance abuser's treatment process. Finally, because of his extensive experience in the public health field and linkages in the public health community, Jim Nunnelly constantly tried to communicate the message to citizens as well as to law



enforcement of the critical importance of prevention and early intervention programs as part of an overall strategy to reduce substance abuse and related crime.

A professional with training in public health is very well suited to administer an interdisciplinary initiative based in the criminal justice system. When a social problem is examined from a public health perspective, the public health administrator brings all the tools of the discipline to the study of the problem. According to Dr. Richard Beery, the former Director of the Kansas City Health Department, there are several core competencies that individuals acquire from an education and training in public health: (1) knowledge of management sciences (finance, marketing, personnel, administration); (2) knowledge about behavioral change; (3) knowledge of disease processes and prevention; (4) knowledge about epidemiology, including biostatistics; and (5) information about environmental sciences. In addition, public health is a highly collaborative field and no problem is considered the exclusive domain of one governmental agency, organization or discipline. Cross-disciplinary initiatives are not considered new territory for a public health administrator. A public health professional is trained in collaborative program development and learns to function as part of a team. Educated in the importance of collaboration, a public health administrator is equipped with the skills to bring together different community and professional groups necessary to the success of a COMBAT-type initiative. For example, Jim Nunnally has been particularly effective in fostering dialogue among different players to structure a response to the substance abuse problem (i.e., the Paseo Corridor Initiative). An individual with a background in public health also recognizes the critical importance of prevention and early intervention in devising remedies for social problems. Finally, a professional schooled in public health has a much broader vision of what is needed to address a social problem than traditional law enforcement officials. Public health professionals like Jim Nunnally tend to look at the "big picture" rather than focus on individual clients or defendants. They embrace a holistic approach. Moreover, the problem is not viewed in isolation. There is an examination of its antecedents as well as the societal and environmental factors that have an impact on the problem.

It is for these reasons that the placement of a public health official at the helm of an interdisciplinary initiative like COMBAT would be beneficial and ultimately contributes to the success of the program.

## **Support Services for the Drug Court Client**

The Jackson County Drug Court, like other treatment drug courts, links criminal justice processing with support services and agencies in the community, including not only substance abuse treatment, but also employment assistance, health care, education, and case management services. This array of support services is designed to help build self-esteem and to provide skills and resources necessary for Drug Court clients to ultimately lead a drug-free, healthy lifestyle.

County Court Services is a private agency dedicated to providing a range of services to individuals referred from local courts, including an anger management program, alcohol and drug treatment, a financial management course, electronic monitoring and probation supervision, and domestic violence programs. In 1995, County Court Services was awarded the contract as the treatment provider for the Jackson County Drug Court and played an active role in developing a central intake operation for all Drug Court clientele. This unit will ultimately process other substance abusing offenders in the criminal justice system. As the sole treatment provider for the Drug Court, County Court Services evaluates all Drug Court participants to determine treatment placement level, and provides group and individual counseling in an intensive outpatient treatment program. County Court Services also offers individual and group education and counseling for Drug Court clients placed in the Judge Mason Day Report Center, a Day Report Center Program based on a therapeutic community model modified for outpatient services.

The first component of Drug Court treatment is the assessment process carried out by staff from County Court Services. The assessment is conducted to not only determine the extent of the client's level of drug use and criminality, but also to shed light on the nature and extent of other problems in the client's life (e.g., health, mental health, education and family) that may contribute to the client's ongoing substance abuse problem. To address these problems, the Drug Court offers a range of support services to assist clients recovering from addiction, including a preparatory class to obtain a G.E.D., employment counseling and training information, case management, and health care services. County Court Services has been quite flexible in integrating support services for Drug Court participants onsite at the Judge Mason Day Report Center.

### **Employment Counseling and Training**

In 1986, to build a comprehensive employment and training system in the Greater Kansas City Area, both privately and publicly funded employment and training programs were merged into the Full Employment Council. Under the terms of this reorganization, the FEC would be responsible for coordinating all federally-funded employment and training programs for economically disadvantaged and dislocated workers, and youth employment programs for a five county area. The Full Employment Council, in a unique cooperative effort, partners with

local businesses, community-based organizations, educational institutions, and private citizens to create jobs for the unemployed, working poor, and disadvantaged youth in the Greater Kansas City area. Through this public/private partnership, a range of services are offered to the unemployed, including vocational skill training, adult education, GED preparation, youth employment programs, on-the-job training, career planning and assessment, and dislocated workers programs at employment and training centers in the Kansas City metropolitan area and at community-based satellite centers. One of the primary goals of the agency is to eliminate the many barriers to gaining meaningful employment.

COMBAT funds three Full Employment Council Programs: (1) Working Connection/Drug Treatment Program; (2) Youth Prevention Program; and (3) Court Companion Project. The Working Connection/Drug Treatment Program provides job assistance and training services to individuals enrolled in substance abuse programs. These clients are referred to the Working Connection/Drug Treatment Program located at the Full Employment Council by counselors from their particular substance abuse treatment programs. The Youth Prevention Project provides services for high risk youths, particularly services to improve literacy. Referrals to this program include drop-outs, pregnant/parenting youths, drug court clients, unemployed youth, and youngsters deficient in basic skills. Finally, the Court Companion Project provides employment and training services to drug court clients at the Judge Mason Day Report Center and at County Court Services.

The primary goal of the Court Companion Project is to assist Drug Court clients in finding appropriate employment as well as obtaining training opportunities to gain meaningful employment. Assistance may take the form of job placement, job search strategies, job skills training, e.g., obtaining a G.E.D., enrollment in a computer training course at a local community college, a job internship, or on-the-job training. Employment assistance may also involve helping clients in such tasks as filling out a job application, or advising them on the appropriate type of clothing for a job interview. Some of these services such as pre-employment training and adult basic education classes are available at Full Employment Council sites.

COMBAT funds three employment and training consultants at the Full Employment Council; one of these consultants provides pre-employment assessment and employment counseling and information on site to Drug Court clients at the Day Report Center and County Court Services. In addition, he provides information about and refers clients to literacy and vocational rehabilitation programs if he determines that they have learning problems and/or disabilities. He not only links clients to employment, training, educational opportunities and remedial programs, but he also assists them with supportive services such as transportation, day care, and the purchase of clothing for job interviews. Aside from direct service work with Drug Court clients, the employment and training consultant based at the Day Report Center is also responsible for contacting employers in business and industry, labor, educational

institutions, and community organizations to investigate potential job opportunities for Drug Court participants, thereby creating a job bank for Drug Court clients.

### **Health Care Services**

Drug-dependent individuals processed through the criminal justice system often have health problems associated with substance abuse, and limited access to medical care, particularly primary prevention and treatment services. Drug courts present a window of opportunity and an ideal setting to provide important preventive and medical treatment services to a population traditionally underserved by the health care system.

To address the health care needs of Drug Court clients, a physician's assistant from the local community health center, Swope Parkway Health Center, comes on site to the Judge Mason Day Report Center to provide health care services. One of the responsibilities of the physician's assistant during the initial assessment of the client is to determine his/her eligibility for free care through the Health Care for the Homeless Program at Swope Parkway Health Center. The majority of the participants at the Day Report Center are deemed eligible for the Program, since if they are not presently homeless, they are at high risk of becoming homeless. However, if clients don't qualify for the Health Care for the Homeless Program because they are employed, and/or own a home, and they do not have enough money to pay for health care, they can take advantage of a sliding scale fee arrangement available at Swope Parkway Health Care Center.

In addition to the initial review for eligibility, the physician's assistant does a basic health screening of Drug Court participants, including some routine tests and a health history. This screening includes questions about medication, allergies to medication, medical history, surgical history, family history of specific medical problems, employment status, and use of substances. Typically, a Drug Court participant at the Judge Mason Day Report Center will come to the physician's assistant with a health complaint, and the physician's assistant will do a brief medical evaluation. It includes a blood pressure screening, an evaluation of heart and lungs, eye examination, etc. If he determines, based on the medical screening that the client needs additional follow-up, such as further lab work or a chest x-ray, he refers the individual to Swope Parkway Health Center, or in some instances, to Truman Medical Center.

Women are routinely queried about their gynecological history and care and there is a discussion and periodic lectures about HIV/AIDS at the Day Report Center given by a very effective HIV health educator. Drug Court clients respect him because he is quite knowledgeable about substance abuse, was incarcerated for a period of time, and speaks the language of the streets. The physician's assistant also gives lectures on a variety of health topics suggested by members of the Judge Mason Center population, e.g., STD's, high blood pressure, respiratory disorders, etc. HIV testing is available to everyone on site through the oral HIV test (Orasure) and most clients get tested for HIV. Moreover, clients can go to

Swope Parkway Health Center on weekdays and get a free and totally confidential HIV blood test. The physician's assistant is also trying to implement tuberculosis testing for all Judge Mason Center clients and is hopeful that in the near future, all Drug Court clients will be tested. Finally, testing for other infectious diseases associated with substance abuse such as hepatitis is costly. Therefore, there is no universal screening for Drug Court participants. If the physician's assistant suspects that the client may have hepatitis, he will refer the client to Swope Parkway Health Center for a blood test. Clearly, the physician's assistant is trying to address the high incidence of infectious diseases among individuals under criminal justice supervision

The physician's assistant encounters specific obstacles in accessing medical services for Drug Court clients and the barriers fall into three categories: (1) offender characteristics; (2) funding and resource constraints; and (3) bureaucratic barriers. Drug Court participants are plagued by a variety of social problems and medical care is often not a priority. Moreover, some Drug Court clients who are not deemed eligible for free primary care through the Healthcare for the Homeless Program may not be able to easily access the health care system. Finally, the enormous amount of red tape involved in gaining entry to the health care delivery system may discourage some drug court clients from seeking further health care.

### **Educational Program**

Since early 1998, a teacher employed by the Kansas City School District Adult Basic Education Program has been overseeing the educational component of the Drug Court Program. Essentially, she is responsible for teaching a G.E.D. preparation course on site at the Judge Mason Day Report Center.

There are approximately seven clients in a class at any given time. There are no formal enrollment requirements; yet, new students are asked to attend their first class on Fridays, since orientation to the program occurs at that time. When a new student joins the class, he/she is given a "locator test" to determine his/her skill level. Since the primary goal of the Program is to prepare Drug Court participants for the G.E.D. exam, the class only focuses on the development of math and verbal skills. There is no individualized or even general educational counseling and the course does not concentrate on educational goals outside of passing the G.E.D. exam.

The teacher determines when a client is prepared for the test by examining his/her class performance and scores on practice tests. The Drug Court Program will pay for the actual "sitting" fee, but the client is responsible for the application fee. Drug Court participants taking the G.E.D. exam are tracked by a site number which indicates that they are a student at the Judge Mason Day Report Center site. Therefore, it is possible to ascertain how many clients in the Program actually took the exam, when they took the test, and the number of

students who passed the exam. As of April, 1998, none of the students in the Educational Program had taken the G.E.D. exam.

Although the extended length of the Drug Court program allows for a client to focus intensely on passing the G.E.D. exam, the educational component of the Drug Court program suffers from several shortcomings. First, few students take advantage of the class. This situation in part may result from the Drug Court's failure to fully integrate educational requirements into its program guidelines. In addition, when clients at the Judge Mason Center advance through the phases of treatment, they are no longer required to report to the Center on a daily basis, and many students eventually drop out of the educational program. Moreover, the G.E.D. instructor is not part of the treatment team and therefore, is not briefed as to the current status of each client. Clearly, the work of the G.E.D. educator has not been coordinated with the efforts of the other members of the treatment team. In short, the educational component needs to be fully integrated into the overall Drug Court Program. Meeting the educational needs of Drug Court participants is critical to preventing further involvement in the criminal justice system.

### **Enhanced Case Management Services**

In early, 1998, a staff member from Project Neighborhood began to provide enhanced case management services to the families of Drug Court clients. The client advocates at the Day Report Center are keenly aware of the barriers in an individual's life that may impede progress in the Drug Court Program. Such barriers include family problems. To address these obstacles to recovery, the Client Advocate makes a referral for intensive case management services, and the family situation is evaluated by a specific staff member from Project Neighborhood. Based on the results of the assessment, family members are referred to an array of social services, ( e.g., inpatient substance abuse treatment, a child care agency to obtain day care, basic education classes, a housing agency to deal with homelessness, an alternative school for youngsters who are unable to function in a regular school environment). In essence, the Project Neighborhood staff member acts as a case manager, facilitating access for family members to other service systems.

In summary, the Jackson County Drug Court Program carefully assesses not only the individual's severity of addiction, but also addresses the range of problems related to substance abuse such as medical issues, educational deficits, family problems, and unemployment. The "target population of the Drug Court requires a global approach in order for the intervention to be effective."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jackson County Drug Court Policy and Procedures Manual, 1998.

## **Kansas City In-School Truancy Prevention Project**

The Kansas City In-School Truancy Prevention Project is a collaborative prevention and early intervention initiative of the Kansas City Missouri School District, the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, the city of Kansas City, Missouri, and the Missouri Department of Public Safety. An intergovernmental management committee comprised of representatives from the Department of Neighborhood and Community Services in the Mayor's Office, the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, the Police Department, and the Superintendent of Schools, is responsible for general oversight and ongoing monitoring of the Truancy Prevention Project. Moreover, a governing body made up of the Mayor of Kansas City, the Prosecutor of Jackson County, the President of the School Board, the Deputy Police Chief, and representatives from the Division of Family Services, and non-profit community organizations act in an advisory capacity to the management committee as well as to the staff of the Truancy Program.

The Truancy Prevention Project was designed to provide a range of intervention strategies and services to support families and children to help keep youngsters in school, reduce truancy, prevent delinquency, and improve academic performance. It was fully implemented in February, 1997, and initially, it involved three middle schools and three high schools. Schools were chosen based on low attendance and achievement scores. However, in September, 1997, the Project began providing services to only youngsters in six middle schools. High schools were excluded because the majority of the students are over the age of prosecution.

Youth choose not to attend school on a regular basis for a variety of reasons including low self-esteem resulting from learning deficits and/or disabilities, family health or financial pressures, negative role models in a youngster's peer group, added concerns due to teen pregnancy or parenthood, fear of violence in school or community, and lack of family support for education. The Kansas City In-School Truancy Prevention Project systematically intervenes with youth who have exhibited attendance problems and addresses many of the factors that underlie truancy. More specifically, the Project targets those youngsters under 16 years of age who have at least one period of non-excused absence for at least three consecutive days and an attendance rate below 70 percent. (See the figure.)

### **The Educational Component**

This truancy reduction program involves several steps designed to motivate students and their parents to address the problems of chronic absenteeism and poor academic achievement. Through a team approach, the parent-school liaison, attendance clerk, assessment counselor, and prosecutor determine what issues are contributing to the youngster's truancy. Each of the six middle schools is assigned an attendance clerk, and four of the six middle schools are assigned one parent-school liaison. Two parent-school liaisons are assigned to two middle





schools with a particularly high enrollment and suspension rate. Using reports generated by the Absence Warning System at each of the participating schools, the intervention teams at each school ( the parent school liaison(s) and attendance clerk) are able to monitor and track students with excessive absenteeism. After targeting these youngsters, the parent-school liaison contacts the student either at home or in school to set up a meeting to identify the reasons for the truancy. In addition, the parent-school liaison contacts the parents/guardians through letters and telephone calls and conducts home visits or holds in-school conferences with parents/guardians in an effort to address the problems leading to repeated absences from school and to expedite the student's return to school. As part of the intervention process, targeted students and their families are referred to the Truancy Assessment Center in the Family Court for a comprehensive evaluation by an assessment counselor including an examination of the youngster's academic performance, physical, medical, and mental health needs, and conditions in the home and in the community. The results of the assessment provide the intervention team as well as school administrators, counselors and parents with very valuable information to guide their intervention efforts. Moreover, based on these data, the truancy assessment counselor and parent-school liaison jointly make referrals to community-based social service agencies and educational programs that will assist parents/guardians in dealing with the factors underlying the child's attendance problem.

Staff from the Truancy Prevention Project receive ongoing in-service training on a range of topics. Some of the subjects addressed by the trainings include prosecution of delinquent parents, services for different cultural communities, creating a community response to the "anti-achievement ethic," why parents are not involved in their children's schooling, and "building resilience in children."

Many youth who are habitually truant have experienced repeated school failure. As part of the S.M.A.R.T. Campaign (an acronym for Students Motivated to Achieve and Resist Truancy), another feature of the Kansas City In-School Truancy Prevention Project designed to promote attendance as well as academic achievement, part-time tutors have been placed in each of the six project schools to assist targeted students with reading, math, and test-taking skills. In addition to part-time tutors, each project school has a S.M.A.R.T. team comprised of students who are both targeted and not targeted for intervention by the project who participate in a wide variety of activities designed to foster attendance and academic performance. These activities include: essay and speech contests, posters for display in the schools and the community, special achievement assemblies, and radio and television announcements. Finally, as part of the S.M.A.R.T. campaign, a conference entitled "Getting School into Children" was held in June, 1998 to develop and implement a coordinated plan to promote attendance and academic achievement. Representatives from the media, students, teachers and administrators from the Kansas City School District, members of law enforcement, and business and community leaders came together to develop a comprehensive response to the truancy problem.

The truancy coordinator from the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office is also an integral part of prevention and early intervention efforts to address truancy. Each week, the assistant prosecutor visits targeted middle schools and talks to a cohort of students who have the worst attendance records in order to learn more about their particular life situations and the factors underlying their truancy. The assistant prosecutor's philosophy is that "truancy is a symptom of other problems going on at home." To gain further understanding of some of the causes of students' chronic absenteeism, he also conducts home visits along with school officials and links parents who are in need of support services to resources in the community. Essentially, the response of the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office to the truancy problem is proactive rather than reactive.

### **Prosecutorial Component**

If the parents have not responded to the initial intervention efforts of the school and have missed two scheduled appointments at the truancy Assessment Center without an appropriate excuse, the parent-school liaison, school principal and the truancy assessment counselor meet to refer the case to the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office. The Jackson County Prosecutor's Office then sends a letter to the parents/guardians alerting them of their responsibilities under the Missouri Compulsory Attendance Statute and advising them to contact the parent-school liaison at the school in which their child is enrolled within five days to discuss the truancy problem. If there is no response, a second letter is sent to the parents instructing them to contact the Prosecutor's Office to attend a joint meeting including the parent-school liaison, school principal, truancy assessment counselor, and assistant prosecutor. At this meeting, parents are informed of their responsibilities under the Missouri Compulsory Attendance Statute and the consequences of refusing repeated requests to cooperate with the school's efforts to address the truancy problem. If the parents still fail to comply with state law, and chronic truancy persists, the assistant prosecutor will prepare the case for prosecution, and parents can be fined, compelled to do community service, or even incarcerated in jail.

Since the initiation of the program, all parents, when contacted, have responded to intervention efforts to help their children succeed in school. Consequently, no criminal complaints have been filed by the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office against negligent parents. It should be noted that while prosecution is a feature of the Kansas City In-School Prevention Project, this option is only exercised when all other intervention efforts have been exhausted.

The Kansas City In-School Truancy Prevention Project is a very promising example of the team approach to truancy reduction. The Program provides a continuum of interventions and services to support families and children to keep youngsters in school, and involves the court's authority only when absolutely necessary. Since the inception of the Program in February,

1997, the Kansas City In-School Prevention Project has targeted 3,282 truant students for services. Moreover, since the imitation of the Program, 1,947 children returned to school.

## Drug Awareness Month

COMBAT has been hosting an annual Drug Awareness Month every August since 1994. The first year, the event was actually a drug awareness *week*, but because it was so well attended and was too short to include a number of valuable activities, it was extended to a month the following year.

### Purposes

The principal reason COMBAT holds Drug Awareness Month is to raise citizens' awareness of COMBAT and its programs so that they know how their tax dollars are being spent—and that they are being well spent. Every activity distributes information about COMBAT, its mission, and its effectiveness. Furthermore, most of the month's activities are geared toward introducing residents to the prevention and treatment initiatives that COMBAT funds. As a result, the event enables COMBAT to help address the public's misconception that COMBAT is exclusively or primarily a program devoted to busting into crack houses.

Not only do people who attend the events learn about COMBAT, the local press routinely writes articles about the activities, such as a *Kansas City Star* editorial of August 17, 1997, under the headline, "It's Drug Awareness Month: Annual Event Shows How Anti-Drug Money Is Spent."

The event also serves a prevention purpose by focusing on youth who are likely to become involved in crime and drugs, trying to educate them to the risks of substance abuse and the benefits of remaining sober.

### Activities

Drug Awareness Month includes as many as 150 events scattered throughout the county (see the figure). Examples of events include the following:

- Drug Awareness Month in 1997 included several events focused on the county's fight against methamphetamine, such as training sessions for community workers whose jobs take them into homes and areas where someone might be manufacturing the illicit drug, and seminars for landlords who need to learn how to keep drug activity out of their properties.
- Two COMBAT provider agencies offered education on the connection between domestic violence and substance abuse.

- Prevention providers offered conferences for school teachers on high-risk youths and drug prevention.
- A Mayor's Night Hoops Fest at a downtown high school involved a national basketball tournament with a special program for middle school children and their parents on drug and crime prevention.
- A group of high school students stage a mock trial to decide the fate of their peers at the Jackson County Courthouse Annex in Independence.
- The Kansas City Royals paid for 500 children to attend a baseball game.

A highlight of every August is a Recovery Picnic to celebrate the successes of treatment graduates and offer hope to others. Stories of recoveries are featured throughout the afternoon. COMBAT distributes a directory of recovery resources at the picnic. The following pages show the entire schedule of events for the 1997 Drug Awareness Month.

In 1996, General Barry McCaffrey, the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (known as "the drug czar"), spoke at the event, making clear to participants that COMBAT has achieved recognition at the highest levels of the Federal Government.

### **Funding**

Kristin Roselli, COMBAT's chief of planning and development, coordinates the event. However, Drug Awareness Month does not cost the taxpayers or COMBAT any money. The agencies that COMBAT funds put on the activities—indeed, their contracts with the county include a clause inserted by the COMBAT Commission stipulating that "Contractor shall participate in at least one event during the County's Drug Awareness Month in order to increase the community's awareness and understanding of the Anti-Drug Tax and the services provided by such tax."



## 4th Annual COMBAT Drug Awareness Month - August 1997

### Schedule of Events



The purpose of COMBAT Drug Awareness Month is to increase the community's awareness of COMBAT, COMBAT-funded programs and agencies, COMBAT's impact on the overall betterment of our community, and to provide useful information on how to reduce the risk of drug-abuse and drug-related crime. The focus of this year's COMBAT Drug Awareness Month is on methamphetamine -- reversing the trend of this increasingly dangerous drug in our community. All events are free and open to the public.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Location</b>
8/4	4-5 PM	COMBAT Drug Awareness Month Opening Session & Progress Report to the Jackson County Legislature	Jackson County Courthouse Legislative Assembly Area, 2nd FL 415 E. 12th Street, KC
8/4	5-6 PM	Drug Court Graduation	Jackson County Courthouse Division 50, 10th FL 415 E. 12th Street, KC
8/4 - 8/8	8 AM-4 PM	Youth Anti-Drug Collages -- "What Drug Awareness Means to Me (from Youth to Recovery)" <i>Featuring artwork of youth from Family Court's Detention Center.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/4 - 8/8	8 AM-4 PM	Multi-Media Substance Abuse Information Center <i>Videos and take-home materials available. Certified substance abuse counselors will be available to answer questions.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/5	7-10 PM	"Night Out Against Crime" <i>Be sure to turn on your front porch light during these hours and try to participate in a neighborhood event.</i>	Call for locations of "Night Out Against Crime" celebrations (881-3112).
8/9	1 PM	COMBAT Interview on Available Services	KTGN 890 AM Radio Station
8/6	7 PM	HBO Special "27th & Prospect" <i>Part of the "Faces of Addiction Series" sponsored by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.</i>	Call your local cable company for specific station ( <i>free viewing for all cable subscribers</i> )
8/7	12-1:30 PM	Drug Detection/Meth Lab Early Recognition Seminar for "Front-Line Community Workers" <i>Anyone who works in a residential area is invited to attend.</i>	Call for Eastern Jackson County location. <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>

Schedule is subject to change. Contact COMBAT at 881-3112 for a complete listing of Drug Awareness Month events, additional information and for reservations.

**4th Annual COMBAT Drug Awareness Month - August 1997  
Schedule of Events**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Location</b>
8/8	4-7 PM	Mayor's Urban Symposium & Tournament (M.U.S.T.) -- Truancy Symposium	Central High School 3221 Indiana, KC
8/10	9 AM	COMBAT Interview with Olivia Dorsey on "Dimensions"	KMBC Channel 9
8/10	3:30 PM	HBO Special "27th & Prospect" <i>Part of the "Faces of Addiction Series" sponsored by Robert Woods Johnson Foundation.</i>	Call your local cable company for specific station ( <i>free viewing for all cable subscribers</i> )
8/11-8/15	8 AM-4 PM	Youth Anti-Drug Collages -- "What Drug Awareness Means to Me (from Youth to Recovery)" <i>Featuring artwork of youth from Family Court's <u>community-based</u> programs.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/11-8/15	8 AM-4 PM	Multi-Media Substance Abuse Information Center <i>Videos and take-home materials available. Certified substance abuse counselors will be available to answer questions.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/11	TBA	Treatment Services Update for Community Referral Agents <i>For barbers, beauticians, ministers, and others in a position to informally provide drug prevention and treatment information to individuals.</i>	Call for location (881-3814).
8/14	8-9:30 AM	COMBAT Commission Meeting	Legislative Assembly Area - Courthouse Annex 306 W. Kansas, Independence
8/14	12-1:30 PM	Drug Detection/Meth Lab Early Recognition Seminar for "Front-Line Community Workers" <i>Anyone who works in a residential area is invited to attend.</i>	Call for Kansas City location. <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>
8/14	6 PM	HBO Special "27th & Prospect" <i>Part of the "Faces of Addiction Series" sponsored by Robert Woods Johnson Foundation.</i>	Call your local cable company for specific station ( <i>free viewing for all cable subscribers</i> )

Schedule is subject to change. Contact COMBAT at 881-3112 for a complete listing of Drug Awareness Month events,  
additional information and for reservations.

Page 2

363

P.04

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**4th Annual COMBAT Drug Awareness Month - August 1997**  
**Schedule of Events**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Location</b>
8/17-20	All Day	<b>National Training: Planning &amp; Implementing a Drug Court</b>  <i>Sponsored by Justice Management Institute &amp; Office of Drug Court Planning</i>	Jackson County Courthouse 415 E. 12th Street, KC
8/18-8/22	8 AM-4 PM	<b>Youth Anti-Drug Collages -- "What Drug Awareness Means to Me (from Youth to Recovery)"</b>  <i>Featuring artwork of youth from Family Court's field and after-care service programs.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/18-8/22	8 AM-4 PM	<b>Multi-Media Substance Abuse Information Center</b>  <i>Videos and take-home materials available. Certified substance abuse counselors will be available to answer questions.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/18-8/19	8:30 AM-5 PM	<b>The Alternative School Network's "Success Is The Only Option" Conference</b>	RLDS Auditorium Temple Garden Level 1001 W. Walnut Independence, MO <i>Reservations required (881-3814).</i>
8/19	2 PM	<b>HBO Special "27th &amp; Prospect"</b>  <i>Part of the "Faces of Addiction Series" sponsored by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.</i>	Call your local cable company for specific station (free viewing for all cable subscribers)
8/20	1-4 PM	<b>Prevention &amp; Treatment Symposium - Methamphetamine</b>  <i>Extent of the problem from the viewpoint of law enforcement, effects of meth on the human body and effective treatment methods.</i>	TeleCommunity Center Metropolitan Community Colleges Independence Campus 20301 E. 78th Highway Independence, MO <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>
8/21	8 AM-5 PM	<b>Jackson County, Missouri Landlord Training Seminar</b>	Vesper Hall 400 NW Vesper Blue Springs, MO <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>

Schedule is subject to change. Contact COMBAT at 881-3112 for a complete listing of Drug Awareness Month events, additional information and for reservations.

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**4th Annual COMBAT Drug Awareness Month - August 1997  
Schedule of Events**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Location</b>
8/23	8 AM-5 PM	Jackson County, Missouri Landlord Training Seminar	Jackson County Courthouse Legislative Assembly Area, 2nd FL 415 E. 12th Street, KC <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>
8/24	1-6 PM	Recovery Picnic <i>A drug &amp; alcohol-free family picnic. Food, entertainment and games.</i>	Spring Valley Park 27th & Woodland, KC
8/24- 30	TBA	Jackson County Read-A-Thon  <i>Sponsored by COMBAT Commission &amp; KC Star Editorial Board to encourage young people and adults to read.</i>	Locations throughout Jackson County. <i>Call 881-4626 for information.</i>
8/25-8/29	8 AM-4 PM	Youth Anti-Drug Collages -- "What Drug Awareness Means to Me (from Youth to Recovery)"  <i>Featuring artwork of youth from Family Court's McCune &amp; Hilltop Treatment Centers.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/25-8/29	8 AM-4 PM	Multi-Media Substance Abuse Information Center  <i>Videos and take-home materials available. Certified substance abuse counselors will be available to answer questions.</i>	Jackson County Family Court Lobby 625 E. 26th Street, KC
8/28	12-1:30 PM	Drug Detection/Meth Lab Early Recognition Seminar for "Front-Line Community Workers"  <i>Anyone who works in a residential area is invited to attend.</i>	Call for Eastern Jackson County location. <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>
8/29	9-11 AM	Drug Detection/Meth Lab Early Recognition Seminar for "Front-Line Community Workers"  <i>Anyone who works in a residential area is invited to attend.</i>	Call for Kansas City location. <i>Reservations required (881-3112).</i>

Schedule is subject to change. Contact COMBAT at 881-3112 for a complete listing of Drug Awareness Month events, additional information and for reservations.

Page 4

P.06

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596

## Appendix C

### The Arrest Process

The initial COMBAT legislation called for a portion of COMBAT funds to go to the criminal justice system; the 1996 legislation calls for not less than 50 percent of the proceeds to go to the criminal justice system.

The charts on the following pages summarize the arrest process for drug offenders in Jackson County. Depending on the charge, the amount of drugs seized, and other considerations, the arresting agency directs the case to a city prosecutor, the Jackson County Prosecutor, or a Federal prosecutor. Misdemeanor arrests are submitted to the city prosecutor; major cases to the Federal prosecutor; and the rest to the Jackson County Prosecutor. About 95 percent of SNU's and DEU's arrests go to the County Prosecutor. Overall, however, the city prosecutor handles more drug cases than the county prosecutor does.

For adult arrests directed to the county prosecutor, the arresting officer brings the arrest paperwork to the prosecutor's warrant desk. An attorney screens the case, deciding whether to file it in criminal court, recommend diversion to Drug Court, or decline to prosecute.

All cases involving drug charges go to the prosecutor's Anti-Drug Unit for entry into Docket O, a special docket set up with COMBAT funds. Before a case is scheduled in Docket O, there must be an arraignment at the associate level, a preliminary hearing at the associate level (unless the defendant waives his or her right to one), and an arraignment at the circuit court level. Of course, the defendant could make a plea or the case could be dismissed at any point along this route.

Juveniles are referred to Family Court. After an initial screening, the case may be dismissed or referred to the court's legal unit and an eventual court hearing. A petition is either dismissed or sustained. If sustained, the offender is either given probation or placed in a public or private facility.

If the case is directed to the Drug Court, there is an initial court appearance where the offender is offered the chance to enter the program. If the defendant refuses, or enrolls in but fails the program, the person is arraigned in criminal court. If the person successfully completes the program, the charges are dismissed.

## Appendix D

### Summary and Assessment of COMBAT Evaluations

This appendix summarizes each evaluation of COMBAT, or a COMBAT-funded initiative, in terms of the evaluation's focus, methodology, findings, and strengths and weaknesses.

The legislature commissioned two early studies of COMBAT. In 1989, the legislature contracted with BOTEC Analysis Corporation in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to provide an overview of the entire county's drug problem and methods of improving the county's response to it.

**Focus.** The 136-page report, submitted in December 1990, described the drug problem in Jackson County and its consequences for the community; discussed the current response to the problem being taken through state and local legislation and by law enforcement agencies, prosecutor offices, the courts, and corrections; and offered 102 recommendations for addressing the problem more effectively grouped under 17 topic areas (e.g., legislation, Drug Task Force). The analysis focused on state and local initiatives designed to address the substance abuse problem, not just COMBAT.

**Methodology.** While the report does not include a methodology section, it appears from the acknowledgments that information was obtained through in-person interviews with state and local officials responsible for addressing the substance abuse problem in the county and at least two community-based organizations. The report does not indicate how many individuals were interviewed or how they were selected.

#### Findings.

- Drug abuse has skyrocketed in Jackson County. The consequences to the county are pervasive.
- Several law enforcement agencies are responsible for handling drug-related crime, but they are hampered by deficiencies in the regional crime laboratory.
- The Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney's Office is overwhelmed with drug cases.
- The entire criminal justice system lacks modern computerization. The community needs to monitor and evaluate its drug suppression efforts.

Strengths and weaknesses. The report provided a useful discussion of the nature of the substance abuse problem in the county and a valuable description of efforts at the time to control the problem and the efforts' deficiencies. The report included many worthwhile recommendations for improving the county's response. The report did not prioritize the 102 recommendations, making it difficult for local officials, with limited resources, to decide which ones to implement. The report did not suggest which recommendations for improvement COMBAT in particular should address. Because the study examined county initiatives, not just COMBAT's efforts, many of the recommendations were tangential to COMBAT's mission or beyond its authority or finances to implement (e.g., conducting a study to determine the weight and sentencing differences between state and federal courts; providing funding to reduce probation officers' case loads). Some recommendations were probably not feasible to implement (e.g., enforcing a proposed statute to prohibit "loitering for the purpose of buying, selling, or consuming a controlled substance") or of questionable constitutionality (e.g., legislation that makes being under the influence of an illicit substance grounds for arrest). There was no discussion of the significant barriers officials could be expected to encounter in implementing many of the recommendations—many of which required significant funding—or guidance for overcoming them.

In 1993, recognizing that the legislation was near the midpoint of its seven year "trial run"—and that there had been criticisms of COMBAT's administrative structure (see above)—the Legislature's Anti-Drug Sales Tax Committee appointed an Anti-Drug Sales Tax Special Advisory Panel to assess COMBAT's progress implementing its eight initiatives.

**Focus.** The panel's 19-page report, the result of five months of work, evaluated the strategies that each of COMBAT's eight components used to achieve its three goals, suggested mid-course corrections, and made recommendations for improvement.

**Methodology.** The panel's nine members included the research director of the Kauffman Foundation, representatives of the legislature, Midwest Research Institute, Arthur Andersen, the Urban League, a business school, and a bank. A private attorney chaired the panel. James Nunnely and a representative of the County Executive's office were ex-officio members. The panel commissioned reports and heard presentations from 10 sources, including both prosecuting attorneys, the Kansas City police chief, the chair of the Drug Task Force, the presiding circuit court judge, and the administrator of family court. The panel asked these executives to explain how their department implemented their respective COMBAT initiatives. The panel's report included the 10 executives' reports as appendixes. The panel also solicited citizen comment at a three-hour public hearing attended by over 75 people and

examined unaudited sources and financial statements prepared by the county finance manager.

**Findings.** “The Drug Tax has funded many important programs in support of its ‘mission’ of reducing both the demand for and consequences of the use and abuse of illicit drugs in Jackson County.” COMBAT was “making serious inroads into the problem.” Nevertheless, because of a variety of problems (see the discussion of recommended improvements below), COMBAT was “not, however, winning the war.”

**Strengths and weaknesses.** By concentrating on a few areas of COMBAT’s performance, the report proposed a limited but feasible and important set of recommendations for improving the program (see below). Because panel members included a number of respected and influential individuals, COMBAT could be expected to take the recommendations especially seriously. It is questionable whether James Nunnally, as a representative of the agency receiving most of the COMBAT funding, should have been even an ex-officio member of the panel.

There have been four studies of COMBAT’s Drug Court. In 1994, a researcher from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation in Kansas City and a researcher from the University of Missouri at Kansas City conducted an evaluation of the planning process for Drug Court.

**Focus.** The report, 20 single-spaced pages, examined the effectiveness of an 18-member steering committee created in June 1993 to develop a plan for the court. The committee’s responsibilities included establishing criteria for eligibility, getting the different groups to buy into the diversion model, and examining other diversion models. The study was designed to identify the committee’s major accomplishments and how the committee achieved them, and to suggest needed immediate changes to improve the committee’s remaining work.

**Methodology.** The planning committee requested the evaluation. Using structured but open-ended interviews, evaluators talked with steering committee members.

**Findings.** Most planning tasks were well executed. Four aspects of the planning process needed improvement: the court’s mission statement, goals, and objectives were written too late for the committee to do its work effectively and a work plan with specific objectives and due dates was needed; the steering committee was too large to meet its responsibilities in a timely manner; the committee needed subcommittees; and there were limitations in the committee’s work product, such as a management information system and written guidelines describing the consequences to clients who fail the program.

**Strengths and weaknesses.** The report provided an interesting picture of the committee’s operations and presented a number of significant findings. The

text was enlivened with direct quotations from committee members. The report used percentages to report the committee members' opinions, but there is a well established convention to use only absolute numbers when the sample size is smaller than 100 (since a shift in only one or two respondents' opinions changes the percentages dramatically). Parts of the report are tangential to its goal—for example, what participants hoped to gain by participating on the committee (altruism) and their most beneficial learning experience. These sections diluted the report's important findings. It appears that the report is based entirely on the committee members' experiences.

In 1995, the Kauffman Foundation funded an evaluation of the first year of Drug Court's operation.

**Focus.** The principal purpose of this formative evaluation was to analyze the relationships between the characteristics of Drug Court clients and differential performance patterns for overall and treatment-specific compliance rates and urinalysis test results. The study intended that the information would make it possible for Drug Court to develop differential treatment programming based on characteristics of clients and its target population.

**Methodology.** Researchers analyzed archival data on 217 clients, examining compliance with treatment, urinalysis tests (UAs) results, selected client characteristics (e.g., employment status, child care concerns, dual diagnosis status, residential status), and client demographic characteristics (age, sex, and race). Compliance rates were examined for clients participating in acupuncture, individual and group counseling, self-help groups, and attending meetings with the diversion managers. The researchers also interviewed a nonrandom sample of five participants and conducted a focus group with 10 other participants.

#### Findings.

- Clients with high levels of participation tended to have more negative UAs compared with clients with lower levels of participation. (These clients have a longer time in which to present UAs, and the positive UA clients may have dropped out or been terminated.)
- Overall compliance rates were associated with client race (white were more likely to comply), age (older clients did better), employment status (the employed part-time did better than the unemployed or full-time employed), and residential status (clients living with friends, spouse or significant other, or living alone, did better than those living with their family of origin or living in a shelter).
- There was an interaction between race and age, with younger whites complying more than older whites, and older blacks complying more than younger blacks. High negative UA rates were associated with client race (whites had more negative

test results) and with higher levels of compliance with individual and group counseling.

- Of 450 processed cases, 193 were closed before October 7, 1994. Just over half (52 percent) of the closed cases were terminated for noncompliance—failure to attend treatment and diversion management.
- Nearly one in five participants (19 percent) opted out of the program, taking their cases through the traditional criminal processing procedure. Almost one in ten (9 percent) had their cases closed because of new charges were filed.
- Only four percent of participants during the first year were charged with committing a new crime.

Strengths and weaknesses. The study provided information that could be used to identify ways of improving Drug Court performance, most notably, differential compliance rates across treatment modalities and client characteristics associated with poor compliance. The study also provided a useful model of social science research that other drug courts could replicate to improve client success rates--a secondary purpose of the study. Outcome data were limited because the program was designed to last a year, and only one client had successfully graduated from the program in its first year of operation. While clients with high levels of participation tended to have more negative UAs compared with clients with lower levels of participation, this may have occurred because they have had a longer time in which to provide UAs and clients with positive UAs are more likely to have been terminated. According to the researchers, the data used to form the aggregate totals may be suspect because of inconsistent records. For example, records showed that some clients listed on other records as terminated for noncompliance were later found to have been deported or deceased. The study did not measure the differential effects of support services (education, job referral) or inpatient and shock time. The researchers did not identify the universe of individuals who were eligible but declined to participate and were eligible but were dropped; collect follow-up data on drop-outs; and develop a comparison group. The report identifies other limitations of the study.

COMBAT contracted with Resource Development Institute, a private research firm in Kansas City, to conduct a process evaluation of Drug Court focusing on the Day Report Center.

Focus. The evaluation was supposed to identify the characteristics of clients who completed the program. However, the preliminary findings concentrated exclusively on characteristics of program participants, a comparison of UA test results with participants' self-reports of drug use, and interviews with Drug Court staff on their perceptions of the court's strengths and weaknesses. The evaluation was required by

COMBAT's Enhancement Grant and Treatment Network Grant from the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT).

**Methodology.** The researcher examined case records of 89 current Drug Court participants and interviewed an unknown number of them. There is no indication of how the case records and respondents were selected. The researcher also distributed a written, anonymous questionnaire to Drug Court staff. Twelve of the 14 staff returned their questionnaires. Staff included administrators, diversion managers, client advocates, and counselors.

#### Findings.

- Seventy-three percent of the 89 clients examined had officially been charged with possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia; 17 percent had been charged with selling drugs; 9 percent had been charged with felony theft.
- Fifty-nine percent of participants surveyed tested positive at least once for marijuana; 47 percent for cocaine; 7 percent for PCP; 2 percent for amphetamines and benzodiazepines; 1 percent for opiates; and none for barbiturates.
- The surveyed participants reported higher levels of drug use than the UAs indicated: 19 percent who tested negative for marijuana reported using the drug; 16 percent for cocaine; 14 percent for PCP; 9 percent for amphetamines; 8 percent for barbiturates; and 3 percent for opiates. These discrepancies may be accounted for at least in part by the claims of some participants that they did not attend the program when they were likely to test positive and the comments of other participants that they changed the drugs they use to avoid positive test results, for example, switching from marijuana (which continues to be detectable for a week or more) to cocaine (with its shorter half-life) or alcohol (which is not included in the test). Staff differed in their perceptions of the program. Some reported there was a need to improve both the process by which clients enter and are oriented to the program and the procedures for dealing with drug activity by clients on the premises. Seven staff felt the administration was not receptive to staff concerns; some staff were concerned about administrators making clinical decisions regarding client placement and overturning decisions of the treatment team. Many reported high levels of frustration with the lack of organization and clear direction in the program. [Cf. Joanna's observation of lack of organized activities.] Staff were mixed on whether they felt clients benefitted from the program.

**Strengths and weaknesses.** The 24-page preliminary report was a collection of disparate statistics with only three pages of discussion (two of them on the staff interview results). The study was never completed because the principal investigator left the company and her replacement was unable to complete the work. The researcher's exclusive focus on discrepancies between UA results and client self-reports resulted in no discussion of the actionable implications of drug use rates (however determined) for improving the operations of Drug Court.



James Nunnally and the Fiscal Commission initiated, and the COMBAT Commission completed, an agreement with the Center for Management Assistance, a private consulting organization in Kansas City, to conduct a client satisfaction survey of prevention and treatment provider clients.

**Focus.** The study's goals were to determine client satisfaction with COMBAT-funded prevention and treatment services and to compare client satisfaction among individual providers.

**Methodology.** Providers distributed the surveys on-site. For the prevention and treatment sites, the provider's COMBAT coordinator asked clients to participate in the survey over a two-week time period. Coordinators instructed clients to complete the 10-minute survey, seal it in an enclosed envelope, and return it to the coordinator, who brought the sealed envelope to CMA. For the nine D.A.R.E. programs, the sample approach and method of administration differed from school to school: some schools used a random sampling approach recommended by CMA, while others asked D.A.R.E. program officers to go into classrooms and ask for volunteers. Students sealed their completed surveys and returned them to the officers, who forwarded them to CMA. The researchers distributed surveys (based on the programs' estimates of their caseload) to each site to pass out, collect, and return. Out of a total of 63 providers and 14,702 clients, 45 providers returned a total of 1,827 surveys, representing 13 percent of clients. Eleven of 31 prevention providers, and 3 of 21 treatment providers, did not return their surveys. Response rates—that is, the percentage of surveys returned—varied dramatically, from 7 to 167 percent for prevention sites. The researchers drew a sample of 744 (5 percent) from these surveys. The survey results have a margin of error of +/- 3.7 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.

#### Findings.

- Ninety percent of clients in the sample reported that they knew their program was meant to “reduce (stay off) illegal drugs”—83 percent of prevention clients, 96 percent of the D.A.R.E. clients, and 96 percent of treatment clients. This rate of understanding may seem high, but it is difficult to understand why *any* participants would not know what the purpose of their program was. Furthermore, in five prevention programs, at least one-third of the clients did not know their program's purpose, including at least half the clients in two prevention programs. Eighteen percent of participants in one of six D.A.R.E. programs did not know its purpose. Between 15 and 20 percent of clients at two treatment programs and five percent at three others did reported not knowing their program's purpose. While one might argue that prevention programs can be effective without explicitly explaining their purpose, this cannot be said of participation in D.A.R.E. or in a substance abuse treatment program.

- Eighty-eight percent of all clients reported that they would tell others to go to their program, including 85 percent of the prevention sample, 87 percent of the D.A.R.E. sample, and 92 percent of the treatment sample.
- Eighty-one percent of prevention clients and 99 percent of D.A.R.E. clients reported that they were more likely to stay off drugs as a result of their prevention activities. At least 30 percent of clients in 6 prevention programs said they were not more likely to stay off drugs by participating in their prevention activities
- Ninety-four percent of treatment clients reported they got what they wanted from their treatment program, and 85 percent reported there were no other kinds of drug treatment services that would help them more. However, at least one third of clients representing seven of the 20 prevention providers, at least one quarter of participants in four of six D.A.R.E. programs reported that programs they had participated in elsewhere were better than the COMBAT-funded program.
- Sixty-two percent of the prevention sample, 94 percent of the D.A.R.E. sample, and 45 percent of the treatment sample reported that they had never participated in a prevention, drug resistance, or treatment program before.

Strengths and weaknesses. A small pilot team of prevention and treatment providers provided CMA with suggestions about the content and format of the surveys, as well as pilot testing the instruments. However, the same survey instrument was administered to both adult and juvenile clients; as a result, the comprehension level of the questions was too difficult for many of the younger respondents. In addition, the evaluators had preferred that the providers draw a random sample from their own client lists to receive the survey, but, according to CMA, some providers were unwilling or unable to comply. As a result, providers distributed the surveys on-site to all their clients over a two-week period. The D.A.R.E. clients did not represent a random sample of students. Because the researchers did not supervise administration of the survey, there was no independent verification that they were administered properly or, in the case of the providers, randomly (that is, to every client over the two week period). Because clients and D.A.R.E. students returned their completed surveys to program staff, some respondents may have given dishonest responses because they did not feel confident that their answers would be kept confidential. The question clients were asked about their knowledge of the program's purpose was phrased in a manner that was designed to elicit the correct response: "Do you know that your prevention activities [treatment program] are [is] meant to reduce illegal drugs [sic] use [keep you off illegal drugs]?" A more reliable approach to learning whether clients knew what the purpose of their programs was would have been to ask a multiple choice question. The data regarding clients' comparisons of how good their present treatment program was compared with other programs they had participated in must be tempered by the fact that 45 percent had been in their present treatment program for only one month or less, and 45 percent reported they had never been in another drug treatment program. While the study findings by individual provider are

suggestive, the researchers caution that “great caution” should be used in examining the results for individual sites for reasons presented above and other considerations.

YouthNet, a community-based organization, commissioned Research and Assessment, Inc., a Kansas City firm, to evaluate the organization’s COMBAT-funded 1996 “Key to a Safe Summer” program.

**Focus.** An independent research firm, Research & Assessment, assessed whether a safe summer program achieved its three objectives.

**Methodology.** The assessment included interviews with YouthNet and Safe Summer program staff, four funders, five agency executives, seven site directors and seven assistants, nine school staff, seven community consultants, and one parent’s group. The evaluators also conducted three youth focus groups and secured written survey results from 134 youth at three different sites. In addition, the researchers reviewed program activity documentation.

**Findings.** The report concluded that the program had mixed results in meeting its three objectives.

- The program met its first objective of providing young people in Kansas City—1,393 youth—access to a safe place within walking distance. The parents interviewed and youth who returned the survey questionnaire agreed that the school site was a “safe” place. Fifty-eight percent of the surveyed youth reported that they felt “much” safer or “lots” safer this summer. In addition, no assaults or violent acts, and no more than two very minor thefts were reported all summer at the schools.
- Seventy percent of the surveyed students reported they felt the staff liked them “much” or “lots,” a proxy measure for assessing whether the program achieved its second goal of providing youth an opportunity to connect with caring adults.
- The program partially met its third goal of engaging youth in positive, developmental activities, because there was inadequate time for agencies to plan an appropriate program. Career and life skills activities and academic programming “were uneven in quality.”

**Strength and weaknesses.** While the researchers appear to have conducted a wide range of interviews, it is difficult to assess the quality of the interviews because the evaluation does not include the interview questions. Because there is no discussion of how the youth surveys were administered, it is not known whether the responses represent a random or biased sample of participants. The program was supposed to provide access to a safe place within walking distance of home. However, at some sites almost all participating youth were driven to the sites in busses or vans, or by their parents. It is possible that some of the youth felt safer “this summer” for reasons unrelated to their participation in the program, such as being a year older. The

evaluation provided no direct evidence that youth were able to “connect with caring adults.” The proxy measure used to assess this goal—whether they liked the adults—has not been validated as being associated with “connecting with caring adults.”

In 1995, COMBAT, along with the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, funded the Institute for Human Development, a program affiliated with University of Missouri-Kansas City (UMKC), to evaluate YouthNet, a program that provides crisis intervention, assessment, case management, and survival skills to children of substance abusing families referred by Family Court.

**Focus.** The study included a process and impact evaluation designed to answer the questions: Was the project implemented as specified in the grant application? What was the profile of the families and children served? What were the perceptions of the community agencies collaborating on the project? and What were the outcomes with respect to the children?

**Methodology.** The process and impact evaluation examined 174 families who agreed to participate in the study. The researchers interviewed the children and family members and examined court records. A random sample of 30 families referred to Family Court in the same manner as the participants was chosen as a comparison group—every tenth family of 300 who called during March 1993. The National Council on Alcohol and Drug Dependence conducted an additional assessment of the children’s perceptions of their parents’ substance abuse.

**Findings.**

- After a year there was a statistically significant reduction in violence in the participating families’ homes. There was no change in the level of emotional abuse and inappropriate discipline.
- A year after the families’ participation ended, there were no telephone calls to a child abuse hotline to report child abuse among the participating families, while there were 7 calls regarding 4 families in the comparison group. The report did not indicate whether these differences were statistically significant.
- The participating families did not have significant decreases in their need for financial resources employment, living arrangements, or food at the end of the year compared with before they enrolled. They did have a reduced need for clothing.
- After one year, the children had statistically significant better immunization records than before enrollment and decreased health symptoms.

**Strengths and Weaknesses.** The nearly 200-page report (excluding appendixes) did not include an executive summary. The report does not indicate whether the differences in hotline calls between participants and nonparticipants was statistically significant. With the exception of hotline calls, the report does not appear to provide comparisons on any other outcomes between the program participants and the comparison group.

## Appendix E

### Implementation of Evaluation Recommendations

This appendix reviews the recommendations of each evaluation summarized in appendix F, indicating which suggestions were implemented along with the reasons, where available, for why the other suggestions were not implemented.

The BOTEC report offered 102 recommendations for improvement in each of 17 areas. Several of the most significant of these recommendations follow. However, BOTEC identified changes that the county as a whole, not just COMBAT, needed to implement in order to be more successful in fighting substance abuse.

- Propose five separate statutes to the Missouri Legislature and two local ordinances, such as a triple prescription regulatory plan for licit pharmaceuticals.
- Implement new drug enforcement strategies for implementation by KCPD patrol divisions, such as increasing foot patrols in high density areas.
- Make changes in the operations of the Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) and Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU), such as reducing delays in case filing, assigning an administrative officer as permanent liaison to the prosecuting attorney's office, and allocating additional administrative personnel.
- Increase training, equipment, and staff compensation of the KCPD Regional Crime Lab.
- Provide the prosecuting attorney's drug unit with more personnel, reduce pre-filing case review time, initiate a formal training program, restrict staff exclusively to drug cases, work with DEU, SNU, and the Drug Task Force to target specific drug trafficking areas, implement a deferred prosecution program in the Drug Unit, and implement a state-of-the-art information system, including ongoing records of where defendants are in the system and compilation of statistical data.
- Add staff and equipment to the prosecuting attorney's forfeiture unit and develop more forfeiture cases.
- Have city prosecutors refer first-time cocaine offenders and other defendants to the deferred prosecution unit.
- Offer a comprehensive drug treatment program to inmates at the county jail and reinstate a discontinued work release program.

- Arrange for the Department of Probation and Parole to obtain funding to conduct random urine testing to monitor probationers.
- Determine the information system needs of the police, prosecution, court, and other organizations that handle drug abuse cases, including an action plan to identifying computerization objectives and plan for integrating these new systems into existing operations with minimal disruption.
- Design and implement an ongoing agenda of monitoring and evaluation.

The Special Advisory Panel to the Legislature's Anti-Drug Committee made a number of recommendations.

- Exert greater efforts to direct funds to innovative prevention and treatment programs not traditionally supported by public and private sources. COMBAT programs "by and large, appear to have perpetuated traditional theories of how the drug problem should be attacked on a communitywide basis"--that is, respond to symptoms--rather than address the environmental conditions that foster substance abuse, including generating communitywide intolerance for substance abuse. To do so, COMBAT needs a coordinated public policy to guide the recipients of COMBAT funds that includes devising and implementing innovative prevention and treatment programs.
- "There is not now, nor has there ever been, a coordinated set of anti-drug strategies bound together in a community-wide public policy. Too many sectors in Jackson county engage in the anti-drug effort have either poorly coordinated their efforts or not communicated with each other." As a result, "Jackson County needs a community action coalition . . . [because] the effectiveness of the programs . . . could be enhanced if there were more collaboration and communication among the community sectors involved in substance abuse prevention and treatment initiatives." Schools, in particular, are an important but neglected link in the county's drug tax strategy.
- Place greater emphasis on prevention and treatment of persons involved in illegal substance abuse, particularly youth. Provide easier access and entry methods for individuals desiring drug treatment.
- Have COMBAT administrators exercise greater leadership.
- Publicize COMBAT's successful activities more effectively.
- Ensure that nongovernmental organizations that benefit directly from funding decisions are not involved in the Fiscal Commission's funding allocation process.

Specifically, the report observed that the two treatment providers who were commission members had a conflict of interest in deciding both the distribution of COMBAT funds and receiving some of those funds. The panel called for modifying the Fiscal Commission “. . . to assure nongovernmental persons and organizations, directly benefiting from funding decisions, are not involved in the funds allocation process . . . .”

- Address root causes of drug abuse like communitywide environmental influences.
- Develop a formal ongoing evaluation process (see above).

The Kauffman Foundation/University of Missouri process evaluation of Drug Court recommended that the steering committee adopt several steps to focus its efforts on accomplishing specific tasks necessary to implement the Drug Court plan.

- Create a written, formal operating structure with clearly defined responsibilities for tasks by individual staff person and associated completion dates.
- Reduce the committee’s size to 8 to 12 members (instead of 18) and develop subcommittees to address specific parts of the plan.
- Develop written guidelines defining the consequences to participants who fail Drug Court.
- Develop plans for a management information system, and establish an ongoing evaluation plan.
- Plan a program component that focuses on preventing recidivism.
- Establish an ongoing evaluation plan for Drug Court.

The Kauffman Foundation’s evaluation of the first year of operation of Drug Court made a number of recommendations for improving the court’s operations:

- Consider a central location for program intake to reduce duplication of activities associated with intake processes of diversion management and treatment.
- Investigate ways of modifying the program to retain more clients with characteristics—race, employment status, residential status—consistently associated with low levels of compliance.



- Define and track the relapse status of clients as they progress through the program.
- Place greater emphasis on developing an aftercare program for clients.
- Continue to monitor the problem of disputed urinalysis results. (The initial procedures had proven less than 100 percent reliable.)

The prevention and treatment client satisfaction survey offered only one formal suggestion—that COMBAT utilize the interview instrument as a “user survey” for providers to distribute to all clients. The COMBAT Commission could use the results to measure changes in client satisfaction over time. Although not included in the report, the study findings imply that COMBAT staff need to consider the following actions:

- Work with providers whose results suggest they may have serious program weaknesses as suggested by the percentage of clients who did not know the programs’ purposes, would not recommend it to others, or did not find it as good as other programs with which they were familiar.
- Consider requiring providers that failed to submit their client surveys to do so as a condition of contract renewal. Require all newly contracted providers in the future to participate fully in the survey.
- Resurvey programs whose data raise red flags, after they have been given assistance or warning to improve, and consider terminating or not renewing the contracts of any that fail to correct their deficiencies.

The YouthNet Safe Summer program evaluation recommended that the program

- - Begin the planning process much earlier than was done in 1996.
  - Hire more qualified youth workers and provide additional training to youth workers.
  - Clarify the relationship of volunteers to site directors and agencies;
  - Provide agencies with assistance in planning a program for youth by furnishing them with samples of “best practices” in programming curriculum in selected areas.
  - Develop a transportation plan in advance for each site and provide additional vans and buses.
  - Coordinate the summer school schedules of the public schools in advance.

The evaluation report on the SAFE-TYES program offered 18 recommendations, of which the following are representative:

- Implement aftercare services in the form of support groups or continuing monthly meetings with families.
- Provide ongoing support to the children and adolescents.
- Focus more attention on helping parents to secure training or employment.
- Coordinate better with mental health services for treating families in which dual diagnosis is a problem.
- Conduct an annual needs assessment of the resources and gaps in services that support substance abuse treatment and support services in the Kansas City area.

Finally, COMBAT has implemented changes in its initiatives not only in response to the recommendations of program studies but also in response to other indications that change was needed. For example

- In response to staff reports that administrators were not addressing their concerns, Drug Court has implemented a focus group to help address these issues as they occur.

# **Appendix F**

## **Survey of Community for Evaluation of COMBAT Initiative 1998**

## **SURVEY OF COMMUNITY FOR EVALUATION OF COMBAT INITIATIVE**

**1998**

### *INFORMATION FOR THE INTERVIEWERS*

This survey is designed to determine the knowledge and experience of the population in Jackson County (Missouri) with the COMBAT program. COMBAT is a 10 year old initiative which operates treatment, prevention and law enforcement programs in Jackson County funded by a set aside of a portion of the county sales tax. Its focus is services related to the problems caused by the use of illegal drugs. The community survey portion of Abt's evaluation covers four basic areas:

- knowledge of COMBAT and its programs
- opinion and knowledge of substance abuse issues in Jackson County
- victimization, experience with crime and/or substance abuse problems
- perception of risk, community safety.

This survey is to be administered by telephone and is intended to collect information without burdening the respondent unduly. It is to be administered by the Abt Associates Survey Group telephone services. It is part of a larger research project Abt is conducting for the National Institute of Justice and the Kauffman Foundation.

If there are any questions regarding this survey or the larger research project, please direct them to Dr. Dana Hunt, Abt Project Director at (617) 349-2733.

<INTRO1> Hello, My name is [FIRST NAME]. I'm calling from Abt Associates, a research company in Cambridge, Mass. I'm part of an important study which is evaluating knowledge and opinions about substance abuse treatment, prevention and law enforcement programs in Jackson County. This is an anonymous survey which should only take about ten minutes. Can we begin?

<INTRO2> For this study, I need to talk with the adult in the household, someone 18 years old or older, who had the most recent birthday. Is that you or someone else?

ALREADY SPEAKING TO DESIGNATED RESPONDENT	1
DESIGNATE RESPONDENT AVAILABLE (REPEAT INTRO1)	2
HANG-UP DURING INTRO	6
GENERAL CALLBACK	92
DESIGNATED RESPONDENT NOT AVAILABLE (SCHEDULE CB)	93
FINAL OTHER	97

<S1> Just to confirm, are you 18 years old or older?

YES (SKIP TO <NEIGH>)	1
NO	2
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<S2> I'd like to speak with a member of your household who is 18 years of age or older

18+ Available	1
No 18+ in Household (TERMINATE)	3
General CB for 18+	92
Specific CB for 18+	93
REFUSED (TERMINATE)	97
DON'T KNOW (TERMINATE)	98

**RESIDENT LOCATION**

<NEIGH> Is your residence located in Jackson County?

YES	1
NO (TERMINATE)	2
REFUSED (TERMINATE)	7
DON'T KNOW (TERMINATE)	8

*If respondent does not live in Jackson County, thank and terminate.*

<WHERE>1. In what city, town or area of the county do you live?

LISTING OF CITIES	1-76
OTHER	95
REFUSED	97
DON'T KNOW	98

<LONGU>2. How long have you lived at this location? (*select unit*)

Years	1
Months	2
Date	3
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<YEARS>, <MONTHS>, OR <SINCEYY> <SINCEMM>

<SATIS> 3. In general, how satisfied are you with (RESIDENCE AREA) as a place to live?

Are you...

Very satisfied	4
Somewhat satisfied	3
Somewhat dissatisfied	2
Very dissatisfied	1
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<DAY> 4. In general, how safe do you feel out alone in (RESIDENCE AREA) during the day? Do you feel...

Very safe	4
Somewhat safe	3
Somewhat unsafe	2
Very unsafe	1
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<DARK> 5. In general, how safe do you feel out alone in (RESIDENCE AREA) after dark?

Do you feel...

Very safe	4
Somewhat safe	3
Somewhat unsafe	2
Very unsafe	1
Don't go out at night	6
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<GENERAL>

6. In the past five years, would you say that (RESIDENCE AREA) has become a safer place to live, a less safe place to live or stayed about the same?

Safer	3
About the same	2
Less safe	1
Did not live here 5 years ago	6
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

Now I am going to read you a list of thing that may or may not be current problems in (RESIDENCE AREA). After I read each, please tell me whether you think it is a big problem, a small problem or not a problem in your area.

*Read each item. After each, repeat: "a big problem, a small problem or no problem."*

Big	Small	No	REF	DK
Problem	Problem	Problem		

<D\_SOLD>

- 7a. Illegal drugs  
being sold in the area

<D\_USER>

- 8a. Illegal drug use in area

<D\_BURGLE>

- 9a. Burglaries, shoplifting,  
other property crimes

<D\_ROB>

- 10a. Robbery, violent crimes

<D\_TRUANT>

- 11a. Truancy

At the conclusion of Q7-11, ask the sequence again as:

“Has \_\_\_\_\_ changed in the last five years; that is, gotten worse, better or remained about the same?”

Gotten worse	Remained the same	Gotten better	REF	DK
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<C\_SOLD>

7b. Illegal drugs  
being sold in the area

<C\_USER>

8b. Illegal drug use in area

<C\_BURGLE>

9b. Burglaries, shoplifting,  
other property crimes

<C\_ROB>

10b. Robbery, violent crimes

<C\_TRUANT>

11b. Truancy

Next I would like to ask you about some things which may have happened to you or your family in the past two years in (RESIDENCE AREA).

<BREAKIN>

12. In the past two years, has anyone broken into your home, garage or other building on your property?

YES	1
NO	2
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<VICTIM>

13. In the last two years, have you or anyone in your family been a victim of a violent crime such as a mugging, assault or robbery?

YES	1
NO	2
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<DRUG>

14. In the last two years, have you witnessed a drug transaction such as a sale or trade in (RESIDENCE AREA)?

YES	1
NO	2
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8



## LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES

<ORDER>

15. In general, how good a job are the police doing in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs these days in Jackson County? Would you say they are doing a...

Very good job	5
A good job	4
A fair job	3
A poor job	2
A very poor job	1
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

<DRUG>

16. How good a job would you say the prosecutors and the courts are doing in controlling the sale and use of illegal drugs in Jackson County? Would you say they are doing a ...

Very good job	5
A good job	4
A fair job	3
A poor job	2
A very poor job	1
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

## KNOWLEDGE OF COMBAT AND COMBAT PROGRAMS

I would like to ask you now whether you have heard of, or you or a member of your family participated in, any of the activities of any of the following programs in the County.

- <TAX\_A> 17a. Have you heard of...  
The anti-drug sales tax or COMBAT?

YES	1
NO (SKIP TO Q18a)	2
REFUSED (SKIP TO Q18a)	7
DON'T KNOW (SKIP TO Q18a)	8

<TAX\_B> 17b. Have you participated in...  
The anti-drug sales tax or COMBAT?

YES	1
NO (SKIP TO Q17d)	2
REFUSED (SKIP TO Q17d)	7
DON'T KNOW (SKIP TO Q17d)	8

<TAXSAT> 17c. Regarding the anti-drug sales tax or COMBAT, would you say you were...

Satisfied	1
Had mixed feelings about	2
Not satisfied	3
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

*Only ask if answer to Q17a is yes.*

<TAXVOT> 17d. Did you vote for or against this initiative when it was on the ballot in 1995?

Voted for	2
Voted against	1
Did not vote	3
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

*Only ask if answer to Q17b is yes.*

<TAXOPN> 17e. What was the nature of your involvement with COMBAT or the sales tax program? (Record as the respondent states the programs involved in or the nature of the involvement)

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Rotate List.

		<i>ask only if a. is yes</i>	<i>ask only if b. is yes</i>	<i>ask only if a. is yes</i>	<i>ask only if b. is yes</i>
	a.Heard of Program	b.Participated in Program	c.Satisfaction	d.Voted for	e.Nature of Involvement
<b>Drug Court</b>	<COURT_A>	<COURT_B>	<COURTSAT>	<COURTVOT>	<COURTOPN>
<b>Kansas City or Eastern Jackson County Youth Court</b>	<YOUTH_A>	<YOUTH_B>	<YOUTHSAT>	<YOUTHVOT>	<YOUTHOPN>
<b>Eastern Jackson County Task Force</b>	<EJCTF_A>	<EJCTF_B>	<EJCTFSAT>	<EJCTFVOT>	<EJCTFOPN>
<b>Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)</b>	<DART_A>	<DART_B>	<DARTSAT>	<DARTVOT>	<DARTOPN>
<b>Community Action Networks (CANS)</b>	<CANS_A>	<CANS_B>	<CANSAT>	<CANSVOT>	<CANSOPN>
<b>COMBAT Commission</b>	<BAT_A>	<BAT_B>	<BATSAT>	<BATVOT>	<BATOPN>
<b>Paseo Corridor Partnership</b>	<PCP_A>	<PCP_B>	<PCPSAT>	<PCPVOT>	<PCPOPN>
<b>Full Employment Council Job Assistance</b>	<FECJA_A>	<FECJA_B>	<FECJASAT>	<FECJAVOT>	<FECJAOPN>
<b>Safe Summer Program</b>	<SSP_A>	<SSP_B>	<SSPSAT>	<SSPVOT>	<SSPOPN>
<b>Alternatives Schools Program</b>	<ASP_A>	<ASP_B>	<ASPSAT>	<ASPVOT>	<ASPOPN>

## RESPONDENT INFORMATION

Thank you very much for your time. I would just like to ask you a few demographic questions and we are finished.

<BORN> 19. In what year were you born? *(Enter a four digit year greater than 1890)*

\_\_\_\_\_

ENTER F10 (-2) FOR REFUSED  
ENTER F9 (-1) FOR DON'T KNOW

20. Which of the following describes your current employment situation?  
<EMPLOY>

Working full time	1
Working part time	2
Unemployed and looking for work	3
Retired or otherwise not looking	4
Homemaker, not working outside home	5
Student, part time student	6
Disabled	7
Other	995
REFUSED	997
DON'T KNOW	998

21. How many people under 18 live in your household?  
<KIDS>

\_\_\_\_\_

ENTER F10 (-2) FOR REFUSED  
ENTER F9 (-1) FOR DON'T KNOW

22. What is your ethnic identity? Do you consider yourself to be...  
<RACE>

African American	1
White	2
Hispanic	3
Asian/ Pacific Islander	4
American Indian	5
Multiracial/ Multiethnic	10
REFUSE TO CATEGORIZE BY RACE	11
Something else	995
REFUSED	997
DON'T KNOW	998

<SEX> 22. Respondent Gender

Male	1
Female	2
REFUSED	7
DON'T KNOW	8

**That's all. Thank you very much for your help.**

## **Supervisor Alert**

**Supervisor:** Keely Malone

**Project:** Chase

**Shift:** 5-10 pm

**Day:** Wednesday

**Date:** Sept. 9, 1998

**Number of Interviewers Scheduled: 7**

**Number of Interviewers Added: 0**

**Number of Interviewers Cancelled: 0**

**Total Number of Interviews: 7**

**Number of Interviewers Late/ Left Early: 0**

**Shift Comments:** We were able to obtain all of the necessary complete to fill all quotas, but one. We even extended the shift a fraction of an hour, with Ray's permission. We just didn't have enough available regular "Texas" sample to fill that quota. We fell one interview short.

We had 3 cases that had to be coded "final other" this evening. ID#s 7706 and 7673 were coded "final other" based on the fact that both respondent's claim to have completed this survey a few days ago. The third, ID# 7319 was coded a final other due to the fact that the respondent named on the sample has been dead since 1965. The interviewer reached his son who claimed that no one had made any phone calls regarding any accounts in his father's name, because they don't exist.

**Supervisor:** Keely Malone

**Project:** Combat

**Shift:** 5 - 10 pm

**Day:** Wednesday

**Date:** September 9, 1998

**Number of Interviewers Scheduled:** 3

**Number of Cancellations:** 0

**Total Number of Interviewers:** 3

**Number of Lates / Leave Earlyies:** 0

**Shift Comments:** The sample was fairly thin today. I regenerated the generic no contact sample (No Answer, Busy, Answering Machine) three times through out the shift. The interviewers were able to complete a total of 14 interviews this evening. The final rates for tonight's shift were 32.88 for dialing, 1.12 for completion, and 1.44 for refusal.

PROPERTY OF  
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)  
Box 6000  
Rockville, MD 20849-6000

# August

		Service	Select	Extnd Hrs	Jericho	Select TX	Online	Texas	Total	Incidence	Production Rate
<b>Total</b>	Quota	100	75	100	75	75	75	75	575	60%	1.45
	Completes	100	75	100	76	76	75	75	577		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	101.3%	101.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.3%		
<b>Week 1</b>	Quota	27	17	25	18	4	16	22	129	60%	1.52
	Completes	27	17	25	18	4	16	22	129		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<b>Week 2</b>	Quota	25	22	25	20	6	22	20	140	60%	1.45
	Completes	25	22	25	20	6	22	20	140		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<b>Week 3</b>	Quota	23	11	25	21	9	20	20	129	60%	1.36
	Completes	23	11	25	21	9	20	20	129		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<b>Week 4</b>	Quota	25	25	25	16	56	17	13	177	61%	1.47
	Completes	25	25	25	17	57	17	13	179		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	106.3%	101.8%	100.0%	100.0%	101.1%		

## SERVICE COMPLETES

426

## SALES COMPLETES

76

## ONLINE COMPLETES

75



# August

		Service	Select	Extnd Hrs	Jericho	Select TX	Online	Texas	Total	Incidence	Production Rate
<b>Total</b>	Quota	100	75	100	75	75	75	75	575	<b>60%</b>	<b>1.45</b>
	Completes	100	75	100	76	76	75	75	577		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	101.3%	101.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.3%		
<b>Week 1</b>	Quota	27	17	25	18	4	16	22	129	<b>60%</b>	<b>1.52</b>
	Completes	27	17	25	18	4	16	22	129		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<b>Week 2</b>	Quota	25	22	25	20	6	22	20	140	<b>60%</b>	<b>1.45</b>
	Completes	25	22	25	20	6	22	20	140		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<b>Week 3</b>	Quota	23	11	25	21	9	20	20	129	<b>60%</b>	<b>1.36</b>
	Completes	23	11	25	21	9	20	20	129		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
<b>Week 4</b>	Quota	25	25	25	16	56	17	13	177	<b>61%</b>	<b>1.47</b>
	Completes	25	25	25	17	57	17	13	179		
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	106.3%	101.8%	100.0%	100.0%	101.1%		

**SERVICE COMPLETES**

426

**SALES COMPLETES**

76

**ONLINE COMPLETES**

75

Weekly Report

09/10/98