1 Complainant Hall cited the
following employee protection provisions in his complaint filed with the Wage and Hour Division on
January 7, 1997: the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1994); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1994); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300j-9(i) (1994); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994); the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7622 (1994); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1994). We have referred to these statutes collectively as
"the Acts" or "the environmental whistleblower laws."
2 Hall also asserted before the ALJ
that the 30 day limitations period should be tolled because EG&G did not post notices of complainants'
right to file complaints with the Department of Labor. Hall apparently has abandoned that claim before
us; he does not raise it in his briefs before the Board.
3 Hall was institutionalized for a
short period of time in March or April 1997, several months after the running of the statute of limitations
here.
4 Hall also filed a complaint of
discrimination on the basis of disability and religion with the Utah Industrial Commission (date illegible)
and a claim for disability benefits on February 2, 1996.
5 Even if we were to conclude that
Hall's mental condition provided a basis for equitably tolling the statutes of limitations, Hall would face
an additional hurdle posed by the fact that he was represented by counsel during that period. See, e.g.,
Lopez v. Citibank, N.A., 808 F.2d 905 (1st Cir. 1987) (Mental illness does not toll statute of
limitations where plaintiff presented no strong reason why, despite the assistance of counsel, he was
unable to bring suit). See also Tracy v. Consolidated Edison Co., Case No. 89-CAA-1, Sec. Dec.
and Ord., July 8, 1992 (Fact that complainant was represented by counsel supports finding that
complainant cannot invoke equitable tolling); Mitchell v. EG&G, Case No. 87-ERA-22, Sec.
Dec. and Ord., July 22, 1993 (same).