U.S. Department of Labor Administrative Review Board
200 Constitution Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20210
ARB CASE NO. 98-005
ALJ CASE NO. 97-ERA-35
DATE: OCT 20 1997
In the Matter of:
MELVIN G. CHANEY,
COMPLAINANT,
v.
MOBILE TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
BEFORE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD
FINAL ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT
AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
This case arises under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §5851 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). The parties submitted a Settlement
Agreement seeking approval of the settlement and dismissal of the complaint. The
Administrative Law Judge issued a Recommended Order of Dismissal on October 8, 1997
approving the settlement.
The request for approval is based on an agreement entered into by the
parties, therefore, we must review it to determine whether the terms are a fair, adequate and
reasonable settlement of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. §24.6. Macktal v. Secretary of
Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1991); Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
885 F.2d 551, 556 (9th Cir. 1989); Fuchko and Yunker v. Georgia Power Co., Case Nos.
89-ERA-9, 89-ERA-10, Sec. Order, Mar. 23, 1989, slip op. at 1-2.
[Page 2]
Review of the agreement reveals that it may encompass the settlement of
matters under laws other than the CAA. See ¶3. As stated in Poulos v. Ambassador
Fuel Oil Co., Inc., Case No. 86-CAA-1, Sec. Order, Nov. 2, 1987, slip op. at 2:
[The Secretary's] authority over settlement agreements is limited to such
statutes as are within [the Secretary's] jurisdiction and is defined by the applicable statute.
See Aurich v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Case No.
[86-]CAA-2, Secretary's Order Approving Settlement, issued July 29, 1987; Chase v.
Buncombe County, N.C., Case No. 85-SWD-4, Secretary's Order on Remand, issued
November 3, 1986.
We have therefore limited our review of the agreement to determining
whether the terms thereof are a fair, adequate and reasonable settlement of Complainant's
allegations that Respondent violated the CAA.
Paragraph 7 provides that the agreement will be governed by the laws of
California. We construe this to except the authority of hte Secretary of Llabor and any Federal
court which shall be governed in all respects by the laws and regulations of the United States.
See Phillips v. Citizen's Ass'n for Sound Energy, Case No. 91-ERA-25, Final Ord. of
Dismissal, Nov. 4, 1991, slip op. at 2.
Paragraph 3 of the agreement could be construed as a waiver by
Complainant of any causes of action he may have which arise in the future. As the Secretary has
held in prior cases, see Johnson v. Transco Products, Inc., Case No. 85-ERA-7, Sec.
Ord., Aug. 8, 1985, such a provision must be interpreted as limited to the right to sue in the
future on claims or causes of action arising out of facts or any set of facts occurring before the
date of the agreement. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52
(1974); Rogers v. General Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Board requires that all parties requesting settlement approval of
cases arising under the ERA provide the settlement documentation for any other alleged claims
arising from the same factual circumstances forming the basis of the federal claim, or to certify
that no other such settlement agreements were entered into between the parties. Biddy v.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, ARB Case Nos. 96-109, 97-015, Final Order Approving
Settlement and Dismissing Complaint, Dec. 3, 1996, slip op. at 3. Accordingly, the parties have
certified that the agreement constitutes the entire and only settlement agreement with respect to
the complainant's claims. See Settlement Agreement ¶ 10.
We find that the agreement, as so construed, is a fair, adequate, and
reasonable settlement of the complaint. Accordingly, we APPROVE the agreement and
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. See Settlement Agreement ¶
1.