For these reasons we hold, and thus a majority of this Board holds, that in cases arising under the employee protection sections of all of the statutes that the Labor Department adjudicates, the Burlington Northern materially adverse standard, not the tangible consequence standard, governs whether the employer action is adverse.
Applying this standard here, we find that the warning letter that Melton received was not materially adverse since, as our colleague has pointed out, the record demonstrates that it did not affect his pay, terms, or privileges of employment, did not lead to discipline, and was removed from his personnel file without consequences. Therefore, under the particular facts and circumstances presented here, the warning letter at issue would not dissuade a reasonable employee from refusing to drive because of fatigue. Accordingly, we concur that Melton's complaint must be DENIED.
OLIVER M. TRANSUE
Administrative Appeals Judge
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 While this member would argue (in disagreement with my colleagues) that the deterrence test of Burlington Northern does not trump the tangible employment test the ARB has previously applied to the other whistleblower statutes and their implementing regulations that fall under our jurisdiction, that question is not before us in this case.
2 The substantive anti-discrimination provisions state:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
§ 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
3 The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
§ 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
4 The anti-retaliation provision of the FMLA states "It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter." 29 U.S.C.A. § 2615(a)(2)(West 2008).
5 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
6 See Luckie v. United Parcel Serv., ARB Nos. 05-026, 05-054, ALJ No. 2003-STA-039, slip op. at 16-17 (ARB June 29, 2007).
7 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121 (West Supp. 2005); Hirst v. Southeast Airlines, Inc., ARB Nos. 04-116, 04-160, ALJ No. 2003-AIR-047, slip op. at 9-12 (ARB Jan. 31, 2007).
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851 (West 2003); Overall v. Tennessee Valley Auth. ARB No. 04-073, ALJ No. 1999-ERA-025, slip op. at 7-10 (ARB July 16, 2007).
9 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2006); Powers v. Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical & Energy Workers Int'l Union, ARB No. 04-111, ALJ No. 2004-AIR-019, slip op. at 13 (ARB Aug. 31, 2007).
10 The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2622 (West 1998); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2001); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-9 (West 2003); the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7622 (West 2003); the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), also known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6971 (West 2003); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9610 (West 2005); Powers, slip. op. at 13.
11 See Secretary's Order 1-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272 (Oct. 17, 2002) at 4.(c.) (listing, among others, employee (whistleblower) protection statutes that the Department of Labor adjudicates).
12 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2003).
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
14 White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795-804, 809-818 (6th Cir. 2004).
15 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 60.
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
17 548 U.S. at 61-67.
18 Id. at 57, 67-68, quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) and Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
19 Id. at 68-69.
20 Id. at 69, quoting Washington, 420 U.S. at 661.
21 49 U.S.C.A § 31105 (a)(1) (West 2008).
22 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7622(a) (West 2003) ("No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ."); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a)(1)(West 1995) ("No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ."). Whistleblower protection provisions that the Secretary adjudicates that do not contain the "compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges" language include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9610(a) (West 2005) ("No person shall fire or in any other way discriminate against, or cause to be fired or discriminated against, any employee . . . ."); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6971(a)(West 2003) (same); and the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West 2001) (same). Even so, the regulations that implement those statutes limit their scope to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." See 29 C.F.R. § 24.102(a) (2008).
23 See Washington, 420 F.3d at 660 ("adverse employment action" is a "judicial gloss on the word ‘discrimination'").
24 See 63 Fed. Reg. 44,956, 44,957 (Aug. 10, 2007) (preamble to interim final rule implementing the Employee Protection Provisions of Six Federal Environmental Statutes and Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended), citing Essex v. U.S. Parcel Serv., Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1997).
25 Supra, at 11.
26 Id.
27 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62.
28 In this case, as in all Labor Department cases, the scope of employer action is not an issue because, as we explained, it is limited to the workplace.
29 548 U.S. at 67.
30 548 U.S. at 71-73.
31 See Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ARB No. 98-166, 98-169, ALJ No. 1990-ERA-030, slip op. at 15 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001).
32 See Safley v. Stannards, Inc., d/b/a/ Stannard Moving & Storage, ARB No 05-113, ALJ No. 2003-STA-054, slip op. at 5 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513 (1993); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
33 548 U.S. at 57.
34 Id. at 70-71.
35 ARB No. 98-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-002 (ARB Feb. 28, 2003).
36 See n. 6.
37 Jenkins, slip op. at 20-22.
38 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
39 40 F. Supp. 2d 544, 552-553 (D. Del. 1999).
40 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (1997).
41 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993).
42 ARB No. 04-155, ALJ No. 2004-STA-034, slip op. at 4-5 (ARB Nov. 30, 2005).
43 240 F.3d 605, 612-613 (7th Cir. 2001).
44 424 F.3d 640, 647-648 (7th Cir. 2005).
45 ARB Nos. 03-002, 03-003, 03-004, 03-064, ALJ Nos. 1999-CAA-002, 2001-CAA-008, 2001-CAA-013, 2002-CAA-03, 2002-CAA-018, slip op. at 18 n.52 (ARB May 31, 2006).
46 344 F.3d 1161, 1181-1182 (2003) (emphasis in original).
47 ARB No. 04-073, ALJ No. 1999-ERA-025 (ARB July 16, 2007).
48 Id., slip op. at 10-11.
49 __F. 3d __, No. 07-1156, 2008 WL 4052918, *at 2-3 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 2008) (emphasis added).
50 527 F.3d 1340, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)).
51 See Jenkins, slip op. at 20, citing Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996); Hirst v. Southeast Airlines, Inc., ARB Nos. 04-116, 04-160, ALJ No. 2003-AIR-047, slip op. at 9 (ARB Jan. 31, 2007)
52 Jenkins, slip op. at 20, citing Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F. 3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999).
53 Griffith v. Wackenhut Corp., ARB No. 98-067, ALJ No. 1997-ERA-052, slip op. at 12 (ARB Feb. 29, 2000).
54 But see Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973-974 nn.14, 15 (11th Cir. 2008) ( indicating that the materially adverse standard is distinct and different from, and significantly broadens, the "serious and material" standard).
55 See Miles v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-5162, 2008 WL 222694, *at 4 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 25, 2008).
56 See McNeill v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 243 Fed. Appx. 93, 98 (6th Cir. 2007) ("For purposes of this case, we assume that White [i.e. Burlington Northern] applies.").