The ALJ found that reinstatement was no longer an issue because Dixon's appointment was for two years, with a possible extension to four years. R. D. & O. at 20. Dixon was fired at the end of his probationary year, and the ALJ ordered BLM to pay Dixon's salary and benefits through October 18, 2005, the end of his term appointment. Id. The ALJ noted that Dixon obtained some type of employment when he moved to North Carolina, but the details of his earnings were not in the record. Id. The ALJ found it "equitable" to grant $10,000.00 to cover Dixon's relocation costs, but found that exemplary damages were not indicated. Id. Finally, the ALJ added that he was "reluctant" to assess a penalty against a federal agency that taxpayers would pay. Id.
Dixon argues that he should have been reinstated long enough for so that BLM could have made the decision regarding Dixon's continued employment that it would have been required to make absent its retaliatory discharge. Id. at 29.
Reinstatement is a "make-whole" remedy intended to return the complainant to the position that he would have occupied but for the unlawful discrimination. Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ARB Nos. 98-166, -169, ALJ No. 1990-ERA-030, slip op. at 7 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001). Although reinstatement is the statutory remedy, the ARB has held that in certain circumstances reinstatement may be impossible or impractical and alternative remedies may be necessary. Assistant Sec'y & Bryant v. Bearden Trucking Co., ARB No. 04-014, ALJ No. 2003-STA-036, slip op. at 8 (ARB June 30, 2005).
Project management of the Yerlington site was transferred to BLM's state office in October 2004, and in early 2005, EPA took over clean-up efforts. Therefore, Dixon's job no longer exists and reinstatement is not possible. See Doyle v. Hydro Nuclear Servs., Inc., ARB Nos. 99-041, -042, 00-012; ALJ No. 1989-ERA-022, slip op. at 7-8 (ARB Sept. 6, 1996), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Doyle v. United States Sec'y
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of Labor, 285 F.2d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 2002) (reinstatement was impractical because the company no longer engaged workers in the job classification complainant occupied, and had no positions for which the complainant qualified).
Where reinstatement is not possible, front pay is appropriate. Berkman v. United States Coast Guard Acad., ARB No. 98-056, ALJ Nos. 1997-CAA-002, -009, slip op. at 27 (ARB Feb. 29, 2000). Front pay may only be awarded for as long as the employee could have expected to hold the job. Schick v. Illinois Dept. of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2002).
Dixon's term appointment ended on October 18, 2005. The ALJ ordered BLM to pay benefits and salary through that date. In view of the lack of evidence in the record regarding Dixon's earnings after his discharge, we conclude that the ALJ's order for BLM to pay Dixon salary and benefits from the date of his firing until the end of his appointment constitutes an appropriate award. While Dixon's appointment might have been extended for another two years, front pay beyond the ALJ's award would be purely speculative. Hobby, slip op. at 18.
Dixon also argues that the ALJ erred in not awarding damages for Dixon's emotional distress. CRB at 28. Emotional distress is not presumed; it must be proven. Moder v. Village of Jackson, Wis., ARB Nos. 01-095, 02-039; ALJ No. 2000-WPC-005, slip op. at 10 (ARB June 30, 2003). To recover compensatory damages for mental suffering or emotional anguish, a complainant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the unfavorable personnel action caused the harm. Gutierrez v. Univ. of Cal., ARB No. 99-116, ALJ No. 1998-ERA-019, slip op. at 10 (ARB Nov. 13, 2002).
The only evidence in the record supporting emotional distress is Dixon's response to the following:
Q. How would you describe the impact on your life, your personal life, your emotional state from having been removed in the fashion that you've described?
A. Well, it's been devastating financially. Emotionally it created a hardship that eventually helped lead to my divorce. It's created a lot of emotional distress on my mom. It's just been a hard thing to - - a burden.
TR at 134. Dixon's terse statement does not support an award for emotional distress.
Further, Dixon argues that the ALJ erred in limiting the compensatory damages award to $10,000.00 because he was "reluctant" to burden the taxpayers with a greater amount. Dixon contends that the ALJ had no basis in law for exempting the government from damages liability since sovereign immunity had been waived. CRB at 28-29.
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Dixon testified that he had to sell his house in Carson City, Nevada, and then relocated to Cherokee, North Carolina, for employment - he is Cherokee. He estimated his financial losses at over $200,000.00, including the loss of back pay, attorney's fees and expenses, borrowing money, and "all these costs." TR at 135.
The ALJ permitted Dixon's counsel to file for attorney's fees. Dixon earned about $58,000.00 plus benefits annually. TR at 132-33. The ALJ awarded $10,000.00 for relocation expenses. There is no other evidence of monetary damages in the record beyond Dixon's brief statement. Thus, nothing supports a higher compensatory award. We conclude that the $10,000.00 award for a cross-country move is reasonable and within the ALJ's discretion.
Finally, Dixon seeks exemplary damages of $1,000,000.00, arguing that BLM's blatant disregard of his rights and the danger to the environment support such an award. CRB at 29-30.
SDWA permits an award of exemplary (i.e., punitive) damages, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B)(ii), but punitive damages are not awardable against the federal government. Cf. Baker v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 668, (7th Cir. 1997)(award of punitive damages against the United States Postal Service reversed because under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(1), it is an exempted governmental entity); see also Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)(holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983); Mitchell v. Chao, 358 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 (N.D. N.Y. 2005) (former federal employee precluded from seeking liquidated damages from Department of Labor under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
Further, nothing in this record would support an award of any amount of punitive damages, let alone the one million dollars Dixon seeks. Finally, the fact patterns in the four United States Supreme Court cases Dixon cites to support his argument for punitive damages are completely inapposite from the facts in this case because none of those cases involves a federal governmental entity. CRB at 30. Accordingly, we reject Dixon's argument. Cf. White v. The Osage Tribal Council, ARB No. 96-137, ALJ No. 1995-SDW-001, slip op. at 9 (ARB Aug. 8, 1997) (rejecting exemplary damage award where the ARB "fully expects future compliance" with the Safe Drinking Water Act).
Conclusion
We agree with the ALJ that Dixon established by a preponderance of the evidence that BLM fired him in part because of his protected activities and that BLM failed to prove that it would have fired him in the absence of those activities. We AFFIRM the ALJ's award of damages as supported by substantial evidence and therefore accept his
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recommended decision. Dixon will have thirty (30) days to file a fully supported attorney's fee petition, and BLM will have thirty (30) days thereafter to file an opposition thereto, if any.
SO ORDERED.
M. CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
WAYNE C. BEYER
Administrative Appeals Judge
[ENDNOTES]
1 They are: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9610 (West 2005); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6971 (West 2003) (now known as the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2001); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2622 (West 1998); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-9(i) (West 2006); and the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7622 (West 2003), as well as the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851 (West 2003).
2 We conclude that the CERCLA's whistleblower provisions also apply. See discussion, infra.
3 "Superfund" is the colloquial name of the CERCLA program that, through technical assistance and funding grants, helps the states to identify and clean up hazardous and toxic waste disposal sites. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611.
4 The Department of Labor has amended these regulations since Dixon filed his complaint. 72 Fed. Reg. 44,956 (Aug. 10, 2007). The amended regulations provide for substantial evidence review of the ALJ's factual findings. 29 C.F.R. § 24.110(b) (2007). We have applied the regulations in effect when Dixon filed his complaint. Redweik v. Shell Explor. & Prod. Co., ARB No. 05-052, ALJ No. 2004-SWD-002, slip op. at 7 (ARB Dec. 21, 2007). Even if the amended regulations were applied to this case, they would not change the outcome. See discussion, infra.
5 In its post-hearing brief, BLM stipulated to the waiver of sovereign immunity under CERCLA and SDWA, among others. Agency Post-Hearing Brief at 1-2. The ALJ did not analyze the complaint under CERCLA.
6 SDWA provides in pertinent part:
No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) has –
(A) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under this subchapter or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of drinking water regulations or underground injection control programs of a State,
(B) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or
(C) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-9(i)(1).
CERCLA provides in pertinent part:
No person shall fire or in any other way discriminate against, or cause to be fired or discriminated against, any employee or any authorized representative of employees by reason of the fact that such employee or representative has provided information to a State or to the Federal Government, filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9610(a).
7 In his Petition for Review, Dixon stated that the ALJ erred in concluding that this was a dual motive case because he should have found that BLM's reasons for Dixon's discharge were "pure pretext." Petition for Review at 2. Given our conclusion that BLM did not meet its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have fired Dixon absent his protected activity, we need not address Dixon's argument.
8 SDWA provides in pertinent part:
(ii) If in response to a complaint filed under subparagraph (A) the Secretary determines that a violation of paragraph (1) has occurred, the Secretary shall order (I) the person who committed such violation to take affirmative action to abate the violation, (II) such person to reinstate the complainant to his former position together with the compensation (including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, (III) compensatory damages, and (IV) where appropriate, exemplary damages. If such an order is issued, the Secretary, at the request of the complainant, shall assess against the person against whom the order is issued a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorneys' fees) reasonably incurred, as determined by the Secretary, by the complainant for, or in connection with, the bringing of the complaint upon which the order was issued.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B)(ii).
CERCLA provides in pertinent part:
Whenever an order is issued under this section to abate such violation, at the request of the applicant a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including the attorney's fees) determined by the Secretary of Labor to have been reasonably incurred by the applicant for, or in connection with, the institution and prosecution of such proceedings, shall be assessed against the person committing such violation.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9610(c).
9 Dixon filed a timely Petition for Review on September 15, 2006, but never received the ARB's briefing order issued on October 6, 2006. The ARB issued a Show Cause Order on December 29, 2006. Dixon explained that a mix-up in mailing addresses had caused the delay and asked that the ARB consider his reply brief in ARB No. 06-147 as his initial brief in ARB No. 06-160. The ARB agreed by Order dated January 30, 2007.