It is clear that Congress intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
be broad in its scope (Helena Glendale Ferry Co. v. Walling, 132 F. 2d
616). ``Breadth of coverage is vital to its mission'' (Powell v. U.S.
Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497). An employer who claims an exemption under
the Act has the burden of showing that it applies (Walling v. General
Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S.
290; Tobin v. Blue Channel Corp. 198 F. 2d 245, approved in Mitchell v.
Myrtle Grove Packing Co., 350 U.S. 891; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button
Co., 113 F. 2d 52). Conditions specified in the language of the Act are
``explicit prerequisites to exemption'' (Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S.
388; and see Walling v. Haden, 153 F. 2d 196). In their application, the
purpose of the exemption as shown in its legislative history as well as
its language should be given effect. However, ``the details with which
the exemptions in this Act have been made preclude their enlargement by
implication'' and ``no matter how broad the exemption, it is meant to
apply only to'' the specified activities (Addison v. Holly Hill, 322
U.S. 607; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254). Exemptions provided in the
Act ``are to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to
assert them'' and their application limited to those who come ``plainly
and unmistakably within their terms and spirits.'' This construction of
the exemptions is necessary to carry out the broad objectives for which
the Act was passed (Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490; Mitchell v.
Kentucky Finance Co., supra; Arnold v. Kanowsky, supra; Helena Glendale
Ferry Co. v. Walling, supra; Mitchell v. Stinson, 217 F. 2d 210;
Flemming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52; Walling v. Bay State
Dredging & Contracting Co., 149 F. 2d 346, certiorari denied 326 U.S.
760; Anderson v. Manhattan Lighterage Corp., 148 F. 2d 971, certiorari
denied 326 U.S. 722; Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Walling, 158 F. 2d 678).
