Detailed Information on the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Programs, South Asia Assessment

Developing a new efficiency measure to track annually the full program cost per hectare eradicated by the Afghan Eradication Force.

Implement policy of force/non-negotiated eradication to increase hectares eradicated

Developing a baseline assessment and indicators for measurement of institutional and operational performance improvements of Afghan National Police.

Hiring new staff to ensure proper oversight of funds and extending the Bureau's new financial management system to this program.

Analyzing if funding allocations for counternarcotic efforts are the most effective in reducing illicit drug activity and assuring that resources are targeted to activites with the greatest impact.

Instituting a new Department-wide budget planning process and providing greater specificity on budget submissions.

Measure: Maintain the percentage of administrative costs to total program costs in Afghanistan and Pakistan between five and ten percent.

Explanation:The percentages represent the proportion of funds dedicated for Federal government overhead to administer and provide oversight for the programs in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The percentage is way below the recommended range of five to ten percent. The percentage should increase as the funding for both counternarcotics and police stabilizes. The percentage of administrative costs to total program costs is a measure of program management effectiveness. Keeping the percentage at less than ten percent falls in line with limits placed by Congress on other foreign assistance agencies that include administrative costs as part of program costs. In order to ensure adequate staffing and oversight, the program should aim to keep its percentage between five and ten percent of total program costs.

Measure: Ensure Afghan police who have received basic training at the regional training centers and in Kabul also receive necessary specialized and advanced training to achieve the professional standard requirements for the positions they hold by 2015.

Explanation:The U.S. government's long-term goal in Afghanistan is to increase the overall capacity of the criminal justice sector. Through advanced and specialized training, INL will help in further the development of the Afghan law enforcement sector. Both INL and DOD use 4 similar Capacity Milestones (CM1 through CM4) to assess ANP progress in developing the necessary law enforcement capacities to operate effectively and independently. CM4: Not capable. The police and law enforcement organization are still being formed. Training, mentoring, and reform ativities occurs under an international lead. Afghans can conduct basic law enforcement operations with significant outside support. CM3. Partially capable: The police and law enforcement organization are partially formed. Training, mentoring, and reform activities are co-lead by Afghans and international forces. Afghans can conduct basic and comlex law enforcement operations with significant outside support. CM2. Capable; lead with support. Training and reform activities are lead by Afghans. International and Afghan forces co-lead mentoring activities. Afghans can plan, execute, and sustain basic and complex law enforcement operations with moderate support. CM1. Fully Capable and operational. Afghan forces lead all training, mentoring, reform activities. Afghans can plan, execute and sustain basic and complex law enforcement operations with minimal support.

Measure: Number of Afghan National Police (ANP), border police, and highway police trained and maintained at the levels deemed necessary to provide effective law enforcement services to the people of Afghanistan

Explanation:At the Bonn Conference in 2002, the international community and the Transitional Government of Afghanistan determined that the target size for the reconstituted national police, border police, and highway police would be 62,000.

Measure: Remove Pakistan from the President's List of Major Drug Producing Nations by 2008 and Afghanistan by 2017.

Explanation:The criteria for removal from the list of Major Drug Producing Nations is to cultivate less than 1,000 hectares of opium poppy. The Presidential determination is made each year by the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and reported each year in the International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report.

Measure: Reduce Cultivation of Opium Poppy in Afghanistan by 15% or more each year between 2005 and 2012. Increase the number of poppy-free provinces and provinces with reduced poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

Explanation:1. Reporting annual reductions in the number of hectares of opium cultivated will enable INL to determine the degree of progress Afghanistan makes in a given year towards the established goal of removal from the Department's Major Drug Producing Nations list. 2. Reporting annual reductions in cultivation in terms of the number of poppy-free provinces will enable INL to better capture the geographic distribution of existing poppy cultivation and improve targeting of its intensive eradication and public information efforts. In 2008 UNODC certified a total of 18 provinces as poppy-free (i.e. cultivating less than 100 hectares of opium poppy per annum). Going forward, INL will begin tracking both the number of poppy-free provinces, as well as the number of remaining provinces that have reduced their overall cultivation year over year. Those provinces which demonstrably reduce poppy cultivation, even if they do not reach the threshold (less than 100 hectares cultivated) necessary for poppy-free status, are eligible for project awards through the Good Performers' Initiative (GPI).

Measure: Number of hectares of opium ppoppy eradicated each year in Afghanistan.

Explanation:Separate eradication efforts are implemented under the Governor-Led Eradication Program (GLE) and the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF). Nationwide eradication targets are set annually by the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), with Embassy Kabul input through the Policy Action Group and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. INL's primary role in the eradication process is to provide funds and expertise in support of the Ministry of Interior's Poppy Eradication Force. INL also provides assistance to governors as they plan and execute their provincial crop control efforts. INL does not conduct actual eradication operations. INL support to eradication programs ultimately seeks to decrease the need for opium poppy eradication (through reducing opium poppy cultivation at the outset) and to transfer full ownership of eradication activities to the Afghan National Police. NB on 2009 target: As cultivation of illicit crops becomes less publicly accepted due to public information campaigns and previous eradication campaigns, the challenge of successful eradication intensifies. With successful eradication, it becomes more difficult in successive years to find and target illicit crops??more often located in smaller, difficult-to-access plots in insecure locations. For this reason, INL postulates that the GoA's annual eradication goals will gravitate towards a sustainable level of approximately 5,000 hectares per annum.

Measure: Number of hectares of opium poppy cultivated in Afghanistan

Explanation:The criteria for removal from the list of Major Drug Producing Nations is to cultivate or harvest less than 1,000 hectares of opium poppy.

Measure: Percent of targeted regions (previously inaccessible border regions and safe-havens) in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) made accessible to central government law enforcement through U.S. funded Border Security construction projects.

Explanation:The program funds construction of roads and law enforcement outposts in FATA agencies and is divided into 26 distinct project elements which will be completed in 2008.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The program supports the emergence of effective rule of law institutions in Afghanistan and Pakistan by 1) disrupting the overseas production and trafficking of illicit drugs and 2) establishing and facilitating stable criminal justice systems to strengthen international law enforcement and judicial effectiveness, bolster cooperation in legal affairs, and support the rule of law while building respect human rights.

Evidence: The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) is part of the State Department's strategic planning framework and defines the purpose and mission clearly for the bureau's criminal justice sector and counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The program addresses the weak or lack of institutions in Afghanistan and Pakistan addressing counternarcotics, border security, criminal justice and law enforcement. Opium poppy production in Afghanistan acts as a destabilizing force within the region accounting for nearly 90% of the world's supply and for roughly one-third of Afghanistan's total (licit and illicit) GDP. Pakistan is also on the frontline of the war against drugs as increased law enforcement pressure in Afghanistan threatens to shift drug trafficking operations across the border.

Evidence: The Department of State's FY 2007 Congressional Justification for Foreign Operations accounts discusses the existing problem and how it relates to the Department's mission, as outlined in the Joint State-USAID Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009. The Foreign Assistance Act includes a Congressional mandate for the Department to combat international narcotics with foreign assistance. The National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy both outline the importance of continued success in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the fight against terrorism and the war on drugs.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: Coordination and policy for U.S. agencies working in Afghanistan are set by the National Security Council or through the Cabinet-level Deputy's Committee to ensure that agency contributions are complementary and not duplicative. In reconstructing the civilian police force in Afghanistan, for example, the State Department focuses on police training and mentoring, while the Department of Defense provides infrastructure support for law enforcement activities. In the counternarcotics sector, The U.S. interagency developed a five-pilllar program of Alternative Livelihoods, Public Information, Criminal Justice Sector Reform, Law Enforcement, and Eradication. The State Department supports Afghanistan's opium poppy eradication efforts, while the U.S. Agency for International Development runs alternative livelihood programs. In counternarcotics interdiction, the bureau also provides management and contract support and the Department of Defense provides airlift capabilities for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) interdiction activities. In Pakistan, the bureau served as an intermediary between the government of Pakistan and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as they began implementation of an Automated Fingerprint Identification System.

Evidence: Part 1, Chapter 8 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) gives the Department of State the mandate to provide foreign assistance to combat narcotics. Section 660 of the FAA prohibits the disbursement of law enforcement assistance unless an agency or bureau has directly been granted "not withstanding authority" by Congress, as the bureau has. Mission Performance Plans (MPP) for Afghanistan and Pakistan include country- specific performance initiatives that outline coordinated USG strategies and tactics. Interagency Agreements, commitment letters between the bureau and other U.S. agencies, and Bilateral Letters of Agreement, the bureau's execution documents with host countries, also detail the specific roles and tasks of USG agencies and international program partners.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The program is free of major design flaws that limit the programs efficiencies. The five-pillar counternarcotic program creates incentives to engange in and provides support of licit activites, while discouraging poppy cultivation. The program must overcome numerous challenges including coordination between government agencies, the international community and Afghanistan. In addition, there is no strong evidence that another training method or counternarcotics strategy would be more effective or efficent in disrupting the overseas production and trafficking of illicit drugs and establishing and facilitating stable criminal justice systems in the region.

Evidence: FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations account outlines Dept. of State funding priorities that are targeted towards maximizing program effectiveness.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: It is unclear if resources are used efficiently to support the program purpose. Resources in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are targeted with the goal of disrupting the production and trafficking of illicit drugs and strengthening the criminal justice systems in both countries so as to create effective rule of law institutions, bring stability to Afghanistan and ungoverned spaces in Pakistan, and effectively prosecute the U.S. foreign policy priorities of the War on Terror and the War on Drugs. Through the Mission Performance Plan interagency process, the Department Program Budget Reviews, and the Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) process, the Department evaluates country needs assessments against policy priorities on an annual basis. Still, within the counternarcotics program there is little analysis supporting the funding levels of each pillar in relation to the other. This may be attributed to the drastic increase in funding levels without the commensurate increase in staff or the specifed skills necessary to perform these tasks. In addition, the Inspector General notes that the bureau needs to improve oversight of multi-million dollar contracts. The program is making strides to ensure funding is targeted efficiently by increasing staff and through increased use of web-based applications for program and financial management, but without such oversight it is difficult to ascertain if efficiencies are achieved.

Evidence: The 2006 National Security Strategy discusses the vital role that victory in Afghanistan plays in winning the Global War on Terror. The FY 2008 MPPs for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the FY 2008 INL BPP reflect the program priorities of USG personnel in the field and the policy priorities of INL personnel in Washington, respectively.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The program has three specific, outcome-oriented, long-term performance measures. The long-term performance goals are to 1) Reduce Cultivation of Opium Poppy in Afghanistan by 50% between 2005 and 2009; 2) Remove from the President's List of Major Drug Producing Nations (with a criteria of reducing cultivation of opium poppy to less than 1,000 hectares per year) Pakistan by 2008 and Afghanistan by 2017; and 3) Ensure Afghan police who have received basic training at the regional training centers and in Kabul also receive necessary specialized and advanced training to achieve the professional standard requirements for the positions they hold by 2015.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan. The Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The long-term targets of the program are 1) reduce Cultivation of Opium Poppy in Afghanistan by 50% between 2005 and 2009; 2) remove Pakistan from the President's List of Major Drug Producing Nations by 2012 and Afghanistan by 2017; and 3) ensure Afghan police who have received basic training at the regional training centers and in Kabul also receive necessary specialized and advanced training to achieve the professional standard requirements for the positions they hold by 2015. These targets are set by the highest levels of the USG, including the National Security Council, the Deputies Committee and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Given the security situation and the ongoing resistance to counternarcotics programs and security sector reform in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, setting targets that show measurable progress is considered ambitious by the federal government.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The program has a number of specific, outcome-oriented annual performance measures that demonstrate progress towards achieving the program's long- term goals. The first measure tracks the progress towards the goal of the international community to provide basic training to 62,000 police officers to fully staff the Afghan National Police (ANP), the border police, and the highway police. The second annual performance measure tracks annual eradication of illicit opium poppy in Afghanistan. The third performance measure tracks the number of hectares of illicit opium poppy cultivated annually in Pakistan. The fourth performance measure tracks the percentage of targeted regions (previously inaccessible border regions and safe-havens) in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) made accessible to central government law enforcement through U.S. funded Border Security construction projects.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The program has baselines and targets for its annual outcome measures. For the police program in Afghanistan, the goal is to put provide basic training to 62,000 non-commissioned police officers and continue to maintain the police force at the levels deemed necessary to provide effective law enforcement to the people of Afghanistan while achieving the long term goal of making the police force "Fully Capable" of conducting independent law enforcement operations. For the counternarcotics program in Afghanistan, the goal is increase eradication in Afghanistan to 38,000 hectares by 2008. For the counternarcotics program in Pakistan, the goal is to reduce the cultivation of opium poppy from a baseline of 7,571 hectares in 2004 to less than 1,000 hectares by 2008. For the Border Security Construction program in Pakistan, the goal is to have 100 percent of the targeted regions made accessible to central government law enforcement by 2008. Given the security situation and the ongoing resistance to counternarcotics programs and security sector reform in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, setting targets that show measurable progress is considered ambitious by the federal govvernment.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Program partners meet the program's long-term goals as specified in the Letters of Agreement (LOA) between the U.S. government and those of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Annual goals and project plans are established in the LOAs as well as in the Interagency Agreements (IAA) between the bureau and other USG agencies and with contracted project implementers. Each organization reports to program officers in daily activity reports and monthly or quarterly financial performance reports. In Afghanistan, for instance, the Afghanistan National Drug Control Strategy and the Afghan Security Sector Reform Strategy were developed as a partnership of the Afghan government and the international donor community. In the police sector, for instance, the stakeholders planned the makeup of the Afghan police force, with the German government taking the lead in training commissioned officers while the program implemented a "train the trainer" program to maximize the number of noncommissioned police officers trained and achieve the target of 62,000 police officers trained by the end of FY 2006.

Evidence: Afghanistan National Drug Control Strategy, the Letter of Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Letter of Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Pakistan, and bureau contracts agreements all work towards the bureau's long-term goals and specify annual benchmark requirements.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Evaluations conducted to date were not designed to assess the impact the program is having on its intended outcomes. Their methodologies were not specifically designed to be qualitative impact assessments or quantitative studies of program effectiveness. Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on an annual basis and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) conduct formal evaluations of counternarcotics and security sector assistance programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Due to the high profile of this program GAO, the OIG and CRS will continue to conduct rigorous reviews into the broad scope of program activites. In addition, the Bureau also conducts regular Management Assistance Visits (MAV)??informal, internal evaluations of program management, implementation and performance??to provide senior leadership with a critical perspective and will continue to do so in upcoming fiscal years.

Evidence: Pertinent GAO inspections include: "Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to be Better Defined (GAO- 05-575)"; "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals (GAO- 05-742)"; "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed (GAO-04- 403)"; "Central and Southwest Asian Countries: Trends in U.S. Assistance and Key Economic, Governance, and Demographic Characteristics (GAO-03- 634R)". "CRS report for Congress - Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (RL32686)". "CRS report for Congress - Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (RL30588)". OIG's "Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (ISP-I-05-14)" and "Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (ISP-I- 06- 13A)" shaped the form of program management in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The State Department's integrated budget and performance planning process allows the bureau to clearly match desired performance levels to its annual resource request. However, it is unclear how an increase or decrease in funding levels will affect the output of programs and the attainment of long-term outcomes.

Evidence: INL FY 2008 budget call guidance; INL FY 2008 MPP guidance; FY 2008 MPP for Afghanistan and Pakistan; FY 2008 INL BPP; FY 2007 Budget Justification for Foreign Operations; FY 2007 INL Congressional Budget Justification.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Previous assessments of bureau programs in the Western Hemisphere identified planning and budgeting weaknesses that may have contributed to limited program effectiveness. The bureau has taken several meaningful steps to improve strategic planning and has developed a bureau-level strategic plan. The bureau and the Department are also modifying their budget planning process and their annual budget call to increase the transparency and links between budget requests and performance information. In addition, the bureau strategic planning framework serves as a guide for all future strategic planning documents within the South and Central Asia region, including the Mission Performance Plans, the Bureau Performance Plans, Letters of Agreement with partner countries, and the annual budget request documents.

Evidence: The INL Strategic Planning Framework, INL Performance Management Framework, the FY 2008 Mission Performance Plan guidance and INL Budget call all demonstrate INL's efforts at integrating strategic planning into the budget and program management process.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The program collects program-related performance information on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, program field officers work in conjunction with host government officials and the program's implementing partners to execute law enforcement, counternarcotics, and border security projects. In Afghanistan, field officers track performance through daily field activity reports from implementing partner Dyncorp International for all police training activities and from the government of Afghanistan and U.S. funded contractors for counternarcotics activities. In Pakistan, weekly activity reports, monthly financial reports and quarterly performance reports allow program managers to make necessary management decisions. Dyncorp also produces twice-monthly financial reports to program managers and other stakeholders. Bureau personnel report pertinent counternarcotics and law enforcement issues to senior management through embassy-generated weekly Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) reports to the Assistant Secretary and Washington- generated Daily Activity Reports for the Assistant Secretary. Senior management utilizes performance information included in the reporting process to inform official decisions and create ambitious performance targets.

Evidence: Dyncorp International activity reports, Assistant Secretary Daily Activity Reports (ASDAR) and Weekly Narcotics Affair Section (NAS) combine program, performance, and financial information to inform management at the operational level and assist them through the decision making process. Furthermore, Washington program managers communicate policy discussions and management decisions through weekly reports to the field. The Mission Performance Plans, the Bureau Performance Plan, the INL Congressional Budget Justification and the Budget Justification for Foreign Operations all include performance information that informs management decision making at the strategic level.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: SES and SFS managers are held accountable for performance through employee evaluations, including performance-based management targets related to program performance. Due to the drastic increase in funds for Afghanistan, the program has had trouble with oversight which has left contractors overseeing contractors. The program has taken steps to increase staff oversight to ensure accountability. Contractors are held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results through liquidated damages clauses in statement of work that allow the U.S. government to enter arbitration or recover funds should the contractor perform unsatisfactorily. However, clear metrics are not always specified in the contract. Almost all of the funds go to contractors or to the governments. All INCLE/ACI PARTS have been conducted as Direct Federal programs since most funds are agreed upon with the host government via a bilateral agreement before they are obligated to a specific contract item.

Evidence: Letter of Agreement between the United States and the Government of Afghanistan and the Letter of Agreement between the United States and the Government of Pakistan both include clauses for termination of foreign assistance. Contract documents, such as those for Dyncorp International in Afghanistan, include liquidated damages clauses. The Department of State's "Senior Executive Service Performance Agreement" is one of the documents that ties senior leaders to departmental goals, allowing for increased accountability.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Although this program obligates funds consistent with the overall program plan, programs continue to have significant amounts of unobligated funds at the end of the fiscal year, due to Congressional certification requirements and holds contributing to large carryover balances by delaying receipt of funds. INL receives multi-year funding from Congress and is required by Congress to produce annual Congressional Notifications (CN), a process that can delay allocation of funds to INL. Once a CN has cleared Congress, funds are released to INL and bilateral Letters of Agreement (LOA) are signed. Each LOA designates funds for specific projects and are allotted to post (in the case of Pakistan) or the Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan (AIJ) contract support group in headquarters. In addition, coordination between DoD and State has hindered obligation of funds in a timely manner. Changing priorities require change in the numbers of police trainers and mentors, which causes delays the hiring of personnel and thus the timely obligation of funds.

Evidence: Congressional Notifications, LOAs, contractor financial reports, Financial Management Activity Reports and Status of Unliquidated Funds reports are all documents that INL utilizes to ensure that funds are obligated in a timely and responsible manner.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The program has an efficiency measure with a baseline and target that tracks the ratio of administrative costs as a percentage of program costs, a standard measure utilized by foreign assistance agencies to track administrative efficiencies. The program is making strides to improve efficiencies by increasing staff and through increased use of web-based applications for program and financial management; however, without increased oversight, it is difficult to ascertain if efficiencies are achieved. Increased staff would work in contract management and oversight, helping to keep down contract costs through increased cost analysis. The bureau, through its Management Assistance Visits (MAV), is also increasing program effectiveness and cost efficiencies through process standardization at headquarters and annual contract cost analysis and asset verification reviews. The program is developing an additional efficiency measure to track the full cost of the program's eradication efforts. The effort is identified in the program's Improvement Plan.

Evidence: The LFMS training manual provides further detail in INL efforts to standardize post information and reduce reporting requirements.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: Given the cross-cutting nature of the counternarcotics and law enforcement programs, significant coordination occurs among the interagency and international community at the country level and among the interagency community in Washington. The U.S. ambassadors in Afghanistan and Pakistan each lead the interagency law enforcement working group at the embassy in the host country which, with guidance from Washington, decides the annual strategy and tactics that is incorporated into the MPP, the LOAs, and other planning and execution documents. Operational coordination in Afghanistan and Pakistan occurs through the Tripartite Commission, consisting of senior diplomatic and military representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S. In Washington, the Afghanistan Interagency Working Group coordinates Washington's efforts to provide timely support to post and implementing partners.

Evidence: MPPs, the FY 2008 BPP, LOAs, and notes from Afghanistan Interagency Working Group all demonstrate the extensive coordination that goes into implementing the counternarcotics and law enforcement programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The South Asia program has updated its financial management system, designed with the primary purpose of reconsiling the bureau's financial management report with that of the State Department. The historical data is being updated and reconciled mannually. The State Department evaluated its management control systems and financial management systems for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2005. This evaluation provided reasonable assurance that the objectives of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act were achieved in FY 2005, and formed the basis for the Secretary's Statement of Assurance. OIG's inspection of INL's Washington operations found no material weaknesses and noted the substantial progress the bureau has made in strengthening its financial management practices. INL's Management Assistance Visits ensure that financial regulations and standard operating procedures for financial, procurement, and property management are adhered to at post.

Evidence: FY 2005 Department of State Performance & Accountability Report; OIG's "Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (ISP-I-05- 14)", INL's Financial Management Handbook and the LFMS Voucher Reports all demonstrate the bureau's efforts to improve its financial management practices.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: INL has undertaken a number of initiatives to address management deficiencies. The Inspector General's review of the bureau's Washington operations found that oversight of multi-million dollar contracts was weak and that the bureau was poorly structured to address its program management obligations. To rectify these deficiencies, the bureau underwent a reorganization that resulted in the establishment of both the Office of Afghanistan/Pakistan programs (INL/AP) the Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan (AIJ) contract support gffice. The bureau has increased its staffing levels both in Washington and in the field and has added contract officer's representatives to closely monitor the sizeable contracts operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 2005, INL has conducted Management Assistance Visits in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of internal review process to identify and correct program and financial management deficiencies and conduct performance and cost analysis.

Evidence: OIG's "Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (ISP-I-05-14)" and "Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (ISP-I- 06- 13A)" shaped the form of INL program management in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The INL Strategic Planning Framework and the Performance Management Framework outline bureau attempts to standardize performance management information at posts.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: Poppy cultivation levels within Afghanistan remain at record high levels even with a successful reduction in poppy cultivation hectares in 2005. The police training program is working on the important task of ensuring the Afghan forces are capable enough to support the needs of the country. The ultimate goal is to have the Afghanistan Police forces move from its current state of "Not Capable" of conducting basic law enforcement operations without significant outside assistance to being "Fully Capable" by 2015. The program has made progress in ensuring an adequate number of trained individuals, but the program has yet to indicate they are on track to meet the fully capable goal. Supporting documentation is not available at this time of rating. However, the program may be on track to remove Pakistan from the President's List of Major Drug Producing Nations by 2008.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Achievement of annual goals has been mixed. Between 2004 and 2005, opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan declined by approximately 58%, from 7,571 hectares to 3,147 hectares, well on its way to falling under 1,000 hectares in 2008 and achieving the program's long-term goal of Pakistan's removal from the List of Major Drug Producing Nations. However, specific eradiaction benchmarks for previous years had not been set and results have been substantially below capabilities. This is disappointing in light of the resources dedicated. The civilian police training in Afghanistan resulted in an increase in the size of the new police force in Afghanistan to 55,000 officers trained. The program will continue to maintain the police force at the levels deemed necessary to provide effective law enforcement to the people of Afghanistan while achieving the long term goal of making the police force "Fully Capable" of conducting independent law enforcement operations.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department. Data for opium poppy cultivation provided annually be the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center. Data regarding police training are reported directly by implementing partners to INL's Office of Civilian Police.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The program met its 2006 administrative cost efficiency target at 1.96% of program costs. The program lacks sufficient oversight resources to determine whether initiatives to improve administrative efficiency have actually improved efficiency.

Evidence: The FY 2008 Bureau Performance Plan is an internal planning document that the State Department uses for setting policy priorities, developing program plans and targets, and presenting resource justification to senior leaders within the department.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: While INCLE programs in other regions share the same broad goals for security reform and counternarcotics, the programs are not comparable because of the differing security, political and institutional circumstances involved in working with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Program in South and Central Asia is part of an interagency and multi-national coordinated effort to improve the rule of law and disrupt the production and transit of illicit drugs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By design, there are no other programs that have the depth or breadth of the U.S. government effort in stabilizing Afghanistan. Programs sponsored by NATO, the United Nations Office of Drug Control and the lead country are all part of the coordinated, complementary multi- nation effort and do not provide a real basis for comparison. No other program has the challenges facing INCLE South Asia in Afghanistan.

Evidence: N/A

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Evaluations conducted to date were not designed to assess the impact the program is having on its intended outcomes. Their methodologies were not specifically designed to be qualitative impact assessments or quantitative studies of program effectiveness. Studies conducted by the State Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicate that U.S. foreign assistance in Afghanistan is confronting an insecure environment, a factor in its is making limited progress in achieving program results amid an insecure environment. The 2005 OIG inspection of INL's domestic operations noted that "in a period of extraordinary challenges, INL has a solid record of achievement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and with its other programs" but also notes that "INL is, at present, an embattled entity, facing the need to address its overtaxed resources and organizational weaknesses, while drastically reordering its priorities to deal with burgeoning high priority Iraq and Afghanistan programs. INL must move promptly to restructure." The evaluation points out that the adoption of the five-pillar strategy went a long way towards focusing U.S. counternarcotics policy towards Afghanistan and improving interagency coordination. However, much progress needs to be made to reduce poppy cultivation from record high levels and to ensure a stable, responsive police force

Evidence: Pertinent GAO inspections include: "Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to be Better Defined (GAO- 05-575)"; "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals (GAO- 05-742)"; "Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed (GAO-04- 403)"; "Central and Southwest Asian Countries: Trends in U.S. Assistance and Key Economic, Governance, and Demographic Characteristics (GAO-03- 634R)". "CRS report for Congress - Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (RL32686)". "CRS report for Congress - Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (RL30588)". OIG's "Inspection of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (ISP-I-05-14)" and "Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan (ISP-I- 06- 13A)" shaped the form of INL program management in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other evaluations by NGO's (AREU) and academic/policy publication provide further insight into program strengths, weaknesses, and trends.