July 29, 1994

                STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JAMES H. QUELLO 

     On July 13, 1994, the Commission adopted and released a
Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC 94-187) in the matter involving
the application of Nationwide Wireless Network Corp. (Mtel) for a
nationwide authorization in the narrowband PCS.

     Commissioner Quello concurred in the result of that action
and has issued the following statement. 





                                     CONCURRING STATEMENT
                             OF
                 COMMISSIONER JAMES H. QUELLO  


RE:  Nationwide Wireless Network Corp.
     Mtel Narrowband PCS License


Because I have consistently contended that pioneer's preference
grantees were never intended to take their spectrum for free in a
post-auction world, it may seem curious that I am not giving my
unqualified support to a Commission decision that endorses that
principle.  Two aspects of today's decision, however, trouble me.

The first is the prospect that, as the decision candidly admits,
Mtel could in fact wind up paying nothing for its spectrum if the
spectrum's auction value turns out to be $3 million or less.  To
me, this result is inconsistent with the basic reason for having
auctions, which is to capture the value of spectrum for the
public.  Even at an unexpectedly low auction price, no one could
plausibly argue that narrowband PCS spectrum would have no value
for Mtel.  For this reason, I cannot endorse a payment plan that
could allow Mtel, or any pioneer's preference holder, to take its
spectrum for free.  I do believe, however, that the current pre-
auction estimates of the value of narrowband PCS spectrum are
more likely to be too low rather than too high, and therefore
Mtel will ultimately make a substantial payment for its spectrum. 
On this basis, and this basis alone, I can concur with this
aspect of the Commission's decision.

The other facet of today's decision that I find problematic is
our statutory basis for imposing this payment requirement on
Mtel.  Our legal analysis, although plausible, certainly entails
what may best be described as an aggressive interpretation of
Section 4(i) of the Communications Act.  Should this decision be
appealed, I trust that the reviewing court will agree with our
interpretation in light of the case law we cite  -  but it would
be unrealistic to suggest that reviewing courts are lately in the
habit of extending us this sort of benefit of the doubt.  And if
for any reason today's decision does not stand, with the result
that we are unable to require payment from pioneer's preference
holders,  I for one would seriously question whether we should
grant such preferences in the future.