Religious
Freedom in Focus is a
monthly email update about the Civil
Rights Division's religious liberty
and religious discrimination cases.
Assistant Attorney General R. Alexander
Acosta has placed a priority on these
cases. Through vigorous enforcement
of:
- Federal
statutes prohibiting religion-based discrimination
in education, employment, housing, public
facilities, and public accommodations;
- Federal
laws against arson and vandalism of houses
of worship and bias crimes against people
because of their faith; and
- The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA);
and
through participation as intervenor and
friend-of-the-court in cases involving
the denial of equal treatment based on
religion, the Civil Rights Division is
working to protect the right of people
of all faiths to participate fully in public
life. |
IN
THIS ISSUE:
Civil Rights
Division Submits Brief Defending the Boy Scouts' Right to Use City Land in San Diego;
Court Refuses to Accept it
The Civil Rights Division on March 4, 2004, submitted
a brief in
federal court in San Diego in support of the Boy
Scouts in Barnes-Wallace
v. Boy Scouts of America, an ongoing legal battle
over the Boy Scouts' use of city land. The brief
argued that the Boy Scouts is not a religious organization
and that its operation of a water-sports facility
on city property does not violate the First Amendment's
bar against establishments of religion. The Court, which
ruled against the Boy Scouts last July in a related claim
involving the Boy Scouts' operation of a campground in
San Diego's Balboa Park, refused to accept the United States'
brief. The United States is disappointed that its views
will not be heard on this important issue in the trial
court.
The Justice Department's friend-of-the-court brief was submitted in an ACLU lawsuit brought
by six San Diego residents in U.S. District Court in San Diego that challenges a lease
under which the Boy Scouts built an aquatic center on Fiesta Island for swimming, canoeing,
kayaking and other water sports. In exchange for being able to reserve the facility for
its own activities, the Boy Scouts agreed to invest more than $1.5 million to develop the
center, pay all its operating costs and open it for use by other youth organizations. The
City of San Diego has entered similar leases for the development and maintenance of
city-owned buildings and parkland with more than 100 other community organizations. The
lawsuit sought to invalidate this lease and a similar lease for a Boy Scout facility in
San Diego's Balboa Park, arguing that the Boy Scouts is a religious organization and that
the leases violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. In July 2003, the
District Court invalidated the Balboa Park lease but delayed ruling on the Fiesta Island
lease, citing insufficient evidence.
The Justice Department brief argued that the Boy Scouts "is a social and recreational
organization dedicated to promoting good character, citizenship, and personal fitness
in young boys in a manner that does not undermine, and in fact respects and supports, the
religious values with which they enter the program," and is not a religious organization
under the Establishment Clause. The brief also argued that the type of benefit to the Boy
Scouts that the suit challenges, namely opportunities for youth to participate in water
sports, is secular in nature and cannot in any event be construed to be aid to religion in
violation of the Constitution.
"Quite simply, the Boy Scouts of America is not a church, and canoeing, kayaking and
swimming are not religious activities," said R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Rights Division, in a press release announcing the submission.
"The Boy Scouts should not be prohibited from using public lands on an equal basis with
other youth groups."
The case is currently scheduled to be heard by the District Court on April 5, 2004.
Civil
Rights Division Brief Defends Constitutionality of Title VII
On March 8, 2004, the Civil Rights Division filed a brief in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit defending the constitutionality of Title VII's religious
accommodation provisions. In the case, Muhammed v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction,
a Muslim corrections officer brought suit in 2001 seeking, among other things,
the right to wear a Muslim skullcap, called a kuffi, under his uniform cap. The State of
Ohio moved to dismiss, arguing that Congress lacked authority to require states to
accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of employees.
The District Court upheld the constitutionality
of Title VII and the State appealed. The Civil Rights
Division intervened in the Court of Appeals for the
limited purpose of defending the constitutionality
of Title VII. The brief filed by the Civil Rights
Division on March 8th argues that the Title VII accommodation
provisions, as applied to State employers, simply
enforce the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
Because Title VII targets conduct that is subject
to heightened constitutional scrutiny, the Civil Rights
Division argues that Congress has the necessary leeway
to craft appropriate remedies under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Civil
Rights Division Closes Pennsylvania Religious Zoning Discrimination Investigation
On March 17, 2004, the Civil Rights Division announced
that it was closing its investigation of the zoning
practices of Brighton Township, Pennsylvania, in
light of changes the township made to its zoning
code to eliminate discriminatory treatment of houses
of worship. The investigation had been opened in
January of 2003 pursuant to the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA")
(see Focus
on RLUIPA, Volume 1, February issue of
Religious Freedom in Focus) after the Beaver
Assembly of God was unable to expand its church
due to zoning laws that facially discriminated
against houses of worship.
Under the Brighton zoning code, houses of worship were limited to lots with five or
more acres. However, numerous other types of buildings with the same or greater impacts
on traffic and noise, including adult movie theaters and cabarets, assembly halls, and
fraternal organizations, had no minimum acreage requirement. The Beaver Assembly of God's
church, which it had occupied since the early 1970s, was on a 1.25 acre parcel. The church
was too small for its growing congregation, and it purchased an adjoining 2-acre lot and
sought to build a larger church. Its zoning application was rejected due to the failure
of the combined parcels to meet the 5-acre minimum. The church brought a federal suit
against the township in January of 2003, and the Department of Justice then opened an
investigation, seeking documents and information from the township. The township
subsequently amended its ordinance to remove the five-acre requirement and create a zone in
the Township in which houses of worship are permitted as of right. The township also agreed
to permit the church to proceed with construction on its property. In light of these
victories, the Department of Justice has decided to close its investigation.
"Nothing justifies zoning laws that make it harder for people to assemble for religious
exercise than for secular purposes such as civic meetings, fraternal gatherings, or movie
going, let alone adult entertainment," said R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights. "We commend Brighton Township for recognizing the
discrimination against religion that was written into its zoning code and for promptly
correcting it."
Since September of 2000, when Congress enacted
RLUIPA, the Civil Rights Division has opened
15 investigations into allegations of religious
discrimination in local government land use
and zoning practices in cases involving a wide range
of religious traditions. For more information about RLUIPA,
including information on filing complaints, please visit
the Civil Rights Division's Housing
and Civil Enforcement's RLUIPA page.
Church Arson
Act's Constitutionality Defended
On February 9, 2004, the Eighth Circuit heard oral argument in United States v. Corum.
The case involves the federal civil rights prosecution of Gary Corum for making a series
of bomb threats to synagogues in the Minneapolis area. He was convicted of three counts
of violating the statute known as the Church Arson Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. 247, which
prohibits damaging or destroying religious property, or interfering with religious exercise
through force or the threat of force, in a manner that affects interstate commerce.
He was also convicted of three counts of 18 U.S.C. 844(e), which prohibits using a telephone
or other instrument of interstate commerce to make a threat.
On appeal, Corum argues that the Church Arson Prevention
Act violates the Constitution's Establishment
Clause by singling out religious institutions
for special protection. He also maintains that
there is an insufficient nexus between his acts
and interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional
elements of the Act. In response, the Civil Rights
Division argues in its brief
that preventing violence affecting interstate
commerce does not advance religion, but rather "curb[s]
violence and threats that have an adverse effect
on an aspect of interstate commerce that Congress
found to be particularly vulnerable to violent
interference." The
Division also argues that Corum's threats affected
interstate commerce because the synagogues are
engaged in a wide range of religious, social
service, and educational activities affecting
commerce. The Eighth Circuit decision is pending.
Supreme
Court Reverses Ninth Circuit in Locke v. Davey
The U.S. Supreme Court handed down Locke
v. Davey on February 25, 2004, holding that the State
of Washington did not violate the constitutional
rights of a high school graduate when it
barred him from using a State "Promise
Scholarship" toward a Pastoral Ministries
degree at a religiously affiliated college.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held
that the state had violated his rights under
the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
The United States submitted an amicus
brief in support of affirming the Court
of Appeals, arguing that Washington State had
imposed a special disability on individuals'
exercise of their religion in violation of the
Free Exercise Clause because it permitted students
to use their scholarships to undertake any choice
of course of study, including the secular study
of religion, but barred them from using their
scholarships to major in theology at religious
institutions.
The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that while the Establishment
Clause permits students to use their scholarships
for ministerial training, States are not required
to allow the use of scholarships for such purposes.
The Court noted the special concern expressed in
State Constitutions at the time of the Founding regarding
the use of tax funds to support the training of ministers.
The Court also noted that students may use the Promise
Scholarships to take theology courses at religiously
affiliated schools, but only are forbidden from pursuing
a theology or divinity degree. Finding that the "State's interest
in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees
is substantial and the exclusion of such funding
places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars,
the Court held that Davey's rights were not violated.
United
States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt