

4.0 What are the Implications of Climate Change and Variability for Gulf Coast Transportation?

Lead Authors: Robert S. Kafalenos, Kenneth J. Leonard

Contributing Authors: Daniel M. Beagan, Virginia R. Burkett, Barry D. Keim, Alan Meyers, David T. Hunt, Robert C. Hyman, Michael K. Maynard, Barbara Fritsche, Russell H. Henk, Edward J. Seymour, Leslie E. Olson, Joanne R. Potter, Michael J. Savonis

The major climate drivers discussed in Chapter 3.0 have significant implications for the transportation system in the Gulf Coast region. This chapter provides an overview, in Section 4.1, of the impacts of climate change on the region's transportation infrastructure. It starts with a summary organized around the primary climate effects addressed in Chapter 3.0 (temperature, precipitation, sea level rise, and storm activity) and continues with a discussion of freight and private sector concerns. In Section 4.2, it shifts to a more detailed discussion organized by transportation mode; this subsection ends by summarizing and discussing freight and private sector concerns involving multiple modes. Finally, we use a series of case studies in Section 4.3 to illustrate some of the effects of the 2005 hurricanes on transportation.

Based on the analysis of the climate scenarios relayed in Chapter 3.0, climate change is likely to have the largest impact on highways, ports, and rail, particularly through sea level rise and storm surge. Temperature increases, particularly temperature extremes, are likely to increase energy consumption for refrigerated storage as well as rail and highway maintenance. Bridges, included in multiple modes, also could be affected by changes in precipitation, particularly through changes in peak stream flow. Changes in severe weather patterns (thunderstorms) or cloud cover could affect flight operations. See Tables 4.3 through 4.6 for summary statistics.

■ 4.1 Climate Drivers and their Impacts on the Transportation System

This section focuses on the main impacts on transportation facilities and features (e.g., bridges) resulting from the primary climate drivers: temperature, precipitation, sea level rise, and storm activity, and summarizes some of the issues that affect multiple modes.¹ While each climate factor has implications for the transportation network, relative sea level rise (RSLR) and storm activity have the potential to cause the most serious damage to transportation infrastructure in this study region. The relative significance of different climate factors will vary from region to region. The section closes with a look at key cross-modal issues, particularly private sector involvement and the potential for climate impacts in the Gulf Coast region to disrupt freight movements outside the study region.

As noted in Chapter 3.0, the climate impacts on transportation infrastructure assessed in this study rely on the combination of an understanding of historical climate trends and future projections from General Circulation Models (GCM). While model results imply that change will be gradual and linear, it should be noted that regional “surprises” are increasingly possible in the complex, nonlinear earth climate system (Groisman et al., 2004), which is characterized by thresholds in physical processes that are not completely understood or incorporated into climate model simulations, e.g., interactive chemistry, interactive land and ocean carbon emissions, etc. While there is still considerable uncertainty about the rates of change that can be expected (Karl and Trenberth, 2003), there is a fairly strong consensus concerning the direction of change for most of the climate variables that affect transportation in the Gulf Coast region.

4.1.1 Effects of Warming Temperatures

Based on the results presented in Chapter 3.0 for the Gulf Coast subset of the GCM runs performed for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007), the average temperature in the Gulf Coast region appears likely to increase by at least $1.5^{\circ}\text{C} \pm 1^{\circ}\text{C}$ ($2.7^{\circ}\text{F} \pm 1.8^{\circ}\text{F}$) during the next 50 years. While changes in average temperatures have some implications for transportation infrastructure and services, the more significant consideration is the potential change in temperature extremes. As the number of days that the temperature is above 32°C (90°F) increases – rising in the next century to as much as 115 days (plus or minus 16 days) per year from the current level of 77 days – stress will increase on both the infrastructure itself and on the people who use and provide transportation services. Temperature extremes are most likely to cause the greatest maintenance problems. The greater frequency of very hot days will lead to greater need for maintenance of roads and

¹ Aside from introductory and summary sections, the climate drivers are not addressed in order of relative importance but rather according to a specific order for purposes of analysis: temperature, precipitation, sea level rise, and storm activity.

1 asphalt pavement (although some paving materials may handle temperature extremes better
2 than others), rail tracks and freight facilities, some vehicles, and facility buildings and
3 structures due to degradation in materials. Further, construction and maintenance
4 schedules may be affected, as work crews may be unable to work during extreme heat
5 events as higher temperatures make it difficult for workers to work outside. For aviation,
6 longer runways may be required, although this will probably be offset by advancements in
7 engine technology and airframe materials.

8 Increases in temperatures also are likely to increase energy consumption for cooling. This
9 applies particularly to freight operations, including ports where energy is required to
10 provide for refrigeration, as well as to trains and truck operations. Air conditioning
11 requirements for passengers also can be expected to increase, which may lead to a need for
12 additional infrastructure at terminal facilities. This has both environmental and economic
13 costs, and may pose a public health concern to vulnerable populations during emergency
14 situations.

15 **4.1.2 Effects of Precipitation Levels and Patterns**

16 ***Precipitation and Runoff***

17 In this study, annual and monthly (January and July) precipitation totals are examined.
18 Changes in mean precipitation levels appear to have a less significant effect on
19 transportation than do sea level rise, storm surge, and temperature extremes. However, the
20 potential exists for increased intensity in individual precipitation events, which would
21 likely affect transportation network operations, safety, and storm water management
22 infrastructure. Runoff resulting from such events could lead to increased peak streamflow,
23 which could affect the sizing requirement for bridges and culverts.

24 As reported in Chapter 3.0, the climate models show relatively wide variance in average
25 precipitation projections, with plausible scenarios showing annual rainfall potentially
26 increasing or decreasing by as much as 13 percent by 2050, and by plus or minus 15
27 percent by 2100. However, regardless of whether average precipitation rises or falls,
28 higher temperatures are expected to result in more rapid evaporation. This would result in
29 declining soil moisture and decreased runoff to rivers and streams. The size and extent of
30 natural habitats adjacent to highways may be altered, resulting in changes in some plant
31 and animal communities. These ecological changes may have implications for
32 environmental mitigation strategies and commitments.

33 While changes in annual average precipitation may have some effects, change in the
34 intensity of individual rainfall events is likely to be the more significant implication for the
35 transportation system. An increase in the intensity or frequency of heavy downpours may
36 require redesign of storm water management facilities for highway, bridges and culverts,
37 ports, aviation, and rail. Severe weather events are correlated to higher incidence of
38 crashes and delays, affecting both safety and mobility. Further, aviation services can be
39 disrupted by intense rainfall events as well as an increase in the probability of severe

1 convective weather. No attempt is made in this study to quantify potential changes in
2 intensity under the climate scenarios presented in Chapter 3.0.

3 **4.1.3 Relative Sea Level Rise**

4 ***Background***

5 Based on the range of projected relative sea level rise discussed in Chapter 3.0 of 24-199
6 cm (about 1-7 feet, depending on location, GCM, and SRES emission scenario), scenarios
7 of 61 cm and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet) of relative sea level rise were selected as inputs to our
8 analysis of potential transportation impacts in the study area. Even the lowest end of the
9 range of increase in relative sea level has the potential to threaten a considerable proportion
10 of the transportation infrastructure in the region. Future planning, construction, and
11 maintenance activities should be informed by an understanding of the potential
12 vulnerabilities. This subsection begins with a summary of the relative sea level rise
13 analysis conducted for this study (see Chapter 3.0 for the full discussion), and continues by
14 summarizing the potential effects of relative sea level rise on the transportation modes.

15 As noted in Chapter 3.0, relative sea level rise (RSLR) is the combined effect of the
16 projected increase in the volume of the world's oceans (eustatic sea level change), which
17 results from increases in temperature and melting of ice, and the projected changes in land
18 surface elevation at a given location. In the Gulf Coast region, land surface elevation
19 change is dominated by subsidence, or sinking, of the land surface. While sea level may
20 continue to rise incrementally, the potential for abrupt increases in relative levels cannot be
21 dismissed. Gradual and relatively consistent rates of sea level increases will be more easily
22 addressed by transportation planners and designers than would more abrupt or
23 discontinuous changes in water levels. No analysis is conducted regarding the implications
24 of a catastrophic degree of sea level change that would result from major changes in the
25 rate of land ice decline (e.g., a rapid collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet).

26 Two different sea level rise models were used to estimate potential RSLR in the study area.
27 Both models were used to estimate relative sea level rise by 2050 and 2100 under the
28 greenhouse gas emissions scenarios considered in this study (see Chapter 3.0 for more on
29 the scenarios). Both models account for eustatic sea level change and land subsidence in
30 the region based on the historical record. One model, CoastClim, produces results that
31 approximate future change in RSLR under the climate scenarios. A similar model, SLRRP,
32 also incorporates values for high and low tidal variation attributed to astronomical and
33 meteorological causes, which are pulled from the historical record. The tide data used is
34 based on a monthly average of the mean high tide (Mean Higher High Water) for each day
35 of the month. The SLRRP results presented in the study are the highest predicted monthly
36 sea level elevations by 2050 and 2100. Thus, the SLRRP results capture seasonal
37 variability and inter-annual trends in sea level change, while the CoastClim results do not.

38 Results for the low- and high-range RSLR cases are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
39 (See Tables 3.14 and 3.16 for the full range of results.) Analysis was conducted for three
40 long-term tide gage locations, as subsidence rates vary substantially across the region:

1 regional subsidence rates are 4.7 mm/year (0.19 in/year) for Galveston, Texas and the
2 Chenier Plain; 8.05 mm/year (0.32 in/year) for Grand Isle, Louisiana and the Mississippi
3 River Deltaic Plain; and 0.34 mm/year (0.013 in/year) for Pensacola, Florida and the
4 Mississippi/Alabama Sound of the central Gulf Coast. Results generated using CoastClim
5 range from 24 cm (0.8 foot) in Pensacola to 167 cm (5.5 feet) in Grand Isle. Results from
6 SLRRP, which as noted above accounts for historical tidal variation, are somewhat higher
7 with predicted sea level ranging from 70 cm (2.3 feet, NAVD88) in Pensacola to 199 cm
8 (6.5 feet, NAVD88) in Grand Isle.

9 [INSERT Table 4.1: Relative sea level rise (RSLR) modeled using SLRRP]

10 [INSERT Table 4.2: Relative sea level rise (RSLR) modeled using CoastClim]

11 This Phase 1 analysis broadly examines the potential effects of sea level rise on the region
12 as a whole; the results related in this study should not be used to predict specific impacts on
13 any single location at a specific point in time. Impacts were analyzed assuming two
14 different levels of relative sea level rise; 61 cm (2 feet) and 122 cm (4 feet). From a
15 regional perspective, the selection of this range for analysis is clearly supported by the
16 model results. In fact, given that the results range from 24 cm to 199 cm (0.8 to 6.5 feet),
17 analyzing for 61 cm and 122 cm (2- and 4-foot) increases in RSLR may be overly
18 conservative from a regional perspective. For both Galveston and especially Grand Isle,
19 analyzing at the 122 cm level (4 feet) is conservative, given that the high-range scenario
20 results modeled to 2100 range from 130 cm (4.3 feet) to 199 cm (6.5 feet) for these two
21 areas. In the case of Pensacola, given that 3 of the 4 values that define the range of the
22 results are above 61 cm (2 feet), 61 cm level should be considered conservative. The 122
23 cm (4-foot) level, however, is representative of the high-range scenario results (114 cm or
24 3.8 feet) for Pensacola.

25 As discussed in Chapter 3.0, RSLR will not be uniform across the region. This study's
26 results are meant to give a broad indication of where relative sea levels could be by 2100
27 and what infrastructure could be affected as a result of the analysis under the 61 and
28 122 cm (2- and 4-foot) RSLR scenarios. This analysis provides a first approximation of
29 potential vulnerabilities and provide insights for transportation planners; more detailed
30 analyses can then be conducted to further assess specific locations and facilities that may
31 be at risk. Phase 2 of this study will examine specific sublocations within the region, and
32 incorporate location-specific projections of future RSLR.

33 ***Impact on Transportation***

34 Relative sea level rise poses the greatest danger to the dense network of ports, highways,
35 and rail lines across the region. An increase in relative sea level of 61 cm (2 feet) has the
36 potential to affect 64 percent of the region's port facilities, while a 122 cm (4-foot) rise in
37 relative sea level would affect nearly three-quarters of port facilities. This is not surprising
38 given that port facilities are adjacent to a navigable water body. For highways and rail,
39 while the percentages are lower, the effect also is quite large. About a quarter of arterials
40 and interstates, nearly half of the region's intermodal connector miles and 10 percent of rail
41 miles would be affected by a 122 cm (4-foot) rise. Because goods are transferred to and

1 from ports by both trucks and rail, service interruptions on selected segments of
2 infrastructure are likely to affect much more than these percentages imply due to the
3 disruption to network connectivity. For example, an increase in relative sea level of 61 cm
4 (2 feet) would affect 220 km (137 miles) of I-10 east of New Orleans, which could affect
5 on-road transport of both people and goods into and out of New Orleans and, to a lesser
6 extent, Houston. Similarly, while less than 10 percent of rail miles would be affected, most
7 of the rail lines linking New Orleans to the rail system could be affected. This could hinder
8 freight movements in the region, especially since New Orleans is the main east-west link
9 for rail located in the region, one of four in the United States. While airports in the region
10 are less directly vulnerable to sea level rise, the vulnerability of roads and rail lines serving
11 them affects the passenger and freight services these facilities provide as well. See
12 Table 4.3 for a summary of this information.

13 [INSERT TABLE 4.3 – Relative sea level rise impacts on Gulf Coast transportation modes:
14 percentage of facilities vulnerable.]

15 Relative sea level rise is likely to have an impact on the other modes as well. While bus
16 routes can be adjusted over time should facilities no longer be of use, light rail facilities are
17 not so easily moved; some of the light rail routes in Galveston and New Orleans would be
18 affected by a 61 cm (2-foot) rise. Airports would not escape the direct and indirect effects
19 of relative sea level rise; New Orleans International airport, at 122 cm (4 feet), and two
20 other smaller airports could be affected directly by higher sea levels. Others could be
21 affected indirectly if the roads and connectors leading to them are flooded.

22 The data and analysis for both relative sea level rise and storm surge are based on land area
23 elevations, rather than facility elevations. Facility elevations generally were not readily
24 available for this phase of the study in a consolidated and geospatial format. The elevation
25 of land areas was determined from the National Elevation Dataset (NED) maintained by
26 the United States Geological Survey (USGS) (USGS, 2004). Mapping data for
27 transportation infrastructure was obtained from the DOT's Bureau of Transportation
28 Statistics (BTS, 2004).

29 The NED has a horizontal resolution of 30 meters (98 feet). Since the positional accuracy
30 of the transportation facilities is plus or minus 80 meters (262 feet), the elevation data is
31 sufficient only to make general conclusions about transportation facilities that are
32 vulnerable to flooding. While some sections of the transportation network – particularly
33 roads and rail lines – may be elevated, it is important to note that inundation of even short
34 segments of the system can shut down significant portions of the broader network due to
35 the essential connectivity provided by these segments. Furthermore, such inundation can
36 undermine infrastructure's foundations and substructures.

37 **4.1.4 Storm Activity**

38 As discussed in Chapter 3.0, the intensity of hurricanes making landfall in the Gulf Coast
39 study area is likely to increase. In addition, the climate analysis indicates that the number
40 of hurricanes may increase as the temperature of the sea surface continues to warm.

1 Simulated storm surge from model runs across the central Gulf Coast at today's elevations
2 and sea levels demonstrated a 6.7-7.3 meter (22- to 24-foot) potential surge for major
3 hurricanes of Category 3 or greater. Based on recent experience even these levels may be
4 conservative; surge levels during Hurricane Katrina (rated a Category 3 at landfall)
5 exceeded these heights in some locations.

6 Many of the region's major roads, railroads, and airports have been constructed on land
7 surfaces at elevations below 5 meters. Storm surge poses significant risk to transportation
8 facilities² due to the immediate flooding of infrastructure, the damage caused by the force
9 of the water, and secondary damage caused by collisions with debris. While surges at
10 varying heights may disrupt operations and damage infrastructure, the effects of storm
11 surges of 5.5 and 7 meters (18 and 23 feet) were assessed for the purposes of this analysis.

12 This assessment does not take into account the possible dampening of surge effects due to
13 distance inland from coastal areas, and the buffering qualities of both ecological systems
14 (barrier islands, wetlands, marshes) and the built environment. The analysis identifies
15 portions of the transportation network that are at land elevations below 5.5 and 7 meters
16 (18 and 23 feet) as an initial indication of areas and facilities that may be at risk and
17 warrant more detailed analysis. Areas significantly inland from the coast or protected by
18 buffering systems may be less vulnerable, depending on site-specific coastal
19 geomorphology and the characteristics of individual storm events.

20 As shown clearly by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, storm surge has the potential to cause
21 serious damage and loss of life in low-lying areas. As considered in this study, much of the
22 region's infrastructure is vulnerable to storm surges on the order of 5.5 to 7 meters (18 to
23 23 feet), though the specific infrastructure that would be flooded depends on the
24 characteristics of a given storm, including its landfall location, wind speed, direction, and
25 tidal conditions.

26 As in the case of relative sea level rise, ports, highway, and rail are the transportation
27 facilities that would be most directly affected by storm surge. Ports have the most
28 exposure, as 98 percent of port facilities are vulnerable to a storm surge of 5.5 meters (18
29 feet). Fifty-one percent of arterials and 56 percent of interstates are located in areas that
30 are vulnerable to a surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet), and the proportions rise to 57 and 64
31 percent, respectively, for a surge of 7 meters (23 feet). Some 73 percent of intermodal
32 connector miles are vulnerable to surges of 5.5 or 7 meters (18 feet or 23 feet). One-third
33 of rail lines are vulnerable to a storm surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet); this proportion climbs to
34 41 percent vulnerable at 7 meters (23 feet). Twenty-nine airports are vulnerable to a surge
35 of 7 meters (23 feet), and one major commercial service facility – New Orleans

² Bridges may be of particular interest in this regard. Phase II of this study, which will include an in-depth analysis of a single location within the study region, is expected to include a systematic analysis of the potential impacts of climate change on bridges, as they play a key role across multiple modes, and their failures can produce bottlenecks.

1 International – also is vulnerable to a 5.5 meter (18-foot) surge. Vulnerability of the
2 region’s infrastructure to storm surge is summarized in Table 4.4.

3 [INSERT TABLE 4.4. Storm surge impacts on Gulf Coast transportation modes: percentage of
4 facilities vulnerable]

5 The effect of existing flood control works has not been addressed in this study. Many
6 existing facilities at lower elevations are protected by levees and other physical structures,
7 which are intended to provide resistance to storm surge. The present land-based elevation
8 data allows us to identify general geographic zones of potential risk, and identify areas that
9 merit further study. More detailed future assessments of specific sites and facilities should
10 consider the presence and viability of protective structures as part of an analysis of risk and
11 vulnerability at those locations.

12 The effects of storms on the transportation network go beyond the impacts of storm surge.
13 Severe winds and rainfall events throughout the study region can cause damage and
14 flooding, disrupting system performance. Wind damage risk contours were not mapped as
15 part of this project. Experience shows that the highest hurricane velocities are experienced
16 along the coasts, diminishing as storms move inland, but that severe damaging winds can
17 be sustained well inland. Hurricanes also spawn tornados, which can have substantially
18 higher velocities over much smaller areas. The entire study area is within 100 miles of the
19 Gulf of Mexico shoreline, and all of it could be considered potentially vulnerable to
20 significant wind damage. As noted in Chapter 3.0, while historical and projected increase
21 in summer minimum temperatures for the study area suggest an increase in the probability
22 of severe convective weather (Dessens, 1995, Groisman et al., 2004), GCMs currently lack
23 the capacity for simulating small-scale phenomena such as thunderstorms, tornadoes, hail,
24 and lightning.

25 One factor that complicates the effects of both storm surge and relative sea level rise is the
26 condition of the barrier islands. As noted in Section 3.5.1, wave heights in coastal bays
27 will tend to increase due to the combined erosional effects of sea level rise and storms on
28 coastal barrier islands and wetlands. As the barrier islands erode, their role in shielding
29 Gulf Coast waterways and infrastructure from the effects of waves will diminish, which
30 means their ability to protect coastal infrastructure from waves at current sea levels and
31 future sea levels, as well as from storm surge, will likely diminish.

32 Any facility subject to flooding may incur structural damage or be rendered inoperable due
33 to debris or other obstructions. Restoring facility and system performance necessitates
34 considerable time and investment on the part of facility owners. The secondary economic
35 costs to both businesses and communities who rely on these transportation networks could
36 be considerable as well, depending on the time required to restore system performance.

37 This report does not attempt to estimate the total costs of protecting, maintaining, and
38 replacing Gulf Coast transportation infrastructure due to damage caused by climate change.
39 It does, however, include a case study on Hurricane Katrina in Section 4.3.1 that provides
40 examples of the efforts associated with addressing the impacts of the hurricane.

4.1.5 Climate Impacts on Freight Transport

The private sector has made massive investments in transportation infrastructure in the Gulf Coast study area, a large portion of which revolves around moving freight. Almost all of the roads and major airports are publicly owned, but the vehicles that operate over them, and the commercial and freight services that they accommodate, are private. Many of the ports are private and the vessels and commercial services using them are private. Almost all of the nation's rail infrastructure is privately owned and operated.

Disruption of privately owned infrastructure can have huge costs for the owners and users of these facilities. Repair costs for the more than 65 km (40-mile) CSX railroad segment damaged in Hurricane Katrina, \$250 million, could be dwarfed by the costs of moving the line if the company chose to relocate the line further inland; Congressional proposals have considered authorizing \$700 million in Federal funding to help relocate the damaged portion of the CSX segment. This is just a small share of the 1,915 km (1,190 miles) of rail line in the study area that are vulnerable to sea level rise and storm surge. Critical transportation-dependent industries – petroleum, chemical, agricultural production and transportation, etc. – are heavily concentrated in the study area. The private sector, therefore, has a significant interest in the impacts of climate change on transportation infrastructure, as it potentially affects hundreds of billions of dollars annually in commercial activity over study area roads, railroads, airports, seaports, and pipelines.

One of the key issues that draws the private sector into the discussion of climate impacts on transportation is the movement of freight. The private sector has proven adept at using intermodal freight systems – involving ports, highways, rail, and aviation – to transport goods as inexpensively as possible. However, this lean and efficient system is vulnerable: a disruption that seemingly affects a limited area or a single mode can have a ripple effect throughout the supply chain.

The loss of direct freight transportation service or connectivity in the Gulf Coast would likely have a substantial impact beyond the transportation provider and the local economy. The interruption of freight transportation service in the Gulf Coast could impact the distribution of goods nationally and, therefore, impact the national economy. Costs of raw materials or products that have to be rerouted or transported by an alternate mode would likely increase to absorb higher transportation costs. Further, most businesses and industries that once held large inventories of products have shifted to low inventory, just-in-time delivery business models, managing much of their inventories in transit. Therefore, they have lower tolerance for delays in shipment and receipt of goods, and now demand greater reliability and visibility from their freight carriers. This system is very cost effective, but it leaves shippers with little cushion when the freight transportation system fails. A large failure such as that caused by a hurricane can quickly disrupt thousands of supply chains, undermining the operations and profitability of many shippers, carriers, and customers. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, CSX rerouted trains and experienced an increase in operating costs of the railroad through increased fuel usage, crew costs, equipment delays, and a loss of overall system capacity. Other freight transportation impacts included the disruption in the distribution of petroleum by pipelines and the failure

1 of ships being able to make port in the Gulf Coast. An increase in transportation costs such
2 as these is likely to increase the price of the final product, and could jeopardize the national
3 and global competitiveness of affected businesses.

4 ■ 4.2 Climate Impacts on Transportation Modes

5 This section begins with an in depth examination of the impacts of climate change on each
6 individual mode. It continues by looking at how these impacts could affect emergency
7 management and evacuation, and closes with a look at key cross-modal issues.

8 4.2.1 Highways

9 As in most parts of the nation, roads are the backbone of the transportation network in the
10 Gulf Coast. Highways³ are the chief mode for transporting people across the region. And,
11 together with rail, highways are essential for moving freight throughout the region and to
12 other parts of the United States. Thus, impacts to the highway network could serve as
13 choke points to both passenger and freight traffic that emanates in or flows through the
14 region. While temperature and precipitation changes have some implications for highway
15 design and maintenance, the key impacts to the highway network result from relative sea
16 level rise and storm surge.

17 *Temperature*

18 Impacts related to projected changes in average temperatures appear to have moderate
19 implications for highways, while increases in extreme heat may be significant.
20 Maintenance and construction costs for roads and bridges are likely to increase as
21 temperatures increase. Further, higher temperatures cause some pavement materials to
22 degrade faster, requiring earlier replacement. Such costs will likely grow as the number of
23 days above 32°C (90°F) – projected to grow from the current average of 77 days to a range
24 of 99 to 131 days over the next century – increases, as well as the projected maximum
25 record temperatures anticipated in the region.

26 While maintenance and construction costs are expected to rise as the number of very hot
27 days increase, the incremental costs have not been calculated as part of this analysis. These
28 additional excessive temperature-related costs are incorporated into the total maintenance
29 and construction costs for all pavements and bridges. Changes in materials used may help
30 reduce future temperature-induced maintenance costs. For example, Louisiana DOT has
31 begun to use asphalts with a higher polymer content, which helps pavement better handle
32 higher temperatures, though at a higher initial cost than standard asphalt.

³ As noted in Chapter 2.0, this report focuses on interstates, arterials and collectors, and not local roads.

1 There are measures that could be taken to mitigate the loss in productivity associated with
2 maintenance and construction, such as evening work hours, but these measures also would
3 increase costs. In subsequent phases of this study, the implications on construction,
4 maintenance, and operation budgets in specific sublocations should be examined.

5 The designs of steel and concrete bridges and of pavements in the study area typically are
6 based on a maximum design temperature of 46°C (115°F) to 53°C (125°F). The increase
7 in maximum record temperatures implied by the climate model projections are less than
8 these values, although under the climate scenarios they would approach those values over
9 the next century. It may be prudent for future designers of highway facilities to ensure that
10 joints in steel and concrete bridge superstructures and concrete road surfaces can
11 adequately accommodate thermal expansion resulting from these temperatures. The state
12 DOT design manuals generally establish the maximum design temperature at a value near
13 53°C (125°F), well above the current maximum recorded temperatures in the study area,
14 but as temperatures increase there may well be more failures of aging infrastructure.
15 Consideration should be given to designing for higher maximum temperatures in
16 replacement or new construction.

17 ***Precipitation***

18 As previously noted, the analysis generally indicates little change in mean annual
19 precipitation (152 cm or 60 inches per year) through either 2050 or 2100, but the range of
20 possible futures includes both reductions and increases in seasonal precipitation. In either
21 case, the analysis points to potential reductions in soil moisture and runoff as temperatures
22 and the number of days between rainfall events increase. The research team analyzed
23 average annual precipitation separately from potential changes in intensity of rain events.

24 Under a scenario of insignificant change or a reduction in average precipitation, coupled
25 with drier soils and less runoff, there would be decreases in soil moisture, which may result
26 in a decline of slides in slopes adjacent to highways. It also would mean less settling under
27 pavements, with a decrease in cracking and undermining of pavement base courses. While
28 uniform decreases in runoff could reduce scouring of bridge piers in rivers and streams,
29 greater frequency of high-intensity events could result in more scour. Stresses on animal
30 and plant populations brought about by higher temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns
31 could make it more difficult and expensive to mitigate the impacts of highway
32 development on the natural environment.

33 Pavement settling, bridge scour, and ecosystem impacts may not be significantly impacted
34 by modest increases in average annual rainfall because of the effects of increasing
35 temperature on evaporation rates. However, while potential changes in average annual
36 precipitation are likely to have minor impacts, an increase in the intensity of individual
37 rainfall events may have significant implications for highways. An increase in the
38 frequency of extreme precipitation events – as discussed in Chapter 3.0 – would increase
39 accident rates, result in more frequent short-term flooding and bridge scour, as well as
40 more culvert washouts, and exceed the capacity of stormwater management infrastructure.
41 More instances of intense rainfall also may contribute to more frequent slides, requiring
42 increased maintenance. However, some states, such as Louisiana, already address

1 precipitation through pavement grooving and sloping, and thus may have adequate capacity
2 to handle some increase in precipitation.

3 ***Relative Sea Level Rise***

4 As discussed above, the effects of 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet) were analyzed to assess the
5 implications of relative sea level rise on highways. The presence or absence of protective
6 structures was not considered in this baseline analysis, but would be an important factor in
7 subsequent sublocation assessments.

8 As shown in Figure 4.1, the majority of the highways at risk from a 61 cm (2-foot) increase
9 in relative sea level are located in the Mississippi River delta near New Orleans. The most
10 notable highways at risk are I-10 and U.S. 90, with 220 km (137 miles) and 235 km (146
11 miles), respectively, passing through areas that will be below sea level if sea levels rise by
12 61 cm (2 feet). Overall 20 percent of the arterial miles and 19 percent of the interstate
13 miles in the study area are at elevations below 61 cm (2 feet) and thus at risk from sea level
14 rise unless elevated or protected by levees (Table 4.5).

15 The majority of the highways at risk from a 122 cm (4-foot) increase in relative sea level
16 are similarly located in the Mississippi River delta near New Orleans (Figure 4.2). The
17 most notable highways at risk remain I-10 and U.S. 90, with the number of miles
18 increasing to 684 km (425 miles) and 628 km (390 miles) passing through areas below sea
19 level, respectively. Overall 28 percent of the arterial miles and 24 percent of the interstate
20 miles are at elevations below 122 cm (4 feet).

21 As shown in Figure 4.3, many of the NHS Intermodal Connectors pass through low-lying
22 areas concentrated in the Mississippi River Delta, where sea level rise is expected to have
23 the most pervasive impact. Intermodal connectors are primarily necessary to provide
24 highway access for various transportation facilities, such as rail, ports, and airports, some
25 of which will be below sea level with a relative sea level rise of 61 to 122 cm (2 to 4 feet).
26 Of the 1,041 km (647 miles) of IM Connectors, 238 km (148 miles), or 23 percent, are at
27 risk to a 61 cm (2-foot) increase in relative sea levels; and a total of 444 km (276 miles), or
28 43 percent, are at risk to a 122 cm (4-foot) increase. In addition to the terminals at risk
29 under the 61 cm (2 feet) increase scenario (the New Orleans International Airport, Port
30 Fourchon, most rail terminals in New Orleans, ferry terminals in New Orleans, and ferry
31 terminals outside of the Mississippi River Delta in Galveston and Houston), additional
32 terminals at risk under the 122 cm (4 feet) relative sea level rise scenario include port
33 facilities in Lake Charles, Galveston, Pascagoula, and Gulfport.

34 The cost of various adaptation options – including relocating, elevating, or protecting
35 highways and intermodal connectors – is not addressed by this study. Additionally, the
36 costs of right-of-way and environmental mitigation for relocating or elevating such
37 facilities are unknown at this time. The adaptation and investment plans for specific
38 facilities will be determined by local and regional decision-makers.

39 As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the available elevation data for the study area is sufficient to
40 make first order conclusions about roads that are at risk of flooding; it does not indicate the

1 elevation of specific highways. However, it is worth noting that the loss of use of a small
2 individual segment of a given highway may make significant portions of that road network
3 impassable. Further, even if a particular interstate or arterial is passable, if the feeder roads
4 are flooded, then the larger road becomes less usable.

5 [INSERT FIGURE 4.1: Highways at risk from a relative sea level rise of 61 cm (2 feet)]

6 [INSERT [FIGURE 4.2.: Highways at risk from a relative sea level rise of 122 cm (4 feet)]

7 [INSERT FIGURE 4.3: NHS Intermodal Connectors at risk from a relative sea level rise of 122
8 cm (4 feet)]

9 [INSERT TABLE 4.5: Relative sea level rise impacts on highways: percentage of facilities
10 vulnerable]

11 ***Storm Activity***

12 As discussed in Chapter 3.0, the intensity of hurricanes making landfall or striking in the
13 Gulf Coast study area can be expected to increase. About half of the region's arterial miles
14 and about three-quarters of the intermodal connectors are vulnerable to a storm surge of 5.5
15 meters (18 feet), and these proportions are even higher for a 7 meter (23-foot) storm surge.

16 **Surge Wave Crests and Effects on Bridges**

17 The wave energy during storm surge events is greatest at the crest of the wave. The
18 facilities most at risk are bridge decks and supports that are constructed at the wave heights
19 reached during a storm. The impact of the 2005 hurricanes vividly illustrated some of the
20 factors involved in infrastructure vulnerability (see Section 4.3.1.) While only a small
21 percentage of the study area's bridges are located at the shore and have bridge decks or
22 structures at these heights, when storm waves meet those bridges the effect is devastating;
23 spans weighing 300 tons were dislodged during Hurricane Katrina. Although these bridges
24 are few in number compared to the over 8,000 bridges on the functionally classified
25 system, over two dozen bridges were hit by wave surges resulting from Hurricane Katrina
26 and experienced serious damage.

27 An example is shown in Figure 4.4. In perhaps the most spectacular example, the Bay
28 St. Louis Bridge on U.S. 90, which links Bay St. Louis and Henderson Point, Mississippi,
29 was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina's storm surge. The 3.2 km (2-mile) long bridge was
30 recently replaced at a cost of \$267 million, and has two lanes in each direction and a shared
31 use path. At its highest point, the new bridge reaches 26 meters (85 feet) above the bay, 17
32 meters (55 feet) higher than its predecessor (Nossiter, 2007; Sloan, 2007).

33 Design features such as lack of venting along the length of the span, solid railings
34 (preventing water from flowing through), and lack of connectors anchoring the spans to the
35 pilings or corrosion in existing connectors, made some bridges more susceptible than
36 others to the force of the water during Katrina. In the absence of standard AASHTO
37 design factors for storm surge, both the Louisiana DOTD and Mississippi DOT have

1 developed their own approaches to designing for future storms. For instance, Louisiana
2 DOTD is developing standards calling for new bridges to be elevated beyond a 500-year
3 event for the main span (9.1-11.6 meters, or 30-38 feet) and a 100-year event for transition
4 spans close to shore. In addition, new bridges will be designed with open railings to reduce
5 the impact of pounding water (Paul, 2007). Mississippi also has adopted more stringent
6 design standards and is rebuilding the Biloxi Bay and St. Louis Bay bridges as high-rise
7 structures, to keep the bridge decks above future storm surges.

8 As the sea level rises, the coastline will change. Bridges that were not previously at risk
9 may be exposed in the future. Additionally, bridges with decks at an elevation below the
10 likely crest of storm surges, based on experience from previous storms, will be below water
11 during the storm event and not subject to wave damage. Only data regarding the height of
12 bridges above navigable channels was available to this study – a small portion of all
13 bridges in the region. Therefore, a full analysis of the possible impacts of wave crests on
14 bridges was not feasible.

15 [INSERT FIGURE 4.4 Hurricane Katrina damage to Highway 90 at Bay St. Louis, MS]

16 **Surge Inundation**

17 Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show areas potentially vulnerable to surge inundation at the 5.5 and 7
18 meter (18- and 23-foot) levels and identifies interstate and arterial highways that pass
19 through these risk areas. As illustrated, a substantial portion of the highway system across
20 the study area is vulnerable to surge inundation: 51 percent of all arterials and 56 percent
21 of the interstates are in the 5.5 meter (18-foot) surge risk areas. At the 7 meter (23-foot)
22 level, these percentages increase only slightly: 57 percent of all arterials and 64 percent of
23 the interstates are in 7 meter (23-foot) surge risk areas (Table 4.6).

24 The risk from surge inundation for NHS Intermodal Connectors is even greater than that
25 for all highways. Seventy-three percent of IM Connector miles are located in areas that
26 would be inundated by a 5.5 meter (18-foot) surge, and the proportion of IM connectors
27 that is vulnerable at the 7 meter (23-foot) level is only slightly higher (see Figure 4.7).

28 As noted above, the elevation data is sufficient to make only general conclusions about
29 roads that are at risk of inundation. Local conditions for specific segments and facilities
30 may be important, and individual roads that may be vulnerable should be studied in detail.

31 While inundation from storm surges is a temporary event, during each period of inundation
32 the highway is not passable, and after the surge dissipates, highways must be cleared of
33 debris before they can function properly. Of particular concern is that a substantial portion
34 of all of the major east-west highways in the study area, particularly I-10/I-12, are at risk to
35 storm surge inundation in some areas, and during storm events and the recovery from these
36 events, all long-distance highway travel through the study area is likely to be disrupted.

37 The expense of these post-storm cleanups can be considerable and is often not included in
38 state DOT budgets. For instance, the Louisiana DOTD spent \$74 million on debris
39 removal alone following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Paul, 2007). In the 14 months

1 following the hurricanes, the Mississippi DOT spent \$672 million on debris removal,
2 highway and bridge repair, and rebuilding the Biloxi and Bay St. Louis bridges
3 (Mississippi DOT, 2007). See Section 4.3.1 for a fuller discussion of post-storm cleanup
4 costs.

5 Moreover, data from the Louisiana DOTD suggests that prolonged inundation can lead to
6 long-term weakening of roadways. A study of pavements submerged longer than three
7 days during Katrina (some were submerged several weeks) found that asphalt concrete
8 pavements and subgrades suffered a strength loss equivalent to two inches of pavement.
9 Portland concrete cement pavements suffered little damage, while composite pavements
10 showed weakening primarily in the subgrade (equivalent to one inch of asphalt concrete).
11 The study estimated a \$50 million price tag for rehabilitating the 320 km (200 miles) of
12 submerged state highway pavements, and noted that an additional 2,900 km (1,800 miles)
13 of nonstate roads were submerged in the New Orleans area. The data was collected several
14 months after the waters had receded; there has not been a subsequent analysis to test
15 whether any strength was restored over time (Gaspard et al., 2007).

16 [INSERT FIGURE 4.5 Highways at risk from storm surge at elevations currently below 5.5
17 meters (18 feet)]

18 [INSERT FIGURE 4.6 Highways currently at risk from storm surge at elevations currently
19 below 7.0 meters (23 feet)]

20 [INSERT FIGURE 4.7 NHS Intermodal Connectors at risk from storm surge at elevations
21 currently below 7.0 meters (23 feet)]

22 [INSERT TABLE 4.6: Storm surge impacts on highways: percentage of facilities vulnerable]

23 **Wind**

24 Wind from storms may impact the highway signs, traffic signals, and luminaries
25 throughout the study area. The wind design speed for signs and supports in the study area
26 is typically 160 to 200 km/hr (100 to 125 mph). These designs should accommodate all but
27 the most severe storm events. More significant safety and operational impacts are likely
28 from debris blown onto roadways and from crashes precipitated by debris or severe winds.

29 **4.2.2 Transit**

30 Transit in the region consists of bus systems as well as light rail in New Orleans, Houston,
31 and Galveston. While bus routes could be affected by relative sea level rise, transit
32 operators can presumably adjust their routes as needed, particularly since the location of
33 transit users and routes also might change. Storm surge could be a more serious, if
34 temporary, issue. For the light rail systems in New Orleans and Galveston, an increase in
35 relative sea level of 61 or 122 cm (2 or 4 feet) would affect at least some of the routes,
36 especially in New Orleans; storm surge of 5.5 or 7.0 meters (18 or 23 feet) would have an
37 even greater impact. The light rail system in Houston would not likely be affected.

1 Projected rises in temperature could lead to greater maintenance and air conditioning costs,
2 and an increased likelihood of rail buckling for the light rail systems. If the intensity of
3 precipitation increases, accident rates could be expected to increase. If total average annual
4 precipitation increases, it could lead to higher accident rates.

5 ***Temperature***

6 Given the temperature projections noted in Chapter 3.0, temperature stresses on engines
7 and air conditioning systems could possibly affect vehicle availability rates, disrupting
8 overall scheduled service. Since these additional excessive temperature-related costs are
9 included in the total maintenance and construction costs of transit agencies, it is possible
10 that those amounts will at a minimum increase by an amount proportional to the increase in
11 the number of days above 32°C (90°F).

12 Furthermore, temperature increases, especially increases in extremely high temperatures,
13 will cause increases in the use of air conditioning on buses to maintain passenger comfort.
14 This will exacerbate the issue of vehicle availability rates and raise costs due to increased
15 fuel consumption.

16 Increases in (record maximum) temperatures are likely to only impact fixed guideway rail
17 networks and have little or no impact on bus or paratransit systems, aside from the vehicle
18 maintenance issues noted above. As discussed in greater detail in Section 4.2.3, rail
19 networks are subject to “sun kinks” (the buckling of sections of rail) at higher
20 temperatures; sun kinks are likely to occur more frequently as (record maximum)
21 temperatures increase. The possibility of rail buckling can lead to speed restrictions to
22 avoid derailments. The track used by the trolley systems in Galveston and New Orleans
23 have expansion joints which generally are not significantly affected by sun kinks, while
24 Houston’s METRORail uses Continuously Welded Rail (CWR) track. CWR track lacks
25 expansion joints and thus is more prone to sun kinks.

26 ***Precipitation***

27 The climate model results point to potential increases or decreases in average annual
28 precipitation. If precipitation increases, it very likely would lead to an increase in accidents
29 involving buses, as well as increased costs and disruptions associated with such accidents.
30 The same also is likely if the intensity of precipitation increases. Even an increase in
31 roadway accidents not involving buses will lead to congestion that could disrupt bus
32 schedules.

33 ***Relative Sea Level Rise***

34 If relative sea level increases to an extent that transit service passes through areas that will
35 be under water in the future, either the connectivity provided by that transit is lost or
36 corrective actions to reroute the transit will be needed. Since the vast majority of transit
37 service is provided by buses, schedules and routes can be modified easily, though the same
38 is not true for terminals and maintenance facilities. Therefore, minimal impact on bus

1 systems is expected from relative sea level rise. For light rail systems in the region,
2 however, relative sea level rise could potentially be a much more serious issue. Moving
3 tracks and permanent facilities is a major undertaking; tracks would need to be protected or
4 moved to higher ground.

5 With the exception of the RTA and St. Bernard buses in New Orleans and a small portion
6 of the routes traveled in Galveston, bus and paratransit service is not expected to be
7 affected by either a 61 or 122 cm (2- or 4-foot) increase in relative sea levels. If bus routes
8 are not affected, ancillary facilities such as terminals and maintenance facilities may not be
9 affected either. Figure 4.8 shows the effect of a 122 cm (4-foot) rise in relative sea level on
10 fixed bus routes in New Orleans. This clearly illustrates the vulnerability of the transit
11 network in New Orleans without levees or other protection.

12 [INSERT FIGURE 4.8 Fixed bus routes at risk from a relative sea level rise of 122 cm (4 feet),
13 New Orleans]

14 The New Orleans streetcars system operated by the RTA and some small portions of the
15 streetcar system operated by Island Transit in Galveston are similarly at risk of inundation
16 at either the 61 or 122 cm (2- or 4-foot) sea level rise levels. Like the city itself, portions of
17 many of the streetcar routes in New Orleans currently are below sea level and it is only the
18 levee system that maintains the ability of these streetcars to function. In contrast, the fixed
19 transit system in Houston is not at risk at these levels, as show in Figure 4.9.

20 [INSERT FIGURE 4.9 Fixed transit guideways at risk from a relative sea level rise of 122 cm
21 (4 feet), Houston and Galveston]

22 ***Storm Activity***

23 Transit facilities passing through areas at elevations at or below 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18 and
24 23 feet) were identified. As shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11, the fixed transit systems in
25 New Orleans and Galveston are very likely to be affected by any storms that generate
26 surges of 5.5 meters (18 feet) or more. This inundation would affect service during and
27 immediately after a storm, though not likely result in long-term disruptions.

28 [[INSERT FIGURE 4.10: Fixed transit guideways at risk from storm surge at elevations
29 currently below 5.5 meters (18 feet), New Orleans]

30 [INSERT FIGURE 4.11: Fixed transit guideways at risk from storm surge at elevations
31 currently below 5.5 meters (18 feet), Houston and Galveston]

32 Fixed bus route systems also are at risk to storm surges. The bus route systems that are
33 vulnerable to storm surges of 5.5 meters (18 feet) include all the systems except those in
34 Baton Rouge, Beaumont, and Houston (Figure 4.12 and 4.13). At 7.0 meters (23 feet), the
35 risk of storm surge inundation also extends to the fixed bus routes in Beaumont.

36 The risk of inundation by storm surge is that the bus routes could not operate while the
37 roads would be flooded or obstructed. It also should be noted that in low surge events,

1 even if the buses can operate, their utility would be influenced by whether pedestrian
2 facilities are passable and riders can walk to bus stops. Consideration should be given to
3 developing contingency plans for alternative routes during storms.

4 [INSERT FIGURE 4.12: Fixed bus routes at risk from storm surge at elevations currently below
5 5.5 meters (18 feet), New Orleans]

6 [INSERT FIGURE 4.13: Fixed bus routes at risk from storm surge at elevations currently below
7 5.5 meters (18 feet), Houston and Galveston]

8 **Storm Winds**

9 The transit infrastructure that is most vulnerable to impacts by the winds associated with
10 increases in the number of intense storms are the overhead catenary lines that power street
11 cars in New Orleans and Houston. Transit signs and control devices also are subject to
12 wind damage.

13 However, rather than wind damage to transit facilities, the most widespread impact may be
14 from fallen trees and property debris blocking the streets on which transit routes operate.
15 This impact would occur during and immediately after storm events and should be
16 addressed by highway clean up operations.

17 **Storm Waves**

18 With the exception of light rail and BRT systems, transit equipment can be moved away
19 from areas subject to wave impacts and therefore, storm wave impacts during surge events
20 are not expected to impact most transit systems. Even in the case of fixed guideways,
21 storm waves will mostly affect areas immediately on the shoreline, which is not where
22 fixed guideway facilities in the New Orleans and Houston systems are located. However,
23 the trolley tracks in Galveston are at risk to these impacts.

24 **4.2.3 Freight and Passenger Rail**

25 Rail lines in the region play a key role in transporting freight, and a minor role in intercity
26 passenger traffic. Much of the traffic on Class I rail lines in the region is for
27 transshipments as opposed to freight originating or terminating in the region (Figure 2.12).
28 Rail connectivity and service also is vital to the functioning of many, if not most, of the
29 marine freight facilities in the study area.

30 Of the four main climate drivers examined in this study, storm surge could be the most
31 significant for rail. One-third of the rail lines in the study region are vulnerable to a storm
32 surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet), and 41 percent are vulnerable to a storm surge of 7.0 meters
33 (23 feet). Fifty-one freight facilities and 12 passenger facilities are vulnerable to storm
34 surges of 7.0 meters (23 feet). Sea level rise is of less concern for rail; a 122 cm (4-foot)
35 relative sea level rise would affect less than 10 percent of rail miles, as well as 19 freight
36 facilities and no rail passenger facilities. Temperature increases could raise the danger of

1 rail buckling, but would be unlikely to necessitate design changes. Projected precipitation
2 patterns do not indicate that design changes are warranted to prevent increased erosion or
3 moisture damage to railroad track.

4 ***Temperature***

5 The level of average temperature increases discussed in Chapter 3.0 is unlikely to require
6 immediate design changes to track or other rail infrastructure, as these ranges generally fall
7 within the current standards for existing rail track and facilities. However, the increase in
8 temperature extremes – very hot days – could increase the incidence of buckling or “sun
9 kinks” on all the rail tracks in the study area. This occurs when compressive forces in the
10 rail, due to restrained expansion during hot weather, exceed the lateral stiffness of the track
11 causing the track to become displaced laterally. The amplitude of track buckles can reach
12 75 cm (30 inches) or more.

13 Track buckling occurs predominately on continuously welded track, though it also can
14 occur on older jointed track when the ends of the track become frozen in place. Track
15 buckling is most prevalent on an isolated hot day in the springtime or early summer, rather
16 than mid to late summer when temperatures are more uniformly hot. Buckling also is more
17 likely to occur in alternating sun/shade regions and in curves.

18 The most serious problem associated with track buckling is derailments. A derailment can
19 occur when a buckled section of track is not observed in time for the train to safely stop.
20 One way to overcome this is through blanket slow orders. In hot weather (more than 35°C,
21 or 95°F), railroads issue blanket slow orders (generally to reduce all train speeds by 16 kph
22 or 10 mph) to help prevent derailments caused by buckling. This has several negative
23 consequences, such as longer transit times, higher operating costs, shipment delays,
24 reduced track capacity, and increased equipment cycle time leading to larger fleet sizes and
25 costs. Reduced train speeds similarly affect passenger rail schedules, causing delays in
26 travel schedules.

27 Research into improved track design and installation has greatly reduced the derailments
28 attributable to buckling. For example, concrete cross-ties with improved fasteners can
29 withstand greater track stress than wooden ties with spikes. During installation, the rail is
30 prestressed to a target neutral temperature. Since the track is more stable when the rail is in
31 tension at temperatures below the neutral temperature, the target neutral temperature is
32 generally 75 percent of the expected maximum temperature of the region. In the Gulf
33 Coast Region, the neutral temperature is typically 38°C (100°F), while 32°C (90°F) is used
34 in more northern climates. Prestressing can occur either thermally (by actually heating the
35 steel during installation) or mechanically by stretching the steel to introduce the desired
36 stress prior to fastening it to the cross-ties.

37 A temperature change of 1.5°C (2.7°F) over the next 50 years may slightly raise the neutral
38 temperature used for installation, but would have little impact on track design otherwise. A
39 temperature increase in this range would not necessitate replacing existing track. It would
40 most likely be replaced as part of normal maintenance, upgrades to handle increased traffic
41 volumes, or replacement due to storm surge or other catastrophic events. The typical cost

1 to upgrade track can vary greatly depending upon the type of upgrade, the slope and
2 curvature, and the number of bridges and tunnels. Costs to replace track range from \$0.3
3 million to \$1.9 million per kilometer (\$0.5 million to \$3 million per mile), excluding any
4 additional right-of-way expenses.

5 If incidences of buckling rise it will be increasingly important to develop improved
6 methods of detection. It is relatively easy to detect a broken rail by running a light electric
7 current through track, but manual observation remains the best method for identifying track
8 buckling. Research is underway to develop improved methods that measure temperature
9 and stress of the track.⁴

10 The projected increases in average temperature and number of hot days, coupled with
11 possible increases in humidity, would create serious safety concerns for workers in rail
12 yards and other rail facilities, and would require investments to protect rail workers. This
13 might include increases in crew size to allow for more frequent recovery breaks, or greater
14 use of climate controlled facilities for loading and unloading the railcars. Regardless of the
15 solution, providing the necessary relief for workers will lead to increased operating or
16 capital expenses, which will be reflected in higher transportation costs.

17 ***Precipitation***

18 The primary impacts on rail infrastructure from precipitation are erosion of the track
19 subgrade and rotting of wooden crossties. Erosion of the subgrade can wash away ballast
20 and weaken the foundation, making the track unstable for passage of heavy locomotives
21 and railcars. Ballast is typically granite or other hard stone used to provide a flat, stable
22 bed for the track, and also to drain moisture from the track and ties. Without ballast,
23 wooden crossties would rot at a faster rate, leading to more buckling and unstable track.
24 As with buckling, subgrade erosion and rotting crossties are difficult to detect using
25 methods other than visual inspection. This is improving, though, through remote sensing
26 advances that detect standing water and air pockets.

27 The precipitation projections do not indicate that design changes are warranted to prevent
28 increased erosion or moisture damage to railroad track, even with a potential change of
29 13 percent in precipitation levels. The runoff projections point to even fewer problems
30 with erosion over the next century than are present today, due to possibly less precipitation
31 and slightly higher temperatures. However, if the frequency and/or the intensity of extreme
32 rainfall events increases, it could lead to higher rates of erosion and railroad bridge scour,
33 as well as higher safety risks and increased maintenance requirements.

⁴ Much of the material in this section was developed through personal communication with David Read, Principal Investigator, Transportation Technology Center, Inc., an Association of American Railroads subsidiary located in Pueblo, Colorado.

Relative Sea Level Rise

The effects on rail lines and facilities of relative sea level of 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet) over the next 50 to 100 years were analyzed. The obvious impacts for both of these sea level rise scenarios are water damage or complete submersion of existing rail track and facilities. These ground elevations affect the vulnerability of rail segments to storm surge as well.⁵ Table 4.7 indicates the percent of rail lines and facilities vulnerable to sea level rise at 61 and 122 cm (2- and 4-foot levels).

[INSERT Table 4.7: Relative sea level rise impacts on rail: percentage of facilities vulnerable]

Figure 4.14 displays the rail network, used by both freight trains and Amtrak, with the relative sea level rise elevation projections. Rail lines located in areas with a ground elevation of 0 to 61 cm (0 to 2 feet) are vulnerable to a relative sea level rise of 61 cm (2 feet) or more. Lines located in slightly higher areas, with a ground elevation of 61 to 122 cm (2 to 4 feet), are vulnerable to a relative sea level rise of 122 cm (4 feet).

Most of the rail lines in and around New Orleans would likely be impacted by relative sea level rise. The heavily traveled CSX line between Mobile and New Orleans, which was damaged during Hurricane Katrina, also is at risk, as are several area short lines. A listing of the rail lines impacted if relative sea level rises 61 cm (2 feet) includes the following:

- Most rail lines in and around New Orleans;
- BNSF line between Lafayette and New Orleans;
- CN/IC line into New Orleans;
- CSX line between Mobile and New Orleans;
- CSX line north of Mobile;
- Louisiana and Delta Railroad west of New Orleans;
- Portions of the MSE rail line in Mississippi;
- The New Orleans and Gulf Coast Railway line between New Orleans and Myrtle;
- NS line into New Orleans;
- Portions of the Port Bienville Railroad;
- Segments of the UP line west of New Orleans; and
- Various segments of track around Lake Charles and Galveston.

⁵ It should be noted that many existing facilities at low elevations are protected by levees and other physical structures, which provide some resistance to gradual changes in sea level and the impacts of storm surge. The effects of existing or planned protections were not addressed by this study. Even with this protection, the infrastructure described in this study is potentially still at risk.

1 [INSERT FIGURE 4.14: Rail lines at risk due to relative sea level rise of 61 and 122 cm (2 and
2 4 feet)]

3 Further degradation of these lines is very likely to occur should relative sea level increase
4 by 4 feet, with additional problems on the KCS route into New Orleans, the NS line north
5 of Mobile, and selected track segments around Beaumont and Houston.

6 Figure 4.15 shows the potential impacts of relative sea level rise on railroad-owned and
7 served facilities in the study region. Facilities located at less than 61 cm (2 feet) of
8 elevation are very likely to be affected by a rise in relative sea level of 61 cm (2 feet).
9 These include the KCS, NS, and UP rail yards in the New Orleans area. Facilities between
10 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet) of elevation are very likely to be affected by a rise in relative
11 sea level of 122 cm (4 feet). A listing of facilities with elevation 122 cm (4 feet) or less is
12 contained in Table 4.8. A listing of all freight rail facilities in the Gulf Coast Study
13 Region, along with their elevation grid code, is provided in Appendix C.

14 [INSERT FIGURE 4.15: Freight railroad-owned and served facilities at risk due to relative sea
15 level rise of 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet)]

16 [INSERT TABLE 4.8 Freight railroad-owned and served facilities in the Gulf Coast study
17 region at elevation of 122 cm (4 feet) or less]

18 A related issue is how railroad customers will respond to these rising relative sea levels and
19 storm surges, and how these decisions will affect the demand for rail services. For
20 example, to what extent will customers choose to relocate or modify their shipping and
21 possibly production patterns? Some industries, most notably the ports, need to remain at or
22 near the water's edge to send and receive shipments. There will be a continued need for
23 rail service into these locations. Other rail customers, however, may begin to relocate to
24 higher ground or to different regions entirely. This will in turn affect the type and scale of
25 rail network needed to meet the demand for inbound and outbound freight shipments.
26 While it is difficult to predict the future choices of rail customers, it seems likely that
27 climate change will negatively impact growth in goods movement at the lower elevations,
28 and thus could lead to significantly reduced, and costlier, rail service in the region.

29 Turning to passenger rail service, none of the Amtrak passenger rail stations are at a high
30 risk of impact due to a 122 cm (4-foot) increase in relative sea level. However, the rail
31 lines used by Amtrak are at risk. These include the Sunset Limited routes between Mobile
32 and New Orleans on the CSX-owned track and between New Orleans and Houston on the
33 UP-owned track.

34 Table 4.9 summarizes the impacts of relative sea level rise and storm surge on the freight
35 and passenger rail lines and facilities in the region. These calculations are based on
36 ground-level elevations of the rail facilities. All facilities and lines at low elevations are
37 included, even though some are surrounded by higher land that may block rising sea levels.
38 The actual inland flow of water due to higher relative sea levels was not available for this
39 study.

1 [INSERT TABLE 4.9: Vulnerability from sea level rise and storm surge by rail distance and
2 number of facilities]

3 One final factor, not directly addressed by the maps and tables discussed in this section, is
4 the extent to which rising relative sea levels create a higher water table that leads to
5 additional flooding during periods of normal precipitation. As the water table rises, the
6 ground is less able to absorb normal rainfall. This could cause frequent flooding of rail
7 track and facilities beyond the levels identified in the maps and tables.

8 ***Storm Activity***

9 Hurricane Katrina provided a vivid example of the devastating impacts of severe storm
10 events to the rail system in the Gulf Coast Study Area. Making landfall on August 29,
11 2005, Katrina caused damage to all of the major railroads in the region. BNSF, CN, KCS,
12 and UP all suffered damage, mostly to yards in and around New Orleans. CSX track and
13 bridges also were damaged. NS had nearly 8 km (5 miles) of track washed away from the
14 9.3 km- (5.8-mile-) long Lake Pontchartrain Bridge. By September 13, 2005 most of these
15 railroads had resumed operations into New Orleans, at least on a partial basis. There were
16 still yards that had not fully opened, though this was due to a mixture of storm damage to
17 the yard and customers not being fully operational. By October 8, 2005 most rail service
18 on these carriers had been restored, except CSX (Association of American Railroads,
19 2005). (See Section 4.3.1 for more on the impacts of the 2005 hurricanes.)

20 Figure 4.16 illustrates the rail lines most at risk from storm surge at the 5.5 and 7.0 meter
21 (18- and 23-foot) marks. One-third of the rail lines in the study region are vulnerable to a
22 storm surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet), and 41 percent are vulnerable to a storm surge of 7.0
23 meters (23 feet) (Table 4.10). This includes the heavily traveled CSX line from New
24 Orleans to Mobile, and the UP and BNSF lines from New Orleans to Houston. Cities at
25 risk include Mobile, Gulfport, Biloxi, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Lafayette, Lake Charles,
26 Beaumont, Port Arthur, and Galveston.

27 Similarly, Figure 4.17 shows the potential impacts of storm surge on railroad-owned and
28 served facilities in the study region. Facilities at less than 5.5 meters (18 feet) of elevation
29 have the highest risk of 5.5 meter (18-foot) storm surge impacts. These include 43 percent
30 of the rail facilities in the study region. An additional 11 facilities are between 5.5 and 7.0
31 meters (18 and 23 feet) of elevation and are very likely to be affected by a 7.0 meter
32 (23-foot) storm surge. A listing of all freight rail facilities in the Gulf Coast Study Region,
33 along with their elevation grid code, is provided in Appendix C.

34 Figure 4.18 shows the risks for Amtrak passenger rail stations due to storm surge at 5.5 and
35 7.0 meters (18 and 23 feet). The data indicates that there is low risk overall to Amtrak
36 stations from storm surge, but the nine stations listed in Table 4.11 are very likely to be
37 affected by a storm surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet). Two of the stations, Galveston and La
38 Marque, Texas, do not have direct passenger rail service, but are connected to the Amtrak
39 services by bus. At the 7.0 meter (23-foot) storm surge level, an additional three stations
40 are likely to be affected: New Iberia, Louisiana, and Bay St. Louis and Biloxi, Mississippi.

1 A listing of all Amtrak stations in the Gulf Coast Study Region, along with their elevation
2 grid code, is provided in Appendix C.

3 [INSERT FIGURE 4.16 Rail lines at risk due to storm surge of 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18 and 23
4 feet)]

5 [INSERT Figure 4.17 Freight railroad-owned and served facilities at risk due to storm surge of
6 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18 and 23 feet)]

7 [INSERT TABLE 4.10: Storm surge impacts on rail: percentage of facilities vulnerable]

8 [INSERT FIGURE 4.18 Amtrak facilities at risk due to storm surge of 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18
9 and 23 feet)]

10 [INSERT TABLE 4.11: Amtrak stations projected to be impacted by storm surge of 5.5 and 7.0
11 meters (18 and 23 feet)]

12 ***Railroad Response to Hurricane Damage***

13 In the immediate aftermath of a hurricane, one of the largest problems facing railroad
14 operators who are trying to restore service is safety issues at road-rail at-grade crossings.
15 Without power to operate the crossing gates, the railroads either need to manually flag each
16 crossing or not run the trains. The larger railroads purchase electric generators that can be
17 deployed after a hurricane to operate the gates, thus allowing trains to offer emergency
18 response services and resume economic activity. For prolonged outages, as was the case
19 with Hurricane Katrina, the railroads need to reeducate the public on the dangers of
20 at-grade crossing once train service resumes.

21 Other short-term responses are directed at protecting revenues and controlling costs.
22 Business customers within a region impacted by a hurricane are likely facing the same
23 difficulties as the railroads and may not be fully operational. Once a company is fully
24 operational, though, a railroad needs to be ready to offer service, or risk losing business to
25 other railroads, trucks, or barges. Delays in rail service availability can lead to a long-term
26 loss of revenue. The other issue is continued long-haul service to businesses outside of the
27 impacted area. After Hurricane Katrina, CSX rerouted trains that previously passed
28 through the New Orleans gateway to junctions at St. Louis and Memphis. This extra
29 routing increases the operating costs of the railroad through increased fuel usage, crew
30 costs, equipment delays, and a loss of overall system capacity. There is a strong financial
31 incentive to return to normal operations as soon as possible after a catastrophic event.

32 The long-term response of the railroads to increased storm intensity currently is being
33 evaluated. The railroads are participating with both public and private groups to identify
34 the best ways to serve the Gulf Coast region in the future. CSX Chief Operating Officer
35 Tony Ingram stated, “We are open to ideas that are in the best interests of CSX, its
36 customers, and its communities.” Mr. Ingram further stated, “Our recent rebuild of the
37 Gulf Coast line restores vital service and underscores our commitment, but does not
38 foreclose other long-term alternatives for the rail line.” (CSX, 2006a).

1 One obvious response is to begin relocating rail track and facilities further away from
2 coastal areas and making expanded use of intermodal shipping. For example, CSX
3 recently announced a new 1,250-acre integrated logistics center (ILC) in Winter Haven,
4 Florida to serve the Tampa and Orlando markets. This ILC will include truck, rail, and
5 warehousing for the storage and transfer of consumer goods to these two urban markets
6 (CSX, 2006b). Although this ILC location was driven by proximity to the expanding
7 Tampa and Orlando markets and the availability of affordable land – rather than as a risk
8 reduction strategy – it does provide an interesting model for redesigned approaches to long-
9 haul shipping using inland locations and trucks to serve sensitive coastal markets.

10 Other proposals have included the relocation of CSX rail lines in Mississippi. As
11 proposed, the rail relocation would occur in the Gulfport area, and would bypass the Bay
12 St. Louis Bridge that was damaged by Hurricane Katrina. However, much of the rail line
13 on this CSX route might remain in storm surge danger, as illustrated in Figure 4.16.

14 The other issue with moving rail lines further away from coastal areas is that it will, in
15 most cases, move passenger rail service further from population centers. The highest
16 density populations tend to occur along coastal regions, making it the most desirable
17 location for passenger rail stations. If the rail track is moved further inland to areas with
18 lower population density, it would have a negative impact on intercity service and the
19 potential of any future commuter passenger rail service that might be warranted by
20 population growth along the coast.

21 The temperature and precipitation changes projected under the climate scenarios and
22 models used in this study likely would not necessitate any rebuilding of rail facilities or any
23 significant design changes in the Gulf Coast Study Area rail network. The larger issue is
24 damage due to relative sea level rise, storm surge, and hurricanes. Rail lines totaling 1,915
25 km (1,190 miles) and 40 rail facilities are at risk from storm surge as examined above.
26 (See Figures 4.16 and 4.17.) Railroads may begin slowly relocating track and facilities
27 further away from coastal areas, though this will be largely driven by customer location
28 and needs. Increased use of rail-truck transloading from integrated logistics centers further
29 from the coast might be an alternative. Any effort to move rail lines from the higher
30 density coastal areas will have a negative impact on intercity passenger rail ridership and
31 the potential utility of the line for commuter rail service as the population along the coast
32 increases.

33 **4.2.4 Marine Facilities and Waterways**

34 Due to their location, marine facilities are most vulnerable to storm surge and relative sea
35 level rise. Marine facilities include both freight and nonfreight facilities: ports, marinas,
36 and industry support facilities. Virtually all of the region's port facilities, or 98 percent,
37 have the potential to be inundated by a storm surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet), and 99 percent
38 would be affected by a surge of 7.0 meters (23 feet). A relative sea level rise of 61 cm
39 (2 feet) has the potential to affect 64 percent of the region's port facilities, while a 122 cm
40 (4-foot) rise in relative sea level would affect nearly three-quarters of the port facilities.
41 Impacts related to increased temperatures and changes in precipitation are expected to

1 include increased costs related to maintenance as rising temperatures place greater stress on
2 facilities, higher energy costs for refrigeration, and changes in the quantity and type of
3 products shipped through the region as production and consumption patterns change both
4 in and outside the region due to climate change.

5 Marine facilities and waterways are vital to the region, and to the nation as a whole. As
6 noted in Chapter 2.0, the study area is one of the nation's leading centers of marine
7 activity. Much of the region's economy is directly linked to waterborne commerce; and in
8 turn, this waterborne commerce supports a substantial portion of the U.S. economy.

9 While some of these functions could be considered "replaceable" by facilities and
10 waterways elsewhere, many of them – by virtue of geography, connections to particular
11 industries and markets, historic investments, or other factors – represent unique and
12 essentially irreplaceable assets. It might be possible to provide capacity equivalent to the
13 Gulf Intracoastal Waterway or the Mississippi River on land, via highway and/or rail. It
14 might even be possible to provide landside connections to, and sufficient capacity at,
15 alternative international seaports. But the capital costs to provide such "replacement
16 capacity" would undoubtedly be huge, and the costs to system users would be dramatically
17 higher, if not prohibitively higher.

18 ***Higher Temperatures***

19 Higher temperatures may affect port facilities in three key ways. First, higher temperatures
20 will increase costs of terminal construction and maintenance, particularly of any paved
21 surfaces which will deteriorate more quickly if the frequency of high temperatures
22 increases. Many terminals – especially container and automobile handling terminals –
23 have very large open paved surfaces for storing cargo that in some cases can range up to
24 hundreds of paved acres, while most others have at least some open paved area for storage.
25 Nearly all provide on-terminal circulation space for trucks and wheeled terminal
26 equipment. All such areas would be vulnerable to higher temperatures. Second, higher
27 temperatures will lead to higher energy consumption and costs for refrigerated warehouses
28 or "reefer slots" (electrical plug-ins for containers with on-board cooling units). Third,
29 higher temperatures would likely lead to increased stress on temperature-sensitive
30 structures. Container handling cranes, warehouses, and other marine terminal assets are
31 made of metals. With increasing record temperatures and days over 32°C (90°F), it may be
32 necessary to design for higher maximum temperatures in replacement or new construction.
33 On the other hand, most dock and wharf facilities are made of concrete and lumber, which
34 are generally less sensitive to temperature fluctuations. It is possible that lock and dam
35 structures could be affected, although this will require further investigation. While this
36 analysis examines existing facilities, it should be noted that development of new types of
37 surfaces and structures that can better tolerate high temperatures; for example, would
38 counteract some adverse impacts.

39 Temperature changes in other parts of the country may prompt some changes in
40 consumption and production patterns in the United States that in turn would affect shipping
41 patterns in the study region. Compared to the freight movement patterns of today,
42 increases in temperature in the southeast or other regions could possibly lead to increases in

1 shipments of coal or other energy supplies that pass through the region's ports. (This
2 assumes that the current mix of power plants and fuels remains the same; however, changes
3 in energy consumption patterns and improvements in energy efficiency are certainly
4 possible, which could lead to changes in demand for fossil fuels.) Additionally,
5 temperature changes in other regions could possibly lead to changes in the quantity and
6 location of grain production, thus changing shipping patterns involving Gulf Coast ports;
7 such changes could have economic ramifications for the nation as a whole as well as for
8 regional ports.

9 ***Precipitation***

10 As noted previously, projections of future annual average rainfall suggest a slight increase
11 or decrease in average annual precipitation depending on choice of GCM and emission
12 scenario. The prospect of more intense precipitation events, as indicated in Chapter 3.0,
13 could require the capacity of some stormwater retention and treatment facilities to be
14 increased. The handling of stormwater can be a significant expense for container
15 terminals, auto terminals, and other terminals with large areas of impervious surface.
16 Increasing environmental regulatory requirements also may add to costs of adapting
17 stormwater handling infrastructure.

18 ***Relative Sea Level Rise***

19 Typically, the highest portion of the marine terminal is the wharf or pier structure, where a
20 vessel actually berths. Structures and open storage areas behind the wharf or pier may be
21 at the same level, or may be lower. The highway and rail connections serving the terminal
22 will be at land level, unless they are on bridge structures. Depending on their design,
23 different terminals will have different areas of particular vulnerability with respect to
24 relative sea level rise.

25 It is important to note that many existing facilities at low elevations are protected by levees
26 and other physical structures, which should provide resistance to gradual changes in sea
27 levels. The specific effects of existing protections have not been considered in this study.
28 For facilities that are not appropriately protected, either by elevation or by structures, rising
29 water levels pose an increased risk of chronic flooding, leading in the worst case to
30 permanent inundation of marine terminal facilities, either completely or in part, rendering
31 them inoperable.

32 Of freight facilities in the study area, about 72 percent of are vulnerable to a 122 cm (4-foot
33 rise) in relative sea level. Of the 994 freight facilities in the USACE database, 638 (64
34 percent) are in areas with elevations between 0 and 61 cm (2 feet) above sea level, and
35 another 80 (8 percent) are in areas with elevations between 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet).
36 More than 75 percent of facilities are potentially vulnerable in Beaumont, Chocolate
37 Bayou, Freeport, Galveston, New Orleans, Pascagoula, Plaquemines, Port Arthur, Port
38 Bienville, and Texas City; between 50 percent and 75 percent of facilities are potentially
39 vulnerable in Gulfport, Houston, Lake Charles, Mobile, South Louisiana, and the Tenn-

1 Tom. Only Baton Rouge, with 6 percent of facilities potentially at risk, appears to be well-
2 positioned to avoid impacts of sea level rise. See Figure 4.19.

3 A similar situation faces nonfreight facilities. Seventy-three percent of study area marine
4 nonfreight facilities are potentially vulnerable to a 122 cm (4-foot) increase in relative sea
5 level. Of the 810 nonfreight facilities in the SACE database, 547 (68 percent) are in areas
6 with elevations between 0 and 61 cm (2 feet) above sea level, and another 47 (6 percent)
7 are in areas with elevations between 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet). More than 75 percent of
8 facilities are potentially vulnerable in Beaumont, Chocolate Bayou, Freeport, Galveston,
9 New Orleans, Pascagoula, Plaquemines, Port Arthur, the Tenn-Tom, and Texas City;
10 between 50 percent and 75 percent of facilities are potentially vulnerable in Houston, Lake
11 Charles, Mobile, and South Louisiana. Twenty-seven percent of Gulfport facilities and no
12 Baton Rouge facilities are potentially at risk. See Table 4.10.

13 Navigable depths are likely to increase in many harbors and navigation channels as a result
14 of rising sea levels. This could lead to reduced dredging costs, but higher costs where
15 rising water levels require changes to terminals. The functionality and/or protections of
16 lock and dam structures controlling the inland waterway system also may be impacted by
17 relative sea level rise.

18 Various indirect impacts could potentially affect operations and need for ports. As
19 discussed in earlier sections, impacts on highways and rail connections could affect the
20 ability to utilize and transport goods to and from affected ports. Rail connections to the
21 Ports of New Orleans, Mobile, Pascagoula, and Gulfport/Biloxi are at greatest risk.

22 Production and consumption patterns within the study area are likely to be significantly
23 affected by changes in sea level, which could lead to increased demand for certain types of
24 shipments and reduced demand for others. As residential populations relocate from
25 affected areas, demand for transported goods would decline. Similarly, as commercial
26 activities relocate, transportation services would shift with them. Further, shifts in
27 population could cause labor shortages for transportation and commercial facilities.

28 [INSERT TABLE 4.12: Relative sea level rise impacts on ports: percentage of facilities
29 vulnerable]

30 [INSERT FIGURE 4.19: Freight handling ports facilities at risk from relative sea level rise of
31 61 and 122 cm (2 and 4 feet)]

32 ***Storm Activity: Water and Wind Damage***

33 While the actual facilities that would be flooded depend on the particulars of a given
34 storm – the landfall location, direction, tidal conditions, etc. – fully 99 percent of all study
35 area facilities are vulnerable to temporary and permanent impacts resulting from a 7.0
36 meter (23-foot) storm surge, while almost 98 percent are vulnerable to temporary and
37 permanent impacts resulting from an 5.5 meter (18-foot) storm surge (Figure 4.20 and
38 Table 4.13). All facilities are vulnerable to wind impacts. Similar to sea level rise, storm

1 surge impacts on highway and rail connections could affect the ability to utilize ports for
2 transport of goods to and from affected ports.

3 As evidenced by Katrina, fast moving water can be incredibly damaging to marine
4 facilities. Water can physically dislodge containers and other cargo from open storage
5 areas, knock down terminal buildings, damage, or destroy specialized terminal equipment,
6 damage wharf and pier structures, temporarily inundate and submerge large areas, and
7 undermine or damage pavement and foundations. Wind has its most damaging effects on
8 un-reinforced terminal structures, such as metal warehouses which feature large surface
9 areas and relatively light construction. Much of Katrina's damage to the Port of New
10 Orleans – which mostly escaped water damage – was due to wind tearing off warehouse
11 roofs and doors.

12 Wind and water can result in navigation channels becoming inoperable due to blockages
13 and/or loss of markers. One of the first recovery tasks following Katrina was locating and
14 clearing the channel in the Mississippi River, allowing it to reopen to barge and vessel
15 traffic. Wind and water also can affect the location and protection afforded by the barrier
16 islands that help define the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.

17 [INSERT FIGURE 4.20: Freight handling ports facilities at risk from storm surge of 5.5 and 7.0
18 meters (18 and 23 feet)]

19 [INSERT TABLE 4.13: Storm surge impacts on ports: percentage of facilities vulnerable]

20 Further, as mentioned earlier, highway and rail connectivity is vital to the functioning of
21 nearly all port facilities in the study area. The road and rail facilities that are potentially at
22 risk of surge at 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18 and 23 feet) are shown in Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.16,
23 and 4.17. While the actual highways that would be flooded depends on the particulars of a
24 given storm, a substantial portion of the highway system is at risk of surge inundation,
25 including roads in all four states in the study area. The resulting potential loss of access to
26 ports is obviously a critical vulnerability to reliable intermodal operations.

27 ***Secondary Impacts***

28 Water levels in navigable rivers, and thus the ability to move freight, would be affected by
29 higher or lower levels of precipitation, evapotranspiration, and runoff occurring outside the
30 region. Such changes in the Mississippi River Basin could affect the ability to use the
31 upper Mississippi and its tributaries to export grain and other commodities from the
32 Midwest and Plains states through Gulf Coast ports. Dredging operations and changes in
33 water control facilities and marine terminals at up river ports could be needed to maintain
34 access to them. Freight transport by truck and rail outside the study region could increase
35 if river transport is curtailed. Estimation of these effects would require the application of
36 models and data from outside of the study area to incorporate up-river hydrology.

37 Demand for freight services that include use of Gulf Coast ports also could be influenced
38 by changes in precipitation and temperature outside the study region. For example,
39 changes in the amount and frequency of precipitation as well as temperature levels could

1 affect demand for U.S. grain products overseas, just as changes in the same climate drivers
2 in the United States could affect the ability of U.S. grain producers to supply export
3 markets and domestic consumers. Such changes could have implications for Gulf Coast
4 ports in particular as well as for national highway and rail systems.

5 Similarly, transport of energy supplies through Gulf Coast ports could be influenced by
6 changes in temperature across the globe. Increases in temperature in the United States
7 could affect the demand for energy products transported through Gulf Coast ports; demand
8 for natural gas and coal to power electricity plants in the southeast, for example, could lead
9 to greater production and/or importation of natural gas and LNG through the ports, and
10 could put downward pressure on coal exports through the Gulf in favor of domestic
11 consumption. On the other hand, coal exports through Gulf Coast ports could increase as
12 export demand increased. Of course, climate mitigation policies could lead to significant
13 shifts in preferred energy resources, leading to changes in energy transport demand. Such
14 changes would have implications for pipelines (natural gas, petroleum), as well as rail
15 (coal) and ports (coal). These secondary effects may prove to be important in the future,
16 and such changes need to be monitored closely to track and adapt to changing demand
17 levels.

18 **4.2.5 Aviation**

19 It is possible that existing patterns and intensity of severe weather events could be
20 adversely affected by climate change, and such events could have the greatest impacts on
21 aviation. These changes in severe weather may be widespread geographically such that
22 they could profoundly affect the operational aspects of aviation and overall air traffic and
23 air space management. If the climate becomes wetter, more general aviation pilots would
24 need to learn to fly by instruments or avoid flying during inclement weather. Increased
25 precipitation also could affect commercial service operations, particularly by raising the
26 potential for delays. However, it should be noted that predicting how severe weather
27 patterns would change as a result of climate change is extremely difficult and uncertain.
28 Ultimately, the impact on the operational aspects of aviation could potentially supersede
29 the overall magnitude of combined effects on aviation due to other factors discussed below

30 A total of 29 airports could be vulnerable to a storm surge of 7.0 meters (23 feet). The
31 analysis suggests that 3 airports may be vulnerable to an increase in relative sea level rise
32 of 1.2 meters (4 feet). Temperature increases considered by this report would indicate a
33 small increase in baseline runway length requirements, assuming other relevant factors are
34 held constant; however, the changes will very likely not be sufficient, especially accounting
35 for ongoing technological change in commercial aircraft, to have any substantial impact on
36 runway length requirements. Nevertheless, aircraft manufacturers may want to determine
37 whether the generic hot day temperatures used in their specifications for civilian aviation
38 aircraft are sufficiently high.

1 **Temperature**

2 **Runway Design and Utilization**

3 Required runway length is a function of many variables, including airport elevation, air
4 temperature, wing design, aircraft takeoff weight and engine performance, runway
5 gradient, and runway surface conditions.⁶ Runways are designed to accommodate the
6 most stringent conditions aircraft can experience. Climate model simulations as discussed
7 in Chapter 3.0 have conclusively noted that future change in climate will be accompanied
8 by increases in temperature. Generally speaking, the higher the temperature the longer the
9 runway that is required. In fact, initial runway construction planning takes into account, as
10 a matter of course, a range of temperatures that can very well capture the extent of the
11 increase in mean maximum temperature derived from the model results. If increases in
12 temperature exceed the range initially expected, then considerations for additional
13 adjustment in runway length may be necessary, depending on other relevant considerations
14 such as payload and elevation. However, this is considered unlikely.

15 With rising temperatures, it is possible that there could be an impact on aircraft
16 performance that would warrant aircraft manufacturers considering field length
17 requirements in their design specifications. However, current trends in aircraft design
18 point to shorter takeoff distances as airframes become lighter and engines become more
19 powerful. Thus, due to technological innovation, runway length requirements may
20 actually decrease even if temperatures increase.

21 Forecasting aircraft manufacturer's product offerings beyond 20 to 30 years is speculative,
22 but trends toward increased fuel efficiency, more powerful engines, and lighter weight
23 aircraft are anticipated to continue, which could offset the need for longer runway length as
24 temperatures rise. Analysis of passenger jet aircraft performance indicates newer aircraft
25 entering the market over the last 50 years use less runway length per pound of aircraft. A
26 comparison of the two similar Boeing aircraft illustrates this point: the Boeing 737-200
27 aircraft entered commercial service in 1968 with an engine thrust of 6,580 kg (14,500
28 pounds) and a per passenger seat thrust ratio of 53 kg (117 pounds). In 2008, the
29 company's first 787-800 "Dreamliner," made of up to 50 percent light weight composite
30 products, will enter service. Compared to its predecessor the 737-200, the GE Aircraft
31 Engines on the 787 will provide more than four times as much thrust and twice as much
32 engine thrust per passenger seat. This design, paired with more fuel efficient engines,
33 translates into increased fuel efficiency, producing fuel savings up to 20 percent versus
34 similar sized aircraft as well as shorter takeoff distances.

35 In order to better understand how changes in temperature could affect the current
36 generation of aircraft, we looked at both general aviation and civil aviation applications.

⁶ These variables affect the performance of departing aircraft in particular; landing aircraft use less runway as reduced landing weight (from fuel usage) as compared to take-off weight and the use of flap settings reduce runway landing lengths.

1 Generally, assessments of required runway length are conducted along two tracks for
2 general aviation and civil aviation airports, and our analysis below reflects this difference:⁷

- 3 • Using the procedures outlined in the FAA Advisory Circulars (for general aviation
4 aircraft); and
- 5 • Using the manufacturer's performance curves, published by aircraft manufacturers⁸
6 (primarily large commercial service aircraft).

7 **General Aviation**

8 While planning for runway design generally accounts for a range of temperatures, this
9 analysis of general aviation airports looks solely at how changes in assumptions about
10 temperature would affect the baseline analysis of runway length requirements for a
11 hypothetical general aviation airport using the FAA's Airport Design for Microcomputers
12 software.⁹ The software allows for four variable inputs: airport elevation; runway slope
13 measured in difference in elevations at each end of the runway; mean maximum
14 temperature for the hottest day of the month; and runway conditions. Aircraft performance
15 during takeoff varies significantly based on runway elevation, although generally speaking,
16 there is only moderate difference in runway length needed between an airport at sea level
17 and one at 91 meters (300 feet) above sea level. Runways located in mountainous areas,
18 however, have significantly longer runways than those at sea level. Mean maximum
19 temperature is used by airport planners to identify the average hottest temperature during
20 the hottest month of the year. Generally speaking, longer runways are required at hotter
21 temperatures. Requirements for wet runways, which have less friction for braking, or
22 slowing the aircraft, are set out in regulation.

23 Table 4.14 lists the FAA design standards for a hypothetical general aviation airport, and
24 shows that all small airplanes (defined as having a maximum takeoff weight of less than
25 5,670 kg or 12,500 pounds) could operate in the study area with a 1,308 meter (4,290-foot)
26 runway on days as hot as 33°C (91.5°F). On cooler days, less runway length is required.
27 Large aircraft with maximum takeoff weights greater than 5,670 kg (12,500 pounds)
28 require longer runways. As noted in the table, 1,637 meters (5,370 feet) of runway is
29 recommended to accommodate 75 percent of large airplanes up to 27,200 kg (60,000
30 pounds) at up to a 60 percent useful load when runway surfaces are wet. Wet runway
31 conditions require more length and these conditions are typically used when calculating
32 runway length.

⁷ The approach is not completely different. The FAA AC provides design guidance for both small aircraft and large aircraft by using the charts within the AC or directing the reader to obtain manufacturer performance charts for small or large aircraft. The FAA AC also stipulates what design procedure to apply, based on whether or not Federal dollars are involved, e.g., AIP.

⁸ Runways at military airports are designed to military aircraft specifications.

⁹ It should be noted that the FAA Airport Design microcomputer software is solely for **planning purposes** and not for design since the software generates rough estimated lengths.

1 [INSERT Table 4.14 FAA recommended runway lengths for hypothetical general aviation
2 airport]

3 While planning for airport construction generally accounts for a range of temperatures, this
4 analysis looks solely at how changes in assumptions about temperature would affect the
5 baseline results generated using the FAA's Airport Design for Microcomputers. The
6 research team analyzed the effect of changes in mean maximum temperature for the hottest
7 month of the year on runway length requirements as indicated by the climate scenarios
8 reviewed in Chapter 3.0. Mean maximum temperature was the only variable changed;
9 airport elevation, centerline elevation, and runway surface conditions (wet) were held
10 constant.¹⁰ The 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile temperature increases demonstrated in
11 Scenarios A1B, B1, and A2 were applied to the FAA Design standards for the hypothetical
12 airport presented. The increases in runway length based on the increase in temperature
13 associated with each scenario are discussed below. Mean maximum monthly temperature
14 is derived by averaging the daily high temperature for the month with the highest average
15 maximum temperature, which for the Gulf Coast is August. The projected temperature
16 increases used were then added to the base year mean maximum monthly temperature. The
17 current average mean maximum temperature is estimated to be 33°C (91.4°F), based on
18 1972-2002 data from 12 research stations from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis
19 Center (CDIAC) located in the region. For example, for Scenario A1B the 50th percentile
20 temperature increase of 2.5°C (4.5°F) was added to the 33°C (91.4°F) base year mean
21 maximum temperature, indicating that in 2050 the mean maximum temperature is projected
22 to be 35.5°C (95.9°F).

23 Below is a brief discussion of the results of this analysis that indicates the range of
24 potential changes in baseline runway length requirements under the climate scenarios,
25 conveying the full range of results based on the models and scenarios. For 2100, we point
26 out the lowest and highest results. These results indicate the change in baseline runway
27 length requirements for this hypothetical airport using the FAA's Airport Design software
28 given a specific change in mean max temperature.

29 The analysis confirms that generally speaking, the possible increases are quite small.
30 Given the long lead times and ongoing changes in aircraft technology, this means that
31 possible temperature increases most probably will have little effect on runway length for
32 commercial aircraft.

33 The potential temperature increases for the month of August are summarized in
34 Chapter 3.0, Table 3.11. Over the longer term (to 2100), the analysis indicates an increase
35 of between 1.8°C (3.2°F) (B1, 5th percentile) and 6°C (10.8°F) (A2, 95th percentile). An
36 increase at the lower end would indicate a potential need to increase runway length by 9
37 meters (30 feet) for small aircraft, and by 12 to 15 meters (40 to 50 feet) for large general
38 aviation aircraft. At the 95th percentile, an increase of 6°C (10.8°F) could require

¹⁰One hundred percent of all large aircraft category is seldom used in runway design since very few airports experience the entire spectrum of large general aviation aircraft operations.

1 lengthening the runway by 30 to 46 meters (100 to 150 feet) for small airplanes and by 40
2 to 219 meters (130 to 720 feet) for large aircraft.

3 Generally speaking, the possible increases in baseline runway length requirements are very
4 low, especially for small aircraft (see Table 4.15). The scale of these runway length
5 requirement increases range from 8 to 16 percent for corporate jets to 2 to 3 percent for
6 light general aviation aircraft. While these limited analyses are illustrative of the potential
7 influence of temperature increase on runway length based on existing aircraft technology,
8 whether more detailed analyses would need to be conducted would be decided by airport
9 managers on a case by case basis in order to determine possible investment considerations.

10 [INSERT Table 4.15: Summary of impacts of temperature change to runway length (general
11 aviation) under three climate scenarios (SRES Scenarios A2, B1, and A1B)]

12 **Commercial Service Airports**

13 Commercial Service, Military Airfields, and Industrial Airport master plans determine the
14 size of “critical” aircraft anticipated to operate at an airport in the future, then design the
15 runway system to accommodate the critical aircraft. Runways at commercial airports are
16 designed using aircraft manufacturer’s specifications. Figure 4.21 is a runway length table
17 for airport design issued by Boeing for the 757-200 aircraft. These specifications provide
18 length of runway required for aircraft based on payload, temperature, and elevation. In
19 general, the higher the temperature, elevation, and payload weight, the longer the runway
20 needs to be to accommodate the aircraft (Figure 4.21).

21 [INSERT FIGURE 4.21 B757-200 takeoff runway requirements for design purposes]

22 Commercial airliners offer versatility in their ability to operate at a wide assortment of
23 airports throughout the world. Large wide-body aircraft such as the Boeing 747 are
24 designed to seat over 300 passengers and operate at international gateway airports such as
25 Houston, whereas narrow-body aircraft – designed for medium-size markets – seat 100 to
26 200 passengers and serve markets such as Tallahassee, Florida and Baton Rouge,
27 Louisiana. Regional jets seat 34 to 70 passengers and serve markets such as Lake Charles
28 Regional Airport in Louisiana.

29 Airport master plans determine the size of “critical” aircraft anticipated to operate at an
30 airport in the future, then design the runway system to accommodate these critical aircraft.
31 Unlike general aviation airports which rely on the FAA Design software to calculate
32 runway length requirements, runways at commercial airports are designed using aircraft
33 manufacturer’s specifications. Once airports go into service, it is the pilot’s responsibility
34 to calculate aircraft performance on a given day prior to takeoff based on the following:
35 ambient temperature, aircraft gross takeoff weight (GTW), airfield elevation, wind velocity
36 and direction, and runway surface slope and drag. Thus, on hot days the pilot can make
37 adjustments in cargo or passenger loads in order to takeoff on a runway, given its length.
38 On days when the temperature is higher than the aircraft specs contemplate, the airliner
39 would need to lower its weight to accommodate the higher temperatures.

1 Table 4.16 lists the required runway lengths for three groups of aircraft, fully loaded, for a
2 “generic” hot day (a standard day temperature of 15 °C (59°F) plus 15 °C (27°F) for at
3 total of 30°C (86°F)), and compares the manufacturer’s specifications with the primary
4 runway lengths of the 11 Commercial Service airports in the study area. Shortfalls in
5 runway length for specific aircraft are presented in italics. Houston Bush Intercontinental
6 (IAH) is the fourth largest market in the United States and is the only international gateway
7 airport in the study area. Other airports in the study area do not require the same runway
8 lengths since wide-body aircraft do not operate at these airports on a scheduled basis. On
9 the opposite end of the spectrum, regional jets typically operate at Lake Charles Regional
10 (LCH), Hattiesburg (HBG), and Beaumont/Port Arthur (BPT). These airports are designed
11 to accommodate regional jets and turboprop aircraft and have shorter runway lengths. The
12 other commercial airports in the study area are designed to accommodate medium-haul,
13 narrow-body jets.

14 As shown in the discussion above, the maximum temperature contemplated by this study is
15 39°C, or 102.2°F (33°C (91.4°F) plus 6°C (10.8°F) under Scenario A2)) in 2100, 9°C
16 (16.2°F) higher than the “generic” hot day. Therefore, aircraft manufacturers may want to
17 consider the extent to which the use of a standard day temperature of 15°C (59°F) plus
18 15°C (27°F) as a measure of a typical hot day will continue to be applicable for aircraft
19 design or whether to increase this temperature based on any projected temperature increase
20 associated with a change in climate.

21 [INSERT TABLE 4.16: Commercial aircraft runway length takeoff requirements]

22 **Temperature Conclusions**

23 As is the case today, pilots will need to address how temperature increases may affect
24 aircraft takeoff performance capabilities and payload requirements, and airports will need
25 to address any such increases in the context of current runway utilization and future runway
26 design. Given past trends, it is likely that future aircraft will be able to operate on shorter
27 runways. Airports serving large commercial aircraft in the future, however, are anticipated
28 to continue to utilize aircraft manufacturer’s specifications to determine runway lengths.

29 **Precipitation**

30 In general, airlines, airports, and aircraft operate more efficiently in dry weather conditions
31 than wet. Weather is a critical influence on aircraft performance and the outcome of the
32 flight operations while taking off, landing, and while aloft. Precipitation affects aircraft
33 and airports in several ways such as decreasing visibility, slowing air traffic by requiring
34 greater separation between aircraft, and decreasing braking effectiveness. On the ground,
35 effects include creating turbulence, increasing the risk of icing of wings, and affecting
36 engine thrust.

37 The climate scenarios for the years 2050 and 2100 developed as part of this research
38 generally indicate the Gulf Coast study area could become a warmer but drier climate.
39 However, the models do indicate the possibility that the climate could be warmer with
40 increased annual precipitation. In either scenario, the increased intensity of individual

1 rainfall events is likely. Nevertheless, weather always impacts aviation operations and
2 airport design.

3 Implications of a drier climate to airport and aircraft operations may include positive and
4 negative effects. Less precipitation would most likely reduce aircraft and air traffic delays;
5 reduce periods of wet surfaces on runways, taxiways, and aprons; and in the winter months,
6 reduce the risk of wing icing. It also may increase the number of days of Visual Flight
7 Rules¹¹ (VFR) operations. A warmer climate with less precipitation may, however,
8 increase convective weather (turbulence), as well as increase the number and severity of
9 thunderstorms. In addition, increased water vapor in the atmosphere, particularly during
10 the summer months, may increase haze and reduce pilot visibility, thereby reducing the
11 number of VFR days.

12 A wetter climate would reduce the number of VFR operating time periods and would
13 impact the general aviation sector. General aviation pilots would either learn to fly in
14 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) conditions by becoming “instrument rated” or not fly during
15 periods of reduced visibility and precipitation. In order for pilots to fly in IFR conditions,
16 aircraft flight decks must be equipped with complex navigation instruments, which is a
17 significant investment for aircraft owners.

18 Increased extreme precipitation events also would impact commercial service aircraft
19 operations. During severe thunderstorm activity it is not unusual for an airline to cancel
20 flights or at a minimum experience delays in operations. Navigation in heavy precipitation
21 is possible and currently occurs on a daily basis in the national air system. However,
22 precipitation almost always creates delays; particularly at the most congested airports.

23 If the Gulf Coast study area climate proves to have more intense precipitation events,
24 airport planners and engineers would need to consider the implications of periods of
25 increased heavy rainfall in airport design and engineering. This is particularly true of
26 airports located on floodplains in the study area since they are more susceptible to “flash
27 flood” events. Eight of the 61 airports in the study area are located on 100-year
28 floodplains. These airports are identified in Table 4.17.

29 [INSERT TABLE 4.17: Airports located on 100-year flood plains]

30 ***Relative Sea Level Rise***

31 As indicated in Chapter 3.0, relative sea level rise scenarios developed as part of this
32 research indicate coastal zones in the Gulf Coast study area are very likely to be inundated
33 by rising sea level combined with geologic subsidence. As a result, some airport
34 infrastructure would most likely be susceptible to erosion and flooding.

¹¹ Visual flight rules (VFR) are a set of aviation regulations under which a pilot may operate an aircraft, if weather conditions are sufficient to allow the pilot to visually control the aircraft’s attitude, navigate, and maintain separation with obstacles such as terrain and other aircraft.

1 GIS analysis indicates three airports in the study area would be below mean sea level
2 (MSL) if relative sea level increases by 122 cm (4 feet). Each of these airports currently is
3 protected by preventive infrastructure such as dikes and levees, which will need to be
4 maintained. If feeder roads in the area are inundated, however, access to these airports may
5 be disrupted. Table 4.18 lists these airports and their elevations. All three airports are
6 located in Louisiana, and range from New Orleans International (122 cm or 4 feet
7 elevation), one of the study area's large commercial service airports, to South LaFourche
8 (30 cm or 1 foot), a very small general aviation facility. The third is a military airport,
9 New Orleans NAS JRB (91 cm or 3 feet).

10 [INSERT Table 4.18 Gulf Coast study area airports vulnerable to submersion by relative sea
11 level rise of 61 to 122 cm (2-4 feet)]

12 ***Storm Activity***

13 Both storm surge and hurricane force winds can damage airport facilities. As indicated in
14 Chapter 3.0, the study team analyzed the vulnerability of facilities to storm surge heights of
15 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18 and 23 feet). At these elevations a variety of airports in the region
16 would be vulnerable to the impacts of storm surge, though this depends on the specific
17 characteristics of each individual storm event, including landfall location, wind speed,
18 direction, tidal conditions, etc.

19 Figure 4.22 depicts airports within the study that are vulnerable to storm surges of 18 or 23
20 feet. Table 4.19 lists these airports by location, type, and elevation. There are 22 airports
21 in the 0- to 5.5 meter (18-foot) MSL category and seven airports in the 5.8 meter to 7.0
22 meter (19- to 23-foot) MSL category. This list includes some major airports in the region,
23 such as New Orleans International. Also, the commercial service airport in Lake Charles,
24 Louisiana would be vulnerable. See Section 4.3.1 for a discussion of the wind impacts of
25 the 2005 hurricanes on airport facilities.

26 [INSERT FIGURE 4.22: Gulf Coast study area airports at risk from storm surge]

27 [INSERT TABLE 4.19: Gulf Coast study area airports vulnerable to storm surge]

28 **4.2.6 Pipelines**

29 There is a combined total of 42,520 km (26,427 miles) of on-shore liquid (oil and
30 petroleum product) transmission and natural gas transmission pipelines in the Gulf Coast
31 area of study, as shown in Figure 4.23.¹² This includes 22,913 kilometers (14,241 miles) of
32 onshore natural gas transmission pipelines and 19,607 kilometers or 12,186 miles of
33 onshore hazardous liquid pipelines (PHMSA, 2007). This region is essential to the

¹²This includes some extended pipeline sections beyond the boundaries of the study, as GIS coding of links included segments that spanned both inside and outside the study area.

1 distribution of the nation’s energy supply through pipeline transportation, and historically
2 the landside pipelines have been relatively secure from disruption by increased storm
3 activity and intensity. A number of risks and vulnerabilities to climate-related impacts
4 have been revealed, however, particularly for submerged or very low elevation pipelines.
5 The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the U.S.
6 Department of Transportation has jurisdiction over on-shore pipeline facilities and some
7 offshore pipeline facilities. PHMSA has jurisdiction over offshore pipeline facilities that
8 are exposed or hazards to navigation when the offshore pipeline facilities are between the
9 mean watermark and the point where the subsurface is under 15 feet of water as measured
10 from mean low water. The U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service
11 (MMS) has jurisdiction over about 36,000 miles of offshore pipelines in the Gulf of
12 Mexico.

13 [INSERT FIGURE 4.23 – Landside pipelines having at least one GIS link located in an area of
14 elevation zero to 91 cm (3 feet) above sea level in the study area]

15 Some historical weather events have resulted in only minor impacts on pipelines, with the
16 notable exceptions of Hurricanes Andrew’s, Ivan’s, Katrina’s and Rita’s fairly extensive
17 damage to underwater pipelines and flooded distribution lines in areas where houses were
18 destroyed. Storm surge and high winds historically have not had much impact on
19 pipelines – either onshore transmission lines or offshore pipelines – since they are strong
20 structures, well-stabilized and/or buried underground. Yet offshore pipelines have been
21 damaged in relatively large numbers on occasion, as during Hurricanes Andrew and Ivan.
22 Temperature shifts resulting from climate scenario projections are not expected to have
23 much direct or indirect impact on pipelines. Increases or decreases in precipitation – either
24 long-term or in the frequency or extent of droughts or inundation – could impact soil
25 structure. Sea level rise would likely have little direct effect, but could affect water tables,
26 soil stability, and the vulnerability of pipelines to normal wave action as well as sea surge.

27 Changes in soil structure, stability, and subsidence – whether undersea, landside, or in
28 wetlands or transition elevations – could play an important role in pipeline-related risks.
29 However, there is little information on this topic outside of earthquake risks. There has
30 recently been concern about how wave action could affect the seabed, either by
31 liquefying/destabilizing the sand or silt surface above a buried pipeline or by gradually
32 eroding away seabed that had been covering the pipeline. It is unclear at present whether a
33 changing climate might lead to conditions that exacerbate these effects and cause additional
34 damage.

35 The possible effects on pipelines from climate change – storm surge and extreme winds,
36 temperature shifts, precipitation changes, and sea level rise – were considered in this
37 analysis. Both pipeline companies and government agencies have considered pipeline
38 risks, vulnerability, and safety, and have well-developed inspection, maintenance, and
39 response plans. However, these plans do not appear to address a number of risks that may
40 be arising. This study did not examine the adequacy of those plans. While some issues
41 regarding impacts have been addressed here, there is still significant uncertainty about the
42 overall risk to pipelines from climate change.

1 ***Importance of Pipeline Operations in the Study Area***

2 Onshore natural gas transmission pipelines are primarily located in Louisiana.
3 Approximately 49 percent of natural gas wellhead production either occurs near the Henry
4 Hub,¹³ which is the centralized point for natural gas futures trading in the United States, or
5 passes close to the Henry Hub as it moves to downstream consumption markets. The
6 Henry Hub interconnects nine interstate and four intrastate pipelines, including: Acadian,
7 Columbia Gulf, Dow, Equitable (Jefferson Island), Koch Gateway, LRC, Natural Gas Pipe
8 Line, Sea Robin, Southern Natural, Texas Gas, Transco, Trunkline, and Sabine’s mainline.

9 ***Temperature***

10 The great majority of the transmission pipeline system is buried under at least 3 feet of soil
11 cover, both onshore and offshore. Federal regulations require that all pipelines in
12 navigable waters be buried. Pipelines typically carry product at significant temperature
13 variations (natural gas under pressure in their system, while petroleum products are heated
14 considerably above ambient temperatures. There is extensive experience with pipelines in
15 much more extreme ambient temperature conditions (Alaska, Saudi Arabia, West Africa)
16 than anyone expects in the Gulf Region. Sea temperatures will vary even less than land
17 temperatures. Thus, there is not expected to be any significant effect on pipelines due to
18 direct effects from increased (or decreased) temperatures.

19 ***Precipitation Changes***

20 Sustained periods of increases or decreases in precipitation, whether over months or the
21 cumulative effect across years, can cause substantial soil changes due to drought or
22 saturation. Changes in water tables may occur both from local climate changes as well as
23 from global effects such as sea level rise. An increase in water table level or increased
24 surface water runoff can cause erosion or slumping (collapse) of the soil surface, thereby
25 leading to potential for pipeline exposure.

26 In the lowland and marsh areas particularly associated with the coastal regions of
27 Louisiana, the soil is being washed away due to storm activity. With the disappearance of
28 the soil, the pipelines in these regions are losing cover.

29 Detailed analysis of geology and pipeline-specific conditions are required to draw more
30 precise conclusions regarding the potential for serious disruption of the transmission
31 pipeline system from climate-related soil changes. Nonetheless, this is an area of concern
32 as a considerable and unpredictable portion of the pipeline system could be vulnerable to
33 these climate change and sea level induced impacts.

34 Another vulnerability is from expected short-term changes (such as torrents and floods),
35 where significant change in water flow rate and water flow energy are a result of increased

¹³ Located near the town of Erath in Vermilion Parish, north central Louisiana.

1 precipitation. Risk analysis of the impacts of extreme events is required to determine
2 appropriate adaptation or mitigation actions.

3 ***Storm Impact Preparation, Mitigation, and Response***

4 Wave action during storms may impact pipelines. For offshore pipelines, in instances
5 where significant subsidence occurs and the pipeline segment is exposed, that section is
6 exposed to wave action. High-energy waves may subject a pipeline to stress levels it was
7 not designed to withstand, causing a fracture. An exposed offshore pipeline also could be
8 vulnerable to lateral and vertical displacement, exposure to vessel traffic and fishing trawls,
9 or rupture by currents, which may be very important in this context.

10 Pipeline operating companies are required to have an emergency plan in place covering all
11 known or expected situations that may require response to repair the pipeline system due to
12 damage, including, storms, excavation, and even sabotage or terrorist attack. Pipeline
13 systems are segregated by sections between valves in order to allow isolation and shutdown
14 of segments for routine maintenance, malfunctions, or response to emergency incidents.
15 During shutdowns, pipelines are pressurized at the emergency plan design pressure and all
16 valves are closed, preventing flow problems during the rest of the event and facilitating
17 repair. The operating portion of the emergency plan generally presumes operations will be
18 interrupted for a period of only up to 10 days.

19 As soon as a storm or other event dissipates in the pipeline area of concern, the pipeline
20 response team initiates their response plan. An inspection begins as a visual flyover the
21 pipeline in the affected region to examine it for exposure or other obvious indications of
22 damage. Some damage also can be detected through sensors measuring pressure in
23 different pipeline segments or through other physical indicators, although these may miss
24 some damage (e.g., structural damage not yet causing a leak), or make it more difficult to
25 isolate damage location more precisely. If damage is apparent, then a thorough close-up
26 inspection will take place, including divers as necessary. After damage has been identified,
27 a repair team initiates repairs.

28 The damages caused to pipelines by Hurricanes Andrew and Ivan were severe and fairly
29 widespread throughout the storm front region, as documented by the Minerals Management
30 Services (MMS) study discussed below. After Ivan, oil refineries had ample products to
31 supply, but the pipelines could not deliver due to damages. In contrast, damage to
32 pipelines from Katrina/Rita was relatively minor; most pipelines were ready to take
33 product, but were hampered by the lack of available product due to refinery damage and/or
34 power shortages.

35 One hazardous liquid pipeline representative stated that, prior to Ivan, obtaining pipeline
36 maintenance and repair contract commitments was relatively easy, “a foregone conclusion
37 of commitment” but, after Katrina/Rita, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain solid
38 commitments from suppliers to respond to emergency calls. While suppliers are still
39 offering contracts, the commitment is now only an offering to put the customer on a
40 response list for a front end fee. There is no longer a guarantee that the supplier will

1 respond to an emergency call within a fixed time period or otherwise provide service,
2 because all their assets and personnel may be engaged in a prior commitment.

3 Response capabilities and reliability have thus declined, even while the acknowledged
4 storm threat has increased due to Ivan's illustration of a previously unknown level of
5 damage. And while before there were emergency operating plans that matched the
6 committed response time, not only may responses take longer, but operating plans will
7 need to be adapted to meet these eventualities.

8 ***Hurricane Damage Studies***

9 One of the more substantial studies of hurricane damage to pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico
10 (GOM) was done by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Technology Services upon a request from
11 the Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) (Skinner, 2006). This
12 was an assessment of damage to the Gulf of Mexico offshore pipelines resulting from the
13 passage of Hurricane Ivan in September 2004. The DNV study also summarized the
14 impacts of Hurricanes Andrew, Lili, Katrina, and Rita.

15 Hurricane Ivan reached Category 5 strength three times and was a Category 3 hurricane
16 when it made landfall. Hurricane Ivan resulted in approximately 168 pipeline damage
17 reports, although the vast majority of GOM offshore pipelines performed well during the
18 passage of Hurricane Ivan. According to the MMS DNV report, the impact on the
19 environment from pipeline spills was minimal. The majority of pipeline damage occurred
20 at or near platform interfaces, in areas of mudflows, or as a result of an indirect hurricane
21 impact, such as platform failure or anchor dragging. Localized failures at pipeline
22 crossings and excessive movements in shallow water depths indicate that more hurricane
23 resistant design considerations might be needed on a site-specific basis, but do not warrant
24 industry-wide design or construction code revisions. The report suggests that design
25 assumptions used for shallow water pipelines need to be evaluated in areas dominated by
26 silty soils, particularly where self-burial is intended as the method of installation.

27 Hurricane Andrew passed through the Gulf of Mexico in August 1992 as a Category 4-
28 level storm. It damaged more than 480 pipelines and flow lines. Prior to Hurricane
29 Andrew, minimal damage to pipelines had been experienced as a result of passing
30 hurricanes, with combined pipeline failures from hurricanes for the period of 1971 through
31 1988 resulting in about 100 damage reports. Most of the pipeline failures were in depths
32 less than 30 meters (100 feet) of water.

33 Hurricane Lili was a Category 4-level storm offshore in the GOM, and was downgraded to
34 a Category 2 hurricane at landfall in October 2002. There were 120 pipeline damage
35 reports to the MMS following Hurricane Lili. The majority of the pipeline failures in Lili
36 occurred in small diameter pipelines, with no apparent correlation for age, which also was
37 true for damages reported from Andrew.

38 According to the MMS, there were 457 offshore oil and gas pipelines that were damaged as
39 a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (MMS Press Release, 2006). Most of the damage
40 was relatively minor. Disruptions also occurred due to power outages, and pipeline

1 operators procured portable electric power generators necessary to resume operations. The
2 closure of major pipelines originating in the GOM region in the wake of both storms served
3 to exacerbate the petroleum product supply situation (EIA, 2005).

4 ***Storm Activity: Erosion***

5 The above information and an interview with a hazardous liquids (mostly petroleum
6 products) pipeline company revealed that damage from erosion and soil stability due to
7 storm wave action has focused new interest on this phenomenon. The results of Hurricane
8 Ivan, when erosion occurred in waters up to 76 meters (250 feet) in depth, demonstrated
9 that this effect can occur at depths previously considered impervious. The problem and
10 solution is still being investigated in joint industry programs, along with Office of Pipeline
11 Safety and MMS.

12 Erosion typically has been found to occur in what the industry has termed “ultra shallow
13 waters.” This phenomenon was prevalent from Hurricane Ivan (Skinner, 2006) but almost
14 completely lacking from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This indicates that risk is not only
15 due to storm intensity, but may be based on more complex meteorological and fluid
16 dynamics factors, making the risk less predictable than assumed.

17 In ultra shallow waters where erosion occurs, the general concurrence of industry
18 specialists is that the seabed is “liquefying” (the sand or silt shifts from a wet solid to a
19 suspended state) in certain wave action conditions. Pipeline design incorporates negative
20 buoyancy (a present regulatory requirement and previously considered good design
21 practice), but, if the sands are liquefying, the negative buoyancy may become positive and
22 the pipeline ends up on the seabed surface. Documentation shows that the seabed level has
23 not changed in these occurrences, but the pipeline has changed its elevation from 3 feet
24 below the seabed surface to resting on the surface. While possible solutions are being
25 developed, impacts from more frequent or severe storms currently can be considered a
26 vulnerability of the pipeline system (EIA, 2005).

27 ***Storm Activity: Increased Storm Severity***

28 In the Gulf Coast area of study, transmission pipelines have been designed to maintain their
29 integrity for a (historical) 100-year storm event. Interviews with natural gas transmission
30 pipeline company representatives indicate that the potential of pipeline damage due to
31 increased storm activity or increased severity of storms is considered to be of marginal
32 concern. They framed the issue as: to what extent can increased weather damage be
33 effectively planned for, and what level of risk exposure should be assumed, beyond
34 regulatory requirements? While there is an extensive regular inspection process that may
35 identify weaknesses that could be expanded by a storm or by more gradual soil structure
36 changes, it only partially prepares for and mitigates potential storm damage.

37 Discussions regarding the potential for transmission pipeline damage consistently centered
38 on the issue that nearly all the transmission lines are buried with 0.9 meters (3 feet) of top
39 cover, more in urban and populated areas, and they are regularly inspected for integrity.

1 Issues regarding damage to the exposed pipeline portions (which may be the most vital, as
2 valves, pumping stations, etc.) or damage to underground portions from previously
3 unconsidered factors (changing water tables, soil subsidence due to sea level changes) need
4 to be better understood.

5 Researchers interviewed MMS regulatory officials in the New Orleans, Louisiana office
6 regarding the effects they see concerning climate change. The offshore pipelines are
7 regulated by MMS regarding design, construction, operations, and maintenance
8 requirements. MMS indicated they do not anticipate increased storm severity and
9 frequency will appreciably affect the pipelines under their regulatory authority in the Gulf
10 of Mexico. Note that MMS' authority ends at the state/Federal boundary offshore.¹⁴ It is
11 unclear whether their comments took into account the changing soil structure and shore
12 line in the region. They based their comments on the fact that the subject pipelines are at
13 substantial depth and the pipelines are buried 0.9 meters (3 feet) below sea floor level or
14 anchored to piers designed to prevent pipeline movement on the sea floor. It is not certain
15 how this accounts for the results of Hurricane Ivan and the findings of the DNV study.

16 **Secondary Impacts**

17 The level of oil and natural gas products moved via pipelines could be influenced by
18 changes in temperature across the globe. Increases in temperature in the United States
19 could affect the demand for energy products transported through the Gulf Coast; demand
20 for natural gas (and coal) to power electricity plants in the southeast, for example, could
21 lead to greater production and/or importation of natural gas through study region pipelines.
22 Furthermore, climate mitigation policies designed to reduce carbon emissions could favor
23 natural gas over other fossil fuels, thus promoting greater exploration and production of
24 natural gas and importation of LNG, with clear implications for pipelines.

25 Further study is necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the vulnerability
26 of on- and off-shore pipelines. Relatively significant damage has occasionally occurred,
27 yet other storms have produced only minor damage. Recent investigations have raised
28 concerns about sea-bed conditions under which pipelines exhibit some vulnerability. It is a
29 matter of further research whether climate change will exacerbate those conditions or
30 whether the interface between on- and off-shore pipelines might be affected.

31 **4.2.7 Implications for Transportation Emergency Management**

32 Without proactive planning, climate change could complicate evacuation efforts in the
33 region. As noted above, some highways, the chief mode for evacuation, are very likely to
34 be inundated permanently as relative sea level rises, and periodically when areas are
35 flooded by storms. Further, higher temperatures could make evacuations more problematic

¹⁴The state/Federal boundary is three miles offshore in the study area except in Texas, where it is 10 miles offshore.

1 particularly in situations where there is severe congestion; higher temperatures lead to
2 greater air conditioning usage, making it more likely that vehicles will run out of fuel and
3 block traffic. Large-scale emergency management is further challenged by the changing
4 demographics of the region: an increasing percentage of residents are older and/or have
5 special needs. Also, recent experience with evacuations suggests that congestion on key
6 evacuation routes poses serious challenges to evacuating residents quickly. The need for
7 interoperable communications systems across the region, currently lacking, will be
8 heightened as the number of emergencies increases with climate change.

9 A robust emergency management system is highly dependent on the viability of the
10 region's transportation infrastructure. Ensuring the capability to both evacuate residents,
11 and move emergency responders and services into affected areas will require purposeful
12 adaptation and thus focused investment in the transportation system. This section
13 examines the implications for transportation emergency management of the potential
14 impacts highways, transit and passenger rail presented earlier in this report. Many of these
15 routes are expected to become increasingly vulnerable to higher sea levels and storm surge.

16 This section also highlights some of the lessons learned from recent hurricane evacuation
17 experiences, and examines some of the issues related to the varied – and often
18 incompatible – communications system found across the region.

19 Further analysis and institutional consensus development is necessary to more fully
20 understand the implications of climate change on transportation emergency management.
21 However, the preliminary vulnerability issues raised here are illustrative of the kinds of
22 interactions that climate change and variability may cause for emergency management
23 planning and operations. These issues are compounded by the changing demographics in
24 the region.

25 There are two key types of emergency management/climate change scenarios. The first
26 involves complications for emergency response activities given climate impacts. For
27 example, unusable roads caused by higher sea levels caused by climate change could
28 disrupt road connectivity, increasing the time needed for emergency response vehicles to
29 reach fires, medical emergencies, etc. The second involves situations where the climate
30 impact itself causes the emergency – where hurricane induced flooding or a sudden rise in
31 relative sea levels forces people to evacuate a particular area.

32 ***Temperature***

33 As discussed in Chapter 3.0, both mean and extremes temperatures are very likely to
34 increase in the Gulf Coast region over the next 50 to 100 years. The increase in
35 temperatures could cause more air conditioning usage during some evacuations and could
36 further diminish mobility. Vehicles using air conditioning during storm evacuations,
37 particularly on congested roads, would contribute to roadside blockages as fuel is depleted
38 and vehicles are abandoned. Furthermore, an increase in temperatures, especially
39 maximum temperatures, coupled with a growing number of special needs residents in the
40 Gulf Coast study area, means that more lives could be vulnerable in the absence of
41 electrical power and air conditioning in the aftermath of a storm.

Relative Sea Level Rise

As noted above, interstates and arterials tend to serve as the major evacuation routes for emergencies in the Gulf Coast study area. This substantial reliance on a single mode of transportation may endanger many people if the highway infrastructure is damaged or made inaccessible because of relative sea level rise. If the relative sea level increases such that portions of evacuation routes are under water then the essential connectivity and evacuation provided by those highways would be lost. This will be particularly important for large-scale evacuations dependent on east-west routes. Of course, as sea levels rise over time population centers may shift to higher elevations; the segments of evacuation routes that will be most critical are likely to change with these shifts in community locations. Furthermore, if the increase in relative sea level is gradual, infrastructure development would likely follow the movement of population centers.

As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the majority of the highways vulnerable to a 61 and 122 cm (2- and 4-foot) rise in relative sea level are located in the Mississippi River delta near New Orleans. The most prominent vulnerable highways are I-10, with 220 km (137 miles) and U.S. 90 with 235 km (146 miles) passing through areas likely to be below sea level with a 61 cm (2-foot) rise in relative sea level. Overall 19 percent of the interstate miles and 20 percent of the arterial miles are at elevations below 61 cm (2 feet). With a 122 cm (4-foot) rise, the miles affected increase to 684 km (425 miles) of I-10 and 628 km (390 miles) of U.S. 90. Overall, 24 percent of the interstate miles and 28 percent of the arterial miles currently are at elevations below 122 cm (4 feet).

Storm Activity

As noted in Chapter 3.0, studies suggest that as radiative forcing (that is, GHG concentrations) and sea surface temperatures continue to increase, hurricanes may be more likely to form in the Atlantic and Pacific and more likely to intensify in their destructive capacity. Storm surge disperses debris that blocks highways and makes many roads, including evacuation routes, impassable. In addition, storm surge may damage bridges and other structures, potentially compromising mobility for extended periods. While the actual highways that would be flooded and impacted by debris depends on the specific characteristics of any given storm, a substantial portion of the highway system is vulnerable to surge inundation, including roads in all four states in the study area. The areas that are potentially vulnerable to 5.5 and 7.0 meters (18- and 23-foot) storm surge levels are shown in Section 4.2.1 above. At the 5.5 meter (18-foot) level, 51 percent of all arterial highways and 56 percent of the interstates in the study area are affected (Figure 4.24). At 7.0 meters (23-feet), these percentages rise to 57 percent of all highways and 64 percent of the interstates.

[INSERT FIGURE 4.24 Potential evacuation route highways vulnerable from storm surge of 5.5 meters (18 feet)]

Although not traditionally used for evacuation and emergency management purposes, railroads also could provide a transportation choice – especially for evacuees with special needs. Figure 4.25 illustrates the impacts on Amtrak facilities due to relative sea level rise

1 and storm surge, and identifies the Amtrak stations that are vulnerable to storm surge at the
2 5.5 meter (18-foot) level.

3 [INSERT FIGURE 4.25 Risks to Amtrak Facilities due to relative sea level rise and storm surge]

4 ***Other Considerations Affecting the Success of Emergency Management***

5 The issues below are important from the perspective of managing emergencies and
6 protecting people. Highlighting these issues is important as they are relevant to preparing
7 for potential emergencies, some of which could be related to the impacts of climate change.

8 **Adapting Emergency Management Plans**

9 Effective emergency evacuation plans must be living documents that incorporate current
10 and anticipated conditions, procedures, and resources. Climate change will likely
11 exacerbate the need to update these plans and procedures. The 2005 hurricane season
12 highlighted the need to reassess the appropriate level of investment for emergency
13 management planning. As discussed, the climate analysis indicates a rise in temperature
14 and relative sea level for the Gulf Coast region. These changes – coupled with continued
15 increases in overall population, and of particular concern, major increases in the elderly
16 and special needs populations – translate into a difficult situation for emergency
17 evacuations in the Gulf Coast region absent thoughtful and proactive planning.

18 The requirement to transport those with special needs is especially challenging along the
19 Gulf Coast, where many elderly people live in rural areas. Figure 4.26 illustrates the state
20 and county/parish boundaries and the population over 65 that were impacted by Hurricane
21 Katrina.

22 [INSERT FIGURE 4.26 Population over age 65 impacted by Hurricane Katrina]

23 **Interdependent Communications Infrastructure**

24 Successful emergency management depends not only on the transportation infrastructure
25 but also on interdependent communications infrastructure that allows emergency
26 management personnel and responders to dynamically accommodate changing needs and
27 infrastructure availability. Lessons learned from recent events indicate that significant
28 breakdowns in communication can occur across multiple jurisdictions and agencies during
29 major emergencies. Although not linked to or caused by changes in climate characteristics
30 directly, cell phones and land lines quickly become unreliable both pre- and post-event in
31 major regional emergencies. Changes in climate may exacerbate this dynamic as greater
32 penetration of storm surge and wind fields may disable the “day-to-day” communications
33 infrastructure.

34 A recent study released by First Response Coalition, a public safety group, suggests that
35 many wireless communications systems in hurricane-prone states are still unlikely to
36 function well during major regional emergencies. Communication plans and infrastructure

1 remain largely uncoordinated, even after concerted efforts to improve these dynamics
2 following the 2005 Hurricane season (First Response Coalition, 2006).

3 The use of new surveillance technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may
4 help ameliorate problems with existing communications systems that would be exacerbated
5 by future storm events. These relatively new, but increasingly efficient and more
6 affordable devices could be effective new tools in the critical 72-hour period leading up to
7 evacuations, as well as post-event recovery and response operations. These and other
8 strategies may serve as a new means of acquiring and relaying real-time information when
9 existing infrastructure is disabled during a storm.

10 **Traffic Management**

11 Traffic management related to emergency evacuations will become increasingly critical as
12 the population in the Gulf Coast region grows. This may lead to increased instances such
13 as that experienced during Hurricane Rita in 2005, where a coastal community evacuation
14 plan to a nearby regional urban area may be complicated by the inland urban area further
15 from shore undergoing an evacuation itself. As an example, the Galveston region's
16 historical plans of "evacuating to" Houston changed dramatically during the 2005
17 hurricane season. Many Galveston (and other area coastal region) residents tried to
18 evacuate "through Houston," only to encounter hours of gridlock in the oversaturated
19 transportation system that already was filled with Houston residents evacuating from the
20 approaching storm. Also, as storm impacts and the resulting evacuations do not follow
21 state lines, it is important that states not only plan for evacuations of their own residents but
22 also account and allow for potential multistate evacuations that cross multiple state
23 boundaries.

24 **Critical Care Facilities and Shelters for Those with Special Needs**

25 The predicted changes in climate over the next century will make the care of those with
26 special needs more complex and problematic. In the instance of "sheltering in place,"
27 increased attention and planning will need to be given to auxiliary power and backup
28 communication systems to sustain critical health services and to maintain acceptable
29 quality of life (air conditioning, water supply, etc.).

30 The 2005 hurricane season also produced numerous instances of evacuees with special
31 needs arriving at their "designated shelters," only to be turned away due to lack of capacity
32 or the facility not even being open. Many of these shelters that denied evacuees shelter
33 receive(d) Homeland Security funding to support the facility infrastructure and operation.
34 With evacuee demands only expected to increase in the future, the need to ensure reliable
35 shelter services becomes increasingly important.

36 **Local Development Policies**

37 As it relates to the ability to support regional evacuations during emergencies, the potential
38 for climate impacts – particularly storm surge and wind field during major hurricanes –
39 should be mapped (and otherwise illustrated) to determine probable zones of risk. This

1 information can inform local development policies, and guide the location of new housing
2 and critical care facilities to areas of lower vulnerability.

3 **Fiscal Impacts**

4 Revenue data collected by the State of Florida indicates that hurricane weather events
5 reduce toll collection and increase toll system costs. As shown in Table 4.20 below, the
6 Florida 2004 hurricane season cost the State's tolled facilities \$62,600,000 (Ely, 2005).
7 These financial impacts could negatively impact the fiscal viability of toll projects that are
8 used for evacuation routes in emergencies. The toll operating agencies in Florida recognize
9 their toll facilities as evacuation routes and are working to suspend payment of tolls in the
10 event of a hurricane (Warren, 2005).

11 [INSERT TABLE 4.20 Hurricane impacts on toll revenue in Florida]

12 Increased frequency and severity of hurricanes might pose a challenge to the fiscal
13 strategies of toll facilities, may discourage the trend to finance future infrastructure with
14 tolls, and may thereby reduce infrastructure that can be used for emergency evacuation. If
15 too much of an area is inundated for an extended period there may be a reduction in vehicle
16 trips below the threshold needed to support repayment of bonds. For example, beaches that
17 had served as a destination for toll bridges could be flooded by rising sea levels, and no
18 longer support tourism. This could in turn affect toll revenues, and ultimately undermine
19 the financial viability of key segments of evacuation routes. Bridge tolls in the Northwest
20 Florida region (Garcon Point and Mid-Bay Bridges) offer one illustration of this potential
21 impact.

22 Highways provide the majority of transportation infrastructure for emergency operations.
23 There are limited public transportation capabilities that operate on separate rights-of-way.
24 This substantial reliance on a single mode of transportation could endanger many residents
25 if the highway infrastructure is damaged or made inaccessible.

26 The prospect of climate change may require more frequent changes to emergency
27 management plans and procedures. After the 2005 hurricane season, many public agencies
28 are reassessing the appropriate level of investment for this activity. Recent events, as well
29 as the climate change projections discussed in this report, highlight the need to develop
30 action plans for worst-case scenarios. With predictions of a warmer Gulf Coast climate,
31 more intense storms and hurricanes, and rising relative sea levels, the future design of
32 critical infrastructure and emergency evacuation plans will need to incorporate increased
33 challenges to our emergency management system.

■ 4.3 Impacts and Adaptation: Case Examples in the Study Region

While Sections 4.1 and 4.2 analyze the potential future impacts of climate change on the region, this section focuses on the impacts associated with the recent past Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The challenges of responding to severe weather events are all too familiar to transportation managers in the Gulf Coast. The hurricane season of 2005 was devastating for many communities in the study area. As the region rebuilds, some areas are incorporating changes to infrastructure design to help systems better withstand flooding and storm surge. The lessons learned from the costs of clean up and repair can help managers assess the implications of infrastructure damage as they consider future adaptation options. The following case examples illustrate the issues confronting managers working to ensure a safe and reliable transportation system.

4.3.1 Impacts of Hurricane Katrina on Transportation Infrastructure

Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, 2005, was the most destructive and costliest natural disaster in the history of the United States, and the deadliest hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee Hurricane. Over 1,800 people lost their lives during Hurricane Katrina and the economic losses totaled more than \$100 billion (Graumann et al., 2006). More than 233,000 km² (90,000 square miles) were declared disaster areas. While a single storm cannot be attributed to climate change, the impacts of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 illustrate the types of impacts that would occur more frequently if the Gulf Coast were to experience more Category 4 and 5 hurricanes in the future.

The storm had a devastating impact on much of the transportation infrastructure of coastal Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, causing major damage to highways, railroads, ports, and airports. Damage was caused by flooding, pounding waves, and high winds. In addition, when the floodwaters subsided, an enormous amount of debris still had to be removed before transportation networks could function. Forty six million cubic yards of debris were removed from Mississippi alone (from all locations, not just transportation facilities). Louisiana DOTD spent \$74 million on debris removal following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Paul, 2007).

Through aggressive action by public and private transportation managers, many major transportation facilities were reopened relatively quickly considering the level of damage. Most of the study area highways, rail lines, pipelines, ports, and airports were back in service within weeks to a month. Limited access across the I-10 Twin Span Bridge was available within two months and nearly full access achieved within five months. The heavily damaged CSX Gulf Coast mainline and its bridges were reopened six months after being washed out by Hurricane Katrina. The worst damaged facilities were the river and bay bridges that carry U.S. 90 along the edge of the Gulf Coast. Though much of the roadway and three of the six badly damaged crossings were repaired within about three months, the three remaining bridges took considerably longer to repair or replace. The last of these bridges, the Biloxi-Ocean Springs Bridge, is scheduled to reopen in November

1 2007, more than two years after Katrina. In all, the price tag of clean-up and reconstruction
2 effort will run into the billions of dollars: the Louisiana Recovery Authority estimated
3 costs exceeding \$15 billion for Louisiana alone (Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2006).
4 Mississippi spent more than \$1 billion on cleanup and bridge replacement. (Mississippi
5 DOT, 2007).

6 By most accounts, the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on national-level freight
7 flows was modest because of redundancy in the national transportation system and timing.
8 Truck traffic was able to divert to parallel east-west interstate routes that avoided the
9 collapsed bridges and other barriers. Railroad operators were able to reroute intermodal
10 and carload traffic that was not bound directly for New Orleans through Memphis and
11 other Midwest rail hubs. Most of the Mississippi river ports and the Mississippi inland
12 waterway were back in service in time to handle the peak export demand later in the fall of
13 2005. Major pipelines suffered relatively little damage and were able to open within days
14 as electrical power was restored (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2006).

15 The following text outlines some of the key impacts by mode:

16 **Roads**

17 The most significant impacts to roads were to the numerous bay and river crossings
18 throughout the region. While the effects were limited in some locations and damage was
19 repaired within days, in some coastal sections prominent elements of the transportation
20 network remained closed many months after the storm. The worst damage was focused in
21 the area along and to the south of the I-10/I-12 corridor, including U.S. 90, LA-1, and I-110
22 in Mississippi and the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway. Three major bridge crossings along
23 the route were destroyed and two more sustained significant damage. The damage was
24 largely caused by the immense force of wave action on the bridge spans, many of which
25 were not sufficiently tied down to the bridge pilings to resist movement (Figure 4.4).
26 Spans weighing 300 tons were dislodged by the hurricane.

27 Inundation also caused structural problems along many miles of roadway. More than 50
28 km (30 miles) of coastal U.S. 90, which runs through the beachfront communities of
29 Mississippi, were completely inundated by the storm. At a cost of \$267 million, the 3.2 km
30 (2-mile), four-lane U.S. 90 Bay St. Louis Bridge reopened on May 17, 2007. The total
31 request for emergency repairs to Mississippi highways alone after Katrina is \$580 million
32 (Mississippi Gulf Coast Regional Planning Commission, 2006). Much of the paved surface
33 between Pass Christian and Biloxi buckled or dropped into sinkholes; in places it took
34 weeks to repair washouts and to remove many feet of sand from the road surface. 3,200
35 km (2,000 miles) of roads were submerged in Louisiana, and the Louisiana DOTD found
36 indications that prolonged inundation can lead to long-term weakening of roadways. A
37 study of pavements submerged longer than three days (some were submerged several
38 weeks) found that asphalt concrete pavements and subgrades suffered a strength loss
39 equivalent to two inches of pavement (Gaspard et al., 2007). The estimate for
40 rehabilitating a portion of these roads, 320 km (200 miles) of submerged state highway
41 pavements, amounted to \$50 million.

1 The expense of post-storm cleanup and repair can be considerable. The Louisiana
2 Recovery Authority estimated that the cost of rebuilding infrastructure (defined as roads,
3 bridges, utilities and debris removal) damaged by the hurricanes would cost \$15-18 billion.
4 Louisiana DOTD spent \$74 million on debris removal; as of June 2007, Mississippi DOT
5 had spent \$672 million on debris removal, highway and bridge repair, and rebuilding the
6 Biloxi and Bay St. Louis bridges; it expects to spend an additional \$330 million in the
7 subsequent 18 months (Mississippi DOT, 2007; Louisiana Recovery Authority, 2006).
8 Also, debris removal is not completely benign; heavy trucks removing debris in Louisiana
9 also damaged some roadways (Paul, 2007).

10 **Rail**

11 The rail infrastructure in coastal Mississippi and Louisiana suffered major damage that
12 took weeks or months to repair. The worst storm damage was focused on a 160 km (100-
13 mile) section of CSX's Gulf Coast Line between New Orleans and Pascagoula, Mississippi.
14 CSX had to restore six major bridges and more than 65 km (40 miles) of track, much of
15 which was washed out or undermined. Damage was so extensive on the line that CSX
16 required more than five months and \$250 million to complete repairs and to reopen the
17 line. It would take many times that if the company wanted to relocate the line further
18 inland. In addition, New Orleans is a major rail freight interchange point for east-west rail
19 traffic, and the railroads needed to reroute intermodal and carload traffic that was not
20 bound directly for New Orleans through other rail hubs in Memphis and St. Louis, which
21 increased operating expenses (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2006).

22 **Ports**

23 Due to their low-lying locations, the ports were susceptible to damage from all effects of
24 the hurricane – high winds, heavy rains, and especially the storm surge. Container cranes
25 were knocked down, storage sheds blown apart, and navigational aids lost. In Gulfport,
26 Mississippi, the storm surge pushed barges hundreds of feet inland and scattered 40-foot
27 containers throughout downtown Gulfport. The storm sank nearly 175 barges near New
28 Orleans, disrupting navigation on the river. However, almost all ports in the Central Gulf
29 Coast were able to reopen within a month of Katrina's landfall. Nonetheless, damage was
30 costly: More than \$250 million has been allocated to repair, rebuild, and expand the Port
31 of Gulfport in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2006).

32 Fortunately, the timing of the storm prevented a catastrophic impact on U.S. agricultural
33 exports. Gulf Coast ports typically handle 55 percent to 65 percent of U.S. raw corn,
34 soybean, and wheat exports. Since the bulk of U.S. corn and soybean harvest moves down
35 the Mississippi river from October to February, the ports were generally able to restore
36 operations in preparation for this critical season, although agriculture still faced increased
37 shipping costs due to a shortage of barges. The severe damage to Gulfport (which
38 specializes in importing containerized bananas and winter fruits from Central and South
39 America) did result in a regional shortage of tropical fruits, because major fruit importers

1 such as Dole, Chiquita, and Crowley were forced to reroute shipments to Port Everglades,
2 Florida or Freeport, Texas at extra expense (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2006).

3 **Airports**

4 A number of airports in the study area received significant damage from the strong winds,
5 flooding rains and embedded tornadoes associated with Hurricane Katrina. Airports
6 sustained damage to passenger terminals, maintenance facilities, and navigational devices.
7 Power outages also took air traffic control facilities off-line and darkened nighttime runway
8 lights. As a result, some airports were closed for days and weeks while necessary repairs
9 could be made, but relief flights were flown in before the airport facilities were fully
10 reopened.

11 Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, the third largest airport in the Central
12 Gulf Coast, sustained damage to its roofs, hangars, and fencing, but had no significant
13 airfield damage despite sitting only 4 feet above sea level (making it the second lowest
14 lying international airport in the world, after Schiphol International in The Netherlands).
15 For the first few weeks of September, the airport was open only to military aircraft and
16 humanitarian flights, but reopened to commercial flights on September 13, 2005. On the
17 other hand, Lakefront Airport, one of the busiest general aviation facilities in the Gulf
18 Coast and located directly on Lake Pontchartrain to the north of the New Orleans city
19 center, suffered extensive damage, with a number of terminals and hangars destroyed. It
20 took seven weeks before it could even reopen for daytime operations. Gulfport-Biloxi
21 International, the fifth busiest commercial airport in the Central Gulf Coast, was also hard
22 hit by the storm. Located less than a mile inland, between U.S. 90 and I-10 in Gulfport, the
23 airport's terminal building, taxiways, cargo facility, general aviation facility, and rental car
24 facility sustained an estimated \$50 million to \$60 million in damage. The airport reopened
25 to commercial flights on September 8 and returned to its normal volume of traffic in
26 February 2006 (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2006).

27 Fifty-eight airports were surveyed on how they were affected by the hurricanes – the extent
28 of damage either hurricane caused, the ability of the airports to cope with the damage, and
29 the use of the airports for emergency management. Twenty-nine airports, or 50 percent,
30 responded to the survey. Forty-eight percent of respondents pointed to the following as
31 some of the main reasons for closure: electrical outage (19 percent), wind damage (16
32 percent), and debris on runways (12 percent) were the top three reasons identified. Civil,
33 military, and passenger airline operations were affected by the hurricanes. Figure 4.23
34 identifies airports affected by Hurricane Katrina's winds. GIS analysis indicates 16
35 airports experienced winds exceeding 161 km/hour (100 miles per hour) during Hurricane
36 Katrina, including New Orleans International, Gulfport-Biloxi, and Hattiesburg
37 commercial service airports. These airports are located in Southeast Louisiana and South-
38 Central Mississippi. USGS data also indicates nine airports impacted by Hurricane Rita
39 experienced winds exceeding 161 km/hour (100 miles per hour), including two commercial
40 service airports located in Texas and Southwest Louisiana: Lake Charles Regional and

1 Beaumont-Port Arthur. Survey responses indicated additional implications to aircraft
2 operations as follows:

- 3 • Civil aircraft operations were closed at 12 airports. The average length of closure to
4 civil aircraft operations was 209 hours and the maximum observed closure was 1,152
5 hours. Lakefront Airport in New Orleans, an outlier, was closed for 48 days and skews
6 the data. When removing this airport from the data field, the average length of time
7 closed to civil aircraft operations is 35 hours. It is noteworthy that although many
8 airports “opened” soon after the hurricanes passed, many were without electricity and
9 were only open during daylight hours.
- 10 • Military aircraft operations were closed at eight airports. The average length of closure
11 to military aircraft operations at civil airports was 33 hours and the maximum observed
12 closure was 96 hours.
- 13 • Two commercial service airports, Lake Charles Regional and William P. Hobby,
14 reported passenger airline operations were suspended at their airport.

15 [INSERT FIGURE 4.27 Airports affected by Hurricane Katrina winds]

16 Hangar facilities also were damaged by the two hurricanes. Thirty-eight percent of
17 responding airports suffered damage to T-hangars, long rectangular structures with 12 to 20
18 “bays” which store single-engine and small twin-engine aircraft. Forty-five percent of
19 responding airports experienced damage to conventional hangars, which are designed to
20 store large aircraft, and are 18 by 18 meters (60 by 60 feet) to 30 by 30 meters (100 by 100
21 feet) in size. Conventional hangars are also 6 to 9 meters (20 to 30 feet) in height to
22 accommodate large aircraft with high tails.

23 **Pipelines**

24 The major petroleum/petroleum product pipelines servicing the study area received
25 relatively little physical damage from the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but could
26 not operate reliably due to massive power outages in the wake of the storms and by
27 interruptions to the supply of fresh product to transport due to refinery shutdowns, causing
28 shortages of petroleum products in parts of the nation. Even so, most of these systems
29 were able to resume partial service within days of the storm and full service within a week.
30 At the peak of the disruption cause by Hurricane Katrina, 11 petroleum refineries were shut
31 down, representing 2.5 million barrels per day or 15 percent of U.S. refining capacity and
32 all major pipelines in the area were inoperable due to power outages. By September 4, five
33 days after the storm, eight major petroleum refineries remained shut down (representing 1.5
34 million barrels per day or nine percent of U.S. refining capacity); however, all of the major
35 crude or petroleum product pipelines had resumed operation at either full or near-full
36 capacity (Grenzeback and Lukmann, 2006).

4.3.2 Evacuation during Hurricane Rita

Emergency evacuation is a key strategy to cope with hurricanes in the low-lying Gulf Coast study region. The evacuation of Houston/Galveston, the largest metropolitan area in the study region, prior to Hurricane Rita presents a case study of the difficulties of evacuating large urban areas and some lessons learned for future emergency planning.

Unlike New Orleans, much of Houston is high enough to be out of the storm surge zone; thus generally Galveston and the low-lying eastern areas are supposed to evacuate first. However, Houstonians learned during Tropical Storm Allison (2001) that precipitation alone can cause massive flooding in the city from overflowing bayous and lack of drainage. With images of the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina fresh on their mind, up to 2.5 million people attempted to evacuate the Houston/Galveston area in the days before Rita's projected landfall (Mack, 2005) – twice as many people as the area's evacuation planning was developed for (Durham, 2006). In fact, only about half of these people lived in evacuation zones (Feldstein and Stiles, 2005).

Evacuees faced massive congestion, with 160 km (100-mile) traffic jams reported (Breckinridge et al., 2006). One fifth of the evacuees spent more than 20 hours on the road to leave the area; only half completed the trip in less than 10 hours (Mack, 2005). Worsening the congestion, households traveled in multiple cars in order to get valuable property out of harm's way: the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) estimated that on average there were 1.2 occupants per vehicle, versus the 2.1 occupants generally assumed in evacuation planning (Durham, 2006). In an effort to ease congestion, officials improvised a last-minute contraflow system on some highways, which was not part of their original evacuation plan. Fuel shortages plagued travelers as gasoline stations on the evacuation routes were overwhelmed by demand. Tragically, 23 nursing home evacuees died when their bus caught fire on the road.

Following the storm, the Houston-Galveston Area Evacuation and Response Task Force identified several lessons learned from the experience and recommendations for the future (Durham, 2006):

- Evacuation plans should be practiced extensively prior to the hurricane season, to reveal problems ahead of time.
- Plans should include a system for removing disabled vehicles – during Rita, an effective incident management service was available only within the Houston city limits. As a result, vehicle breakdowns caused significant bottlenecks along the evacuation routes.
- Contraflow plans should be developed well in advance. However, it recognized that contraflow operations are not a panacea. Emergency planners will need to consider the numerous drawbacks of implementing contraflow strategies: They require intensive use of law enforcement and other personnel, disrupt day-to-day operations in areas not evacuating, and make it more difficult to move emergency vehicles and supplies back into the area.

- Thorough planning is necessary for special needs evacuees, including ensuring an adequate supply of vehicles, identifying destination(s) capable of supporting their needs, and providing personnel sufficient training to ensure a safe trip.

The Rita evacuation also demonstrated the importance of accounting for human behavior. “Too few” people evacuated New Orleans before Katrina, but “too many” evacuated the Houston-Galveston area (Breckinridge et al., 2006). Evacuation orders are meant to reinforce the fundamental strategy of “run from the water, hide from the wind”; however, in the case of Rita it seems many evacuees ran from the wind. Similarly, the tendency of households to take as many vehicles with them as possible is a logical way to protect property but counterproductive during a mass evacuation. This illustrates the need to better understand the range of potential reactions by residents during a crisis, and how best to communicate with the public to facilitate effective emergency management.

4.3.3 Elevating Highway 1

Louisiana currently is in the process of upgrading and elevating portions of Louisiana Highway 1, a road that is very important both locally and nationally. It connects Fourchon and Port Fourchon to Leeville and Golden Meadow to the north. The project is broken into multiple phases and includes a four-lane elevated highway between Golden Meadow, Leeville, and Fourchon, to be elevated above the 500-year flood level; a bridge at Leeville, with 73-foot clearance over Bayou LaFourche and Boudreaux Canal. Construction has begun on both the \$161 million bridge project, and a segment of the road south of Leeville to Port Fourchon (Wilbur Smith, 2007).

Hurricane Katrina’s impact on the energy infrastructure helped raise the profile of the dangers facing and importance of Highway 1. The highway floods even in low-level storms, and in addition to the effects of storm surge the existing infrastructure also faces threats from very high rates of coastal erosion and subsidence (Smith, 2006).

The importance of this part of the Gulf Coast, and thus Highway 1, to the nation’s energy supply and infrastructure cannot be overstated. It is the only roadway linking Port Fourchon and the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) to the nation. Port Fourchon supports 75 percent of deepwater oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico, and its role in supporting oil production in the region is increasing. The LOOP, located about 32 km (20 miles) off-shore, plays a key role in U.S. petroleum importation, production and refining as it links daily imports of 1 million barrels and 300,000 barrels of oil produced in the Gulf of Mexico to 50 percent of U.S. refining capacity. Locally, the road is the key route for transporting machinery and supplies to Port Fourchon and offshore oil workers, and also for exporting seafood from the region. Perhaps most importantly, it is the evacuation route for south Lafourche and Grand Isle, as well as some 5,000 offshore oil workers (LA 1 Coalition, 2007a and b).

■ 4.4 Conclusions

The results of this investigation shows a wide range of possible impacts on transportation infrastructure and services across the Gulf Coast study area. Given the uncertainties inherent in modeling and the complexities of the natural processes involved, the analysis does not attempt to pinpoint the precise timing of climate effects but rather provides a broad assessment of potential impacts during the coming decades. These findings provide a critical overview for transportation planners and managers of the potential implications of climate factors, and indicate areas of vulnerability that warrant consideration by decision-makers. Future investment decisions should be informed by the potential risks identified in this study.

Some of the most evident impacts are related to relative sea level rise and storm surge. A 4-foot increase in RSLR could inundate a substantial portion of the transportation infrastructure in the region: 28 percent of the arterials, 43 percent of the intermodal connectors, and 20 percent of the rail miles. Nearly three quarters of ports could be affected, as well as three airports, including Louis Armstrong International in New Orleans. Impacts associated with storm activity are more acute, although confined to the specific locations of individual storm events. Some 51 percent of arterials and 56 percent of interstates along with almost all ports, a third of rail lines and 22 airports are vulnerable to a storm surge of 18 feet, should such a surge occur. As the potential of higher-intensity storms increases and sea level rises, the vulnerability of infrastructure to storm surge becomes increasingly significant.

The direct impacts of climate factors on specific facilities can have much broader implications than implied by the percentages and maps contained in this chapter. Damage to critical links in the intermodal network can disrupt connectivity throughout the region. These disruptions can be relatively short-term, as in the case of precipitation and some storm surge and weather events; moderate, as in the case of shut-downs to conduct maintenance required to repair pavement surfaces caused by higher temperatures or storm surges; or long-term interruptions of service caused by inundation and damage to entire segments of infrastructure due to storm surge or permanent sea level rise.

The safety impacts associated with climate impacts deserve further in-depth analysis beyond this effort. Storm activity and storm surge in particular have the most direct implications for safety. These include accidents caused by: debris caused by storms, washed-out roads during or after storms, or evacuations before storms. Furthermore, the other key climate drivers, including changes in precipitation patterns, temperature, and relative sea level rise could have important safety impacts as well.

In addition to these regional impacts, the vulnerabilities of Gulf Coast transportation will have nationwide significance that merit further investigation. The resilience of Gulf Coast transportation infrastructure capabilities has implications for the country's ability to transport many key commodities into and out of the United States, including petroleum and natural gas, agricultural products, and other bulk goods.

Data and Research Needs

This study identified needs for additional data and research that would further advance understanding of the implications of climate change for transportation. These include information and investigation in the following areas:

- **Integration of Site-Specific Data** – The integration of site-specific elevation and location data in a GIS-compatible format would greatly facilitate investigation of the impacts of climate change and the natural environment on transportation. This data should include information on transportation facilities as well as on protective structures such as levees and dikes
- **Additional and Refined Climate Data and Projections** – Further development of environmental trend data and climate model projections tailored to transportation decision-makers is needed to facilitate integration of climate information into transportation decisions. In addition, specific data on other climate factors not fully addressed in this study would be valuable. These factors include wind speeds, isolated hot days, and fog.
- **Effects of Climate Change on Freight Transport Demand** – Research is needed on the perspectives, investment considerations, relocation plans, and adaptation strategies of private sector shippers and freight transportation providers, and how their requirements may evolve due to climate change and shifts in market demand.
- **Demographic Response to Climate Change** – High-population density creates increased need for both passenger transport and movement of consumer goods. Population change will be driven by multiple factors, possibly including changing environmental conditions. Projections of population density along coastal regions and their impact on the demand for freight and passenger services need to be explored.
- **Design Standards and Reconstruction and Adaptation Costs** – Additional case information would be valuable regarding the costs of rebuilding transportation facilities following severe storms. Research is needed on how local agencies are adapting design standards during reconstruction (or construction of new facilities) to increase the resilience of their facilities, such as changes in bridge height or construction, use of new materials, and changes in design criteria. Analysis of the range of adaptation options available to transportation decision-makers, and the costs and benefits of specific strategies, would help inform state and local transportation planners and decision-makers.
- **New Materials and Technologies** – Research is needed to develop materials that can better withstand higher temperatures and drier or wetter conditions, and technologies that can help us better adapt to the effects of climate change.
- **Pipelines** – A more complete examination of pipeline impacts from climate change and adaptation strategies is warranted.

- 1 • **Land Use and Climate Change Interactions** – Research is required to investigate
2 how various land use development and environmental management strategies in
3 vulnerable areas affects the magnitude of climate change impacts on communities and
4 transportation infrastructure. A comparative analysis of current international best
5 practices in land use and building codes, particularly in coastal regions, could provide
6 useful information to U.S. transportation and planning agencies.

- 7 • **Emergency Management Planning/Coordination/Modeling** – Additional study on
8 successful approaches in coordinating emergency management planning among public
9 agencies and major private sector entities in at-risk areas could identify opportunities
10 for improved coordination, public-private partnering, and risk reduction. Development
11 and application of simulation modeling should be considered to illustrate the increasing
12 challenges of evacuating major urban areas and evaluate mitigation strategies.
13 Collection and evaluation of real-time data gathered during emergencies is needed to
14 determine its possible use to first responders, operating agencies, the media, and the
15 general public. Changes in communication and information technology infrastructure
16 also should be explored.

- 17 • **Secondary and National Economic Impacts** – More in-depth research into the
18 secondary economic impacts to the region and nation of freight disruption would
19 benefit understanding of national trends and vulnerabilities, and inform development of
20 appropriate policies.

- 21 • **Site Specific Impacts** – This assessment considers scenarios of change for the counties
22 that comprise the central Gulf Coast. More detailed analysis is desirable since specific
23 transportation facilities will ultimately be affected by climate change. This will require
24 development of climate data and information that is specific to much smaller
25 geographic areas, in addition to detailed analysis of specific facilities.

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