

1 **Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6**

2 **Analyses and Effects of Global Change on Human Health and**
3 **Welfare and Human Systems**

4 **Chapter I: Introduction**

5

6 **Convening Lead Author:** Janet L. Gamble, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

7 **Lead Authors:** Kristie L. Ebi, ESS, LLC, Frances G. Sussman, Environmental Economics Consulting, Thomas J.
8 Wilbanks, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

9 **Contributing Authors:** Katharine Hayhoe, Texas Tech University, John V. Thomas, U.S. Environmental
10 Protection Agency, Christopher P. Weaver, AAAS Fellow

11

12

13

14

15

1 I.1 Scope and Approach of the SAP 4.6

2 The Global Change Research Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-606) calls for the periodic
 3 assessment of the impacts of global environmental change for the United States. In 2001, a
 4 series of sector and regional assessments were conducted by the U.S. Global Change Research
 5 Program as part of the First National Assessment. Subsequently, the U.S. Climate Change
 6 Science Program developed a *Strategic Plan* (CCSP 2003) calling for the preparation of 21
 7 synthesis and assessment products (SAPs) to inform policy making and adaptive management
 8 across a range of climate-sensitive issues. Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6 examines the
 9 effects of global change on human systems. This product addresses Goal 4 of five strategic goals
 10 in the CCSP *Strategic Plan* to “understand the sensitivity and adaptability of different natural
 11 and managed ecosystems and human systems to climate and related global changes”(CCSP
 12 2003). The “global changes” assessed in this report include: those related to climate change,
 13 those related to climate variability and those derived from shifting patterns of land use within the
 14 United States and associated changes in the nation’s population patterns. While the mandate for
 15 the preparation of this report calls for evaluating the impacts of global change, the emphasis
 16 throughout are those impacts associated with climate variability and change. Collectively, global
 17 changes are human problems, not simply problems for the natural or the physical world. Hence,
 18 this SAP examines the vulnerability of human health and socioeconomic systems to climate
 19 variability and change across three foci of potential impacts and adaptations: human health,
 20 human settlements and human welfare.

21 The report’s authors included a Convening Lead Author from the Environmental Protection
 22 Agency, three Lead Authors for each of the topic chapters and a team of 28 contributing authors.
 23 The audience for this report includes public health practitioners, resource managers, urban
 24 planners, transportation planners, elected officials and other policy makers, and concerned
 25 citizens.

26 Chapter 2 provides a synthesis chapter specifically designed to appeal to a wide range of readers,
 27 including non-scientists, policy makers, resource managers and resource planners, interested
 28 citizens, and others who have a stake in understanding the potential consequences of climate
 29 change on human systems. Chapter 2 synthesizes findings from across Chapters 3-5, focusing on
 30 several organizing themes.

31 Chapters 3-5 describe the impacts of climate variability and change on human systems and
 32 outline opportunities for adaptation and associated near- and long-term research needs. SAP 4.6
 33 addresses the questions of how and where climate variability and change may impact U.S. social
 34 systems. The challenge for this project is to derive an assessment of risks associated with health,
 35 welfare, and settlements and to develop timely adaptive strategies that address wide-ranging
 36 human vulnerabilities. Successful risk assessment classifies impacts of climate variability and
 37 change across an array of characteristics, including: the magnitude of risk (both baseline and
 38 incremental risks), the distribution of risks across populations (typical responders v. maximum-
 39 exposed individuals), and the availability, difficulty, irreversibility, and cost of adaptive
 40 alternatives. The primary goals for adaptation to climate variability and change are:

- 41 (i) To avoid maladaptive responses;
- 42 (ii) To manage significant risks proactively when possible;

- 1 (iii) To establish protocols to detect and measure risks;
- 2 (iv) To leverage technical and institutional capacity;
- 3 (v) To reduce current vulnerabilities to climate variability and change, and
- 4 (vi) To develop adaptive capacity to address new climate risks that exceed conventional
- 5 adaptive measures.

6 Key to successful adaptation is the recognition that adaptive strategies are processes that play out
7 across time. Needs we identify and respond to today are expected to evolve with the passage of
8 time. Furthermore, as individuals respond to climate change they may yield substantial
9 individual, in addition to collective, goods.

10
11 Chapter 3 assesses the potential impacts of climate variability and change on four health
12 endpoints in the United States: water and foodborne diseases, vector and zoonotic diseases,
13 human morbidity and mortality associated with changes in air quality, and human morbidity and
14 mortality associated with extreme weather events and temperature extremes. For each of the
15 health endpoints, the assessment addresses a range of topics, including:

- 16 • characterization of human health impacts from climate change in the United States;
- 17 • characterization of potential indirect effects;
- 18 • adaptation opportunities and support for effective decision making; and
- 19 • an overview of important research gaps.

20
21 The first part of the chapter focuses on the impacts of global change --- with an emphasis on
22 those of climate variability and change --- on human morbidity and mortality. The assessment
23 includes research published from 2001 through early 2007 in the U.S., or in Canada, Europe, and
24 Australia, where results may provide insights for U.S. populations. The second section focuses
25 on adaptation to the potential health impacts of climate variability and change, including public
26 health interventions that could be revised, supplemented, or implemented to protect human
27 health in response to the challenges and opportunities posed by climate change.

28 Chapter 4 focuses on the impacts and adaptations associated with climate change on human
29 settlements in the United States. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001) concludes
30 that settlements are among the human systems that are the most sensitive to climate change. For
31 example, projected changes in climate extremes could have devastating consequences for human
32 settlements that are vulnerable to droughts and wildfires, coastal and riverine floods, sea level
33 rise and storm surge, heat waves, avalanches, land slides, and windstorms. While specific
34 changes in these conditions cannot yet be predicted with great certainty, climate change is likely
35 to increase the frequency and severity of some if not all of these events. Chapter 4 focuses on
36 the interaction between settlement characteristics and climate and other global stressors, with a
37 particular focus on urban areas and densely-developed population centers in the U.S. Because of
38 their high population density, urban areas multiply human risk, especially where there are high
39 percentages of the very old, the very young, the poor, the disabled and the chronically ill. In
40 addition, because of the scale and complexity of these built environments, transportation
41 networks, the energy and resource demands, and the interdependence of these systems and the
42 populations they serve, urban areas are vulnerable to multiplying impacts in response to
43 externally imposed environmental stresses. The collective vulnerability of American urban
44 centers is expected to grow over time as a disproportionate share of urban growth is likely to
45 concentrate population in areas like the Inter-Mountain West or the Gulf Coast. The focus of
46 Chapter 4 is on high density and or rapidly growing settlements and the potential for changes

1 over time in the vulnerabilities associated with their **place-based** characteristics (such as climatic
 2 regime, elevation, and proximity to coasts and rivers) and their **form-based** characteristics (such
 3 as whether development patterns are sprawling or compact).

4 Chapter 5 focuses on the impacts of climate variability and change on human welfare. Human
 5 welfare is an elusive concept, and there is no single, commonly-accepted definition or approach
 6 to thinking about welfare. Yet there is a shared understanding that increases in human welfare
 7 are associated with improvements in individual and group life conditions in areas such as
 8 economic power, social contacts, and opportunities for leisure and recreation along with
 9 reductions in injury, stress, and loss. The physical environment, with climate as one aspect, is
 10 among many factors that can affect human welfare via economic, physical, psychological, and
 11 social pathways that influence individual perceptions of quality of life. At a minimum, climate
 12 variability and change may result in lifestyle changes and adaptive behavior with both positive
 13 and negative welfare implications. More generally, studies of climate change in the U.S. identify
 14 an array of impacts on human health, on the productivity of human and natural systems, and on
 15 human settlements. Many of these impacts are likely to be linked to human welfare. To examine
 16 the impacts of climate variability and change on human welfare, this chapter reports on two
 17 relevant bodies of literature: approaches to welfare that rely on qualitative assessment and
 18 quantitative measures, and the economic approach which monetizes, or places money values, on
 19 quantitative impacts.

20 The remainder of this introductory chapter is designed to provide the reader with an overview of
 21 the current state of knowledge regarding

- 22 (1) likely changes in climate and climate variability in the United States along with
 23 (2) a general discussion of population trends, migration patterns, and the distribution of
 24 population across settlements in the U.S.

25

26 **I.2 Climate Variability and Change in the United States: Context for an** 27 **Assessment of Impacts on Human Systems**

28 In the following chapters, the authors examine the likely impacts on human society of global
 29 change, especially the impacts of climate variability and change. The impact assessments in
 30 Chapters 3-5 do not rely on specific emissions and/or climate change scenarios but, instead, refer
 31 to widely-held scientific understanding of climate change and its impacts on social systems and
 32 human health and well-being in the United States. This report does not make quantitative
 33 projections of specific impacts in specific locations based on specific projections of climate
 34 drivers of these impacts. Instead the report adopts a vulnerability perspective that blends a
 35 current understanding of climate change that has already occurred with changes that are likely to
 36 occur. The report points to vulnerabilities and then, where possible, points to the likely direction
 37 and range of potential climate-related impacts.

38 The brief overview that follows summarizes observed changes in the global climate reported in
 39 *The Summary for Policy Makers* as part of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
 40 Fourth Assessment Report (Alley, R. et al. 2007). This introduction is intended for readers who
 41 would benefit from a short discussion of climate change as a context for the following chapters

1 on impacts and adaptation. The general findings of the Fourth Assessment include the following
2 observations:

- 3 • “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
4 increases in global average air and ocean temperature, widespread melting of snow and
5 ice, and rising global average sea level.”
- 6 • “Eleven of the last twelve years rank among the 12 warmest years in the instrumental
7 record of global surface temperatures.”
- 8 • “Urban heat island effects are real but local.”
- 9 • “Average temperature of the global ocean has increased to depths of at least 3000 m with
10 warming that causes sea water to expand, contributing to sea level rise.”
- 11 • “Mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined on average in both hemispheres.”
- 12 • “The frequency of heavy precipitation events has increased over most land areas,
13 consistent with warming and observed increases of atmospheric water vapor.”
- 14 • “Widespread changes in extreme temperatures have been observed over the last 50 years,
15 with hot days, hot nights, and heat waves becoming more frequent.”
- 16 • “There is observational evidence for an increase of intense tropical cyclone activity in the
17 North Atlantic since about 1970 (Alley, R. et al. 2007)”

1 In addition to the projected changes described in the *IPCC Summary for Policy Makers* (Alley,
 2 R. et al. 2007), we include a brief discussion of the historical record and trends in U.S. climate
 3 for temperature means and extremes, trends in precipitation, extremes in heat and hydrology,
 4 rising sea level, and the potential for changes in the intensity of hurricanes and other catastrophic
 5 storms. Taken together, these descriptions provide a context from which to assess the likely
 6 impacts of climate variability and change on human health, human welfare, and human
 7 settlements that form the basis for Chapters 2-4.

8 **Rising temperatures.** Climate change is
 9 already affecting the United States.
 10 According to long-term station-based
 11 observational records such as the
 12 Historical Climatology Network (Karl et
 13 al., 1990; Easterling et al., 1999; Williams
 14 et al., 2005), temperatures across the
 15 continental U.S. have been rising at a rate
 16 of 0.1oF per decade since the early 1900s.
 17 Increases in average annual temperatures
 18 over the last century now exceed 1oF
 19 (Figure 1a).

20 **Trends in annual and seasonal**
 21 **precipitation.** Shifting precipitation
 22 patterns have also been linked to climate
 23 change. Over the last century, annual
 24 precipitation across the continental U.S.
 25 has been increasing by an average of 0.18
 26 inches per decade (Figure 1b). Broken
 27 down by season, winter precipitation
 28 around the coastal areas, including the
 29 West, Gulf, and Atlantic coasts, has been
 30 increasing by up to 30% while
 31 precipitation in the central part of the
 32 country (the Midwest and the Great
 33 Plains) has been decreasing by up to 20%.




Figure 1. Observed trends in annual average (a) temperature (°F) and (b) precipitation (inches) across the continental United States from 1896 to 2006 (Source: NCDC, 2007)

1 Large-scale spatial patterns in summer precipitation trends are more difficult to identify, as much
 2 of summer rainfall comes in the form of small-scale convective precipitation. However, it
 3 appears that there have been increases of 20-80% in summer rainfall over California and the
 4 Pacific Northwest, and decreases on the order of 20-40% across much of the south. As the
 5 Fourth Assessment Report finds, rainfall is arriving in more intense events (Alley et al., 2007).

6 **Temperature-driven changes in extreme heat and hydrology.** According to the latest IPCC
 7 findings (Alley et al., 2007), warming temperatures are already causing widespread changes in
 8 many aspects of the climate system. Prolonged heat waves are becoming more intense and
 9 lasting longer, both here in the U.S. and around the world (Frich et al., 2002).

10 Warmer temperatures are also melting mountain glaciers, with Glacier National Park projected to
 11 be glacier-free as early as 2030 (Hall & Fagre, 2003). More winter precipitation in northern
 12 states is falling as rain instead of snow (Huntington et al., 2004). Snow pack is also melting
 13 faster, affecting stream flow in rivers. Over the last fifty years, changes in the timing of snow
 14 melt has shifted the schedule of snow-fed stream flow in the western part of the country by 1-4
 15 weeks earlier in the year (Stewart et al., 2005). The seasonal “center of stream flow volume”
 16 (i.e., the date at which half of the expected winter-spring stream flow has occurred) also appears
 17 to be advancing by on average 1 day per decade for streams in the Northeast (Huntington et al.,
 18 2003).

19 **Rising sea levels and Atlantic storm intensity.** Sea levels are rising at an increasing rate. The
 20 main cause for observed sea level rise over the past century is the fact that the oceans are
 21 absorbing about 80% of the additional heat being trapped in the earth-atmosphere system by
 22 greenhouse gases. This trapped heat is causing the ocean waters to expand, raising sea levels
 23 around the world. Over the first part of the century, sea level was rising at a rate of just 0.7
 24 inches per decade (1.7 mm/yr). Over the last few decades, however, sea level has been rising
 25 nearly twice as fast, at 1.2 inches per decade (3.1 mm/yr; Alley et al., 2007). Some of this recent
 26 increase may be due to the observed acceleration in the rate of Greenland ice melting over the
 27 past decade (Rignot, 2006).

28 Even by themselves, rising sea levels will exacerbate the impacts of coastal storms. However, the
 29 intensity of Atlantic hurricanes and tropical cyclones has also been increasing over the last few
 30 decades. According to the IPCC, increased intensity is “as likely as not” due at least in part to
 31 warming sea surface temperatures (Emanuel, 2005; Webster et al., 2005; Alley et al., 2007). The
 32 combination of higher sea levels with more intense storms further raises the risk of serious
 33 climate change impacts on coastal zones.

34 **Extremes.** Although no single extreme event can be directly attributed to climate change, many
 35 events typical of what it is likely we can expect in the future (Alley et al., 2007) have occurred in
 36 recent decades. These include the very warm summers and prolonged heat waves of 1988, 1995,
 37 1998, 1999 and 2006 (Karl and Knight, 1997; Ross & Lott, 1999; Stott, 2004; Meehl & Tebaldi,
 38 2004). These heat waves affected air quality and led to significant increases in heat-related
 39 morbidity and mortality, particularly in urban areas (Semenza et al., 1996; Whitman et al., 1997).
 40 They also led to billions of dollars in agricultural losses (Ross & Lott, 1999).

41

1 Extreme events typical of what may be expected in the future also include the numerous periods
 2 of heavy downpours that have led to documented increases in flood-related losses across the
 3 continental U.S. (Chagnon, 2003). In general, more rain is falling during heavy rainfall events,
 4 and these have increased in frequency by as much as 100% across much of the Midwest and
 5 Northeast over the last century (Kunkel et al., 1999).

6 Finally, the intense hurricanes that battered the Gulf Coast in 2005 cannot be directly attributed
 7 to climate change alone. However, the likelihood of stronger storms appears to have increased
 8 over the past few decades (Emanuel, 2005). Furthermore, these events are certainly indicative of
 9 what may be expected in the future under higher sea levels combined with equally or even more
 10 intense storms (Knutson & Tuleya, 2004). Together, the heat waves, heavy downpours and
 11 flooding, and coastal storms experienced in recent years give us a foretaste of what we might
 12 expect to see in the future due to climate change.

13

14 **I.3 Population Trends, Migration Patterns, and Development of the** 15 **Nation's Landscape: A Context for Assessing Climate-related Impacts**

16

17 Just as the preceding discussion of climate variability and change provides a framework for
 18 understanding impacts on human health, settlements and welfare, an overview of population
 19 trends and settlement patterns provides the basis for assessing broader interactions of global
 20 change, especially climate change, within the larger social context . Underlying many of the
 21 studies discussed in this report are assumptions about U.S. population projections across the next
 22 20, 50 or 100 years. At the intersection of the impacts of climate variability and change, are
 23 impacts associated with demographic factors and region-specific effects. The results of impacts
 24 or risks assessments are shaped by questions such as:

- 25 • *Which coastal counties will grow most rapidly?*
- 26 • *How many more people do we expect to move into arid states in the Mountain West?*
- 27 • *What level of international immigration can we expect and which communities will be the*
 28 *primary gateway destinations?*
- 29 • *Which currently rural counties will become urban?*
- 30 • *What share of retirees will migrate and where will they move?*


31 Detailed assessments of climate-related risk make assumptions about the size and distribution of
 32 the U.S. population. These baseline projections can be done at three basic levels: 1) across the
 33 fifty states, 2) within states and regions, and 3) within cities and neighborhoods.

34 Given the technical and computational challenges of downscaling model-based climate change
 35 projections, quantitative impact studies tend not to address impacts at the city and neighborhood
 36 scale. This is a critical gap in the existing literature since many impacts such as: heat related
 37 deaths, exposure to vector borne disease, storm damage to uninsured property and heat induced
 38 changes in air quality do vary at this scale (Borrell et al., 2006, Patz et al., 2005, Naughton et al.,
 39 2002, McGeehin and Mirabelli 2001). This variation may be important, because vulnerable
 40 populations, like seniors, low income families, and others with more limited access to health care
 41 and property insurance who are already disproportionately impacted by climate variability and
 42 change, are often concentrated in particular urban neighborhoods. Better understanding of

1 climate change at the community scale would provide a basis for adaptation research that
 2 addresses environmental justice / equity concerns (Rosenthal and Brandt-Rauf 2006, Bernard and
 3 McGeehin 2004).

4 While precise population forecasts are not feasible over long time frames, many rigorous
 5 scenarios have been developed at the national, state and regional scale. The scenarios typically
 6 provide a benchmark future for the assessments of climate change impacts. At the state level, the
 7 Census Bureau regularly produces 25-year predictions. Most states also produce county level
 8 forecasts consistent with the Census projections. While some impact studies have relied on these
 9 official population estimates, others have employed economic or land allocation models to
 10 develop independent baseline scenarios.

11



12
 13 **Figure I.1: U.S. Population and Growth Trends with evidence of more pronounced growth**
 14 **projected along the coasts, in urban centers, and in cities in the South and West (NAST,**
 15 **2001).**
 16

1 Although numbers produced by population
 2 forecasts are important, the striking
 3 relationship between the most likely impacts
 4 of climate change and the most likely future
 5 settlement patterns is the critical insight. *In*
 6 *particular, nearly all trends and forecasts*
 7 *point to more Americans living in areas most*
 8 *vulnerable to the effects of climate change.*
 9 For example, many rapidly growing places in
 10 the Mountain West are also most likely to
 11 experience decreased snow pack during winter
 12 and earlier spring melting of what snow pack
 13 there is, leading to lower stream flows,
 14 particularly during the high-demand period of
 15 summer. The most rapidly growing coastal
 16 counties also tend to be in areas most prone to
 17 hurricane activity and to storm surge. With
 18 continued growth in these vulnerable regions,
 19 research is needed to consider alternative
 20 growth futures and to minimize the
 21 vulnerability of new development, to insure
 22 that communities adopt measures to manage
 23 significant changes in sea level, temperature,
 24 rainfall and extreme weather events.

25 Movement toward coastal areas has been one
 26 of the most pronounced trends over the past
 27 few decades and the trend is expected to continue. The overlay of this migration pattern with
 28 climate change forecasts has several implications. Perhaps the most obvious is the increased
 29 exposure of people and property to the effects of sea level rise and hurricanes. With rapidly
 30 growing communities near coastlines, property damages would be expected to increase even
 31 without any changes in storm frequency or intensity. If sea level rise intensifies storm surges
 32 and extreme weather events become more frequent, the negative impacts and adaptation
 33 challenges will be compounded by intensely-developed coastal zones.

34 The continued growth of arid states in the West is another critical crossroads for human
 35 settlements and climate change. Eleven states have significant reservoir capacity that would
 36 most likely be impacted by a significant change in precipitation and snowfall (see figure). These
 37 states are also expected to account for one-third of all U.S. population growth over the next 25
 38 years (US Census Bureau, 2005). This dual challenge of decreased water supply in the face of
 39 rising demand is yet another example of a critical pressure point between population trends and
 40 climate change projections. For example, a study commissioned by the California Energy
 41 Commission estimated that the Sierra Mountain snow pack could be reduced by 12 to 47% by
 42 2050 (Cayan et al 2006). At the same time, State projections anticipate an additional 20 million
 43 Californians by that date (California Department of Finance 2004). States in the Northeast and
 44 Midwest will most likely continue to see substantial out-migration to the South and West.

National Population Trends

- Since 1980 the U.S. population has grown by more than 40 million
- However, the growth has been unevenly distributed
 - More than 500 counties actually lost population
 - Over 2 million fewer people live in these areas
 - While just 40 counties accounted for more than half the growth (either from migration or natural increase)
 - Ranging from 2.5 million in Los Angeles County to just over 200,000 in Polk County, Florida.
- Over the next 25 years the U.S. is expected grow by more than 60 million
 - 7 states are expected to account for more than two-thirds of this growth (Florida, Texas, California, Arizona, North Carolina, Georgia, and Washington)
 - Large urban and coastal counties will continue to account for the majority of growth, although many rural and urban fringe counties will grow rapidly in percentage terms.

Source: US Census Bureau, 2005

1 However, immigration from abroad and natural population increase are expected to generate
2 some amount of population growth in nearly all states.

3 Within regions, two competing trends have emerged. Over the past century, advances in
4 transportation technology – electric streetcars, freight trucks, personal automobiles, and the
5 interstate highway system -have fueled the decentralization of urban regions (Hanson and
6 Giuliano 2004, Garreau 1991, Lang 2003). While the Internet and telecommunications
7 technology have contributed to this trend, they have also made central cities more important
8 engines of economic growth (Graham and Marvin 1996, Castells 1996, Sassen 2002). Not
9 surprisingly, most of these global cities – New York, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco and
10 Seattle - are also in coastal regions. Historically, gateway cities have often been port cities, with
11 a history of development based on easy access for immigrant populations and for international
12 trade. During the 1990's, most large central cities experienced population growth, reversing
13 long-standing trends.

14 Overall, the rate of land development at a national level has been fairly consistent over the past
15 20 years. However, across the 50 states, the acres of land developed for every additional person
16 varies from less than a quarter acre per person in California and Hawaii to more than an acre per
17 additional person in 16 states. In other words, some regions have grown rapidly with relatively
18 modest increases in developed land, while other regions have increased the amount of developed
19 land in spite of declining populations (NRCS 2007). The potential for regional land use policy to
20 affect climate change impacts and adaptation opportunities seems clear. Metropolitan areas
21 concentrate climate impacts on densely-populated urban areas that in turn multiply the climate
22 effects in these heavily-developed business centers.

23 Another trend of significance for climate change is the suburbanization of poverty. A recent
24 study noted that by 2005 the number of low income households living in suburban communities
25 had for the first time surpassed the number living in central cities (Berube and Kneebone 2006).
26 Although the poverty rate in cities was still double the suburban rate, there were 1 million more
27 people overall living in poverty in America's suburbs.

28 Therefore, many of these people who will be more vulnerable to the effects of climate change
29 live in older inner-ring suburbs developed in the 1950's and 60's. The climate adaptation
30 challenge for these places is captured succinctly by a recent policy study focusing on the broader
31 set of public policy issues in such places:

32
33 *“Neither fully urban nor completely suburban, America's older, inner-ring, "first"*
34 *suburbs have a unique set of challenges—such as concentrations of elderly and*
35 *immigrant populations as well as outmoded housing and commercial buildings—very*
36 *different from those of the center city and fast growing newer places. Yet first suburbs*
37 *exist in a policy blind spot with little in the way of state or federal tools to help them*
38 *adapt to their new realities.” (Puentes and Warren 2006)*
39

40 It is often said that Americans are a nation of movers and data collected for both the 1990 and
41 2000 Census support this notion. While roughly half of the U.S. population had lived in the
42 same house for the previous five years, nearly 10 percent had recently moved from out of state

1 (Census 1990 STF 3 Table P043 and Census 2000 STF 3 Table P24). In other words, during the
 2 five year period preceding each Census, over 20 million Americans had moved across state lines
 3 and half of those moved to an entirely different region.

4 Although many forces shape domestic migration, climate is a key element of perceived quality of
 5 life. In turn, quality of life can be an important factor driving the relocation decisions of
 6 households and businesses. The popularity of the Places Rated Almanac and other publications
 7 ranking cities' livability illustrates the concept's importance. Additionally, many of the
 8 indicators in these reports are based directly on climatic conditions (average winter and summer
 9 temperature, precipitation, days of sunshine, humidity, etc.).

10 A range of studies have attempted to quantify how natural amenities, including a favorable
 11 climate, affect migration. While the methods have varied ¹ the basic conclusions are similar. In
 12 general:

- 13 • People move for a variety of reasons other than climate: proximity to family and friends,
 14 employment opportunities, lower cost of living
- 15 • Therefore, areas with natural amenities that are close to urban centers have attracted the
 16 largest numbers of in-migrants (Serow 2001)
- 17 • Climate's impact on migration varies by income with lower income groups also moving
 18 to colder areas in which their wages are likely to compare more favorably to the cost of
 19 living (Rebhun and Raveh 2006)
- 20 • For retirees, weather is a far more important rationale cited for moving out of an area
 21 than moving to an area (AARP 2006)
- 22 • Population growth in rural counties is strongly related to a more favorable climate and
 23 other key natural amenities (McGranahan 1999)

25 Of particular interest are the trends among rural counties. One study identified 277 rural
 26 counties as retiree destinations, with 90 emerging as new retiree destinations in the 1990's
 27 (McGranahan 2003).² An overwhelming share had natural amenities that would place them
 28 among the most desirable places to live.(see figure below)³ Studies of rapidly growing "amenity
 29 counties" suggest that jobs are increasingly following the migration of working age adults to
 30 such places (Carruthers and Vias 2005, Cromartie 1998). The obvious question for climate
 31 research is: *If some regions become less frigid in the winter and others more hot and humid in*
 32 *the summer, will these migration patterns change substantially?*


33

¹ Study methodologies include: aggregate studies of population changes alongside regional characteristics, explanatory models developed from individual migration data and individual surveys.

² Defined by the authors as a greater than 15% increase in the over 60 population in the previous decade.

³ Researchers at the USDA Economic Research Service ranked counties according to a natural amenity index (average winter and summer temperature, winter sunshine, summer humidity, water area and topography)

Average Growth Rate by Natural Amenity Ranking



(Source: County Amenity Index - McGranahan 1999; Population Data - US Census 2006)

1
2 **Figure 1.2. Average population growth rate by Natural Amenity Index. (1980-2005). High**
3 **amenity indices (based on county-level data) correlate with high population growth.**
4

1 I.4 Reporting Uncertainty in SAP 4.6

2 We have adopted a framework for treating uncertainty in this report that is informed by ongoing
3 discussion within the Climate Change Science Program. General guidance issued by the CCSP
4 on handling uncertainty in the various Synthesis and Assessment Products (SAPs), draws on best
5 practices documented in previous large assessment exercises, such as the Intergovernmental
6 Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as on new CCSP efforts. The specific application of
7 this guidance in each SAP is a function of the subject matter and scope of the particular report.

8 In this report, as in the other SAPs, handling uncertainty involves characterization (of the
9 uncertainty surrounding a finding, judgment, or prediction) and communication (of this
10 uncertainty) in clear, precise, objective language. This characterization and communication in
11 this report reflects the following guiding principles:

- 12 • It is important to recognize the basic differences between descriptions of uncertainty in terms
13 of *likelihood* or in terms of *level of confidence* of the science. Likelihood is relevant when
14 assessing the chance of defined future occurrence or outcome, often expressed in a
15 probabilistic way. Level of confidence refers to the degree of belief in the scientific
16 community that available understanding, models, and analyses are accurate, expressed by the
17 degree of consensus in the available evidence and its interpretation. Both are important when
18 dealing with climate change impacts assessments and both must be communicated.

19 Specifically:

- 20 • When expressing likelihood, there are many words used to describe different degrees of
21 uncertainty: e.g., “probable,” “possible,” “likely,” “unlikely,” etc. Such qualitative language
22 is inadequate because the same words can mean very different things to different people, and
23 the same words can mean very different things to the same person in different contexts.
24 Therefore, in this report, numerical probabilities are assigned to such qualifiers (Table 1),
25 which are then used consistently throughout the report.

26

27 **Table 1. Defining the likelihood of an outcome where it can be estimated probabilistically.**

28


Likelihood Terminology	Likelihood of the occurrence / outcome
Virtually certain	> 99% probability
Extremely likely	> 95% probability
Very likely	> 90% probability
Likely	> 66% probability
More likely than not	> 50% probability
About as likely as not	33 - 66% probability
Unlikely	< 33% probability
Very unlikely	< 10% probability
Extremely unlikely	< 5% probability
Exceptionally unlikely	< 1% probability

29

- 30 • When dealing with the level of confidence in our scientific judgments about climate change
31 and its impacts, it is important to consider two attributes: the amount of evidence available to
32 support the judgment being made and the degree of consensus within the scientific

1 community about that judgment. The state of knowledge underlying any judgment can in
 2 principle be sorted into specific categories (e.g., see Figure 1).

3
 4 **Figure I.3 State of Knowledge**



5
 6 Throughout this report, an evaluation of uncertainty will be presented to accompany any
 7 judgment, finding, or conclusion made in the text. If such a judgment, finding, or conclusion
 8 regards the subjective probability of a future event, for example a future projection of a specific
 9 climate change impact, the appropriate expression of likelihood (taken from Table 1) will be
 10 used. If instead the finding is an assessment of the degree of knowledge and understanding
 11 currently present in the scientific community about a topic, as expressed in the literature, the
 12 report will explicitly address questions like, “Is there a lot of literature out there dealing with this
 13 issue, or only a little?” and, “For the literature that does exist, is there broad agreement or wide
 14 disagreement?”

15 The application of this approach to likelihood and level of confidence estimates varies in each of
 16 the three core chapters (Chapters 3-5) according to the current richness of the respective
 17 knowledge bases. A relatively more extensive and specific application is possible for health
 18 impacts, only a more general approach is warranted for conclusions about human settlements and
 19 uncertainty statements about human welfare conclusions are necessarily the least explicit.

1 **References**

- 2
- 3 AARP (2006) Aging, Migration, and Local Communities: The Views of 60+ Residents and
4 Community Leaders. Published September 2006
- 5
- 6 Alley, R. et al. 2007. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis: Summary for
7 Policymakers. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, 21pp. Available
9 online at: <http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf>
- 10
- 11 Bernard SM, JM Samet, A Grambsch, KL Ebi, I Romieu. May 2001. The Potential Impacts of
12 Climate Variability and Change on Air Pollution-Related Health Effects in the United States.
13 Environmental Health Perspectives. 109 (Supplement 2): 199-209.
- 14
- 15 Bernard, Susan M. and Michael A. McGeehin (2004) Municipal Heat Wave Response Plans
16 September 2004, 94(9) American Journal of Public Health pp. 1520-1522.
- 17
- 18 Berube, Alan and Elizabeth Kneebone (2006) *Two Steps Back: City and Suburban Poverty*
19 *Trends 1999–2005*. Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program.
- 20
- 21 Borrell, Carme, Marc Marí-Dell’Olmo, Maica Rodríguez-Sanz, Patrícia Garcia-Olalla, Joan A.
22 Caylà, Joan Benach and Carles Muntaner (2006) Socioeconomic position and excess mortality
23 during the heat wave of 2003 in Barcelona. Journal European Journal of Epidemiology. 21(9)
24 September, 2006. pp. 633-640.
- 25
- 26 Carruthers, John I., Alexander C. Vias (2005) Urban, Suburban, and Exurban Sprawl in the
27 Rocky Mountain West: Evidence from Regional Adjustment Models Journal of Regional
28 Science 45 (1), 21–48.
- 29
- 30 Cayan, Dan, Amy Lynd Luers, Michael Hanemann, Guido Franco and Bart Croes (2006)
31 Scenarios of Climate Change in California: An Overview. A Report From: California Climate
32 Change Center.
- 33
- 34 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Heat-
35 Related Deaths—Los Angeles County, California, 1999-2000, and United States, 1979-1998
- 36
- 37 Chagnon, S. 2003. Shifting Economic Impacts from Weather Extremes in the United States:
38 Result of Societal Changes, Not Global Warming. *Natural Hazards* 29, 273-290.
- 39
- 40 Cromartie John B. (1998) Net Migration in the Great Plains Increasingly Linked to Natural
41 Amenities and Suburbanization. Rural Development Perspectives. 13 (1). pp. 27-34.
- 42
- 43 Easterling, D.R., Karl, T.R., Lawrimore, J.H. and Del Greco, S.A. 1999. *United States*
44 *Historical Climatology Network Daily Temperature, Precipitation, and Snow Data for 1871-*

- 1 1997. ORNL/CDIAC-118, NDP-070. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge
2 National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN.
3
- 4 Easterling, D.R., Meehl, G.A., Parmesan, C., Changnon, S.A., Karl, T.R., and Mearns, L.O.
5 2000. Climate extremes: Observations, modeling, and impacts. *Science* 289, 2068–2074.
6
- 7 Emanuel, K. 2005. Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years. *Nature*
8 436, 686-688.
9
- 10 Frich, P., Alexander, L.V., Della-Marta, P., Gleason, B., Haylock, M., Tank, A. and Peterson, T.
11 2002. Observed coherent changes in climatic extremes during the second half of the twentieth
12 century. *Climate Research* 19, 193–212.
13
- 14 Garreau, Joel (1991) *Edge Cities: Life on the New Frontier*. Anchor Press.
15
- 16 Graham, Stephen and Simon Marvin (1996) *Telecommunications and the City: Electronic*
17 *Spaces, Urban Places*. London. Routledge Press.
18
- 19 Greenough G, M McGeehin, SM Bernard, J Trtanj, J Riad, D Engelberg. May 2001. The
20 Potential Impacts of Climate Variability and Change on Health Impacts of Extreme Weather
21 Events in the United States. *Environmental Health Perspectives*. 109 (Supplement 2): 191-198.
22
- 23 Gubler DJ, P Reiter, KL Ebi, W Yap, R Nasci, JA Patz. May 2001. Climate Variability and
24 Change in the United States: Potential Impacts on Vector- and Rodent-Borne Diseases.
25 *Environmental Health Perspectives*. 109 (Supplement 2): 223-233.
26
- 27 Hall, M.H.P. and Fagre, D.B. 2003 Modeled climate-induced glacier change in Glacier National
28 Park, 1850-2100. *Bioscience* 53, 131-140.
29
- 30 Huntington, T. G., Hodgkins, G. A. and Dudley, R.W. 2003. Historical Trend in River Ice
31 Thickness and Coherence in Hydroclimatological Trends in Maine. *Climatic Change* 61, 217-
32 236.
33
- 34 Huntington, T. G., Hodgkins, G. A., Keim, B. D. and Dudley, R.W. 2004. Changes in the
35 proportion of precipitation occurring as snow in New England (1949 to 2000). *J. Climate* 17,
36 2626-2636.
37
- 38 Hanson, Susan and Genevieve Giuliano (eds). (2004). *The Geography of Urban Transportation*,
39 3rd Edition. New York: Guilford Press.
40
- 41 Houghton, J. T., Ding, Y., Griggs, D. J., Noguer, M., van der Linden, P. J., Dai, X., Maskell, K.,
42 and Johnson, C. A. (eds.): 2001, *Climate Change: The Scientific Basis*. Contributions of
43 Working Group 1 to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
44 Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 881 pp.
45

- 1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2001. *Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation*
 2 *and Vulnerability*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 3
- 4 Karl, T.R. and Knight, R.W. 1997. The 1995 Chicago heat wave: How likely is a recurrence.
 5 *Bull. Am. Met. Soc.* 78, 1107-1119.
- 6
- 7 Karl, T.R., Williams, C., Quinlan, F. and Boden, T. 1990. *United States Historical Climatology*
 8 *Network (HCN) Serial Temperature and Precipitation Data*, Environmental Science Division,
 9 Publication No. 3404, Carbon Dioxide Information and Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National
 10 Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, 389 pp.
- 11
- 12 Knutson, T.R. and Tuleya, R.E. 2004. Impact of CO₂-induced warming on simulated hurricane
 13 intensity and precipitation: Sensitivity to the choice of climate model and convective
 14 parameterization. *J. Climate* 17, 3477-3495.
- 15
- 16 Kunkel, K.E., Pielke R. Jr. and Changnon, S.A. 1999. Temporal fluctuations in weather and
 17 climate extremes that cause economic and human health impacts: A review. *Bull. Am. Met. Soc.*
 18 80, 1077–1098.
- 19
- 20 Kunkel, K. E.: 2003, ‘North American trends in extreme precipitation’, *Natural Hazards* 29,
 21 291–305.
- 22
- 23 Lang, Robert (2003) *Edgeless Cities: Exploring the Elusive Metropolis*. Washington D.C.
 24 Brookings Institution Press.
- 25
- 26 McGheehin MA and M Mirabelli. May 2001. The Potential Impacts of Climate Variability and
 27 Change on Temperature-Related Morbidity and Mortality in the United States. *Environmental*
 28 *Health Perspectives*. 109 (Supplement 2): 185-190.
- 29
- 30 McGranahan, David (1999) *Natural Amenities Drive Rural Population Change* U.S. Department
 31 of Agriculture Economic Research Service Report No. 781.
- 32
- 33 Meehl, G. A. and Tebaldi, C.: 2004, ‘More intense, more frequent, and longer lasting heat waves
 34 in the 21st century’, *Science* 305, 994–997.
- 35
- 36 Mendelsohn, R and JE Neumann (Eds.). 1999. *The Impact of Climate Change on the United*
 37 *States Economy*. Cambridge University Press.
- 38
- 39 National Assessment Synthesis Team. 2001. *Climate Change Impacts on the United States:*
 40 *Foundation*. Cambridge University Press.
- 41
- 42 National Research Council Division on Earth and Life Studies. 2001. *Under the Weather:*
 43 *Climate, Ecosystems, and Infectious Disease*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- 44
- 45 Natural Resources Conservation Service (2007) *National Resource Inventory*. US Department of
 46 Agriculture.

- 1
2 Naughton Marie, Alden Henderson, Maria C. Mirabelli, Reinhard Kaiser, John L. Wilhelm,
3 Stephanie M. Kieszak, Carol H. Rubin, and Michael A. McGeehin. (2002) Heat-related mortality
4 during a 1999 heat wave in Chicago. *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*. 22(4) May 2002,
5 pp. 221-227.
6
- 7 National Center for Climatic Data (NCCDC). 2007. U.S. Climate at a Glance. Available online at:
8 <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/cag3/cag3.html>
9
- 10 Patz, Jonathan, Samar Khoury and Cindy Parker (2005) *Climate Change and Health in*
11 *California: A Pier Research Roadmap*, Report Prepared for the California Energy Commission.
12 CEC-500-2005-093.
13
- 14 Puentes, Robert and David Warren (2006) *One Fifth of America, A Comprehensive Guide to*
15 *America's First Suburbs*. Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program
16
- 17 Rebhun, Uzi and Adi Raveh (2006) The Spatial Distribution of Quality of Life in the United
18 States and Interstate Migration, 1965–1970 AND 1985–1990. *Social Indicators Research*. 78 pp.
19 137–178.
20
- 21 Rignot, E. 2006. Changes in ice dynamics and mass balance of the Antarctic ice sheet. *Phil.*
22 *Trans. Royal Society* 364, 1637-1655.
23
- 24 Rosenthal, Joyce Klein, Paul W Brandt-Rauf (2006) Damage and low income households,
25 *Environmental Planning and Urban Health Annals Academy of Medicine*. 35(8) pp. 517-522
26
- 27 Rosenzweig, C and WD Solecki (Eds.). July 2001. *Climate Change and a Global City: The*
28 *Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change: Metro East Coast*. New York City:
29 Columbia Earth Institute: Columbia University.
30
- 31 Ross, T. and N. Lott. 1999. *A climatology of recent extreme weather and climate events*.
32 National Climatic Data Center, Technical Report 2000-02, 18 pp.
33
- 34 Sassen, Saskia (2002) *Global Networks, Linked Cities*. London. Routledge Press.
35
- 36 Scheraga, Joel D., K.L. Ebi, A.R. Moreno, and John Furlow, “From Science to Policy:
37 Developing Responses to Climate Change,” in *Climate Change and Human Health: Risks and*
38 *Responses* (Eds. A.J. McMichael et. al), WHO, WMO, UNEP, 2003.
39
- 40 Semenza, J.C., Rubin, C.H., Falter, K.H., Selanikio, J.D., Flanders, W.D., Howe, H.L., Wilhelm,
41 J.L.: 1996, ‘Heat-related deaths during the July 1995 heat wave in Chicago. *New Eng. J.*
42 *Medicine* 335, 84-90.
43
- 44 Serow, William J. (2001) Retirement Migration Counties in the Southeastern United States:
45 Geographic, Demographic, and Economic Correlates. *The Gerontologist*. 41(2) pp. 220–22
46

- 1 State of California, Department of Finance, (2004) Population Projections by Race/Ethnicity,
2 Gender and Age for California and Its Counties 2000-2050, Sacramento, California
3
- 4 Stewart, I.T., Cayan, D.R. and Dettinger, M.D. 2005. Changes toward earlier stream flow timing
5 across western North America. *J. Climate* 18, 1136-1155.
6
- 7 Stott, P.A. 2004. Human contribution to the European heat wave of 2003. *Nature* 432, 610-614.
8
- 9 U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. 2003.
10 Strategic Plan for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program.
11
- 12 U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). 2001. *Climate change impacts on the United*
13 *States: The potential consequences of climate variability and change*. Eds: Melillo, J.M., A.C.
14 Jacentos, T.R. Karl, and the National Assessment Synthesis Team. U.S. Climate Change
15 Research Program, Washington, D.C.
16
- 17 USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service, National Water and Climate Center,
18 <http://www.wcc.nrcs.usda.gov/cgibin/rs.pl> (reservoir data)
19
- 20 Webster, P.J., Holland, G.J., Curry, J.A. and Chang, H.R. 2005. Changes in tropical cyclone
21 number, duration, and intensity in a warming environment. *Science* 309, 1844-1846.
22
- 23 Whitman, S., Good, G., Donoghue, E.R., Benbow, N., Shou, W.Y. and Mou, S.X. 1997.
24 Mortality in Chicago attributed to the July 1995 heat wave. *Am. J. Public Health* 87, 1515-1519.
25
- 26 Williams, C.N. Jr., Menne, M.J., Vose, R.S. and Easterling, D.R. 2005. *United States Historical*
27 *Climatology Network Monthly Temperature and Precipitation Data*. ORNL/CDIAC-118, NDP-
28 019. Available on-line at: http://cdiac.ornl.gov/epubs/ndp/ushcn/usa_monthly.html from the
29 Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN.