WPC  2BJZCourier#|jix6X@`7X@HP LaserJet 5SiHPLAS5SI.PRSx  @\%MX@ X4  @-  -@#Xj\  P6G;ynXP#2KX0CourierTimes New Roman"i~'^:DPddDDDdp4D48dddddddddd88pppX|pDL|pp||D8D\dDXdXdXDdd88d8ddddDL8ddddX`(`lD4l\DDD4DDDDDDdDd8XXXXXX|X|X|X|XD8D8D8D8ddddddddddXdbdddpdXXXXXlX~|X|X|X|XdddldldD8DdDDDdplld|8|P|D|D|8dvddddDDDpLpLpLpl|T|8|\ddddddl|X|X|Xd|DdpL|Dd~4ddC$CWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxH\dDXddddd8@d<@d<DDXXdDDxddxHxxHvppDXd<"dxtldpxxd<?xxx,ix6X@`7X@7jC:,ynXj\  P6G;XP }9sjPWV,&t GU+G+ QQjWV_^[]UD$HuQPu u]ËL$APQVWt$~Lvw WVt$:u3,GFPTimes New Roman2 Z$40HP LaserJet 5SiHPLAS5SI.PRSXj\  P6G;\%MXP#|jX01Í ÍX0Í ÍҫXN\  PXP(hH  Z6Times New Roman RegularX2 XK Kd FZ'7jC:,ynXj\  P6G;XPW!@(#,h@\  P6G;hPdddldldD8DdDDDdplld|8|P|D|D|8dvdddDDDpLpLpLpl|T|8|\dddddd"i~'^:DPddDDDdp4D48dddddddddd88pppX|pDL|pp||D8D\dDXdXdXDdd88d8ddddDL8ddddX`(`lD4l\DDD4DDDDDDdDd8XXXXXX|X|X|X|XD8D8D8D8ddddddddddXdbdddpdXXXXXlX~|X|X|X|XdddldldD8DdDDDdplld|8|P|D|D|8dvddddDDDpLpLpLpl|T|8|\ddddddl|X|X|Xd|DdpL|Dd~4ddC$CWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxH\dDXddddd8@d<@d<DDXXdDDxddxHxxHvppDXd<"dxtldpxxd"i~'^#)0< KRg X3ԍA final judgment for purposes of separation of powers does not include all forms of judgment by the courts. As stated in Plaut, a judgment at law is generally immune to subsequent legislative changes, and an attempt by Congress to alter the legal judgment of a court implicates separation of powers principles. A judgment providing prospective equitable relief, however, remains vulnerable to subsequent legislative action that accordingly would not raise the same separation of powers concerns. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855); see also System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 649-52 (1961); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The mandate in Freeman Engineering to remedy the FCC's prior inconsistent treatment of QUALCOMM and Omnipoint, and thereby grant QUALCOMM a pioneer's preference, was a final judgment entitling QUALCOMM to a preference, not a judgment with prospective effects subject to evolving conduct or conditions.> jThe fact that the sunset provision, unlike the statute invalidated in Plaut, was not by its terms directed specifically at a particular disfavored judicial decision is irrelevant; the Supreme Court explained in Plaut that Congress' use of more generally applicable terms does not alter the separation of powers analysis. See 514 U.S. at 228. The sunset of the FCC's preference authority did nothing to deprive the FCC of the intellectual, staffing, or resource capability to take appropriate action in QUALCOMM's favor. Nor does the FCC suggest a lack of capability. Pursuant to the remand in Freeman Engineering, then, despite intervening congressional action taking away its own authority, the FCC was obligated to act pursuant to the authority of the court. Had Congress expressly commanded what the FCC contends it meant by its silence, the court would be forced to decide whether Congress acted constitutionally in light of Plaut. However, the sunset provision can reasonably be read not to" 0*(("  X3bar relief for QUALCOMM, and it should be so read to avoid imputing to Congress the rareRg Xy3ԍUntil Plaut, the Supreme Court was unaware of any "instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation." Plaut, 514 U.S. at 230. In light of this historical pattern, and as with retroactive legislation generally, see Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277-80, the court will not read a statute retroactively to alter a final judgement absent an express statement of intent. intent to undo a final judicial mandate and the constitutional questions that such an intent  X3would raise.D bRg X 3ԍSaco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is not to the contrary. In that case, the mandate called for a remand to afford the FCC an opportunity to provide a better explanation for its waiver of a financial reporting requirement. See Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Hence, the FCC's subsequent decision to award a license to a different applicant stemmed from its own reconsideration of the case rather than a judicial order compelling a specific result. The direction to "remedy this inconsistency" in Freeman Engineering is not comparable; it afforded the FCC no opportunity to develop better reasons for denying QUALCOMM's application, much less to reevaluate QUALCOMM's application. Rather, the court's instruction was clear from context: both Omnipoint and QUALCOMM had sought preferences on the basis of technological modifications on which work had commenced before the FCC had promulgated its pioneer's preference rules. Yet the FCC had denied QUALCOMM a preference on this basis while granting Omnipoint a preference, and Congress had barred the FCC from rescinding Omnipoint's preference. While the court afforded the FCC the opportunity to reevaluate its interpretation of its rules--either to abandon its "newly developed" and "questionable" interpretation of its preference rules that it applied only to QUALCOMM or retain that interpretation--it required in any event that the FCC grant QUALCOMM a preference. No such relief was obtained by the prevailing party in Saco River.D jFourth, the legislative history is consistent with our interpretation of the sunset provision inasmuch as Congress sought to protect settled expectations. When Congress in 1994 set the date for withdrawal of the FCC's authority to grant new pioneer's preferences, its focus was on increasing federal revenues and not upsetting settled expectations. It imposed a new requirement that pioneers pay for part of the value of the spectrum they received, and it added a sunset provision ending the FCC's authority to grant pioneer's preferences. Significantly for our purposes, Congress also directed the FCC not to reconsider the pioneer's preference grants that it had approved in the Third Report and Order and not to delay by more than 15 days the issuance of licenses based on such grants; it also prohibited any further administrative or judicial review of the preferences that had already been granted. See 47 U.S.C.  &Xs  &X  &X  309(j)(13)(E))(i). In so doing, Congress made clear its intent not to undo the settled expectations of APC, Cox, and Omnipoint based on final agency action granting their pioneer's preferences. There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress nevertheless intended to interfere with settled expectations derived from a final judicial"y G 0*((" mandate directing agency action. The House Report expressly stated that the provision finalizing the grants in the Third Report and Order was not intended to "affect the rights of persons who have been denied a pioneer's preference," such as QUALCOMM; those persons could still pursue further administrative and judicial review of the denial of their applications. H.R. Rep. No. 103-826, pt. 2, at 8 (1994). So too, nothing suggests that when Congress advanced the sunset date in 1997, it intended to upset settled expectations much less undo the vested rights of an applicant that had already obtained an entitlement to a pioneer's preference under a judicial mandate with which the FCC was obliged to comply under  &Xs  &X  &X  402(h). jAccordingly, we grant QUALCOMM's petition and remand to the FCC "forthwith" to grant a pioneer's preference to QUALCOMM and to take prompt action to identify a suitable spectrum and award QUALCOMM the license for it.