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Robbins argued the cause for petitioners/ appellants EchoStar Satellite Corporation, et al.  zP3 $!With him on the briefs were H. Thomas Byron, III, Charles G. Cole and Philip L. Malet. William L. Fishman entered an appearance.  zP]3 ""Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioner DIRECTV, Inc., with whom James H. Barker, III,  zP'3and Gary M. Epstein were on the briefs.  zP3 ""W Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause  zP3 $"for respondents/appellees, with whom William E. Kennard, General Counsel, Roberta L. Cook, Counsel, Stewart  zPM3 $!A. Block, Counsel, Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Catherine G.  zP3O'Sullivan and Nancy C. Garrison, Attorneys, were on the brief.  zP3 ""Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. argued the cause for intervenor MCI Telecommunications Corporation, with whom  zPs3Anthony C. Epstein was on the brief.  zP!3Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Randolph, Circuit Judges.  zP"3Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.  zP)$3 ""\Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Before us are four consolidated petitions for review of the Federal  $!Communications Commission's rules and regulations governing the distribution of Direct Broadcasting Satellite  zP%3 $"channels reclaimed from Advanced Communications Corporation. See Revision of Rules and Policies for the Direct  zP&3 $Broadcast Satellite Service, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 9712 (1995) (DBS Order). Petitioners EchoStar  $g!Satellite Corporation, Directsat Corporation, and Direct Broadcasting Satellite Corporation (DBSC) challenge the  $"Commission's decision to put up for competitive bidding certain DBS channels that the Commission reclaimed when  $V!it canceled a DBS permit held by Advanced Communications Corporation. The Commission had previously said"(0*0*0*-"  $h that any reclaimed channels would be distributed pro rata among certain preexisting permittees, including the  $f"petitioners. The petitioners contend that the new auction rule is impermissibly retroactive, arbitrary and capricious,  $""and without statutory authority. EchoStar, Directsat, and DIRECTV also contend that it is arbitrary and capricious  $!for the FCC to require that the winning bidder at the auction divest itself of its existing DBS channels. DIRECTV  $#!also challenges as arbitrary and capricious the Commission's decision not to adopt a rule restricting the ability of  $F cable system operators to participate in the auction. The Commission, in addition to opposing the petitioners'  $"contentions on the merits, maintains that the petitioners lack standing to challenge the structural rules of the auction. MCI Telecommunications Corporation, a successful bidder at the auction, has intervened in support of the FCC.  ""We hold that the Commission's decision to adopt an auction rule was neither retroactive (let alone  xP3 $!impermissibly retroactive), nor arbitrary and capricious, nor without statutory authority. In addition we hold that DIRECTV has standing to petition for review of the divestiture rule, but we deny its petition on the merits.  xP( 3L@I. BACKGROUND  ""DBS is a radio communication service that uses satellites in geostationary orbits to transmit multiple  $!channels of video programming directly to 18inch satellite dishes located at the premises of subscribers. Pursuant  $!to an agreement among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, the United States has been allocated eight orbital  $!locations for domestic DBS transmission. These are located at 61.5$, 101$, 110$, 119$, 148$, 157$, 166$, and  $!175$ Western Longitude. Each orbital position contains 32 channels, each of which, with current technology, is  zP3 $!capable of simultaneously transmitting from five to seven video programs. See Revision of Rules and Policies for  zPj3 $ the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 1297  5 (1995) (NPRM).  $3"Only the 101$, 110$, and 119$ W.L. orbital locations are capable of transmitting a "full-CONUS" signal, i.e., one  $!that reaches the entire continental United States. The four U.S. orbital positions located at 148$, 157$, 166$, and  $ 175$ W.L. can be used to transmit to the western United States, and signals from the orbital position located at  $D"61.5$ W.L. reach the eastern United States. Signals from these orbital positions are called "half-CONUS" signals.  $F At present an 18inch DBS satellite dish is not capable of receiving transmissions from more than one orbital location.  ""There are now only a few DBS systems in operation. DIRECTV and USSB both offer full-CONUS service  $from their respective channels located on the satellite at 101$ W.L. Because these two companies offer  $"non-overlapping programming, they are complementary and not competitive services, and many customers subscribe  $!to both of them. EchoStar and Directsat, subsidiaries of the same parent company, have combined their channels  $f"on the full-CONUS satellite at 119$ W.L. and together transmit approximately 126 channels of video programming.  $!DBSC is constructing a 32transponder satellite from which it expects to begin full-CONUS service later this year.  $"In addition, there are two companies that offer "DBS-like" programming. PrimeStar Partners, L.P., a joint venture  $f"of six cable companies and GE American Communications, broadcasts from satellites in the Fixed Satellite Service,  $!which requires that a subscriber use a 36inch or 40inch satellite dish. Although PrimeStar offers programming  $E!that is similar to that of the DIRECTV/USSB combine, it has less than half the channel capacity. AlphaStar, a  $g!Canadian firm, is reportedly scheduled to transmit, using FSS frequencies, roughly 90 channels of programming to U.S. subscribers with a 24inch satellite dish.  ""iApplications for DBS channels are considered mutually exclusive when the requests for channels exceeds  $!the available supply. Although an applicant may request a specific channel assignment, "[t]he Commission ...  $Xgenerally consider[s] all frequencies and orbital positions to be of equal value, and conflicting requests for  $g!frequencies and orbital positions will not necessarily give rise to comparative hearing rights as long as unassigned  $ frequencies and orbital slots remain." 47 C.F.R.  100.13(b). Until recently, the only ways in which the FCC  $g!could assign DBS channels among mutually exclusive applicants was through a comparative hearing or a lottery.  zP%3 $w"Now the Commission may, under certain circumstances, choose to auction DBS channels. See 47 U.S.C.  309(j).  $!No matter which method the FCC uses to assign channels, however, a successful applicant is granted its permit  $U"subject to due diligence requirements: the permittee must (1) "complete contracting for construction of the satellite  $E!station(s) within one year of the grant of the construction permit," and (2) begin operating its system "within six  $h years of the construction permit grant." 47 C.F.R.  100.19(a). In addition, any party that receives a new or"(0*0*0*,"  $!additional DBS permit after January 19, 1996 must (3) complete construction of its satellite within four years of  $ receiving its construction permit.  100.19(b). Once it is determined that a permittee has satisfied the first due  zP3 $x!diligence requirement, the FCC assigns specific orbital positions upon a first-come, first-served basis. See In the  zPZ3 $E!Matter of Advanced Communications Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 3399  6 (1995), aff'd, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)  $!(per curiam). If a permittee does not timely reach the construction and operation milestones, its permit is subject to cancellation.  ""The FCC granted the first permits for the construction of DBS satellites in 1982; prior to the auction at  zPD3 $issue here, the FCC had conducted five processing rounds for DBS applicants. Id. at  7. In 1988 the fifth  $V!processing round began when EchoStar applied for 16 orbital channels. Four other companies"TEMPO Satellite,  $Directsat, DBSC, and Dominion "thereafter filed competing applications, and three more companies"USSB,  $U"Hughes Communications Galaxy (parent of DIRECTV), and Advanced Communications Corporation"filed mutually exclusive applications to modify their existing permits.  ""In 1989 the FCC determined that each of the applicants except TEMPO was qualified to hold a DBS  zP 3 $ permit. Continental Satellite Corp., 4 F.C.C.R. 6292  54 (1989). The Commission withheld consideration of  zP 3 $"TEMPO's application pending further review of its qualifications. Id. at  53. This processing round was the first  zPR 3 $f"time that the number of channels for which there were requests exceeded the number available. See Advanced, 11  $F.C.C.R. 3399  7. What to do? A comparative hearing "would likely result in considerable delay and the  zP3 $ expenditure of substantial Commission and applicant resources." Continental, 4 F.C.C.R. at  55. Instead,  $y therefore, the Commission decided to grant each application "to the extent that it is possible to award an equal  zPv3 $W number of general orbital/channel reservations to each applicant." Id. at  54. The agency held in reserve a  $"sufficient number of channels in order to satisfy TEMPO's request prorata, pending the outcome of further inquiry  zP3 $iinto its qualifications. Id. at  53. In addition, the agency declared that the permittees would "receiv[e] a  zP3reservation," id. at  4, for a share of any channels that were surrendered or canceled in the future:  ""jX[I]n the event the permit of any of these applicants, or any of the current permittees, is surrendered or  ""canceled, the remaining permittees from this group will have the first right to additional allocations,  ""apportioned equally, up to the number requested in their applications. Specific allocations will be awarded, as always, on a first-come, first-served basis, as each applicant demonstrates due diligence.(#  zPL3Id. at  54; see also  64.  ""EchoStar, Directsat, DBSC, Hughes, Continental, and Advanced each received a permit to provide service  $x!to the continental United States on 11 paired half-CONUS channels or on 11 full-CONUS channels"five channels  zPn3 $g!fewer than any of them had requested"and USSB received the eight paired channels for which it had applied. Id.  $!at WW 6470. Three years later the FCC determined that TEMPO was also qualified and issued it a permit for  zP311 channels. See TEMPO Satellite, Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 2728 (1992).  zP3 ""All of the Continental permittees eventually satisfied the first due diligence requirement and were assigned  $x!specific orbital positions on a first-come, first-served basis. As a result of these assignments (and of assignments made in prior rounds of distribution) the full-CONUS channels were held as follows:  xP!3"R8X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:3Id. at  135.  xP3  ""In view of the agency's discussion of the relative merits of the alternatives before it, we cannot say that  zP3 $g!the Commission's decision to abandon the Continental policy in favor of an auction was arbitrary and capricious.  $4!First, contrary to the petitioners' claim, the Commission did seriously consider the various proposals for channel  zP*3 $!reassignments that some of the Continental permittees presented to it. The Commission reasonably concluded that  zP3 $6the process required to get all of the Continental permittees, with their divergent interests, to agree to any  zP3 $"rearrangement of the DBS channel spectrum would be "a time-consuming one," id. at  135, that would be "further  zP3 $g!complicated by the time required for Commission consideration and approval of the resulting transactions," id. at  $V! 147. At no point during the rulemaking (or indeed to date) have the petitioners presented a consensus proposal  $2#for the reassignment of ACC's reclaimed channels. Although EchoStar, Directsat, DBSC, and Continental presented  zP3 $ similar proposals for the reassignment of the ACC channels among the Continental permittees, DIRECTV and  $h TEMPO did not support their proposals. Nor is that surprising: the other permittees' proposed reassignments  $y would improve EchoStar's competitive position by giving it an entire 32channel full-CONUS orbital position,  $x!require TEMPO to move from the 119$ to 110$ W.L. orbital position so that EchoStar could take over its former slots, and give DIRECTV a possibly nonviable allocation of five channels at either 110$ or 61.5$ W.L.  ""Second, the Commission reasonably concluded that it would be in the public interest to award ACC's  $"channels to the highest bidder in a block large enough to provide competitive DBS service. The Commission noted  $V!that auctioning the channels in blocks "obviate[s] the need for reaggregation and allow[s] the auction winners to  $3"proceed directly to acquisition or construction of satellites and operation of their systems without having to negotiate  zP!3 $!with other permittees or engage in several rounds of administrative processing." DBS Order at  136. In addition, the Commission explained, the auction rule would promote the rapid development of DBS service:  ""XPaying for spectrum provides incentives for permittees to construct quickly in order to obtain a return on  xP$3 ""their investment. Indeed, an auction is likely to promote the rapid development of service because those  ""parties that are in the best position to deploy technologies and services are also likely to be the highest bidders. (#  zP'3 $g!Id. at  160; see also NPRM at  16 ("[A]uction procedures are designed to assign scarce resources to those who  xP(3value them most highly and can make the most efficient use of them.")."(0*0*0*,"Ԍ zP3 ""ԙIn sum, the Commission did not lightly reject the Continental order, nor did it fail to give a reasoned  $!explanation of why it believed an auction would best serve the public interest in the efficient and prompt usage of  $x!the limited DBS spectrum. Therefore, we reject the petitioners' claim that the Commission acted arbitrarily and  zPZ3capriciously in abandoning the Continental pro rata methodology in favor of competitive bidding. C. Is there statutory authority for the rule?  ""zThe FCC may conduct an auction only "[i]f mutually exclusive applications are accepted for filing for any  $ initial license or construction permit which will involve a use of the electromagnetic spectrum," 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(1), and if the FCC finds that an auction would promote the following statutory objectives:  ""X(A) the development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in rural areas, without administrative or judicial delays;(#  ""X(B) promoting economic opportunity and competition and ensuring that new and innovative technologies  ""are readily accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and by  ""Hdisseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by minority groups and women;(#  ""X(C) recovery for the use of the public of a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made  ""zavailable for commercial use and avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods employed to award uses of that resource; and(# X(D) efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum.(#  $ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3). Subparagraph 309(j)(6)(E) also provides, however, that "[n]othing in this subsection  $![309(j)], or in the use of competitive bidding, shall ... be construed to relieve the Commission of the obligation in  $U"the public interest to continue to use engineering solutions, negotiation, threshold qualifications, service regulations and other means in order to avoid mutual exclusivity in application and licensing proceedings."  ""For openers the petitioners argue that the Commission lacked authority to adopt an auction rule under   zP<3 $!309(j) because it did not first make sufficient efforts, while still using the Continental approach to the assignment  $E!of licenses, to avoid mutual exclusivity among their applications. The problem with the petitioners' argument is  zP3 $V!that the Commission abrogated the Continental methodology before it adopted the auction rule in its stead. Once  zP3 $#!the Commission had abandoned the Continental methodology"for sufficient reasons, as we have seen"it was faced  $ with mutually exclusive applications. Nothing in  309(j)(6)(E) requires the FCC to adhere to a policy it deems  $4!outmoded "in order to avoid mutual exclusivity in ... licensing proceedings"; rather, that provision instructs the  $"agency, in order to avoid mutual exclusivity, to take certain steps, such as the use of an engineering solution, within the framework of existing policies.  ""The petitioners also claim that the Commission lacked authority to adopt the auction rule because it was  $x!not assigning "initial" permits, within the meaning of  309(j)(i), for the former ACC channels. This argument  zP 3 $#!would have merit if, but only if, the Commission had improperly abandoned the Continental policy. Under that  zP!3 $!policy the Continental permittees would have had the right to receive a pro rata portion of the ACC channels, and  $4!the Commission would have had to issue them modified permits reflecting the additional channels. As we have  zP6#3 $seen, however, the Commission did not improperly abandon the Continental policy; it was reasonable in  $3"concluding, therefore, that any permits issued for the reclaimed ACC channels would be "initial" permits under 47  zP$3U.S.C.  309(j)(1). See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  ""'We also reject the petitioners' argument that the Commission violated its own cut-off rules for the  zP"'3 $W processing of license applications by reopening the Continental processing round without first disposing of the  zP'3 $3"requests of applicants who had filed before the cut-off date. The Continental processing round concluded long ago,  $%when the Commission assigned all the DBS channels then available and announced the policy of pro rata"(0*0*0*,"  $"reassignment for any DBS channels that might be reclaimed in the future. When it later decided to abandon the pro  $!rata policy, the Commission did not reopen a previously closed processing round; the agency merely reconsidered its method of distributing DBS channels in the light of later developments.  ""Finally, the petitioners contend that the auction rule does not foster "the development and rapid deployment  $U"of new technologies, products, and services" and the "efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum,"  $ as required by the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3). As we stated earlier, however"in the course of  zPx3 $h determining that the Commission was not arbitrary and capricious in adopting the auction rule (see Part II.B,  $above)"the Commission reasonably concluded that a competitive bidding process would in fact promote these objectives. D. Are the structural rules arbitrary and capricious?  ""6Finally we turn to the petitioners' challenges to the structural rules for the auction of the reclaimed ACC  $!channels. EchoStar/Directsat and DIRECTV contend that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in  $adopting the divestiture rule, while DIRECTV additionally challenges the FCC's decision not to restrict the  $!participation of cable companies or their affiliates in the auction. The FCC responds first that the petitioners lack  $U"constitutional standing to bring these challenges to the structural rules, and second that the court should reject them on their merits. 1. The petitioners' standing  ""|In order to have Article III standing a party must demonstrate three things: injury in fact, a causal  $4!relationship between that injury and the conduct under challenge, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will  zP3 $w"redress the injury. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1529, 1533 (1996). The Commission contends that the petitioners are unable to satisfy any of these three requirements.  ""iFirst, the Commission argues, the petitioners cannot show any injury because none of them is required by  $F the rule to divest any channels: DIRECTV and Directsat because they did not participate in the auction, and  $W EchoStar because it was outbid. Second, the FCC claims EchoStar's participation in the auction undermines  $f"DIRECTV's argument that it would have participated but for the deterrent effect of the divestiture rule; DIRECTV  $"could have entered the auction and, if the high bidder, then challenged the divestiture rule. Finally, the FCC argues  $ that re-running the auction sans the divestiture rule"which is the relief the petitioners seek"would not avail them unless they can show that they would then submit the highest bid.  ""|EchoStar/Directsat did not respond to the Commission's argument against their standing, which we  $!therefore take as conceded. Accordingly, we consider only the standing of DIRECTV to challenge the divestiture rule and the Commission's decision not to restrict the participation of the cable industry.  ""iWhat is the nature of DIRECTV's injury? As we have explained before, the standing of an unsuccessful  $bidder for a government contract"which is in a position analogous to an unsuccessful bidder at a government  $Xauction"may be established by reference either to its lost profits or to its right to a legally valid procurement  zP 3 $!process. See Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 87 F.3d 1356, 1358 (D.C. Cir.  zP!3 $!1996); CC Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Here, DIRECTV's claim that  $!the divestiture rule was an unlawful barrier to its participation in the auction entails the latter type of harm, and it  $4!"is obviously an injury both traceable to the alleged illegality in [the auction] and redressable by any remedy that  zP#3 $"eliminates the alleged illegality." National Maritime Union of America, AFLCIO v. Commander, Military Sealift  zP$3Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 123738 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Scheduled Airlines, 87 F.3d at 1359.  ""When the alleged injury is to the complainants' right to a fair procurement process, it need not, in order  $!to show that it has been injured in fact, demonstrate that it would be successful if the contract were let anew. As  zP'3 $"the Supreme Court explained in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. City  zP(3of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993):"( 0*0*0*,"Ԍ ""ԙXWhen the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a  xP3 ""benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the  ""Xbarrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit in order to establish standing. The "injury  ""Xin fact" ... is the denial of equal treatment from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.(#  zP3 $"Accord Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,  xPz3 $!438 U.S. 265 (1978). In the present context, if DIRECTV was injured by the denial of an opportunity to compete  $!upon valid terms, then it need show only that it was "able and ready to bid [on the channels] and that the [rule]  zP 3prevent[ed] it from doing so on an equal basis." Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 666.  ""iAccording to the Commission, nothing in the rule prevented DIRECTV from participating in the auction.  $ But the FCC reads the rule as though it operated in a vacuum, without touching or being touched by the world  $ around it. If DIRECTV had bid and prevailed at the auction, it would have been required to divest itself of the  $ substantial block of fullCONUS channels it holds at the 101$ W.L. orbital location"unless it could get the rule  $g!declared unlawful. Failing that, moreover, it would surely have realized less on the sale than it had just paid for  $!comparable channels; by hypothesis no one else was willing to pay as much at the auction. The rule therefore  $g!placed DIRECTV at a substantial competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other bidders, which did not have to take the risk that their successful bid would be but a costly misstep.  zP3 ""The Supreme Court confronted a similar situation in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1981).  $D"Officeholders challenged a provision of the state constitution that required an incumbent to resign his present office  $in order to become a candidate for another office. The Court held that although none of them had actually  $V!announced his candidacy, the officeholders' injury was not hypothetical because they "ha[d] alleged in a precise  $!manner that, but for the sanctions of the constitutional provision they seek to challenge, they would engage in the  zP3 $g!very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provision." Id. at 962. Just as the automatic resignation rule  zPX3 $ in Clements served as a very real "obstacle to [the officeholders'] candidacy for higher judicial office," id., the divestiture rule here challenged, as a practical matter, precluded DIRECTV from participating in the auction.  ""iFinally, we reject the Commission's argument that the redressability of DIRECTV's injury is speculative.  $U"As we have said, DIRECTV need not prove that it would win a new auction conducted without the divestiture rule.  $x!An opportunity to bid for the full-CONUS channels reclaimed from ACC in a legally valid bidding contest would  zP 3 $g!"afford [DIRECTV] just that opportunity the loss of which constitutes [its] injury." CC Distributors, 883 F.2d at  zP3 $x!151; see also Scheduled Airlines, 87 F.3d at 1359 (provision of a legally valid procurement process would redress alleged injury).  ""On the other hand, DIRECTV does not have standing to challenge the Commission's decision not to restrict  $V!the participation of the cable industry in the auction of the DBS channels reclaimed from ACC. Only one cable  $D"company (TCI) bid, and it was not the highest bidder. Therefore, DIRECTV has not shown that the Commission's  $y decision caused it any injury, and it is merely speculation that, if the auction were rerun (because DIRECTV prevailed on its objection to the divestiture rule), the petitioner would be outbid by a cable operator. 2. The merits of the petitioners' claims  ""On the merits DIRECTV contends that the FCC's decision to adopt the divestiture rule was unlawful  $!because the rule does not further the Commission's stated objectives and is based upon a faulty economic analysis.  $ The Commission stated that it wants to promote competition in the DBS market, but according to DIRECTV it  $ adopted a rule that effectively excluded from the auction noncable companies, which have virtually no market power, while inviting bids from cable companies, which dominate the MVPD market.  ""6The Commission contends that DIRECTV's focus upon market power is misguided. As the Commission  zP'3 $x!explained in the DBS Order, its "concern is not that a DBS firm might obtain market power; rather, [its] goal is  zP(3 $ to foster rivalry among MVPDs by promoting rivalry within the DBS service." DBS Order at  64. In its final"( 0*0*0*,"  $!order the Commission explained that although DBS and other MVPDs may in the future compete directly, they do  $E!not do so now. DBS services are promoted "as higher-quality, higher-priced options targeted at those consumers  $!that live outside cable markets or have strong preferences for niche programming, a large number of channels,  zPX3 $ and/or digital quality video signals." Id. at  48. Because DBS and cable are not yet in direct competition, the  zP"3 $!Commission thought it important for now to promote competition within the DBS service. Id. at WW 4849. The  $Commission concluded that it could best do this by "encouraging the emergence of an additional [i.e. third]  zP3full-CONUS DBS competitor unrelated to existing DBS full-CONUS providers." Id. at  61.  ""XThus do we see that the Commission did not adopt the divestiture rule arbitrarily and capriciously. Rather  $!the Commission recognized that DBS operators might compete head-to-head with cable systems and other MVPDs  $f"but thought it more important, for the nonce, to get for consumers the benefit of additional competition among DBS  $g!providers. The divestiture rule was reasonably aimed at promoting that competition by fostering the development  $iof a third independent and competitive provider of DBS service and preventing the concentration of all the full-CONUS channels in only two firms. A?III. CONCLUSION  ""In summary, we hold that the Commission's decision to assign DBS channels by auction is not retroactive,  $V!arbitrary and capricious, or without statutory authority; the Commission's one-time divestiture requirement was  $g!reasonable; and DIRECTV lacks standing to challenge the Commission's decision not to exclude cable operators  $!from the auction of the channels reclaimed from ACC. Therefore the petitions to review the Commission's new rules and regulations for DBS are  zP3`!(#^Denied.ă