(ID 3340)

Fortiz, 21 I&N Dec. 1199 (BIA 1998)

(1) An alien who is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994), as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, and whose deportation proceedings were initiated prior to the April 24, 1996, enactment date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”), is not ineligible for a waiver under section 212(c) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)) unless more than one conviction resulted in a sentence or confinement of 1 year or longer pursuant to the former version of section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), prior to its amendment by the AEDPA.

(2) For an alien to be barred from eligibility for a waiver under section 212(c) of the Act as one who “is deportable” by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered by one of the criminal deportation grounds enumerated in the statute, he or she must have been charged with, and found deportable on, such grounds.

(ID 3339)

M-D-, 21 I&N Dec.1180 (BIA 1998)

An alien who did not provide any evidence to corroborate his purported identity, nationality, claim of persecution, or his former presence or his family’s current presence at a refugee camp, where it was reasonable to expect such evidence, failed to meet his burden of proof to establish his asylum claim.

(ID 3338)

A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec.1157 (BIA 1998)

(1) The reasonableness of an alien’s fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure.

(2) Where evidence from the United States Department of State indicates that country conditions have changed after an alien’s departure from his native country and that the Peruvian Government has reduced the Shining Path’s ability to carry out persecutory acts, the alien failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in Peru.

(3) An alien who failed to rebut evidence from the United States Department of State indicating that the Shining Path operates in only a few areas of Peru did not establish a well-founded fear of country-wide persecution in that country.

(ID 3337)

Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136 (BIA 1998)

(1) An asylum applicant does not meet his or her burden of proof by general and meager testimony.

(2) Specific, detailed, and credible testimony or a combination of detailed testimony and corroborative background evidence is necessary to prove a case for asylum.

(3) The weaker an applicant’s testimony, the greater the need for corrobative evidence.

(ID 3336)

A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106 (BIA 1998)

(1) Although the Board of Immigration Appeals has de novo review authority, the Board accords deference to an Immigration Judge’s findings concerning credibility and credibility-related issues.

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals defers to an adverse credibility finding based upon inconsistencies and omissions regarding events central to an alien’s asylum claim where a review of the record reveals that (1) the discrepancies and omissions described by the Immigration Judge are actually present; (2) these discrepancies and omissions provide specific and cogent reasons to conclude that the alien provided incredible testimony; and (3) a convincing explanation for the discrepancies and omissions has not been supplied by the alien.

(3) Since an Immigration Judge is in the unique position to observe the testimony of an alien, a credibility finding which is supported by a reasonable adverse inference drawn from an alien’s demeanor generally should be accorded a high degree of deference, especially where such inference is supported by specific and cogent reasons for doubting the veracity of the substance of the alien’s testimony.

(ID 3335)

Miche, 21 I&N Dec.1101 (BIA 1998)

(1) Pursuant to 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,369 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(a)(1) (interim, effective Apr. 1, 1997), an Immigration Judge must ascertain whether an alien desires representation in removal proceedings.

(2) An alien who has not previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), despite his conviction for an aggravated felony.

(ID 3334 )

O-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1079 (BIA 1998)

Presentation by an asylum applicant of an identification document that is found to be counterfeit by foresic experts not only discredits the applicant’s claim as to the critical elements of identity and nationality, but, in the absence of an explanation or rebuttal, also indicates an overall lack of credibility regarding the entire claim.

(ID 3333)

Collado, 21 I&N Dec. 1061 (BIA 1998)

(1) A lawful permanent resident of the United States described in sections 101(a)(13)(C)(i)-(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i)-(vi)) is to be regarded as “seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws,” without further inquiry into the nature and circumstances of a departure from and return to this country.

(2) The Immigration Judge erred in finding that the Fleuti doctrine, first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), requires the admission into the United States of a returning lawful permanent resident alien who falls within the definition of section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act, if that alien’s departure from the United States was “brief, casual, and innocent.”

(ID 3332)

Ali, 21 I&N Dec. 1058 (BIA 1997)

Neither an alien’s long-standing minor illness existing prior to a grant of voluntary departure nor an allegation of serious illness to others, including family members, establishes the requisite exceptional circumstances under section 242B(f)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(f)(2) (1994), in the absence of evidence specifying how such circumstances resulted in the alien’s failure to depart, which renders him or her ineligible for certain forms of discretionary relief from deportation under section 242B(e)(2) of the Act.

(ID 3331)

S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. 1050 (BIA 1997)

An applicant’s general assertion that he was prevented from reaching his hearing on time by heavy traffic does not constitute reasonable cause that would warrant reopening of his in absentia exclusion proceedings.

(ID 3330)

Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 19978)

A conviction for distribution of cocaine under 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1) (1988), is a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994), where knowledge or intent is an element of the offense. Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992), modified.

(ID 3329)

Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035 (BIA 1997)

(1) A child legitimated under the laws of his or her residence or domicile may only be included within the definition of the term “child” provided in section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C) (1994), if the legitimizing act occurred prior to the child’s 18th birthday.

(2) In order to qualify as a legitimated child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, a child residing or domiciled in the Dominican Republic must have been under the age of 18 at the time the new law regarding legitimation took effect and must have been acknowledged by his or her father prior to her 18th birthday, unless he or she was legitimated under the former laws of that country.

(ID 3328)

Bueno, 21 I&N Dec. 1029 (BIA 1997)

(1) In order to qualify as the legitimated child of the petitioner under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C) (1994), the beneficiary must be the biological child of the petitioner.

(2) A delayed birth certificate does not necessarily offer conclusive evidence of paternity even if it is unrebutted by contradictory evidence; it must instead be evaluated in light of the other evidence of record and the circumstances of the case.

(ID 3327)

Yewondwosen, 21 I&N Dec. 1025 (BIA 1997)

Where an alien has not strictly complied with the regulatory requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1) (1997) by failing to submit an application for relief in support of a motion to reopen or remand, but the Immigration and Naturalization Service affirmatively joins the motion, the Board of Immigration Appeals or an Immigration Judge may still grant the motion.

(ID 3326)

Pineda, 21 I&N Dec. 1017 (BIA 1997)

(1) Section 348(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, _____ (“IIRIRA”), enacted on September 30, 1996, amended section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1994), to add restrictions precluding a grant of a waiver to any alien admitted as a lawful permanent resident who either has been convicted of an aggravated felony since the date of admission or did not have 7 years of continuous residence prior to the initiation of immigration proceedings.

(2) Section 348(b) of the IIRIRA provides that the restrictions in the amendments to section 212(h) of the Act apply to aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of September 30, 1996, unless a final order of deportation has been entered as of such date.

(3) An aggravated felon who had a final administrative order of deportation as of September 30, 1996, would be subject to the restrictions on eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver if his proceedings were thereafter reopened; therefore, his motion to reopen deportation proceedings to apply for adjustment of status in conjunction with a section 212(h) waiver was properly denied.

(ID 3325)

Dillingham, 21 I&N Dec. 1001 (BIA 1997)

The expungement of an alien’s foreign drug-related conviction pursuant to a foreign rehabilitation statute is not effective to prevent a finding of his inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1994), even if he would have been eligible for federal first offender treatment under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1994) had he been prosecuted in the United States. Matter of Manrique, Interim Decision 3250 (BIA 1995), distinguished.

(ID 3324)

Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 998 (BIA 1997)

Matter of Shaar, 21 I&N Dec.3290 (BIA 1996), is not applicable to an alien who was ordered deported at an in absentia hearing and has therefore not remained beyond a period of voluntary departure; consequently, the proceedings may be reopened upon the filing of a timely motion showing exceptional circumstances for failure to appear. Matter of Shaar, supra, distinguished.

(ID 3323)

J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997)

(1) A motion to reconsider a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals must be filed not later than 30 days after the mailing of the decision, or on or before July 31, 1996, whichever date is later. Only one motion to reconsider may be filed, and there is no exception to the time bar imposed on such motions.

(2) Only one motion to reopen is allowed and must be filed with the Board not later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever date is later. An exception exists for motions to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if evidence is presented that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

(3) An appeal or motion is deemed filed when it is received at the Board, irrespective of whether the alien is in custody.

(4) The Board’s power to reopen or reconsider cases sua sponte is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to cure filing defects or circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship.

(ID 3322)

L-S-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 973 (BIA 1997)

(1) An asylum applicant who has been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon (handgun) and sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison is not eligible for asylum because he has been convicted of an aggravated felony, that is, a crime of violence for which the sentence is at least 1 year.

(2) An applicant for withholding of deportation who has been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon (handgun) has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and is not eligible for withholding of deportation regardless of the length of his sentence.

(ID 3321)

Batista, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997)

(1) The offense of accessory after the fact to a drug-trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. V 1993), is not considered an inchoate crime and is not sufficiently related to a controlled substance violation to support a finding of deportability pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994).

(2) The respondent’s conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 establishes his deportability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act,because the offense of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of an obstruction of justice crime under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp. 1997), and because the respondent’s sentence, regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that sentence, “is at least one year.”

(ID 3320)

Gonzalez, 21 I&N Dec. 937 (BIA 1997)

An alien who is deportable under sections 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) (1994), is ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), as amended by section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (enacted Apr. 24, 1996), regardless of whether the waiver is requested alone or in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status.

(ID 3319)

C-Y-Z-, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1997)

(1) An alien whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure can establish past persecution on account of political opinion and qualifies as a refugee within the definition of section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994), as amended by section 601(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, ____.

(2) The regulatory presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution may not be rebutted in the absence of changed country conditions, regardless of the fact that the sterilization of the alien’s spouse negates the likelihood of future sterilization to the alien.

(ID 3318)

Fuentes-Campos, 21 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 1997)

An applicant for admission in exclusion proceedings who is inadmissible on the basis of a controlled substance offense is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), as amended by section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277.

(ID 3317)

S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 900 (BIA 1997)

(1) Pursuant to section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)), an alien’s term of imprisonment or sentence is determined for immigration purposes by the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law, irrespective of whether the sentencing court suspended the imposition or execution of the sentence in whole or in part.

(2) Section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Act took effect on September 30, 1996, and applies to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after that date.

(3) The respondent’s 1993 suspended sentence for an indeterminate term not to exceed 5 years under Iowa law is a sentence to 5 years’ imprisonment for immigration purposes and, consequently, satisfies the imprisonment requirements of the deportation charges under sections 241(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) and (iii) (1994).

(4) The respondent’s conviction for terrorism under section 708.6 of the Iowa Code Annotated is a felony involving a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the victim and, therefore, constitutes a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994).

(ID 3316)

Fuentes, 21 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 1997)

(1) A child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994), before the age of 18 years has acquired derivative United States citizenship regardless of the child’s age at the time the amendments to that section by the Act of October 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-417, 92 Stat. 917 (“1978 Amendments”), took effect.

(2) The respondent, who was 16 years and 4 months of age when his mother was naturalized, and who resided in the United States at that time as a lawful permanent resident while under the age of 18 years, became a derivative United States citizen, even though he was already 18 years old when the 1978 Amendments took effect.

(ID 3315)

Air India, 21 I&N Dec. 890 (BIA 1997)

A decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the imposition of a fine that does not state the specific reasons for the determination fails to meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1) (1996) and is inadequate for purposes of appellate review.

(ID 3314)

P-L-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 887 (BIA 1997)

(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (1996), the Office of Refugees, Asylum, and Parole has initial jurisdiction over an alien’s asylum application when the alien has not been served an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221).

(2) Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1996), an Immigration Judge has exclusive jurisdiction over an asylum application filed by an alien once an Order to Show Cause has been served upon the alien and filed with the Immigration Court.

(ID 3313)

Melo, 21 I&N Dec. 883 (BIA 1997)

(1) In bond proceedings under the Transition Period Custody Rules, the standards set forth in Matter of Drysdale, 20 I&N Dec. 815 (BIA 1994), apply to the determinations of whether the alien's release pending deportation proceedings will pose a danger to the safety of persons or of property and whether he or she is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.

(2) The "is deportable" language as used in the Transition Period Custody Rules does not require that an alien have been charged and found deportable on that deportation ground. Matter of Ching, 12 I&N Dec. 710 (BIA 1968); and Matter of T-, 5 I&N Dec. 459 (BIA 1953), distinguished.

(3) The Transition Period Custody Rules do not limit "danger to the safety of persons or of property" to the threat of direct physical violence; the risk of continued narcotics trafficking also constitutes a danger to the safety of persons.

(ID 3312)

N-K- & V-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 879 (BIA 1997)

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can, if the applicant meets the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), form the basis of a successful motion to reopen exclusion proceedings where the applicant was ordered excluded in an in absentia hearing.

(ID 3311)

E-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 860 (BIA 1997)

(1) A finding of credible testimony by an asylum applicant is not dispositive as to whether asylum should be granted; rather, the specific content of the testimony, and any other relevant evidence in the record, is also considered.

(2) When evaluating an asylum claim, the changed conditions of the country at issue, as properly established in the record of proceedings, may be a significant factor in concluding that an applicant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution.

(ID 3310)

Villalba, 21 I&N Dec. 842 (BIA 1997)

(1) Language contained in the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221), which provides that notice of deportation hearings will be sent only to a respondent’s last known address and that failure to provide an address may result in an in absentia hearing, is a reasonable construction of the notice requirements set forth in section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1994).

(2) The prohibition set forth in Purba v. INS, 884 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1989), that a deportation hearing may not be conducted telephonically absent a respondent’s affirmative waiver of the right to appear in person, does not apply in properly conducted in absentia proceedings.

(ID 3309)

N-J-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 812 (BIA 1997)

(1) The general effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is April 1, 1997. Section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA creates an exception to the general effective date with regard to suspension of deportation for aliens with pending deportation proceedings and establishes a transition rule to be applied in these pending cases.

(2) Under the provisions of the IIRIRA transition rule, service of the Order to Show Cause ends the period of continuous physical presence prior to the acquisition of the requisite 7 years.

(3) The respondent was served with an Order to Show Cause before the IIRIRA's enactment and deportation proceedings are still pending. Inasmuch as the Order to Show Cause was served prior to the respondent's acquisition of the 7 years' continuous physical presence, she is ineligible for suspension of deportation under the transition rule.

(4) The Attorney General vacates the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals pending her further determination.

(ID 3308)

V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792 (BIA 1997)

(1) Although kidnapping is a very serious offense, the seriousness of conduct is not dispositive in determining persecution, which does not encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.

(2) While there may be a number of reasons for a kidnapping, an asylum applicant bears the burden of establishing that one motivation was to persecute him on account of an enumerated ground, and evidence that indicates that the perpetrators were motivated by the victim's wealth, in the absence of evidence to suggest other motivations, will not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

(ID 3307)

T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1997)

(1) An applicant for asylum need not show conclusively why persecution occurred in the past or is likely to occur in the future. However, the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground.

(2) Criminal extortion efforts do not constitute persecution “on account of” political opinion where it is reasonable to conclude that those who threatened or harmed the respondent were not motivated by her political opinion.

(3) Country profiles submitted by the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor are entitled to considerable deference.

(ID 3306)

Valles, 21 I&N Dec. 769 (BIA 1997)

(1) An Immigration Judge maintains continuing jurisdiction to entertain bond redetermination requests by an alien even after the timely filing of an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals from a previous bond redetermination request.

(2) If, after a bond appeal has been filed by the alien, the Immigration Judge grants an alien’s bond redetermination request, that appeal is rendered moot, and the Board will return the record to the Immigration Court promptly.

(ID 3305)

C-A-L-, 21 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 1997)

(1) An alien, who served as a soldier in the Guatemalan Army, has not established a well-founded fear of persecution by the guerrillas on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994), where he claims that his personal file from the army fell into the hands of the guerrillas, who sought to recruit him for his artillery expertise.

(2) An alien has failed to establish that he has a well-founded fear of country-wide persecution from the guerrillas in Guatemala where he was able to live for more than 1 year in different areas within the country, including an area well known for its guerrilla operations, without experiencing any problems from the guerrillas.

(ID 3304)

Varig Brazilian Air, 21 I&N Dec. 744 (BIA 1997)

(1) The reasonable diligence standard of section 273(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1323(c) (Supp. III 1991), is applied both to the determination of whether the passenger was an alien and to the adequacy of the carrier’s examination of the passenger’s documents.

(2) In a determination of reasonable diligence under section 273(c) of the Act, the carrier must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it has established, and its staff has complied with, procedures to ensure that all of its passengers’ travel documents have been inspected prior to boarding so that only those with valid passports and visas are permitted to board.

(3) Where a document is altered, counterfeit, or expired, or where a passenger is an imposter, to the extent that a reasonable person should be able to identify the deficiency, a carrier is required to refuse boarding as a matter of reasonable diligence.

(4) In denying reconsideration, the Board of Immigration Appeals reaffirms its decision that, in fine proceedings, the reasonable diligence standard is applied both to the determination of whether a passenger is an alien and to the adequacy of the carrier’s examination of the passenger’s documents.

(ID 3303)

S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1997)

(1) General background information about a country, where available, must be included in the record as a foundation for an applicant's claim of asylum and withholding of deportation.

(2) Where the record contains general country condition information and an applicant's claim relies primarily on personal experiences not reasonably subject to verification, corroborating documentary evidence of the asylum applicant's particular experience is not required; but where it is reasonable to expect such corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant's claim, such evidence should be provided or an explanation should be given as to why such information was not presented. Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), clarified.

(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service should play an active role in introducing evidence regarding current country conditions.

(4) Although the burden of proof is not on the Immigration Judge, if background evidence is central to an alien's claim and the Immigration Judge relies on the country conditions in adjudicating the alien's case, the source of the Immigration Judge's knowledge of the particular country must be made part of the record.

(ID 3302)

Valdez, 21 I&N Dec. 703 (BIA 1997)

(1) The Transition Period Custody Rules invoked on October 9, 1996, govern bond redeterminations of aliens falling within the nonaggravated felony criminal grounds of deportation covered in those rules, regardless of when the criminal offenses and convictions occurred.

(2) The Transition Period Custody Rules govern bond redetermination appeals of otherwise covered criminal aliens who are not now in custody by virtue of immigration bond rulings rendered prior to the October 9, 1996, invocation of those rules.

(ID 3301)

Noble, 21 I&N Dec. 672 (BIA 1997)

(1) Bond redeterminations of detained deportable aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are governed by the Transition Period Custody Rules of section 303(b)(3) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, (enacted Sept. 30, 1996), irrespective of how or when the alien came into immigration custody.

(2) Aliens deportable on aggravated felony grounds are eligible for release from immigration custody under the Transition Period Custody Rules, provided the alien can demonstrate that he or she was either lawfully admitted or cannot be removed because the designated country will not accept him or her, will not pose a danger to safety of persons or of property, and will likely appear for any scheduled proceeding.

(ID 3300)

Q-T-M-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1996)

(1) Under section 243(h)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1994), an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is considered to have committed a particularly serious crime, which bars the alien from applying for withholding of deportation under section 243(h)(1) of the Act ("aggravated felony bar").

(2) Under section 243(h)(3) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(3)), as enacted by section 413(f) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (enacted Apr. 24, 1996) ("AEDPA"), the Attorney General may apply section 243(h)(1) of the Act to any alien, notwithstanding any other provision of law, if she determines in her discretion that it is necessary to do so "to ensure compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," Jan. 31, 1967, 1968 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 ("Protocol").

(3) Section 243(h)(3) of the Act did not repeal the aggravated felony bar directly or by implication, but amended it to the limited extent necessary to ensure that refoulement of a particular criminal alien would not place compliance with the Protocol in jeopardy.

(4) Under the provisions of section 305(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009,___ (effective April 1, 1997) ("IIRIRA"), an alien convicted of one or more aggravated felonies for which the aggregate sentence is at least 5 years is considered to have committed a particularly serious crime, which bars the alien from eligibility for withholding of removal.

(5) In cases governed by the provisions of section 243(h) of the Act, the standards for determining whether the deportation of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in the AEDPA, must be withheld under section 243(h)(1) in order to ensure compliance with the Protocol should not be inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the IIRIRA.

(6) For purposes of applying section 243(h) of the Act, an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in the AEDPA, and sentenced to an aggregate of at least 5 years' imprisonment, is deemed conclusively barred from relief under section 243(h)(1), and such ineligibility is in compliance with the Protocol.

(7) For purposes of applying section 243(h) of the Act, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in the AEDPA, who has been sentenced to less than 5 years' imprisonment, is subject to a rebuttable presumption that he or she has been convicted of a particularly serious crime, which bars eligibility for relief under section 243(h)(1) of the Act.

(8) For purposes of applying section 243(h) of the Act, in determining whether or not a particular aggravated felon, as defined in the AEDPA, who has not been sentenced to at least 5 years' imprisonment, has overcome the presumption that he or she has committed a particularly serious crime, consistent with the meaning of that term in the Protocol, the appropriate standard is whether there is any unusual aspect of the alien's particular aggravated felony conviction that convincingly evidences that the crime cannot rationally be deemed "particularly serious" in light of treaty obligations under the Protocol.

(9) Although the respondent's convictions for "illicit trafficking in firearms" fall within the aggravated felony definition of the AEDPA and he has been sentenced to less than 5 years' imprisonment, the nature and circumstances of the convictions are such that overriding the aggravated felony bar in this case is not necessary to ensure the United States' compliance with the Protocol.

(ID 3299)

X-P-T-, 21 I&N Dec. 634 (BIA 1996)

(1) An alien who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for resistance to a coercive population control program, has suffered past persecution on account of political opinion and qualifies as a refugee within the amended definition of that term under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Matter of Chang, 20 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1989), superseded.

(2) The language of section 101(a)(42) of the Act deeming persons who have been subject to population control measures or persecuted for resistance to such programs to have been persecuted on account of political opinion applies to determinations of eligibility for withholding of deportation, as well as asylum.

(3) Section 207(a)(5) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5)) limits the number of refugees that may be admitted to the United States or granted asylum pursuant to the provisions of section 101(a)(42) of the Act relating to persecution for resistance to coercive population control methods.

(4) The applicant, who was forcibly sterilized for violating the coercive population control policies of China, is granted asylum conditioned upon a determination by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that a number is available for such grant; withholding of exclusion and deportation is also granted without condition.

(ID 3298)

Pilch , 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996)

The respondents, husband and wife, failed to show, either individually or cumulatively, factors which demonstrate extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in deportation to themselves or to their three United States citizen children in order to establish suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).

(ID 3297)

Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA 1996)

(1) Under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1994), as amended by section 348(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, ______ (enacted Sept. 30, 1996) (“IIRIRA”), an alien who has been admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident and who has been convicted of an aggravated felony since the date of such admission is ineligible for a waiver.

(2) Section 348(b) of the IIRIRA provides that the amendments to section 212(h) of the Act apply to aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of September 30, 1996, the date of enactment of the IIRIRA, unless a final administrative order of deportation has been entered as of such date.

(3) Where a court reverses an order of deportation by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the order is nullified and therefore is not final.

(4) An aggravated felon whose order of deportation had been reversed by a court of appeals and was pending on remand before the Board on September 30, 1996, did not have a final administrative order of deportation on that date, so the restrictions on eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver apply.

(5) Any presumption against the retroactive application of a statute does not apply where Congress has clearly stated that a statute is to be applied retroactively.

(ID 3296)

Rivera, 21 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 1996)

An alien seeking to reopen in absentia proceedings based on her unsuccessful communications with her attorney did not establish exceptional circumstances pursuant to section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), where she failed to satisfy all of the requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim set out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff'd, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).

(ID 3295)

Saint John, 21 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1996)

An alien convicted of attempting or conspiring to commit a firearms violation is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (1994), which applies retroactively to convictions entered before, on, or after October 25, 1994. Matter of Hou, 20 I&N Dec. 513 (BIA 1992), superseded.

(ID 3294)

CABRERA, 21 I&N Dec. 589 (BIA 1996)

A child born out of wedlock in the Dominican Republic is placed in the same legal position as one born in wedlock once the child has been acknowledged by the father in accordance with Dominican law and hence qualifies as a “legitimated” child under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C) (1994). Matter of Reyes,17 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1980), overruled.

(ID 3293)

AMAYA, 21 I&N Dec. 583 (BIA 1996)

(1) Service of an Order to Show Cause issued against a minor under 14 years of age may properly be made on the director of a facility in which the minor is detained pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (1996).

(2) Although under 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(b) (1996), an Immigration Judge may not accept the admission to a charge of deportability by an unaccompanied and unrepresented minor under the age of 16, the regulation does not preclude an Immigration Judge from accepting such a minor’s admissions to factual allegations, which may properly form the sole basis of a finding that such a minor is deportable.

(3) Even where an unaccompanied and unrepresented minor under the age of 16 years admits to the factual allegations made against him an Immigration Judge must take into consideration the minor’s age and pro se and unaccompanied status in determining, after a comprehensive and independent inquiry, whether the minor’s testimony is reliable and whether he understands any facts that are admitted, such that his deportability is established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.

(ID 3292)

CHAPLAIN SERVICES, INC., 21 I&N Dec. 578 (BIA 1996)

(1) In an application for recognition, an applicant must respond to and successfully rebut an adverse recommendation made by the district director, even when such recommendation has been made in a prior recognition proceeding involving the applicant.

(2) Denial of the applicant’s recognition request is justified by unrebutted allegations in the district director’s recommendation made in prior recognition proceedings that the applicant’s personnel supplied clients with misinformation; that the applicant improperly submitted Notices of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative (Forms G-28) on behalf of a purportedly associated attorney who never performed services; that the applicant’s clients had been charged excessive amounts for services in spite of the applicant’s fee list which reflects nominal charges; and that the member of the applicant’s staff upon whose expertise the applicant relies has been the subject of complaints for the unauthorized practice of law.

(ID 3291)

JIMENEZ, 21 I&N Dec. 567 (BIA 1996)

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), is not available to waive an alien’s deportability under section 241(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3)(B)(iii) (1994), as an alien convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1994), because there is no comparable statutory counterpart to sec-tion 241(a)(3)(B)(iii) among the various grounds for exclusion enumerated in section 212(a) of the Act. Matter of Esposito, 21 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1995); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas,20 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990; A.G. 1991), aff’d, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); Matter of Wadud,19 I&N Dec. 182 (BIA 1984), followed.

(ID 3290)

SHAAR, 21 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA 1996)

(1) An alien who has filed a motion to reopen during the pendency of a voluntary departure period in order to apply for suspension of deportation and who subsequently remains in the United States after the scheduled date of departure is statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation pursuant to section 242B(e)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993), if the notice requirements of that section have been satisfied, absent a showing that the alien’s failure to timely depart the United States was due to “exceptional circumstances” under section 242B(f)(2) of the Act.

(2) Neither the filing of a motion to reopen to apply for suspension of deportation during the pendency of a period of voluntary departure, nor the Immigration Judge’s failure to adjudicate the motion to reopen prior to the expiration of the alien’s voluntary departure period constitutes an "exceptional circumstance."

(ID 3289)

Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996)

(1) The 1996 amendments to section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), bar relief to aliens deportable by reason of having committed any of the criminal offenses described in the amended section 212(c).

(2) The Attorney General vacates the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and holds that the bar to relief under the amended section 212(c) applies to all applications pending on the April 24, 1996, effective date of the amendments.

(3) Pursuant to the order of the Attorney General, aliens who conceded deportability in reliance on the availability of section 212(c) relief before April 24, 1996, may petition the Executive Office for Immigration Review for reopening of the proceedings for the limited purpose of permitting the alien to contest deportability.

(ID 3288)

W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996)

(1) The provisions of section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1994), apply any time an alien, whose presence has not been excused by the Immigration Judge, fails to appear for a deportation hearing after proper notice has been issued pursuant to section 242B, regardless of whether the issue of deportability has already been addressed or resolved and regardless of whether the alien has someone else appear on his behalf.

(2) An Immigration Judge retains the authority to properly excuse an alien’s presence at a hearing, to grant a continuance, or to change venue for good cause shown by the alien or the Immigration and Naturalization Service either prior to or at the time of the deportation hearing.

(3) If an alien’s presence at a deportation hearing has not been excused, and any request for a rescheduling of the hearing has not been granted, the provisions of section 242B apply and a challenge to the entry of an in absentia deportation order based on the alien’s failure to appear is governed by the “rescission” provisions of section 242B(c)(3) of the Act.

(ID 3287)

S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996)

(1) Although an applicant for asylum must demonstrate that harm has been or would be inflicted on account of one of the protected grounds specified in the “refugee” definition, persecution for “imputed” reasons can satisfy that definition.

(2) In mixed motive cases, an asylum applicant is not obliged to show conclusively why persecution has occurred or may occur; however, in proving past persecution, the applicant must produce evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated in part by an actual or imputed protected ground.

(3) In situations involving general civil unrest, the motive for harm should be determined by considering the statements or actions of the perpetrators; abuse or punishment out of proportion to nonpolitical ends; treatment of others similarly situated; conformity to procedures for criminal prosecution or military law; the application of antiterrorism laws to suppress political opinion; and the subjection of political opponents to arbitrary arrest, detention, and abuse.

(4) Asylum was granted where the applicant was detained and abused by the Sri Lankan Government, not only to obtain information about the identity of guerrilla members and the location of their camps, but also because of an assumption that his political views were antithetical to those of the Government.

(ID 3286)

Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996)

(1) Administrative closure of a case is used to temporarily remove the case from an Immigration Judge’s calendar or from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s docket. A case may not be administratively closed if opposed by either of the parties. Administrative closing of a case does not result in a final order. It is merely an administrative convenience which allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate situations.

(2) The settlement agreement under American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“ABC”), specifically states that nothing in the agreement shall limit the right of a class member to pursue other legal rights to which he or she might be entitled under the Immigration and Nationality Act. This language is mandatory and does not indicate that such action by an alien would be curtailed by the administrative closing of each class member’s case or postponed until the eventual final resolution of each class member’s remedies under the settlement agreement itself.

(3) An ABC alien’s right to apply for relief from deportation is not prohibited due to the administrative closure of his or her case. Such an alien, therefore, may file a motion to reopen with the administrative body which administratively closed his or her case in order to pursue issues or relief from deportation which were not raised in the administratively closed proceedings. Such motion must comply with all applicable regulations in order for the alien’s case to be reopened.

(4) An alien who has had his or her case reopened and who receives an adverse decision from an Immigration Judge in the reopened proceedings must file an appeal of that new decision, in accordance with applicable regulations, in order to vest the Board with jurisdiction to review the Immigration Judge’s decision on the issues raised in the reopened proceedings. That appeal would be a separate and independent appeal from any previously filed appeal and would not be consolidated with an appeal before the Board regarding issues which have been administratively closed.

(5) Any appeal pending before the Board regarding issues or forms of relief from deportation which have been administratively closed by the Board prior to the reopening of the alien’s proceedings will remain administratively closed. A motion to reinstate an appeal is required before issues which have been administratively closed can be considered by the Board.

(ID 3285)

Fualaau, 21 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1996)

(1) Assault in the third degree under section 707-712 of the Hawaii Revised Statute is not a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994), where the offense is similar to a simple assault.

(2) Where reckless conduct is an element of the statute, a crime of assault can be, but is not per se, a crime involving moral turpitude.

(ID 3284)

Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 1996)

An order of deportation issued following a hearing conducted in absentia may be rescinded under section 242B(c)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993), where an alien properly establishes that his failure to appear was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel which amounts to “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Act.

(ID 3283)

Sanchez, 21 I&N Dec. 444 (BIA 1996)

(1) Under the present statutory and regulatory scheme, an Immigration Judge properly declined to order an alien excluded in absentia where the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not detain or parole the alien at the time he applied for admission to the United States, but instead returned him to Mexico with instructions to appear for an exclusion hearing at a later date.

(2) By directing an applicant for admission to return to Mexico after being served with a Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing before an Immigration Judge (Form I-122), the Service in effect consented to the alien’s withdrawal of that application when the alien elected not to return to pursue his application for admission to the United States.

Pro se

(ID 3282)

Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 427 (BIA 1996)

A returning applicant for legalization under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988 & Supp. III 1991), may not, by virtue of his membership in the class action suit of Catholic Social Services v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Catholic Social Services v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 (1993), successfully file a motion to terminate exclusion proceedings based on the doctrine set forth in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).

Pro se

(ID 3281)

L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996)

(1) Reopening may be had where the new facts alleged, together with the facts already of record, indicate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, so as to make it worthwhile to develop the issues at a hearing. Where ruling on a motion requires the exercise of judgement regarding eligibility for the relief sought, the Board does not require a conclusive showing that, assuming the facts alleged to be true, eligibility for relief has been established. By granting reopening the Board does not rule on the ultimate merits of the application for relief. Matter of Sipus, 14 I&N Dec. 229 (BIA 1972), reaffirmed.

(2) Reopening to apply for suspension of deportation is granted where 1) the 15-year-old respondent has lived in the United States since the age of 6; 2) the adult respondent, her mother, also has a 6-year-old United States citizen child; 3) the respondents are from a country where economic and political conditions are poor; and 4) the respondents have been covered by the Nicaraguan Review Program since 1987.

(ID 3280)

O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1996)

Suspension of deportation was granted where the 24-year-old Nicaraguan respondent lived in the United States since the age of 13, was educated in this country, speaks English fluently, is fully assimilated into American life and culture, is involved in various activities in this country, runs a small trucking business, has no other means of obtaining lawful permanent resident status, and if deported, would return to a country where economic and political conditions were difficult.

(ID 3279)

Castro, 21 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 1996)

(1) In exclusion proceedings, jurisdiction over an alien’s application for adjustment of status generally lies with the district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(2) The regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a) and 236.4 (1994) grant limited jurisdiction to the Immigration Judge in exclusion proceedings to adjudicate adjustment applications that have been denied by the district director, but only if the alien, after first having been inspected and admitted into the United States, had applied to adjust status and then departed the country under a grant of advance parole.

(ID 3278)

Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)

(1) The practice of female genital mutilation, which results in permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of persecution.

(2) Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a “particular social group” within the definition of the term “refugee” under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).

(3) The applicant has met her burden of proving through credible testimony and supporting documentary evidence (1) that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear country- wide persecution in Togo on account of her membership in a recognized social group and (2) that a favorable exercise of discretion required for a grant of asylum is warranted.

(ID 3277)

Cervantes, 21 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 1996)

An alien is not barred from demonstrating continuous physical presence for purposes of section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1) (1994), when he has made brief, casual, and innocent departures from the United States during the pendency of his deportation proceedings, and when the Immigration and Naturalization Service has readmitted him as a returning applicant for temporary resident status under section 210 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988).

(ID 3276)

H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996)

(1) Membership in a clan can constitute membership in a “particular social group” within the meaning of section 208(a) of the Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1994); the Marehan subclan of Somalia, the members of which share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities, is such a “particular social group.”

(2) While interclan violence may arise during the course of civil strife, such circumstances do not preclude the possibility that harm inflicted during the course of such strife may constitute persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) of the Act; and, persecution may occur irrespective of whether or not a national government exists.

(3) An alien who has demonstrated past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that, since the time the persecution occurred, conditions in the applicant’s country have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in that country.

(4) In the consideration of whether a favorable exercise of discretion should be afforded an applicant who has established eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, careful attention should be given to compelling, humanitarian considerations that would be involved if the refugee were to be forced to return to a country where he or she was persecuted in the past.

(ID 3275)

Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1996)

(1) Where the statute under which an alien has been convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the Board of Immigration Appeals will look beyond the statute, but only to consider such facts which appear from the record of conviction, or other documents admissible under federal regulations as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense for which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (1994).

(2) Where the only criminal court document offered into the record to prove an alien’s deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act consists of a Certificate of Disposition which fails to identify the subdivision under which the alien was convicted or the weapon that he was convicted of possessing, deportability has not been established, even where the alien testifies that the weapon in his possession at the time of his arrest was a gun, since it is the crime that the alien was convicted of rather than a crime that he may have committed which determines whether he is deportable.

(ID 3274)

Madrigal, 21 I&N Dec. 323 (BIA 1996)

(1) Where the statute under which an alien has been convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the Immigration and Naturalization Service must establish through the record of conviction, and other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, that the specific offense of which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (1994).

(2) The transcript from the respondent’s plea and sentence hearing, during which the respondent admitted possession of a firearm, is part of the record of conviction and, consequently, was sufficient to establish that the respondent had been convicted of a firearms offense and was deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act.

(3) The respondent’s right to counsel was not violated where the Immigration Judge properly informed the respondent of his right to counsel and provided him with adequate opportunity to obtain representation.

(ID 3273)

Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1996)

(1) Where the statute under which an alien was convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the Board of Immigration Appeals looks to the record of conviction, and to other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense of which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993).

(2) A police report, standing alone, is not part of a “record of conviction,” nor does it fit any of the regulatory descriptions found at 8 C.F.R. § 3.41 (1995) for documents that are admissible as evidence in any proceeding before an Immigration Judge in proving a criminal conviction, and it therefore should not be considered in determining whether the specific offense of which an alien was convicted constituted a firearms violation.

(3) Although a police report concerning circumstances of arrest that is not part of a record of conviction is appropriately admitted into evidence for the purpose of considering an application for discretionary relief, it should not be considered for the purpose of determining deportability where the Act mandates a focus on a criminal conviction, rather than on conduct.

(ID 3272)

Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996)

(1) In assessing whether an applicant has met his burden of establishing that a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is warranted in the exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(1)(B) (1994), the Immigration Judge must balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on his behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of this country.

(2) Establishing extreme hardship and eligibility for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief does not create any entitlement to that relief; extreme hardship, once established, is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered.

(3) The equities that the applicant for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief must bring forward to establish that he merits a favorable exercise of administrative discretion will depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the ground of exclusion sought to be waived and on the presence of any additional adverse matters, and as the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence.

(4) Taking responsibility and showing remorse for one’s criminal behavior does constitute some evidence of rehabilitation, although an alien who claims innocence and does not express remorse is not precluded from ever presenting persuasive evidence of rehabilitation by other means.

(5) While the lack of persuasive evidence of rehabilitation may not in itself be an adverse factor, the absence of this equity in the alien’s favor may ultimately be determinative in a given case concerning the exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act, particularly where an alien has engaged in serious misconduct and there are questions whether the alien will revert to criminal behavior; and conversely, evidence of rehabilitation in some cases may constitute the factor that raises the significance of the alien’s equities in total so as to be sufficient to counterbalance the adverse factors in the case and warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.

(ID 3271)

Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996)

Willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or parent of the perpetrator’s child, in violation of section 273.5(a) of the California Penal Code, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.

(ID 3270)

B-, 21 I&N Dec. 287 (BIA 1996)

The respondent’s conviction for second-degree rape under Article 27, section 463(a)(3) of the Annotated Code of Maryland, for which he was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994) and, hence, an “aggravated felony” under section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994).

(ID 3269)

Farias, 21 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1996)

(1) The waiver provisions of section 241(a)(1)(E)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(E)(iii) (1994), were amended to limit availability to aliens who had the required familial relationship to the smuggled alien at the time the smuggling act occurred.

(2) The amendments to the smuggling waiver provision apply to applications filed before, on, or after the date of their enactment, but only if no final determination on the application had been made prior to that date.

(3) Because the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals was pending review before the Attorney General on certification on the date of enactment of the waiver amendments, no final determination had been made under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1996), and the amended version of the waiver applies to the respondent.

(4) The respondent was not married to her current husband at the time she assisted him to enter the United States and therefore is ineligible for a waiver under the amended version of section 241(a)(1)(E)(iii) of the Act.

(ID 3268)

Garcia, 21 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 1996)

(1) Nunc pro tunc permission to reapply for admission, an administrative practice not expressly authorized by statute, is available only in the limited circumstances where a grant of such relief would effect a complete disposition of the case, i.e., where the only ground of deportability or inadmissability would be eliminated or where the alien would receive a grant of adjustment of status in conjunction with the grant of any appropriate waivers of inadmissability.

(2) A grant of nunc pro tunc permission to reapply for admission is not available to a respondent who, in spite of such a grant, would remain deportable under sections 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) (1994), as a result of a drug-related conviction.

(3) An alien who returned to the United States following deportation with a visa, but without obtaining advance permission to reapply, is not eligible to apply for nunc pro tunc permission to reapply for admission in conjunction with an application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), because he is not independently eligible for the waiver as a result of his unlawful entry.

(ID 3267)

Luviano, 21 I&N Dec. 235 (BIA 1996)

A conviction for a violation of a firearms offense that has been expunged pursuant to section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code will not support a finding of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(C) (1994). Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I&N Dec. 576 (BIA 1966; A.G. 1967); and Matter of G-, 9 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1960; A.G. 1961), followed.

(ID 3266)

Rivera, 21 I&N Dec. 232 (BIA 1996)

The automatic stay of deportation associated with the filing of a motion to reopen an in absentia hearing pursuant to section 242B(c)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252b(c)(3)(1994), continues during the pendency of an appeal from the denial of such a motion.

(ID 3265)

Hernandez, 21 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1996)

(1) The violation of 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) (1995), which requires that the contents of an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) be explained to an alien under certain circumstances, does not necessarily result in prejudice to the alien.

(2) Where an alien raises the issue of violation of 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c), and the Immigration Judge finds that the alien was prejudiced by such violation, the Immigration Judge, where possible, can and should take corrective action short of termination of the proceedings.

(3) The explanation requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) is not jurisdictional. As long as the statutory requirements regarding the Order to Show Cause and regarding notice of deportation proceedings are satisfied, and the alien appears for the scheduled hearing, service of the order without prior explanation of its contents by the Service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the alien.

Pro se

(ID 3264)

Lazarte, 21 I&N Dec. 214 (BIA 1996)

Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (1994), which waives inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act for fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact in relation to procuring a visa, other documentation, or entry into the United States or other benefit provided under the Act, is not applicable to waive inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(F) of the Act for document fraud in violation of section 274C of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324c (1994).

(ID 3263)

Gallardo, 21 I&N Dec. 210 (BIA 1996)

An alien’s admission pursuant to the Visa Waiver Pilot Program does not curtail his ability to obtain a bond redetermination hearing when the Immigration and Naturalization Service has issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) and the alien has applied for asylum and withholding of deportation.

(ID 3262)

Cazares, 21 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1996)

(1) Following the amendment of section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), by section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277, and the Attorney General’s ruling in Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997), an alien who is deportable as an aggravated felon is not eligible for section 212(c) relief.

(ID 3261)

Ponce De Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1996)

(1) Following the amendment of section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), by section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277, and the Attorney General’s ruling in Matter of Soriano, 21 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 1996; A.G. 1997), an alien who is deportable as an aggravated felon is not eligible for section 212(c) relief.

(ID 3260)

Rodarte, 21 I&N Dec. 150 (BIA 1995)

(1) The regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(f) (1995) permit concurrent applications for relief under sections 212(c) and 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(c) and 1255 (1994). Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993), clarified.

(2) The regulation applies where the respondent is seeking further consideration of his section 212(c) application, as well as where initial consideration of the application is sought.

(3) Reopening to allow the respondent to apply for section 212(c) and section 245 relief is granted where the respondent last appeared before an Immigration Judge in 1990, and since that time has married a United States citizen, had two citizen children, worked steadily, and maintained a clean record.

(ID 3259)

Morales, 21 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1995)

(1) Where an alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings requests administrative closure pursuant to the settlement agreement set forth in American Baptist Churches et al. v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“ABC agreement”), the function of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) is restricted to the inquiries required under paragraph 19 of the agreement, i.e., (1) whether an alien is a class member, (2) whether he has been convicted of an aggravated felony, and (3) whether he poses one of the three safety concerns enumerated in paragraph 17.

(2) If a class member requesting administrative closure under the ABC agreement has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and does not fall within one of the three listed categories of public safety concerns under paragraph 17 of the agreement, EOIR must administratively close the matter to afford the alien the opportunity to pursue his rights in a special proceeding before the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(3) If the applicant is subsequently found ineligible for the benefits of the ABC agreement in the nonadversarial proceeding before the asylum officer, or if he is denied asylum after a full de novo hearing, the Service may reinstitute exclusion or deportation proceedings by filing a motion with the Immigration Judge to recalendar the case, and such motion need only show, through evidence of an asylum officer’s decision in the matter, that the class member’s rights under paragraph 2 of the agreement have been exercised.

(4) Neither the Board of Immigration Appeals nor the Immigration Judges will review the Service’s eligibility determinations under paragraph 2 of the ABC agreement.

(5) An interlocutory appeal will ordinarily be considered moot upon the alien’s departure under an order of exclusion and deportation, but such an appeal need not be considered moot in each and every circumstance, particularly where the order of exclusion was erroneous and the issue raised has continuing importance to the proper administration of the immigration laws. Matter of Okoh, 20 I&N Dec. 864 (BIA 1994), distinguished.

(ID 3258)

M-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 125 (BIA 1995)

(1) In asylum proceedings involving a stowaway applicant, where an adverse credibility find-ing is adequately supported by information provided in documents executed by the appli-cant, without reliance upon statements allegedly made by the applicant in his interview with an asylum officer, it is not necessary to remand the case for a record of the interview which satisfies the requirements of Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 1995). Matter of S-S-, supra, distinguished.

(2) Where new asylum proceedings are conducted as a result of some defect in the original proceedings, statements made by the applicant in the original proceedings which are rele-vant to his persecution claim may be considered in the new proceedings.

(3) In asylum proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-vice’s Office of Refugees, Asylum, and Parole, which include proceedings involving stow-away applicants, new regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(g) (1995) require an applicant who is unable to proceed with his asylum interview in English to provide, at no expense to the gov-ernment, a competent interpreter who is fluent in both English and the applicant’s native language.

(4) In the interest of developing a full and complete record for review by the Board of Immi-gration Appeals, an asylum officer should draw a stowaway applicant’s attention to any inconsistencies in his account which may be apparent at the time of his asylum interview and accord the applicant an opportunity to address those inconsistencies at the interview.

(ID 3257)

S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 1995)

(1) In order to fully and fairly review a decision of an Asylum Office Director in asylum proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals must have before it the primary evidentiary matters relied upon by the initial adjudicator.

(2) When the credibility of an applicant for asylum and withholding of deportation is placed in issue because of alleged statements made at the asylum interview, at a minimum, the record of the interview must contain a meaningful, clear, and reliable summary of the statements made by the applicant. In the alternative, a record of the interview might be preserved in a handwritten account of the specific questions asked of the applicant and his specific responses or through transcription of an electronic recording.

(ID 3256)

Fesale, 21 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1995)

(1) The remittance required by section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (1994), added by the Department of Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Act for 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 1765, equalling five times the processing fee for an application for adjustment of status, is by definition a statutorily mandated “sum,” and a requirement separate and apart from the fee which federal regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.7 (1995) require an alien to pay when filing an application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act.

(2) The statutorily mandated sum required by section 245(i) of the Act cannot be waived by an Immigration Judge under the “fee waiver” provisions of 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.24 and 103.7 (1995), based on a showing of an alien’s indigency.

(ID 3255)

Khalifah, 21 I&N Dec. 107 (BIA 1995)

An alien subject to criminal proceedings for alleged terrorist activities in the country to which the Immigration and Naturalization Service seeks to deport him is appropriately ordered detained without bond as a poor bail risk.

(ID 3254)

L-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 89 (BIA 1995) , Modified, Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N 390 (BIA 2002)

(1) A federal definition applies to determine whether or not a crime is a “felony” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1994), and therefore is an “aggravated felony” under section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. V 1993).

(2) For immigration purposes, a state drug offense qualifies as a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) if it is punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.). Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), and Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1990), reaffirmed.

(3) Although we disagree with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), which holds that an alien’s state conviction for a drug offense that is a felony under state law, but a misdemeanor under federal law, qualifies as a conviction for an aggravated felony, we will follow this decision in matters arising within the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction.

(ID 3253)

Powell, 21 I&N Dec. 81 (BIA 1995)

(1) Under section 242B(e)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(3) (1994), an alien who has received oral notice in the alien’s native language or in another language the alien understands and written notice in the final order of deportation of the consequences for failing to appear for deportation, and who nevertheless fails to appear for deportation at the time and place ordered, other than because of exceptional circumstances, is ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994), for a period of 5 years after the date the alien was required to appear for deportation.

(2) When the Board of Immigration Appeals dismisses an appeal from an order of deportation issued an Immigration Judge, the Immigration Judge’s order becomes the final order of deportation on the date of the Board’s decision.

(3) Written notice of the consequences of an alien’s failure to appear for deportation, provided in conjunction with an Immigration Judge’s final order of deportation, constitutes the written notice required by section 242B(e)(3) of the Act.

(ID 3252)

D-V-, 21 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1995)

Well-founded fear of persecution in Haiti was established by a 27-year-old married female activist member of a pro-Aristide church group who was gang-raped and beaten in her home by soldiers and who was targeted by her attackers because of her political opinion and religion.

(ID 3251)

B-, 21 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 1995)

Under the circumstances of this case, where an asylum applicant’s testimony was plausible, detailed, internally consistent, consistent with the asylum application, and unembellished during the applicant’s repeated relating of events in a probing cross-examination, the Board declines to adopt the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding.

(ID 3250)

Manrique, 21 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1995)

As a matter of policy in cases dealing with drug-related convictions under state law, any alien who has been accorded rehabilitative treatment pursuant to a state statute will not be deported if he establishes that he would have been eligible for federal first offender treatment under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1988) had he been prosecuted under federal law. Matter of Deris, 20 I&N Dec. 5 (BIA 1989); Matter of Garcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985); Matter of Carrillo, 19 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1984); Matter of Forstner, 18 I&N Dec. 374 (BIA 1983); Matter of Golshan, 18 I&N Dec. 92 (BIA 1981); Matter of Kaneda, 16 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 1979); Matter of Haddad, 16 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 1977); and Matter of Werk, 16 I&N Dec. 234 (BIA 1977), modified.

(ID 3249)

Compean, 21 I&N Dec. 51 (BIA 1995)

To be eligible for relief under section 212(d)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) (Supp. V 1993), both a lawful permanent resident alien returning from a temporary trip abroad and an alien seeking admission or adjustment of status as an immediate relative or family-sponsored immigrant under sections 203(a)(1)-(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. V 1993), must show that the object of the alien’s smuggling attempt was the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter.

(ID 3248)

Chairez, 21 I&N Dec. 44 (BIA 1995)

(1) A right to appeal such issues as whether a violation of probation has occurred or the sentence imposed upon entry of judgment was correct will not prevent a finding of a final con-viction for immigration purposes under the third prong of the standard set forth in Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988), which requires that any further proceedings available to an alien must relate to the issue of “guilt or innocence of the original charge.”

(2) After a breach of a condition of an order deferring judgment and sentence under Colorado Revised Statutes § 16-7-403, no further proceedings are available to a defendant to contest his guilt.

(3) Where the period during which the respondent’s judgment and sentence were deferred under Colorado law had been completed, any right he may have had to appeal had lapsed and could no longer prevent a finding that his conviction was final.

(ID 3247)

Arreguin, 21 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1995)

(1) An alien who has committed a serious drug offense faces a difficult task in establishing that she merits discretionary relief; nevertheless, the applicant met her burden of demonstrating that relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. V 1993), was warranted where this was her only conviction, the sentencing court noted her acceptance of responsibility and “minor role” in the offense, there was substantial evidence of efforts toward rehabilitation, and the applicant presented unusual or outstanding equities, including nearly 20 years of lawful residence and two minor dependent United States citizen children.

(2) In considering the factors to be weighed in the exercise of discretion with regard to an application for relief under section 212(c) of the Act, evidence such as community ties, property and business holdings, or special service to the community are to be considered in the applicant’s favor; however, the absence of those additional ties in themselves does not negate the weight to be accorded an applicant’s long residence in this country.

(ID 3246)

Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 27 (BIA 1995)

(1) Under section 242B(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993), service of the Order to Show Cause (Form I-221) must be given in person to the respondent or, if personal service is not practicable, such notice must be given by certified mail to the respondent or to his counsel of record, if any, with the requirement that the certified mail receipt be signed by the respondent or a responsible person at the respondent’s address to accomplish personal service. Matter of Huete, 20 I&N Dec. 250 (BIA 1991), followed.

(2) Under sections 242B(a)(2) and (c)(1) of the Act, written notice of the deportation proceedings sent by certified mail to the respondent at the last address provided by the respondent is sufficient to establish proper service by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Proof of actual service or receipt of the notice by the respondent is not required to effect service. It is incumbent upon the respondent to provide an address where he can receive mail in a regular and timely manner.

(3) For purposes of section 242B(a)(2) of the Act, “in person” service of the notice of deportation proceeding is deemed “not practicable” when the respondent is not in immigration court before the Immigration Judge.

(4) In cases where service of a notice of a deportation proceeding is sent by certified mail through the United States Postal Service and there is proof of attempted delivery and notification of certified mail, a strong presumption of effective service arises which only may be overcome by the affirmative defense of nondelivery or improper delivery by the Postal Service.

(ID 3245)

Thomas, 21 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 1995)

(1) Inasmuch as a conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until direct appellate review has been exhausted or waived, a non-final conviction cannot support a charge of deportability, and likewise does not trigger a statutory bar to relief, under a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act premised on the existence of a conviction.

(2) In determining whether an application for relief is merited as a matter of discretion, evidence of unfavorable conduct, including criminal conduct which has not culminated in a final conviction for purposes of the Act, may be considered.

(3) When considering evidence of criminality in conjunction with an application for discretionary relief, the probative value of and corresponding weight, if any, assigned to that evidence will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature and strength of the evidence presented.

(ID 3244)

Xiu Hong Li, Beneficiary of visa petition filed by Bao Yi Xu, 21 I&N Dec.13 (BIA 1995)

(1) If the provisions of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988), have been invoked in order to obtain or confer an immigration benefit by virtue of an adoptive relationship, the natural relationship will not thereafter be recognized for immigration purposes even if it is established that the adoptive relationship has been legally terminated.

(2) A natural parent-child relationship can again be recognized for immigration purposes following the legal termination of an adoption meeting the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act if the petitioner can establish the following four criteria: (1) that no immigration benefit was obtained or conferred through the adoptive relationship, (2) that a natural parent-child relationship meeting the requirements of section 101(b) of the Act once existed, (3) that the adoption has been lawfully terminated under applicable law, and (4) that the natural relationship has been reestablished by law.

(ID 3243)

Esposito, 21 I&N Dec.1 (BIA 1995)

(1) For purposes of section 212(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) (1988), and its successor provision at section 212(a)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993), a sentence is “actually imposed” where a criminal court suspends the execution of a sentence, but no sentence is “actually imposed” where the imposition of sentence is suspended. Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (1988), followed.

(2) Section 212(c) of the Act is ineffective to waive deportability under former section 241(a)(14) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(14) (1988), or section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993), for conviction of a firearms violation, even where the firearms violation is one of two or more crimes which may render the alien inadmissible under section 212(a)(10) [now section 212(a)(2)(B)] of the Act. Matter of Montenegro, 20 I&N Dec. 603 (BIA 1992); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990; A.G. 1991), aff’d, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); and Matter of Wadud, 19 I&N Dec. 182 (BIA 1984), followed.