

Draft for Internal Use Only – Preliminary Results

**Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism?
Some Evidence From Local Broadcast News**

Working Paper

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Abstract

In the interest of pursuing localism, the Federal Communications Commission chose to locally license and encourage local ownership of television stations. This choice traded-off channel capacity and thus diminished diversity and competition. To assess the gains of this policy, we estimate the impact of broadcast television station characteristics on the number of local news seconds, local on-location news seconds, and the ratio of local to total news seconds. OLS results suggest that local ownership adds almost four minutes of local news, and almost three minutes of local on-location news.

1. Introduction

The allocation of broadcast television and radio licenses by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had some intent of promoting localism. This localism objective, and the assignment of broadcast frequency to local communities, had at least one important opportunity cost: a greater number of national networks, and hence a greater number of VHF channels for residents of most locales. Given the constraints imposed by available spectrum and power, every resident in the US could have accessed six national VHF channels; instead the available frequencies were assigned to local channels, precluding additional national networks and limiting residents of many localities to far less than six VHF channels.¹

This discussion hints at a tension between the FCC's three policy objectives of localism, diversity, and competition. Specifically, promoting localism in the allocation of broadcast television licenses diminished diversity and competition by reducing the number of VHF channels available to most US residents. A natural question emerges from this discussion: what localism benefits did the FCC's policy generate in return for this trade-off?

In this paper, we construct a measure of localism and analyze the actual *output* of local broadcast news stations using a highly-granular database of local broadcast news content. We then relate our measure of local content in broadcast news back to variables of interest, including ownership structure. We find that local ownership of television stations adds almost four minutes of local news and almost three minutes of local on-location news.

We organize the paper as follows. In Section Two, we briefly summarize some regulatory history relating to the question of localism. In Section Three, we give a brief review of literature relating to localism. In Section Four, we introduce our measure of localism. In Section Five, we discuss our data and methodology.

¹ Some may contend that the modern MVPD universe (i.e., cable and satellite) makes irrelevant the concern over an additional one-to-six VHF channels. However, because a single VHF channel can be subdivided into several digital channels, the upcoming transition to digital signals multiplies the opportunity cost of each lost VHF channel.

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In Section Six, we present our results. In Section Seven, we make some concluding remarks.

2. Localism and the Federal Communications Commission

Adopted on April 11, 1952, the FCC's Sixth Report and Order, in Docket 8736 and 8975, assigned television spectrum using "five priorities."² The five priorities were: (1) provide at least one television station to all parts of the United States; (2) provide each community with at least one television broadcast station; (3) provide a choice of at least two television services to all parts of the United States; (4) provide each community with at least two television broadcast stations; (5) assign any channels which remained under the foregoing priorities to the various communities depending on the size of the population of each community, the geographical location of such community, and the number of television services available to such community from television stations located in other communities.

The five priorities were originally expounded in the March 22, 1951, Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making. Interestingly, these principles may be based on a facially innocuous misquoting of the 1934 Act. The Third Notice said that it had "endeavored to meet the twofold objective set forth in Sections 1 and 307(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, to provide television service, as far as possible to all people of the United States and to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of television broadcast **stations** to the several states and communities" (emphasis added). However, Section 307(b) of the 1934 Federal Communications Act states that "the Commission shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio **service** to each of the same" (emphasis added).

The apparently modest distinction between stations and service may have implications. Had the FCC licensed the television spectrum nationally, then all

² Paragraph 63.

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viewers in all localities could have received 6 VHF channels, which could have carried 6 national television networks. By licensing stations locally, the FCC created a less equitable distribution of service for viewers: due to spectrum scarcities, viewers in smaller localities received fewer VHF channels. Thus, changing a single word in the quotation of Section 307 (b) of the 1934 Act may have committed the FCC to pursue a licensing policy that violated the text of the Act.³

Aside from legal issues, in pursuing priority (2) to guarantee at least one channel to each locality and priority (4) to guarantee at least two channels to each locality (in combination with rules capping ownership at five VHF stations), the FCC traded channel space, which would have provided more competition and diversity, for locally-licensed and locally-owned channels.

Our study suggests that local ownership of broadcast television stations appears to promote greater localism in local news content than non-local ownership, and especially network owned-and-operated stations. We suggest that there may be a relatively simple reason for this: economies of scale in program distribution favor non-local content. Simply, given a fixed cost of producing news content, multi-station owners can spread those fixed costs over more stations by distributing the same content across many localities. This content will be non-local for most localities. It is possible that local owners cannot capture these efficiencies, and thus a local owner has a higher cost of providing non-local content. This higher cost, *ceteris paribus*, induces a local owner to favor local content.⁴

Moreover, a local owner may be most likely to access local advertisers, which may lower the opportunity cost of providing local programming. This may provide a market-based inducement for the local owner to favor local programming.⁵

³ In fairness to the FCC, this interpretation may have been motivated by their reading of Congressional intent. Given the FCC's reliance on annual Congressional appropriations, Congressional intent may motivate the FCC more than the text of Congressional statutes.

⁴ FCC rulemakings and information given by television and radio broadcasters during merger applications often include efficiencies as a motivating factor. We are simply taking this explanation at face value.

⁵ It is worth noting that non-local content may be more appealing to viewers than local content.

3. Localism Literature

Literature relating to cultural rationales for localism includes the works of Briffault (1988), Frug (1980), Bernard (1973), Donner (1998), Neuman (1991), Morgan (1986), Emig (1995) and Napoli (2001), among others. Much of this output focuses on distinctive cultural values and traditions within local communities, and the function media plays in reinforcing or diminishing these values and traditions.

Literature relating to political rationales for localism includes the works of Briffault (1988, 1990), Collins (1980), Pateman (1970), Frug (1980), Cook (1998), McChesney (1993), and Napoli (1997a, 1998a, 2001). Hamilton (2003) summarizes much of the literature relating to the political economy of news production. Typically, this literature explores the relationship between localism and the diffusion of political power, and posits media organizations as critical institutions in the political process. In particular, this literature suggests that media can provide incentives for political participation, as well as information that is (generically) voter-relevant.

Two recent economic studies are noteworthy in this context. George and Waldfogel (2002) find that an increase in local penetration by the New York Times decreases local penetration by the local newspaper, reducing local news content, and participation in local elections. This result provides empirical evidence that suggests consumption of local media may confer consumption externalities. Stromberg (forthcoming (a)) explores the introduction of a new source of information, specifically radio, and the flow of federal funds in the New Deal era. According to Stromberg:

Media influences the political strength of different groups by affecting who is informed and who is not. The results of this paper indicate that radio improved the relative ability of rural America to attract government transfers, as the estimated radio effects are significantly larger in rural areas. In total, radio is estimated to have increased the funds allocated to a rural county, relative to an identical urban county, by around 50 percent. (p.25)

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Thus, according to Stromberg, radio's role in informing voters had a large and significant influence relating to the actual local destinations of federal funds.

4. A Definition and Measure of Localism

As we noted above, we utilize a new database of actual news stories broadcast on local television news and establish a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for defining a given news story as local. Our definition and measure of localism is determined, in part, by the delineation of designated market areas (DMA) as determined by Nielsen Media Research, an independent, third-party audience measurement system. According to Nielsen, "In designing the DMA regions, Nielsen Media Research uses proprietary criteria, testing methodologies and data to partition regions of the United States into geographically distinct television viewing areas, and then expresses them in unique, carefully defined regions that are meaningful to the specific business we conduct."⁶ The "specific business" referred to above is the sale of advertising time and space to advertisers. According to the California Newspaper Publishers Association:

DMA is a term used by advertising agencies to define specific geographical areas where groups of people tend to live, work and conduct their normal day-to-day activities similar to others in the same general region. DMA boundaries are often defined by significant geographical changes in a region's landscape such as mountain ranges, deserts, or sparsely populated areas. These "natural barriers" often tend to create different and unique lifestyles among entire populations of people, creating unique and identifiable designated market areas. Each DMA generally has its own unique market characteristics and measurable consumer media usage patterns used by media buyers to help identify the newspapers, TV and radio stations most likely to reach the audience targeted by the client.⁷

⁶ Federal Communications Commission document, Letter from Nielsen Media Research to the Commission, April 3, 2003, 98-206. Geographic continuity is a standard feature of all 210 DMAs except three.

⁷ California Newspaper Publishers Association, http://www.cnpa.com/snap/dma_map.htm

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In what follows, we base our measure of localism on the conceptual framework established by the construction of designated market areas. Thus, the “necessary” part of our necessary and sufficient conditions for localism is that the story takes place within the DMA.

A second element of localism, our “sufficient” condition, concerns the news stories themselves, i.e., when is a story reported by a station within the DMA a “local” story? Our decision rule is that the story is local if the story is of at least marginally greater importance to the mean individual residing within the DMA, and if we believe the mean individual within the DMA would identify the story as local. Thus, it is the value of the story to the individual within a DMA, and that individual’s perception of the story as local relative to individuals in other DMAs, that gives the story its “sufficient” local context.⁸

For example, Federal budget negotiations in Washington, D.C., take place within that DMA and, given the large population of local interested parties, the mean individual in the Washington, D.C., DMA is likely more interested in the Federal budget negotiations than the mean individual in other DMAs. However, even the mean individuals in the Washington, D.C., DMA would likely perceive the Federal budget negotiations as a national issue. Hence, Federal budget negotiations are classified as non-local even within the Washington, D.C., DMA. Note that these “hard cases” are the exception rather than the rule.

5. Data and Methodology

Our database consists of 4,078 individual news stories from five different days, with length measured in seconds, drawn from sixty stations across 20 DMAs.⁹ We categorized each story as either local or non-local, based on the

⁸ Everyday weather and sports were not included in the original data set, and are not reflected in our analysis. However, exceptional weather events (e.g., tornado, avalanche, heat wave, sandstorm, blizzard, fire, flood, earthquake, hurricane, typhoon, tsunami, meteor impacts), were covered as news.

⁹ The data, all from 1998, were obtained from www.localtvnews.org and were gathered by the Project for Excellence in Journalism. A comprehensive description can be found at <http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/ownership/default.asp>. According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, “market selection was performed based on Nielsen Media Research market rankings. Markets were grouped into four quartiles on the basis of the number

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criteria given in Section 3.¹⁰ We also categorized the stories as to whether the station utilized live location reporting on those stories. This yielded 275 station-level observations on the number of total news seconds, the number of local news seconds, and the number of local live location seconds.¹¹

We adjust for all “circumstance of time and place” by creating a series of 97 dummy variables that interact the day and the DMA.^{12,13} This allows us to adjust for all unobserved heterogeneity created by events on any particular day in any particular DMA (e.g., a fire in Wichita on March 9th).

We regress the number of seconds of total news, local news, and on-location local news on thirteen station characteristics, which we list and describe in Table One.¹⁴ We derive the data on station characteristics from the May 1998 BIA Television Database and the website Business.com.

One important concern relating to nearly all empirical studies is sample selection. In our study, we observe news seconds for only those stations airing local news during our sampled time slot. If local ownership decreases the likelihood of airing a local news program (because local owners do not enjoy the cost advantages in non-local news content that may stem from non-local ownership), this could bias standard regression estimates.

of television households in each. Markets were then chosen randomly within each quartile, after stratification in order to ensure geographic diversity. Within each market, the highest-rated half-hour timeslot for news was studied.”

<http://www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/ownership/methodology.asp>.

¹⁰We classified the news clips before we observed the station characteristics (or even the stations) that comprise our set of independent variables.

¹¹ Not every station was in the sample on every day, which is why we obtain 275 (not 300) station level observations. Appendix A displays the list of stations, their DMAs, and their owners. In addition, Appendix A lists the means, minima, and maxima of the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, and local live location news seconds.

¹² Not all DMAs are present in every sample day; therefore we have a total of 98 DMA day pairs (rather than 100).

¹³These dummies adjust for all DMA characteristics, including market size. Because we have DMA day dummies and all of the stations in a given DMA on a given day share the same time slot, our DMA dummy completely accounts for all time slot variation.

¹⁴ Our sample consists of stations from a stratified random sample of markets. We can therefore consistently estimate the effect of our exogenous variables on localism, because any possible sample selection takes place on an independent variable, and our independent variables are exogenous. As Wooldridge (2002, p.555) notes: “When x is exogenous and we apply OLS to the selected sample...we can select the sample on the basis of explanatory variables.” Since the selection indicator does not correlate with the dependent variable (which means that $E(u|x,s)=0$), our estimates are consistent.

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However, we observe all of the original three network affiliates/O&Os in our sample DMAs. This is not surprising, as the original three networks air national news broadcasts and air a 10:00PM-11:00PM hour of network programming, both of which provide their local stations with two unique characteristics that lead all of these stations to air local news at particular times during the day.

This implies that if we did observe all of the characteristics of all of the stations in all of our markets and ran a first-stage Heckman selection probit, being an “original three” network O&O/affiliate (or, equivalently, having the unique characteristics thereof) would be a perfect predictor of selection success. We can therefore employ a sample consisting only of “original three” network affiliates and employ standard regression techniques, because the inverse mills ratio derived from the first-stage Heckman selection probit would not vary among these observations.

6. Estimation and Results

We estimate four models: two OLS models estimating the effect of station characteristics on total news seconds and local news seconds; one Tobit model estimating the effect of station characteristics on local on-location news seconds, and a fractional logit model estimating the effect of station characteristics on the fraction of local to total news. For the first two models (total news and local news), we also employ robust regression to adjust for possible outliers.¹⁵ Specifically, we estimate:

$$(1) \text{ Total News Seconds} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \alpha_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \alpha_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \alpha_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \alpha_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \alpha_6(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \alpha_7(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \alpha_8(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_a$$

¹⁵ To the degree observations are outliers, Robust Regression weights those observations inversely.

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$$(2) \text{ Total Local News Seconds} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \beta_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \beta_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \beta_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \beta_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \beta_6(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \beta_7(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \beta_8(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\beta$$

$$(3) \text{ Total On Location Local News Seconds} = \varphi_0 + \varphi_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \varphi_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \varphi_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \varphi_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \varphi_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \varphi_6(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \varphi_7(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \varphi_8(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\varphi$$

$$(4) \frac{\text{Local News Seconds}}{\text{Total New Seconds}} = \vartheta_0 + \vartheta_1(\text{Owned \& Operated}) + \vartheta_2(\text{Own Cities}) + \vartheta_3(\text{Local Owner}) + \vartheta_4(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \vartheta_5(\text{Cross Radio}) + \vartheta_6(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \vartheta_7(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \vartheta_8(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\vartheta$$

Table Two reports the results of Regression 1 relating the number of total news seconds to station characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 in Table Two report the OLS and Robust Regression coefficient of each variable, which is the number of seconds of total news added or subtracted by a station characteristic.

Interpreting the statistically significant OLS results, we find that local ownership adds over 169 seconds (almost three minutes) of total news to the local broadcast.¹⁶ When the owner is local, within-DMA cross-radio ownership subtracts over 120 seconds (over two minutes) of total news to the local broadcast. Finally, the number of total news seconds declines almost 9 for each additional DMA in which the owner has a television station.

However, these results are not robust to Robust Regression, which implies that an outlier or outliers may be influencing the OLS results.

Table Three reports the results of Regression 2 relating the number of local news seconds to station characteristics. Interpreting the statistically significant results, owned and operated stations air almost 93 fewer seconds (over one and a half minutes) of local news. The number of local news seconds declines by almost three seconds for each DMA in which the owner has a television station. Local owners air over 223 more seconds (almost four minutes) of local news.¹⁷ The number of local news seconds increases by over 67 seconds

¹⁶ We obtain 169.20 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner * own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

¹⁷ We obtain 223.36 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner * own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

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(over one minute) if a non-local station owner also owns a radio station within the DMA. Finally, if the local owner also owns a radio station within the DMA, the number of seconds of local news declines by over 268 seconds (over four minutes).¹⁸

In this specification, all of the results (except for non-local cross-radio) are robust to Robust Regression. Note, that the Robust Regression cross-radio coefficient is still positive, which implies that outliers do not move against the relationship in the rest of the data.

Table Four reports the results of Tobit Regression 3 relating the number of local on-location news seconds to station characteristics. Local on-location news seconds reflects a greater degree of actual investment in local news coverage, since on-location reporting requires the dedication of specific assets (e.g., camera crews, reporters, vehicles, etc.). Local ownership adds almost 178 local on-location news seconds (almost 3 minutes).¹⁹ If the local owner also owns a radio station within the DMA, the number of seconds of local news declines by over 198 seconds (over three minutes). Finally, UHF stations air over 51 seconds (almost one minute) more local on-location news seconds.

Table Five reports the results of fractional logit Regression 4, relating the ratio of local news to total news to station characteristics.²⁰ Interpreting the statistically significant coefficients,²¹ the fraction of local news is 6.6% less on owned and operated stations. Ownership of a radio station within the DMA increases the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news by 5.3%. Finally, if a

¹⁸ We obtain 268.02 seconds by adding the estimated (local owner*cross-radio) effect to the cross-radio effect.

¹⁹ We obtain 177.85 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner * own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

²⁰ Papke and Wooldridge (1996) detail the fractional logit estimation technique. Papke (2004) outlines the Stata command for implementing the fractional logit technique. Stata 8 users should add the command "IRLS" following the comma in the GLM command to employ maximum quasi-likelihood estimation.

²¹ The coefficient on local ownership is not significant. This is because the dependent variable is a fraction with total news in the denominator, and local ownership also increases the amount of total news, which would reduce the fraction.

local owner owns radio station within the DMA, the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news decreases by 18.5%.²²

7. Conclusions

We estimate station characteristics' impact on the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, local on-location news seconds, and the fraction of total news seconds devoted to local news. We find that local ownership adds almost four minutes of local news and almost three minutes of local on-location news. Local on-location news seconds may reflect a greater degree of actual investment in local news coverage, since on-location reporting requires the dedication of specific assets (e.g., camera crews, reporters, vehicles, etc.).

Ownership of a radio station by a local owner diminishes the effect of local ownership on news coverage. Specifically, we find that radio cross-ownership by the local owner decreases local news coverage by over four minutes, and decreases local on-location news coverage by over three minutes.

As we suggested in this paper, the ownership rules that have emerged from recent FCC rule-makings and subsequent Congressional action may not promote localism.²³ On the contrary, ownership rules have been relaxed in a context where licensing policy trades away diversity and competition for the goal of localism. Relaxed ownership rules, which may decrease localism, when combined with the extant licensing policy sacrificing diversity and competition, might in fact provide the worst possible policy outcome.

If there were six national networks, these networks could also likely attain at least the same scale economies as extent multi-market station owners, and all viewers could enjoy the enhanced diversity and competition generated by six VHF channels. Arguably, Congress might consider committing to a lower national ownership cap, or allow the FCC to drop the objective of localism in

²² We obtain 18.5% by adding the Cross-Radio marginal effect to the [(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)] marginal effect.

²³ This finding has no clear implications for consumer welfare, since we do not explicitly model the relationship between localism and consumer welfare in our paper. However, see Stromberg (forthcoming (a), forthcoming (b)).

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broadcast television and let consumers enjoy the fruits of increased VHF channel space, diversity, and competition.

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Table One: Independent Variable Names and Descriptions

Variable	Description
Owned & Operated	Dummy Variable Indicating O&O
Own Cities	Total Number of DMAs in Which the Station Owner Owns a Station
Local Owner	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner is Headquartered Within the DMA
Owns Newspapers	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner Owns Newspapers in Other DMAs
Cross Radio	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner Owns a Radio Station Within the DMA
UHF	Dummy Variable Indicating Channel Above 13
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	The Total Number of DMAs in Which a Local Station Owner Owns a Station
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	Interaction Dummy Indicating a Local Owner That Owns Newspapers in Other DMAs
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	Interaction Dummy Indicating a Local Owner That Owns a Radio Station Within the DMA

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Table Two: Number of Total News Seconds to Station Characteristics

Variable	OLS Regression	Robust Regression
	Coefficient (t-statistic)	Coefficient (t-Statistic)
Owned & Operated	-37.48 (-1.33)	-43.74 (-1.51)
Own Cities	-1.17 (-0.89)	0.11 (0.12)
Local Owner	178.73** (2.16)	-66.73 (-1.64)
Owns Newspapers	-6.97 (-0.28)	11.46 (0.67)
Cross Radio	-6.46 (-0.30)	-23.95 (-0.91)
UHF	-5.48 (-0.18)	31.92 (1.65)
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-8.53* (-1.87)	-1.70 (-0.44)
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	15.87 (0.27)	39.44 (0.75)
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-124.50* (1.86)	50.65 (1.12)
Observations = 275	R ² = 0.70	
	Robust Standard Errors	

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

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Table Three: Number of Local News Seconds to Station Characteristics

Variable	OLS Regression Coefficient (t-statistic)	Robust Regression Coefficient (t-Statistic)
Owned & Operated	-92.75** (-2.43)	-68.25* (1.68)
Own Cities	-2.88* (-1.88)	-2.83** (-2.29)
Local Owner	226.24*** (3.00)	113.88** (1.99)
Owns Newspapers	-16.04 (-0.56)	9.36 (0.39)
Cross Radio	67.33** (2.17)	44.06 (1.20)
UHF	-42.87 (-1.26)	-23.64 (0.87)
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-5.30 (-1.11)	-3.26 (-0.60)
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	-21.15 (-0.36)	7.56 (0.10)
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-335.35*** (-5.21)	-227.48*** (-3.60)
Observations = 275	R ² = 0.68	
	Robust Standard Errors	

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

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Table Four: Tobit Regression, Number of Local On-Location News Seconds to Station Characteristics

Variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Owned & Operated	14.15	0.39
Own Cities	-0.26	-0.23
Local Owner	179.34***	3.47
Owens Newspapers	-4.01	-0.18
Cross Radio	29.91	0.89
UHF	51.25**	2.09
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-1.49	-0.31
(Local Owner) * (Owens Newspapers)	12.93	0.19
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-198.33***	-3.47
Observations = 275	Pseudo R ² = 0.07	

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

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Table Five: Local News as a Fraction of Total News

(In Column 2, Percentages are Expressed as Whole Numbers)

Variable	Marginal Effect	Z-Statistic
Owned & Operated	-6.60%**	-2.45
Own Cities	-0.18%*	-1.86
Local Owner	4.82%	1.43
Owens Newspapers	-1.65%	-0.89
Cross Radio	5.31%***	2.88
UHF	-3.91%	-1.61
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	0.12%	0.45
(Local Owner) * (Owens Newspapers)	-2.21%	-0.58
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-23.78%***	-5.56
Observations = 275		

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

Appendix A

City	Station	DMA	Statistic	Total News Seconds	Local News Seconds	Local Location	Channel	Owner	Total Owned	Within DMA Cross-Radio Ownership	Within DMA Newspaper Ownership	Other DMA Newspaper Ownership	O&O (1, Yes)	Affiliate (1, Yes)	Network
Albuquerque	KOAT	49	mean	922	674	355	7		30	0	0	1	0	1	ABC
Albuquerque	KOAT	49	min	863	589	190	7	Hearst-Argyle TV	30	0	0	1	0	1	ABC
Albuquerque	KOAT	49	max	969	755	633	7		30	0	0	1	0	1	ABC
Albuquerque	KOB	49	mean	839	669	379	4	Hubbard	5	0	0	0	1	0	NBC
Albuquerque	KOB	49	min	787	553	109	4	Broadcasting	5	0	0	0	1	0	NBC
Albuquerque	KOB	49	max	911	864	669	4		5	0	0	0	1	0	NBC
Albuquerque	KRQE	49	mean	853	649	340	13	Lee Enterprises	9	0	0	1	0	1	CBS
Albuquerque	KRQE	49	min	662	462	144	13		9	0	0	1	0	1	CBS
Albuquerque	KRQE	49	max	948	799	591	13		9	0	0	1	0	1	CBS
Atlanta	WGNX	10	mean	941	638	315	46		18	0	0	1	0	1	CBS
Atlanta	WGNX	10	min	844	569	250	46	Tribune Broadcasting	18	0	0	1	0	1	CBS
Atlanta	WGNX	10	max	1034	700	484	46		18	0	0	1	0	1	CBS
Atlanta	WSB	10	mean	911	627	371	2		9	1	0	1	0	1	ABC
Atlanta	WSB	10	min	823	441	274	2	Cox Broadcasting	9	1	1	1	0	1	ABC
Atlanta	WSB	10	max	1040	773	465	2		9	1	1	1	0	1	ABC
Atlanta	WXIA	10	mean	891	698	406	11		21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC
Atlanta	WXIA	10	min	728	486	285	11	Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC
Atlanta	WXIA	10	max	1022	904	525	11		21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC
Boston	WBZ	6	mean	754	470	353	4		17	1	0	0	1	0	CBS
Boston	WBZ	6	min	595	260	177	4	CBS Station Group	17	1	0	0	1	0	CBS
Boston	WBZ	6	max	830	719	550	4		17	1	0	0	1	0	CBS
Boston	WCVB	6	mean	806	479	140	5		30	1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Boston	WCVB	6	min	664	299	0	5	Hearst-Argyle TV	30	1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Boston	WCVB	6	max	920	634	310	5		30	1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Boston	WHDH	6	mean	869	477	148	7	Sunbeam Television Corp	2	0	0	0	0	1	NBC
Boston	WHDH	6	min	837	424	0	7		2	0	0	0	0	1	NBC
Boston	WHDH	6	max	933	559	311	7		2	0	0	0	0	1	NBC
Buffalo	WGRZ	44	mean	670	640	451	2		21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC
Buffalo	WGRZ	44	min	575	528	312	2	Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC
Buffalo	WGRZ	44	max	790	790	507	2		21	0	0	1	0	1	NBC
Buffalo	WIVB	44	mean	668	636	458	4		8	0	0	0	0	1	CBS
Buffalo	WIVB	44	min	586	426	285	4	LIN Television Corporation	8	0	0	0	0	1	CBS
Buffalo	WIVB	44	max	720	720	577	4		8	0	0	0	0	1	CBS
Buffalo	WKBW	44	mean	940	809	592	7		9	0	0	0	0	1	ABC
Buffalo	WKBW	44	min	662	389	300	7	Granite Broadcasting	9	0	0	0	0	1	ABC
Buffalo	WKBW	44	max	1404	1282	951	7		9	0	0	0	0	1	ABC
Burlington	WCAX	91	mean	1448	1430	395	3		1	0	0	0	0	1	CBS
Burlington	WCAX	91	min	1415	1360	281	3	Mt Mansfield	1	0	0	0	0	1	CBS

Appendix A

Burlington	WCAX	91	max	1509	1509	520	3	Television	1	0	0	0	1	CBS
Burlington	WPTZ	91	mean	822	670	263	5	Hearst-Argyle TV	30	0	1	0	1	NBC
Burlington	WPTZ	91	min	755	506	111	5		30	0	0	0	1	NBC
Burlington	WPTZ	91	max	863	787	332	5		30	0	1	0	1	NBC
Burlington	WVNY	91	mean	736	619	222	22	Straightline	1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Burlington	WVNY	91	min	640	327	100	22	Communications	1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Burlington	WVNY	91	max	844	844	299	22		1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Chicago	WBMM	3	mean	858	717	545	2		17	1	0	1	0	CBS
Chicago	WBMM	3	min	788	607	511	2	CBS Station Group	17	1	0	0	1	CBS
Chicago	WBMM	3	max	927	826	578	2		17	1	0	0	1	CBS
Chicago	WLS	3	mean	899	774	459	7		10	1	0	0	1	ABC
Chicago	WLS	3	min	769	654	313	7	ABC Inc	10	1	0	0	1	ABC
Chicago	WLS	3	max	991	909	641	7		10	1	0	0	1	ABC
Chicago	WMAQ	3	mean	904	704	407	5		13	0	0	0	1	NBC
Chicago	WMAQ	3	min	867	511	317	5	NBC/GE	13	0	0	0	1	NBC
Chicago	WMAQ	3	max	975	834	546	5		13	0	0	0	1	NBC
Evansville	WEHT	98	mean	522	491	358	25		1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Evansville	WEHT	98	min	487	436	325	25	Gilmore Broadcasting	1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Evansville	WEHT	98	max	551	551	398	25		1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Evansville	WEVV	98	mean	777	585	375	44		1	0	0	0	1	ABC
Evansville	WEVV	98	min	620	485	215	44	WEVV Inc	1	0	0	0	1	CBS
Evansville	WEVV	98	max	866	659	469	44		1	0	0	0	1	CBS
Evansville	WFIE	98	mean	630	333	49	14		11	0	0	0	1	NBC
Evansville	WFIE	98	min	520	238	0	14	Cosmos Broadcasting	11	0	0	0	1	NBC
Evansville	WFIE	98	max	702	400	146	14		11	0	0	0	1	NBC
Jacksonville	WJXT	52	mean	665	648	372	4		6	0	0	1	0	CBS
Jacksonville	WJXT	52	min	638	620	305	4	Post-Newsweek Stations	6	0	0	1	0	CBS
Jacksonville	WJXT	52	max	713	713	409	4		6	0	0	1	0	CBS
Jacksonville	WJXX	52	mean	796	733	585	25		9	0	0	0	1	ABC
Jacksonville	WJXX	52	min	715	691	511	25	Allbritton	9	0	0	0	1	ABC
Jacksonville	WJXX	52	max	891	773	625	25	Communications	9	0	0	0	1	ABC
Jacksonville	WTLV	52	mean	639	566	286	12		21	0	0	1	0	NBC
Jacksonville	WTLV	52	min	558	453	189	12	Gannett Company	21	0	0	1	0	NBC
Jacksonville	WTLV	52	max	736	697	377	12		21	0	0	1	0	NBC
Lansing	WILX	107	mean	522	354	253	10		21	0	0	0	1	NBC
Lansing	WILX	107	min	460	281	212	10	Benedek Broadcasting	21	0	0	0	1	NBC
Lansing	WILX	107	max	592	498	331	10		21	0	0	0	1	NBC
Lansing	WLAJ	107	mean	661	317	199	53		8	0	0	1	1	ABC
Lansing	WLAJ	107	min	591	202	125	53	Freedom	8	0	1	0	1	ABC
Lansing	WLAJ	107	max	719	409	267	53	Communications	8	0	0	1	1	ABC
Lansing	WLNS	107	mean	527	343	186	6		14	0	0	0	1	CBS
Lansing	WLNS	107	min	452	185	88	6	Young Broadcasting	14	0	0	0	1	CBS

Appendix A

City	Station	Time	Max	Min	Mean	Rating	Company	Weeks	Viewers	Share	Advertiser	Network
Pittsburgh	WPXI	20	1068	861	470	11		9	0	1		NBC
Pittsburgh	WTAE	20	840	535	247	4		30	0	1		CBS
Pittsburgh	WTAE	20	817	471	124	4	Hearst-Argyle TV	30	0	1		CBS
Pittsburgh	WTAE	20	914	583	420	4		30	0	1		CBS
Seattle	KING	12	992	593	346	5		18	0	1		NBC
Seattle	KING	12	805	483	142	5	Belo Corporation	18	0	1		NBC
Seattle	KING	12	1192	854	568	5		18	0	1		NBC
Seattle	KIRO	12	985	618	290	7		9	0	1		CBS
Seattle	KIRO	12	949	497	207	7	Cox Broadcasting	9	0	1		CBS
Seattle	KIRO	12	1025	833	516	7		9	0	1		CBS
Seattle	KOMO	12	947	503	243	4		2	1	0		ABC
Seattle	KOMO	12	843	378	141	4	Fisher Broadcasting Inc	2	1	0		ABC
Seattle	KOMO	12	1130	652	368	4		2	1	0		ABC
St. Louis	KDNL	21	853	564	416	30		28	0	0		ABC
St. Louis	KDNL	21	785	449	298	30	Sinclair Communications	28	0	0		ABC
St. Louis	KDNL	21	902	667	566	30		28	0	0		ABC
St. Louis	KMOV	21	1000	639	357	4		18	0	1		CBS
St. Louis	KMOV	21	981	601	270	4	Belo Corporation	18	0	1		CBS
St. Louis	KMOV	21	1019	740	645	4		18	0	1		CBS
St. Louis	KSDK	21	895	664	410	5		21	0	1		NBC
St. Louis	KSDK	21	858	544	297	5	Gannett Company	21	0	1		NBC
St. Louis	KSDK	21	954	752	577	5		21	0	1		NBC
Tallahassee	WCTV	109	661	379	127	6		7	0	1		CBS
Tallahassee	WCTV	109	636	331	0	6	Gray Communications	7	0	1		CBS
Tallahassee	WCTV	109	681	435	224	6		7	0	1		CBS
Tallahassee	WTWC	109	648	435	301	40		6	0	1		NBC
Tallahassee	WTWC	109	588	343	218	40		6	0	1		NBC
Tallahassee	WTWC	109	727	553	457	40	Guy Gannett	6	0	1		NBC
Tallahassee	WTXL	109	656	402	138	27		2	0	0		ABC
Tallahassee	WTXL	109	636	274	40	27	Media Venture Management	2	0	0		ABC
Tallahassee	WTXL	109	704	512	314	27		2	0	0		ABC
Tucson	KGUN	72	670	363	161	9		9	0	1		ABC
Tucson	KGUN	72	550	227	0	9	Lee Enterprises, Inc	9	0	1		ABC
Tucson	KGUN	72	739	463	302	9		9	0	1		ABC
Tucson	KOLD	72	846	414	192	13		26	0	0		CBS
Tucson	KOLD	72	782	190	0	13		26	0	0		CBS
Tucson	KOLD	72	903	636	387	13	Raycom Media	26	0	0		CBS
Tucson	KVOA	72	768	443	140	4		10	0	1		NBC
Tucson	KVOA	72	617	241	0	4	Evening Post Publishing	10	0	1		NBC
Tucson	KVOA	72	949	709	298	4		10	0	1		NBC
Wash DC	WJLA	8	714	405	264	7		9	1	1		ABC
Wash DC	WJLA	8	654	302	114	7	Allbritton	9	1	1		ABC

Appendix A

Station	City	Class	Power	Day	Time	Rate	Spots	Comments	Network
Wash DC	WJLA	max	799	7	Communications	9	1	0	ABC
Wash DC	WRC	mean	809	4		13	0	0	NBC
Wash DC	WRC	min	718	4	NBC/GE	13	-0	0	NBC
Wash DC	WRC	max	888	4		13	-0	0	NBC
Wash DC	WUSA	mean	776	9		21	0	0	CBS
Wash DC	WUSA	min	761	9	Gannett Company	21	0	0	CBS
Wash DC	WUSA	max	794	9		21	-0	0	CBS
Wichita	KAKE	mean	660	10		3	0	0	ABC
Wichita	KAKE	min	536	10	Chronicle Broadcasting	3	0	0	ABC
Wichita	KAKE	max	769	10		-3	0	0	ABC
Wichita	KSNW	mean	691	3		9	0	0	NBC
Wichita	KSNW	min	616	3	Lec Enterprises, Inc	9	0	0	NBC
Wichita	KSNW	max	742	3		9	0	0	NBC
Wichita	KWCH	mean	672	12		8	0	0	CBS
Wichita	KWCH	min	531	12	Spartan Communications	8	0	0	CBS
Wichita	KWCH	max	762	12		8	0	0	CBS