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Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? Evidence From Local Broadcast News

Working Paper

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Peter J. Alexander and Keith Brown,
Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission

Abstract

We estimate station characteristics' impact on the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, local on-location news seconds, and the fraction of total news seconds devoted to local news. We find that local ownership adds almost four minutes of local news, over four minutes of total news, and almost five minutes of local on-location news.

Introduction

Localism is a much debated, yet elusive concept and policy objective. As Napoli (2001) notes:

> Localism traditionally has been viewed as a means of achieving broader social objectives...(however) localism policymaking has suffered from severe ambiguity in terms of what exactly constitutes local programming. This operational ambiguity hinders coherent and consistent policymaking, as the evaluative criteria are constantly shifting. (pps. 205, 215)

Defining and measuring localism prove problematic from both a practical and policy perspective. Typically, however, the underlying rationales for localism policy have included, at least implicitly, political and cultural considerations (Napoli, 2001). George and Waldfogel (2002) provide empirical evidence of localism's value, finding that a reduction in local media consumption decreases local civic participation, as measured by voting in local elections.

In this paper, using a new database of local broadcast news content, we construct a measure of localism and analyze the actual *output* of local broadcast news stations. We then relate our measure of local content in broadcast news back to variables of interest. Importantly, we are able to econometrically explore the question of whether ownership structure appears to influence the local content (output) of local broadcast news? The short answer is yes.

The paper is constructed as follows. In section two, we summarize the literature relating directly to the question of localism. In section three, we introduce our measure of localism. In section four, we discuss our data and methodology. In section five, we introduce our results. In section six, we make some concluding remarks and discuss directions for future research.

2. Localism: Political and Cultural Rationales

The literature relating to political rationales for localism includes the works of Briffault (1988, 1990), Collins (1980), Pateman (1970), Frug (1980), Cook (1998), McChesney (1993), and especially Napoli (1997a, 1998a, 2001). Much of this literature explores the relationship between localism and the diffusion of political power, and posits media organizations as critical political institutions. In particular, this literature suggests that local media provide incentives for political participation as well as information that is voter-relevant. In a novel study, George and Waldfogel (2002) find that an increase in local penetration by the New York Times decreases local penetration by the local newspaper, which in turn reduces participation in local elections. This finding provides the first empirical evidence that consumption of local media may confer positive externalities.

The literature relating to cultural rationales for localism includes that works of Briffault (1988), Frug (1980), Bernard (1973), Donner (1998), Neuman (1991), Morgan (1986), Emig (1995) and Napoli (2001). Much of this literature focuses on distinctive cultural values and traditions within local communities, and the function media plays in reinforcing or diminishing these values and traditions. In general, this literature argues that local values and traditions have been progressively weakened by broadcast media concentration and the economic incentives large media conglomerates have in homogenizing broadcast content.

3. A Definition and Measure of Localism

Localism is difficult to define. Does localism mean simple proximity, and if so, what is proximate? Does localism imply some type of distinctive customs or beliefs? If so, how do we measure the content and extent of these customs and beliefs? We have no doubt that there are many ways in which localism can be defined and measured, but each will undoubtedly reflect some type of conceptual and hence measurement bias. We establish, therefore, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for defining a given news story as local.

As we noted above, we utilize a new database of actual news stories broadcast on local television news. Our definition and measure of localism is determined, in part, by the delineation of designated market areas (DMA) as determined by Nielsen Media Research, an independent, third-party measurement system. A DMA or designated market area is used by advertising agencies to define specific geographical areas where groups of people live, work, and conduct their normal day-to-day activities in a fashion similar to others in the same general region. DMA boundaries are often determined by geographical changes in a region's landscape, such as mountains, deserts, or sparsely populated areas. These so-called "natural barriers" are thought to create different and unique lifestyles among entire populations of people, creating unique and identifiable designated market areas.

In what follows, we base our measure of localism on the conceptual framework established by the construction of designated market areas. While imperfect (as are all measures), a DMA combines political, cultural, sociological, geographic, and economic elements, yielding a well-defined "physically local" aspect. Therefore, the "necessary" part of our necessary and sufficient conditions for localism is that the story takes place within the DMA.

A second element of localism, our "sufficient" condition, concerns the news stories themselves, i.e., when is a story reported by a station within the DMA a "local" story? Our decision rule is that the story is local if the story is of at least marginally greater importance to the mean individual residing within the DMA, and if we believe the mean individual within the DMA would identify the story as local. Thus, for example, a story on a within-DMA high school marching band, a within-DMA food drive, or within-DMA elections, is presumed to be at least of

marginally greater value to a resident within the DMA than an individual residing outside the DMA. Thus, it is the value of the story to the individual within a DMA, relative to individuals in other DMAs, that gives the story its "sufficient" local context.

As might be expected, evaluating and categorizing some stories proved problematic. While a story of apparent national interest (e.g., the Clinton impeachment proceeding) was largely trivial to categorize, some stories, especially those with intra-DMA, often statewide content, posed some difficulties. Our decision rule in cases where the story within one DMA was of equal relevance or value with another DMA (e.g., a story of statewide political importance that encompassed two or more DMAs) was to not count the content as local. Provided the distribution of this type of reportage is uniformly distributed across DMAs, our results should not be biased.

4. Data and Methodology

Our database consists of 4,078 individual news stories from five different days, with length measured in seconds, drawn from over sixty stations across 20 DMAs. We categorized each story as either local or non-local, based on the criteria given in Section 3. We also categorized the stories as to whether the station utilized live location reporting on those stories. This yielded 285 station-level observations on the number of total news seconds, the number of local news seconds, and the number of local live location seconds.[1]

Due to the way the initial data were collected, the observations are disproportionately drawn from larger DMAs. For the purposes of estimating an econometric model, this does not pose a problem ~~because~~ when the selection occurs on an independent variable (Woolridge, 2002).

Our dependent variable, the number of seconds of some type of news, is a count variable. This means that the dependent variable can only take on non-negative integer values. An appropriate estimation technique for an econometric model with a dependent count variable is negative binomial regression (Woolridge, 2002).

Finally, we adjust for all "circumstance of time and place" by creating a series of 97 dummy variables that interact the day and the DMA. This allows us to adjust for all unobserved heterogeneity created by events on any particular day in any particular DMA (e.g., a fire in Wichita on March 9th).

We regress the number of seconds of total news, local news, and on-location local news on thirteen station characteristics, which we list and describe in Table One.

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[1] Appendix A displays the list of stations, their DMAs, their owners. In addition, Appendix A lists the means, minima, and maxima of the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, and local live location news seconds.

5. Estimation and Results

We estimate four models: three negative binomial models estimating the effect of station characteristics on (1) total news seconds, (2) local news seconds, (3) on-location local news seconds, and (4) a fractional logit model estimating the effect of station characteristics on the fraction of local to total news. Specifically, we estimate:

$$\begin{aligned}(1)\ \text{Total News Seconds} = {} & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(ABC) + \alpha_2(CBS) + \alpha_3(NBC) + \alpha_4(ABC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \\ & \alpha_5(CBS\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \alpha_6(NBC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \alpha_7(\text{Own Cities}) + \alpha_8(\text{Local Owner}) + \\ & \alpha_9(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \alpha_{10}(\text{Cross Radio}) + \alpha_{11}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \alpha_{12}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \\ & \alpha_{13}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\alpha\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(2)\ \text{Total Local News Seconds} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1(ABC) + \beta_2(CBS) + \beta_3(NBC) + \beta_4(ABC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \\ & \beta_5(CBS\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \beta_6(NBC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \beta_7(\text{Own Cities}) + \beta_8(\text{Local Owner}) + \\ & \beta_9(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \beta_{10}(\text{Cross Radio}) + \beta_{11}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \beta_{12}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \\ & \beta_{13}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\beta\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(3)\ \text{Total On Location Local News Seconds} = {} & \varphi_0 + \varphi_1(ABC) + \varphi_2(CBS) + \varphi_3(NBC) + \varphi_4(ABC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \\ & \varphi_5(CBS\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \varphi_6(NBC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \varphi_7(\text{Own Cities}) + \varphi_8(\text{Local Owner}) + \\ & \varphi_9(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \varphi_{10}(\text{Cross Radio}) + \varphi_{11}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \varphi_{12}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \\ & \varphi_{13}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\varphi\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}(4)\ \frac{\text{Local News Seconds}}{\text{Total New Seconds}} = {} & \vartheta_0 + \vartheta_1(ABC) + \vartheta_2(CBS) + \vartheta_3(NBC) + \vartheta_4(ABC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \\ & \vartheta_5(CBS\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \vartheta_6(NBC\ \text{Owned \& Operated}) + \vartheta_7(\text{Own Cities}) + \vartheta_8(\text{Local Owner}) + \\ & \vartheta_9(\text{Owns Newspapers}) + \vartheta_{10}(\text{Cross Radio}) + \vartheta_{11}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Own Cities}) + \vartheta_{12}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Owns Newspapers}) + \\ & \vartheta_{13}(\text{Local Owner} * \text{Cross Radio}) + X_{DMA-Day} + \varepsilon_\vartheta\end{aligned}$$

Table Two reports the results of Regression 1 relating the number of total news seconds to station characteristics. Column 2 in Table Two reports the marginal effect of each variable, which is the number of seconds of total news added or subtracted by a station characteristic. Interpreting the statistically significant results, we find that local ownership adds over 229 seconds (almost four minutes) of total news to the local broadcast.[2] Within-DMA cross-radio ownership subtracts almost 135 seconds (over two minutes) of total news to the local broadcast. Finally, the number of total news seconds declines almost 15 for each additional DMA in which the owner has a television station.

[2] We obtain 229.24 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner * own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

Table Three reports the results of Regression 2 relating the number of local news seconds to station characteristics. Interpreting the statistically significant results, we find that NBC affiliates air almost 133 more seconds (over two minutes) of local news than NBC owned and operated stations. The number of local news seconds declines by slightly over two seconds for each DMA in which the owner has a television station. Local owners air almost 264 more seconds (over four minutes) of local news.[3] The number of local news seconds declines by almost 8 seconds for each DMA in which the local owner has a television station. Finally, if the local owner also owns a radio station within the DMA, the number of seconds of local news declines by 238 seconds (almost four minutes).

Table Four reports the results of Regression 3 relating the number of local on-location news seconds to station characteristics. Local ownership adds almost 297 local on-location news seconds (almost 5 minutes). If the local owner also owns a radio station within the DMA, the number of seconds of local news declines by over 123 seconds (over two minutes). Finally, UHF stations air over 83 (over one minute) more local on-location news seconds.

Table Five reports the results of the fractional logit regression (4), relating the percentage of local news to station characteristics.[4] Interpreting the statistically significant coefficients, we find that NBC affiliates devote over 11% more of their news seconds to local news than NBC owned and operated stations. Ownership of a radio station within the DMA increases the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news by almost 9%. Finally, if a local owner owns a radio station within the DMA, the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news decreases by almost 20%.[5]

Note that local ownership does not confer a statistically significant increase in the fraction of news seconds devoted to local news, despite the fact that locally owned stations air more local news seconds. This is because locally owned stations also air more total news seconds.

6. Conclusion

We estimate station characteristics' impact on the number of total news seconds, local news seconds, local on-location news seconds, and the fraction of total news seconds devoted to local news. We find that local ownership adds almost four minutes of local news, over four minutes of total news, and almost five minutes of local on-location news. Local on-location news seconds likely reflects a greater degree of actual investment in local news coverage, since on-

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[3] We obtain 263.55 seconds by adding the estimated local owner effect to the estimated (local owner * own cities) effect from having a local owner in one city.

[4] Papke and Woolridge (1996) detail the fractional logit estimation technique. Papke (2004) outlines the Stata command for implementing the fractional logit technique.

[5] We obtain 19.88% by adding the Cross-Radio marginal effect to the [(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)] marginal effect.

location reporting requires the dedication of specific assets (e.g., camera crews, reporters, vehicles, etc.).

The effect of local ownership is attenuated when the local owner owns a radio station within the DMA. Specifically we find that radio cross-ownership by the local owner decreases local news coverage by almost four minutes, and decreases local on-location news coverage by over two minutes. The effect of local ownership is also attenuated when the local owner owns television stations in other DMAs. For each additional DMA in which the local owner owns a television station, the amount of total news decreases by almost 15 seconds and the amount of local news decreases by 8 seconds.

Table One: Independent Variable Names and Descriptions

Variable	Description
ABC	Dummy Variable Indicating ABC Affiliate or O&O
CBS	Dummy Variable Indicating CBS Affiliate or O&O
NBC	Dummy Variable Indicating NBC Affiliate or O&O
ABC Owned & Operated	Dummy Variable Indicating ABC O&O
CBS Owned & Operated	Dummy Variable Indicating CBS O&O
NBC Owned & Operated	Dummy Variable Indicating NBC O&O
Own Cities	Total Number of DMAs in Which the Station Owner Owns a Station
Local Owner	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner is Headquartered Within the DMA
Owns Newspapers	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner Owns Newspapers in Other DMAs
Cross Radio	Dummy Variable Indicating Whether the Station Owner Owns a Radio Station Within the DMA
UHF	Dummy Variable Indicating Channel Above 13
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	The Total Number of DMAs in Which a Local Station Owner Owns a Station
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	Interaction Dummy Indicating a Local Owner That Owns Newspapers in Other DMAs
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	Interaction Dummy Indicating a Local Owner That Owns a Radio Station Within the DMA

Table Two: Number of Total News Seconds to Station Characteristics

Variable	Marginal Effect	Z-Statistic
ABC	20.77	0.73
CBS	22.69	1.00
NBC	-2.64	-0.12
ABC Owned & Operated	68.14	0.89
CBS Owned & Operated	82.62	1.58
NBC Owned & Operated	-54.91	-1.56
Own Cities	-0.01	-0.01
Local Owner	244.06***	3.90
Owns Newspapers	-2.29	-0.11
Cross Radio	-134.69***	-3.25
UHF	7.42	0.30
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-14.82***	-4.15
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	74.87	1.59
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-29.58	-0.70
Alpha = 0.01***		
Observations = 285		
Pseudo R^2 = 0.10		

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

Table Three: Number of Local News Seconds to Station Characteristics

Variable	Marginal Effect	Z-Statistic
ABC	74.43*	1.78
CBS	69.17**	2.05
NBC	117.82***	3.27
ABC Owned & Operated	-79.02	-1.06
CBS Owned & Operated	-35.26	-0.69
NBC Owned & Operated	-132.55***	-3.46
Own Cities	-2.05*	1.65
Local Owner	271.34***	4.42
Owns Newspapers	-15.29	-0.58
Cross Radio	38.11	0.66
UHF	-11.02	-0.35
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-7.79*	-1.93
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	34.63	0.63
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-238.01***	-6.52
Alpha = 0.04***		
Observations = 285		
Pseudo R^2 = 0.08		

what about t-stat

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

Table Four: Number of Local On-Location News Seconds to Station Characteristics

Variable	Marginal Effect	Z-Statistic
ABC	-13.59	-0.31
CBS	-2.15	-0.06
NBC	52.67	1.31
ABC Owned & Operated	143.59	0.69
CBS Owned & Operated	93.20	0.64
NBC Owned & Operated	-36.92	-0.71
Own Cities	-0.09	-0.04
Local Owner	301.41**	2.28
Owns Newspapers	-5.01	-0.12
Cross Radio	-14.19	-0.10
UHF	83.04**	2.07
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	-4.54	-0.80
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	48.73	0.64
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-123.40*	-1.66
Alpha = 0.40***		
Observations = 285		
Pseudo R^2 = 0.03		

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

Table Five: Local News as a Fraction of Total News

(In Column 2, Percentages are Expressed as Whole Numbers)

Variable	Marginal Effect	Z-Statistic
ABC	4.51%	1.55
CBS	4.16%*	1.77
NBC	8.61%***	3.83
ABC Owned & Operated	-10.30%	-1.43
CBS Owned & Operated	-7.42%	-1.36
NBC Owned & Operated	-11.03%**	-2.44
Own Cities	-0.17%*	-1.82
Local Owner	6.48%*	1.65
Owns Newspapers	-1.88%	-1.04
Cross Radio	8.66%***	2.56
UHF	-2.34%	-0.79
(Local Owner) * (Own Cities)	0.07%	0.21
(Local Owner) * (Owns Newspapers)	-1.53%	-0.36
(Local Owner) * (Cross Radio)	-28.54%***	-4.58
Observations = 285		

same as previous t-stat

* = Significant at the 10% Level; ** = Significant at the 5% Level; *** = Significant at the 1% Level

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Appendix A

City (DMA Rank)	Station	Metric	Total News Seconds	Local News Seconds	Local On-Location News Seconds
New York (1)	WABC	Mean	985	724	375
		Min	948	684	317
		Max	1022	766	470
	WCBS	Mean	982	442	228
		Min	914	234	119
		Max	1029	633	368
	WNBC	Mean	916	632	435
		Min	901	539	378
		Max	929	760	498
Los Angeles (2)	KABC	Mean	1107	605	364
		Min	875	284	176
		Max	1942	1113	805
	KCBS	Mean	1059	628	359
		Min	970	456	105
		Max	1121	745	646
	KNBC	Mean	970	409	160
		Min	942	250	0
		Max	1010	504	347
Chicago (3)	WBBM	Mean	858	717	545
		Min	788	607	511
		Max	927	826	578
	WLS	Mean	899	774	459
		Min	769	654	313
		Max	991	909	641
	WMAQ	Mean	904	704	407
		Min	867	511	317
		Max	975	834	546
Boston (6)	WBZ	Mean	754	470	353
		Min	595	260	177
		Max	830	719	550
	WCVB	Mean	806	479	140
		Min	664	299	0
		Max	920	634	310
	WHDH	Mean	869	477	148
		Min	837	424	0
		Max	933	559	311

Appendix A

Wash DC (8)	WJLA	Mean	714	405	264
		Min	654	302	114
		Max	799	572	390
	WRC	Mean	809	421	274
		Min	718	356	148
		Max	888	472	436
	WUSA	Mean	776	462	320
		Min	761	290	214
		Max	794	568	440
Atlanta (10)	WGNX	Mean	941	638	315
		Min	844	569	250
		Max	1034	700	484
	WSB	Mean	911	627	371
		Min	823	441	274
		Max	1040	773	465
	WXIA	Mean	891	698	406
		Min	728	486	285
		Max	1022	904	525
Seattle (12)	KING	Mean	992	593	346
		Min	805	483	142
		Max	1192	854	568
	KIRO	Mean	985	618	290
		Min	949	497	207
		Max	1025	833	516
	KOMO	Mean	947	503	243
		Min	843	378	141
		Max	1130	652	368
Fox > Minneapolis St.Paul (14)	KARE	Mean	817	622	346
		Min	781	440	150
		Max	844	774	562
	KMSP	Mean	852	535	331
		Min	788	349	133
		Max	904	670	496
	KSTP	Mean	859	590	400
		Min	606	363	179
		Max	1108	820	539
	WCCO	Mean	845	589	364
		Min	645	336	229
		Max	937	709	563

Appendix A

Pittsburgh (20)	KDKA	Mean	823	532	185
		Min	741	447	89
		Max	949	631	294
	WPXI	Mean	949	721	344
		Min	867	641	248
		Max	1068	861	470
	WTAE	Mean	840	535	247
		Min	817	471	124
		Max	914	583	420
St. Louis (21)	KDNL	Mean	853	564	416
		Min	785	449	298
		Max	902	667	566
	KMOV	Mean	1000	639	357
		Min	981	601	270
		Max	1019	740	645
	KSDK	Mean	895	664	410
		Min	858	544	297
		Max	954	752	577
	KTVI	Mean	908	557	339
		Min	851	379	234
		Max	1013	658	468
Buffalo (44)	WGRZ	Mean	670	640	451
		Min	575	528	312
		Max	790	790	507
	WIVB	Mean	668	636	458
		Min	586	426	285
		Max	720	720	577
	WKBW	Mean	940	809	592
		Min	662	389	300
		Max	1404	1282	951
Louisville (48)	WAVE	Mean	591	529	383
		Min	311	200	118
		Max	872	831	623
	WHAS	Mean	661	472	236
		Min	580	265	121
		Max	726	580	524
	WLKY	Mean	617	489	403
		Min	495	209	130
		Max	713	713	601

Appendix A

Albuquerque (49)	KOAT	Mean	922	674	355
		Min	863	589	190
		Max	969	755	633
	KOB	Mean	839	669	379
		Min	787	553	109
		Max	911	864	669
	KRQE	Mean	853	649	340
		Min	662	462	144
		Max	948	799	591
Jacksonville (52)	WJXT	Mean	665	648	372
		Min	638	620	305
		Max	713	713	409
	WJXX	Mean	796	733	585
		Min	715	691	511
		Max	891	773	625
	WTLV	Mean	639	566	286
		Min	558	453	189
		Max	736	697	377
Wichita (65)	KAKE	Mean	660	407	174
		Min	536	288	0
		Max	769	685	499
	KSNW	Mean	691	590	342
		Min	616	520	182
		Max	742	680	441
	KWCH	Mean	672	312	156
		Min	531	185	119
		Max	762	418	190
Tucson (72)	KGUN	Mean	670	363	161
		Min	550	227	0
		Max	739	463	302
	KOLD	Mean	846	414	192
		Min	782	190	0
		Max	903	636	387
	KVOA	Mean	768	443	140
		Min	617	241	0
		Max	949	709	298

Appendix A

Burlington (91)	WCAX	Mean	1448	1430	395
		Min	1415	1360	281
		Max	1509	1509	520
	WPTZ	Mean	822	670	263
		Min	755	506	111
		Max	863	787	332
	WVNY	Mean	736	619	222
		Min	640	327	100
		Max	844	844	299
Evansville (98)	WEHT	Mean	522	491	358
		Min	487	436	325
		Max	551	551	398
	WEVV	Mean	777	585	375
		Min	620	485	215
		Max	866	659	469
	WFIE	Mean	630	333	49
		Min	520	238	0
		Max	702	400	146
Lansing (107)	WILX	Mean	522	354	253
		Min	460	281	212
		Max	592	498	331
	WLAJ	Mean	661	317	199
		Min	591	202	125
		Max	719	409	267
	WLNS	Mean	527	343	186
		Min	452	185	88
		Max	634	447	247
Tallahassee (109)	WCTV	Mean	661	379	127
		Min	636	331	0
		Max	681	435	224
	WTWC	Mean	648	435	301
		Min	588	343	218
		Max	727	553	457
	WTXL	Mean	656	402	138
		Min	636	274	40
		Max	704	512	314