Findings Letter re Use of Force by the Washington Metropolitan Police Department
The Honorable Anthony Williams
Mayor of the District of Columbia
One Judiciary Square, Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20001
Mr. Charles H. Ramsey
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Police Department
300 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Re: Department of Justice Investigation of Use of Force by the Washington
Metropolitan Police Department
Dear Mayor Williams and Chief Ramsey:
We are pleased to transmit the enclosed Memorandum of
Agreement between the Department of Justice, the District of
Columbia, and the Washington Metropolitan Police Department
(MPD). As you are aware, the Agreement resulted from the
Department of Justice's review of use of force issues in MPD
pursuant to our authority under the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. § 14141). We conducted the
investigation at your request to inform you whether MPD officers
engage in a pattern or practice of using excessive force. At
your request, we also reviewed MPD's use of the Glock firearm.
Due to the unprecedented genesis of the investigation -- at
the request of the agency to be investigated -- the Department of
Justice agreed that, parallel with its pattern or practice
investigation, it would provide MPD with technical assistance to
correct identified deficiencies during the course of the
investigation.
As discussed below, our investigation did reveal a pattern or practice of
use of excessive force by MPD. The Department of Justice, however, would like
to applaud the commitment to reducing the risk of excessive use of force demonstrated
by your request that we conduct the investigation and assist MPD to identify
and begin to correct deficiencies. We acknowledge that because of your efforts,
MPD has initiated a number of significant reforms in the manner in which it
tracks, investigates, monitors, and manages use of force issues. Additionally,
MPD has committed to implementing these reforms fully in order to ensure effective
and respectful policing.
We recognize that in the past two years, MPD has achieved a significant reduction
in the rate at which it uses deadly force and the rate at which its canines
bite subjects. In 1998, eleven fatalities resulted from MPD's use of deadly
force. Fatalities decreased to four in 1999 and to two in 2000. Due to important
changes in its canine operations, over the same time period, canine bites have
decreased from occurring approximately 70 percent of the time that canines are
deployed to slightly over 20 percent.
The use of force reforms outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement are a direct
outgrowth of the deficiencies we identified in our investigation. Accordingly,
below we summarize our investigation and our major findings in the following
areas: use of force reporting and investigation; canines; early warning tracking;
complaint system; training; and discipline.
A. Description of Investigation
The Department of Justice, aided by nationally recognized
experts in police use of force, reviewed reported use of force,
including canine bites, by MPD during the period of 1994 through
early 1999. During this period, approximately 1400 incidents
involving uses of force by MPD officers were reported. This
figure does not account for all uses of force occurring during
the period under review because MPD does not require that
officers report and supervisors review all uses of force.
In addition to analyzing individual use of force incidents,
the Department of Justice examined MPD's management practices
related to use of force including, its use of force policies,
training, supervision, and disciplinary system. During the
course of the investigation, when the Department of Justice
identified deficient policies, practices, or procedures, it
notified MPD and provided technical assistance recommendations
aimed at improving the identified problem.
B. Investigative Findings
1. Use of Excessive Force
The Department of Justice conducted an in-depth analysis of
a stratified random sample of the use of force incidents, and
determined that approximately 15 percent of them involved use of
excessive force by MPD officers. According to police use of
force experts, in well-managed and supervised police departments,
excessive use of force would not be expected to occur in more
than 1-2 percent of all incidents. In addition, in a significant
number of cases, we found that the force used, while lawful,
could have been avoided had the officer utilized different
tactics.
In addition to revealing a pattern or practice of use of
excessive force and avoidable force, our review revealed several
other disturbing patterns.
For example, 14 percent of the incidents in our sample
involved uses of force by off-duty officers and roughly a quarter
of these incidents may have involved alcohol (the off-duty
officers were patronizing a bar, nightclub, etc.). In
approximately one-third of the incidents in our sample, the
subject was charged with "assault on a police officer." In many
of these cases, the United States Attorney's office determined
that the charges lacked prosecutorial merit and refused to
prosecute the subject. These cases may indicate that some
officers have attempted to justify a use of excessive force by
alleging "assault on a police officer."
Twenty-two percent of the firearms incidents sampled
involved claims by MPD officers that a use of deadly force was
justified because the subject "reached into his waistband" or
possessed a firearm. In each case, however, post-incident
searches failed to reveal any weapon. Approximately 22 percent
of the sampled incidents involved officers firing their weapons
at moving vehicles. MPD has, however, revised its policies to
limit this practice significantly.
2. Use of Force Reporting
We found MPD policies regarding the reporting of force to be
under-inclusive and inconsistently followed. The policies in
place during the period of our review appeared to require that
officers report use of firearms, electronic stun devices, pepper
spray (oleoresin capsicum), batons, carotid artery holds, and
forcible frisks. Based on statements from MPD employees,
including senior supervisory personnel, we had serious concerns
regarding whether any use of force, except firearms, was
consistently reported. We found widespread variances in how MPD
officers understand and define the kinds of force they need to
report.
The under-reporting of force appears to be a consequence of
under-inclusive reporting policies and reporting forms. MPD
policy does not explicitly mandate officers to report the use of
all physical force. The policy does not mandate officers to
report the use of most hands-on force or some instruments, like
flashlights, which may cause injuries. MPD policy does not
mandate that officers report when they unholster their firearm to
point it at an individual. Further, MPD's reporting forms are
not designed to capture this type of information. For example,
MPD's "Nonlethal Control Devices Incident Report" form only
provides spaces for reporting the use of tasers or chemical
spray.
MPD's failure to collect and analyze detailed data regarding
all uses of force makes it extremely difficult for MPD
supervisors and executives to measure and manage use of force.
With the exception of firearms, MPD cannot measure accurately
whether certain officers use force more than others, under what
circumstances MPD officers use force, what kinds of force are
being used, the frequency of use of force by MPD officers, or
officer or civilian injury resulting from uses of force.
We recommended that MPD redefine and expand what it
considers a use of force and when officers are obligated to
report it. Specifically, we recommended that MPD adopt and
implement the following policies: (1) define "use of force" to
include all physical (pain compliance, kicks, punches, etc.) and
instrumental (flashlight, radio, baton, ASP, firearm, etc.) acts
that impose any degree of force on a civilian; (2) require
officers to report every use of force; (3) create a use of force
reporting form that adequately captures the type of force used,
the circumstances of the use, injuries to officers and civilians,
and all other relevant information; (4) train officers on these
new policies; and (5) monitor compliance with the new policies.
We also recommended, in light of MPD's high level of firearms use at the time
our investigation was initiated, that MPD require officers to report when they
make a discretionary decision to unholster their firearm and point it at an
individual. This reporting requirement would allow MPD to identify the kinds
of circumstances in which officers seriously consider using firearms in order
to better identify and address tactical considerations in use of firearms and
alternatives to firearm use.
In response to our recommendations, MPD has drafted a new use of force policy
and reporting form. When finalized and fully implemented and enforced, the new
policy and reporting form will go a long way to address the deficiencies identified
during our investigation.
3. Use of Force Investigations
When force incidents are accurately reported, the incident
should be thoroughly and neutrally investigated and adjudicated.
Our investigation uncovered serious shortcomings in the quality
of MPD use of force investigations. Our review of a sample of
MPD use of force investigations and our interviews with MPD use
of force investigators, made us concerned about the competency,
thoroughness, and impartiality of use of force investigations.
For example, we found instances in which investigators failed to
interview victims, suspects, or MPD or civilian witnesses. In
other instances, MPD investigators failed: (i) to record the
location of shell casings and other physical evidence, (ii) to
perform ballistics comparisons, or (iii) to take relevant
photographs.
These failures may derive from inadequate training for use
of force investigators (usually lieutenants). We recommended
that MPD provide all of its use of force investigators with, at a
minimum, training in the following: investigation techniques;
observation and surveillance skills; basic forensics;
interviewing and interrogation skills; report writing; basic
criminal law; basic court procedures; basic rules of evidence;
and MPD's disciplinary and administrative procedures.
In addition to the above investigative deficiencies, we observed a lack of
impartiality in certain use of force investigations. With the exception of investigations
conducted by MPD's new Force Investigation Team, discussed below, use of force
investigations are conducted by investigators from the district where the use
of force occurred. This practice can create conflicts of interest, particularly
where the investigator and officer under investigation are personally acquainted
or work together. Conflicts also may arise if the investigator was involved
in or supervised the use of force incident. For these reasons, for significant
categories of cases, we recommended that investigators not be based in the district
in which the incident occurred.
We also recommended that every supervisory review of a use
of force include an assessment of the following issues: (1) was
the force used in policy, reasonable, and necessary; (2) should
the incident be investigated to determine whether misconduct
occurred; (3) does the incident indicate a need for additional
training, counseling or other remedial measures; and (4) whether
the incident suggests that MPD should revise its policies,
training, or tactics.
To begin to address the investigative deficiencies, MPD
created the Force Investigation Team (FIT) in 1999. FIT is a
group of highly trained and centralized investigators. MPD
created FIT to investigate uses of deadly force by MPD officers.
We have recommended and MPD has agreed to expand FIT's role to
include investigation of all serious uses of force.
Additionally, in the Memorandum of Agreement, MPD has agreed to
remedial efforts aimed at improving all use of force
investigations, including additional training for investigators
and creation of standardized investigation manuals.
4. Use of Canines
Our investigation revealed that MPD's policies and practices
related to deployment of canine units resulted in bites nearly 70
percent of the time the canines were deployed between 1996 and
1999. By comparison, in tightly run police canine programs,
bites occur in only about 10 percent of deployments. At MPD, the
bites resulted from a "find and bite" policy, allowing dogs to
bite the subject upon locating him or her. The bites also
resulted from inadequate training for canine handlers regarding
appropriate control of the dogs.
We recommended that MPD adopt a "find and bark" policy,
requiring the dog to bark, rather than bite, upon locating the
subject. We also recommended that MPD limit the circumstances in
which canines may be deployed; to require supervisory approval
prior to deployment; to require greater handler control of the
dogs; to improve its practices related to verbal warnings prior
to deployment; to prohibit biting passive resisters; and to
require handlers to order the dog to release a bite as soon as
possible.
In addition, we recommended improvements in the manner in
which MPD reviews and investigates canine bites to ensure that
they are treated as serious uses of force and receive heightened
scrutiny.
In response to our recommendations, MPD has initiated
ambitious reforms to its canine program, including adopting a
"find and bark" program, purchasing new canines, limiting the
circumstances in which it allows deployment, requiring
supervisory approval prior to deployment, and providing enhanced
training to handlers and canines. As a result of this work,
MPD's bite ratio has decreased from nearly 70 percent to slightly
over 21 percent. If MPD continues with planned reforms in its
canine operations, the ratio should continue to decline.
5. Early Warning Tracking System
Our examination of MPD's current use of force tracking system and associated
policies and practices led us to conclude that MPD does not have a comprehensive
program to minimize use of excessive force. As a result, MPD cannot adequately
identify officers or units who have, or may in the future, engage in excessive
force or other misconduct. Without such identification, MPD cannot fully manage
the risks such officers or units pose.
MPD's current early warning system suffers from a number of deficiencies.
First, it is seriously limited in scope. The database only captures citizen
complaints, civil lawsuits, official reprimands, and vehicle accidents. Significantly,
the system does not specifically capture officer uses of force. Second, it is
too limited in time. The database maintains information for only two years.
Third, the system offers insufficient options to deal with potential problem
officers. The sole consequence of the early warning that results from the current
system is a referral to the police and fire psychology clinic. This narrow option
is apparently not accompanied by any corresponding requirement that clinic attendance
be confirmed. Fourth, the MPD unit responsible for maintaining the system has
a very low staffing level. At times during our investigation, only one sworn
officer staffed the office. This staffing level is substantially less than the
minimum needed to perform the currently assigned functions: maintain the early
warning system, track citizen complaints, review the quality of citizen complaint
investigations, and conduct financial audits. At this staffing level, the unit
cannot reasonably perform a meaningful role in developing and implementing a
comprehensive risk management strategy to reduce unnecessary force.
To address these deficiencies, we recommended that MPD
immediately begin, at a minimum, to collect at one location all
available data related to officer use of force, including:
officer and supervisor reports on all uses of force; citizen
complaints alleging use of excessive force; civil lawsuits
alleging use of excessive force; and the results of all
investigations of and litigation regarding uses of force,
including sustained/not sustained judgments, civil verdicts, and
settlement amounts.
We also recommended that MPD form a team to purchase or develop an adequate
early warning tracking system. In response to our recommendations, MPD has developed
a draft Request for Proposals for the design and program of a comprehensive
early warning computer database. As described in the Memorandum of Agreement,
in addition to agreeing to the creation of a comprehensive early warning system,
MPD has pledged to input relevant data into the forthcoming system, develop
the necessary protocols and supports for the execution of an early warning program,
and develop an array of programs and options to deal with officers whose conduct
is considered problematic or may indicate a likelihood of using excessive force.
6. Complaint System
We found MPD's system for receiving, investigating, and resolving complaints
from individuals alleging misconduct to be inadequate. In 1980, the District
of Columbia Council created a Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). See Civilian
Complaint Review Board Act of 1980, D.C. Code § 4-901 to 4-911 (1988 & Supp.
1992). The CCRB was given exclusive jurisdiction to receive and investigate
certain categories of civilian complaints, including complaints alleging excessive
force by MPD officers. The CCRB was abolished in mid-1995 because it was a "patently
inadequate system" which allowed "serious misconduct to go unchecked." Cox v.
District of Columbia, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
When the CCRB disbanded, it left a backlog of nearly 800 unresolved complaints
which were transferred to MPD. In the years since inheriting these complaints,
MPD has not devoted sufficient resources to resolve them. Many have grown stale,
making the possibility of adequate investigation remote, if not impossible.
Timely investigation of allegations of officer misconduct is necessary because
witnesses are transient, memories fade, and physical evidence can irretrievably
be lost.
In addition to being responsible for resolution of complaints inherited from
the disbanded CCRB, during the period of our review, MPD was responsible for
receiving and investigating new complaints of officer misconduct. An adequate
complaint system must be open and accessible to the public; conduct thorough,
fair, and timely investigations; and promote officer and department accountability.
MPD's complaint system falls short in all of these respects.
We found that MPD's complaint intake system discourages individuals from filing
complaints. MPD policy 1202.5, Citizen Complaints, authorizes complaints to
be registered in person, by correspondence, or by telephone. However, the policy
requires MPD employees to ask individuals who attempt to file a written or telephonic
complaint to appear in person at MPD in order to file the complaint. This practice
has a deterrent effect on would-be-complainants who fear retaliation or who
are simply unable or otherwise reluctant to come to a police station. The practice
is particularly problematic because MPD does not keep records documenting the
individuals who are turned away or the nature of their attempted complaints.
MPD's investigation of complaints suffers from the same
investigative deficiencies described above in Section B(3),
namely a lack of thoroughness, impartiality, timeliness, and
competence in investigating the allegations.
In 1998, the District passed legislation creating a new
Office of Citizen Complaint Review (OCCR). The legislation
became effective in March 1999, but the OCCR did not begin
accepting complaints until January 8, 2001. Accordingly, we do
not discuss the new OCCR here.
We have, however, recommended that, in order to help avoid repeating some
of the failures of the old CCRB, it is critical that the new OCCR and MPD clearly
delineate their respective roles and establish strong lines of communication
between the two entities. MPD has created a special order providing some preliminary
guidance to MPD officers regarding how to handle complaints in light of the
new OCCR. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, MPD will implement several
reforms to improve its handling of complaints, including conducting expanded
community outreach and education regarding complaints; centralized recording
and tracking of complaints; and improved investigation of complaints.
7. Use of Force Training
We examined MPD's use of force training in a variety of
settings: academy, in-service (including roll-call and the firing
range) and field. When we began our investigation, MPD had
recently expanded and enhanced its use of force training program.
We found, however, that the program continued to suffer from the
following deficiencies.
We found that MPD provided use of force training in an
uncoordinated manner with insufficient oversight by MPD
policymakers or legal staff. As a result, use of force training
was disjointed and, at times, in conflict with applicable law and
MPD policy.
We offered MPD a series of recommendations to overcome these deficiencies
and MPD has recently implemented a number of reforms in its training program
aimed at increasing both the quantity and quality of use of force training provided
to MPD officers. For example, MPD developed a mandatory 40-hour in-service training
program, set up systems to guarantee officers achieve timely firearms re-certification,
and developed more interactive training programs using role-play and computer
simulations related to use of force training.
Significantly, MPD has undertaken an ambitious and necessary
review of all use of force training curricula. MPD's general
counsel is now reviewing all of MPD's training materials to
ensure compliance with law and MPD policy. Additionally, MPD is
creating a training resource library and has updated and
computerized its training records. MPD hired a professional
curriculum development specialist and is in the process of
developing an instructor development course. MPD has also
created a training task force made up of individuals from across
the Department to conduct a use of force training needs
assessment.
At the request of Chief Ramsey, we also reviewed MPD's use
and training of the Glock firearm. We were pleased with MPD's
efforts to ensure that all officers complete firearms semi-annual
re-certification training. We were also impressed with the
expertise of MPD's firearms training management staff. Our
review of firearm training, however, revealed deficiencies that
potentially compromise MPD's safe use of the Glock. We found
that MPD fails to reinforce safe gun handling skills, such as
repeatedly failing to admonish officers to keep their fingers off
the triggers unless appropriate and ready to shoot, an imperative
warning since the Glock does not have an external safety
mechanism. We also noted MPD's review of officer shootings fails
to examine weapons alleged to have malfunctioned, or to review an
officer's firearm safety training needs in unintentional
shootings.
We recommended that MPD enhance its firearm training, both
written documents and as applied, to ensure safe usage of the
Glock and that MPD enhance its investigations of shootings to
include a firearm safety perspective. As described in the
Memorandum of Agreement, MPD has agreed to implement these
enhancements.
8. Disciplinary System
We examined MPD's system for disciplining officers who
engage in excessive force because the timely and effective
imposition of appropriate discipline is critical for preventing
and controlling excessive force. We determined that MPD does not
have an adequate disciplinary system in place to respond to use
of excessive force.
Although we requested all documents related to MPD's discipline of officers
for use of excessive force, we received very few records, indicating that few
officers are ever disciplined for excessive force. For example, the documents
provided indicate that in approximately 350 use of force incidents referred
to the United States Attorney's Office for possible criminal prosecution, MPD
recommended discipline for only 16 officers. In many instances in which MPD
held a use of force "unjustified", or in which MPD held a citizen complaint
of excessive force "sustained," we did not receive any documents evidencing
that MPD imposed any form of discipline. From the documents MPD provided, it
appears that of 31 uses of force held by MPD to be unjustified, discipline was
recommended in less than 50 percent of the cases. Similarly, of 11 sustained
citizen complaints of excessive force, discipline was recommended in only 7
cases.
We have recommended that, consistent with its collective bargaining obligations,
MPD revise and update its disciplinary policies to ensure the timely imposition
of adequate discipline for excessive force cases. We have also recommended that
MPD establish a centralized system for documenting and tracking all disciplinary
and corrective action. As described in the Memorandum of Agreement, MPD has
agreed to implement these improvements.
C. Conclusion
The Memorandum of Agreement provides for the development and
implementation of updated use of force policies and procedures
addressing the issues raised by our investigation as summarized
above. Additionally, the Agreement builds upon work MPD started
during the course of our review. In particular, MPD will
continue with reforms initiated in its canine operations; will
improve its use of force investigations; will address
deficiencies in its handling of misconduct complaints; will
update and revise its disciplinary policies; and will continue to
enhance use of force training. Finally, the Agreement provides
that implementation of the Agreement will be monitored by an
independent monitor, who is jointly selected by the parties. The
monitor will assist the City and MPD with compliance and issue
periodic reports.
In conclusion, we would like to commend the City and MPD for their willingness
to work together with us to resolve this matter amicably, and we look forward
to your continued cooperation as the terms of the Agreement are implemented.
We believe that, working together, the City and the Civil Rights Division, have
helped to promote exemplary policing by the Washington Metropolitan Police Department.
Sincerely,
/s/ William R. Yeomans
William R. Yeomans
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Robert Rigsby, Corporation Counsel
Mr. Terrence D. Ryan, General Counsel
Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia
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