



Privacy Impact Assessment  
for the

# Secure Flight Program

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## Abstract

The Secure Flight program will match identifying information of aviation passengers and certain non-travelers against the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government<sup>1</sup> in a consistent and accurate manner, while minimizing false matches and protecting personally identifiable information. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is publishing a Final Rule outlining TSA's implementation of the Secure Flight program. In conjunction with this Final Rule, TSA is publishing this updated Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). This updated PIA reflects the Secure Flight program as described in the Final Rule.

## Introduction

The purpose of the Secure Flight program is to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists from boarding aircraft or accessing sterile areas<sup>2</sup> of airports where they may jeopardize the lives of passengers and others. The program is designed to better focus passenger and baggage screening efforts on passengers likely to pose a threat to civil aviation. In addition, the Secure Flight program is intended to facilitate the secure and efficient travel of the vast majority of the traveling public while protecting individuals' privacy.

TSA is implementing the Secure Flight program in accordance with section 4012(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 2004). Under the Secure Flight program, TSA will collect limited Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) from certain U.S. aircraft operators and foreign air carriers for the purpose of passenger watch list matching against the No Fly and Selectee list components of the Terrorist Screening Database<sup>3</sup>. SFPD consists of full name, date of birth, gender, redress number<sup>4</sup> (if available), known traveler number<sup>5</sup> (if implemented and available), and passport information<sup>6</sup> (if available).

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<sup>1</sup> Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) § 4012(a) (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 2004). Currently, the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The No Fly and Selectee List are components of the TSDB.

<sup>2</sup> "Sterile area" is defined as a portion of airport defined in the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by TSA, or by an aircraft operator under part 1544 of this chapter or a foreign air carrier under part 1546 of this chapter, through the screening of persons and property. 49 C.F.R. §1540.5.

<sup>3</sup> TSA will also match against individuals TSA nominates to the watch list pending a decision on inclusion. Nominations pending decision are ordinarily concluded in a very short time period and rejections for watch list inclusion will be promptly deleted from matching.

<sup>4</sup> A redress number would be a unique number assigned to individuals who use the proposed redress process for Secure Flight that the individual may use in future correspondence with DHS and when making future travel reservations.

<sup>5</sup> A known traveler number would be a unique number assigned to "known travelers" for whom the Federal Government has already conducted a threat assessment and has determined do not pose a security threat.

<sup>6</sup> Passport information consists of passport number, country of issuance, expiration date, gender, and full name.



Pursuant to this authority, TSA is issuing this updated PIA, and associated Final Rule for the Secure Flight program, under which TSA will receive passenger and certain non-traveler information from aircraft and airport operators, conduct watch list matching, and transmit boarding pass printing results back to aircraft and airport operators. As part of the implementation of the Secure Flight program, TSA is conducting operational testing of its capabilities to interact with and perform matching of names to the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government<sup>7</sup> for each covered aircraft operator<sup>8</sup> before assuming the watch list matching function from each aircraft operator. Although covered aircraft operators will be required to conduct operational testing with TSA after the final rule is effective, covered aircraft operators may voluntarily choose to begin testing with TSA prior to the effective date of the final rule. The consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).<sup>9</sup> The No Fly and Selectee List are components of the TSDB.

### **Current Watch List Matching Process**

TSA currently performs passenger and baggage screening at the nation's commercial airports (*See* 49 U.S.C. 44901). Additionally, aircraft operators conduct passenger watch list matching using the No Fly and Selectee list components of the TSDB, and as required under security directives TSA issued following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Aircraft operators also conduct this watch list matching process for non-traveling individuals authorized to enter the sterile area of an airport in order to escort a passenger or for some other purpose approved by TSA.

Under the current watch list matching process conducted by the aircraft operators, when an aircraft operator has a passenger reservation in a name that is the same as, or similar to, a name on the No Fly List, the aircraft operator is required to notify law enforcement personnel and TSA in order to determine whether that passenger is in fact the individual whose name is on the No Fly List. If the passenger is verified as an individual on the No Fly List, the aircraft operator is prohibited from transporting the passenger. When an aircraft operator has a passenger reservation in a name that is on the Selectee List, the aircraft operator is required to identify the individual to TSA for enhanced screening at security screening checkpoints.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) § 4012(a) (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> U.S. aircraft operators that are required to have a full security program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a) and foreign air carriers that are required to have a security program under 49 CFR 1546.101(a) or (b). These aircraft operators generally are the passenger airlines that offer scheduled and public charter flights from commercial airports. In the NPRM they are referred to as "covered U.S. aircraft operators" and "covered foreign air carriers" respectively, and collectively as "covered aircraft operators."

<sup>9</sup> The TSC is an entity established by the Attorney General in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense. The Attorney General, acting through the Director of the FBI, established the TSC in support of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), dated September 16, 2003, which required the Attorney General to establish an organization to consolidate the Federal Government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening processes. The TSC maintains the Federal Government's consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list, known as the TSDB.

<sup>10</sup> Individuals may undergo enhanced screening at security screening checkpoints for a variety of other reasons, such



## **Watch List Matching Process Under Secure Flight**

The Secure Flight program implements a mandate of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, Dec. 17, 2004) and is consistent with TSA's authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Section 4012(a)(1) of the IRTPA requires TSA to assume from air carriers the comparison of passenger information for domestic flights to the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government. Section 4012(a)(2) of IRTPA similarly requires DHS to compare passenger information for international flights to and from the United States against the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list before departure of such flights.

For passengers on covered flights, TSA is requiring covered aircraft operators to request passengers' full name, gender, date of birth, and Redress Number (if available) or known traveler number (if implemented and available). Passengers must provide their full name, gender, and date of birth. Covered aircraft operators are then required to transmit to TSA the Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD), which contains the information provided by each passenger, as well as passport information (if available), and certain non-personally identifiable information used to manage messages between covered aircraft operators and TSA, including itinerary information, for each passenger.

For non-traveling individuals for whom the aircraft operator seeks authorization to enter an airport sterile area (such as to escort minors or passengers with disabilities), TSA also is requiring covered aircraft operators to request from the non-traveler the same information requested from passengers and transmit to TSA that information as well as certain non-personally identifiable information used to manage messages between covered aircraft operators and TSA, including the airport code for the sterile area to which the non-traveler seeks access.

Generally, the Secure Flight program will compare passenger and non-traveler information to the No Fly and Selectee List components of the TSDB, which are currently used for the pre-flight passenger watch list matching conducted by aircraft operators. However, as recommended in the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), TSA may use the "larger set of watch lists maintained by the Federal government."<sup>11</sup> Therefore, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) which requires TSA to assess threats to transportation, where warranted by security considerations, TSA may use the full TSDB or other government databases, such as intelligence or law enforcement databases. For example, TSA may obtain intelligence that flights flying a particular route may be subject to an increased security risk. Under this circumstance, TSA may decide to compare passenger information on some or all of the flights flying that route against the full TSDB or other government databases.

Based on the watch list matching results produced by Secure Flight (using either the No Fly and Selectee List or the full TSDB or other government databases where warranted by security considerations), TSA will instruct an aircraft operator to process the individual in the normal manner, to identify the individual for enhanced screening at a security checkpoint, or to deny the individual transport or authorization to enter the airport sterile area.

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as random selection or a walk through a metal detector alarm.

<sup>11</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, page 393.



TSA will retain records for most individuals encountered by Secure Flight for a short period of time. Records for individuals who are not identified as potential matches by the automated matching tool, which comprise the vast majority of travel records held by TSA, will be retained for seven (7) days after the completion of the individual's directional travel for audit purposes. Records for individuals who are potential or confirmed matches will be retained for no less than seven years after the completion of the individual's directional travel, as outlined in section 3.0 of this PIA. These records will be available if needed as part of the redress process discussed in section 7.0 of this PIA. In case of a terrorist event, records concerning the event, which may possibly include passenger information, will be retained in accordance with a separate TSA record retention schedule covering major security incident records. This information will be retained to support the investigation and documentation of a terrorist event. Such records will be maintained in accordance with applicable SORNs, DHS/TSA 001, Transportation Security Enforcement Records System, 69 Fed. Reg. 71818, 71829 (December 10, 2004) and DHS/TSA 011, Transportation Security Intelligence Service Operations Files, 69 Fed. Reg. 71828, 71835 (December 10, 2004).

### **Scope**

The Secure Flight final rule affects U.S. aircraft operators that are required to have a full security program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a)<sup>12</sup> and foreign air carriers that are required to have a security program under 49 CFR 1546.101(a) or (b). These aircraft operators generally are the passenger airlines that offer scheduled and public charter flights from commercial airports. They are referred to in the associated final rule as "covered U.S. aircraft operators" and "covered foreign air carriers" respectively, and collectively as "covered aircraft operators." Under the Final Rule, the program will eventually cover all flights conducted by covered U.S. aircraft operators, and all flights conducted by a covered foreign air carrier arriving in or departing from the United States, or overflying the continental United States, defined as the lower contiguous 48 states. These flights are referred to in the Final Rule as "covered flights."

### **Implementation Stages of Secure Flight**

TSA will implement this Final Rule in two stages where the first stage will include covered flights between two domestic points in the United States and the second stage will include covered flights to or from the United States, flights that overfly the continental United States, and all other flights (such as international point to point flights) operated by covered U.S. aircraft operators not covered in the first stage.

During the first stage of implementation, TSA will assume the watch list matching function for domestic flights conducted by covered U.S. aircraft operators. During the second phase, TSA will begin watch list matching for all other flights operated by covered U.S. aircraft operators, as well as covered flights operated by covered foreign air carriers. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently requires covered foreign air carriers to collect and transmit passenger information to CBP for border enforcement purposes as well as watch list matching prior to the departure of a flight under its Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) pre-departure final rule. As part of the second stage of Secure Flight

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<sup>12</sup>49 CFR 1544.101 defines seven types of security programs (full, partial, private charter, etc.) that aircraft operators must follow. The Secure Flight Final Rule covers aircraft operators that must adopt a full program as described in section 1544.101(a)



implementation, TSA will assume the watch list matching function for covered foreign air carriers from CBP.

Pursuant to the associated Final Rule, TSA will also conduct passenger watch list matching for passengers on flights that fly over the contiguous lower 48 states of the United States during the second phase of implementation, except for those flights that transit the airspace of the United States between two airports or locations in the same country, where that country is Canada or Mexico.

### Privacy Documentation

In conjunction with the Final Rule for the Secure Flight Program, TSA is publishing this updated PIA. A Privacy Act SORN and a Final Rule including Privacy Act exemptions have already been published. This updated PIA and the already published SORN address both implementation stages of the Secure Flight Program. Although not required, covered aircraft operators may voluntarily choose to begin operational testing with TSA prior to publication of the Final Rule or may voluntarily choose to begin operational testing with TSA prior to the implementation of the first stage of the program. This PIA and the associated, previously published SORN covers any testing between an aircraft operator and TSA including both domestic and international flights prior to the publication of or effective date of the Final Rule, and cover required operational testing.

## Section 1.0

### Information Collected and Maintained

The following questions are intended to define the scope of the information requested as well as the reasons for its collection as part of the system, rule, and/or technology being developed.

#### 1.1 What information is to be collected?

Airlines currently collect information from passengers and non-travelers that is necessary both for security purposes and for ensuring passenger comfort during their flights to their destinations.

Under the Secure Flight Final Rule, TSA will require covered aircraft operators to send to TSA Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) that will consist of the below listed elements, to the extent available.

- (1) full name;
- (2) date of birth;
- (3) gender;
- (4) redress number (if available);
- (5) known traveler number (if implemented and available); and
- (6) passport information (if available).





To manage the processing of the SFPD, TSA will require aircraft operators to include in the SFPD the following information: Reservation Control Number; Record Sequence Number; Record Type; Passenger Update Indicator; Traveler Reference Number; and Itinerary information.

Covered aircraft operators will be required to request from passengers or non-traveling individuals their full name, date of birth, gender, and redress number or known traveler number. Individuals must provide their full names, gender and date of birth in order to make a reservation or request authorization to access a sterile area but are not required to provide the other data elements requested. Although covered aircraft operators will not be required to ask for passport information for individuals traveling on domestic flights, covered aircraft operators will be required to transmit the passport information if they collect such information in the ordinary course of business. It should be noted that passport information is not required to travel domestically. For passengers who have reserved an international flight but who have not yet traveled on an international flight as part of their travel itinerary, covered aircraft operators will collect passport information in accordance with CBP regulations and will be required under this Final Rule to transmit such information to TSA as soon as it is available.

A covered aircraft operator may, in the ordinary course of business and as part of its reservation process, input data that TSA requires covered aircraft operators to request from individuals, but that the individual did not provide at the time of reservation, such as data from a passenger profile stored by the aircraft operator. In these situations, the aircraft operator will be required to include that data as part of the SFPD transmitted to TSA to assist with effective automated watch list matching. Any data elements sent by the covered aircraft operator in addition to those required by TSA will be automatically filtered out prior to submission to the Secure Flight system to ensure that Secure Flight does not receive any nonessential information.

At a future date, covered aircraft operators may be required to begin accepting known traveler numbers from Federal programs approved for use by TSA. TSA will inform covered aircraft operators in writing of the date on which they must begin to request an approved category of known traveler numbers. TSA expects that the covered aircraft operator will request this information from the individual making a reservation on a covered flight or requesting access to a sterile area of an airport. The covered aircraft operator will then be required to enter known traveler information provided by the passenger into the SFPD. If TSA begins accepting known traveler numbers, it will only be necessary to include one reference number in a SFPD. That reference number could be a redress number or a known traveler number.



### Information Collection Requirements for Secure Flight

Data Elements	Covered Aircraft Operators Must Request from Passengers	Passengers Must Provide	Covered Aircraft Operators Must Transmit to TSA If Available
Full Name	X	X	X
Date of Birth	X	X	X
Gender	X	X	X
Redress Number or Known Traveler Number	X		X
Passport Information			X
Itinerary Information <sup>13</sup>			X
Reservation Control Number			X
Record Sequence Number			X
Record Type			X
Passenger Update Indicator			X

The Final Rule provides that if TSA cannot determine from the information provided by the covered aircraft operator whether an individual is a match to the watch list prior to the individual’s arrival at the airport or online check-in, it will be necessary for the individual to provide additional information at the airport. Covered aircraft operators will be required to request a verifying identity document from these individuals at the airport. The verifying identity document must be unexpired, issued by a Government (Federal, State, local, or tribal), and contain the individual’s full name, photo, and date of birth. An unexpired passport issued by a foreign government will also constitute a verifying identity document, and may be used to update the passenger’s SFPD to correctly identify an individual

There may be occasions where the aircraft operator will need to call TSA. In such cases, the aircraft operator may be asked to provide additional identifying information about the passenger, such as a physical description, that may be required by TSA to complete the watch list matching process. Secure Flight may retain some of the additional information about the passenger in accordance with the proposed retention schedule discussed in section 3.0 of this PIA. TSA will complete the watch list matching process, in coordination with the TSC, and provide the aircraft operator with boarding pass printing results for that individual.

<sup>13</sup> Itinerary information includes the following information about a covered flight: (1) departure airport code; (2) aircraft operator; (3) departure date; (4) departure time; (5) arrival airport code; (6) flight number; (7) operating carrier (if available). For non-traveling individuals, itinerary information includes the airport code for the sterile area to which the non-traveling individual seeks access.





## 1.2 What are the sources of information in the system?

Aircraft operators will request the information outlined above from passengers and non-traveler individuals requesting access to airport sterile areas.

Additionally, Secure Flight receives information from the Terrorist Screening Center's Terrorist Screening Database No Fly and Selectee lists. Where warranted by security considerations, TSA may use the full TSDB or other government databases, such as intelligence or law enforcement databases. For example, TSA may obtain intelligence that flights flying a particular route may be subject to an increased security risk. Under this circumstance, TSA may decide to compare passenger information on some or all of the flights flying that route against the full TSDB or other government databases.

TSA will record telephone calls to its Resolution Center in connection with resolving the identity of individuals who appear to be a match to a watch list.

## 1.3 Why is the information being collected, used, disseminated, or maintained?

As required under section 4012 of the IRTPA, TSA will obtain passenger and non-traveler information in order to assume the function of conducting watch list comparisons. Based on the watch list matching results, an aircraft operator will be provided with boarding pass printing results necessary to perform one of three functions: (1) process the individual in the normal manner; (2) identify the individual for enhanced screening at a security checkpoint; or (3) deny the individual transport or authorization to enter the airport sterile area. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 114(f), where warranted by security considerations TSA may use the full TSDB or other government databases, such as intelligence or law enforcement databases.

Before TSA assumes the watch list matching function from each aircraft operator, passenger and non-traveler information will be collected and submitted to Secure Flight during operational testing with each aircraft operator. Operational testing will be conducted to test the transmission connections between Secure Flight and each covered aircraft operator and to test Secure Flight's ability to receive passenger and non-traveler information, conduct watch list matching, and transmit boarding pass printing results back to the aircraft operator. Operational testing will allow TSA to refine program operations and verify its ability to effectively conduct watch list matching before TSA assumes the function from aircraft operators. When approved by DHS and Congress, following successful completion of operational testing with aircraft operators, TSA will assume the watch list matching function from aircraft operators.

## 1.4 How is the information collected?

Airport operators and aircraft operators will collect passenger and non-traveler information by electronic means or verbally.

TSA will require covered aircraft operators to transmit SFPD to TSA prior to flight departure time, in accordance with each aircraft operator's Aircraft Operator Implementation Plan (AOIP). TSA



anticipates requiring covered aircraft operators to transmit SFPD to TSA approximately 72 hours prior to scheduled flight departure time for reservations made 72 hours or more before the scheduled departure time of the flight. For reservations made within 72 hours of scheduled flight departure time, TSA will require covered aircraft operators to transmit the SFPD as soon as possible after the reservation is made.

Covered aircraft operators that voluntarily chose to begin operational testing with TSA prior to publication of a Final Rule or who choose to begin operational testing prior to the implementation of the program will provide SFPD to TSA via secure means as agreed to by the aircraft operators and TSA. In some cases aircraft operators may direct transmission of SFPD data elements held by CBP.

Covered aircraft operators will be required to accurately transmit passenger and non-traveler SFPD. However, covered aircraft operators will not be required to validate the underlying accuracy of the collected passenger or non-traveler information unless the covered aircraft receives an inhibited boarding pass printing result. Covered aircraft operators will be required to transmit information updates to reflect changes to any information required in the SFPD. TSA is working with other agencies, including CBP, to develop ways to eliminate unnecessary duplication of comparable screening efforts and thereby reduce governmental and private sector costs.

If an individual is identified as a possible match to the watch list such that the aircraft operator must verify their identity, the individual must present a verifying identity document to the covered aircraft operator at the airport. The aircraft operator must request a verifying identity document pursuant to procedures in its security program.

## **1.5 How will the information be checked for accuracy?**

The Secure Flight system will rely on the following measures to promote the accuracy of the information it utilizes:

- The accuracy of SFPD transmitted to TSA by the aircraft operators will be initially based on the accuracy of passenger and non-traveler information submitted by the individual at the time of airline reservation.
- Personal information that changes after initial transmission to TSA due to passenger or covered aircraft operator reservation modifications will be re-transmitted by covered aircraft operators to Secure Flight.
- Name, date of birth, and gender will be verified at the aircraft operator ticket counter if an individual is identified as a possible match to the watch list that would warrant denying issuance of a boarding pass. Data verification will validate whether the submitted SFPD is consistent with the passenger's government-issued identification.
- Additional identifying information provided through the resolution process while the passenger is at the ticket counter will be reviewed by Secure Flight analysts to help resolve reasonably similar or exact matches to names on the watch list.
- The system generates and maintains data quality metrics which will be used to identify problematic trends for remediation.
- The redress process described in Section 7.0 below is a mechanism to maintain and improve accuracy of information.



TSA will apply the same resolution process for potential matches to both the No Fly List and the Selectee List. Confirmation that a passenger is an actual match to the Selectee List, as opposed to just a possible match, is an important security and intelligence measure, as well as an accuracy measure that ultimately leads to less misidentification and associated passenger inconvenience as individuals who may have been misidentified are cleared.

## **1.6 What specific legal authorities/arrangements/agreements define the collection of information?**

TSA's general operating authorities are set forth in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) 49 U.S.C. § 114(f). IRTPA specifically directs TSA to test and implement a pre-flight watch list matching program, such as Secure Flight. Section 4012(a)(1) of the IRTPA requires TSA to assume from air carriers the comparison of passenger information for domestic flights to the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government. Section 4012(a)(2) of IRTPA similarly requires the DHS to compare passenger information for international flights to and from the United States against the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list before departure of such flights. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 114(f), TSA is required to assess threats to transportation. Therefore, in addition to current checking of the No Fly and Selectee watch lists, where warranted by security considerations, TSA may use the full TSDB or other government databases.

## **1.7 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the amount and type of data being collected, discuss what privacy risks were identified and how they were mitigated.**

In connection with its information collection activities, TSA seeks to implement Fair Information Practices, including minimization of data collection. TSA has limited the proposed information collection requirements for Secure Flight to the data elements TSA believes are necessary for effective watch list matching of aviation passengers. In making this determination, TSA has attempted to balance the privacy interest in minimizing the collection of personal information with the need to conduct effective watch list matching to protect the security of the United States and to avoid unnecessarily delaying legitimate passengers due to misidentification.

TSA has determined that an individual's full name, gender, and date of birth are critically important for effective automated matching of that individual against those individuals on the watch list. These data elements in combination is expected to be sufficient to conduct watch list matching for the vast majority of individuals and distinguish more individuals from individuals on the watch list as part of the automated process, reducing instances of misidentification. Full name is the primary attribute used to conduct watch list matching. Many names, including non-English names, do not indicate gender because they can be used by either gender. Additionally, names not derived from the Latin alphabet, when transliterated into English, often do not denote gender. Providing information on gender will reduce the number of false positive watch list matches because the information will distinguish persons who have the same or similar names but who are of different gender.



Similarly, date of birth is helpful in distinguishing a passenger from an individual on a watch list with the same or similar name, thereby reducing the number of false positive watch list matches. (By way of example only, Patricia born 12/10/1976 is less likely to be matched with Patrick born 12/1/1967 with the inclusion of gender and date of birth.)

TSA has determined that passport information would enable TSA analysts to resolve possible false positive matches and make the watch list matching process more accurate. For passengers who have previously flown on an international flight as part of their travel itinerary, the covered aircraft operator may already have the passport information pursuant to requirements under regulations issued by CBP. For such passengers, TSA will require covered aircraft operators to transmit passport information to TSA as part of the initial SFPD transmission.

For passengers who have reserved an international flight, but who have not yet traveled on an international flight as part of their travel itinerary, covered aircraft operators will collect passport information in accordance with CBP regulations and will be required under this Final Rule to transmit such information to TSA as soon as it is available. In cases where passport information is available, this Final Rule will require covered aircraft operators to transmit the passport information to TSA, to allow TSA to verify the information provided at the time of reservation, facilitate identification of individuals who are on the watch list, and further minimize false positive matches.

Secure Flight seeks to balance the competing interests of data collection minimization and reduction of false positives. Requiring additional information, such as country of citizenship or a phone number, would have been helpful in further reducing the risk of a false match and passenger inconvenience, but it is expected that a sufficient reduction of false positives can be achieved using only the data elements proposed in the Final Rule.

To prevent personal information beyond what has been noted above from being accessible to TSA, Secure Flight will employ processes to filter out and prevent any additional personal information beyond what is identified above from being received by TSA. As a result, the Secure Flight system will only receive the personally identifiable information that would be required under the Final Rule and described in this PIA, and will not receive many data elements typically found in passenger reservations such as seating or meal preferences, or credit card information.

Itinerary information permits TSA to appropriately prioritize Secure Flight processing, communicate with the covered aircraft operator, facilitate an operational response, and more effectively allocate security resources.

## Section 2.0 Uses of the System and the Information

The following questions are intended to delineate clearly the use of information and the accuracy of the data being used.

### 2.1 Describe all the uses of information.

TSA will use information in the Secure Flight system to identify and protect against potential and actual threats to transportation security, and support the Federal government's counterterrorism efforts by



assisting in the identification of individuals who warrant further scrutiny prior to boarding an aircraft or entering a sterile area or who warrant denial of boarding or denial of entry to a sterile area on security grounds. Passengers will be matched against watch list updates and updates to the cleared list for the duration of each passenger's directional travel. Additionally, passengers will be re-matched to the watch list when there are changes to the original SFPD during the 72 hours before flight departure. If an individual's status changes following boarding pass issuance and/or admittance to a sterile area, appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, foreign or international entities may be notified to initiate an operational response

TSA will maintain the identifying information and results of the matching analysis in a matching history for individuals who are identified as potential matches by the automated watch list matching process and are either subsequently cleared or confirmed as matches through manual analysis. For individuals that are matches or potential matches to the watch list, Secure Flight analysts can consult the individual's matching history to expedite the clearance or identification of the individual.

TSA will also collect information to conduct operational testing of its ability to connect to the aircraft and airport operators, receive passenger and non-traveler information, conduct watch list matching, and transmit boarding pass printing results back to the aircraft and airport operators. During testing, aircraft operators will continue to match passengers against the watch list. Aircraft operators will maintain responsibility for denying issuance of boarding passes and for identifying individuals for enhanced screening during operational testing, but TSA may refer matches identified to the covered aircraft operator for boarding pass issuance denial or enhanced screening if the operator did not otherwise identify that match and to TSC for watch list, operational, and intelligence purposes. Following successful operational testing TSA, through the implementation of Secure Flight, will assume the responsibility for denying issuance of boarding passes and for identifying individuals for enhanced screening.

## **2.2 What types of tools are used to analyze data and what type of data may be produced?**

The Secure Flight system results will be analyzed for quality assurance purposes to improve the automated system and to better eliminate false positives.

## **2.3 If the system uses commercial or publicly available data please explain why and how it is used.**

The Secure Flight system does not use commercial or publicly available data.

## **2.4 Privacy Impact Analysis: Describe any types of controls that may be in place to ensure that information is used in accordance with the above described uses.**

TSA mitigates the privacy risk of false positive matches to the watch list by supplementing the initial automated comparison with a manual assessment conducted by a Secure Flight analyst, but only if



necessary to complete the watch list matching process. Individuals are provided with the opportunity under Secure Flight's redress process and under the Privacy Act of 1974 to access and correct personal information, subject to the Privacy Act exemptions claimed for Secure Flight records and other applicable legal constraints. Secure Flight does not utilize commercial data to verify identities, nor does it use algorithms to assign risk scores to individuals.

TSA has developed a comprehensive approach to promoting compliance with the Fair Information Practices codified in the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, DHS and TSA privacy policies, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) privacy guidance. Comprehensive privacy requirements are being included in the program requirements to allow TSA to identify privacy issues and risks at each phase of the program and implement privacy principles across Secure Flight systems and operations. The Secure Flight program has designated an individual to work closely with the TSA Director of Privacy Policy & Compliance as well as the DHS Chief Privacy Officer to promote compliance with the published documents for the program, including the SORN and this PIA. This individual will also routinely monitor and review the operations that authorized users perform on personal information according to a schedule to be determined and will be responsible for the implementation of the privacy program.

The Secure Flight Program further minimizes potential privacy risks by integrating administrative, technical, and physical security safeguards as outlined in this PIA to place limitations on the collection of personally identifiable information (PII) and to protect information against unauthorized disclosure, use, modification or destruction. Specifically, administrative safeguards will restrict the permissible uses of personal information and implement the controls for adherence to those uses. As part of technical safeguards employed, Secure Flight will employ role-based access controls and audit logging (the chronicling of information accesses and uses of information) as described in Section 8.0 to control and monitor the use of personal information.

Further, all personnel who are authorized to handle personal information for the Secure Flight program are required to complete TSA privacy training when they join the program and on at least an annual basis thereafter. Personal information will only be disclosed to, and used by, authorized individuals who have a need to know the information in order to perform their duties. These safeguards will further minimize the potential privacy risk that personal information may be improperly used.

## Section 3.0 Retention

The following questions are intended to outline how long information will be retained after the initial collection.

### 3.1 How long is information retained?

TSA will receive SFPD on non-travelers and passengers, beginning approximately 72 hours before the individual is expected to board a plane or be granted access to a sterile area. In the event that the individual is determined not to be a match by the automated matching process, the Secure Flight





program will retain that individual's information for no more than 7 days after directional travel has been completed or the non-traveling individual has left the sterile area. Directional travel means that each leg of a round trip itinerary will be assessed separately.

If the automated matching tool determines that an individual is a potential match to an individual on the watch list, TSA will retain the information concerning that potential match for seven years. If the potential match is confirmed, TSA will retain that confirmed match for 99 years. This retention period is consistent with TSC's NARA-approved record retention schedule for TSDB records.

The retention schedule for Secure Flight records will be applicable to all covered flights, including overflights, regardless of origin or destination.

Any data collected for purposes of testing will be destroyed when no longer needed.

### **3.2 Has the retention schedule been approved by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)?**

TSA submitted its final version of the record retention schedule to the NARA archivist and is awaiting final approval. The submission to NARA establishes a record retention schedule that permits TSA to retain and dispose of records in the Secure Flight system in accordance with the above stated retention cycles. Data collected for purposes of implementation testing will be retained until no longer needed for test purposes pursuant to government-wide General Record Schedule 20.

### **3.3 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the purpose of retaining the information, explain why the information is needed for the indicated period.**

Under the record retention periods for Secure Flight, TSA will retain records for most individuals encountered by Secure Flight for a short period of time. The vast majority of records are expected to be destroyed within seven days of completion of directional travel. Under the retention periods, records for individuals who are not identified as potential matches by the automated matching tool will be retained for seven days after the completion of the individual's directional travel for audit purposes. The Secure Flight program will employ processes to prohibit access to itinerary information for those individuals not identified as a potential match.

Records for individuals who are potential matches will be retained for seven years after the completion of the individual's directional travel in order to expedite future screening and provides the individual with the maximum opportunity to seek legal review under the law. These records will also be available if needed as part of the redress process discussed in section 7.0 of this PIA.

TSA will retain records for individuals confirmed as a positive match to an individual on the watch list for 99 years after the completion of the individual's directional travel in order to support law enforcement and intelligence activities. This retention period for confirmed matches is consistent with the TSC's NARA-approved record retention schedule for records of matches to the TSDB. SFPD collected by TSA under Secure Flight is security information exempt from European Union Data Protection



Directives and typically from other data privacy governance around the world. It is not the same as PNR data which is collected by aircraft operators for commercial purposes and thus, it is not subject to the DHS-EU PNR agreement. TSA will retain Secure Flight data pursuant to published record retention schedules as specified in the Final Rule

In case of a terrorist event, records concerning the event, which may include passenger information, will be retained in accordance with a separate TSA record retention schedule covering major security incident records. This information will be retained to support the investigation and documentation of a terrorist event.

## Section 4.0 Internal Sharing and Disclosure

The following questions are intended to define the scope of sharing within the Department of Homeland Security.

### **4.1 With which internal organization(s) is the information shared, what information is shared and for what purpose?**

Secure Flight will share information within DHS with those offices and components that have a need for the information in the performance of their duties under 5 U.S.C. §552a(b)(1). These purposes may include national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS mission-related functions and to provide associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis.

In the ordinary course, TSA expects to share an individual's personally identifiable information, itinerary information, and/or airport code, as well as watch list matching analysis and results, and redress information with the following TSA offices: Office of Intelligence (OI) and Vetting Operations if there is a suspected or actual threat to transportation or national security; Office of Transportation Security Redress (OTSR) to respond to redress requests; Federal Security Directors and Federal Air Marshals in order to facilitate an appropriate law enforcement or operational response to an individual that poses or is suspected of posing a threat to transportation security; Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Privacy Office to respond to inquiries from individuals; Office of Chief Counsel to assist in the reviews of possible threats to transportation or national security and review responses to inquiries from individuals; Legislative Affairs to respond to inquiries made by members of Congress on behalf of their constituents; and with Freedom of Information Act Office to respond to traveler requests for information.

TSA may also routinely share personally identifiable information with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to coordinate the watch list matching function.

### **4.2 How is the information transmitted or disclosed?**

Depending on the urgency, information may be transmitted electronically, in person, in paper format, via facsimile, or by telephone, as required by the circumstances necessitating such sharing. In most cases, the data will be transmitted between Secure Flight and other systems on the secured DHS information technology (IT) network.



### **4.3 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the internal sharing, discuss what privacy risks were identified and how they were mitigated.**

Information is shared internally with those employees and officials, including contractors, who have a need to know such information in the performance of their duties. Privacy risks that personal information may be disclosed to unauthorized individuals are mitigated using a set of layered privacy safeguards that include physical, technical, and administrative controls to protect personal information in the automated system, appropriate to its level of sensitivity. These controls are described below in Section 8.0. Recipients will mitigate any privacy risks through data sharing procedures that may include such things as access controls, re-sharing limits, and other physical, technical, and administrative controls.

## **Section 5.0 External Sharing and Disclosure**

The following questions are intended to define the content, scope, and authority for information sharing external to DHS which includes Federal, state and local government, and the private sector.

### **5.1 With which external organization(s) is the information shared, what information is shared, and for what purpose?**

TSA will provide covered aircraft operators and airport operators with boarding pass printing results. This will authorize them to take one of the following actions: print boarding/access passes to those who are authorized to receive them, identify individuals for enhanced screening, or deny individuals boarding or sterile area access. The Final Rule prohibits covered aircraft operators from using the boarding pass printing results for any purposes other than security purposes. To avoid implementing redundant messaging systems for communicating with aircraft operators, Secure Flight will leverage the DHS capabilities to support the connectivity and data transport services to/from the covered aircraft operators for Secure Flight.

In the event of potential matches to the watch lists that cannot be cleared through a manual review process by a Secure Flight analyst, TSA expects to share an individual's personally identifiable information, watch list matching results and analysis, and, if applicable, redress information with the TSC to adjudicate.

TSA also expects to share an individual's personally identifiable information, itinerary, information, and watch list matching analysis and results with law enforcement personnel responsible for airport security who may be notified to facilitate a timely law enforcement response to an individual identified as a potential match to the watch list. Further inquiry by law enforcement may also help resolve a situation of mistaken identity or confirm the determination made in the screening process that an individual should be denied boarding or entry to a sterile area.

Consistent with the routine uses outlined in the Secure Flight Privacy Act System of Records Notice, TSA may share an individual's personally identifiable information, itinerary information, and/or



airport code, as well as watch list matching analysis and results, redress information and any of the other information contained in the Secure Flight system with other Federal, state, local, tribal, foreign or international government agencies and organizations for national security, law enforcement, immigration, or intelligence purposes in cases of actual or potential threats to transportation or national security and as necessary to facilitate an operational response to such threats.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, TSA may also share information for additional purposes under the SORN's applicable routine uses including: (1) sharing with an appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, foreign, or international agency responsible for investigating, prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing a statute, rule, regulation, or order regarding a violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law or regulation; (2) sharing with the National Archives and Records Administration for proper handling of government records; (3) sharing with the U.S. Department of Justice or other Federal agency for purposes of conducting litigation or administrative proceedings in which the Federal government or its employees are a party or has an interest; (5) sharing with appropriate agencies, entities and persons to protect the individual who is the subject of the record from the harm of identity theft in the case of a data breach affecting this system; and (6) sharing with appropriate Federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign governmental agencies or multilateral governmental organizations. Streamlining the reporting of passenger information for this purpose reduces the economic burden on aircraft operators and promotes the privacy interest of passengers by minimizing the number of times their information is transmitted to U.S. authorities.

**5.2 Is the sharing of personally identifiable information outside the Department compatible with the original collection? If so, is it covered by an appropriate routine use in a SORN? If so, please describe. If not, please describe under what legal mechanism the program or system is allowed to share the personally identifiable information outside of DHS.**

Yes. These uses are compatible with the original collection of information. For the types of public and private entities that TSA may notify, see "Routine Uses of Records Maintained in the System, Including Categories of Users and Purposes of Such Uses" in the Federal Register notice entitled "Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records; Secure Flight Records" and the discussion in Section 5.1 above.

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<sup>14</sup> For the types of public and private entities that TSA may notify, see "Routine Uses of Records Maintained in the System, Including Categories of Users and Purposes of Such Uses" in the Federal Register notice entitled "Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records; Secure Flight Records."



### **5.3 How is the information shared outside the Department and what security measures safeguard its transmission?**

Depending on the recipient and the urgency, information may be transmitted electronically, in person, in paper format, via facsimile, or by telephone, as required by the circumstances necessitating such sharing.

Prior to sharing with aircraft operators, aircraft operators will have TSA-approved AOIPs that specify how information will be shared and reflect the scope of the information sharing. The AOIP will set forth the specific means by which the covered aircraft operator will transmit SFPD to TSA, the timing and frequency of transmission, and any other related matters. Aircraft operators are prohibited from using boarding pass printing results provided by Secure Flight for any purpose other than for security purposes.

To avoid implementing redundant messaging systems for communicating with aircraft operators, Secure Flight will leverage the existing DHS system to support the connectivity and data transport services to/from the covered aircraft operators for Secure Flight. Using this secure system, SFPD and boarding pass printing results are transmitted electronically via a network secured using a defense-in-depth strategy and a layered set of security controls to support confidentiality and integrity of data transmission.

TSA will transmit to TSC any potential match information, the results of watch list matching, and any analysis conducted in an automated message transmitted electronically between the two agencies via the secure DHS network.

External information technology (IT) connections from TSA to any external organizations must be documented and approved with each party's signature in an interagency security agreement (ISA) that outlines controls in place to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information being shared or processed. Organizations with which DHS shares information must agree to maintain reasonable physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards to appropriately protect the shared information. Any Federal agency receiving this information is required to handle it in accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act, their applicable SORNs and the Federal Information Management Security Act (FISMA).

### **5.4 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the external sharing, what privacy risks were identified and describe how they were mitigated.**

External sharing will be conducted in accordance with the applicable routine uses under the governing SORN as required by the Privacy Act. Information is shared with external organizations for national security, law enforcement, immigration, or intelligence purposes and as necessary to facilitate an operational response to threats to transportation or national security. Privacy risks that personal information may be disclosed to unauthorized individuals is minimized using a set of layered privacy safeguards that include physical, technical, and administrative controls to protect personal



information as appropriate. Any Federal agency receiving information is required to handle it in accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act, their applicable SORNs and FISMA.

Furthermore, TSA will only share boarding pass printing results with covered aircraft operators for purposes of issuing boarding passes to those who are authorized to receive them, identify individuals for enhanced screening, or deny individuals boarding or sterile area access. TSA prohibits the use of boarding pass printing results that TSA provides to covered aircraft operators and airport operators for any other purpose other than security purposes. TSA will also instruct aircraft operators to appropriately safeguard the data related to Secure Flight, in terms of the SFPD it generates through the collection of information from passengers.

## Section 6.0 Notice

The following questions are directed at notice to the individual of the scope of information collected, the right to consent to uses of said information, and the right to decline to provide information.

### 6.1 Was notice provided to the individual prior to collection of information?

TSA will provide notice to individuals through a layered approach. TSA will provide notice through its website ([www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov)) and as a result of the publication of the rulemaking, this PIA and a Privacy Act SORN for the Secure Flight system.

Prior to collecting information from an individual through a website or an airport kiosk with the capability of accepting a reservation, a covered aircraft operator would be required to make available the following privacy notice, or substantial equivalent approved by TSA, prior to collecting information:

The Transportation Security Administration requires us to collect information from you for purposes of watch list matching, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. section 114, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Providing this information is voluntary; however, if it is not provided, you may be subject to additional screening or denied transport or authorization to enter a sterile area. TSA may share information you provide with law enforcement or intelligence agencies or others under its published system of records notice. For more on TSA Privacy policies or to view the system of records notice and the privacy impact assessment, please see TSA's web site at [www.tsa.gov](http://www.tsa.gov).

Covered aircraft operators are also responsible for ensuring that third parties that collect reservation information on their behalf through a website or airport kiosk make available the complete privacy notice.

TSA will record telephone calls to its Resolution Center in connection with resolving the identity of individuals who appear to be a match to a watch list. TSA will play an automated prompt notifying the parties prior to recording that the communications may be recorded.





## **6.2 Do individuals have an opportunity and/or right to decline to provide information?**

Yes, however if the individual declines to provide the requested information, he or she may be subject to additional screening or denied boarding or authorization to enter a sterile area. Individuals, who decline to provide their full name, date of birth, and gender will be denied boarding or access to a sterile area.

A covered aircraft operator may, in the ordinary course of business and as part of its reservation process, input data that TSA requires covered aircraft operators to request from individuals, but that the individual did not provide at the time of reservation, such as data from a passenger profile stored by the aircraft operator. This requirement is limited to aircraft operators that program their systems to automatically use the stored information to populate the SFPD data fields for future flights. In these situations the aircraft operator will be required to include that data as part of the SFPD transmitted to TSA, without obtaining additional consent from the individual, to assist with effective automated watch list matching. Any data elements beyond those required by TSA will be automatically filtered out prior to receipt by the Secure Flight system.

## **6.3 Do individuals have the right to consent to particular uses of the information? If so, how does the individual exercise the right?**

Individuals do not have the right to consent to particular uses of the information collected for the Secure Flight program. However, uses of the information collected through the Secure Flight program are detailed in this PIA, the SORN, and the Final Rule.

## **6.4 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the notice provided to individuals above, describe what privacy risks were identified and how you mitigated them.**

The Secure Flight program provides to individuals at or before the time of collection a sufficient number of notice opportunities to reduce the potential risk that those individuals may not be forewarned of the collection and uses of personal information by TSA and of the consequences of not providing the requested information. Notice is provided in a variety of the electronic means utilized by most passengers making reservations. Notice will not be provided in ticket jackets or on airport signage because, as a practical matter, such notice would come too late in the process to provide meaningful opportunity for informed consent.

Individuals participating in the redress process will be provided notice in order to permit them to exercise informed consent prior to providing any information.



## Section 7.0 Individual Access, Redress and Correction

The following questions are directed at an individual's ability to ensure the accuracy of the information collected about them.

### 7.1 What are the procedures which allow individuals to gain access to their own information?

Pursuant to a Privacy Act request, individuals may have access to information that they have provided to airline operators that is maintained in the Secure Flight system. Secure Flight will not make available information on the individual, such as watch list matching results or analyses that were not supplied by that individual. Privacy Act requests for access to an individual's record must be in writing and should be addressed to the TSA FOIA Office, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), TSA-20, 601 South 12<sup>th</sup> Street, Arlington, VA, 22202. Requests should conform to the requirements of 6 CFR part 5, Subpart B, which provides the rules for requesting access to Privacy Act records maintained by DHS. The envelope and letter should be clearly marked "Privacy Act Access Request." The request should include a general description of the records sought and must include the requester's full name, current address, and date and place of birth. The request must be signed and either notarized or submitted under penalty of perjury. Some information may be exempt from access provisions. An individual who is the subject of a record in this system may access those records that are not exempt from disclosure. A determination whether a record may be accessed will be made at the time a request is received. After conferring with the appropriate component or agency, the agency may waive applicable exemptions in appropriate circumstances where it would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement or national security purposes of the systems from which the information is recompiled or in which it is contained.

Additionally, TSA has established a voluntary redress process to assist those individuals seeking to ensure that Secure Flight has access to the most accurate information on the individual for the purposes of determining an individual's match to a name on the watch list. An individual who believes they have been unfairly or incorrectly delayed, denied boarding or identified for additional screening at an airport as a result of the Secure Flight program may initiate the Secure Flight redress process by completing and submitting a Traveler Inquiry Form (TIF) to the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP).

Based on the information provided by the individual seeking redress, DHS TRIP will coordinate with TSA to address the request. The DHS TRIP PIA and the TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress (OTSR) PIA are available at [www.dhs.gov](http://www.dhs.gov). Redress requests should be addressed to: Program Manager, DHS TRIP, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528. Additionally, requests for access to the information submitted during the redress process may be made by submitting a request to the DHS TRIP email link [TRIP@dhs.gov](mailto:TRIP@dhs.gov) posted on the DHS TRIP website [www.dhs.gov/trip](http://www.dhs.gov/trip).

TSA shall not assert any exemption with respect to information submitted by and collected from the individual or the individual's representative in the course of the Secure Flight Program or any redress process associated with the underlying records.



## **7.2 What are the procedures for correcting erroneous information?**

The Secure Flight redress process begins when an individual who believes he or she has been improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft or entering a sterile area as a result of the Secure Flight program, applies for redress by completing and submitting a TIF to DHS TRIP.

The individual may obtain the forms and information necessary to initiate the redress process on the DHS TRIP web site at [www.dhs.gov/trip](http://www.dhs.gov/trip) or by contacting the DHS TRIP office by mail. Written requests may be sent to the DHS TRIP office, and must include the individual's name and current address. DHS will provide the necessary documents and information to individuals through its website or by mail.

The individual must send to the DHS TRIP office the personal information and copies of the specified identification documents. If TSA needs additional information in order to continue the redress process, TSA will notify the individual in writing and request that additional information. An individual's redress application will be suspended if documentation is not received on or before the established deadlines.

TSA, in coordination with the TSC and other appropriate Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies, if necessary, will review all the documentation and information requested from the individual, correct any erroneous information, and provide the individual with a timely written response.

If TSA determines that the delay or prohibition from boarding or access to a sterile area resulted from a misidentification of the individual, TSA will retain the information provided by the individual as part of the redress process to facilitate authentication of the individual's identity during future air travel and to prevent repeated and unnecessary delays of misidentified individuals. Once the redress process is complete, an individual who TSA determines is not the individual on the watch list may provide his or her Redress Number to covered aircraft operators. With this Redress Number, the Secure Flight program should be able to clear this individual when it receives and processes the SFPD for the individual.

TSA is committed to minimizing misidentifications by continuously updating information as it becomes available to ensure the accuracy of the watch lists and the Cleared List.

TSA's Office of Transportation Security Redress will provide Secure Flight with the Cleared List for use during the watch list matching processes. Updates to this list will be submitted to Secure Flight on a regular basis, and will be incorporated into the watch list matching process.

## **7.3 How are individuals notified of the procedures for correcting their information?**

Individuals are notified of redress procedures through this PIA, the Final Rule, and both the TSA and DHS websites. TSA and DHS press releases and education campaigns will also provide information



on the redress procedures, as well as posters and pamphlets available to passengers at transportation facilities.

## **7.4 If no formal redress is provided, what alternatives are available to the individual?**

An individual who is dissatisfied with the results of DHS TRIP may have the opportunity to submit supplementary information based upon the redress procedures, to TSA. Additionally, upon closing the matter, an individual will be notified in a disposition letter sent by TSA whether he or she may request to have the resolution reconsidered. For individuals who choose not to seek redress through DHS TRIP, TSA does not have another mechanism to obtain the necessary information to determine whether the individual is a match to a person on the watch list.

## **7.5 Privacy Impact Analysis: Please discuss the privacy risks associated with the redress available to individuals and how those risks are mitigated.**

DHS TRIP provides a redress process that furthers the privacy interest of the individual by making available an easy-to-use website that facilitates the submission and processing of redress requests. Because DHS TRIP collects PII directly from the individual, the risk of collecting inaccurate information should be minimized.

With the implementation of the Secure Flight program, TSA believes that it will become even more effective with uniform application by the Government rather than relying on application by individual covered aircraft operators.

A PIA for DHS TRIP was published by DHS on January 18, 2007. It is available at the DHS website ([www.DHS.gov](http://www.DHS.gov)). In addition, individuals may request access to or correction of their PII pursuant to the Privacy Act.

## **Section 8.0 Technical Access and Security**

The following questions are intended to describe technical safeguards and security measures.

### **8.1 What procedures are in place to determine which users may access the system and are they documented?**

User groups that may be granted access to the Secure Flight system will be limited to system administrators, security administrators, IT specialists, and analysts with a need for the information to perform their duties. The system has in place controls to limit access based on user roles and responsibilities, need to know, least privilege, and separation of duties. Rules governing a user's access to the system are applied by the system automatically based on their assigned role. These roles will be approved by the Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) and any changes in role will need further approval prior to implementation.



Logical access controls restrict users of TSA Secure Flight data. These controls are guided by the principles of least privilege and need to know. User accounts are created with specific job functions in mind and accounts are only granted the necessary access to perform their role as approved by the ISSO. Any changes to user roles require approval of the ISSO. Event logs record system access.

Only TSA Secure Flight personnel and authorized personnel who have passed a background check and completed mandatory privacy and security training will be granted system access.

The Secure Flight system is secured against unauthorized access using a layered defense-in-depth security approach involving procedural and informational safeguards.

Government employees or contractors are assigned roles for accessing the system based on their function. The system administrator grants access to authorized users based on the principles of need to know, least privilege, and separation of duties. The ISSO confirms compliance to policy and manages the activation or deactivation of accounts and privileges as required or when expired. The Secure Flight program will permit personnel that have completed security and privacy training commensurate with their role to access the system.

## **8.2 Will Department contractors have access to the system?**

Contractors supporting TSA's Secure Flight program will have access to the system to perform their official duties including system administration, monitoring, and security functions. Access will be automatically restricted by systems and policies with oversight conducted by Security Officers and management level government personnel. No access will be allowed prior to receiving the necessary clearances and training as required by DHS, TSA and Secure Flight program policy.

## **8.3 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the program or system?**

Secure Flight personnel, including government personnel and contractors, are required to attend privacy training offered by TSA and role-specific training provided by Secure Flight. This will allow individuals with varying roles to understand how privacy impacts their role and retain knowledge of how to properly and securely act in situations where they may use PII in the course of performing their duties. All DHS personnel, including government personnel and contractors, are required to take privacy training when they begin their employment or contract with DHS.

## **8.4 Has Certification & Accreditation been completed for the system or systems supporting the program?**

The Secure Flight system is proceeding through the certification and accreditation processes to become FISMA compliant. The system received an authority to operate in advance of initiation of the testing phase and will receive complete certification and accreditation prior to full operational status.



## **8.5 What auditing measures and technical safeguards are in place to prevent misuse of data?**

The Secure Flight system maintains an auditing function that tracks all user activities in relation to data including access and modification. Through technical controls including firewalls, intrusion detection, encryption, access control lists, system hardening techniques, and other security methods, TSA will prevent unauthorized access to data stored in its system. These controls will meet Federally mandated information assurance and privacy requirements. Both the ISSO and Privacy Officer will periodically review audit logs to confirm compliance with applicable regulations.

The Secure Flight program also embedded security and privacy subject matter experts within core components of the development teams. These individuals help identify potential security and privacy issues to mitigate risk early in the Secure Flight system development.

## **8.6 Privacy Impact Analysis: Given the sensitivity and scope of the information collected, as well as any information sharing conducted on the system, what privacy risks were identified and how do the security controls mitigate them?**

Identifiable privacy risks of the Secure Flight system include unauthorized access to data, accidental disclosure of PII, and improper modification of data. These risks have been mitigated by defense-in-depth strategy, access controls, auditing, and appropriate oversight. Moreover, the vast majority of individual information is retained for only a short time, thereby reducing risk.

The Secure Flight system is designed to limit the use of PII only to approved uses by authorized parties and protect against inadvertent and unnecessary disclosure. Access to the system and data will be strictly controlled. Only individuals with proper authorization, credentials, training and need to know will be granted access to the system in performance of their duties as approved by the ISSO. Access and audit log reviews, along with other security precautions are in place to further secure system and data access. Processes and policies are in place to further provide that the system use is limited to its intended design while limiting as much as possible the use of PII.

The Secure Flight program embedded security and privacy subject matter experts within core components of the development teams. These individuals have been privy to all levels of decision making, program management, system design and engineering to help identify potential security and privacy issues to mitigate risk early in system's development.





## Section 9.0 Technology

The following questions are directed at critically analyzing the selection process for any technologies utilized by the system, including system hardware, RFID, biometrics and other technology.

### 9.1 What type of project is the program or system?

Secure Flight is a level 1 technology insertion project that establishes passenger watch list matching capabilities within TSA on behalf of DHS. The system is composed primarily of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the shelf products with some customized solutions included. System components include COTS hardware and operating systems along with custom applications running on said systems.

### 9.2 What stage of development is the system in and what project development lifecycle was used?

The Secure Flight development model is based on the approved TSA System Development Lifecycle (SDLC). The system has been assessed by the DHS investment review process including Enterprise Architecture Center of Excellence I (EACOE) and Integrated Project Review Team (IPRT)..

### 9.3 Does the project employ technology which may raise privacy concerns? If so please discuss their implementation.

The primary technologies employed by Secure Flight consist of standard electronic communications and data storage systems. The matching algorithm used to determine if an individual is a potential match to the watch list does not present specific privacy concerns and is deployed in an environment subject to strict administrative, technical and policy controls.

## Approval Signature

Original signed and on file with the DHS Privacy Office.

Hugo Teufel III,  
Chief Privacy Officer,  
Department of Homeland Security