This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-323 
entitled 'Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and 
Oversight' which was released on April 23, 2009. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2009: 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and 
Oversight: 

GAO-09-323: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-323, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of 
geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R). 
GOES-R is to replace the current series of satellites, which will 
likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 
2014. This series is considered critical to the United States’ ability 
to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting 
through the year 2028. 

GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R program, (2) 
evaluate whether plans for the acquisition address problems experienced 
on similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA’s plan will be 
adequate to support current data requirements. To do so, GAO analyzed 
contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and 
NASA. 

What GAO Found: 

NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but the program’s 
cost, schedule, and scope have changed. The GOES-R program has moved 
into the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. It has 
awarded development contracts for the instruments and plans to award 
contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments by mid-2009. However, 
after reconciling program and independent cost estimates, the program 
established a new cost estimate of $7.67 billion—a $670 million 
increase from the prior $7 billion estimate. The program also reduced 
the number of products the satellites will produce from 81 to 34 and 
slowed the delivery of these products in order to reduce costs. More 
recently, the program also delayed key milestones, including the launch 
of the first satellite, which was delayed from December 2014 to April 
2015. Such delays could lead to gaps in satellite coverage if NOAA 
experiences problems with its current operational satellites before a 
backup satellite is in orbit. 

GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite 
programs, but important actions remain to be completed. NOAA has made 
progress in its efforts to address prior lessons by taking steps to 
ensure technical readiness on key components, using an acceptable cost 
estimating approach, implementing techniques to enhance contractor 
oversight, and regularly briefing agency executives. However, technical 
challenges remain on both the ground segment and the instruments. In 
addition, the program did not perform a comprehensive review after 
rebaselining a critical instrument, and it has not documented all of 
the reasons for cost overruns. Until these issues are addressed, NOAA 
faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the same 
mistakes that have plagued other satellite programs. 

NOAA has a plan to meet some, but not all, data requirements. An 
instrument that was originally planned as part of the GOES-R satellite 
was to meet requirements for 15 products that are currently produced, 
as well as 11 new, technically advanced, products. When NOAA removed 
this instrument from the GOES-R satellite program, it arranged to 
obtain the current products from another instrument. However, the 
agency has not developed plans or a timeline to address the 
requirements for the new products. Doing so would include justifying 
the funding for any new initiatives within the agency’s investment 
decision process. Until a decision is made on whether and how to 
proceed in providing the advanced products, key system users, such as 
weather forecasters, will not be able to meet their goals for improving 
the accuracy of severe weather warnings. Further, climate research 
organizations will not obtain the data they need to enhance the science 
of climate, environmental, and oceanic observations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the program take steps to improve management 
and oversight and determine whether and how to recover certain 
capabilities that were removed from the program. In commenting on a 
draft of this report, the Acting Secretary of Commerce agreed with GAO’
s recommendations and stated that the agency plans to implement them. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-323]. For more 
information, contact David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, pownerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

GOES-R Is in Development, but Costs Have Increased, Envisioned 
Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Schedules Have Been Delayed: 

The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned 
from Other Satellite Programs, but Important Actions Remain: 

NOAA Plans to Address Requirements for Current Products but Has Not 
Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced Products: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES: 

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 
2006: 

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program, as of September 2006: 

Table 4: Description of Instrument Development Contracts, as of 
November 2008: 

Table 5: Status of GOES-R Instruments, as of February 2009: 

Table 6: Recent Delays in Key GOES-R Milestones: 

Table 7: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology: 

Table 8: Summary of the GOES-R Cost Estimation Process: 

Table 9: Key Products from the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite 
Instrument: 

Table 10: Comparison of the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Legacy 
Sounder Instrument: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage: 

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern: 

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing: 

Figure 4: Planned Schedule for GOES-R Program and Key Instruments: 

Abbreviations: 

GOES-R: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 2, 2009: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role 
in our nation's weather forecasting. These satellites--which are 
managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)--provide critical information on 
atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help 
meteorologists observe and predict global and local weather events. 
They also provide a means to identify severe storm conditions, such as 
hurricanes and tornadoes, and to track the movement and intensity of 
these storms once they develop. 

NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary satellites, 
called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES- 
R) series. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of 
satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful 
lives in approximately 2014. This new series is expected to mark the 
first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994. 
It is also considered critical to the United States' ability to 
maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting 
through the year 2028. 

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA's management 
of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the 
status of the program, (2) evaluate whether plans for the GOES-R 
acquisition address problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) 
determine whether NOAA's plan to address the capabilities that were 
planned for the satellites, but then removed, will be adequate to 
support current data requirements. 

To determine GOES-R acquisition status, we evaluated program documents, 
including cost and schedule estimates, contractor performance reports 
on instrument development, and executive briefings. To evaluate whether 
NOAA's acquisition plans address problems experienced on similar 
programs, we identified lessons learned from other major space 
acquisitions and compared them with relevant program and contractor 
documents, including instrument technical reviews, and risk lists. We 
assessed the GOES-R cost estimate by comparing the process used to 
develop the estimate with best practices identified in our cost 
estimating guide.[Footnote 1] To determine the adequacy of NOAA's plan 
to support key data requirements, we compared original and revised data 
requirements, determined whether the agency had developed plans for 
addressing different types of requirements, and discussed agency plans 
and options for addressing the requirements with key data users. For 
all objectives, we interviewed the applicable agency and contractor 
officials and consulted with GAO subject matter experts. 

We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area. We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to 
April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
contains further details on our objectives, scope, and methodology. 

Background: 

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental 
satellites have been used by the United States to provide 
meteorological data for weather observation, research, and forecasting. 
NOAA's National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service 
is responsible for managing the civilian operational geostationary and 
polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES 
and the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites, 
respectively. 

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in 
a relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a 
constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in 
space. NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily 
focused on the United States (see figure 1). These satellites are 
uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data about the 
earth's atmosphere, its surface, cloud cover, and the space environment 
to meteorologists and their audiences. They also observe the 
development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes and severe 
thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or 
avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites' 
ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric 
conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA's weather 
forecasting operations. 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

This illustration depicts the approximate GOES geographic coverage for 
GOES-11 and GOES-12. 

Sources: NOAA (data); MapArt (map). 

[End of figure] 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites 
every few years (see table 1). NOAA's policy is to have two operational 
satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times. 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES: 

Series name: Original GOES[B]; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1970-1987; 
Satellites: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 

Series name: GOES I-M; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1985-2001; 
Satellites: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. 

Series name: GOES-N; 
Procurement duration[A]: 1998-2010; 
Satellites: 13, O, P, Q[C]. 

Series name: GOES-R; 
Procurement duration[A]: 2008-2016; 
Satellites: R, S. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite 
launch. 

[B] The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate 
contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-2 
and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on launch) and 
GOES-7. 

[C] NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

[End of table] 

Four GOES satellites--GOES-10, GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13-
-are currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational 
satellites, with GOES-12 covering the east and GOES-11 the west. GOES- 
13 is currently in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the 
other two satellites should they experience any degradation in service. 
GOES-10 is at the end of its service life, but it is being used to 
provide limited coverage of South America. The others in the series, 
GOES-O and GOES-P, are planned for launch over the next 2 years. 
[Footnote 2] NOAA is also planning the next generation of satellites, 
known as the GOES-R series, which are planned for launch beginning in 
2015. 

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits 
raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed 
at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for 
broadcast to primary weather services and the global research community 
in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed data are also 
distributed to users via ground stations through other communication 
channels, such as dedicated private communication lines and the 
Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from the 
geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial 
terminals. 

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

GOES satellite: 
Raw environmental data sent to ground station; 
Processed environmental data sent back to GOES; 
Processed environmental data broadcast from GOES satellite to users; 
Communications link between ground station and users. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

GOES-R Program: An Overview: 

NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of prior 
series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The system 
improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements 
by updating the satellite data more often and providing satellite 
products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements are 
expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the 
observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six 
different types of instruments. Furthermore, two of these instruments--
the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite--
were considered to be the most critical because they would provide data 
for key weather products. Table 2 summarizes the originally planned 
instruments and their expected capabilities. 

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 
2006: 

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information about the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key 
features include: 
* monitoring and tracking severe weather; 
* providing images of clouds to support forecasts; and; 
* providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 
simultaneously. 

Planned instrument: Hyperspectral Environmental Suite[A]; 
Description: Expected to provide information about the earth's surface 
to aid in the prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key 
features include: 
* providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support 
forecasts and climate monitoring; 
* monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, 
coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms; and; 
* providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 
Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over 
the United States and adjacent oceans and to provide a more complete 
dataset than previously possible. Key features include: 
* detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms, and; 
* providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on 
NASA research satellites. 

Planned instrument: Magnetometer; 
Description: Expected to provide information on the general level of 
geomagnetic activity, monitor current systems in space, and permit 
detection of magnetopause crossings, sudden storm commencements, and 
substorms. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in 
the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance and 
disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key features 
include: 
* measuring magnetic fields and charged particles; 
* providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low-energy electrons 
and protons; and; 
* enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, 
telecom services, astronauts, and airlines. 

Planned instrument: Solar Imaging Suite[B]; 
Description: Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range 
of solar X-ray features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well 
as estimate the measure of temperature and emissions. Key features 
include: 
* providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor 
solar storms, and; 
* providing improved imager capability. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled in September 
2006. 

[B] The Solar Imaging Suite was divided into two separate acquisitions, 
the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray 
Irradiance Suite. 

[End of table] 

In September 2006, however, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and 
technical complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that 
total costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could 
reach $11.4 billion.[Footnote 3] Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum 
number of satellites from four to two, canceled plans for developing 
the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the number of 
planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the Solar 
Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. The agency estimated that 
the revised program would cost $7 billion. Table 3 provides a summary 
of the timeline and scope of these key changes. 

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program, as of September 2006: 

Number of satellites; 
Baseline program, as of August 2006: 4; 
2 critical instruments and 4 noncritical instruments or instrument 
suites; 
Critical instruments: 
1. Advanced Baseline Imager; 
2. Hyperspectral Environmental Suite; 
Noncritical instruments/suites: 
3. Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
4. Magnetometer; Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
5. Solar Imaging Suite (which included the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and 
the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray Irradiance Suite); 
Revised program, as of September 2006: 2; 
1 critical instrument and 5 noncritical instruments or instrument 
suites; 
Critical instrument: 
1. Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Noncritical instruments/suites: 
2. Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
3. Magnetometer; 
4. Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
5. Solar Ultraviolet Imager (formerly a component of the Solar Imaging 
Suite); 
6. Extreme Ultraviolet and X-Ray Irradiance Suite (formerly a component 
of the Solar Imaging Suite). 

Number of satellite products; 
Baseline program, as of August 2006: 81; 
Revised program, as of September 2006: 68. 

Life-cycle cost estimate (in then year dollars); 
Baseline program, as of August 2006: $6.2-11.4 billion; 
Revised program, as of September 2006: $7 billion. 

End of operations and maintenance; 
Baseline program, as of August 2006: 2034; 
Revised program, as of September 2006: 2028[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] All satellites are expected to have a 15-year life span (5 years in 
on-orbit storage plus 10 years in operation). 

[End of table] 

Acquisition Strategy: 

NOAA's acquisition strategy was to award contracts for the preliminary 
design of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would subsequently 
compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for overall 
system development and production. In keeping with this strategy, NOAA 
awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R 
system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in March 2007, NOAA 
revised its acquisition strategy for the development contract. In 
response to recommendations by independent advisors, the agency decided 
to separate the overall system development and production contract into 
two separate contracts--the spacecraft segment and the ground segment. 
In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing technically 
advanced instruments, NASA awarded contracts for the preliminary 
designs for five of the planned instruments. NASA subsequently awarded 
development contracts for these instruments and, upon completion, plans 
to turn them over to the prime contractor responsible for the 
spacecraft segment of the GOES-R program. The sixth instrument, the 
Magnetometer, is to be developed as part of the spacecraft contract. 

Program Office Structure: 

NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall 
mission success. However, since it relies on NASA's acquisition 
experience and technical expertise to help ensure the success of its 
programs, NOAA implemented an integrated program management structure 
with NASA for the GOES-R program (see figure 3). NOAA also located the 
program office at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. Within the 
program office, there are two project offices that manage key 
components of the GOES-R system. These are called the flight and ground 
segment project offices. The flight project office, managed by NASA, is 
responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and 
delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The ground 
segment project office, managed by NOAA, oversees the ground contract, 
satellite data product development and distribution, and on-orbit 
operations of the satellites. 

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Top level: 
* Commerce; 
* NASA. 

Second level: 
* NOAA (reports to Commerce); 
* National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service 
(reports to NOAA); 
* NOAA Program Management Council (communicates with NOAA and National 
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service); 
* Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council (reports to NASA; 
communicates with National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 
Information Service and GOES-R Program). 

Third level: 
* GOES-R Program: 
System Program Director: NOAA; 
Deputy System Program Director: NOAA; 
Assistant System Program Director: NASA; (reports to National 
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service; communicates 
with Program Scientist: NOAA and Goddard Space Flight Center Management 
Council). 
* Program Scientist: NOAA (reports to National Environmental Satellite, 
Data, and Information Service; communicates with GOES-R Program). 

Fourth level (all report to GOES-R Program): 
Program Control Lead: NOAA; 
Program Mission Assurance Lead: NASA; 
Flight Project Project Manager: NASA; Deputy: NOAA; 
Program Systems Engineering Lead: NASA; 
Contracts Lead: NOAA; 
Ground Project; Project Manager: NOAA; Deputy: NASA. 

Source: NOAA. 

[End of figure] 

Prior Report Noted the Likelihood of Continued Cost Growth and 
Recommended Steps to Mitigate Program Risks: 

In October 2007, we reported that NOAA had completed preliminary design 
studies of GOES-R, but that program costs were likely to grow and 
schedules were likely to be delayed.[Footnote 4] At that time, GOES-R 
was estimated to cost $7 billion and scheduled to have the first 
satellite ready for launch in 2014. However, independent studies showed 
that the program could cost about $2 billion more than the program's 
cost estimate, and the first satellite launch could be delayed by 2 
years. NOAA officials stated that they were working to reconcile the 
two different cost and schedule estimates. 

We also reported that while the program had implemented a risk 
management program, it had multiple risk lists that were not always 
consistent, and key risks were missing from the risk watch lists--
including risks associated with unfilled executive positions, 
insufficient reserve funds for unexpected costs, and limitations in 
NOAA's insight into NASA's deliverables. Specifically, we noted that in 
past GOES procurements, NOAA did not have the ability to make quick 
decisions on problems because it lacked insight into the portions of 
the procurement that were managed by NASA. We recommended that the GOES-
R program office manage risks using a program-level risk list and 
address the additional risks we identified. Over the past year, the 
program office has improved the integration of its risk management 
process and taken steps to mitigate the risks we identified. 

GOES-R Is in Development, but Costs Have Increased, Envisioned 
Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Schedules Have Been Delayed: 

The GOES-R program has moved from the preliminary design and definition 
phase to the development phase of its acquisition life cycle. Program 
officials have awarded contracts for the five instruments, and they 
plan to award contracts for the spacecraft[Footnote 5] and ground 
segments later this year. However, the program's cost, scope, and 
schedule have changed. 

Progress Has Been Made on GOES-R Procurement Activities: 

NOAA and NASA have made progress on the GOES-R program. In January 
2008, NOAA approved a key decision milestone that allowed the program 
to move from the preliminary design and definition phase to the 
development phase of the acquisition life cycle. This approval also 
gave the program the authority to issue the requests for proposals for 
the spacecraft and ground segment projects--which it did in January 
2008 and May 2008, respectively. The program office plans to award the 
prime contract for the spacecraft in May 2009 and the contract for the 
ground segment in June 2009. 

In addition, between September 2004 and December 2007, the GOES-R 
program awarded contracts for the development of five key instruments. 
[Footnote 6] Table 4 briefly describes each of these instruments, their 
contract award dates, and their cost and schedule estimates, while 
figure 4 depicts the schedule for both the program and key instruments. 

Table 4: Description of Instrument Development Contracts, as of 
November 2008 (Dollars in millions): 

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Description: Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric 
information of the earth's surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover; 
Contract award date: Sept. 2004; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; 
Baseline cost[A]: $358. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Description: Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in 
the prediction of disturbances and disruptions of radio communications 
and navigation systems; 
Contract award date: Aug. 2006; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012;
Baseline cost[A]: $67. 

Planned instrument: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Description: Expected to provide real time measurement of solar 
activity in the Extreme Ultraviolet and X-ray spectrum; 
Contract award date: Aug. 2007; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; Baseline cost[A]: $55. 

Planned instrument: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Description: Expected to observe the sun's ultraviolet emissions and 
provide early detection and location of flares and coronal mass 
ejections; 
Contract award date: Sept. 2007; 
Scheduled completion date: Oct. 2012; Baseline cost[A]: $113. 

Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Description: Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over 
the United States; 
Contract award date: Dec. 2007; 
Scheduled completion date: June 2012; Baseline cost[A]: $58. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] These costs reflect the contractor's baseline cost estimates. In 
some cases, the program office's cost estimate is higher than the 
contractor's cost estimate. 

[End of table] 

Figure 4: Planned Schedule for GOES-R Program and Key Instruments: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated schedule] 

Program start: 2003; 

Contract award and completion dates for the development of five key 
instruments: 

Advanced Baseline Imager: 
Award: Mid-2004; 
Completion: Mid-2012. 

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite: 
Award: Mid-2006; 
Completion: Mid-2012. 

Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor: 
Award: Mid-2007; 
Completion: Mid-2012. 

Solar Ultraviolet Imager: 
Award: Mid-2007; 
Completion: Late-2012. 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper: 
Award: Late-2007
Completion: Mid-2012. 

Development phase begins: 2008; 

Space contract award: 2009. 

Ground contract award: 2009. 

Key instruments complete: 2012. 

GOES-R launch: 2015. 

GOES-S launch: 2018. 

Program end: 2028. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of figure] 

The five key instruments are currently in varying stages of 
development. One instrument, the Advanced Baseline Imager, has 
experienced technical issues leading to cost overruns and schedule 
delays. The program office rebaselined the cost and schedule of the 
program in February 2007 and then rebaselined the schedule again in 
March 2008. Since February 2007, the contractor incurred a cost overrun 
of approximately $30 million and, since March 2008, the contractor has 
delayed $11 million worth of work. Program officials reported that they 
have sufficient management reserves to address the overruns experienced 
to date. The other instruments are still very early in development. 
Table 5 describes the status and risk level of each instrument. 

Table 5: Status of GOES-R Instruments, as of February 2009: 

Planned instrument: Advanced Baseline Imager; 
Status: In development since 2004, this instrument has experienced 
technical issues that led to the need to rebaseline the cost and 
schedule. A prototype of the unit is under development, and testing is 
scheduled to begin in May 2009; 
Program-identified risk level: Cost: high; Schedule: low; Technical: 
low. 

Planned instrument: Space Environmental In-Situ Suite; 
Status: This instrument successfully completed a preliminary design 
review in December 2008 and is on track for a critical design review in 
May 2010. It is to be delivered for integration on the GOES-R satellite 
by June 2012; 
Program-identified risk level: Cost: low; Schedule: low; Technical: 
low. 

Planned instrument: Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor; 
Status: This instrument completed a preliminary design review in 
November 2008 and is on track for its critical design review in 
November 2009. Even though the instrument is still relatively early in 
its development, it is currently at its limit for mass. The contractor 
has developed a plan to reduce the instrument's mass. This instrument 
is to be delivered for integration on the GOES-R satellite by June 
2012; 
Program-identified risk level: Cost: low; Schedule: low; Technical: 
low. 

Planned instrument: Solar Ultraviolet Imager; 
Status: This instrument completed a preliminary design review in 
October 2008 and is scheduled for a critical design review in December 
2009. It is to be delivered for integration on the GOES-R satellite by 
October 2012; 
Program-identified risk level: Cost: low; Schedule: low; Technical: 
low. 

Planned instrument: Geostationary Lightning Mapper; 
Status: This preliminary design review for this instrument was delayed 
from January to March 2009 to complete risk reduction activities. In 
addition, the delivery of the prototype was delayed from July 2010 till 
February 2011. The instrument has recently experienced cost and 
schedule variances due to delays in completing key activities, the need 
for increased coordination with a subcontractor, and additional 
activities in the design of a component of the prototype; 
Program-identified risk level: Cost: high; Schedule: high; Technical: 
low. 

Sources: NOAA and NASA data. 

[End of table] 

GOES-R Cost Estimate Has Increased, Envisioned Functionality Has Been 
Reduced, and Key Milestones Have Slipped: 

NOAA has made several important decisions about the cost, scope, and 
schedule of the GOES-R program. After reconciling the program office's 
cost estimate of $7 billion with the independent cost estimate of about 
$9 billion, the agency established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 
billion. This is an increase of $670 million from the previous 
estimate. Program officials plan to revisit this cost estimate after 
the spacecraft and ground segment contracts are awarded. However, 
agency officials, including NOAA's Chief Financial Officer and NOAA's 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service 
Assistant Administrator, stated that this estimate was developed with a 
relatively high level of confidence and that they believe that any 
adjustments would be well within the $7.67 billion program budget. 

To mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program officials decided 
to remove selected program requirements from the baseline program and 
treat them as options that could be exercised if funds allow. These 
requirements include the number of products to be distributed, the time 
to deliver the remaining products (product latency), and how often 
these products are updated with new satellite data (refresh rate). 
Specifically, program officials eliminated the requirement to develop 
and distribute 34 of the 68 envisioned products, including aircraft 
icing threat, turbulence, and visibility. Program officials explained 
that these products are not currently being produced by legacy GOES 
satellites; they are new products that could be produced from the 
advanced GOES-R instruments. In addition, the program slowed planned 
product latency on the remaining products by as much as 10 minutes for 
hurricane intensity and 6 minutes for volcanic ash detection and 
height. It also reduced the refresh rates on these products by as much 
as 55 minutes for sea surface temperatures, cloud top observations, and 
vertical moisture profiles in the atmosphere. Program officials 
included the restoration of the products, latency, and refresh rates as 
options in the ground segment contract--items that could be acquired at 
a later time. 

NOAA also delayed GOES-R program milestones, including the dates for 
issuing the requests for proposals and awarding the contracts for the 
spacecraft and ground segments. The dates when the satellites would be 
available for launch have also slipped by 4 months, with the first 
satellite launch now scheduled for April 2015. Program officials 
attributed these delays to providing more stringent oversight before 
releasing the requests for proposals, additional time needed to 
evaluate the contract proposals, and funding reductions in fiscal year 
2008. Table 6 identifies delays in key GOES-R milestones. 

Table 6: Recent Delays in Key GOES-R Milestones: 

Event: Request for proposals--spacecraft segment; 
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Sept. 2007; 
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): Jan. 2008; 
Change: 4 months. 

Event: Request for proposals--ground segment; 
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Nov. 2007; 
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): May 2008; 
Change: 6 months. 

Event: Contract award--spacecraft segment; 
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): May 2008; 
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): May 2009; 
Change: 12 months. 

Event: Contract award--ground segment; 
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Aug. 2008; 
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): June 2009; 
Change: 10 months. 

Event: First satellite launch (GOES-R); 
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Dec. 2014; 
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): Apr. 2015; 
Change: 4 months. 

Event: Second satellite launch (GOES-S); 
Scheduled milestones (as of September 2007): Apr. 2016; 
Actual or current milestones (as of March 2009): Aug. 2016; 
Change: 4 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[End of table] 

Further delays in the launch of the first GOES-R satellite would run 
counter to NOAA's policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all 
times and could lead to gaps in satellite coverage. Specifically, in 
2015, NOAA expects to have two operational satellites in orbit, but it 
will not have a backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched. If 
NOAA experiences a problem with either of its operational satellites 
before a backup satellite is in orbit, it will need to rely on older 
decommissioned satellites that may not be fully functional. 

The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned 
from Other Satellite Programs, but Important Actions Remain: 

GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite 
programs, but important actions remain to be completed. Satellite 
programs are often technically complex and risky undertakings and, as a 
result, they often experience technical problems, cost overruns, and 
schedule delays. We and others have reported on repeated missteps in 
the acquisition of major satellite systems, including the National 
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, the GOES I- 
M series, the Space Based Infrared System High Program, and the 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System.[Footnote 7] Key 
lessons learned from these other satellite programs include the 
importance of (1) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the 
system's components prior to key decisions, (2) establishing realistic 
cost and schedule estimates, (3) providing sufficient management at the 
program and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior 
executive oversight to ensure mission success. 

NOAA Has Taken Steps to Ensure Technical Readiness, but Key Risks 
Remain: 

Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in the 
development of critical components as a result of having insufficient 
knowledge of the components and their supporting technologies prior to 
key decision points. One key decision point is when an agency decides 
whether the component is sufficiently ready to proceed from a 
preliminary study phase into a development phase; this decision point 
results in the award of the development contract. Another key decision 
point occurs during the development phase when an agency decides 
whether the component is ready to proceed from design into production 
(also called the critical design review). Without sufficient technical 
readiness at these milestones, agencies could proceed into development 
contracts for components that are not well understood and enter into 
the production phase of development with technologies that are not yet 
mature. 

Since the late 1990s, NOAA has taken a series of steps to help mitigate 
technical readiness issues on GOES-R. Specifically, the agency: 

* conducted preliminary studies on the technologies to be used on the 
GOES-R instruments; 

* awarded contracts for the preliminary design of the planned 
instruments and the overall GOES-R system; 

* awarded instrument development contracts that include provisions to 
develop prototypes or engineering models before the flight units for 
each instrument are developed; 

* conducted a major review of the Advanced Baseline Imager before the 
next major milestone;[Footnote 8] 

* certified that the technology for the spacecraft and ground segments 
was mature before awarding the contracts;[Footnote 9] 

* removed the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite from the GOES-R series 
after preliminary studies showed that it was technically complex; 

* established independent review teams responsible for assessing the 
program's technical, programmatic, and management risks on an annual 
basis to ensure sufficient technical readiness prior to the critical 
design review milestone; and: 

* established processes for reviewing the maturity and readiness of 
algorithms for each of the products. 

However, key technology risks remain--affecting both the ground segment 
and the instruments. Specifically, while the hardware that is to be 
used for the ground segment is mature, key components have not 
previously been integrated. Consequently, if the components do not work 
together, the program might have to procure separate antennas, which 
would impact the program's cost and schedule. The ground segment 
project office utilizes an integrated product team to manage and 
mitigate this risk and released a request for information to industry 
in January 2009. 

In addition to the ground segment risks, technical risks remain on the 
development of the instruments. For example, the contractor responsible 
for developing the Advanced Baseline Imager estimates that the 
instrument is over 50 percent complete and reports that it has 
experienced technical issues, including problems with the quality of 
components in the focal plane module, mirrors, and telescope. As of 
November 2008, the contractor incurred a cost overrun of approximately 
$30 million and delayed $11 million worth of work. The other 
instruments are earlier in their development. Since none has yet been 
demonstrated in a lab or test environment, the risk remains that the 
technologies are not sufficiently mature. The program plans to continue 
efforts to demonstrate technologies before key decision milestones on 
each instrument. 

Program Estimates Were Developed Using an Acceptable Methodology, but 
an Underlying Assumption Is Overly Optimistic: 

In 2007, we reported that cost-estimating organizations throughout the 
federal government and industry use 12 key practices--related to 
planning, conducting, and reporting the estimate--to ensure a sound 
estimate.[Footnote 10] Table 7 lists these practices. 

Table 7: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology: 

Activity area: Planning the estimate; 
Key practice: Define the estimate's purpose; 
Description: The estimate should define the purpose, describe the level 
of detail required, and identify the recipient of the estimate and the 
overall scope. 

Activity area: Planning the estimate; 
Key practice: Define the program or system characteristics; 
Description: The estimate should have a technical baseline description 
document with, among other things, the program's system and performance 
characteristics. 

Activity area: Planning the estimate; 
Key practice: Identify ground rules and assumptions; 
Description: The estimate should define what is included and excluded 
from the estimate and identify global and program-specific assumptions 
such as the estimate's base year and budget constraints. 

Activity area: Planning the estimate; 
Key practice: Determine the estimating approach; 
Description: The estimate should include a work breakdown structure, 
the estimating method, and a cost estimating checklist. 

Activity area: Planning the estimate; 
Key practice: Develop the estimating plan; 
Description: The estimate should identify the team, outline the 
approach, develop an estimate timeline, and identify who will do the 
independent cost estimate. 

Activity area: Conducting the estimate; 
Key practice: Obtain the data; 
Description: The estimate should include a data collection plan with 
emphasis on collecting current and relevant technical, programmatic, 
and risk data. The data sources should be investigated, and data should 
be normalized for inflation and stored for future estimates. 

Activity area: Conducting the estimate; 
Key practice: Perform the estimate; 
Description: The estimate should be developed in accordance with the 
identified methodology, ground rules, and assumptions; express costs in 
constant year dollars; and be validated. 

Activity area: Conducting the estimate; 
Key practice: Conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis; 
Description: The estimate should identify the risks and uncertainties 
associated with the project's cost, schedule, and technology. There 
should also be a confidence interval associated with the point 
estimate. 

Activity area: Conducting the estimate; 
Key practice: Conduct a sensitivity analysis; 
Description: The estimate should test the sensitivity of cost elements 
to changes in input values and key assumptions and identify the effects 
of changing the program schedule on the estimate. 

Activity area: Reporting the estimate; 
Key practice: Document the estimate; 
Description: The estimate should document all steps used to develop the 
estimate so that it can be recreated. 

Activity area: Reporting the estimate; 
Key practice: Review and provide results or presentation; 
Description: The estimate should be presented to management for 
approval. The presentation should include an explanation of the 
technical and programmatic uncertainties and comparisons of other cost 
estimates. 

Activity area: Reporting the estimate; 
Key practice: Update the estimate with actual costs and document 
lessons learned; 
Description: The estimate should be updated to reflect changes in 
assumptions and new project phases and milestones. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

The GOES-R program's cost estimate fully implemented 11 and partially 
implemented 1 of the 12 best practices for developing a credible cost 
estimate (see table 8). The practices that were fully implemented 
include clearly defining the purpose of the estimate and the program's 
characteristics, establishing and implementing a sound estimating 
approach, and appropriately assessing the risk and sensitivity of its 
estimate. The practice that was partially implemented involved ground 
rules and assumptions. The program defined and documented all of the 
ground rules and assumptions used in the estimate. However, an 
independent review team found that the assumed inflation rates used for 
the ground segment were overly optimistic and could lead to a shortfall 
of hundreds of millions of dollars. Specifically, the agency used the 
Department of Defense's inflation rates rather than NASA's historical 
experiences, which are more conservative. Program officials responded 
that the agency's long experience in developing ground systems would 
balance the optimistic inflation rates and that they could adjust the 
inflation rates, if warranted, in later years. 

Table 8: Summary of the GOES-R Cost Estimation Process: 

Best practice: 
1. Define the estimate's purpose; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
2. Define the program or system characteristics; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
3. Identify ground rules and assumptions; Partially met. 

Best practice: 
4. Determine the estimating approach; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
5. Develop the estimating plan; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
6. Obtain the data; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
7. Perform the estimate; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
8. Conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
9. Conduct a sensitivity analysis; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
10. Document the estimate; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
11. Review and provide results or presentation; Fully met. 

Best practice: 
12. Update the estimate with actual costs and document lessons learned; 
Fully met. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

NOAA Has Improved Program Management, but Work Remains on Key Program 
Controls: 

In the past, we have reported on poor performance in program 
management.[Footnote 11] The key drivers of poor management often 
include ineffective risk management, insufficient staff to implement 
earned value management, and inadequate levels of management reserve. 
In 2006 and 2007, we reported that, while NOAA had taken steps to 
restructure its management approach on the GOES-R procurement in an 
effort to improve performance and to avoid past mistakes, key program 
management areas needed additional attention. We recommended that NOAA 
improve the consistency of its risk management process, assess and 
obtain the resources it needed for overseeing the earned value of its 
contracts, and provide sufficient management reserves to address 
unexpected issues in instrument development. NOAA subsequently 
implemented these recommendations by streamlining its risk management 
processes, supplementing oversight resources, and reassessing its 
management reserves. Since we last reported on this issue, the program 
office has made additional progress in earned value management, but 
more remains to be done. 

Program's Approach to Earned Value Management Has Shortfalls: 

Earned value management[Footnote 12] provides a proven means for 
measuring progress against cost and schedule commitments and thereby 
identifying potential cost overruns and schedule delays early, when the 
impact can be minimized. Two key aspects of this process are conducting 
comprehensive integrated baseline reviews and using monthly variance 
reports to manage the program. An integrated baseline review is a 
process used by stakeholders to obtain agreement on the value of 
planned work and to validate the baseline against which the variances 
are calculated. These reviews assess the technical scope of the work, 
key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and technical 
planning, and management processes; they are completed whenever a new 
baseline is established. Once an integrated baseline review has been 
completed and the project management baseline has been validated, 
monthly variance reports provide information on the contract status, 
the reasons for any deviations from cost or schedule plans, and any 
actions taken to address these deviations. 

To its credit, the GOES-R program office is using earned value 
management to oversee the key instrument contracts and plans to use it 
on the spacecraft and ground segment contracts. To date, the program 
office has performed integrated baseline reviews on the instruments and 
obtains and reviews variance reports for each of the instruments. 

However, there are shortfalls in the program's approach. The program's 
integrated baseline review for the Advanced Baseline Imager did not 
include a review of schedule milestones, the adequacy of how tasks are 
measured, and the contractor's management processes. Further, the 
variance reports for two instruments--the Advanced Baseline Imager and 
the Geostationary Lightning Mapper--do not describe all of the 
significant variances. The imager's reports only describe the five 
largest cost and schedule variances and do not include variances 
associated with overhead. For example, the reasons for cost and 
schedule variances exceeding $1 million were not disclosed in October 
and November 2008 cost reports.[Footnote 13] Moreover, while the 
reports identified problems that resulted in cost growth and schedule 
slippage for the five largest variances, the reports did not identify 
the actions taken to address them. The mapper's reports also did not 
disclose the reasons for selected variances, including a $197,000 cost 
overrun in August 2008 and a $141,000 cost overrun in October 2008. 
Program officials explained that they meet with the contractor on a 
monthly basis to discuss all of the variances, but they were unable to 
provide documentation of these discussions or the reasons, impact of, 
or mitigation plans for the variances. As a result of these shortfalls, 
the program office has less assurance that key instruments will be 
delivered on time and within budget, and it is more difficult for 
program managers to identify risks and take corrective actions. 

Executive-Level Involvement Is Occurring: 

Executive-level involvement is a key aspect of program success, and it 
is occurring on the GOES-R program. The Office of Management and Budget 
guidance calls for agencies to establish executive-level oversight 
boards to regularly track the progress of major system acquisitions. 
[Footnote 14] In addition, in 2007, NOAA and NASA signed both an 
interagency agreement and a management control plan that defined the 
agencies' respective roles and responsibilities. Among other things, 
the agreements called for the program to provide monthly status review 
briefings for executives on NOAA's Program Management Council and 
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center Management Council. 

Since these agreements were approved, the program has consistently 
briefed senior management at monthly meetings and has effectively 
communicated the program's status and key risks. Additionally, key 
representatives of NOAA's Program Management Council attend the NASA 
council's meeting, and senior NASA executives attend NOAA's council 
meetings. 

NOAA Plans to Address Requirements for Current Products but Has Not 
Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced Products: 
The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument was originally planned 
as part of the GOES-R satellite to meet requirements for products that 
are currently produced by GOES satellites (such as temperature and 
moisture profiles at different atmospheric levels), as well as new 
technically-advanced products (such as moisture fluctuations and ocean 
color) that are not currently produced by GOES satellites. Table 9 
lists the current and new products that were originally planned to be 
provided by the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. 

Table 9: Key Products from the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite 
Instrument: 

Current sounding products: 
* GOES variable data stream format sounder data; 
* Channel brightness temperature; 
* Cloud top pressure; 
* Cloud top temperature; 
* Effective cloud amount; 
* Automated Surface Observing System categorical cloud height; 
* Automated Surface Observing System categorical cloud amount; 
* Total precipitable water; 
* Layer precipitable water; 
* Lifted index (a derived product image); 
* Surface skin temperature; 
* Vertical moisture profiles; 
* Vertical temperature profiles; 
* Geopotential height; 
* Water vapor winds; 

New sounding products: 
* Dust/aerosol: loading; 
* Cloud base height; 
* Capping inversion information; 
* Moisture flux; 
* Pressure profile; 
* Carbon monoxide concentration; 
* Ozone layers; 
* Microburst windspeed potential; 
* Improved temperature and moisture profiles; 

New coastal waters imaging products: 
* Ocean color (turbidity/chlorophyll/reflectance); 
* Ocean turbidity (turbidity/visibility); 
* Optical properties (particulate absorption, backscatter, 
fluorescence). 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

Note: In addition to the products listed here, selected products were 
to have been jointly produced by the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite 
and the Advanced Baseline Imager. While these products are expected to 
be produced by the Advanced Baseline Imager, some will experience a 
degradation in quality and timeliness from what was originally 
anticipated. 

[End of table] 

NOAA still considers these requirements to be valid. According to 
National Weather Service meteorologists, users depend on the products 
that they currently receive from GOES satellites in orbit for hourly 
and daily weather observations. In addition, NOAA and the science 
community still have a need for the advanced products. NOAA had planned 
to use the new sounding products to improve its performance goals, such 
as helping to increase the lead times associated with severe 
thunderstorm warnings from an average of 18 minutes in 2000 to as much 
as 2 hours by 2025, and helping to increase the lead times associated 
with tornado warnings from an average of 13 minutes in 2007 to as much 
as 1 hour by 2025.[Footnote 15] In addition, NOAA had planned to use 
the new coastal waters imaging products to provide more accurate and 
quantitative understanding of areas along the U.S. East Coast (within 
50 miles of the shore) and 130 estuaries throughout the United States-
-areas for which NOAA has management responsibilities.[Footnote 16] 

Similarly, the environmental science communities have continued to 
express a need for the advanced products. In 2007, the National 
Research Council recommended that NOAA develop a strategy to restore 
the planned geostationary advanced sounding capability that was removed 
from the GOES-R program in order to allow high-temporal and high- 
vertical resolution measurements of temperature and water vapor. 
[Footnote 17] As part of that strategy, the report recommended that 
NOAA work with NASA to complete a demonstration satellite in the near 
term. 

NOAA Plans to Fulfill Requirements for Current Products: 

In light of the cancellation of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, 
NOAA decided to use the planned Advanced Baseline Imager to develop the 
products that are currently produced by the GOES satellite sounders now 
in orbit. In mid-2006, NOAA compared the imager's anticipated 
capabilities with the legacy GOES sounder instrument and reported that 
the advanced imager would be able to produce the necessary data 20 
times faster than the legacy sounder and with comparable or better 
spatial resolution. However, NOAA also reported that the advanced 
imager will be less accurate than the legacy sounder for four of the 
seven product groups. Table 10 compares the capabilities of the 
Advanced Baseline Imager with the legacy sounder in seven product 
groups. 

Table 10: Comparison of the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Legacy 
Sounder Instrument: 

Product groups: Radiances; 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C]; 
Accuracy: Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[C]. 

Product groups: Total precipitable water; 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C]; 
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D]. 

Product groups: Lifted index (atmospheric stability measurement); 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C]; 
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D]. 

Product groups: Skin (land surface) temperature; 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C]; 
Accuracy: Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[C]. 

Product groups: Profiles (vertical moisture/temperature readings); 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[A][C]; 
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D]. 

Product groups: Clouds; 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager has a finer resolution than the legacy 
sounder[B]; 
Accuracy: Imager is less precise than the legacy sounder[D]. 

Product groups: Moisture winds; 
Temporal/latency (refresh rates): Imager is approximately 20 times 
faster than the legacy sounder[B]; 
Spatial (resolution): Imager has a finer resolution than the legacy 
sounder[B]; 
Accuracy: Imager is comparable to the legacy sounder[C]. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

[A] The Advanced Baseline Imager is planned to produce these products 
at a spatial resolution that is finer than that of the legacy sounder. 
However, in order to maintain continuity with existing products, the 
finer resolution data from the advanced baseline imager will need to be 
averaged to produce products with the resolution of the legacy sounder. 

[B] Improved = the imager is expected to improve this capability. 

[C] Comparable = the imager is expected to provide comparable 
capability. 

[D] Degraded = the imager is expected to degrade this capability. 

[End of table] 

In an effort to obtain consensus from the GOES user community, NOAA 
briefed sounding experts on the Advanced Baseline Imager's ability to 
develop products currently produced by the legacy GOES sounder. These 
experts included representatives from the National Weather Service; the 
National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Services; the 
Department of Defense's satellite data processing centers; academia; 
and attendees at a weather-related conference.[Footnote 18] NOAA 
reported that users accepted this plan as a suitable alternative until 
an advanced sounder could be flown on the GOES series. NOAA noted that 
users were pleased with the anticipated improvements in refresh rates. 

While satellite data users were eager to obtain faster refresh rates, 
recent contract changes have since reduced these expected rates. As 
previously reported, when the program office reconciled its cost 
estimate with the independent estimate, the program removed or reduced 
selected capabilities from the ground segment project. One of the 
reduced capabilities was the refresh rates for most of the products. 
Instead of refresh rates that are 20 times faster, current plans call 
for refresh rates that are only 2 to 4 times faster than current 
products. The faster refresh rates are now options in the contract. 

NOAA Assessed Alternatives for Addressing Requirements for Advanced 
Products but Has Not Yet Defined Its Plans: 

In addition to efforts to address the requirements for existing 
products that were removed with the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, 
NOAA, NASA, and the Department of Defense assessed alternatives for 
obtaining advanced sounding and coastal waters imaging products from a 
geostationary orbit. The options include placing an advanced instrument 
on a stand-alone satellite or on later GOES satellites. The results of 
the analysis recommended that NOAA work with NASA to develop a 
demonstration sounder to fly on an as-yet undetermined satellite in 
order to build a foundation for an eventual operational advanced 
sounder on a future GOES satellite. For coastal waters imaging, the 
analysis recommended that, in the near-term, NOAA evaluate a 
hyperspectral imager that is planned to be included on the 
International Space Station and that NOAA and NASA coordinate to 
identify and evaluate other options for the future. NOAA plans to 
assess the technical feasibility of various options and to have the 
National Research Council make recommendations on long-term options for 
coastal waters imaging. 

However, NOAA has not defined plans or a timeline for implementing any 
of the options or for addressing the requirements for advanced 
products. Further, agency officials were unable to estimate when they 
would establish plans to fulfill the requirements. Doing so would 
include justifying the funding for any new initiatives within the 
agency's investment decision process. Until a decision is made on 
whether and how to proceed in providing the advanced products, key 
system users such as the National Weather Service will not be able to 
meet their goals for improving the lead times or accuracy of severe 
weather warnings, including warnings for tornadoes and hurricanes. 
Further, climate research organizations will not obtain the data they 
need to enhance the science of climate, coastal, environmental, and 
oceanic observations. 

Conclusions: 

The GOES-R satellite series is now in development, but program costs 
have increased, schedules have been delayed, and the scope of the 
program has been reduced. Unless the program exercises contract 
options, key benefits in terms of new products and faster data updates 
will not be realized. In addition, recent events make it likely that 
schedules will continue to slip. Any delays in the launch of the first 
satellite in the GOES-R program increase the risk of gaps in satellite 
coverage. 

The program office has made repeated and continuing efforts to learn 
from problems experienced on other satellite programs, but more can be 
done in selected areas. Specifically, the program has improved the 
technical readiness of key components, adopted many sound estimating 
practices, implemented an earned value management process for 
overseeing contracts, and is obtaining executive-level oversight. 
However, the program's approach to earned value management has 
shortfalls. The program did not perform a comprehensive review after 
rebaselining a critical instrument--the Advanced Baseline Imager--and 
has not documented the reasons for all cost overruns. Until these 
issues are addressed, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R 
program will repeat the cost increases, schedule delays, and 
performance shortfalls that have plagued other satellite programs. 

In addition, while the GOES-R program office plans to recover existing 
product capabilities that were lost when a critical sensor was removed 
from the satellites, NOAA has not yet developed a plan or a timeline 
for recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed. Doing so 
would include justifying whether and how to proceed in fulfilling the 
advanced requirements. Until such decisions and plans are made, the 
geostationary satellite user community may not be able to make 
significant improvements in their severe weather forecasts. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve NOAA's ability to effectively manage the GOES-R program, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator 
to ensure that the following three actions are taken: 

* As part of any effort to rebaseline the cost and schedule of the 
Advanced Baseline Imager, perform an integrated baseline review and 
ensure that the review includes an assessment of key schedule 
milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and technical planning, and 
management processes. 

* Improve the agency's ability to oversee contractor performance by 
ensuring that the reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully 
disclosed and documented. 

* If feasible and justified, develop a plan and timeline for recovering 
the advanced capabilities that were removed from the program when the 
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of 
Commerce's Acting Secretary stated that the report did a fair and 
thorough job of assessing the status of the GOES-R program and NOAA's 
efforts to leverage lessons learned from similar programs. The 
department agreed with our findings and recommendations and outlined 
steps it is taking to implement them. For example, the department 
stated that NOAA will perform an integrated baseline review on the 
Advanced Baseline Imager, as part of any effort to rebaseline its cost 
and schedule, and that the GOES-R program office will ensure full 
disclosure of cost and schedule variances. The department also provided 
technical comments on the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 
The department's comments are provided in appendix II. 

In addition, NASA's Associate Administrator for the Science Mission 
Directorate provided written comments on a draft of this report. In 
those comments, the Associate Administrator stated that the report is 
complete and accurate in its assessment of NASA's participation in the 
GOES-R program. The department's comments are provided in appendix III. 
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other 
interested parties. The report also will be available at no charge on 
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

David A. Powner: 

Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Brian Baird: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bob Inglis: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Brad Miller: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Paul Broun, Jr. 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2) 
evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
(NOAA) plans for the GOES-R acquisition address problems experienced on 
similar programs, and (3) determine whether NOAA's plan to address the 
capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then removed, 
will be adequate to support current data requirements. 

To determine the program's status, we evaluated various programmatic 
and technical plans, management reports, and other program 
documentation. We reviewed the spacecraft and ground segment requests 
for proposals, cost and schedule estimates, contractor performance 
reports on instrument development, planned system requirements, and 
monthly executive-level management briefings. We also interviewed NOAA 
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials from 
the GOES-R program office. 

To evaluate whether NOAA's acquisition plans address problems 
experienced on similar programs, we identified lessons learned from 
other major space acquisitions by reviewing prior GAO reports and 
interviewing space acquisition experts. We compared these lessons 
learned with relevant program and contractor documents and risk lists. 
Key lessons were related to technical readiness, cost and schedule 
estimates, program management, and executive-level involvement. 

Specific steps in each of these areas are as follows: 

* Technical readiness: We reviewed program, flight project, and ground 
segment risks, and instrument technical reviews. 

* Cost and schedule estimates: We identified the process used to 
develop NOAA's cost estimate by reviewing the program cost estimate, 
the Cost Analysis Requirements Document, and program cost estimate 
briefings. We then compared NOAA's process with the 12 steps of a high-
quality cost estimating process identified in our cost estimating 
guide.[Footnote 19] For each step, we assessed whether the GOES-R 
estimate fully met, partially met, or did not meet the practices 
associated with a sound cost estimate. We also interviewed government 
and contractor cost estimating officials. 

* Program management: We analyzed the program's risk management plan, 
risk lists, cost performance reports, and integrated baseline reviews. 

* Executive-level involvement: We analyzed the program's management 
control plan, attended NOAA and NASA executive council meetings and 
reviewed the program's briefings to executives at both agencies. We 
also discussed these topics with appropriate agency officials. 

To determine the adequacy of NOAA's plans to address the capabilities 
that were removed from the program, we identified the requirements for 
existing and advanced products that were associated with the canceled 
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite instrument. We reviewed agency plans 
to fulfill requirements for the existing products and the analysis 
supporting this decision. We compared this analysis with an external 
scientific publication[Footnote 20] and interviewed satellite data 
users about the implications of plans to use the Advanced Baseline 
Imager to provide legacy products. To assess NOAA's plans to fulfill 
requirements for advanced products, we reviewed NOAA's analysis of 
options for addressing the advanced products, as well as National 
Research Council reports on priorities in satellite observation. 
[Footnote 21] We also interviewed satellite data users, including 
forecasters and modelers from the National Weather Service, and 
satellite data processing experts from the National Environmental 
Satellite, Data, and Information Service. 

We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area. We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 to 
April 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

United States Department Of Commerce: 
The Secretary of Commerce: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

March 16, 2009: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements 
Needed in Management and Contractor Oversight (GAO-09-323). On behalf 
of the Department of Commerce, I enclose the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration's programmatic comments on the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Otto J. Wolff: 
Acting Secretary: 

Enclosure: 

[End of letter] 

Department of Commerce: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 
Comments on the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under Way, but Improvements 
Needed in Management and Contractor Oversight" (GAO-09-323/April 2009): 

General Comments: 

The Department of Commerce (DOC) appreciates the opportunity to review 
this report on Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites, 
specifically the R-Series (GOES-R). The report does a fair and thorough 
job assessing the status of the GOES-R program and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) efforts to leverage lessons learned 
from similar programs. 

NOAA Response to GAO Recommendations: 

The draft GAO report states, "To improve NOAA's ability to effectively 
manage the GOES-R program, we recommend the Secretary of Commerce 
direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure the following three actions are 
taken:" 

Recommendation 1: "As part of any effort to rebaseline the cost and 
schedule of the Advanced Baseline Imager, perform an integrated 
baseline review and ensure the review includes an assessment of key 
schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and technical 
planning, and management processes." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will perform 
an integrated baseline review on the Advanced Baseline Imager as part 
of any effort to rebaseline its cost and schedule. The integrated 
baseline review will include assessment of the technical scope of the 
work, key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and 
technical planning, and management processes. 

Recommendation 2: "Improve the agency's ability to oversee contractor 
performance by ensuring the reasons for cost and schedule variances are 
fully disclosed and documented." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. GOES-R contractors 
submit monthly Cost Performance Reports with itemization of all 
variances. The GOES-R program office will ensure these cost and 
schedule variances reported by the contractor are elaborated upon as 
needed for full understanding and disclosure. Also, the GOES-R program 
office will fully document the actions taken to address significant 
cost and schedule variances, along with the reasons for and impact of 
those actions. 

Recommendation 3: "If feasible and justified, develop a plan and 
timeline of recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed from 
the program when the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was canceled." 

NOAA Response: NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will identify 
and validate user requirements, evaluate the feasibility and priority 
of addressing those requirements, and determine the most appropriate 
methods to meet the requirements. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Headquarters: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001: 

March 16, 2009: 

Reply to Attention of: Science Mission Directorate: 

Mr. David A. Powner: 
Director: 
Information Technology Management Issues: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Powner: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review your draft report entitled 
"Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES-R): 
Acquisition is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and 
Contractor Oversight," (GAO-09-323). We believe the subject report is 
complete and accurate in its assessment of the GOES-R program insomuch 
as it involves NASA's participation in the activities. As the report 
contains no recommendations to NASA, we do not have any formal 
comments. 

We will continue to work closely with the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration to improve the areas of concern detailed in 
your report. 

If you have any questions or require additional information, please 
contact Ron Hooker at (202) 358-4508 or Stephen Volz on (202) 358-0364. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Edward J. Weiler: 
Associate Administrator for Science Mission Directorate: 

cc: 

Science Mission Directorate/C. Gay; M. Freilich; R. Hooker; S. Volz. 

GSFC/G. Morrow; D. Scheve; M. Brumfield; M. Donnelly. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, or pownerd@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Colleen M. Phillips, 
Assistant Director; Carol Cha; William Carrigg; Neil Doherty; Franklin 
Jackson; Kaelin Kuhn; Lee McCracken; Adam Vodraska; and Eric Winter 
made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and 
Managing Program Costs, Exposure Draft, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2007). 

[2] Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet 
when they are on the ground and by numbers once they are in orbit. 

[3] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional 
Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other Satellite 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1129T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006) and Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned 
from Other Satellite Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 
2006). 

[4] GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Progress 
Has Been Made, but Improvements Are Needed to Effectively Manage Risks, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-18] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 23, 2007). 

[5] NASA awarded the spacecraft segment contract in December 2008. 
However, after a bid protest was filed, NASA decided, in February 2009, 
to re-evaluate its selection. Based on NASA's decision, the protest was 
dismissed. 

[6] A sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, is to be developed as part of 
the spacecraft segment contract. 

[7] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and Keys 
to Addressing Them, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-776R] (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost 
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: 
Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need 
for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 
2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program 
Cost and Schedule Changes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1054] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 
2004); Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program 
Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-48] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 
2003); Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on 
Satellite and Related Acquisitions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-825R] (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 
2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-476] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites: Action Needed to Resolve Status of 
the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-91-252] (Washington, D.C.: July 
24, 1991). Department of Defense, Defense Science Board/Air Force 
Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition 
of National Security Space Programs (May 2003). 

[8] In [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-993], we 
recommended that NOAA use system engineering experts to perform a 
comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager to determine the 
level of technical maturity before moving the instrument into 
production. In February 2007, consistent with our recommendation, an 
integrated independent review team performed a review on the imager. 

[9] The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 requires NOAA to 
determine, among other provisions, that key component technologies have 
been demonstrated in a laboratory or test environment prior to 
contracting for the development of a major program such as GOES-R. 33 
U.S.C. § 878a(b)(1). 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1134SP]. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-249T], and GAO, Defense 
Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees 
Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-66] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 
2005). 

[12] Earned value management is a project management approach that, if 
implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project 
status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and 
cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of a program's total 
costs. 

[13] In October 2008, cost overruns totaling $1,083,298 and schedule 
deviations valued at $1,001,436 were not explained. In November 2008, 
cost overruns totaling $1,193,559 and schedule deviations valued at 
$329,091 were not explained. 

[14] Office of Management and Budget, Supplement to Circular A-11, part 
7 (Washington, D.C.: July 1997). Also see, GAO, Information Technology 
Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process 
Maturity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-394G] 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

[15] In addition to advanced sounding, other activities such as 
improvements in radar technologies are expected to help improve lead 
times. 

[16] While current and future satellite systems provide selected 
coastal waters images, they lack the resolution, sampling frequency, 
and spectral information (field of vision) needed to monitor coastal 
areas and estuaries. 

[17] Committee on Earth Science and Applications from Space: A 
Community Assessment and Strategy for the Future, Earth Science and 
Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and 
Beyond (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007). 

[18] Representatives from the following organizations were also briefed 
on NOAA's plans: NASA, the University of Wisconsin's Cooperative 
Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Hampton University, Utah State University, and the 
University of Maryland Baltimore County. 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1134SP]. 

[20] Schmidt, Timothy J., et al., "The GOES-R Advanced Baseline Imager 
and the Continuation of Current Sounder Products," Journal of Applied 
Meteorology and Climatology, Vol. 47 (Oct. 2008). 

[21] Committee on Earth Science and Applications from Space: A 
Community Assessment and Strategy for the Future, Earth Science and 
Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and 
Beyond (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007); and 
Committee on a Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and 
Demanifests on the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft, Ensuring the Climate 
Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft (Washington, D.C.: The 
National Academies Press, 2008). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: