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Intelligence Information Cable

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automotic

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JEM BEROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

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SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/04352-70

24 22 55 z Aug 70

DIST 24 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY

IRAQ/USSR

DOI

EARLY JANUARY 1970 TO EARLY AUGUST 1970

SUBJECT

INDICATION OF SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE

GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ

ACQ

MID-AUGUST 1970

FIELD NO.

SOURCE


ABOUT JANUARY 1970, TALKING POINTEDLY ABOUT THE "BA'TH GOVERNMENT." IN MARCH THE CHARGE', IN EXPLAINING SOVIET CONCERN WITH INTERNAL IRAQI DEVELOPMENTS, SAID THAT, AFTER ALL, THE SOVIET KURDS CONSIDER MULLAH MUSTAFA B A R Z A N I TO BE THE "KING OF THE KURDS." BY JUNE THE CHARGE' WAS USING THE TERM "NATIONAL SOCIALISM" TO CHARACTERIZE THE BA'TH REGIME. IN JULY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THAT DESPITE THE MILITARY AID GIVEN TO IRAQ SINCE 1963, IRAQ HAS NOT EVEN STARTED PAYING INTEREST ON THE WEAPONS THEY HAVE RECEIVED. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET

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(dissem controls

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM/ (dissem controls)

AMBASSADOR. THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR EVEN A TOKEN OF IRAQI SINCERITY, SUCH AS A CONCESSION ON THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL FRONT.

- 2. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXAMPLE OF SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT
 IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. THE MILITARY ATTACHE SAID THE
 SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ A REFINERY TO SERVE
 AS A SOVIET REFUELING BASE (SIC). ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET
 ATTACHE, BASRA IS INADEQUATE FOR SUCH A PURPOSE. (SOURCE COMMENT:
 THE SUB-SOURCE SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THINGS ARE NOT
 GOING AT ALL WELL FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE GULF, BUT HE HAS NO
 EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE FOREGOING TO SUPPORT THIS FEELING, AND
 THE SOVIET ATTACHE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER ON THIS
 SUBJECT.)
- 3. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXAMPLE OF SOVIET-IRAQI FRICTION.

 EVERY KEY BA'THI OFFICIAL HAS AT LEAST TWO AND SOMETIMES THREE

 RADIO-TELEPHONES ON HIS DESK, AND ONE OR MORE IN HIS CAR AS A

 BACK-UP. THIS IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN COMMUNICATIONS HAS MADE THE

 SOVIETS NERVOUS, AND THE BA'TH REGIME OBVIOUSLY IS IN BETTER CONTROL

 OF THE COUNTRY THAN EVER BEFORE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, MOVEMENT OF

 SOVIETS IN AND OUT OF BAGHDAD ARE CAREFULLY MONITORED. THE CARS

 5
 4





(dissem controls)




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OF SOVIETS OFTEN ARE STOPPED AND INSPECTED AT CHECKPOINTS, AND THE SOVIETS SAY THEY HAVE PROTESTED FREQUENTLY TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SOVIET FAMILIES OFTEN GO TOGETHER IN GROUPS OF TWO OR THREE FAMILIES TO FISH AT LAKE HABBANIYAH, WHICH IS NEAR THE HABBANIYAH AIR BASE.

4. DISSEM: NONE.

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