



Intelligence Information Cable

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GROUP 1
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CITE TDCS DB-315/04352-70

24 22 55 z AUG 70

DIST 24 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY IRAQ/USSR

DOI EARLY JANUARY 1970 TO EARLY AUGUST 1970

SUBJECT INDICATION OF SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ

ACQ MID-AUGUST 1970

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. THE SOVIETS BEGAN CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ ABOUT JANUARY 1970, TALKING POINTEDLY ABOUT THE "BA'TH GOVERNMENT." IN MARCH THE CHARGE', IN EXPLAINING SOVIET CONCERN WITH INTERNAL IRAQI DEVELOPMENTS, SAID THAT, AFTER ALL, THE SOVIET KURDS CONSIDER MULLAH MUSTAFA B A R Z A N I TO BE THE "KING OF THE KURDS." BY JUNE THE CHARGE' WAS USING THE TERM "NATIONAL SOCIALISM" TO CHARACTERIZE THE BA'TH REGIME. IN JULY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THAT DESPITE THE MILITARY AID GIVEN TO IRAQ SINCE 1963, IRAQ HAS NOT EVEN STARTED PAYING INTEREST ON THE WEAPONS THEY HAVE RECEIVED. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET

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(dissem controls)

AMBASSADOR. THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR EVEN A
TOKEN OF IRAQI SINCERITY, SUCH AS A CONCESSION ON THE IDEA OF
A NATIONAL FRONT.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXAMPLE OF SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. THE MILITARY ATTACHE SAID THE
SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ A REFINERY TO SERVE
AS A SOVIET REFUELING BASE (SIC). ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET
ATTACHE, BASRA IS INADEQUATE FOR SUCH A PURPOSE. (SOURCE COMMENT:
THE SUB-SOURCE SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THINGS ARE NOT
GOING AT ALL WELL FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE GULF, BUT HE HAS NO
EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE FOREGOING TO SUPPORT THIS FEELING, AND
THE SOVIET ATTACHE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER ON THIS
SUBJECT.)

3. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXAMPLE OF SOVIET-IRAQI FRICTION.
EVERY KEY BA'THI OFFICIAL HAS AT LEAST TWO AND SOMETIMES THREE
RADIO-TELEPHONES ON HIS DESK, AND ONE OR MORE IN HIS CAR AS A
BACK-UP. THIS IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN COMMUNICATIONS HAS MADE THE
SOVIETS NERVOUS, AND THE BA'TH REGIME OBVIOUSLY IS IN BETTER CONTROL
OF THE COUNTRY THAN EVER BEFORE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, MOVEMENT OF
SOVIETS IN AND OUT OF BAGHDAD ARE CAREFULLY MONITORED. THE CARS

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(classification) (dissem controls)

OF SOVIETS OFTEN ARE STOPPED AND INSPECTED AT CHECKPOINTS, AND THE SOVIETS SAY THEY HAVE PROTESTED FREQUENTLY TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. SOVIET FAMILIES OFTEN GO TOGETHER IN GROUPS OF TWO OR THREE FAMILIES TO FISH AT LAKE HABBANIYAH, WHICH IS NEAR THE HABBANIYAH AIR BASE.

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: NONE.

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