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The 1967 Oil Embargo
228. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Fried)/1/ Washington, May 23, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 2 Middle East Department Memorandum 1967, Box 6297. Confidential. Drafted by J.E. Akins (E/OR/FSE). SUBJECT At my request Admiral Lattu, Director of the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior, called a meeting on May 23 of Interior's experts on fuel supply and transport to discuss possible effects of the current Middle East crisis on world oil supply./2/ State was represented by myself, Jim Akins, Maxwell Harway of the Vietnam working group, and Stephen Rogers of EUR/RPE. /2/Interior's Office of Oil and Gas had been studying the problem since the beginning of May. Early that month, the Petroleum Security Subcommittee of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee recommended that the Department of Defense, as a precautionary measure, consider alternative sources for the 200,000 b/d purchased from Persian Gulf refineries. This figure represented 80 percent of oil used by U.S. military forces in the Pacific. Alternatives were suggested but the meeting was recessed until June 5 to gather more data. (Memorandum reviewing potential petroleum developments, May 31; ibid.) Jim Akins gave a short briefing on the current political scene in the Middle East; we believe that if fighting starts the best we could hope for would be a loss of only the two pipelines, the worst would be a loss, through government action or sabotage of all Arab oil and the closing of the Suez canal. The actual situation would probably lie between the two extremes. Interior's experts conclude that the loss of two of the five major Middle East producers (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya) and the Suez canal would be tolerable. (We note that the loss of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia together would create serious disturbances.) Loss of more would cause disruptions in Europe (and Japan) commensurate to the size of the loss. Arab production is now as follows (millions of b/d): Saudi Arabia--3.2 UAR--.1 Total Arab--9.6 If the oil were lost it could partially be made up from the following sources:
The emergency oil would be expensive. Europe currently imports about 7.5 million b/d for which it pays $6.7 billion per year. Under emergency conditions about 3.9 million b/d could probably be made available to Europe but the cost would be $5.7 billion per year--a per barrel increase of about 67%. The problem is solely that of crude oil; tankers are available or can be made available to ship it but at a higher cost than currently is paid. The Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee is responsible for organizing fuel supplies for the U.S. and its allies. It is currently inactive; its members are top level Department of Interior officers and executives of American oil companies with foreign operations. Its company participants are immune from anti-trust action. It last functioned during the Suez crisis but could be reactivated within a week or two. The permanent subcommittee, the Petroleum Security Subcommittee is composed of Interior officers and oil company employees--mostly those occupying higher technical positions. It met the middle of May and was scheduled to meet again on June 5. If the situation in the Middle East deteriorates it will be asked to come to Washington by the end of this week./3/ /3/The Petroleum Security Subcommittee was called to Washington for a meeting on May 26, 1967. FSE's May 25 submission for the nightly report for Under Secretary Katzenbach is ibid., FSV Facilitative Service--1967. Attachment/4/ /4/No classification marking. OUR TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION REACHED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH NEA
Although it may not be the prime reason for Nasser's bellicose stand, he seems to be using the overheated atmosphere to excite the citizenry and armies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to overthrow their "reactionary" rulers. Unless he gets full cooperation from Kuwait and Libya he is likely to try to overthrow the rulers of those two countries as well. His chances of success in these long-standing plans will be enhanced if his armies give a good showing against Israel--the aura of the conquering hero. Paradoxically, they would also be increased if the Israelis succeed in occupying parts of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon; the case would then be made that Arabism was threatened and could only survive if the "lackies of imperialism" were thrown out. Hussain is more vulnerable than Faisal. It is impossible to calculate what is activating Nasser (the Russians? Are they finally yielding to Chinese taunts of being afraid to distract the Americans away from Vietnam?). He may be risking a war with Israel, may even expect to be defeated (and then rescued by the UN) but will consider it worthwhile if he can, during the process, bring down Hussain, Faisal and perhaps the Kuwaiti and Libyan thrones.
229. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 24, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 6 SAUD. Secret; Exdis. A note attached to the source text on White House letterhead reads, "May 24, 1967 To: S/S, Mr. Ben Read From: Bromley Smith FYI." A note on the source text by Harold Saunders reads, "President From--." SUBJECT Aramco's Washington representative, John Pendleton, called me this afternoon to read a telegram which he had received from Aramco's Vice President Brougham, who is currently visiting Beirut. Brougham reports a conversation with Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Yamani at Beirut airport on 23 May. Yamani is convinced there will be war between the Arabs and Israel. Syria is pushing Nasser toward war and Russia must not resist the Syrians too sharply because Moscow fears Syria is leaning toward Peiping. Yamani recommends that the US keep hands off this crisis, work through the UN and not try to be a policeman. He disagrees flatly with our position on the Gulf of Aqaba and says that if the US directly supports Israel, Aramco can anticipate being nationalized "if not today, then tomorrow." If the US does not stay out of this conflict, the US is finished in the Middle East. When Brougham asked Yamani why Saudi Arabia would object to our standing up to Nasser, Yamani replied, "We are all Arabs. Your government would be foolish if it does not keep out." Harold H. Saunders/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, June 3, 1967, 1140Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 3 OECD. Secret; Exdis. 10105. Ref: London 10099./2/ Concern about oil supplies mounting here and apparently in continental consumer countries. Gregory (MinPower) told Embassy yesterday that OECD Secretariat phoned last week to suggest early meeting OECD oil committee./3/ According Gregory committee chairman (Beckett) declined, and still considers that OECD meeting now would be provocative rather than helpful./4/ /2/Not found. /3/The OECD Special Committee for Oil was the designated forum for the United States and its allies to take steps to manage an oil crisis. In 1960 European OECD members had agreed on emergency procedures to deal with an oil shortage including the "interim apportionment of available oil supplies." The United States, Canada, and Japan were specifically exempted from participation. "However, the U.S. has consistently declared that, as a matter of principle, it would have regard for and take appropriate action to assist its allies and other friendly governments in times of oil shortage." (Draft action memorandum by S.H. Rogers (EUR/RPE), June 8, 1967; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 3 OECD) /4/Beckett called the meeting for Monday, June 12. (Ibid.) Kaiser
231. Letter From John J. McCloy to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ New York, June 5, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 6 SAUD. Exdis. A handwritten note initialed by Assistant Secretary Battle reads, "S--Mr. Borg. Thank you. Will you see that DR acknowledges this." No acknowledgment was found. McCloy, Chairman of the Ford Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations, was also a board director of Chase Manhattan Bank and the Allied Chemical Company, both of which had investments in Iran. In addition, the Consortium in Iran included a number of McCloy's clients. Dear Dean: I have just had read to me over the telephone a communication from Aramco reporting a conversation which the head of Aramco in Saudi Arabia had with King Faisal, which I think you will be interested in reading. I am enclosing a copy of the message herewith but meanwhile I have asked the Washington Office of Aramco to deliver a copy of it to you this afternoon./2/ /2/Not printed. In this June 5 cable from Dhahran, Aramco's R.I. Brougham reported on a conversation with King Faisal that was intended to be a courtesy call after his return from Geneva. Upon arrival, Brougham learned that Egypt had been attacked by Israel. The King, in a very somber mood, said that the issue had been joined and that the Arabs and Israelis could no longer live together--"one side or another must be defeated." "No direct reference to Aramco nor oil policy but His Majesty has made it perfectly clear that major powers and America in particular must not become involved in conflict on either side because consequences of such involvement on behalf of Israel will leave Arab states no alternative but to take measures against those countries involved in providing such assistance." I have also received just now a communication from Dr. Calvin Plimpton, President of Amherst College and Chairman of the Board of the American University in Beirut, to the effect that the President of the latter institution (the American University) has asked him to stress with the U.S. Government that any stand by the United States against the Arab position in favor of Israel could have the deepest consequences in prejudicing the good relations between the United States and the Arab world. He referred to the fact that all of the important Christian professors on the University's faculty feel strongly to the same effect. I do not know whether this communication was sent before or after the outbreak this morning, but I am certain that the view of the President of the American University would not be moderated by anything that happened today. Sincerely,
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, June 6, 1967, 2140Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 ARAB. Unclassified. Repeated to Algiers, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tripoli, and Basra. 2108. 1. According communiqué Oil Ministers' Conference/2/ Baghdad June 4-5, unanimously passed two resolutions declaring (A) "Arab oil shall be denied to and shall not be allowed reach directly or indirectly countries committing aggression or participating in aggression on sovereignty of any Arab state or its territories or its territorial waters, particularly Gulf Aqaba," and (B) "involvement any country, directly or indirectly in armed aggression against Arab states will make assets of its companies and nationals inside territories of Arab countries subject to laws war. This includes assets of oil companies." /2/On May 28 the Iraqi Cabinet decided to ban oil shipments to any country that joined in "Israeli aggression." The Cabinet also decided to convene a conference of Arab oil producers in Baghdad to coordinate action. (Telegram 2029 from Baghdad, May 29; ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Invitees included the United Arab Republic, Syria, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar. Iraq also sent copies of the Council resolution to the Embassies of Iran and Indonesia. According to telegram 2037 from Baghdad, May 31, "Foreign Ministry also reportedly soliciting support of Venezuela for resolution." (Ibid., PET 17-1 ARAB) 2. Conference also (A) recommended creation permanent committee Arab Foreign Ministers meet on 48-hour notice discuss what new attitudes might be classed as hostile to Arab nation; (B) recommended emergency meeting Arab states to enforce resolution in respect to all assets invested by companies, nationals of aggressor countries; (C) warned all foreign petroleum companies operating in Arab countries of consequences of supplying oil to Israel regardless its origin and whether this done directly or indirectly or in cooperation with others. Said companies would thus be liable have rules standard boycott law enforced against them; (D) considers signing any declaration affecting sovereignty Arab states over Gulf Aqaba will be act warranting banning tankers of signatory countries from transporting Arab oil; (E) stated committee Oil Ministers Arab producing countries "shall be formed to adopt necessary resolution"; (F) called on all Islamic and friendly oil producing countries, especially Iran, to take necessary steps to prevent oil from reaching Israel in any way./3/ /3/The complete text of the communiqué is in airgram A-804 from Baghdad, June 6. (Ibid., PET 2 ARAB) Duncan
233. Editorial Note On June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan. At 7:40 a.m. on June 6, Radio Cairo began broadcasting the charge that U.S. aircraft had participated in the Israeli attacks. (Telegram 8565 from Cairo, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) The same day, Iraq was the first to announce that the flow of oil to the United States and the United Kingdom was cut off in light of "military assistance to the enemy," and called on the other Arab oil producers to follow through on their resolutions of the previous day (see Document 232). When the Charge denied the charge, the Iraqis said that the information about U.S.-U.K. intervention had come from the UAR and Syria. The Embassy commented: "In this whole tortured business, this is possibly kind of action President Aref might take to protect oil installations of Iraq. We had been in touch privately with certain government officials earlier who have indicated they powerless deal with allegation of US involvement since all actions on this score clearly coordinated and linked with Cairo." (Telegram 2099 from Baghdad, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 IRAQ) Aramco officials in Saudi Arabia also urged Oil Minister Yamani to issue a statement stressing Aramco's cooperation to prevent sabotoge. "Yamani confirmed SAG aware U.S. and British have not been aggressors but must await appropriate time to acknowledge publicly." (Aramco cable of June 8, transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Saunders to Bundy, June 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee Memos--McGeorge Bundy) Also on June 6, according to oil company sources in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Government insisted on immediate take-over of shipping communications and was preparing to prevent shipment of oil to the United Kingdom and United States. The oil companies did not, however, expect that their assets would be confiscated. The Kuwaiti Government, the Embassy concluded, would "prefer that we not evacuate." (Telegram 1262 from Kuwait City, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 6 KUWAIT) Two days later, the Embassy reported that the "Amir expressed pride in GOK 'cleverness' in demonstrating its Arabism by prompt and full cooperation. By cutting off oil shipments to US-UK, sabotage had been averted. He hoped oil cut-off would be temporary and have minimum bad effect on Kuwait." (Telegram 1286 from Kuwait City, June 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Kuwait) Despite compliance with the embargo, which was announced on June 7, the Libyan Government voiced similar sentiments: "GOL desires operators and experts to stand fast in Libya to reopen production and export when that becomes feasible." (Telegram 1136 from Tripoli, June 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 LIBYA) Documentation on U.S. policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli war and the charges of U.S. involvement is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.
234. Letter From the Manager of the Government Relations Department, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Finlay) to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources (Moore)/1/ New York, June 8, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, E Files: Lot 71 D 84, PET 3 Orgs and Confs, OECD Oil Committee, April, May, June 1967. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon and John Oliver. My Dear Mr. Moore: We have received word from London that pressures are developing in Europe for the establishment of a petroleum industry advisory group to work directly with the OECD Oil Committee/2/ in handling petroleum supply problems arising out of the present difficulties in the Middle East. /2/Once the Europeans activated the OECD emergency procedure, the agreements provided for the establishment of an International oil industry advisory committee which would act as the mechanism for international oil industry cooperation. See footnote 3, Document 230. As I pointed out at the April 19, 1967 meeting of the OECD Petroleum Advisory Committee in Washington, the American oil companies have no legal sanction for effective collaboration in emergencies of this sort except through the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee, which was established under Section 708 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and which gives the participants the protection under the antitrust laws and Federal Trade Commission Act provided by that Section. As you know, the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee was used as the vehicle for American industry collaboration in meeting the Suez crisis of 1956-57. A Plan of Action was drawn up on August 10, 1956 and amended on November 30, 1956 (with Attorney General approval on December 3, 1956), under which the Middle East Emergency Committee was established and authorized, within the limitations set forth in the Plan of Action, to deal with foreign agencies and foreign industry committees in meeting the emergency. Coordination across the Atlantic was effected through the dealings of the Middle East Emergency Committee with these three European industry advisory committees: first, the British-organized Oil Supply Advisory Committee (OSAC); next, the British, French and Dutch-organized Oil Emergency London Advisory Committee (OELAC); and, finally, following the closure of the Suez Canal and the IPC pipelines, the OEEC-organized OEEC Petroleum Emergency Group (OPEG). In each case, the activities of the Middle East Emergency Committee were approved by the Administrator or Director of the Voluntary Agreement Relating to Foreign Petroleum Supply and were thus brought within the protection of that agreement. I am sure that the question of industry collaboration with the OECD will be discussed, or more likely is already being discussed, at the governmental level./3/ I would, therefore, like to urge your assistance in insisting on the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee route as the vehicle for American industry collaboration. Our lawyers frankly tell us that there is no other means, short of new Congressional legislation, that would provide the necessary antitrust clearance for effective American industry collaboration in the event that the present crisis is not eliminated through a quick political solution. /3/Proposals for an Anglo-American company committee were not approved by the State and Interior Departments. "Existence such committee virtually certain to become known in international oil industry and through industry by governments. Knowledge on part of OECD members existence Anglo-American company organization might generate suspicion US and UK not forthcoming re capability those companies to provide petroleum Western Europe and Japan with potential danger that individual OECD members might be encouraged to take separate actions to procure greater POL supplies." The State Department did say that such a proposal would be reconsidered later "in event OECD organization found not to function satisfactorily in the oil crisis." (Telegram 210030 to London, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 1 OECD) Yours very truly, /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Finlay signed the original.
235. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of the Interior Udall/1/ Washington, June 8, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 12-3 US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by M. Chaplin (E/OR/FSE) on June 7 and cleared by Solomon, Oliver (FSE), Hinton (EUR), and Patman (L/E). Dear Mr. Secretary: Recent developments affecting the United States access to foreign sources of crude oil have clear implications for the national security./2/ In the past few days the Governments of Algeria, Kuwait and Bahrein have prohibited the export of petroleum to the United States or to the United Kingdom. The Government of Iraq has ordered the Iraq Petroleum Company to cease operations. The Trans Arabian Pipeline of the Arabian American Oil Company has been closed, as has the Suez Canal. The Libyan Government has ordered foreign oil companies to cease operations. /2/A provision of the Defense Production Act of 1950 authorized the President to take into account the oil supply situations of allies and friendly countries in determining the national security of the United States. The denial of petroleum from these sources creates an oil supply emergency and adversely affects the capability of the United States and our allies to meet our security responsibilities. I consider that this situation calls for the initiation of emergency procedures to ensure that adequate supplies of petroleum continue to be available./3/ /3/On June 10 Assistant Secretary of the Interior J. Cordell Moore announced that "a petroleum emergency exists which threatens the broad security interests of the United States." The decision was concurred in by the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of Emergency Planning. (Circular telegram 210177, June 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 12-3 US) Sincerely yours, /4/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
236. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State/1/ Paris, June 9, 1967, 1621Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 3 OECD. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London and The Hague and passed to the White House and USIA. 20041. Ref: (A) Paris 19995, (B) Paris 20012./2/ Subj: Emergency Session OECD Oil Committee. /2/Telegram 19995, June 8, is ibid., PET 12-2 FR; telegram 20012, June 9 is ibid., PET 3 OECD. 1. Jordan, in charge of petroleum matters in economic section of Foreign Office, informed us that late this morning on his telephoned instructions French Embassy in London asked British Foreign Office to propose to OECD Oil Committee Chairman Beckett postponement of special session now scheduled for June 12. Jordan said that French proposal was prompted by publicity given to meeting in this morning's Financial Times (story out of Paris), and fear that this would cause Arab oil exporting countries to generalize their embargo now limited to US and UK. He said that French believed it was in interest of all countries concerned, including US and UK, to avoid such generalization, since it was obvious that if some countries could go on obtaining Middle East oil, this would make it possible to rearrange supply patterns in way that would maximize scarcities. Moreover, request for postponement did not mean France was attempting to go back on commitments which she had taken re petroleum supply in OECD framework. Hordan said France was not alone in her viewpoint, which was shared at least by Dutch. 2. We asked Jordan if he had as yet any indication of British reaction to his proposal. He replied Foreign Office had commented merely that it seemed very late hour for calling off meeting scheduled to convene on Monday. Jordan did not know reactions of Beckett, but expected that he would be getting [garble] in next few hours. We asked Jordan whether if meeting took place despite French proposal for postponement, French representative would attend. He was clearly not prepared for this question, and said merely that no decision in this regard had yet been made. 3. Jordan reiterated at several points that he wanted us to know that French suggestion in no way signified unwillingness on their part to cooperate with other Western countries in meeting any emergency petroleum situation that might arise out of Middle East crisis. He said that Giraud, Directeur des Carburants, already had appointments for bilateral consultations in Paris on Monday with petroleum officials of several other countries, and French very much favored such consultations. Bohlen
237. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State/1/ Algiers, June 9, 1967, 2220Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 15-2 ALGERIA. Limited Official Use. 4052. Esso Situation. 1. Esso, like other US companies, now being administered by Algerian director. Esso reports that its director is operating in a significantly different way from those with other companies and believes it being singled out for unfavorable and discriminatory treatment. 2. As Embassy reported some weeks ago, Esso already believed it singled out for salami tactics takeover. Company now believes that present situation will eventually be tantamount to a de facto expropriation without formal action by GOA. 3. Esso manager cites following as examples discriminatory treatment: A) Esso manager denied all outside communications within and without country. Telephones cut off and mail censored. He not permitted take papers from office. B) Today forced to open his personal safe at gunpoint. C) Esso station at Algiers airport has been seized by Sonatrach/2/ and is now being repainted as Sonatrach station. Station itself is not Esso property, but much Esso equipment was in it. When challenged as to legality this action, Algerian director in apparent slip of tongue said it would be settled in later litigation. /2/Algeria's national oil entity. D) Algerian director appears to be operating under control of marketing division of Sonatrach. 4. Esso manager has protested and will continue to protest that Algerian director is exceeding his authority in order to protect legal position of company, plans send repeated protests to relevant ministries to establish a record. 5. UGTA is supporting American management since union apparently feels that unlimited authority Algerian director will allow him to ruin company and seems fear that GOA takeover will leave UGTA in position of docile union in govt enterprises. Jernegan
238. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State/1/ Kuwait City, June 10, 1967, 2325Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Passed to the White House. 1304. Ref: State 210122./2/ /2/Not found. 1. Amir proposes Bedu chicanery by changing manifests to permit tankers to carry oil to UK or US./3/ Ambassador Arthur thinks this ruse once discovered may lead to public demand for stronger action against companies and that Amir would be obliged to act. I also consider it risky. /3/Ambassador Cottam's earlier reports of his meeting with the Amir were restrained, and he declined to commit the details to paper until he had spoken with his British counterpart. (Telegram 1299 from Kuwait City, June 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Kuwait; and telegram 1303 from Kuwait City, June 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 ARAB) 2. Inasmuch as Gulf sells most of its share KOC crude to Shell the problem is essentially a UK one in first instance. Amb Arthur was told by Amir several days ago and made arrangements with UK Foreign Office about secrecy which I think should be revised to bring KOC Director Lee into act for consultation at once. 3. Arthur promised cable my views London and I agreed to leave it UK to tell us in Washington and/or London on need-to-know basis. Hope you will deal with it that way in first instance./4/ Seems to me there is time to deal this way. /4/On June 14 the Department suggested that the Ambassador not raise the issue with the Amir. "Should he inquire you authorized tell him on personal basis you think suggestion might have number real problems." The Americans left the British to deal with BP and Shell. (Telegram 210928 to Kuwait City, June 14; ibid.) The next day a British Foreign Office source told the Embassy in London that both companies felt such a move would be a mistake. "FonOff indicated its own concurrence in this view saying this matter of prudence rather than ethics, but noting also that effort at deception, particularly with flags, would raise number of difficult questions concerning maritime law and insurance. Without specific reference to Kuwait situation, Esso, Mobil and Gulf London reps indicated their view that companies should follow closely destination advice of Middle East governments." (Telegram 10390 from London, June 15; ibid.) Cottam
239. Telegram From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State/1/ Tripoli, June 11, 1967, 1200Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967-69, PET 17-1 LIBYA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris for OECD, Dhahran, Jidda, and Kuwait City. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 21. Libyan Oil Sitrep--June 10 and 11. 1. Petroleum Minister Khaliifah Muusa departed morning June 11 for Baida, where he hopes to convince Prime Minister Hussain Maaziq to allow resumption of production and export to countries other than U.S. and U.K. According to Esso Libya President Hugh Wynne (protect source) Muusa was surprised on his return from Baghdad to learn GOL had banned totally all production and exports, thus going beyond scope of Baghdad resolution which banned exports only to countries aiding Israel./2/ /2/See Document 232. 2. To best Embassy's knowledge, there has been no destruction yet of oil installations, and expatriate staff at least are standing by. Operations apparently could be resumed within hours of GOL approval. 3. Morning June 10 bomb thrown into Tripoli warehouse of Geophysical Service International (GSI). There were no personal injuries, but valuable seismic records were destroyed. 4. Saturday (June 10) most oil company offices in Tripoli reopened for business. Libyan absenteeism higher than previous, but union has ordered Libyans return to work on Monday. Newsom [Continue with the next documents]
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