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Martin S. Indyk Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations New York City, NY, April 22, 1999

U.S. Policy in the Middle East

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today on U.S. policy in the Middle East. I am particularly pleased to do so here at the Council of Foreign Relations, whose work contributes so richly to the foreign policy debate and where some of our most trenchant critics and defenders reside.

In the Middle East, as in the rest of the world, we stand on the threshold of a new millenium. But this region finds itself caught between its turbulent, conflict-ridden past and a future of greater peace, stability, prosperity, and popular participation. It is not at all clear which direction it will take because the indicators are mixed.

The stalling of the Arab-Israeli peace process on all tracks over the past two and a half years has dramatically slowed the momentum toward positive change and reduced the hopes of many that a comprehensive peace would usher in a new era of coexistence and regional cooperation. However, elections in Israel hold out the possibility that a broader-based government will emerge capable of moving forward in the peace process.

Saddam Hussein's defiance of the UN Security Council threatens to destabilize the Gulf while exacting a heavy price from the Iraqi people. But the Iraqi tyrant has emerged from the Desert Fox campaign weakened and isolated and less capable of creating trouble for his neighbors.

President Khatami's election in Iran and the recent local elections there have made clear that a significant majority of the people of this great nation support political liberalization, respect for the rule of law, and a constructive role for Iran in regional and international affairs. But this evolution still faces strong and sometimes violent opposition from some quarters inside Iran. Moreover, Iran's determined development of ballistic missiles to enable delivery of its weapons of mass destruction over long distances has the potential to trigger a new and dangerous arms race across the region.

Islamic extremism is now on the defensive in Algeria and Egypt after years of bloody confrontation, and across the Arab world a gradual process of political liberalization and economic reform is taking place. In Morocco, the opposition has become the government; in Qatar women have voted for the first time in a GCC state; the Palestinian Authority is being held to account by an elected Palestinian Legislative Council; and in Yemen and Kuwait democratic, multi-party elections have been held. Developments in the recent Algerian elections were a disappointment to us, but the people's desire for political and economic reform is manifest and we hope that President Bouteflika will be responsive. Meanwhile, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco have implemented significant and far-reaching economic reforms.

Finally, King Hussein's untimely death has underscored the fact that a process of succession is underway across the region after decades of unchanging rule in most Arab countries. The transitions in Jordan and Bahrain have been encouragingly smooth but these may be the exceptions rather than the rule. And we must remain cognizant of the fact that over the next decade, leaders who have built up credibility and legitimacy over many years will be replaced by a younger generation that will take some time to establish themselves.

Because the Middle East is a region of vital interest to the United States, we are committed to helping it achieve a better future in the 21st century than it has experienced in the last half of the 20th century, when the Middle East was often a synonym for trouble and hopelessness. Above all, we have an intense interest in preventing it from backsliding into another era of extremism and conflict, marked by a new arms race in ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

In confronting these challenges, the Clinton Administration has sought on the one hand to contain those governments or political movements that use violence as a matter of policy to advance a hostile agenda. At the same time, we have mounted a steady and determined effort to expand the breadth and depth of our partnerships with friendly governments in the region to promote the peace, stability, and prosperity which remain our abiding vision for the Middle East. We have also sought to encourage states in the region that have developed the bad habit of acting outside of international norms to change in ways that would permit their reintegration into the international community. As a consequence, this always crisis-prone region has seen a marked decline in violence and conflict in the past 6 years and a significant deepening of peace and stability.

In the 6 years since Oslo, we have witnessed the signing of a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreements, the Hebron Protocol, and the Wye River Memorandum. The PLO has revised its Charter, and Arafat has pledged that there will be no return to violence. The Likud-led Government of Israel took a historically important step by agreeing to turn parts of the West Bank over to Palestinian Authority control. The process of normalization and Middle East Economic Summits have resulted in the abandonment of the secondary Arab boycott and the establishment of commercial contacts between Israel and all but a handful of Arab countries, including the establishment of trade offices with Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and Qatar. And although agreement was not reached, Israeli-Syrian negotiations did establish the basis for settlement of that long-standing conflict.

The strength of our relationship with our Arab partners is clearly demonstrated in our common and ongoing effort to contain Iraq. Despite Saddam's persistent attempts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its Arab allies, the common resolve remains to confront what is recognized to be a dangerous and de-legitimized regime. Indeed, at a time when pundits are quick to declare the collapse of the Gulf War coalition, the reality is that all of the Arab states that stood with us at that time still do so today, and many of the Arab and Gulf states that sympathized with Saddam Hussein then no longer do so today.

We have also seen the fruits of our close cooperation in the fight against terror. After a sustained effort on our part, the Palestinian Authority is moving effectively to prevent terrorist efforts to torpedo the Middle East peace process. The Government of Israel has recently acknowledged this development. And thanks in no small part to the efforts of countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and South Africa we have finally succeeded--after 10 long years--in bringing to the bar of justice those individuals identified by the international community as the prime suspects in the murder of so many innocents aboard flight Pan Am 103.

As we look to the future of the region, the question before us is: how can we expand engagement and reinforce containment? How can we widen the circle of peace while countering those who would oppose the promotion of a more normal existence for all the people of the region? The answer in our minds is clear. We must broaden the scope and depth of our relationships with those states that share our commitment to a more peaceful and prosperous region, working with them to achieve our common vision. At the same time, we must maintain our ability to contain those states and those forces who threaten those interests.

My purpose today is to share with you the Clinton Administration's strategy for achieving these goals as we head into the 21st century.

Arab-Israeli Peace Process

Looking back in time, enormous progress has been made in realizing the historic goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Some 20 years after the Israel-Egypt treaty--which remains the bedrock of all subsequent peace progress--between Israel and all of her neighbors is in sight. While we are not there yet, the coming months should offer a renewed opportunity to move forward on all tracks. President Clinton intends to make full use of this period to bring the parties to a settlement of final status issues. On the Palestinian track, we are at the moment in the throes of trying to manage the expiry of the interim period on May 4. It is our view that a unilateral declaration of a state by the Palestinians will undermine final status negotiations. But by the same token, Wye obligations must be fulfilled by both sides, and the final status negotiations must be resumed immediately after the Israeli elections and be brought to a prompt conclusion. It is clear that these negotiations cannot be open-ended. And just as the President and Secretary of State were prepared to devote themselves to an extraordinary effort at Wye to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion, so, too, are they prepared to make a similar effort in the final status negotiations.

After the Israeli elections, the timing may also be propitious for a new effort to achieve a final status agreement on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. There have been no direct negotiations in 3 years; when there were negotiations, progress was made but significant gaps remained, particularly in the all-important area of security arrangements. If the parties are willing to match our effort, we are prepared to make peace between Israel and Syria a high priority in our Middle East diplomacy. This is not only because of our commitment to a comprehensive peace. It is also because an Israel-Syria peace agreement would have important regional benefits: a secure Israeli-Lebanese border; the ending of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the isolation of those parties that continue to reject peace and reconciliation; and the easing of pressure against normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel.

Dual Containment

In May of 1993, almost 6 years ago, I outlined the Clinton Administration's dual containment policy toward Iraq and Iran. This policy reflected the geo-political reality at the time: the recent conclusion of three wars--the Cold war, the Iran-Iraq war, and the war to liberate Kuwait--had left the United States the dominant power in the region. It had also left both Iran and Iraq, while war-weary and economically weakened, still militarily ambitious and clearly hostile to the United States and our interests in the region.

Dual containment was premised on the notion that the U.S. needed to shift away from our earlier policy of relying on one of these regional powers to balance the other, a policy we had followed throughout the previous decade with disastrous results. Rather, we would now focus our efforts on containing Saddam Hussein's threats to his neighbors and his own people, while at the same time pursuing multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them. Our policy vis-a-vis Iran was also based on continuing to seek change in dangerous Iranian policies--including support for terrorism, subversion of friendly governments, and violent opposition to the Middle East peace process--through economic pressure aimed mainly at Iran's oil industry.

Dual containment, however, never prescribed identical policies toward Iraq and Iran, nor was dual containment designed to be static or inflexible over time. Indeed, it is quite natural that these two states would evolve differently, and that our policies would evolve in response. Nor was dual containment meant to impose a kind of pax-Americana on the region, in which Iran and Iraq--both large and important regional players--would permanently be excluded from making positive and constructive contributions to the economics, politics, and security of the region, should they be inclined to change their hostile ways.

Over the past 6 years we have in fact seen pronounced differences in the evolution of both the external and internal policies of these two regional powers. And U.S. policy has adapted in response. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, remains dangerous, unreconstructed, defiant, and isolated. We have come to the conclusion, after more than 7 years of effort at seeking Saddam's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, that his regime will never be able to be rehabilitated or reintegrated into the community of nations. This conclusion is based on what Saddam's record makes manifest--that he will never relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal, and that he will never cease being a threat to the region, U.S. interests, and his own people. It is based on Saddam's policies, not on any predetermined policy of our own. Thus, in November of last year, President Clinton announced a new policy with regard to Iraq: henceforth, we would contain Saddam Hussein until a new regime can govern in Baghdad. The President committed the United States to support those Iraqis--inside and outside Iraq--who seek a better future and a new government for the people of Iraq.

The evolution in Iran, and hence our own response, has been markedly different. In recent years, the Iranian people have demonstrated a desire for greater participation in their governance, freedom from undue interference by the state in their private affairs, and greater openness and contact with the outside world. Iran's leaders have taken steps to address these concerns, conducting free and fair presidential and local elections, allowing increased public debate, and publicly shifting from a foreign policy of confrontation to one of dialogue and cooperation. Despite these positive developments, we continue to have serious concerns about some Iranian policies that violate international norms and threaten our interests and those of our allies.

We would be remiss, however, were we to fail to adjust our approach to the changing reality in Iran. As Iran's leaders have shown an interest in re-engaging with the international community, we have sought to respond by highlighting our interest in engaging Iran in a dialogue, an approach first enunciated by Secretary Albright last June in her speech to the Asia Society here in New York.

Let me lay out our current policies toward Iraq and Iran in more depth.

Iraq

Some 8 years after the Gulf War and Saddam's persistent defiance of the international community, we are under no illusions that Iraq under Saddam Hussein will comply with UNSC resolutions on disarmament, human rights, accounting for POW's, and the return of stolen property.

In view of this reality, our policy rests on three pillars. First, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of containment. Finally, we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community of nations when the departure of Saddam Hussein makes this possible.

Our containment policy is designed to protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his military or WMD capabilities. Operations Northern and Southern Watch prevent Saddam from using his air force against the civilian populations north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd. We maintain a robust force in the region, which we have made clear we are prepared to use should Saddam cross our well-established redlines. Those redlines include: should he reconstitute or deploy weapons of mass destruction; should he again threaten his neighbors or our forces in the region; should he move against his own people, especially in the north; or, should he challenge us in the no-fly zones. We are also committed to maintaining sanctions against the Iraqi regime that is in defiance of the UNSC resolutions, while lifting the burden of sanctions off the backs of the Iraqi people through the expansion and streamlining of the oil-for-food program.

This humanitarian relief program is the second pillar of our policy. Sanctions were never directed against the Iraqi people. In fact, food and medicine are specifically exempt from sanctions. Iraq has always been free to buy and import these goods, but Saddam Hussein has chosen not to do so in order to manipulate public opinion by deliberately causing the suffering of his own citizens. Our response has been to first establish and then expand the oil-for-food program, which provides a mechanism for the international community to use revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people. Despite attempts at interference by the regime, the oil-for-food program has ensured that the people of Iraq receive the food and medicine, which their own government denies them. There is a fundamental principle at work here. As long as Saddam is in defiance of the UNSC resolutions, we will never allow him to regain control of Iraq's oil revenues. They will continue to be escrowed by the UN and their uses controlled by the UN sanctions committee.

Although effective, containment has its costs. As we have seen repeatedly since 1991, a contained Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein remains a threat both to the region and to the Iraqi people. Both are paying a very high price for Saddam's continued rule. In our judgment, both deserve better.

For these reasons, President Clinton announced in November that the United States would work with the Iraqi people toward a government in Iraq which is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors and respect the rights of its people. Make no mistake: we are now clearly committed to supporting the Iraqi people in bringing about a change of regime in Baghdad.

In pursuit of this objective, the United States will adhere to two important principles: one, we will uphold the territorial integrity of Iraq; and two, we will not seek to impose from the outside a particular government or leaders on the people of Iraq. We do support a change of government that will be responsive to the aspirations of the Iraqi people--one that takes meaningful steps toward a democratic future for the country and can represent fairly the concerns of all of Iraq's communities. And we will work with a new Iraqi government, as it fulfills its international obligations, to lift the sanctions, to deal with the large debt burden, and to reintegrate Iraq into the international community.

If it is to be successful, change must come from within, from the Iraqis themselves. It cannot be "made in America." The support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically active opposition, along with neighboring states, however, is indispensable. Our approach is to work in an intensive and coordinated way with these partners to support the aspirations of the Iraqi people for a new Iraq under new leadership. Free Iraqis--those in exile and those who live in relative freedom in northern Iraq--bear a special responsibility to develop a coherent vision for a brighter future. They must take the lead in developing and promoting an alternative vision based on the restoration of civil society, the rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of a new role for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the region. They can also play an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam, in helping to build the case for his prosecution as a war criminal, and in getting the truth into and out of Iraq.

Congress has provided the Administration with a number of important tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a better future for Iraq. These include $8 million in Economic Support Funds. We are using these funds to strengthen opposition political unity, to support the Iraq war crimes initiative, to support humanitarian programs and the development of civil society, and for activities inside Iraq.

We have established Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and broadcasts daily in Arabic uncensored news and information to the Iraqi people.

We have named a Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Frank Ricciardone, who is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone has already had some success in helping some of the disparate opposition groups work together and elect a new interim leadership that will now prepare the way for an Iraqi opposition conference that will have as broad participation as possible.

We have also made progress working with the two major Kurdish factions in the North, the PUK and the KDP, to help them reconcile their differences and better provide for all the people of northern Iraq.

Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97 million in Defense Department drawdown and training for designated Iraqi opposition groups.

Many have called on the President to use this authority to arm the Iraqi opposition and support military action against Saddam Hussein. We believe such action is premature. There are a host of issues that must be resolved before such equipment and training could be provided with confidence that it would advance our objectives of promoting a change of regime and not just lead to more Iraqis being killed unnecessarily. One requirement is a credible, broad-based, Iraqi political umbrella movement, based on consensus, that can authoritatively articulate a future vision for those Iraqis who now lack a voice in their own fate. Through such a movement, it will become possible to channel substantial assistance to those resisting Saddam's oppression inside Iraq.

We also need the cooperation of Iraq's Arab neighbors and Turkey if we are to provide effective support to the internal Iraqi opposition. Although they would all prefer Saddam gone, they have strong views about a post-Saddam Iraq which have to be taken into account. We are working closely with them to achieve our common objective of an Iraq that can assume its rightful place in the region as a constructive and stabilizing power.

Iran

Turning to Iran, Secretary Albright discussed our policy toward Iran at length in her Asia Society speech last June. The main point the Secretary made was that we are prepared to develop with the Islamic Republic, when it is ready, a road map in which both sides would take parallel steps leading to normal relations. Unfortunately, the Iranian Government has made it clear that at this stage it is not ready to engage, insisting instead that the U.S. first take a number of unilateral steps.

Given Iran's reluctance to begin a bilateral dialogue, we have pursued other avenues that can serve to broaden our engagement with Iran. We have worked constructively with Iran in multilateral settings on issues of common concern, such as the spread of narcotics and the situation in Afghanistan. Last year, Iran's eradication of its poppy crop made it possible for us to remove Iran from our list of major drug producers, and we fully support the UN Drug Control Program's plans to increase its activities in Iran. This is a case where positive Iranian actions have been met with a positive U.S. response. We also continue to work with Iran in the six-plus-two forum at the United Nations on Afghanistan, where the Islamic Republic has played a constructive role in the search for a peaceful solution to the civil strife in that war-torn country. As chair of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Iran has become more actively involved in the search for diplomatic solutions to other world crises, and we welcome that as well, including the OIC's support for efforts in Kosovo.

We have also supported greater contact between our two peoples, for we believe that such exchanges can increase mutual understanding and respect and can help overcome decades of mistrust. We have streamlined our visa policies and supported academic and athletic exchanges. We have hosted wrestling teams, newspaper editors, film directors and musicians, and numerous Iranian scholars. We have also on occasion relaxed the 25-mile travel limit for Iranian officials assigned to Iran's Mission to the United Nations, allowing Iran's ambassador to the United Nations and other officials to speak to American audiences in California, Michigan, Pennsylvania and elsewhere.

We are pleased that Iran has opened its doors to increasing numbers of American visitors--wrestling teams, scholars, graduate students, and museum officials. But we are disappointed that the Iranian Government has not yet shown the same readiness for the Iranian public to hear directly from U.S. officials, or even ex-officials, about our perspectives on the way forward.

Given the intense interest in U.S. sanctions policy with respect to Iran, I would like to remind you of the rationale for the sanctions as well as our reasons for some decisions we have made recently in this regard. First, U.S. sanctions are a response to Iranian Government practices that violate international norms and threaten our interests and those of our allies. Their intent is to deprive Iran of the resources to pursue those activities and to demonstrate to Iran's leaders that pursuing such policies comes at a price.

Some of these objectionable Iranian Government practices unfortunately have continued, although not to the same degree in all areas, under the present government. Iran remains on this year's State Department list of state supporters of terrorism. While we have seen some diminution in the number of assassinations of Iranian dissidents abroad, and condemnation by Iranian officials of certain terrorist attacks, Iran continues to provide support to a variety of terrorist groups, particularly some of those that violently oppose progress in the Middle East peace process. President Khatami has publicly denounced terrorism and condemned the killing of innocents, including Israelis; the Iranian Government has also stated that Iran would accept peace acceptable to the Palestinians. We assume that these statements are sincerely made, and it is therefore also reasonable for us to expect that the actions and policies of the Islamic Republic should reflect them. Unfortunately, so far this has not been the case.

Of greatest concern to us, however, is Iran's continued drive to develop weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them. Clandestine efforts to procure nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue despite Iran's adherence to relevant international nonproliferation conventions. In this regard, we are particularly concerned about Iran's nuclear drive. Last summer, Iran also tested a ballistic missile--the Shehab III--capable of delivering warheads 800 miles. We have reports that Iran is close to producing a missile with an even greater range. These developments pose significant potential threats to U.S. forces and our friends in the region. Clearly, our concern about Iranian WMD and missile development must be considered in a regional context. We continue to support a Middle East free of all WMD. But the kind of proliferation we see in the region today--be it in Iran, India, or Pakistan--is leading exactly in the wrong direction. Proliferation on the eastern side of the Persian Gulf is, among other things, increasing nervousness on the other side of the Gulf and could drive other countries to seek their own weapons systems.

We have to act quickly to forestall this imminent arms race in ballistic missiles and WMD by working with our friends in the region including the GCC, Jordan, and Israel, to develop effective responses to the emerging threat. These responses include: strengthening active and passive defenses; enhancing deterrence; slowing down proliferation; and if possible, moderating the policies of those regimes that are trying to acquire these systems.

Iran's efforts to develop WMD and ballistic missiles together with its other ongoing policies of concern are the reason we oppose investment in Iran's petroleum sector, Iran's participation in the development of Caspian resources, multilateral lending to Iran, and Iran's full integration in international economic fora. A change in the U.S. position on these issues will require Iran to bring its practices into line with international norms, or at least demonstrate a willingness to begin such a process. We look forward to a time when greater economic interaction with Iran will be possible, but this depends not just on us, but on the Iranian Government's willingness to address practices that, in our view, continue to disqualify Iran from enjoying the full economic and commercial advantages that come with responsible membership in the international community.

Finally, we continue to observe with great interest internal developments in Iran. As we have often said, we fully respect Iran's sovereignty and the right of the Iranian people to choose their system of government as they see fit. That said, we will not shy away from expressing our support for values that we believe to be universal: human rights, rule of law, free markets, and democracy. In this regard, both the presidential election in 1997 and the recent municipal elections were remarkable for their openness and the level of participation of the Iranian people. We continue to believe that nations living according to democratic and pluralistic values internally will also abide more fully and more naturally with internationally accepted norms of behavior in their foreign policies. This is a principle that underlines our approaches to both Iran and Iraq.

Conclusion

At the close of the 20th century, the United States occupies a unique position in the history of international relations. We are both the world's leading democracy and its sole superpower. As the world's foremost democracy, the people of the United States expect their country will act in defense of the values and beliefs it represents. As the single remaining superpower, we have a responsibility to use our power in the interests of international peace and security.

For this reason, we now find ourselves facing demands for intervention in ways and in places that are unprecedented. As befits our unique position in the world, and consistent with our national interests, we must be responsive.

The history of the post-Cold war world has demonstrated, however, that we cannot effectively impose solutions on unwilling partners or hostile adversaries unilaterally. Our preponderant economic and military strength notwithstanding, advancing national interests and fulfilling the responsibilities of a superpower is a multilateral exercise. Simply put, while we will and must lead, we should not go it alone.

Containing Saddam Hussein; working for a new government in Iraq; promoting an Arab-Israeli peace; fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires the support and cooperation of our regional friends and allies. Over the course of years of sustained diplomacy, we have developed a level of trust and confidence with the key states of the region. This gives us confidence that our policies of expanded engagement and strengthened containment will prevail over time.

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