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Walker: Thank you very much and thank you for this opportunity to get together. I'm delighted to have this chance to come to Kuwait for the first time. I've spent a fair amount of time in the region before, but somehow I was always here at difficult times. I was in Saudi Arabia during the Tanker War and didn't get out. And then I was in Abu Dhabi during the Gulf War and didn't get out. So, now I finally have a chance to get out and get around and come see all of the Gulf States that I have missed before. I had a very good meeting with the Amir. We had an opportunity to talk about a full range of subjects of mutual interest. I was able to express the great thanks and warm friendship of the President of the United States and the Secretary to Kuwait and our expectations that this cooperation will continue well on into the future. We discussed the very difficult question of the POWs and our intense efforts to try to help in resolving this issue, now that there is a new nominee to take on this job in Voronstov. And we discussed Iraqi policy, as well as our approach to Iran and several other issues relating to the region. So, why don't we open it up now to questions. Question: What is the best result [prediction] for U.S.A. and region [in regard to] the Iranian elections? Walker: You know, I learned a long time ago that foreigners should not predict results of other people's elections. For one thing, it tends to have an impact on elections, which those people don't appreciate. And for the second thing, we are usually wrong. So, we'll leave it to the Iranian people to decide what kind of an election they want to have and who they're going to vote for, and I'm sure the results will be the results that the Iranian people want. Question: Is there a favored result for you, is there an outcome that you...? Walker: No, I'm not going to tilt the balance one way or another. I have great respect for the Iranian people. I believe that they will make the choice that is appropriate for Iran. Question: Regarding Iraq. If the Iraqi regime keeps rejecting the latest UN Resolution, will this lead to military strikes against Iraq? Walker: We have certain red lines which the Iraqis know very well, but might well lead to military reaction. The fact of accepting or not accepting a resolution of the UN; we certainly hope they will accept it, but that would not in and of itself cross one of our red lines. We believe that it would be better for the Iraqi people by far for Saddam Hussein to accept this resolution, which opens up the way for greater use of the oil-for-food program and will help to release some of the pressure on the Iraqi people. We have a great deal of concern that they are paying an inordinate price because of the actions and the approach of Saddam Hussein. So, we would like to see them accept this resolution and move forward in that direction and hopefully achieve a situation in which sanctions ultimately can be removed. But right now, we don't see that happening. Question: What does your government mean? Today we read in the newspapers that your government gave Israel the green light to attack Lebanon. What does your government mean by this? Walker: First of all, my government doesn't give green lights--or red lights or yellow lights. That's a press term, not a diplomatic term. Look, the situation in Lebanon is very tragic. We are deeply concerned about the Lebanese. They seem to always get caught in the middle when something happens. The problem is that we have a series of attacks by the Hizballah. In the first month of this year, there were 17 confirmed attacks from villages which violated the understandings. Those 17 attacks were accepted by the Israel-Lebanon monitoring group as valid. In the first 6 months of last year, there were only 17 attacks. So, I think it's fairly obvious that the pace of Hizballah actions and the violations of Hizballah have increased markedly. Now, when the Israelis responded, that also was a violation of the understandings when they hit civilian infrastructure. But the problem is that you can't have one side only adhering to the agreements. Our objective is to move both sides back to the monitoring group, have both sides recommit themselves to the agreements that they have previously reached and move on from there. Because, in our view, the only way that we can really resolve this problem is to achieve peace between Israel and Syria and a collateral peace between Israel and Lebanon. That's the way to solve the problem, not through the ILMG and not through any mechanism that is designed to take care of the situation as it exists but does not solve the problem. So, the solution to the problem is what we are trying to achieve. Question: Your Excellency, the British Defense Minister was here a couple of weeks ago, and he spoke about the Resolution and the need for Iraq's implementation. He said that the main parties here, which are the United States and Great Britain, are willing to leave a certain period of time which is acceptable for Saddam Hussein to consider and reconsider the Resolution, after which there will be other action. He wasn't clear on the other action, and as being the leader of the force here, are you speaking about diplomatic? Is there a certain period of time you've decided--6 months, 3 months? And on the Iraqi opposition, there was a very heavy American activity on that issue, and it was on the news everyday and it sort of went away a little bit. Are you still keen on supporting the Iraqi opposition? What steps are you taking to bring them to power? Walker: There is no set time limit or time frame. Obviously, we would prefer that Saddam Hussein accept this process sooner rather than later. At this point, Blix is in the process of putting together the procedures that he will follow. Those procedures need to go back to the Secretary General and be reported to the Security Council. So, at this point, the question is moot. But we would hope that shortly after the arrangements are put in place that Saddam Hussein would accept them. I am not going to speculate on what will or will not happen if he does not accept them. We will leave that to his imagination. The second part of the question was on...? Question: The Iraqi opposition. Walker: Now, we are very much working with free Iraqis around the world. We believe it is important that they carry their message to the Iraqi people. We believe that we can help them and support them in their efforts to bring back Iraq to a condition of democracy and acceptance in the international community and responsible behavior. We continue to support them, and we will do our best to make that support effective in the future. Question: We are always hearing about the Kuwaiti project, about the development of the Northern oil fields, in the north of our country. So, did you discuss in your visits any kinds of projects, contracts, or something like that? Walker: No, we didn't get into that on this visit. Part of the problem is, unfortunately, in order to do what I need to do in this trip, I need to move very quickly from one country to another. So, I did not have a chance to go into all of the subjects that I wanted to discuss. I promise to come back to discuss a number of issues that I didn't have an opportunity to discuss. Question: What's the aim of your trip? Walker: The aim of the trip, in the first instance, is to gain familiarity with and consult with all of our friends in the Gulf. We are constantly evaluating our policies in the region, and particularly our policy toward Iraq and our policy toward Iran as developments take place. We value and highly prize the advice of our friends in this region. We find that it is helpful to us as we develop our policies to know what their suggestions are. I also sought to convey some messages from my own leadership on prospective steps that we might take on Iraq in the future. Question: Your Excellency, I have a two part question. The first is: We are on the threshold of the second decade of close U.S.-Kuwaiti cooperation. Where do you see this cooperation going in the second decade? The second part is: How much would you be concerned about the internal political situation in Kuwait? In the past 10 days, we had some very strong comments from Kuwait's close allies within the GCC on the internal political situation here. Is this something that would--the internal situation in Kuwait would be something of your concern? Walker: We are not going to intervene or get into the question of the internal situation in Kuwait. We stand ready to help Kuwait as it defines its own course in the future, whether that is in the course of economic reform, or democratic reform, or in other areas that they may choose. But the choice has to be Kuwait's and has to be based on Kuwait's own sense of timing and direction. The future: well it is certainly our hope that, in the future, we will have a region which is far more stable, by virtue of the fact that we will have a new leadership in Iraq. It will be a member in good standing of the international community. It will no longer threaten its neighbors. It will not be seeking to establish a system of weapons of mass destruction or threatening military moves. And that will help us to concentrate on, really, the well-being of people and their economic growth and all of the issues that make life that much better. And that's where we would like to concentrate. Question: How can the internal political instability be of concern to you? Walker: Look, stability in the region is always of concern to us. That's why I say we will be most anxious to help countries in their efforts to ensure that political instability does not become a problem, and usually that relates to questions like economic development, economic reform, democratic reform, and so on. But as I say, this has got to be something that comes from the people themselves of the country. Thank you. [end of document] Remarks Index | Near Eastern Affairs | Department of State | Secretary of State |
