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### MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY BOARD

**SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Joint Defense Science Board/Defense Policy Board Task Force on Chemical Warfare, Biological Defense and Non-Proliferation Policy,**

The Defense Science Board and Defense Policy Board have had a joint task force addressing questions of chemical and biological weapons since April 1990. This task force has provided valuable advice about CW/BW arms control proposals, CW/BW concerns in DESERT STORM, CW/BW intelligence efforts, and CW/BW technology issues. As called for in the 1990 terms of reference the task force has been available for "quick reaction" policy advice.

The changes in the world since 1990 require that the task force terms of reference be modified. In particular the task force is directed to broaden its efforts to include nuclear proliferation and address issues that bear on CW, BW and nuclear proliferation.

The task force is expected to remain cognizant of current technology issues bearing on proliferation in order to be in a position to offer quick reaction advice. Accordingly, the task force will establish liaison with OATSD (Atomic Energy), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and OUSD (Acquisition) to remain informed of current policy and technology issues in arms control negotiation, intelligence, and defensive force planning.

The task force is requested to place initial attention on the following subjects and issue a written report by the end of 1992.

The 1992 annual DoD report to the President and Congress notes that by the end of the century as many as 9 developing countries could have nuclear weapons, and 30 or more countries could have chemical or biological weapons, many with the capability for ballistic missile delivery. With this threat it is important that our smaller forces with their regional orientation maintain their defensive NBC posture. Are the service plans for CW/BW defense (both in terms of equipment and training) adequate for this new threat? Are there technologies for NBC defense that should be more actively pursued?

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-The current experience in Iraq illustrates the difficulty of inspection to verify the absence of a technical capability. Is it possible to define inspection regimes either multilateral or bilateral that have greater promise for effective enforcement of international agreements controlling weapons of mass destruction? How should the DoD organize for participation in various inspection regimes?

-Russia or other of the republics of the former Soviet Union may request US assistance to control technology relevant to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What useful might the US do? What should it avoid doing?

-The Intelligence Community is mounting a major initiative on non-proliferation intelligence. Is the effort adequate for DoD needs? What can be done to strengthen the efforts especially against those nations e.g., Iran, Lybia, North Korea, and Algeria that are of current concern? *Libya*

-What are the consequences for US Political-military objectives and action if one or more nations in the middle-east acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction? If weapons of mass destruction proliferate further, how will this influence US foreign policy? What U.S. policies and military capabilities are likely to deter/defeat the development or use of weapons of mass destruction by current non-nuclear states.

-What are new multilateral export control regimes that may help to slow the spread of technologies that lead to weapons of mass destruction?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy will sponsor this task force. Dr. John Deutch will serve as task force chairman, \_\_\_\_\_ will serve as Executive Secretary and Lieutenant Command Stephen N. Wiley, USN, will be the DSB secretariat representative.

The terms of reference for this joint DSB/DPB task force on non-proliferation policy include no assignment that, by their terms, would indicate the task force members would be participating personally and substantially in the conduct of any specific procurement, or place any member in the position of acting as a procurement official.

Under Secretary of Defense  
(Policy)

Under Secretary of Defense  
(Acquisition)