U.S. Department of State

20. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Bell) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, March 10, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense 3/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Revisions to Defense FY 1962 Budget

This joint memorandum of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget summarizes the results and present status of further reviews of the proposals for revising the FY 1961 and FY 1962 Defense programs and budget which were submitted to you by the Secretary of Defense with his memorandum dated February 20, 1961./2/

/2/Document 17.

Attachment I lists the items and amounts on which there is currently agreement between the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget, assuming that you approve the related policy recommendations of the Department of Defense. The changes in the amounts from those appearing in the attachments to the February 20, 1961, memorandum of the Secretary of Defense result partly from refinements by Defense in the earlier estimates and partly from adjustments recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and concurred in by the Department of Defense.

We have agreed to defer any request for appropriations for an increase in airborne alert over the amounts now included in the FY 1962 Budget. In lieu thereof we propose to rely on continuation in FY 1962 of the present legislative authority to incur a deficiency, if necessary, to support an airborne alert. The FY 1962 Budget now includes funds for a 1/8 "on-the-shelf" air alert capability and 12 sorties per day. Upon your determination at any time during the fiscal year that further airborne alert action is necessary, the Defense Department could provide for the alert on a deficiency basis. We estimate that the additional cost involved in increasing the number of daily sorties from 12 to 30 should be at the rate of $176 million per annum.

Attachment II lists the items and comments on which there is currently disagreement between the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget, together with their respective recommendations.

The items covered in the attachments are limited to those contained in the Department of Defense proposals of February 20, 1961, plus the Bureau of the Budget proposal to cancel the last four Titan II squadrons which was also discussed with you at the meeting on February 21, 1961. Several additional matters involving possible further adjustments to the Defense FY 1962 budget will be treated separately. These include, among others, the impact on the FY 1962 budget of possible actions to close installations, the possible additional fund requirements for retired pay, repair of fire damage to the USS Constellation, cost increases for Minuteman, and a classified project.

The specific amounts of the budget amendments required for each appropriation account will be determined on the basis of your decisions with respect to the program amounts shown in Attachments I and II and the items to be treated separately. Except for a possible FY 1961 supplemental for retired pay, all FY 1961 requirements, including those indicated on Attachments I and II, are to be financed from funds presently available pending the provision of additional funds in the 1962 appropriations where necessary.

Secretary of Defense
Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Attachment I/3/

/3/Secret.

AGREED UPON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE FY 1961 AND FY 1962 DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS

(Millions of Dollars)

/*/Deleted based on continuation of deficiency authority.

/**/Excludes proposed net increase in FY 1962 Military Personnel Funds.

Attachment II/4/

/4/Secret.

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE FY 1961 AND FY 1962 DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND BUDGETS CURRENTLY IN DISAGREEMENT

Proposed Revisions

1. Polaris Second Acceleration

Defense Proposal

Provide $330 million for incremental funding on a minimum basis to initiate with FY 1962 funds work on 10 additional Polaris submarines (Nos. 20 through 29).

Budget Recommendation

Assuming the 10 submarines are to be built, include $778 million additional to provide funds on a "full funding" basis in accordance with regular budgetary practices in the shipbuilding area. Defense recommendation would definitely commit the Government to construction of the 10 submarines. Proposed partial financing will probably be criticized in Congress as a dodge to reduce the total amount of the 1962 budget amendment and would be an unfortunate precedent from a management standpoint. The $778 million will have to be included in the 1963 budget as an increased fund requirement without a corresponding increase in the program.

Defense Recommendation

The inclusion of $778 million additional appropriation in FY 1962 is not considered necessary. The long lead components for the additional submarines can be fully financed without these funds. The $778 million would be required in FY 1963 for financing the ship construction per se. However, this is primarily a fiscal policy matter for decision by the President. Defense would not object if the decision was made to include the additional funds in FY 1962.

2. Titan II--Cancellation of Last Four Squadrons

Budget Proposal

Consider, as a partial offset to the substantial increases in the proposed budget revisions, the cancellation of the last 4 of the presently planned 8 squadron Titan II program. Total savings would be about $500 to $525 million, of which between $200 and $225 million, consisting of amounts in the present 1962 budget and recoupments of 1961 funds, could be applied to reduce the proposed 1962 budget amendments. As shown below, the reduction would eliminate from the forces only 36 operational Titan II missiles which would not come into the force until the third quarter of 1964, by which time the inventory of Polaris and Minuteman missiles will be increasing rapidly, and an even greater increase in Minuteman missiles could be accomplished under the flexibility provisions recommended in the budget amendment.

It is suggested that the equivalent additional deterrent posture could be achieved in this period, if necessary, with additional Minuteman missiles in lieu of the last 4 Titan II squadrons and that the special advantages of the Titan II missile (longer range and heavier warhead) may be provided to a sufficient degree by the first 4 squadrons which, under the proposal, would not be cancelled. It would be desirable not to defer the decision since initial construction contracts have been let and obligations through FY 1962 will be about $250 million.

Defense Recommendation

The cost comparison made by the Bureau of the Budget is not an accepted basis for measuring effectiveness. The current uncertainty as to complete reliability of the Minuteman precludes the substitution thereof for the 4 Titan squadrons. Further, the military requirements, as they are determined from active studies now being made, may indicate a need for missiles of large capabilities which cannot be filled by the Minuteman.

3. Nike Zeus--Long Lead Production

Defense Proposal

Provide $82.8 million, the minimum first year funding, to provide capability for and to initiate actual production of long lead time items which must be contracted for in FY 1962 to permit accomplishment of the first Nike Zeus installations by about October 1965 if all developmental, production, and installation schedules are met. The intention is to provide flexibility, at a low cost, for a future decision whether or not to go ahead with production and installation of the Nike Zeus system. A comprehensive review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense clearly indicates that the minimum initial requirement is $82.8 million rather than the previous provisional estimate of $50.0 million for this purpose.

Budget Recommendation

Defer provision of first year production funding at least to the 1963 budget. There appears to be general agreement (except for certain Army and contractor representatives) that development has not yet progressed to the point where the technical feasibility of the Zeus system has been proven. A decision now to proceed with $82.8 million in 1962 entails follow-on funding of about $550 million in 1963 for large-scale production activities to preserve the possibility of meeting the October 1965 date.

A decision on the $550 million would have to be made in the 1963 budget decision period this fall with very little additional developmental data than is available right now--the key tests of the complete system do not begin until the summer of 1962. Thus, instead of providing flexibility, it appears that a decision to provide $82.8 million in 1962 virtually commits us to large-scale production, and it would certainly be regarded as doing so by the vocal advocates of Nike-Zeus.

Deferring first year production funding at least to the 1963 budget, as recommended, would defer the large-scale $550 million funding decision to the 1964 budget decision period in the fall of 1962, at which time the results of the first full system tests should be available.

In view of the widespread doubts whether the Nike-Zeus system should ever be deployed, because of practical operating problems, its own vulnerability, and its very large cost in relation to the protection received, deferral of the initial production decision appears warranted, even if it means a delay of at least a year in the target date of October 1965. Demonstration for psychological or prestige reasons of our technical capability of intercepting an ICBM would be accomplished by the present research and development program without going into actual production.

Defense Recommendation

The Department of Defense agrees with the position taken by the Bureau of the Budget that the Nike Zeus development program involves many uncertainties and, in common with other advanced weapon system developments, such as the big missiles, constitutes a high risk program with a chance of failure, but believes that it has the promise of substantial pay-off in terms of deterrence and prestige, if successful.

Provision in FY 1962 of $82.8 million does not entail a follow-on funding decision of about $550 million in the FY 1963 budget unless, for good reason, the capability to proceed with preparations for production is exercised early enough in FY 1962 to warrant such an amount of follow-on funding in FY 1963 to preserve the possibility of meeting the October 1965 date. Preservation of the capability to proceed with preparations for production can, of course, be misinterpreted, but it is the intention of the Department of Defense to so manage this capability as to make such misinterpretation unlikely. It does not necessarily follow that deferring the first year production decision to the FY 1963 budget would defer the $550 million follow-on decision to the FY 1964 budget since the time frame of the sequence of events in this program is not that rigid. Furthermore, it is expected that the Nike Zeus program will continue to involve uncertainties even after the test schedule is well underway, but this fact in itself is not a compelling argument against the early provision of the capability to proceed with preparations for production at the earliest time an assessment of the relative risks involved would favor a decision to advance.

4. Military Personnel, Increased Strength (all items)

Defense Proposal

Provide a net increase of $63 million for military personnel costs in 1962 to provide for 13,000 additional personnel for limited war and Polaris capabilities and a 2,000 net increase for the B-52 ground alert program after allowing for slight offsetting reductions resulting from the B-47 accelerated phase-down and the elimination of Snark missile units.

Budget Recommendation

Approve no change in total military personnel strength or funding in 1962, on the grounds that the proposed increases (to which there is no objection) can be accommodated by redistribution within the existing total. Specific areas in which offsetting reductions well in excess of the proposed increases appear possible have been brought to the attention of the Department of Defense.

Defense Recommendation

Defense must have the certain capability of providing the military strength needed for these identified purposes without the conditional necessity of making offsetting reductions elsewhere at this time. The military services advise they cannot absorb these requirements without a time consuming review of all requirements. Such a review has been ordered but cannot be relied upon to produce the required spaces in time to meet these requirements. These requested spaces and funds will be released by the Secretary of Defense only upon showings by the Services that they cannot otherwise provide for them within presently authorized strengths.

5. Advent--Communications Satellite Project

Defense Proposal

The Department of Defense proposes to augment the FY 1961 funding for Advent by a transfer of $13.2 million from the Emergency Fund and to add $22.7 million to the $57.0 million presently in the FY 1962 budget, in order to maintain the research and development effort at a level to insure that highly reliable satellite equipments are available to meet present schedules.

Budget Recommendation

Make no specific recommendations to Congress at this time for additional funding in the controversial communications satellite field in the absence of a thorough review of both Defense and NASA projects in this field on which an administration position can be based. Use 1962 Emergency Fund for any increased funding requirements for Advent that may be required.

Defense Recommendation

The amount of $57.0 million presently in the FY 1962 budget is insufficient to maintain an adequate research and development schedule at a level of effort required to achieve a highly reliable satellite. The requirement is now known and thus would not be an appropriate need to be met from the FY 1962 Emergency Fund. The need for reliable full time military communications is considered to be compelling to the extent that any reassessment of national policy would recognize the need to continue Advent.

6. B-70

Defense Proposal

The Department of Defense proposes to proceed at a reduced rate of $250 million in FY 1962 with a development program which will include 6 prototype aircraft and prototypes of certain sub-systems to provide for the orderly demonstration of Mach 3 flight with an airframe potentially useful as a bomber. The intention is to reserve an option later to develop a weapon system which could provide a first operational wing about 1970.

Budget Recommendation

Consider cancellation of entire program at this time in view of doubtful need for an aircraft with the B-70 characteristics in addition to expected missile capabilities during the period the B-70 would become available and in view of the extremely high cost of the B-70 in relation to the limited second strike capabilities that would be provided by such a vulnerable ground based system. If a new strategic bomber beyond the B-52 and B-58 is needed, consideration should be given to a less costly concept better adapted to an airborne alert.

Defense Recommendation

Since evidence is not conclusive it is not timely to decide either (a) to proceed at this time with an all-out weapon system development program, or (b) that there is to be no further step taken in manned strategic bombers beyond the B-52 by terminating the B-70 program. Even though there will be primary dependence on ballistic missiles for the strategic mission in the future, there remains certain uncertainties with respect to missiles including the question of reliability. There are certain advantages inherent in a controlled force of manned bombers. Until full confidence can be achieved in the missile force and until there is conclusive evidence of the feasibility or lack of feasibility, based on technical, military, economic and timing factors, of a Mach 3 bomber, it is believed to be essential to explore this phase of flight to preserve the option to advance towards a weapon system at the earliest time an assessment of the relative risks involved should favor such decision.

[Here follows a series of financial recapitulations.]

Washington, March 13, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense 3/61. Secret.

/2/Not found. Reference is presumably to a draft of the President's special message to Congress on the defense budget, dated March 28. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 229-240.

1. I think the President is right in thinking that the question of the size of the military budget is important, but wrong in thinking that it is all-important. The net increases in new obligational authority will be less than what many news reports have been hinting: and the state of the country, the state of the world, and the state of the Congressional mind persuade me that there will not be great trouble on this point. The need for accelerating our second generation deterrent force and the need for increased capabilities in the area of limited war take up nearly all of this new money, and I just don't think there is going to be any real opposition to either course of action. Accordingly, I believe that the main thrust of the budget message should be directed not at justification of these relatively modest quantitative changes, but at the discussion of more important underlying questions of military posture which are implied by these first changes.

2. Most of the specific changes that are being made in the Eisenhower budget justify themselves, on common sense grounds, one at a time. It is an interesting tactical question in each case whether the argument should be spelled out in detail. My own hunch is that it may be better to reserve fire on the more controversial items simply because there are so very many skilled propagandists lurking in the wings of the Pentagon, industry and the Hill. To give them exposed targets at this stage may be dangerous.

3. Yet most of the changes can also be defended by more general arguments, of which the most important are the need for flexibility of all sorts, and the need for hard choices among hundreds of possible ways of spending billions of dollars. It seems to me that both of these propositions can be profitably developed at length. The need for flexibility is quite varied: we need to be able to make sensible choices in rapidly changing circumstances--this is the basic case for strengthened command and control; we need to be free to move rapidly to sharply different weapons systems--this is the case for investments in development and in long lead-time items; we need to have a much more varied set of capabilities--this is the case for guerrilla and anti-guerrilla efforts and for research and development in the field of conventional warfare. Each of these points can be spread around to a number of additional items in the budget changes.

4. The argument about hard choices is the President's own, and I see no need to gild the lily here. The initial submissions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the total figures of any one of half a dozen of the weapons systems which are cheerfully proposed, the present tendency of each service to think as if it were responsible for the whole of the national defense, and many other elements are evident here. One quite subtle point which may deserve some attention is that it is always important to calculate the effect of our own plans upon the plans of the enemy. This is where Nike-Zeus still seems to me to fall down badly, and it is also where many advocates of the resumption of testing get into trouble--all they can see is that tests will give us improved warheads; the consequences of the decision in other fields, including the military, are not weighed in.

5. So far I have been discussing relatively easy points. The really tough question about this message, I think, is how far we want to go in restating the basic military posture of the United States. This ties in, of course, with the missile gap question.

For argument, let me suggest that we do not want to discuss "the missile gap" and that we do want to restate a military policy which will be somewhat different from that currently enshrined in national security policy papers. The phrase "missile gap" is now a genuinely misleading one, and I think the President can safely say so. In earlier years it had the useful shorthand effect of calling attention to the need for more rapid and attentive concern with our basic military posture, but no one has ever supposed that a naked count of missiles was in and of itself a sufficient basis for national action. What we have to do, rather, is to be clear about our purposes and then energetic and alert in finding the means to carry them out. The President's language will have enormous effect within the government. There is a whole theological framework here of words like "prevail" and "general war" and so on which has led to a lot of war planning and even budgetary planning of a seriously distorted kind. What I am suggesting is that the President may find it easier to change all this by public language than by a complex renewal of the theological argument within the government. The problem is to find the fresh words, and the following notions are put forward for discussion and not for definite acceptance.

The nut of what the President wants, as I understand it, can be described in the following four requirements:

a. That our military capability be such as to prevent any general atomic aggression. Our own strength should protect us against such an attack upon ourselves, and the strength which we share with our allies should prevent any such attack upon them.

b. That our ability to act effectively with conventional weapons in situations which do not involve general atomic attack should be substantially increased.

c. That we should maintain the necessary strength, in all arms, to take appropriate action, short of general strategic warfare, in the event of a major aggression that cannot be thrown back by conventional forces. (This is the hard one, but I think it cannot be swept under the rug; the suggested language is cool and unthreatening, as far as possible.)

d. That in the terrible event of a general atomic war, we retain the capability to act rationally to advance the national interest by exerting pressure and offering choices to the enemy. (This one need not be public at this stage.)

In addition to these general propositions, there are two limiting propositions, one affirmative and one negative, which I think are greatly needed in our national policy, and which can well be stated in public by the President.

a. Negatively, we are not aiming to create forces whose objective is a preventive or preemptive war, or any other kind of massive first strike against another nation. This is not the policy of the U. S. Government.

b. Affirmatively, we intend to see to it that our military policy is fully consistent with our earnest commitment to seek effective international understandings in the field of limitation and control of armaments. (In a number of ways the current budget does in fact observe this limitation, and they can be spelled out if the connections are not too subtle and sophisticated.)

If the President says these things, or anything like them, you will in fact be rewriting basic military policy which came on to him from the Eisenhower Administration. This is in my view a desirable result, but clearly it implies a decision which he should make only after considering the alternatives. What I like about this notion is that if the President says something of this sort, he will, I think, get strong public support and we can then proceed quite painlessly to the revision of the appropriate policy documents. If we do it the other way around, by revising the policy documents first, we will get one of those terrible guerrilla wars in which calculated leaks about our desire for appeasement mess up the picture before we have a chance to paint it our own way.

/3/In a March 14 memorandum to Bundy, Sorensen stated that he believed the points in Bundy's memorandum might be grouped around two large themes: 1) that the military policy of the administration was to provide the United States with capacity to deter all forms of armed aggression, at any level of force required by the national interest; and 2) the relation of this policy to the maintenance of peace and the negotiation of arms control. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense 3/61)

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

On April 6, 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence circulated NIE 11-61, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US." The estimate concluded: "Considering all the factors affecting the problem of warning, we believe that in most circumstances of an actual Soviet decision to attack at present or in the near future, intelligence could give warning of increased Soviet readiness, and could infer a possible intent to attack, perhaps a few days or more before the attack. Warnings of a probable Soviet intent are likely to be given, if at all, only a few hours before attack."

In the next few years, there was little prospect for major improvement in the "firmness or explicitness" of warning, because improvements in intelligence technique would be offset by a decline in the number and accessibility of military indicators as missiles gained in importance and general Soviet readiness rose. Nonetheless, the "possibility of warning from physical preparations" would not disappear. "Indeed, the limited time between initial attack and potential retaliation would virtually force the Soviets to undertake various preparations, including those for defense and recuperation, prior to launching an attack." In future, intelligence would also have "to place additional reliance for warning on the more ambiguous indicators not directly related to physical preparations." In some cases, "the first preliminary warning of possible Soviet attack might arise from a judgment that the USSR was about to take a political initiative involving great risk of war with the US, or that a crisis was developing in such a way as to prompt the USSR to prepare for war." (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) The full text of NIE 11-61 is in the Supplement.

Washington, April 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 4 Feb 61. Top Secret. Attached to an April 11 memorandum from Gilpatric to the JCS.

To determine the bearing of certain foreign policy considerations on the U.S. defense posture.

/2/Document 10.

/3/Not found.

/4/Memorandum from the JCS to McNamara, JCSM-153-61, not printed.

(1) General War Deterrent. The JCS agree on the deterrent role of nuclear weapons but fear that State fails to recognize the deterrent value of conventional forces as well as their importance should deterrence fail.

The JCS also point out that nuclear retaliatory forces form a part of total force requirements. The degree of improvement which can be attained in nuclear retaliatory forces is thus limited by the total force requirements balanced against available resources. The JCS emphasize the need for responsiveness and diversification in nuclear retaliatory forces in addition to the qualities of effectiveness, invulnerability, and reliability specified by State.

(2) Limited Operations. The JCS are in general agreement with the desirability of "raising the threshold" before a decision has to be made on the use of nuclear weapons. They point out, however, that the level of this threshold is actually determined not by doctrine, which has long required that no more force than necessary be employed, but by existing conventional capabilities. The ceiling on these capabilities, and thus the height of the "threshold", continues to be set by budgetary and manpower limitations. The JCS clearly envisage the selective use of nuclear weapons in limited operations. State, however, appears to be moving toward the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in any limited war situation.

(3) NATO. The most recently expressed views of the Joint Chiefs on U.S. policy towards NATO appear to supersede and to eliminate a major difference expressed in the attached memorandum.

No further discussion of this earlier conflict, therefore, seems necessary.

/5/Reference is to the April 11 memorandum cited in the source note above, as signed by Gilpatric. No record of the proposed discussion has been found.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab D).

Paul H. Nitze

Washington, April 15, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-1561. Top Secret.

Dear Dean:

The enclosed memorandum reflects the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the use of nuclear weapons in limited war. I think you will find them of interest.

/2/See footnote 3, Document 15.

/3/See Document 20.

/4/Enclosure to Document 10.

It is our conviction that greater emphasis be placed on the use of non-nuclear weapons in the defense of third areas. However, as you know, we believe that the United States must retain the ability to use nuclear weapons tactically in local wars under carefully controlled conditions.

When our review of basic policy is further along I would like to discuss our findings with you. I expect that this will be possible within the next few weeks.

Sincerely,

Roswell Gilpatric

/5/Top Secret.

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-170-61

Washington, March 17, 1961

SUBJECT
Assumptions Regarding the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited War (U)

1. In recent discussions relating to the review of defense posture currently underway, two questions have been frequently asked concerning:

a. The assumptions regarding the use or non-use of nuclear weapons in limited wars that are currently used in the formulation of force levels and equipment levels.

b. The validity of those assumptions in the future.

2. With respect to subparagraph 1 a above:

a. Force and equipment levels are based on Basic National Security Policy (NCS 5906/1), which provides in substance that:

(1) Main, but not sole, reliance will be placed on nuclear weapons and that these weapons will be used in conjunction with other weapons when required to meet the nation's war objectives.

(2) The nuclear stockpile should include a variety of weapons to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war.

(3) In the accomplishment of national objectives in certain limited war situations, nuclear weapons may not be necessary or appropriate. However, conflicts involving sizeable forces of the United States and the USSR should not be construed as limited war.

(4) In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as a part of its military forces, its effective nuclear retaliatory power.

(5) In dealing with limited aggression, the United States must be prepared to defeat such aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war.

b. These provisions have combined to give the highest priority to the development of forces primarily designed for general war. Requirements for limited war forces and equipment types are contained within the larger requirements for general war. Additional equipment levels for limited war are also provided for in military planning. However, budgetary and manpower limitations have necessitated lesser priorities for equipping and manning of forces to provide non-nuclear capabilities.

3. In substance, our national strategy requires that limited war operations be conducted with whatever weapons and forces are required by the military and political exigencies involved in each particular situation and by the national objectives to be attained. In terms of nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, the requirements of each of these contingencies are impossible to determine with precision in advance. They can be determined only in the light of the particular military and political context in which each has developed. Situations may occur in which authorization for use of nuclear weapons will be delayed, and there may be other contingencies which do not warrant the use of nuclear weapons. An appropriate mix of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for those of our forces which might be involved will provide the United States with greater political and diplomatic flexibility as well as greater battlefield flexibility and capability for survival than if only one of these capabilities is developed to the exclusion or neglect of the other. Forces and delivery vehicles which might be used in limited war should continue to have the capability of delivering either nuclear or conventional weapons.

4. With respect to subparagraph 1 b above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that while expected changes in the world situation during the next 10 years certainly justify continuing review of national strategy, there is nothing foreseen that will justify abrogation of the principle that US forces must maintain a dual nuclear and non-nuclear capability. It can be reasonably anticipated that the trend in the future will be toward expansion rather than contraction of the weaponry available for these actions, as innovations in agents, weapon systems and techniques develop. For example, a US capability to utilize advanced nonlethal incapacitating agents in a limited conflict in the future might well offer substantial military advantages within the limitations imposed by delicate political considerations.

5. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in planning for limited war, a flexible capability for diverse levels of operations, employing the appropriate weapons, will continue to be of paramount importance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/6/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

CM-190-61

Washington, April 18, 1961

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3020 (3 Apr 61) Sec 2. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
"Doctrine" on Thermonuclear Attack

/2/This memorandum was addressed to the JCS and other recipients within the Department of Defense, and contained 96 questions (informally known as "the 96 trombones") on all aspects of the national defense. (Ibid., JCS 2101/413, JMF 5000 (8 Mar 61) Sec. 1)

2. You will note, from the attached memorandum, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I among them, are in agreement that we do not now have the requisite capabilities for carrying out a doctrine of controlled responses and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack. We also agree that attempts at the present time to implement such a doctrine, or to declare such an intent, would be premature and could gravely weaken our deterrent posture.

3. The basic split in this report relates to the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff should make a judgment now that implementing a doctrine of controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear war is a desirable and feasible course of action in the future.

4. My personal judgment is that we do not now have adequate defenses, nor are our nuclear retaliatory forces sufficiently invulnerable, to permit us to risk withholding a substantial part of our effort, once a major thermonuclear attack has been initiated. Furthermore, the advantages to be achieved by limiting our responses, under such conditions, could only be realized by the enforcement upon the Soviets of a degree of tacit "cooperation" which does not now appear realistic. Nevertheless, I believe that further specification of such a doctrine, insofar as it applies to conditions of less than large-scale deliberate attack, would be a desirable undertaking. It would submit the complex problems of controlled responses, negotiating pauses, and their interrelationship with enemy reactions to rigorous analysis. However, except for these lower levels of attack, I believe that an attempt to spell out specific controlled response options would be undesirable until we have more knowledge of the technological possibility of creating the essential building blocks on which safe implementation of the doctrine could be based.

5. It is my judgment, therefore, that it is not now possible to set forth a more definitive doctrine, which if accepted in the proximate future would permit, with safety, controlled response and negotiating pauses covering the full range of the conceivable thermonuclear threat. Nevertheless, I believe the matter to be of such importance that it can, with profit, be examined further, with regard to its application under conditions of less than large-scale deliberate attack and particularly with respect to the conditions and the time-frame under which such a doctrine might realistically be made increasingly applicable over a wider range. Accordingly, I have directed the Joint Strategic Survey Council, as a matter of priority, to examine the problem further from this point of view and to submit their findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. I recommend, therefore, that the answer to Project 2 provided herewith be considered as a first reply, to be followed by further study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

/4/Top Secret.

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM-252-61

Washington, April 18, 1961

SUBJECT
"Doctrine" on Thermonuclear Attack (U)

1. Reference is made to Item 2 of your memorandum, dated 8 March 1961, requesting preparation of a "doctrine" which, if accepted, would permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack.

/5/Not printed. This tentative doctrine emphasized that the various elements of a controlled reponse strategy should be phased in only as the United States attained capability to implement them.

/6/Concerning the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, see footnote 2 to the memorandum of conference with President Eisenhower held August 11, 1960, in Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, Document 113.

/7/The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), revised annually, was the shortest-range of the JCS group of comprehensive plans. Its major purpose was to translate national defense policy into military tasks consonant with actual capabilities.

4. In the context of your request referred to in paragraph 1, the attached doctrine, if accepted, would not permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack in the current time period. The reasons for this judgment are discussed in paragraphs 9-12 of Appendix A. As further discussed in paragraphs 16 and 23 a of Appendix A, attempts to implement a strategy including such options, or declarations of such intent, would at the present time be premature and could gravely weaken the current deterrent posture.

5. In light of the relative capabilities, limitations and objectives of the United States and its Allies and of the USSR and its satellites, there is no significant likelihood of thermonuclear attack against the former which would be so executed that it would be to the advantage of the United States and/or its Allies in the current period to respond under a degree of control beyond that provided in current policy, doctrines and strategic plans.

/8/For views of the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, see statement following paragraph 7 of Appendix C. [Footnote in the source text. Appendix C is not printed. The view there expressed was that U.S. war plans should reflect, as controlled response capabilities became feasible, "provision for increased latitude in options for controlled response to thermonuclear war emergency, preserving military advantage to the United States and its Allies as the basis for negotiating pauses and war termination under conditions advantageous to the United States and its Allies."]

/9/Not printed. Appendix B recommended "the desirability of moving as rapidly as possible towards a posture which will permit increased flexibility of response" and stated that a doctrine that would rely on counterforce alone would negate controlled response because "any doctrine which specifies in advance the nature of the response would invalidate the entire concept of controlled, deliberate application of force, the achievement of which is the basic objective of the doctrine itself."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/10/Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

Washington, April 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. Top Secret. The actions were approved by the President on April 24.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Action No. 2406, "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba."]

a. Discussed possible changes in the level of effort of the United States in the fields of military activity, foreign policy, civil defense, and para-military effort. The President announced his prospective appointment of General Maxwell Taylor to advise him with respect to ways and means of improving U.S. efforts in para-military, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities, in the light of recent experiences. It was agreed that the Department of Defense would review its military budget, and that the study of the civil defense posture of the United States should be expedited by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

b. Noted the President's request to the Department of Defense for a prompt report to him on military planning for a possible crisis over Berlin.

[Here follow Actions No. 2408, "The Geneva Test Ban Negotiations," and No. 2409, "Review of U.S. Space Program."]

/2/Typed marginal notes indicate that action memoranda were sent to the Department of Defense and OCDM (based on Action No. 2407-a), Defense (Action No. 2407-b), and State, Treasury, Defense, and CIA (Action No. 2407-c). These memoranda have not been further identified.

27. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy /1/

Washington, May 10, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, DOD Study on Conventional Forces 1961. Secret.

SUBJ
Reappraisal of Capabilities of Conventional Forces

You have asked that we reexamine the capabilities of our conventional forces. We have done so and our conclusions are summarized in this report. The study,/2/ which was directed by Mr. John Connally and the Joint Staff, included:

/2/This 73-page study is attached but not printed.

a. An evaluation of the present capabilities of U.S. conventional forces, including our Reserve forces. (See Section 1)/3/

/3/According to Section 1, this evaluation was done under the assumptions that only one large conventional commitment of forces at any one time was unlikely and that participation of more than 250,000-300,000 troops would reach the nuclear threshold and thereby "stem" the requirement for additional combat forces. Given these assumptions, the evaluation found that the United States had "substantial" capacity for waging non-nuclear war and that capacity for strategic mobility was satisfactory "except during the first 10-30 days of a large-scale, rapidly-developing limited war."

b. An evaluation of suggestions from the Army, Navy and Air Force for possible increases in personnel and matériel. (See Section 2)

c. An analysis of suggestions from Congressional leaders for personnel and materiel increases. (See Section 3)

d. A consideration of new uses of our existing forces. (See Section 4)

The Services proposed the following increases in conventional forces:

After a thorough review of the Services' proposals, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Connally and I have concluded that the 2.5 million men in our Armed Services, equipped with 817 ships and over 30,000 aircraft, backed by a highly trained Reserve force of 1.8 million men, an FY'62 Budget for New Obligational Authority of $43.794 billion (including the Budget increase of $2,274 billion which you proposed to the Congress), and the forces of our NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and other allies, represent a military force which is adequate for our purpose.

We believe that, with the exceptions noted below, a further increase in the FY'62 Defense Department Budget is not the answer to the problems which confront us.

The United States and her allies have developed strong military forces. These have been successful in deterring the Sino-Soviet Bloc from overt attack, but they have not effectively stopped the indirect aggression carried on by the Communists in many parts of the world. Militarily, we are neither organized nor oriented for the task of meeting and counteracting this type of Soviet strategy. A substantial augmentation of our forces at this time would provide us with no appreciable assurance that we could better combat the indirect attacks which we face today.

It is apparent that new approaches to organizing and utilizing our military power must be developed. We propose to place increased emphasis on this subject during the coming year. Re-programming of funds within the existing Budget should provide adequate financial support for whatever additional para-military activities appear necessary.

There are only three major additions to the FY'62 Budget which we wish to recommend at this time.

1. An increase of $77 million to permit the start of development work on certain high-thrust boosters for military space projects. This recommendation was discussed in detail in a paper submitted to the Space Council on May 8 by NASA and the Defense Department./4/

/4/Not found.

2. An increase of at least $200 million for the Military Assistance Program. The specific amount to be requested will be determined following completion of the study now being directed by Mr. Burton Marshall. Following completion of Mr. Marshall's study, it is possible that we may wish to request that part or all of the funds be provided in the form of a general contingency reserve for the Defense Department.

3. An increase of $100 million for the procurement of long-lead equipment necessary to support a proposed reorganization of the combat forces of the Army (See Section 5)./5/ The structure of the present Army divisions was tailored to the use of atomic weapons. We believe that without reducing the nuclear power of the Army division, reorganization of the divisional structure will make possible:

/5/This change became known as ROAD (Reorganization Objective, Army Division), a form of organization more flexible than the existing "pentomic" divisions, each composed of five battle groups.

a. Increased non-nuclear firepower--providing to decision-makers a wider range of alternatives and an improved capability to apply measured force without threatening nuclear devastation.

b. Internal flexibility within and between divisions and greater compatibility with forces of major Allies--facilitating tailoring of forces for particular tasks and the coordinated employment of U.S. and Allied forces.

c. Improved tactical mobility (ground and air)--tailored to the operational environment.

d. Mechanized divisions in Europe--providing protected mobility and the means to counter massive Communist mechanized forces.

e. Separate airborne brigades in Europe and the Pacific--providing flexible, mobile forces tailored for immediate response to varying situations without degrading other theater capabilities.

f. Improved capabilities for command and control and for training commanders and units.

Re-equipping of the present active and reserve divisions in accordance with the proposed new organizational structure may cost several hundred million dollars. The divisional reorganization program should start as rapidly as feasible. The Army estimates the program can begin in the latter part of FY'62 and the proposed Budget supplement will support this time schedule./6/

/6/In a May 17 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Clifton argued that the assumptions outlined in footnote 3 above were outdated and recommended that the President approve one additional army division. In a May 20 memorandum, he stated that he had secured General Decker's endorsement of his proposed creation of an additional division with "no additional logistic support." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Clifton, 3/61-6/62, and Departments and Agencies Series, Army 5/61-7/61, respectively) On May 25, however, the President instead asked Congress to fund the Marine proposal for an increase of 12,000 men to a total of 190,000. (Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 396-406)

Robert S. McNamara/7/

/7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Washington, May 25, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Carl Kaysen Series, BNSP 1/61-5/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Kaysen on May 27.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. HENRY ROWEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

/2/Apparent reference to the draft cited in footnote 2, Document 30.

/3/Apparent reference to Daniel Ellsberg of the Rand Corporation, who served as a consultant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The second purpose of the document was to make the same point clear at the level of the Secretary of Defense and the President. In addition, it was also directed at providing some general rationale for this view. The rationale is more important for the second purpose than for the first. It was my impression that Rowen was in effect saying that the Department of Defense could not itself change the views of the Services, a point which he illustrated with a number of anecdotes, and that therefore the NSC and the White House were needed to effect this change.

He appeared to accept my comment that the document in its present form seemed rather without a clear political basis. It was his view that our comment could most usefully be directed toward the political basis on which the report should rest and its usefulness for White House purposes rather than for internal educational purposes.

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

NIE 11-8-61, Annex C

Washington, June 7, 1961.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. NIE 11-8-61 (46 pages), entitled "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack," was published and distributed separately from Annex C, which is printed here. A cover sheet and a table of contents to Annex C are not printed. A note on the cover sheet indicates that Annex C was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred, except the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction. NIE 11-8-61 is ibid.

THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM--EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

1. During the course of the past year or more, US intelligence has acquired a considerable body of additional information pertaining to Soviet programs for ICBMs and other ballistic missiles. This information, derived from a wide variety of intelligence sources, has provided new insights into the general characteristics and performance of the Soviet ICBM, the facilities required for its deployment as a weapon system, and the timing of some of the Soviet activities critical to the progress of this weapon system through research and development into the deployment phase of the program.

2. A major purpose of this Annex is to set forth the direct evidence bearing on Soviet ICBM development and deployment, together with the alternative interpretations which we believe can reasonably be assigned to various aspects of this evidence. From this we seek to arrive at a general estimate of the ICBM force likely to exist in the USSR at present and to set forth clearly the uncertainties attached to any such estimate. The problem is more difficult than that of estimating current Soviet strength in many other forms of military power. Estimates of current bomber strengths, for example, are based primarily on production and order-of-battle information of good quantity and quality, which narrows the area of uncertainty. Indirect evidence and insights drawn from Soviet military thinking and weapon systems programming practices play a much larger role in estimates of current Soviet missile strength.

3. Future estimates of many Soviet weapon programs are projected from a reasonably firm current base; it is far more difficult to establish such a base for Soviet ballistic missile programs. Moreover, the trends are at best only dimly seen. The second major purpose of this Annex, therefore, is to set forth the methodology for making an estimate of the likely future range of Soviet ICBM capabilities, using the evidence as well as insights derived from general considerations.

4. There are several reasons why considerable uncertainty should exist in present US estimates of the Soviet ICBM program, and why there should be a number of elements in the evidence which permit differing judgments. Large ballistic missile systems are new to both the US and the USSR, and it is natural that there should be uncertainty as to the precise problems and lead-times involved in quantity deployment. Ballistic missile systems require the development of new operational concepts, which are not necessarily the same in the two countries; this limits the direct applicability of analogies from US experience. Moreover, these weapon systems are being developed and deployed in a period of vastly accelerated technological change.

5. Another factor in the estimative program, worthy of special attention, is the effect of Soviet security measures. The USSR has always regarded secrecy as a major military asset in itself, and there is evidence that ballistic missile programs have been cloaked with a very high degree of security. The secrecy goes considerably beyond the dispersal and concealment of launching sites, a practice which the Soviet leaders have stated is a part of their missile deployment concept. Even routine aspects of the missile and space programs have been assiduously concealed--place names like Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam continue to be withheld, despite the common use of these place names in the Western press. Khrushchev once publicly apologized for withholding the names of Soviet missile and space experts who received awards, allegedly because such recognition would make them the targets of Western provocateurs. There is much evidence that the Soviets attempt to prevent the observation of missile equipment in transit, by moving it at night, harassing or rerouting Western observers, and other means. Finally, we have recently discovered a special masking address system, apparently designed to prevent the disclosure in personal telegraphic communications of the places where missile personnel are stationed.

Background on the ICBM System

/2/Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, dated 25 April 1961. (Top Secret) [Footnote in the source text.]

/3/See NIE 11-5-61, paragraph 17. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believe that the IOC date did not occur this early. For their position, see paragraphs 77-80. [Footnote in the source text.]

a. The missile itself is of relatively heavy construction and is extremely large. Depending upon its exact configuration, it can best be described either as twice as bulky as a US Atlas or half as large as a US Saturn.

b. It employs radio-inertial guidance, requiring ground guidance equipment at the launch area.

c. It uses nonstorable liquid propellants, requiring extensive transfer facilities at launch sites and storage capacity for the equivalent of at least five large rail tank cars of propellants for each missile.

d. It is probably transportable over long distances only by rail, although very short-haul transport over well surfaced, wide radius roads may be feasible.

e. A certain amount of missile assembly and checkout must be accomplished at permanent on-site facilities, which must also include heavy equipment for handling and erecting the missile.

f. The most suitable deployment areas for the very heavy nosecone ICBMs which had been test fired prior to about 1 January 1960 would be in northwestern USSR or the Soviet Far East, the only areas from which 5,000 n.m. missiles could achieve extensive coverage of the US.

7. From the foregoing, it is clear that the present Soviet ICBM system is heavily dependent on the Soviet rail network, and that launch sites would necessarily be served by rail spurs. The system is extremely bulky and must be fairly cumbersome to handle. It does not readily lend itself to deployment in hardened sites. The most suitable ICBM deployment site would be a large, fixed facility with considerable ground support equipment.

[Here follows discussion of Soviet missile tests, test sites, and missile deployment.]

40. A review of other major Soviet military construction and deployment programs (e.g., airfield construction and surface-to-air missile deployment), shows that there is often a time lag of a year and sometimes as much as two years between the start of a program and our acquisition of sufficient information to determine its scale and pace. Some compensation for this time lag is provided by the probability that work must begin at Soviet ICBM sites some 18 months to two years before they become an operational threat.

/4/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, do not believe that a minimum number of two to four ICBM sites were probably under construction in 1957-1959 in areas suitable to deployment of 5,000 n.m. missiles, nor do they believe that such sites are operational at the present time. For a full statement of their position, see paragraphs 77-80. [Footnote in the source text.]

42. From the foregoing examination of the direct evidence, it is possible to derive a minimum number of operational ICBM complexes which can be supported on reasonably good evidence. In addition, the results of our search for operational deployment sites, taken together with the other elements of direct evidence, contribute to sense of the current tempo of the Soviet program. The relatively small number of suspected areas and the identification of only a few masking addresses which might be associated with ICBM deployment are consistent with the deliberate pace of activities at the test range. Further, the USSR has a greater capacity to produce and deploy ICBMs than we believe it has exercised. In sum, while the direct evidence remains insufficient to establish with certainty the present Soviet ICBM strength, it leads us to believe that the deployment program thus far has proceeded at a deliberate rather than an extremely urgent pace.

Soviet Programming Decisions

/5/The figure quoted by Khrushchev was 30 billion rubles. This amount is not inconsistent with programs for several hundred long range ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles. [Footnote in the source text.]

44. The operational deployment program which we believe is now under way will probably continue over the next two or three years. The scale and pace of this program will probably be determined largely by: (a) the view of the Soviet leaders regarding the ICBM force they require in this time period; (b) factors of efficiency in the scheduling and expenditure of resources on the present weapon system in relation to other military and economic programs; and (c) the Soviet judgment of likely trends in their own and Western offensive and defensive weapon systems. Given the rapidity of technological change and the heavy emphasis on research and development in both the missile and antimissile fields in the USSR, it is likely that Soviet ICBM deployment programming beyond the 1963-1964 period is highly tentative.

45. In persuading their own followers to accept the military reorganization announced in January 1960, and in debating the Chinese Communists on strategy and policy, the Soviet leaders have in the past year or so revealed much of their thinking about modern weapon systems. The most pertinent of these statements have been of three types. First, there have been Soviet statements that the leadership seeks to achieve and maintain a superiority over the West in weapon systems, but the Soviets appear to be stressing their claim to a qualitative superiority in advanced weapon systems as much as to a numerical advantage. Second, there have been a number of public and private references to the potential employment of ballistic missiles against what are termed "strategic" targets or "vital centers," in contexts which seem to include both military bases and other elements of national strength such as industry, government, and population. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have spoken of the desirability of achieving sufficient missile strength to attack these objectives. Finally, in late 1960, Khrushchev privately told important Bloc officials that 300 missiles were sufficient to "destroy" the US, while 200 were sufficient for Europe.

/6/According to information recently received through clandestine channels which have provided reliable military information in the past, several senior Soviet officers associated with missile activity have commented on the ICBM program along the following lines: The Soviets are spending "millions" of rubles on the program. If one success is achieved, it is magnified to support a pretense that the USSR has "hundreds" of ICBMs, in order to impress the West. The implication that there are hundreds is only "idle talk" at present, but such a force will be achieved since the USSR's economy and policy are "geared" for developing such a force. [Footnote in the source text.]

47. The Soviets appear to have decided, for the present and short-term future at least, to maintain a mixed long range attack force and not to rely exclusively on the ICBM for inter-continental striking power. Bomber forces capable of delivering large megatonnages are being maintained, and the USSR is acquiring submarine-launched missile capabilities. The present combined striking force has certain advantages in providing greater flexibility in Soviet tactics and in complicating Western defensive problems. In the light of these advantages, we consider it probable that the USSR will for the foreseeable future retain other intercontinental weapon systems to supplement their ICBM forces.

48. In planning the present and future size of their ICBM force, the Soviet leaders have to weigh the advantages of an ICBM weapon system as compared with bombers, missile launching submarines, and other advanced weapon systems. They have to consider the superior capabilities of the ICBM for launching a large-scale attack, in particular its suitability for surprise attack on US strategic bomber bases, fixed missile sites, communication centers, and other fixed installations related to the US retaliatory capability. They have to weigh these advantages against such considerations as the ability of the heavy bomber to deliver very heavy megatonnages against difficult targets and targets of uncertain location, and the ability of the missile submarine to survive an initial Western strike and deliver a subsequent retaliatory attack. Finally, they have to consider the entire target system which their planners have developed for attacking the US under the whole range of possible circumstances, and determine what role ought to be allocated to the ICBM.

49. As our own approach to an appreciation of the military capabilities that the Soviets might expect to achieve by building up their operational ICBM capabilities, we have computed the number of ICBM launchers the Soviets would theoretically require for a single salvo designed to inflict severe damage on various US targets. We have considered the following target systems: fixed bomber and missile bases of the US nuclear striking forces; command centers associated with control and communications for these and other elements of US military strength; air defense bases whose reduction by missile attack would improve the chances of successful Soviet bomber missions; urban areas containing a large proportion of US industry, population, and other resources of national strength. We believe these are the sorts of target systems the Soviets would have considered in evaluating their own ICBM requirements for potential use in a broad variety of circumstances and kinds of attack.

50. Theoretical computations of this sort are extremely sensitive to varying assumptions regarding the Soviet view of the precise targets worth attacking, the necessary or desirable amounts of damage to be inflicted, and the degree of assurance of inflicting such damage to be sought. We have had to use US criteria for these factors. Such computations are also sensitive to variations in the accuracy and reliability of the Soviet ICBM system, about which there is a margin of uncertainty in our estimates. In addition, computations involving an assumed attack against fast-reaction retaliatory systems (i.e., the bomber and missile bases) apply only to hypothetical circumstances in which the Soviet force has achieved near-perfect surprise and simultaneity of attack. The Soviets are capable of making more valid computations about their own weapon system than we, but they too must be cautious about assessing in advance the results of the first ICBM salvo in human history.

51. While computations of theoretical numerical requirements do not provide any firm basis for estimating Soviet ICBM force goals, they do provide a sense of proportion with respect to the suitability of current and improved Soviet ICBMs for attacking various target systems. In very general terms, we find that Soviet ICBMs are well suited to attacking cities and relatively unprotected military targets, including air and naval bases, soft and semihardened ICBM sites, and soft and semihardened command centers. Even with the improved performance projected for 1963-1965, however, Soviet ICBMs do not appear to be well suited to attacking an ICBM force deployed in very hard sites.

52. Applying these same computations to various hypothetical Soviet force levels, we find--though with considerably less certainty--that under favorable circumstances from their point of view, Soviet planners might expect to achieve the following theoretical capabilities in a single ICBM salvo:

a. With roughly 50 launchers in 1961 or any time thereafter, high assurance of being able to detonate an ICBM warhead over each of the 25 principal US metropolitan areas.

b. With roughly 100 launchers, moderate assurance in 1961 and increasing assurance thereafter of being able to inflict severe damage on the operational air bases of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC).

c. With roughly 200 launchers in 1961-1962, moderate assurance of being able to inflict severe damage on SAC air bases and on soft and semihardened ICBM sites as well.

d. With roughly 300 to 500 launchers in 1962-1963, moderate to high assurance of being able to inflict severe damage, not only on SAC air bases and soft and semihardened ICBM sites, but also on other fixed soft and semihardened targets associated with US striking and defensive capabilities.

53. As the period advances, the Soviets could expect to achieve higher levels of assurance against the foregoing types of targets with fewer missiles, because Soviet ICBM performance will probably improve while the number of such targets will remain relatively unchanged. For example, in 1964-1965 and possibly as early as 1963, the capabilities described in d above might be achieved with as few as 200-400 launchers. However, studies show that several thousand ICBM launchers would be required to provide the Soviets with reasonable assurance of an ability to engage in counterbattery fire against the combined total of hard ICBM sites planned by the US for the period beginning in 1963.

54. In evaluating the significance of various hypothetical numbers of ICBMs, Soviet planners would take into account the likelihood that, for at least the next few years, the great preponderance of US megatonnage would be bomber-borne. They would almost certainly seek an ICBM force large enough to blunt or at least disrupt the US bomber capability before launch so that their air defenses would have a reasonable chance of preventing large-scale penetrations to Soviet target areas. However, they would also know that the US is rapidly acquiring significant capabilities with mobile and hardened missile forces, and that even at present the SAC airborne alert and dispersal capability tends to offset a Soviet ability to destroy air bases. Thus, the advance in US techniques for the protection and security of its own striking forces obliges the Soviets to recognize that--even should they build a very large ICBM force--they are confronted with a growing segment of US retaliatory power which could not be eliminated in a first strike by ICBMs, even under the most favorable circumstances.

55. The foregoing considerations do not, in themselves, define any particular ICBM force levels which the Soviets think appropriate to their needs. They do, however, support a judgment that the USSR has strong incentives to build up a substantial ICBM force, and that, at least for present planning purposes, the Soviets would probably look upon several hundred operational ICBM launchers as a substantial force.

56. The Soviets probably desire an ICBM force with a high salvo capability and high survivability, in order to have a capability either to launch an initial attack or to retaliate against a Western attack. The former can be approached by maintaining a high ratio of launchers to missiles, although this will not fully overcome the problems of fueling and missile hold-times inherent in the present Soviet ICBM system. The latter can best be achieved for the present system by dispersing and concealing operational launchers. Even with their very tight security practices, however, the Soviets probably view the protection afforded by concealment and dispersal as susceptible to deterioration with time, especially in view of the reconnaissance satellite capabilities they would expect the US to achieve in the next few years.

57. Many of the developments referred to in our other estimates, especially the missile advances projected in NIE 11-5-61, point to the period beginning around 1963 or 1964 as a time of major technological change in Soviet weapon systems. Principal among the advances which we can now foresee are initial operational capabilities with a new ICBM system, in about 1963 or after, and at least limited deployment of an antimissile system designed for use against IRBMs and ICBMs, in the period 1963-1966. There is a possibility that test firings of a new ICBM have already begun at Tyuratam. Intensive R&D in antimissile defenses has been under way in the USSR for several years.

58. The new ICBM system will probably be designed to overcome disadvantages in the present system. It will probably use either storable liquid or solid fuels and include compatible elements to increase flexibility and decrease vulnerability in deployment. It will probably be easier to deploy than the present system. Moreover, at that time the oldest of the current Soviet heavy bombers will be approaching 10 years in operational service. Although the USSR has developed air-to-surface missiles for heavy bombers and could be developing new bombers for intercontinental use to supplement its missile capabilities, there is little evidence that the Soviets have made the amount of progress necessary to avert obsolescence in this field. We estimate that by 1963 the Soviets could also achieve a submerged-launching capability with ballistic missiles in nuclear powered submarines. In the same time period, the USSR could also have a long range, ground-launched unmanned aerodynamic vehicle for reconnaissance or weapon delivery. These and other developments could effectively supplement the ICBM force.

59. In 1963-1964, however, US forces will begin to include numerous hard ICBM sites. We cannot exclude the possibility that a new Soviet ICBM could achieve accuracies and reliabilities excellent enough to permit the USSR to contemplate counterbattery fire, but it is extremely unlikely that such improved performance could be attained before late in the decade. Even so, the fast reaction times of US systems and increasing US strength in mobile missiles would probably preclude effective counterbattery fire. The Soviets would probably decide that, in these circumstances, it would be desirable to adopt additional measures such as hardening for the protection of their own ICBM forces, and also to develop more advanced offensive techniques. Moreover, they would probably regard the achievement of effective antimissile defenses as an important element in solving their problem.

60. The potential effectiveness of Soviet antimissile defenses will therefore be an extremely significant factor in their ICBM programming. Their antimissile R&D is receiving very heavy emphasis, but we do not know with any certainty when in the 1963-1966 period they will first deploy antimissile defenses, nor do we know how effective the initial capability will be. If the initial system has only a limited, interim capability, its significance would be primarily political and psychological. However, if the Soviets conclude that their antimissile system could provide reasonable assurance of coping with some substantial portion of the Western ballistic missile capability, they would be strongly motivated to commit extensive resources to its deployment, even, we believe, to the extent of diverting resources which would otherwise be allocated to offensive systems. This conclusion rests partly on the high priority accorded to military defense in the USSR over the years, but also on our belief that in Soviet eyes the early deployment of antimissile defenses would constitute a major technological victory over the US.

/7/The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, do not concur in the range of current and future ICBM force levels estimated herein. For their positions, see their statements beginning respectively at paragraphs 69, 77, and 81. [Footnote in the source text.]

61. In this concluding section of the Annex we present an estimate of probable current and future Soviet ICBM strength, based on the several interpretations we believe can validly be drawn from the evidence and from appreciation of our own ability to acquire such evidence. We again emphasize that the direct evidence is insufficient to establish with certainty the scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM deployment program. Our estimate therefore also rests on the indirect evidence and other considerations discussed in preceding sections, including the strategic ideas which we believe govern Soviet military policy, the approximate levels of ICBM strength which the Soviet leadership appears to be seeking, our general knowledge of Soviet military programming practices, and our sense of the tempo at which the present program is being conducted. For these reasons, our estimates of current and future Soviet ICBM capabilities are expressed as ranges.

62. From the direct and indirect evidence at hand, we judge that the USSR is building toward several hundred operational ICBM launchers, to be acquired as soon as practicable within the next few years. The commitment of resources is probably quite large, but thus far the programming has apparently been deliberate in pace. It is probably affected by a desire for efficiency in scheduling the construction and activation of a number of launching complexes dispersed over a wide geographic area. The production of missiles and training of troops could be scheduled to fit into whatever site activation schedule was deemed practicable.

/8/The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, do not concur that a launcher activation rate of 50 to 100 a year can be supported "by the sense of the current tempo of the ICBM program." They would, in the light of the direct and indirect evidence available, be able to say only that such a launcher activation rate is within Soviet gross capabilities. [Footnote in the source text.]

64. Since it would require 18 to 24 months for launching complexes to be brought to operational readiness, our judgment regarding present activation rates bears most directly on ICBM deployment at present and through the next year or two. Such activation rates are not likely to remain constant; they are likely to vary considerably within this approximate range from year to year, depending on the configuration of the ICBM sites and areas of their deployment. Although we believe that the Soviets have substantially passed through the learning period of the activation program, as they gain additional experience it will be easier for them to increase the rate. At the same time, other considerations such as a new ICBM, developments in their antimissile program, and alternative uses of the resources involved will influence their decisions as to the rate of ICBM activation. Taking these factors into account, we believe it reasonable to project an average launcher activation rate of approximately 50 to 100 per year during the period to 1963-1964.

65. We believe that the probable Soviet force level in mid-1961 is in the range of 50-100 operational ICBM launchers, together with the necessary operational missile inventories and trained crews. This would probably involve the present existence of 10 to 15 operational ICBM site-complexes. This estimate should be regarded as a general approximation. The major bases for it are our sense of the tempo of the program and our judgment as to the relationship between what our evidence supports and what our coverage is likely to have missed. Such a force level could have been acquired through either the smooth or phased deployment programs which can be derived from interpretation of the test range data.

/9/The inventory of operational missiles associated with these numbers of launchers would of course be higher, and the cumulative production total higher still. We have little evidence on the relationships actually obtaining in the Soviet program. In general, however, we believe that the following assumptions are reasonable: (a) to achieve a high salvo capability, to simplify maintenance and logistics, and to have a modest reserve of missiles for possible subsequent use, the Soviet operational ICBM inventory would include some three missiles for each pair of operational launchers; (b) the operational ICBM inventory would also include missiles allocated to operational units but not yet integrated into the complete weapon system at deployment sites, in a pipeline equivalent to about two months' production; (c) the cumulative total of production missiles would be about 50 percent larger than that required for the foregoing operational purposes, with the remaining production missiles allocated to such purposes as R&D, training, static testing, space program, etc. [Footnote in the source text.]

67. Soviet planning for this period probably anticipates the attainment in about 1963 or after of a new ICBM system which will permit greater flexibility and less vulnerability in deployment. Deployment of the present system will probably taper off and then cease as a buildup with the new system begins. Some launchers for the new ICBM system may be operational in mid-1963, and 100 or more may be operational a year later. If so, deployment rates for the present system would almost certainly have begun to phase down before 1963. We therefore consider that 200-400 operational launchers remains the best present estimate of the Soviet force in mid-1964.

68. The deployment program for this period may be significantly affected by such developments as US acquisition of numerous hardened and mobile missiles and other improved capabilities, and by Soviet development of antimissile defenses. Soviet ICBM force goals for 1965-1966 could be enlarged considerably over the 1964 level in view of these anticipated developments. On the other hand, these anticipated changes on the attack-defense relationship may appear to the Soviet leaders to warrant no increase in force goals or, more likely, only a moderate increase. We are unable to predict what the Soviet judgment will be regarding the interplay of these military factors, and there is a good chance that the Soviet leaders themselves have not yet come to a definite decision.

Position on the ICBM Program of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

69. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, does not concur in this estimate. He believes (a) that NIE 11-8-61 should include an estimate of the largest ICBM force which the USSR could have in mid-1961 and that such a force could be as large as 200 operational launchers, and (b) that the probable Soviet force level in mid-1961 is in the range of 75-125 operational launchers and will increase to 150-300 in mid-1962 and 200-450 in mid-1963.

70. Possible force levels. In his opinion, an NIE on Soviet long range attack capabilities should provide policymakers with an estimate of the largest ICBM force which the USSR could have deployed to date, based on an IOC of 1 January 1960 and assuming a vigorous deployment program. He regards such an estimate of the possible mid-1961 force level as just as important as the estimate of the probable current force level. Indeed, by making no explicit judgment about the possible current force level, the Estimate renders a disservice to the policymaker by encouraging him to consider only force levels within the probable range and, at the same time, advising him (paragraph 42) that "the USSR has a greater capacity to produce and deploy ICBMs than we believe it has exercised." The policymaker would not know, on the basis of the NIE, whether he can exclude all force levels for mid-1961 beyond those slightly above the probable range or whether he cannot exclude a force level substantially higher than the probable range. Yet it is precisely this possible Soviet ICBM strength which he needs to take into account in making decisions bearing directly on US national security.

71. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, realizes that an estimate of possible Soviet strength in any weapon system is less essential when there is sufficient evidence to narrow the range of our quantitative judgments. However, in the case of the ICBM, the available evidence is not sufficient to establish current Soviet strength within reasonably narrow limits. The NIE discussion and annexes acknowledge that the evidence relating to ICBM deployment can be interpreted in a variety of ways, that there are many uncertainties in the analyses of such factors as Soviet force goals and programming decisions, and that vast areas of the USSR are not covered or only poorly covered by US collection efforts. Under such circumstances, it is essential to estimate the highest force level that can be reconciled with the evidence and thereby indicate the range of possibilities which cannot be excluded.

72. The view of the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, is that the USSR could have as many as 200 operational launchers in mid-1961. He emphasizes that an ICBM force of this size is definitely less likely than one half as large, but he believes that the chances are sufficiently good to include this estimate of possible current strength in an NIE on Soviet long range attack capabilities. By the same token, he would exclude mid-1961 force levels exceeding 200 operational launchers. He bases his estimate on the following considerations:

a. The available evidence on the Soviet ICBM development program can be interpreted to allow for a steady buildup of operational sites concurrent with ICBM testing activities. While the inferred tempo of the Soviet program suggests that the probable size of the mid-1961 ICBM force is substantially less than 200 operational launchers, it does not preclude a possible force level of about 200 launchers.

b. Missile production is not a limiting factor. Site activation rates in excess of 100 launchers per year are within Soviet technical and economic capabilities. In order to have 200 operational launchers by mid-1961, it is not necessary to begin construction of operational sites for the 5,000 n.m. missile before late 1957 or construction of sites with more simplified launch pads before early 1960. Moreover, construction times need not be shorter than 18-24 months and site activation rates in excess of 100 launchers per year do not have to be achieved in less than the time allowed for the initial buildup period. In short, a deployment program resulting in 200 operational launchers in mid-1961 can be carried out within the limits set by the factors judged to be most critical.

c. Because of the limitations of our intelligence coverage, together with the high degree of Soviet security, substantial ICBM deployment could have occurred without being detected by US collection efforts. In any case, the chances of detecting Soviet deployment activity depend on the number of sites under construction or completed. There is sufficient uncertainty in the number of launchers per site to allow for a considerable increase in aggregate ICBM strength without a corresponding increase in the number of sites.

d. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that construction of the first operational sites began before initiation of test firing or that high rates of site activation were achieved early in the deployment program. A rate of site construction in excess of that required to reach a force level of about 200 launchers in mid-1961 probably would have created severe organizational problems and possibly would have strained Soviet resources. Consequently, an ICBM force of about 200 operational launchers is believed to be the maximum practicable level which the USSR could have achieved by mid-1961.

73. During the next year or so the USSR could increase its ICBM force much more rapidly than in the past, since more simplified launch pads would be constructed at new sites. With several years experience behind them, the Soviets could achieve an activation rate of about 200 launchers per year by early 1962 and an operational force of roughly 400 ICBMs might be deployed by mid-1962. Thereafter deployment could be accelerated if Soviet planners decide on a high ICBM force goal.

74. Probable force levels. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the probable size of the current Soviet ICBM force is in the 75-125 range and that this force is likely to be 150-300 operational launchers in mid-1962 and 200-450 in mid-1963. The higher figures for current strength reflect his judgment that the pace of the Soviet ICBM program is in fact more rapid than the NIE implies; the higher figures for future strength are based on his judgment that a site activation rate of 150-175 launchers per year should be used in projecting the upper limit of the probable program. Underlying both judgments is his estimate that Soviet leaders seek to acquire a force of several hundred operational ICBM launchers before the US has a large number of hardened sites and mobile long range missiles. The Soviet deployment program, consequently, is likely to be pursued at a fairly rapid pace in the next year or two.

75. It is recognized that the additional ICBMs estimated for mid-1961 would not materially increase current Soviet long range attack capabilities. However, a force of about 300 ICBMs around mid-1962 would enable the USSR to bring all SAC operational air bases and soft ICBM sites under attack by missiles alone or, alternatively, to have moderate assurance of inflicting severe damage to command-control centers, air defense bases, and missile-launching submarine bases, as well as SAC operational installations. This capability would be achieved approximately one year sooner than is possible with the maximum ICBM force as estimated in the NIE text. In particular, it would be achieved before the number of hard ICBM sites planned by the US begins to increase sharply.

76. Whether deployment thereafter will continue at a rapid rate or level off depends on such factors as Soviet success in developing a new ICBM system and antimissile defenses, their assessment of US retaliatory capabilities in the post-1963 period, and the extent to which Soviet leaders become convinced that very high ICBM force goals are necessary or desirable. If Soviet leaders decide to build toward an effective ICBM capability against large numbers of US missiles in hardened sites or to achieve a substantial ICBM retaliatory capability by the middle of the decade, then the Soviet deployment program would be accelerated. However, there is at least an equal chance that ICBM deployment will taper off sometime in 1963 since Soviet planners might consider it more advantageous to accelerate their antimissile defense program. In that case, an ICBM force of 300-500 operational launchers would be maintained in the 1964-1966 period.

Position on the ICBM Program of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy

77. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, have entered several specific footnotes in the body of this estimate expressing their differing opinion. The basis for these footnotes, and the only fundamental difference with judgments in the estimate, is their estimate of current force levels of Soviet operational ICBM launchers. A basic difference affecting current force levels is their judgment concerning the date when the Soviets first achieved an operational capability with deployed ICBMs. They do not believe that this occurred in January of 1960. The following factors, well supported by evidence, weigh heavily in their judgment against the Soviets having attained or even sought a deployed operational capability by that time with their existing ICBM:

a. The size of the existing Soviet ICBM (450,000-500,000 pounds and about twice the size of Atlas), the difficulties involved in the use of nonstorable liquid fuel, and heavy dependence on a rail network are factors which combine to make launcher construction a major undertaking which they believe would have been detected by US Intelligence if any substantial program had been undertaken.

b. Despite large and representative collections of evidence, our intensive search has failed to identify even probable operational ICBM site-complexes.

c. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

d. It has been characteristic of other Soviet missile programs that prototype or trial launch sites were constructed at the test range before or, at the latest, concurrently with the construction of an operational facility. Indications of construction of such a prototype site for the ICBM did not appear at the test range until 1960 and it was probably not completed until late 1960 or early 1961.

e. Recent test firings of ICBMs, in which reliability has dropped sharply [1 line of source text not declassified], suggest the introduction of redesigned system components, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] inexperienced personnel, or both.

f. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified], analysis of which indicates that the Soviets did not have a large scale deployment effort under way before mid-1960. Considering 18 months construction time, this would indicate no large operational capability prior to late 1961. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

g. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

78. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believe that the appearance of the probable prototype launching site, the increased pace of firings, and the recent changes in telemetry support the view that the Soviets may now be about to deploy some ICBMs of the existing cumbersome type and clearly strengthen their judgment that the Soviets did not have a deployed ICBM capability by 1 January 1960. This judgment, in turn, influences their view of the possibility of ICBM deployment in the inhospitable northwest portion of the USSR. While information is not yet firm enough to rule out the possibility of ICBM deployment at Plesetsk and Polyarnyy Ural, as well as at two other locations, they believe it unlikely that sites of ICBMs of the type described above were constructed in those areas in the time period 1957-1959, which would have required site design and decision to deploy prior to the first Soviet firing of an ICBM.

79. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believe that the evidence available on the Soviet ICBM development program is sufficiently complete and valid to support the conclusion that little, if any, ICBM deployment has occurred, and that the near absence of evidence of deployment strengthens that conclusion.

80. On the basis of all the evidence and the reasoning outlined above, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, estimate "a few" operational Soviet ICBM launchers for mid-1961. Although they do not consider the evidence sufficient to project a precise estimate of the Soviet planning for future ICBM strength, they accept the reasoning in the text as a generally valid measure of the scale and pace of a build-up. Therefore, on the basis of making a prudent and reasonable projection of Soviet deployed ICBM launcher strength they estimate as follows:

                                                   Mid-1962…………………………..50-100

Mid-1963………………………….100-200

Mid-1964………………………….150-300

Position on the ICBM Program of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF

81. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur with the judgments reached herein on the nature of the current and future Soviet force goals or the strategic considerations which determine their magnitude. In his view the estimate of current force levels does not accurately represent the scope of deployment indicated by the nature and quality of the evidence thus far accumulated, but reflects instead the impact of the extreme security measures which have obscured the broad scope of the Soviet ICBM program from its inception. In addition, he believes that proper allowance has not been made in the estimate for the lack of intelligence coverage of the many areas in the USSR in which ICBM deployment may have been carried out.

82. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the Soviet determination to achieve world domination has fostered recognition of the fact that the ultimate elimination of the US, as the chief obstacle to the achievement of their objective, cannot be accomplished without a clear preponderance of military capability. Moreover, Soviet doctrine and deeds suggest to him that the Soviet hierarchy are mindful of the fact that few, if any, lasting major political victories in history have been achieved without the supporting bulwark of superior military power.

83. The history of their ballistic missile program testifies to an early recognition by the Soviets of the unprecedented potential offered by such weapons and reflects their determination to exploit the potential by making ballistic missiles the dominant system in their strategic strike force. Their highly successful ICBM testing record reflects the qualitative achievement of their well-planned, well-organized program which would facilitate the realization of predetermined force goals of any reasonable magnitude. Soviet efforts to mask their program in secrecy indicate the importance which they attach to their growing missile capability. Moreover, evidence developed in spite of their security measures reveals programming for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] deployment concurrent with the testing phase of their program. This concurrency is a further indication of Soviet determination to maximize their operational capability at the earliest practicable time. In this connection, the evidence on deployment is consistent with the estimate that the Soviets achieved their initial operational capability by 1 January 1960, and in the intervening period of a year and a half, to mid-1961, brought to operational readiness at least 120 and possibly an ever greater number of operational ICBM launchers.

84. Considering the emphasis which the Soviets place on secrecy, and the absence of other than partial intelligence coverage on most of the areas most suitable for ICBM deployment, we could not expect to identify more than a small portion of the Soviet ICBM deployment program. Nevertheless the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, has identified at least six areas on which there is reasonably good evidence of ICBM deployment. Within these areas he believes there are between 10 and 15 operational ICBM site-complexes. Further, he has about 20 additional areas under active consideration on which evidence indicates the possibility of ICBM launch site construction. Considering the economics of logistic support and specialized maintenance and control problems, the siting of several site complexes in a deployment area is highly probable and should be expected. Therefore, deployment--whether actual or planned--represented by the 20 additional areas--reflects the existence of a program of considerable magnitude. Even though identification of some of the suspect areas should later prove erroneous, undoubtedly others will be identified to replace them as the delay in intelligence reporting catches up with the actual situation.

85. In view of the above, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates the operational ICBM launcher availability as follows:

Mid-1961………………………….at least 120

Mid-1962……………………………………300

Mid-1963……………………………………550

Mid-1964……………………………………850

Mid-1965…………………………………1,150

Mid-1966…………………………………1,450

[Here follows 5 pages of charts and maps.]

Washington, June 16, 1961.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3001 (14 Apr 61) Pt. 1, Sec 3. Top Secret.

Dear Henry:

/2/This May 19 draft is the enclosure to Rowen's memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, dated May 22. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Carl Kaysen Series, BNSP 1/61-5/61)

I will be glad to answer any questions, or discuss the comments with you at your convenience.

Cordially yours,

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

/4/Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Draft of Proposed "Military and Related Aspects of Basic National Security Policy"

1. The fourteen sections of the document (labeled A-N in the longer explanatory part) appear to fall into two quite different parts. Sections E, F, H, and N (corresponding to pages 4-6, 6-12, 14-22, and 30, respectively, of the shorter document) contain a basic revision of military policy and doctrine for both general and local war. Their substantive content deals with problems that are primarily military in content and that fall within the operating responsibility of the Defense Department. The other sections deal with a wide variety of problems ranging from a statement of basic national objectives to alliances and civil defense to arms reduction. These problems are less narrowly military, and they involve the operating responsibilities of the State Department and in some cases other Departments, as well as those of the Defense Department. Further, the statement of a new national policy with respect to many of them involves the resolution of political problems which are not explicitly faced in the present draft.

For these reasons, and also because of the importance we attach to restating our military doctrine as soon as feasible, we suggest that the scope of the document be substantially narrowed to encompass just those issues dealt with in the central paragraphs listed above. When so narrowed, it could take the form of an amendment of the present BNSP, which would be followed by other amendments as soon as possible.

2. The new views on central war contain two important components. The first is the proposition that our initial recognition of the outbreak of central war should not result in a spasm in which we fire off everything we can in the way of strategic weapons. Rather, we should substitute a doctrine of controlled response, which emphasizes the maintenance of some reserve strategic nuclear striking capacity, and which has as its goal the limitation of damage and the avoidance of a situation in which we are inferior in military strength after the first exchange. For the single goal of "prevailing" in central war, the new doctrine substitutes a spectrum of possible goals running from superiority to stalemate, the appropriate one of which is to be sought in the light of the situation at the time.

We agree on the importance of this change, and the associated changes in the mechanism of command and control which are necessary to put it into practice.

/5/The most explicit reference to counterforce in the draft paper reads: "Offensive countermilitary attack capabilities, active defenses and passive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance systems, should be able to reduce enemy residual military capability at least to levels that will avoid the strategic inferiority of U.S. residual forces, and if consistent with other U.S. wartime objectives, give the U.S. a strategic superiority."

4. The draft proposes that, in local war, we place main, but not sole reliance on non-nuclear weapons. With this we are in hearty agreement. But there are two aspects of this proposition that are unclear. First, the present transition point from conventional to nuclear response--namely, any war involving more than 300-350 thousand troops--is accepted without discussion. We think this point deserves explicit explanation, including the consideration of how desirable it would be to have a larger conventional capability in order to make possible a higher transition point. Similarly, a more explicit treatment of the feasibility of local nuclear war is desirable. At least the alternative of mobilizing more non-nuclear forces might be brought in.

At present, the draft makes no explicit geographic references in its discussion of local war. It would be better to make explicit that it does not deal with the NATO area, and refer to the recent NSC paper on this subject.

/6/Other commentaries on the May 19 ISA draft BNSP include those of the JCS and Secretary Rusk. In memorandum JCSM-397-61 to the Secretary of Defense, June 12, the JCS reserved comment on general and local war strategy, but maintained that the draft gave the impression that "our security policy contemplates two entirely separate and distinct sets of forces" for limited and general war, that a precise distinction could not be made between local and general war, and that national security policy should be able to deal with China and the Soviet Union as separate entities as well as a common threat. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3001 (14 April 1961), Sec. 2)

For Rusk's comments, see Document 35.

Washington, June 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Organization and Administration 5/6/61-7/25/61. No classification marking. There is no drafting information on the source text.

CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND NSC FOR DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL MATTERS

The President's staff is at present about two-thirds of the way toward a sound and durable organization for his work in international affairs. Since January a number of steps have been taken, and in the same period the President's concept of what he wants has developed somewhat. There is still unfinished business.

The rules of this operation, as we see them, are four:

First: The President's staff must not attempt to replace the President's chief constitutional and statutory advisers.

Second: The President's staff is to serve as an extension of himself--as his eyes and ears and his source of nondepartmental comment. The President's staff is his own instrument. It is not--though this is a hard rule--a place for men trying to peddle their own remedies without Presidential backing.

Third: The President's staff must see to it that all great issues are adequately controlled and coordinated. This does not mean that control and coordination should necessarily be managed through this staff, but rather that when there is weakness the White House group must spot it early and stimulate remedial action--either through efforts with those directly responsible or by reference up the line, to the President if necessary.

/2/Not found attached.

The staff near the President, as it stood in January, 1961, was a complex affair. General Eisenhower had within the White House staff six men with distinct and significant responsibilities in foreign affairs: Gray, Goodpaster, Harr, Kistiakowsky, Randall and Persons. But across the street in the NSC he had a multitude: the NSC staff and the staff of OCB.

President Kennedy has changed all that. He abolished the OCB; his men have cut back the NSC staff. On the other hand, he has used for specific foreign problems several of his immediate White House staff. He has not wished to give clear authority to any one of these men over another, preferring to retain the right of direct communication and command with such men as Schlesinger, Dungan, Goodwin, Sorensen, Feldman, and Clifton--in addition to Bundy and Rostow, who hold formal appointments in this area, and McCloy, McGovern, Berle, and Acheson, each of whom has some special relation to the White House. There is also the Vice President, a highly valuable agent, but obviously one with direct access; and members of the Administration who are particularly close to the President, by blood or friendship, have channels of their own.

First, though the President works through many people and talks to still more, he retains an acute sense of "operational" communication; thus he seldom gives an assignment to an inappropriate receiver; he expects his staff to get his ideas into sensible channels; he counts on his people to keep in close touch with each other, and in general they do. His own plain sense of the matter is that the White House must be the center of both final authority and initiatives, but that the great roles of the State and Defense Secretaries must never be undermined. It is within these standards that his agents work.

Second, after some months of effort and much resistance in all agencies, the White House now has sure and rapid access to all important messages, and they all come in to one place (or nearly all--end-running is endemic). This puts Mr. Kennedy and his people where none of his predecessors have been. It is the cable and despatch traffic, above and beyond anything else, that gives the immediate flavor of the daily world and shows the President and his people where to look further and where to intervene.

Third, although many men have direct access to the President, they have learned, in very large measure, to keep in close touch with one another, and to see to it that their work is coordinated. The White House very rarely speaks with two voices, and there is good communication from the President's men to one another. In part this is the result of informal communication, and in part is the result of a regular staff meeting now held each morning under Bundy. Those who attend with regularity are: Bundy, Rostow, Dungan, Schlesinger, Clifton, Smith, Kaysen, Komer, C. Johnson, R. Johnson, Belk, Hanson and Shepard.

This staff meeting is an informal affair, because no one has formal authority, but it keeps us all informed of what the President wants and what the day's situation is. In particular, this meeting allows for prompt report on any trouble or opportunity in any task force, for the staff is represented on all operating forces.

/3/Not found attached.

Fifth, the White House-NSC group has gradually encouraged the growth of responsible self-reliance in the Departments, and especially in the Department of State. The first stimulus has come from the President: his personal decision formed the post-invasion Cuban task force under Paul Nitze, and his approval has been responsible for all other action. But the incentive for special task forces on South Viet-nam, Korea and Iran came from the staff, and the process of follow-up has drawn deeply on the energies of the staff. Quietly, but persistently, White House men have pressed for activity and energy. This is true also for NATO. But the State Department has been encouraged, not trodden on, and its internal energy, with critical exceptions, is growing.

The White House-NSC group has thus effectively accepted the concept of Departmental responsibility with which the Administration began. Criticism of the sort lately leveled at White House men for work in Latin America is wildly beside the point; the President's men have sometimes filled vacuums as best they could, but they have never tried to take over the work of men who showed energy and ability of their own. The exact opposite is the case.

Finally, the White House-NSC group represents a high level of ability. No comparable dozen men, I believe, meets regularly anywhere in Washington, and no executive in Washington has a more wholly loyal group of agents than the President in these men.

Much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. The staff is much closer to the State Department than it is to Defense, and what it knows of CIA is limited to a handful of top officials. There is a clear need in the White House for a senior military adviser, and in one way or another the world of intelligence needs closer connection to the President. In part, this is a matter of increased direct contact; in part, it is a matter of reinforced staff, and somewhat thickened procedures.

Timing and rules of procedure for the NSC itself need some improvement. The NSC should probably meet more regularly--though not more often--and at fixed times. Against its schedules there should be a more clearly defined pattern of preparation for new policy papers, and reporting on existing crisis areas. Against a fixed pattern of NSC meetings, much could be ordered that is now somewhat haphazard. This would require a Presidential acceptance of routine that might be dull. But meetings that are called suddenly, or suddenly called off, make staff work hard.

The staff labors under some handicaps in being half-in and half-out of the White House. This is not easy to change without changing the statutes, but it would probably help if all staff members could have courtesy access to such immediate conveniences as White House transport and membership in the White House mess.

The mechanism of interdepartmental coordination should be carefully, but sparingly, increased. The experience of the OCB shows how dangerous this sort of thing can be, but in the first few months we have probably gone too far the other way. In this instance, I believe that the administrative responsibility should rest with the White House, and I am proposing a revision of certain weekly meetings to ensure that somewhat more formal processes are followed. But it should be clearly understood that in my own judgment such a modest revision should in no sense replace the department as the agency of daily action, and the task force, with a specified Chairman, as the instrument of interdepartmental performance in a time of crisis.

/4/On September 4, McGeorge Bundy described the new administration's changes in and operation of the National Security Council in a letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. For text, see Jackson, ed., National Security Council, pp. 275-279. In another letter to Jackson dated January 28, 1965, Bundy stated: "In almost every particular, the principles and procedures set forth in the [September 4,] 1961 letter have governed the work of the Council under both President Kennedy and President Johnson." (Ibid., pp. 279-280)