Docs 274-299
SNIE 87.2-62
Washington, April 11, 1962.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret; Noforn. A note on the title page indicates the SNIE was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.
THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN BRITISH GUIANA
The Problem
To estimate the short-term outlook for British Guiana, with particular reference to the political orientation of Jagan and his party, the likely outcome if new elections were to be held, and the nature of possible alternatives to the Jagan government.
Conclusions
1. Racial conflict is likely to continue to be the basic factor in the political situation in British Guiana. The two major political parties represent the nearly equal East Indian and Negro communities and party rivalry has increasingly taken on a racial character. The British, who have exercised a stabilizing influence, will almost certainly withdraw and grant independence not later than mid1963, since they apparently foresee strong adverse reactions with unpleasant international connotations if they try to extend the period of their authority in the colony. (Paras. 5, 13-14)
2. Premier Cheddi Jagan and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) represent the East Indians, who are more numerous than the Negroes and who have been consolidated politically by the February 1962 disturbances. Jagan and the PPP are likely to maintain control of the government, whether or not new elections are held. However, any one of a number of likely developments could precipitate another period of violence. (Paras. 5, 11,15, 18)
3. The PPP leadership has a clear record of Communist association and of Communist-line policies, but the evidence does not show whether or to what extent they are under international Communist control. We believe, however, that Jagan is a Communist, though the degree of Moscow's control is not yet clear. A Jagan government in the post-independence period would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in international affairs, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction. Its associations with East and West would be highly opportunistic and strongly influenced by its interest in obtaining aid for British Guiana. Its domestic program would be radically socialist and reformist. (Paras. 6-7, 19)
4. The People's National Congress (PNC), led by L. Forbes Burnham, is supported by a large proportion of the Negro population but by almost no one else. A PNC majority in the legislature, even with the support of the small United Force Party (UF), is unlikely under presently foreseeable circumstances. If the PNC were to come to power its policies would probably be leftist and neutralist, though somewhat less radical and proBloc than those of the PPP. (Paras. 8-9, 15)
Discussion
I. Background
5. For over a decade political life in British Guiana has been marked by the racial split between East Indians, who make up about half of the population, and Negroes, who account for a somewhat smaller proportion. The most powerful political force has been the People's Progressive Party (PPP), led by the government's East Indian Premier, Cheddi Jagan. The PPP derives its strength mainly from East Indians, most of whom live in the countryside, but also has found some support among the Negroes. In the August 1961 election, the PPP won about 43 percent of the popular vote, thereby gaining a 20-15 majority in the legislature./2/ Since the elections it has demonstrated considerable political ineptitude and has failed to make headway against the enormous economic difficulties of the colony.
/2/The election in one constituency was set aside by court decision as a result of irregularity and the PPP majority is now 19-15. [Footnote in the source text.]
[2 paragraphs (1 column of a 2column format) of source text not declassified]
8. The principal opposition party is the People's National Congress (PNC) of L. Forbes Burnham, a Negro who is a radical reformer and who until 1954 was one of Jagan's lieutenants in the PPP and an advocate of extremist measures in government. The PNC is supported by most of the colony's Negro population in the cities (including most government employees) and in the bauxite mining areas. Outside Negro ranks it has virtually no following, and among many middle class Negroes its support is not firm. In the 1961 election it polled 41 percent of the vote and won 11 seats in the legislature. PNC policy has been largely that of opposing the PPP. What we can say of PNC policy if it were to form a government must be based largely on Burnham's statements and on the content of his party newspaper. The PNC in office would probably feature a more moderate policy of domestic socialism than the PPP. Likewise, in the foreign field it would also be neutralist but somewhat less proBloc than the PPP. [4-1/2 lines of 2-column format source text not declassified]
9. An additional opposition party is the United Force (UF), which seeks to be multiracial. It is based largely on the small commercial class (including the Portuguese minority) which fears that Jagan would transform the country into a Communist state after independence. It won four seats in the 1961 election. Had the UF not run, the PNC might have won some of these seats but probably not all. In any case it would not have gained a majority.
II. February Riots
10. A tremendous increase in the racial tension in British Guiana and in the potential for conflict came as a result of a week of strikes and riots which shook the capital city of Georgetown in midFebruary 1962. The immediate cause of the strikes was Premier Jagan's budget bill, but the riots were also rooted in the longstanding racial antagonism and in the dissatisfaction of many urban groups, notably public service employees and businessmen, with the policies of the PPP government. As the disturbances spread, they took on the character of a struggle between the Negro urban community and the East Indian Government and its rural supporters.
11. Paradoxically, the February crisis strengthened Jagan by consolidating the support of his East Indian followers. At the same time, it reduced his stature and tarnished his prestige as a national leader. His economic and financial problems are more acute now than before the riots. His government is hard pressed to meet current expenditures. Whereas before the riots almost 20 percent of the labor force was out of work, an even larger number are now unemployed as a result of the destruction in Georgetown. Jagan's plans for economic development have been set back, partly because he has been forced to trim his tax measures and partly because uncertainties about his country's political stability are inhibiting the flow of outside public assistance, on which development is heavily dependent. The February events have discouraged foreign investment./3/ Extensive capital flight is in progress and foreign investors are doing no more than attending to existing operations. A good many city merchants, East Indians among them, are inclined to cut and run rather than to stay and rebuild.
/3/British foreign investment in Guiana amounts to between $400 and $500 million and is mainly in sugar production. Canadian investment (about $80 million) and US investment (about $30 million) is mainly in bauxite and sugar. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. On the other hand, the crisis also left the opposition with reduced prestige. Its several leaders acted recklessly and in the end tended to neutralize each other. Those unions which are predominantly Negro actively collaborated with the opposition parties, but the rank and file of the largest single union, chiefly East Indians, did not. There have been rumors of dissension in the PPP and reports that the opposition might try to win some of Jagan's legislators away from him, but sufficient defections to cause the legislative defeat of the Jagan government are not considered probable in the near future under existing circumstances.
III. Prospects
13. The British presence is a check on the violent political forces that seethe near the surface in British Guiana. British departure will be the prelude to a period of uncertainty and possibly of violence during which the country will be establishing its international orientation. Nevertheless, the British appear determined to get out. They are not anxious to continue to put money into British Guiana, and they calculate that the present cost to them of $7 million a year would be increased to $20 million per annum if they reimposed direct government. They assert in private that British Guiana is in the US, not the UK, sphere of interest and they probably consider that its future is not properly their problem, but one for the US. At the same time, London is less inclined than is the US to believe that communism will achieve dominance in the colony. Finally, it fears that to delay independence very long would arouse indignation in many parts of the world where colonialism is a sensitive issue.
14. The British may see fit to hold on for a time by postponing the May 1962 conference, which was to have discussed plans and timing of independence. Even if the conference is held on schedule, independence may be deferred. Jagan has agreed to an investigation of the recent riots by a Commonwealth commission, but the scope of the inquiry is such that it is not likely to necessitate much delay. Independence might also be delayed by the failure of Jagan and opposition leaders to get together on a new constitution. A vote of no-confidence in the government could also hold up proceedings, but we believe that Jagan will move cautiously on matters of domestic policy to assure control of his majority in the legislature. In any circumstance, however, we do not anticipate that the British will delay much beyond the end of 1962.
15. For any of the above reasons, the UK may find it desirable to hold new elections. New elections held on the same basis as were those in August 1961--with the same parties and same electoral system--would probably return a Jagan government again, even in the face of a PNC-UF electoral coalition. The PNC is urging a proportional representation system, under which it believes it could turn the PPP out, but the latter is unlikely to accept any form of proportional representation that would seriously prejudice its electoral chances.
16. After independence Jagan [3 lines of 2-column format source text not declassified] will probably seek to move toward consolidation of his control over the country. [2-1/2 lines of 2-column format source text not declassified]
17. Nevertheless, Jagan will be under some restraints not to ride roughshod over the wishes of the public--Negro as well as East Indian. The size and potential strength of the Negro community were well demonstrated by the February riots, and Jagan will fear to bring the Negroes into the streets against him again. He is also aware that the rank and file of his party--and indeed the East Indian community as a whole--is not Communist and may react against unpalatable Communist or socialist measures. Furthermore, he has the problem of developing and controlling a security force./4/ He has apparently been considering a largely East Indian security force of some kind, but must be aware of the dangers implicit in such a move, especially since the existing police force is principally made up of Negroes. Jagan's [less than 1 line of 2-column format source text not declassified] enthusiasm for his own reform programs and the temptation to work through and for the East Indian community may be moderated by the realization that, if the country is to be held together, important concessions must be made to the Negroes. [2 lines of 2-column format source text not declassified]
/4/In addition to the 1,500man local police, the security forces in the colony now include a Volunteer Guard of about 500, some 200 British troops normally stationed near Georgetown, and about 600 of those brought in at the time of the disorders. Jagan has threatened to recruit his own police or to create a national army and in response the British are proposing to enlarge the local police by 500. [Footnote in the source text.]
18. We do not believe that we can project our estimate very far beyond the period of independence. Jagan will almost certainly maintain his predominant position in the PPP, and can probably prevent an opposition government from taking over. However, any one of a number of likely developments could precipitate another period of disturbances like that of last February. We see no prospect for a coalition of moderates of both parties and both races.
19. We believe a Jagan government in the post-independence period would be likely to identify itself--as it has in the past--with anti-colonialist and independence movements. It would probably follow a policy of nonalignment and seek to benefit from relations with both the West and the Communist countries, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction. For some time Jagan has been seeking trade and aid from the West and he has expressed interest in joining the Organization of American States and in participating in the Alliance for Progress. He has also been seeking trade and aid from the Bloc. He has just signed a trade contract with East Germany and other deals with Bloc countries are likely to follow.
275. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy
Washington, April 27, 1962.
[Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., British Guiana. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, June 7, 1962, 5:48 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Top Secret; Verbatim Text. Drafted and approved by Burdett.
6512. Eyes only Ambassador Bruce. Following is text of letter to President from Macmillan dated May 30:
Dear Friend: When we met in Washington last month we did not find time for any full discussion of the problems of Colonial policy. I am however conscious that Colonial problems can be so presented as to weaken the Western position generally, both at the United Nations and with neutral opinion elsewhere. In the course of our discussion you referred briefly to this, and said you were thinking of taking steps to secure closer coordination on this question between the various agencies of your Government, both in Washington and in New York. You also said that you would be glad to have fuller information on some of our own Colonial problems. I agree that there is room here for closer consultation between our two Governments; and, if you should decide to establish a single focus of coordination for this in Washington, we should be very glad to feed into it fuller information on our own Colonial problems and our views on the Colonial problems of our Allies. On these questions it seems best that Anglo-American consultation should be centered in Washington; and, if you would care to tell our Ambassador what arrangements you have in mind for this purpose, I will see that he is kept fully supplied with the necessary information and views from this end.
Meanwhile, there is the rather separate question of British Guiana on which, at your suggestion, representatives of the State Department had some talk with the official advisers who accompanied me to Washington. The suggestions then made on behalf of the State Department were partly general and partly particular. Their general request was that we should keep you more fully informed of the probable course of political and constitutional developments in British Guiana. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
Since my return to London I have considered these requests in consultation with the Ministers concerned. We all recognise that developments in British Guiana--and, for that matter, in British Honduras--are of special concern to the United States Government. When these territories become independent, as they must before very long, they may well be of more direct concern to you than to us. We hope that you will continue to interest yourself in their future: indeed, in the case of British Guiana, we have been pressing you to contribute towards the cost of economic development. In these circumstances we fully agree that, in these last stages of their advance to independence, you should have full opportunity of expressing your views on the shaping of their future.
We are therefore ready to make special arrangements for consultation with you on the affairs of British Guiana and British Honduras. In this case, as we shall be going into greater detail, I think it would be better that the consultations should be held in London. I envisage a series of informal meetings which, though held at the Foreign Office, would include representatives of the Colonial Office, and also, when necessary, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] other Departments concerned. If you agree that this would be helpful, perhaps you will arrange for your Ambassador here to nominate the representatives who would regularly attend these meetings. I know you will feel, as I do, that we ought to keep these meetings secret.
[1 paragraph (16-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Finally, you may like to have an indication of our latest thinking on the course of constitutional development in British Guiana. Previously, we had been thinking in terms of an Independence Conference in May, to be followed by independence within a few months. We have now decided to postpone the Conference until July, and we intend to try to persuade the leaders of the political Parties to agree that elections should be held before the territory becomes independent. This will give us a little more time and also, perhaps, a further opportunity to establish whether, under a democratic system, there is any alternative to Dr. Jagan's Government. If, however, it becomes clear, by a further expression of electoral opinion, that Dr. Jagan's Party is the choice of the people, I hope we shall be able to persuade you that the best line for both our Governments to follow is to do our best to keep that Government on the side of the West by cooperating fully with it and giving it the economic support which it requires."
Rusk
277. Memorandum for the Special Group
Washington, June 13, 1962.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, British Guiana, Aug. 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]
278. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, June 21, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., British Guiana. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
I attach a collection of papers from the State Department./2/ They include [3 lines of source text not declassified] and (c) a report from Harry Hoffmann on the British Guiana political situation.
/2/None printed.
[3 paragraphs (181/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
At the same time, the Secretary recommends that we go ahead with the economic studies proposed by the Hoffman-Mayne mission on the ground that action on the economic aid front will indicate good will, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and lay the groundwork for a development program when we have a friendly government.
I agree that the evidence shows increasingly that Jagan's heart is with the Communist world. He is quite plainly a Marxist nationalist, who sees the west in terms of the old stereotypes of capitalism and imperialism and who is deeply persuaded of the superiority of Communist methods and values. There is no convincing evidence that he is a disciplined member of the Communist party, but then neither is Castro. [8 lines of source text not declassified]
The alternative to Jagan is Forbes Burnham. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Burnham, moreover, as an African, is the representative of the ethnic group deemed by its low birth rate to minority status in British Guiana. On the other hand, Burnham is regarded more favorably by the AFL-CIO people who have had British Guiana contacts and by some people in the British Labour Party (among them Gaitskell). He made a generally good impression in his visit to Washington.
All alternatives in British Guiana are terrible; but I have little doubt that an independent British Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham will commit himself to a multiracial policy) would cause us many fewer problems than an independent British Guiana under Jagan.
[4 paragraphs (25-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
On a three-day trip to the Berbice and Corentyne last week, I found considerable unrest and suspicion--even fear--of Jagan's leanings among middleclass East Indians, even in Jagan's home village of Port Mourant. They expressed respect and admiration for Raibut to the man they said in an election showdown the masses would flock to Jagan. Rai was described as too new on the political scene, compared with Jagan, and lacking in the mass appeal that belongs to Jagan, who could make political hay by characterizing Rai as a traitor to the cause. In the end, they said, the East Indians would vote race--and Jagan would get the votes of even many of the doubtful ones as the East Indian most likely to win.
This situation would be changed, of course, if there were a uniting of the Burnham and D'Aguiar forces behind Rai. But, so far, Burnham is so impressed by his own importance and self-analysis of popularity that this is not likely to happen. He is convinced in his own mind that his PNC would win any new election, and until such time as he can be persuaded otherwise the chances for any reasonable and effective unification are remote. Also, there is considerable feeling here, which I am inclined to share, that British Guiana would be worse off with Burnham than with Jagan.
[4 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]
Arthur Schlesinger, jr./3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, July 2, 1962, 5:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Confidential. Drafted by Burdett; cleared by Sweeney (BNA), Cleveland (IO), Tasca (AF), Furnas (S/S), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Stevenson.
10. Eyes only for Ambassador Bruce. Request you reply to portion of Macmillan's letter to President of May 30/2/ dealing with consultations on colonialism. At your discretion you may pass our views as given below to either Macmillan or Lord Home indicating they have approval of President:
/2/See Document 276.
1. We are happy to see from Macmillan's letter of May 30 to President that US and UK agree on desirability closest liaison on colonial problems. Generally speaking there are two somewhat overlapping aspects involved--detailed consideration of individual problems and exchange of views on broad policy issues. It might be helpful if you were to feed into your Washington Embassy fuller detailed information on individual problems. We would also welcome as much advance indication as feasible of the trend of your thinking on overall developments. We of course are glad to share our ideas with you. By this approach we could avoid misunderstandings arising from different assessments of factual situation and would be fully aware of each other's policy thinking and the reasons therefor even though we might be obliged to agree to disagree in specific instances.
2. On reflection we believe further formalization of methods of consultation is unnecessary. We are already in constant touch through our Embassies in London and Washington and US and UK Delegations to the UN. These consultations are supplemented periodically by high-level exchanges on broad policy issues. Governor Williams will be in London this month for general discussion of colonial policy and Mr. Cleveland for talks on UN aspects. This combination of day to day consultation supplemented by periodic high-level exchanges seems to us to offer most effective utilization of expert knowledge and senior policy level consideration. We would welcome, of course, your further views and any further suggestions you care to make.
3. Essential point in our opinion is that all concerned should know that President and Prime Minister firmly believe in value of close and continuing consultation.
Rusk
280. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 12, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
We have reassessed the probable orientation of an independent British Guiana under Cheddi Jagan's leadership and I attach for your consideration a paper describing the program we propose to follow (Enclosure 1)./2/
/2/None of the attachments is printed.
A Special National Intelligence Estimate dated April 11, 1962,/3/ concluded We believe . . . that Jagan is a Communist, though the degree of Moscow's control is not yet clear. A Jagan government in the post independence period would probably follow a policy of nonalignment in international affairs, but would probably lean in the Soviet direction." [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We have also been given by the FBI a report of the American Communist Party's intention to seek for Jagan economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc (Enclosure 3). Attached is a study we have prepared of contacts by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with communists, communist fronts and the communist bloc since September, 1961 (Enclosure 4). During cross examination before the Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry into the causes of the February riots Jagan admitted on June 22, 1962 that he was a communist. This admission came after much muddled explanation by Jagan as to what the term communism" meant and was qualified by his definition that communism was a system based on from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs". Further questioning on Jagan's political beliefs was cut short on June 26 by the British Chairman of the Commission with the ruling that it was useless to pursue the subject since it had already been established beyond peradventure" that Dr. Jagan was a communist.
/3/Document 274.
In the light of all the evidence which has now accumulated, I believe we are obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Cheddi Jagan will establish a Marxist" regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet Bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse effects in the foreign relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions within this country.
It is also my view that a policy of trying to work with Jagan, as urged by the British, will not pay off. Jagan is already too far committed emotionally and suspicious of our intentions.
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
I propose that we transfer the locale of the discussions with the U.K. on British Guiana to Washington and that I call in the British Ambassador and speak to him along the lines indicated in the attached paper. My thought in transferring the locale to Washington is to enable us to deal through a sympathetic British Ambassador with the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister rather than sending messages to our Embassy in London which in practice usually discusses British Guiana with the not so sympathetic Colonial Office. It is further helpful to us to talk in Washington because we have available here people with the most uptodate U.S. information on British Guiana and we would be able to provide nuances of our current thinking to the British Ambassador.
Recommendations
I recommend that you approve specifically the following:
[4 paragraphs (12 lines of source text) not declassified]
5. That you approve my talking with the British Ambassador along the lines of Section I of the attached paper and that we try to maintain Washington as the venue for any further discussions on British Guiana in the immediate future. This would constitute a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's letter to you of May 30/4/ (Enclosure 6).
Dean Rusk/5/
/4/See Document 276.
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
281. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 13, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, British Guiana, June 1-Aug. 15, 1962. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
Here is a paper from Dean Rusk which comes out hard for a policy of getting rid of Jagan./2/ It is a careful and thorough argument of one side. It has more energy than most State Department papers.
/2/Document 280.
These documents seem to me to demonstrate that Jagan will indeed go the way of Castro, if he is not prevented. He would be weaker than Castro, because he is even more inefficient, but he would also probably be more easily controlled from Moscow.
But while the papers make a clear case against supporting Jagan, or even trying to sustain peaceful coexistence with him, the case for the proposed tactics to be used in opposing him is not so clear. In particular, I think it is unproven that CIA knows how to manipulate an election in British Guiana without a backfire.
My immediate suggestion is that when you have read this, we should have a pretty searching meeting on the details of the tactical plans, in which you can cross-examine those who are really responsible for their development. I do not think the Secretary of State should go to the British Ambassador with the proposed talking paper until we are a little more sure of our own capabilities and intentions.
There is also a real question whether Dean Rusk is the man to talk with the British on this. The last time he told Home we could not put up with Jagan" the British simply dug in their heels. Since British support for an anti-Jagan policy would be the most powerful single force for its success, I think you may want to go all out with David yourself on this one.
McG. B.
282. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Special Assistant (Dungan)/1/
Washington, July 19, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, British Guiana, June 1-Aug. 15, 1962. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
I return herewith the BG dossier./2/ I agree with Mac's memorandum and with my earlier memorandum/3/ on the initial version of the plan (which I think you have). In short, I agree that there is no future in Jagan; and that the Burnham risk is less than the Jagan risk; but the CIA plan makes me nervous; [1 line of source text not declassified ]. I also share Mac's doubts as to whether the Secretary is the man to talk to Ormsby Gore on the subject.
/2/Not printed.
/3/Documents 281 and 278.
I would suggest that you bear down hard on two points:
1) Does CIA think that they can carry out a really covert operation--i.e., an operation which, whatever suspicions Jagan might have, will leave no visible traces which he can cite before the world, whether he wins or loses, as evidence of U.S. intervention?
2) If we lose, what then? The present suggestions are pretty bleak--especially when our chances of winning are probably less than 50-50.
Arthur Schlesinger, jr./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
283. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, July 20, 1962.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01258A, Box 6, 7/1/62-12/31/62. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
284. Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rewinkel on August 1; cleared by Burdett, Scott (INR), and Little (S/S); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. There is no indication on the source text that this telegram was sent, nor was an outgoing telegram found in Department of State files.
FYI. During weekend July 20 the President spoke along following lines to UK Ambassador Ormsby Gore in reply Macmillan's letter May 30/2/ re British Guiana:
/2/See Document 276. The President and Ormsby Gore met in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, July 21 and 22.
The President welcomed the PM's suggestion for special consultations about BG and suggested they be held in Washington. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Commenting that an independent BG under Jagan's leadership seriously disturbed him, President said US cannot afford to see another Communist regime established in this hemisphere. It is obvious Jagan is distrustful of US motives, that there is little chance of our obtaining his confidence and that it therefore seems unrealistic to hope now that BG could be kept on side of West by policy of cooperation. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Stating he was glad to know that UK envisages new elections in BG, the President said they would provide opportunity for government of different complexion to come into power through democratic processes. [8 lines of source text not declassified]
In conclusion the President told Ormsby Gore that in economic field we are going ahead with the additional detailed studies recommended by our survey mission recently returned from BG. He said our idea is to let people of BG know we are serious about helping them and to be that much further along with preliminary work by the time a new government comes into power in BG. End FYI.
285. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burdett)/1/
Washington, August 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Secret.
As I told you I would on the telephone, I spoke briefly with Lord Hood, at the President's instruction, to comment on the British response to the President's proposals on British Guiana. Lord Hood told me that he had not been informed of the response on this other channel. I told him its general nature and indicated the President's concern that a study of this sort might imply a long delay in reaching an agreed U.S./U.K. position. I told Lord Hood that from our point of view there was considerable urgency in this matter, and while much the best scheme would be to proceed in agreement with the U.K., we would be sorry to have action hampered by prolonged discussion back and forth. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Nevertheless, I said that the President had asked me to convey this point to Lord Hood for such onward communication to the Ambassador or to the Foreign Office as he might think useful.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
I am sending this memorandum only to you [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and will count on you to arrange for any essential limited distribution in your respective empires.
McGeorge Bundy/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
286. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/
Washington, August 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Secret.
The President has received the message conveyed in your memorandum of August 6th,/2/ and requests that the following reply be made through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:
/2/Not found.
The President has received the message [1 line of source text not declassified] and is quite willing that discussions on British Guiana be conducted [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The President would like to emphasize, however, that in his view the first object of these discussions would be to determine whether our two governments can reach agreement on their assessment of the situation in British Guiana and the urgency of taking action to improve it. The President approves of the plan to have a team of four officers come to Washington on August 14th, but he hopes that these discussions can be followed promptly by a policy assessment which will permit him and the Prime Minister to come to a clear understanding on which action can be based."
McGeorge Bundy/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
287. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, August 8, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Burdett.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
At a meeting this afternoon between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Helms it was agreed that we would propose to the British a specific agenda for the talks next week on British Guiana. The objective is to bring matters to a head by forcing a consideration of political factors [1 line of source text not declassified].
The agenda is as follows:
1. Assessment of the situation in British Guiana.
[4 paragraphs (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
E.S. Little/2/
/2/Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.
288. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, September 5, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana II. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Dungan.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
On September 5 a meeting was held at Mr. Moscoso's office to discuss the aid program to British Guiana. Mr. Burdett represented the State Department.
The following considerations were involved:
1) the Administration can not be put in the position of working to strengthen a quasi-Communist regime in British Guiana--and this is all the more true in view of recent developments in Cuba;
2) our covert plans in British Guiana will be much facilitated [1 line of source text not declassified], which requires a minimum of continuing contact with the Jagan regime; and
3) should our covert program succeed, we would wish to be in the position of being able to give the successor regime immediate aid, which requires the completion before that time of certain economic and engineering feasibility studies. (The question of the covert program was not, of course, brought up at the meeting, but was very much in Burdett's mind when he set forth State's position.)
The conclusion, agreed to by everybody, was as follows:
a) that we should go ahead with certain economic feasibility studies as follows:
|
Hydroelectric economic feasibility |
$ 75,000 |
|
Topographic and geological survey at Tiger Hill (engineering feasibility) |
150,000 |
|
DEB Highway Development |
100,000 |
|
Ebini Agricultural Area (Support to UN Soil Survey--Preplanning of Land Settlements--Water Conditions) |
100,000 |
|
Economic Study of New Amsterdam |
60,000 |
|
Architectural Study for Outpatients Clinic for Georgetown Hospital |
80,000? |
This amounts to about half a million dollars. The AID bill budgets about $1.5 million for assistance to British Guiana. Moscoso brought this British Guiana item up on two occasions before committees on the Hill this summer, and no one asked any questions about it. The feasibility studies are invisible so far as immediate impact is concerned, and if anyone heard about them, going ahead with them would be defensible in terms of congressional clearance and approval.
b) that we should postpone until mid-November the asking of bids for the test cut of the Berbice Bar at New Amsterdam. This project, which would cost $860,000, would require a public call for bids in the U.S. and would be highly visible in British Guiana. The feeling was that we should go ahead with the project after November on the ground that this would show what U.S. aid could do if there were a government we really wanted to aid.
c) that certain engineering studies required for the DEB Development Scheme be started as soon as the preliminary economic feasibility studies are completed. These studies are necessary if we are to have an aid program ready for quick action in the event of a Jagan defeat.
Arthur Schlesinger, jr./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
289. Summary of Developments
Washington, January 18, 1963.
[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana, 1/63-5/15/63. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
290. Airgram From the Consulate General in Georgetown to the Department of State
A-250
Georgetown, March 14, 1963.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BR GU. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London. Drafted by Rosenthal.
SUBJECT
Time and Jagan: The Consulate General's Appraisal
REF
A-249, March 14, 1963/2/
/2/Not printed. (Ibid.)
[Here follows a table of contents.]
General
It seems to be generally agreed by the Department, HMG and the Consulate General that Proportional Representation (PR) as an electoral system for British Guiana (BG) represents the most practical electoral device for replacing Premier Cheddi Jagan and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with a more democratic and reliable government. It is generally conceded that PR should be put to a referendum. The most advantageous timing for a referendum and electionin the very near future, or after a delay which may extend for as much as one yearis not so readily apparent.
Based on an appraisal of the local scene, the Consulate General believes that, unless definite action is taken, time favors Jagan. The longer the delay the more difficult it will be to dislodge Jagan and Jagan's brand of socialism" from Government; extended delay presents the possibility of Cubalike situation. Since it is definitely not in the best U.S. interests to have either British Guiana or an independent Guyana ruled by Jagan's PPP, the U.S. Government should strive for an HMG decision for an immediate referendum on PR, either by itself or as a combined referendum-election.
Recent Memorandums of Conversation and other reports reaching this Consulate General indicate that HMG states it believes that the PPP government is ragged and running down hill" and may be forced from office, either by popular uprising or a Legislative Assembly vote of no confidence." In the Consulate General's opinion, this is unrealistic and perhaps reflects wishful thinking. Sufficient British troops are present to prevent any recurrence of the February 16, 1962 disorders, even if Government were to allow conditions which would permit passions to rise as in February 1962. In view of the Guianese temperament, the possibility of a flash riot seems remote. As for a no confidence" vote, it must be stressed that while the form of the BG Legislative Assembly is that of UK parliamentary democracy, its substance is not. On all but the most trivial of issues Legislative Assembly voting is on straight party lines. The PPP legislators are zealots, political hacks, or opportunists--or combinations thereof--in varying degrees. Although Balram Singh Rai defected on ideological grounds (or so he now stoutly claims), he was a comparative newcomer (circa 1956) to the PPP, and has a rich wife. No other PPP legislator, except possibly Fenton Ramsahoye, appears to question the advantages of defecting. It could be that Ramsahoye, an opportunist, and possibly one or two backbenchers could be induced to defect for private gain of one type or another. However, such gain would have to be greater than the patronage and other awards which the ruling PPP can now offer. With the situation currently favoring the PPP there is no practical reason why potential defectors would bolt on their own initiative. Thus, the PPP cannot be expected to fall on a no confidence" vote. If the Government is dissolved, it will be because Jagan believes it can effect some political advantage. Dissolution will be as a result of the ruling clique's decision.
Comments on HMG Position as Seen from the Consulate General
The UK will have no major political interest in an independent Guyana, although comparatively small--by British standards--commercial investment will remain. HMG wants to shed BG quickly, consistent with as graceful a departure as possible. The private views of one Colonial Officer seem to stress more the awkwardness of an Order in Council for PR than its utilization to remove Jagan.
It appears that for most of the last decade it has been the British approach to present the Guianese situation as one which, while neither tranquil nor in the best free world interest, is not as serious as might be supposed.
In 1953 HMG believed that the various actions and declarations of the PPP government demanded suspension of the Constitution and the internment of some PPP leaders, including both Jagans. A subsequent White Paper stated that this was necessary since the PPP was attempting to establish a communist state. In the late 1950's it became HMG policy to consider Cheddi Jagan and the majority of the PPP hierarchy as neither communist nor particularly bloc oriented. Rather, they were considered misguided and politically immature. There was no firm evidence to indicate a change of PPP philosophy, although the Party became somewhat less blatant in its support of communism and communist causes. This may have been due to the leaders' honest, albeit unstated, change of heart. However, given that the Party has maintained and even increased its bloc contacts, the evidence would indicate that the PPP hierarchy realized that, even though the largest political grouping, it would be impossible to head any pre-independence government without British tacit approval. Hence, the softening of the public line. The UF has given wide circulation to what is purported to be Cheddi Jagan's Secret Address to the 1956 Party Conference." The text states that until 1953 the Party committed deviations to the left" which had to be corrected due to the need for a flexible and well considered policy" (allegedly a quote from Stalin). Whether the speech was Jagan's or an excellent fraud has never been ascertained. However, PPP policy certainly corrected the deviationism to the left" in its public approach (excluding its continued strong support for Castro), although, as noted, there was no decrease in communist ties. At the risk of oversimplification, there appear to be four possible explanations for the British approach during the last decade.
1) Selfdeception, based in part on the subconscious recognition that HMG had failed to instill basic democratic principles in some of BG's major political figures, or to create a viable economy.
2) An effort to delude the U.S., temporarily," until such time as HMG had evolved a solution which would allow withdrawal with some degree of dignity, and without U.S. Government pressure or criticism.
3) A combination of 1 and 2, based upon HMG's inability to recognize the need for actions which might be embarrassing internationally.
4) They are instinctively correct.
The current HMG position seems to be one of outlining the administrative or parliamentary problems involved in proposing PR, on the assumption that Jagan will somehow, sometime soon, disappear due to his own incompetence. This approach appears to avoid the unpleasant reality that few Governments fall through stupidity. Jagan might not possess nimbleness of intellect" but his is sincere to his own ends. Janet Jagan and some of the men surrounding her can probably provide the intelligence needed to keep Cheddi propped up.
U.S. Interest in a Solution for British Guiana
Granting that spheres of influence exist, an independent Guyana will be within the U.S. sphere. It is not in the national interest to have a communist government on the mainland of South America. An independent Guyana with Jagan and the PPP in office represents such a threat and as such should be removed.
Politically, Jagan remains firm under the status quo and may well be improving his position. The Civil Service, the Ministries, government corporations and the public information media are all being used to PPP advantage. By what could be described as administrative subversion," PPP actions are eroding the principle of a democratically oriented government with an apolitical Civil Service. Economically, BG's position is worsening but Jagan may well be able to avoid any serious government financial crisis. The longer the delay in firm action which will remove Jagan, the greater must be the eventual U.S. efforts required to correct the damage. If undue delay results, at best it will be most difficult to unscramble and reassemble the Guianese egg; and at worst a communist state will be established.
The Need for Strong Efforts Now to Attempt Forcing HMG Action on PR
Failure to act quickly provides Jagan a chance to assume the initiative. For example, if the present situation continues he might demand new elections under first-past-the-post. With the existing electoral districting, he would probably win a majority of seats. This would permit him to present a fresh mandate" for independence, without PR.
Lack of action probably provides the PPP with a morale boost and simultaneously tends to dishearten further the opposition.
The presence of a British army battalion makes the possibility of renewed mass urban disorders most unlikely. Also, having learned its lesson in January-February 1962, the government can take preventive action to avoid creation of the tension-filled situation which preceded February 16, 1962.
A British Labour Government could be expected to be more inclined to grant independence under the existing government than would a Conservative one. Therefore, U.S. actions should be taken while the UK Government of the moment could be expected to be more receptive to the PR concept.
Two Areas of U.S. Action
1. At appropriate levels, efforts should be intensified to create a greater British awareness that, although it may be temporarily unpleasant and awkward, a PR decision should be quickly implemented. A new PR election would probably force Jagan from office, lead to some revitalization of internal economic activity, speed the date of independence and allow time to correct and eradicate communist influences. If, conceivably Jagan wins a PR referendum, it would force recognition that he would probably head an independent Guyana, at which time other measures could be considered.
2. The U.S. should be able to develop better information on political parties in BG. The Consulate General has fairly reliable sources within the PNC, fewer and less good contacts in the UF, and virtually none in the PPP. Information provided by the British--for whatever reasons--is inadequate and unsatisfactory. This gap in basic data should be filled.
The Current Scene
A. Political Factors
In British Guiana, as elsewhere, domestic politics requires fulltime devotion and is not a field to be cultivated only before an election. The PPP (or at least the Janet-Benn-Bhagwan core) recognizes and exploits this far more effectively than do the opposition. In so doing, the PPP has the tremendous advantage of being the party in power.
After an initial period of inactivity following the failure at London, the PPP has resumed fullscale politicking. Party leaders, including the Premier (but apparently not Janet), are constantly in the country and often in the urban centers. The PPP approach continues to be that immediate independence--without PR--means economic advancement, that colonialism and big business" are the causes of BG's lack of progress and that growth under socialism" can only be accomplished by the PPP. When the question of communism is raised, the Party equivocates although after several months of silence on Cuba, it is returning to somewhat cautious praise for Castro. Strong organizational efforts continue among youth and women through the PPP, the PYO and the PWO.
The PPP continues to infiltrate all levels of the bureaucracy. In the main, the Civil Service, while probably opposed to Jagan as individual voters, is still apolitical. However, as the older civil servants retire or resign, they are being replaced by either Party supporters or bureaucratic nondescripts. In some cases, PPP watchdogs are placed in government enterprises as rewards to the faithful and as implied threats to the others. New government units, such as the Central Planning Division, are staffed with handpicked native or expatriate personnel, who--whatever their other qualifications--are selected for their compassionate views toward the PPP. Plans for a National Army continue and it is believed by many locally, including the Consulate General, that PPP/PYO cadres, including those now in Cuba, will play a significant role. While great emphasis has been placed on the Army's multiracial character, it will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain the political philosophy of future troops. The same may be the case for the BG Volunteer Force (militia). Several months ago, an expatriate police officer remarked that a considerable number of East Indians had suddenly come forth expressing a desire to join the Volunteer Force with the identical reason: to serve my Queen and Country." The officer assumed that they had been ordered to join by the Party.
In the meantime the PPP appears to be accepting some salary and fee kickbacks from government coffers to help support the party. All ministers of government are obliged to contribute BWI$100 from their monthly salaries of BWI$800. Mooneer Khan, Chairman of the Rice Marketing Board, is understood to be taking kickbacks on the sale of rice bags, although who gets the money is unknown. The PPP also receives whatever profits (or other funds) are forthcoming from Guiana Import-Export and the New Guiana Corporation. While the PPP may or may not be receiving funds directly from the bloc, it is most certainly in a better financial position than either the PNC or the UF.
The PPP Government is effectively using the public information media to strengthen the Party hold on BG. By law Government is entitled to free radio time for informational purposes and much of this is being effectively utilized for Party interests. Despite some sniping, Jagan's weekly press conference is little more than a propaganda forum which is rebroadcast twice over the weekend. It is accepted practice that the tape is edited before release. Other Government Information Services press releases and programs exhort Government's deeds, with particular references to PPP ministers or the accomplishments of socialist (never communist) countries.
Although the broadcasting company is privately owned, it is under strict corporate injunction not to antagonize the government. This is carried to such an extreme that local news reports do not mention Legislative Assembly debates which are critical of Government. Scripts (including USIS material) for such programs as Viewpoint" are vetted to ensure that they will not embarrass" Government.
On the press side, the PPP weekly The Mirror (printed on Cuban-confiscated U.S. presses given to the PPP) is becoming consistently more newsworthy since it has private access to ministerial decisions. It is rumored to become at least a biweekly shortly. The other papers are ineffective as sources of antigovernment news. The Evening Post, and its Sunday edition, Argosy, exist on a shoestring. Circulation is down, bills are up. Content is mainly boilerplate and the small amount of local reporting is devoid of intelligent, or even particularly factual, presentation. The Chronicle is so rabid in its attacks on the PPP government that at times it almost assumes an anti-East Indian bias in some of its stories. It has no special reputation for accuracy. Worse, it is ineffective. The expatriate-owned Guiana Graphic, like the radio stations, follows such an a-political course in working with the government of the moment that at times it appears to be pro-government.
Probably to ensure that it becomes even less of a threat, Government has announced that a Press Council will be established. When queried, Jagan said initially the Council will not have punitive powers, although these might be subsequently necessary.
Through Government the PPP is also effectively creating the groundwork for greater control over education. To cite two examples: creation of a University of Guyana and withdrawal from UWI; release of the longstanding Board of Governors of a major government high school after it had refused to allow the PPP to use the school for a political meeting. A new board is to be named.
All these activities are indicative of the degree to which the PPP is spreading tentacles into Guianese life. All will become increasingly more difficult to eradicate the longer the Party is in office.
The situation might be ameliorated if the political opposition showed signs of increasing its effectiveness but if anything the reverse seems to be the case.
PNC organizational activities appear to be almost nonexistent. Most of the PNC effort seems to be directed toward its signature campaign for a PR referendum. However, the fact that the campaign continues well past the original closing date in January indicates that it is not going well, despite recent UF support. A certain amount of time is spent by Burnham and others exhorting the faithful in Georgetown and (once) in New Amsterdam but there seems to be little PNC activity in the rural areas, sections which will become particularly important if PR becomes a reality. Far too often the PNC attacks Jagan for courting the rural areas at the expense of the urban. While this may serve as a sop to the PNC urban supporters, it only tends to alienate further the rural voter.
While the PPP obviously courts and actively recruits youth with Freedom House lectures, strong influence at ITABO, scholarship offers and the prize of a college degree through the University of Guyana, as far as can be determined the PNC is doing little if any proselytizing among this group. With some 6,000 school leavers a year searching for opportunities, the PNC either through ignorance or indolence is overlooking a significant segment of the potential electorate.
The United Force is probably losing much of whatever appeal it may once have had for the nonwhite, non-Amerindian voter. After 2 years, Peter D'Aguiar has failed to develop any political intelligence and the UF is merely his political reflection. Instead of attacking Government on the selected well-documented evidence which abounds, the UF tactic is to swing against the PPP with wild charges, while making the most preposterous of claims as to what it would accomplish in office (i.e., $500,000,000.00 of new foreign investment). As noted, the Chronicle has become little more than a daily political rag, and one which unfortunately often is almost anti-East Indian in tone as it attacks Government. Equally bad is the Chronicle's habit of printing foreign source information about BG which it knows to be misleading, if not patently false. To cite one example: the Chronicle printed U.S. columnist Victor Riesel's story on BG starting with a lead sentence to the effect that the U.S. and UK had forgotten abandoned" Atkinson Field, but the Russians had not. A quote of Janet's supporting the Berlin Wall, later verified, was buried in the story but was generally discounted locally.
UF supporters may be losing heart. Ann Jardim, the only UF leader with any sense of political realities, has been ailing, is discouraged, and considering leaving the colony. The UK Entry Certificate Officer (i.e. visa man) commented privately that many of the middle and upper classes (from which the UF draws the bulk of its support) have taken out departure insurance in the form of UK entry certificates. Thus, in its initial electoral bid in August 1961 the UF, as presently oriented, probably gained as large a percentage of the electorate as possible. Its total voting strength could well decline as time passes. The only group which will remain firm is the numerically small Amerindian, who can still be controlled by Melville, with an assist from the Church.
A PNC-UF working arrangement might be possible with a combined electoral majority under PRif only to keep Jagan out. However, a PPP-PNC coalition is possible if Burnham believes the chances for a PR referendum are fading.
Balram Singh Rai has been inactive politically for the last few months and there has been more speculation recently in the U.S. and UK than in BG on his political future. Whatever electoral potential Rai may hold or be expected to gain, either by himself or in conjunction with other center-left personalities or the UF, is yet to be tested. However, the longer the status quo, the farther from public awareness Rai will be. The Consulate General would hazard that there are two basic criteria for Rai's motivation; a specific electoral target and, possibly, financial support. Public moral support might also help.
Thus, on balance, the PPP is strong and working to solidify its political position. As the party in power, it recognizes all the advantages this carries. While it cannot yet fully implement its policies, it can create the understructure needed to do so on short notice. While its ability to conduct foreign affairs is proscribed, it has started to sever its traditional West Indies ties, and to commence initial (economic") ties with the bloc. Against this background the political opposition, which lacks motivation, seems to be becoming somewhat less effective.
B. Economic Factors
Jagan's government potentially is weaker on the economic side than on the political. There are two issues, the general status of the internal economy and the particular weakness of the government's financial position.
The internal trade sector remains bad. Imports do not appear to have risen and inventories remain down. However, these factors affect the urban areas, particularly Georgetown, far more than the rural. Even if conditions do not improve there will be little adverse effect on Jagan's electoral popularity. While some urbanites may work more actively against Jagan, others show signs of surrendering and leaving BG. In any case, it is well known that Jagan's urban voting strength has been negligible. These factors tend to cancel each other--excluding the very remote possibility of a sudden, truly spontaneous riot in the comparatively brief time before British troops could be mobilized.
The export market is good. Bauxite workers are the highest paid in the colony, have reasonable job security by local standards and continue to support the PNC. The sugar workers support Jagan politically, although the anti-PPP MPCA represents them on trade union matters. Currently, MPCA is negotiating a new contract and another once for all" bonus. While a strike may develop, the ultimate result will be some sort of bonus and possible increased daily wages and fringe benefits. Any dissatisfaction at the settlement will probably be generated by the Guiana Agricultural Workers Union (formerly BG Sugar Workers), the PPP union which is attempting to depose MPCA. GAWU will claim, regardless of what MPCA gets, that they could have done better had they possessed bargaining rights.
Rice could be Jagan's major weakness over a long period. While crop expectations for 1963 are excellent and the price to farmers has improved, at present the 26,000 ton Trinidad market may have been lost. Also, Cuba will absorb only some 15,000 tons in 1963, instead of an expected 36,000. There could be a considerable surplus. Also, through mismanagement and entanglement in bloc arrangements, the Rice Marketing Board may be in serious trouble. The Consulate General's A-242 of February 21, 1963/3/ explores this in some detail, and notes the possible effects of Jagan's electoral popularity.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., 741D.00/2-2163)
Government's financial position presents the greatest potential weakness for Jagan, although not necessarily a fatal one. The 1963 Recurrent Budget predicted a major increase in imports over 1962 and a BWI$4.5 million revenue increase through new taxes and the increased tax rates. If Government is overly optimistic about these levels, a financial crises is possible. While it could incur some deficit spending and draw down its General Revenue Balance (reserves which were only $3.4 million at the end of 1962), there still could be insufficient funds to pay the Civil Service. Any work stoppage could be considered the grave emergency" needed by the UK to suspend the Constitution.
While the potential for a financial crisis is present, there are three possibilities which could forestall it:
1) When a similar situation arose in 1962, the UK rescued the Government with a vitally needed short-term loan. The British might well do so again to avoid the charges that one of their colonies faced financial difficulties resulting from colonialist rule (and the lack of independence).
In late 1962 the Governor, Sir Ralph Grey, stated privately that the UK was unwilling to allow Jagan to wreck the country financially, even if this demanded saving the PPP government. It would be most interesting to know what the UK would do if BG again faced the problem.
2) If a crisis threatened, the Government could request the large expatriate firms to pay immediately all or part of their 1963 taxes (due in 1964). The expatriate firms, who must attempt to work with the government of the day, would not refuse such a request. This device, utilized in other countries, might provide the Opposition with some political ammunition, but the danger is far less serious for Government than a financial breakdown.
3) A quick local loan might be floated. Ordinarily such a loan in BG at this time would be badly undersubscribed. However, if the bloc decided to risk a comparatively small sum for future gains, it could channel funds either through Guiana Import-Export or the New Guiana Corporation, who could then subscribe all or part of the loan.
The Threat of Jagan Out of Office
The argument has been entered, particularly by HMG, that Jagan out of office is more dangerous than Jagan in power, particularly while BG is a colony. This is not valid. Admittedly, Jagan would attack the existing government, the colonialist-imperialist" group, the West and big business. He would also preach his various themes on the need for bloc ties. However, in power, as he is now, he can, and does, follow this approach with a minimum of restraint while entrenching the PPP and laying the framework for even closer bloc connections. The point that Jagan out of office might resort to violence should not deter efforts to remove him; appropriate common criminal action can always be initiated--provided his removal precedes heavy concentrations of the PPP in civil and (proposed) military organizations.
U.S. Long Term Objectives
The immediate objective is the replacement of the PPP in office. A long term objective should be to impress upon the average Guianese the desirability of a democratic government oriented to free world philosophy and objectives, as well as to the dangers of bloc ensnarement.
The need for this immediate objective is outlined in this paper. Parts of the longer term goal, once this is accomplished, can be considered through USAID and USIS programs. In addition, the Consulate General will shortly present an outline of several projects which, after PPP removal, may be effective in discrediting Jagan with some of his supporters.
Conclusion
Continuation of the status quo permits Jagan to consolidate his gains in establishing PPP domination over all facets of BG life. To the degree which the U.S. Government and HMG fail to move to counteract this trend, they are providing implicit support for his rule. Such support is dangerous.
EK Melby
American Consul General
291. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, March 20, 1963, 4 p.m.
[Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BR GU. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
292. Letter From Premier Jagan to President Kennedy/1/
Georgetown, April 16, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana III. Secret. Transmitted to McGeorge Bundy by Brubeck on May 18 under cover of a note that indicates an advance copy of the letter was sent to the White House on May 1 and that the Department of State would submit a recommendation concerning a reply as soon as possible.
Dear Mr. President, It will be recalled that as a result of my talks with you and U.S. Government officials in October 1961,/2/ your Government in response to my request for aid, undertook to take the following steps:
/2/See Documents 259 and 260.
(i) To provide as early as possible in consultation with the British Guiana Government, and unilaterally or in cooperation with Hemisphere organisations, economists and other experts to assist the Government of British Guiana to bring the most modern economic experience to bear upon the reappraisal of its development programme.
(ii) To provide technical assistance for feasibility, engineering and other studies concerning specific development projects.
(iii) To determine as soon as possible after the steps mentioned in paragraphs one and two, and on the submission of suitable projects within the context of the British Guiana Development Plan, what assistance the U.S. can give in financing such projects, taking into account other U.S. commitments, available financial resources, and the criteria established by applicable legislation.
(iv) To expand its existing technical assistance.
2. In the period since my visit, U.S. technical assistance has been expanded, and feasibility and engineering studies for certain specific development projects are in train. On the other hand progress with the reappraisal of the development programme has been far less satisfactory. Following on the cancellation of its proposed visit early in February, the Economic Planning team led by Mr. Harry G. Hoffman eventually visited British Guiana in May of last year. It is now very nearly a year since the visit of that mission but I have so far been unable to obtain any certain information regarding the progress of its report. (It is understood however that when the AID Desk Officer visited British Guiana two months ago he stated in a newspaper interview that the Mission's report had then been sent to the printers.) I am naturally anxious about the fate of the Hoffman report as it appears that U.S. assistance in the financing of development projects is conditional on the completion of it.
3. My request for aid in October 1961 was only the latest request of the many made over the years for U.S. assistance with development projects. Early in 1958, an application was made to the Development Loan Fund (DLF) for aid for financing road and drainage and irrigation projects. I visited Washington in the summer of 1958 and 1959 and held talks with officials of the World Bank and U.S. Government Agencies. At a meeting with State Department officials in 1959 in Washington, I was told that a sum of about $6 to $8 million (U.S.) would be made available to my Government toward the cost of the construction of an interior road from Parika to Lethem. Such aid did not in fact materialise. A request was also made to the Commodities Division Office of International Resources in the State Department to see if this country's imports of flour and stockfeed from the U.S.A. ($3.5 million U.S. per annum) might be given under United States Public Law 480 and the proceeds of the sale used for development projects. This request was turned down as it was explained that any assistance under the law must be over and above the existing volume of imports. The Export-Import Bank was then asked to assist with the financing of equipment for a flour mill and a feed mill but the response was not encouraging.
4. At one stage a U.S. AID official in British Guiana indicated that economic assistance might be forthcoming for a Land Reclamation Project (the Tapacuma Drainage and Irrigation Scheme). But later, when the Project Report was ready my Government was informed that assistance was not likely to be available because of possible Congressional objections to a scheme which would be solely devoted to the cultivation of rice, a commodity of which the U.S. had a large surplus.
5. An application to the Export-Import Bank in June 1961 for rice milling equipment--cleaning, drying and storage--amounting to about $2 million B.W.I. has not yet been considered.
6. It will thus be seen, that leaving technical assistance aside, valuable though such assistance is, my efforts to obtain U.S. assistance have so far yielded little material result. It was against a background of growing unemployment and lack of adequate overseas assistance that I resolved on my return to British Guiana from the U.S.A. in November, 1961, to embark on a programme of fiscal reform designed to mobilise local resources for development. I was encouraged in this step by the fact that the criteria for AID assistance appeared to stress self-help efforts by the less developed countries themselves. I had noted that it had been stated in the Summary Presentation of an Act for International Development, 1961 (page 14) that the major areas of self-help include The effective mobilizing of resources. This includes not only development programming, but also establishing tax policies designed to raise equitably resources for investment; fiscal and monetary policies designed to prevent serious inflation; and regulatory policies aimed to attract the financial and managerial resources of foreign investment and to prevent excessive luxury consumption by a few."
7. Unfortunately this self-help or austerity budget was used as an excuse for disturbances inspired by opponents of the Government. These disturbances have since been thoroughly investigated by a Commonwealth Commission of Inquiry and it is worth recording the views of that Commission on the Budget: It will be seen" stated the Commission on page 15 of its report that there was nothing deeply vicious or destructive of economic security in the budget. It had been drawn up on the advice of an experienced economist, who could not be said to have any Communist prepossessions. The budget won immediate approval from many persons. The New York Times said in an editorial that the budget was courageous and economically sound. The London Times in a leading article observed 'The immediate problem for the Prime Minister, Dr. Jagan, is how to win some acceptance for his economic proposals which are courageous and certainly not far from what Guiana must have.' Sir Jock Campbell, Chairman of Booker Bros., the largest industrial and agricultural concern in British Guiana, said 'It clearly was in intention a serious attempt by the Government to get to grips with the formidable economic problems of the country by a hard programme of self-help. It was radical--what have the people of British Guiana got to be conservative about--but not confiscatory.' Senator Anthony Tasker, Chairman of Bookers Group Committee in British Guiana, gave his own opinion about the budget by saying 'We assessed it as a realistic attempt to grapple with the economic problems of British Guiana.'"
8. I venture to suggest that an objective consideration of these Budget proposals and the overall programme of my Government leads to the conclusion that they meet, to a high degree, the criteria which have been laid down by your Government for disbursements under the Alliance for Progress:
(a) Long range plans based on the application of programming techniques must be drawn up for both private and public sectors:
My country as compared with many underdeveloped territories has had a comparatively long history in the planning of economic development. A development programme prepared as long ago as 1948 by the then Economic Adviser to Government the U.K. economist Col. O.A. Spencer, introduced ideas which later influenced planning within the Caribbean region and exercised a considerable influence in other British colonial territories. In 1952-1953 a Mission from the World Bank considered afresh and reported on the problems of the economic development of the territory. Then in 1959 a Cambridge University Economics Don, Mr. Kenneth Berrill, at the request of my Government, advised on the preparation of the Development Programme which is now in progress. My Government has also had from time to time the benefit of the advice of many distinguished economic experts who have visited for short periods. It will thus be seen that the Hoffman Mission is only the most recent study of our economic problems.
(b) The fiscal system should be reformed both in order to increase the level of tax revenue in relation to national income and to make the tax structure more progressive. At the same time the machinery for the collection and assessment should be completely overhauled:
This was what the budget of 1962 mainly sought to do. It is also to be noted that this budget reflects the major conclusions reached at the Conference on Fiscal Policy held in Santiago, Chile last December and which was attended by fiscal experts from all over the Americas. In a release made in Washington by the Pan American Union Secretariat of the Organisation of American States it was stated among other things that it had been agreed that the reform of Latin American tax system should include progressive personal income tax which included the taxation of capital gains both on mobile and immobile property, complemented by a net wealth tax where feasible and the strengthening of a system of inheritance and gift taxation. Those recommendations also envisaged the establishment of an objective and coordinated system of tax administration--all features of my 1962 Budget. This budget also proposed a number of measures including Pay-As-You-Earn which were calculated to improve the efficiency of tax collection and to prevent tax evasion. Although certain of the budget proposals were subsequently withdrawn the present position is that all the fiscal requirements mentioned have been met.
(c) Measures should be instituted to increase domestic savings and these should be applied to productive investment:
The budget already referred to introduced a National Development Savings Levy. Under this scheme, persons earning more than $300 a month (a better than middle class salary) are asked to contribute 5% of that part of their incomes above $300 to a National Savings Scheme. The scheme also applies to companies which contribute 10% of their income before tax. The monies which accrue in this way are safeguarded by being directly chargeable on the revenues and assets of the country, and are being put into development fund and drawn upon for the financing of concrete and high earning schemes calculated to have an immediate impact on development, especially in the urban areas.
(d) Certain basic social reforms must be implemented such as the breaking up of large latifundiathe old plantation type economy--for the purpose of distributing unused or underutilised land to peasants who will be required to put the land to good use:
Since 1957, my Government has succeeded in persuading the foreign owned sugar companies to release some of their nonutilised lands leased from the Crown. Attempts are still being made to secure additional lands for use by individual farmers. The distribution of unused land to individual farmers is one of the objectives of my Government and has been pursued constantly. Nevertheless, the problem in this country is not one of maldistribution but of lack of financial resources to bring undeveloped land into cultivation.
(e) Development programmes should lay as much stress on improving the quality of the people, for example by expenditure on education and training, as on increasing the stock of physical capital:
My Government is now embarked on an educational programme which aims at promoting a national system of education which will provide all Guianese with the opportunity of developing their educational and personal potential and of sharing in all the educational facilities available regardless of race, religion or economic circumstances. To this end the educational system is being reorganized so as to provide for secondary and university education, after the pattern of your own country, for all who can benefit from it. My Government has also gone a long way towards providing health facilities throughout the country and a start has been made in certain areas on the provision of free medical services for the people.
(f) Democratic regimes in Latin America should be encouraged:
I have achieved power in the political life of my country by virtue of three successive General Elections which my Party won. I have often stated and now wish to reaffirm my adherence to parliamentary democracy by which I recognise the rights of opposition parties, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, regular and honest elections, an impartial judiciary and an independent public service. The draft constitution which my government proposed for an independent Guyana specifically provided for the protection of the rights of citizens by the Courts of Law along the lines enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and moreover provided for the impartial conduct of elections and the review of boundaries of constituencies by an Electoral Commission. On this point may I venture to remind you of remarks ascribed to you in a U.S.I.S. release of the 7th December, 1961. In the course of your interview with the Editor of Izvestia you are reported to have said . . . the United States supports the idea that every people should have the right to make a free choice of the kind of Government they want . . . Mr. Jagan . . . who was recently elected Prime Minister in British Guiana is a Marxist, but the United States doesn't object because that choice was made by honest election, which he won."
(g) Aid should be guaranteed over the period of the plan:
I have long supported this idea as it is only on this basis that the Government of any underdeveloped country can plan development on sound lines.
Trade Policy:
9. As the trade policy of my Government and its attitude to private enterprise has been widely and deliberately misrepresented in the U.S.A. I should like to deal briefly with these subjects. I am aware that the thinking which inspired your Act for International Development recognised the trade problems of the less developed countries. Thus on page 25 of the Summary Presentation already referred to, it is stated inter alia:
Export capacities of most of the less developed countries are limited. In many cases, especially in Latin America and Africa, exports are heavily dependent on one or two primary products of either agricultural or mineral origin. For most of these products, world markets are expanding only slowly. The prices of these products are subject to volatile fluctuations which greatly affect the exchange available to producing countries. In some instances, there appears to be a longrange trend for prices of primary commodities to fall in comparison with the prices of the industrial goods for which they must be exchanged. Moreover, the advance of science and technology presents for some commodities the prospect of displacement by synthetics (as had happened in some measure for rubber) or competition from substitutes."
It is these considerations which compel nations such as my own as a matter of economic necessity to seek markets or capital equipment wherever they may be obtained most advantageously. Such trading arrangements do not mean however that my Government has become part of any international conspiracy.
Attitude to private enterprise:
10. My Government is committed to a mixed economy in which private and public enterprise would exist side by side as is the case with India. For reasons inherent in the nature of this country, my Government must enter as quickly as possible into the industrial sector of development, either alone or in joint ventures with private enterprise. It is however the policy of my Government to give protection where necessary to new undertakings both public and private, in order to make them viable and competitive.
11. The expropriation of private property is not in my Government's programme. The provisions for safeguarding the Fundamental Rights in our present Constitution and in the Constitution for an independent Guyana will provide adequate protection for private property.
12. On nationalisation, no Government can tie its hands but it is not our intention to nationalise the bauxite and sugar industries. I am also prepared to guarantee that if any private enterprise should be nationalised there will be adequate and fair compensation to be decided by the Supreme Court of Law in cases of dispute as laid down in the Constitution.
13. A United Kingdom Trade and Industrial Mission led by the English Industrialist Lord Rootes, which visited British Guiana in 1962 concluded that:
On the political front, there is no exceptional risk to be faced by industry in British Guiana beyond that of nationalisation inherent in any socialist country. It must be said also that sound reasons can be found in the condition of the country for Dr. Jagan's concept of a mixed economy, with the Government providing some of the initiative in development."
14. Again as recently as March this year, Sir Jock Campbell, Chairman of Bookers Bros. McConnell and Company Limited, a group of companies which represent one of the large investments of private capital in this country, while on a visit stated that he saw no danger of a Communist dictatorship being established in British Guiana. He was confident that the Premier, Dr. Jagan had no intention of setting up such a dictatorship and further, that the conditions were not present in British Guiana to make a communist dictatorship viable. I do not believe," Sir Jock Campbell said, that there is a corrupt Government now in British Guiana against which the people will rebel and I do not think that the people can feel that they will be better off if there was a Communist Government." He added, however, that he did not think the people of British Guiana would vote for a Government whose stated policy was to pander to private enterprise.
15. In my country, we are now embarked on the creation of a just society based on the ideas and forms most suitable to the needs of this country and which would enable its citizens to develop themselves to the full in a free country. We have nothing to hide. Because of hostile, uninformed and unsympathetic speeches and comments made in the U.S. Congress and press, I have already invited through your Consul General in Georgetown, members of Congress and of the press to visit from time to time. Such visits would be welcome. I cannot but think that the American people who first began that revolution in social and political thought which still moves our world will find sympathy with the ideas and aspirations of my people and Government.
16. As I am sure you are aware, a Government such as mine has inherited the problems of poverty and underdevelopment which are characteristic of colonial territories. To these problems have been added the problem of a high postwar population growth. In the face of growing unemployment and all that it means in discontent and the waste of human resources, the political Opposition and other local leaders hostile to the Government have openly charged that U.S. assistance will not be forthcoming once my Government remains in office. The long delay in the completion of the Hoffman Report has tended to lend substance to this charge. In addition, the Trade Union Congress which on the whole aligns itself with the political Opposition has recently announced that it has been able to arrange substantial assistance for a housing scheme through the American Institute for Free Labour Development, a body which, one senior local Trade Union Official stated in a broadcast, derives the major part of its funds from the Agency for International Development. Earlier a generous Scholarship Scheme announced by the U.S. Consul General had apparently been designed to bypass my Government which had not been notified or taken into consultation.
17. These are only the most recent of the series of events which have created the impression that your Government is unwilling to assist the presently elected Government of this country and has served to embolden the Opposition to embark on irresponsible courses which are aimed at the forcible overthrow of my Government and which are likely to undermine the future of democratic government and the maintenance of peace in this country.
18. Thus, U.S. citizens, Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Sluis openly interfered in the domestic affairs of the country during the 1961 election campaign when they supported the Defenders of Freedom and the United Force. They later admitted spending the sum of about $76,000 B.W.I. during this campaign. (It is to be noted that Section 53 of Cap. 57--the Representation of the People Ordinance 1957--limits the expenses which may be incurred by a candidate to $1,500 and there were only 35 seats.) Dr. Sluis visited British Guiana six times between 21st February, 1961 and 26th April, 1962, including a twomonth visit just prior to and during the 1961 Elections.
19. You will recall that I complained to you about the activities of U.S. Government Information Services during the 1961 election campaign when film shows were held at street corners. The U.S.I.S. had never before arranged for such shows in the public. These film shows highlighted antiCastro and anticommunist propaganda. It happened that this line of propaganda coincided with the smear campaign then being conducted against the Government by the Opposition.
20. While no economic assistance was given to the Government, the impression was and is still being created in the country by Mr. Peter D'Aguiar and the United Force that they will be able to secure substantial financial assistance from the U.S. Government. During the election campaign the United Force cited a figure of one billion dollars, half a billion dollars as loans to the Government for infra structure" development and half a billion for industrial development by private U.S. investors. So far as I am aware, these statements met with no denial from your Consulate General, or any other U.S. official.
21. Press reports had stated that Dr. Claude Denbow, President of the League of Coloured Peoples and close associate of the People's National Congress had contacted, during a visit to the U.S.A. immediately prior to the 1961 August elections, a group of prominent Guianese professional men now resident in New York, some of whom had interviews with State Department officials at which, it was reported offers of assistance were made to help the Opposition to liberate" British Guiana from my Government.
22. Since the elections it appears to be the policy of the United States State Department to refuse visas to members and known supporters of the governing party, People's Progressive Party, who wish to visit the United States. This has been the case even with well known and eminently respectable members of the business community.
23. I cite these observations because I share your deep concern not only about the problems of world poverty but also of the growing tendency of the usurpation by reactionary elements of the democratic rights and liberties of free peoples. I am sure you would not want it said that in British Guiana, the objectives of your administration were not being realised and fulfilled.
24. In the light of the points made above I shall be grateful if urgent consideration may once again be given to the question of what assistance may be made available for the financing of development projects.
25. I have noted that you have been able in spite of the heavy burden of your office to visit a number of Latin American countries, so as to meet their people and to find out at first hand about their problems. I am aware that my own small country must rate low on the scale of priorities, but my Government nevertheless wishes to invite you to visit this country as soon as may be convenient to you. In the meanwhile my Government wishes to invite your personal aide, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. who I understand has been entrusted with the study of the problems of this country to visit us as soon as possible.
Yours sincerely
Cheddi Jagan
293. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, June 21, 1963.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Helms.
SUBJECT
White House Meeting on British Guiana
ATTENDANCE
The President
For Department of State: Messrs. Rusk, Johnson, and Burdett
For AID: Mr. Bell
For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Dungan, and Kaysen
For CIA: Messrs. McCone and Helms
1. The meeting opened with a briefing by Helms on the current situation in British Guiana. [2 lines of source text not declassified] and the hard position being taken by Jagan in the negotiations for a return to work on the part of the TUC.
2. There followed a discussion of the AID aspects of a paper submitted to the President entitled Instructions for Official Level Talks with UK on British Guiana". Rusk and Bell pointed out that we were proposing financial support to British Guiana which was significantly in excess of anything given to a country of comparable size under the Alliance for Progress. There was some comment about the resentment this might cause in Latin America, but it was clear that the President was prepared to accept unfavorable reaction if the United States Government was able to secure a favorable resolution of the political problem in British Guiana, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
3. The meeting turned to a general discussion of the President's scheduled talk with Macmillan at Birch Grove. It was clear that the President regards British Guiana as the most important topic he has to discuss with the Prime Minister. There was some debate as to the desirability of inviting Duncan Sandys to Birch Grove since he is a significant figure in any decisions which HMG may take. Rusk indicated that he would be better able to advise the President after he had met with Sandys and Home a day or two earlier.
[2 paragraphs (11-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
6. This meeting clarified the significant extent to which British Guiana has become a major policy issue between the United States and Great Britain.
Richard Helms/2/
Deputy Director (Plans)
/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
Attachment/3/
/3/Confidential.
British Guiana--Points the President might make to Senator Fulbright
1. Call his attention to the statement on June 20 by Mrs. Janet Jagan, Minister of Home Affairs in charge of Security-British Guiana will establish closer relations with Russia and Cuba when it becomes independent. British Guiana Government is deeply grateful" to Fidel Castro's Cuba for helping us out when we were stuck."
2. The British have in fact supported the Jagan Government during the current strike. For example, the Cold Stream Guards were used to guard Cuban ships which arrived carrying food and fuel to break the strike. They also guarded the loading of a Russian freighter.
3. We understand that additional Cuban ships are on their way.
4. The strike was called in protest against a labor relations bill introduced by the Jagan Government which would have given the government control over the British Guiana labor movement. The strike has been supported by labor organizations in the US, UK, and the Caribbean.
5. Colonial Secretary Sandys stated in the House of Commons on June 18--The struggle is now more political than industrial and it has become clear the two sides are evenly balanced." He then urged the people themselves to work out a widely acceptable settlement of the dispute. This is not only a misrepresentation of the nature of the strike, but illustrates the unwillingness of the UK to cope with the Jagan Government.
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, June 21, 1963, 7:03 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 BR GU. Secret. Drafted by Burdett; cleared in draft by Rusk and U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Hilliker (S/S); and approved by Burdett.
6918. Eyes only for Ambassador Bruce from the Secretary. President wants you to know high importance he and I attach to reaching understanding with UK on British Guiana. This is principal subject President intends raise with Macmillan at Birch Grove and is main reason for my talks in London with Home and Sandys.
Our fundamental position is that the UK must not leave behind in the Western Hemisphere a country with a Communist government in control. Independence of British Guiana with government led by PPP is unacceptable to US. Our objective in London is to get HMG to take effective action to remove Jagan Government prior to independence. As you know there has been long series high-level exchanges this subject. Last fall Macmillan agreed to this objective but he has now reverted to view UK should wash its hands of British Guiana by granting early independence, leaving the mess on our doorstep.
I hope you will let it be known to Alec Home and the Prime Minister that President and I intend to focus on this subject while in England. I think it most important that we involve Alec Home. This is not just a Colonial problem but one with the highest foreign policy implications.
I would welcome your thoughts on how best to convince our British friends of deadly seriousness of our concern and our determination that British Guiana shall not become independent with a Communist government.
I also ask your views on what might be done with labor leaders. George Brown while in Washington seemed to sympathize with our position, but Patrick Gordon Walker was less receptive. Would you advise frank talks with Labor leaders. If so, by whom? What we wish to avoid is Labor's committing itself publicly to early independence to British Guiana from ignorance of true facts and in effort to needle government. This of course would make it extremely difficult for them to reverse course once they come to power.
I am looking forward to talking this whole problem over with you on June 27.
Rusk
295. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/21
Birch Grove, England, June 30, 1963, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BR GU-US. Secret; Eyes Only; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Tyler.
SUBJECT
British Guiana
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. William R. Tyler
United Kingdom
Prime Minister Macmillan
Lord Home
Sir David Ormsby Gore
Lord Hailsham
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Duncan Sandys
Mr. Peter Thorneycroft
Lord Hood
Mr. Philip de Zulueta
The Secretary reviewed his talks with Lord Home and Mr. Sandys. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Sandys then spoke and confirmed the Secretary's account of the conversations which had been held in London. He said he thought that, theoretically, there were four courses open: (1) To muddle on as we are now doing, which he thought should be rejected as a choice; (2) To move forward by granting British Guiana independence now (he said that although this would be a move forward it obviously presented grave problems); (3) To suspend the constitution and institute direct colonial rule (he said that this would be a move backward politically); (4) to establish a Burnham-D'Aguiar government and then grant British Guiana independence.
He said that if we were to persevere with the present exercise and succeed, we could perhaps give British Guiana independence. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] On the whole he thought that a referendum on proportional representation would have a favorable outcome, though this was not certain. The reaction of the people was problematical. If the referendum was successful, there would have to be new elections. He said another factor in the situation was the predictable increase in support for Jagan as time went by. He said that presumably Burnham, if he came to power, would make a defense agreement with the United States, and that the US had the legal right to reactivate the base in British Guiana, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He thought that a Burnham-D'Aguiar government would certainly wish to have a defense agreement with the United States.
The President asked Mr. Sandys how long he thought the UK could string out the process of establishing proportional representation. Mr. Sandys said he was not sure, as it depended on the outcome of the present strike situation. He said there was a financial problem if the UK was prepared to keep Jagan going. In the meantime, the UK could string out the process for a number of months. He said we had to be careful that Jagan should not be put in a position where he would ask for dissolution and new elections, because he would certainly win again. Under the present constitution he had the right to ask for dissolution, and the governor would have to grant it. He said that under direct rule, two serious problems would emerge, apart from the financial one: (1) it was not certain that after five years we would be any better off than we are now, (2) it was quite likely that Jagan would take off and create a movement of underground resistance of the Malayan type. Mr. Sandys said he did not know whether in this case the Indians and the Negroes would fight against each other, or band together against us. There was also the consideration that, in the event of the UK resuming direct rule, it would be greatly criticized. Its image would be pretty severely tarnished," said Lord Home. There would also be the effect on Southern Rhodesia. People would say that if the UK could resume power in British Guiana, why would it not be able to do the same thing in Southern Rhodesia."
The President said he thought that Mr. Sandys had made a very good and fair presentation. It was obvious that if the UK were to get out of British Guiana now it would become a Communist state. He thought the thing to do was to look for ways to drag the thing out. The situation was inflammatory at this time. He thought that Latin America was the most dangerous area in the world. The effect of having a Communist state in British Guiana in addition to Cuba in 1964, would be to create irresistible pressures in the United States to strike militarily against Cuba. There would be great US resentment against the UK for having pulled out. He thought the UK should say that it could not make British Guiana independent because of the danger of unleashing a racial war, and that the UK should not say that it was because of the danger of British Guiana becoming Communist. The Prime Minister asked whether it was not worth while going on with the present strike pressure. Mr. Sandys asked what the US reaction would be to the UK granting independence to a Burnham-D'Aguiar government. Under present conditions, such a government would collapse by itself. However if the United States Government was prepared to shore it up, this would change the situation, specifically if the US could provide money [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The Secretary pointed out that Africans control the police and the towns, so that Jagan would be relegated to agitating in the countryside. The President asked Mr. Sandys if the UK could tell Jagan that HMG was going to hold on for another two years. Mr. Sandys said that Jagan would then ask for dissolution. The Secretary asked whether, in this event, the UK could insist on holding a referendum on proportional representation. Mr. Sandys said that this would be in the worst circumstances, because it would be clear to everyone that we were only doing this because we were afraid of the outcome of elections.
The President said he agreed with the analysis of all the difficulties, but that these still paled in comparison with the prospect of the establishment of a Communist regime in Latin America. Mr. Sandys said he thought the best solution was that of a Burnham-D'Aguiar government to which the UK would grant independence. [5 lines of source text not declassified] The President again repeated his view which he had previously expressed, that the great danger in 1964 was that, since Cuba would be the major American public issue, adding British Guiana to Cuba could well tip the scales, and someone would be elected who would take military action against Cuba. He said that the American people would not stand for a situation which looked as though the Soviet Union had leapfrogged over Cuba to land on the continent in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Sandys asked whether the United States Government was prepared to give the UK real support in the United Nations and publicly, if the UK were to resume direct rule in British Guiana. It would be a pleasure," said the President, we would go all out to the extent necessary." You didn't give us that much support on Southern Rhodesia," piped up Lord Home. Well, for that matter," said the President, in a light tone of banter, you haven't given us that much support on the MLF." The President added that we would be willing to review our stand on the resolution of the Committee of Twenty-four. He said he thought that the aspects of the situation in British Guiana which we should stress were its instability and the danger of racial strife.
296. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, August 15, 1963.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
297. Telegram From the Consulate General in Georgetown to the Department of State/1/
Georgetown, September 5, 1963, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BR GU-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.
103. Called on Jagan this morning at his request. We had hour-long meeting during which Jagan earnestly discussed general problem U.S.BG relations and means of reversing steady deterioration these relations.
Jagan said he was much concerned about the rate this deterioration and unnecessarily harmful effects this was having on both countries. As far as developments in U.S. were concerned, he reluctantly had been forced to conclusion that administration had now adopted as its policy attitude of right extremists, namely, Jagan must go. He cited as evidence Tyler testimony last March before subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations (only portions he has seen are extracts woven into news story in August issue of Thunder). Jagan said up to present he has steadfastly defended President in face of attacks by extremists in PPP, arguing that President remained true to assurances he gave Jagan in 1961, but that as politician he of course had to be responsive to vocal sections of U.S. public opinion. Now in light of Tyler testimony Jagan wonders if administration has changed its policy.
This change also having important effects in BG. Present state of U.S.BG relations is one of causes of lamentable condition BG economy and fact that our best people are leaving country."
Sir Jock Campbell recently wrote Jagan asking if steps could not be taken to prevent wildcat strikes which were reducing sugar production. Jagan said he was obliged to reply this was aspect of BG affairs which he no longer controlled; hotheads and extremists in party no longer looked to him but acted on their own.
His real worry, Jagan said, was expressed in his press conference remarks on nuclear test ban treaty, though his remarks then had been misrepresented and he apparently had not fully put his meaning across (A-26, August 18)./2/ America, Jagan said, is worried about BG becoming another Cuba. Castro once in reference to BG laughingly asked if socialism had ever come about without revolution. Jagan said he had openly discussed his socialist ideals with President as well as his determination to bring this about by peaceful means. All he is asking of U.S. is understanding and assistance so that he can make BG first example of socialist state created by nonviolent means.
/2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL BR GU-US)
Alternative to himself, Jagan said, is violence because if he were pushed aside extremists in party would take over and then U.S. would have Castroite situation it is now so strenuously seeking to avoid.
I of course made no specific reply to Jagan's question as to what could be done to improve U.S.BG relations. I noted that when matters had deteriorated to the extent he described it was usually a long road back to more normal relations, an observation which seemed to depress him. I also briefly reviewed usual points about doubts in U.S., both public opinion and government, on his ultimate objectives, his relations with Cuba and Communist bloc. As he talked much about his socialism, I said question in mind many Americans was precisely that, whether it was his socialism or socialism controlled by another power. To this Jagan said he had once invited representatives of U.S. press and government to see for themselves who ruled BG, he was thinking of renewing this invitation.
Comment: This is third time in past 10 days that approach has been made to us about improving U.S.BG relations, third time we have had fairly reliable indication of divisions within PPP, and first time Jagan has intimated to U.S. official he might be in serious trouble in his own party. I do not believe Jagan's calling me in for this discussion was merely a trick (which would have been fair conclusion if it had been made only by [garble]); he was as serious today as when we discussed his Washington trip in September-October 1961.
We cannot assess whether Jagan is really in real trouble with his socialist friends here and abroad, and whether this is a last ditch plea for help before more extreme members of PPP take over. We feel, however, there must be some fire behind this smoke and we believe we should not let opportunity to explore it, and possibly exploit it, slip by.
We therefore suggest that contact be made with Jagan during his stay in New York, by U.S. official fully briefed on BG situation and of sufficient rank to speak with authority. Jagan in effect has asked us to tell him what is wrong with U.S.BG relations and what should be done to improve them. We believe that we should talk to him openly and bluntly. Completely frank discussion which he has asked for at least should give us some insight into present state of PPP, which we feel will be extremely valuable for future operations here.
Melby
298. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, September 6, 1963.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, British Guiana III. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limited Distribution.
INTELLIGENCE NOTE
Jagan's Pitch for Improved USBG Relations
Jagan called in our Consul General in Georgetown, September 5, expressed his concern about the deterioration of USBG relations, and asked what could be done to improve them. Jagan said he had concluded that the US had adopted a policy of Jagan must go." He warned that if he were pushed aside the extremists in his party would take over and the US would then have the Castroite situation it was seeking to avoid.
Jagan's Sincerity Doubted. Jagan's concern about the deterioration of USBG relations seems highly inconsistent with (1) the vicious attacks he and his party paper have been making on the US and President Kennedy in the last several weeks, and (2) a series of actions since midsummer resulting in closer links between BG and Cuba.
Ability of Extremists Questioned. Furthermore, Jagan's analysis of his possible succession by extremists seems questionable. We do not deny that the extremists may have subjected Jagan to increasing pressure. We are inclined to doubt, however, that there is any individual or group among Jagan's lieutenants that could command sufficient popular support to run the party and the government without Jagan.
Jagan's Probable Motivation. It seems probable that Jagan's pitch has been motivated by his apparent failure to get aid from the Soviet Bloc in the face of his great need for such assistance. Although his government has recently obtained a $1 million dollar loan from Cuba, and there have been disputed reports of fund transfers from the USSR to BG, the Guianese economy and the government's finance are in poor, though probably not yet disastrous, shape.
299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Georgetown/1/
Washington, September 7, 1963, 2:55 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BR GU-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London.
92. Re Georgetown's 103./2/ We have considered suggestion reftel for approach to Jagan for discussion USBG relationships and have concluded that disadvantages and potential misinterpretations outweigh possible advantages to US. Jagan's alleged concern about deterioration of relations with US seems inconsistent with attacks PPP paper has been making on US and President personally in last few weeks and with series of steps resulting in closer links between BG and Cuba. We also inclined doubt there any individual or group among Jagan's lieutenants that could command sufficient popular support seriously to challenge his control of party.
/2/Document 297.
We wish to avoid creating any impression, or enabling PPP to do so, that there exists real possibility of improving relations between PPP and USG.
Accordingly, we plan adhere to guidance set forth Deptel 88/3/ and keep contacts with Jagan at as low level as possible.
/3/Dated September 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 BR GU/UN)
Rusk
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.