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Ch. 5. India-Pakistan 2

-161. Telegram 6591 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State and the Embassy in the United Kingdom, May 18, 1974, 0600Z. 

Chargé d’Affaires Schneider reported on his telephone conversation with Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh that morning. Singh had telephoned Schneider to inform him that, at 8 a.m., India had conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent niact; immediate to Damascus. On May 23, the President instructed the NSC to study non-proliferation and the NPT in light of the India test; this document will be printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976.

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush acknowledged Secretary of State Kissinger's orders for a "low-key" response to the Indian nuclear test and speculated on its long-term implications for nonproliferation and regional instability, but requested permission to develop a longer-term response.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted and approved by Kurze. It was repeated priority to London for Moynihan; and sent immediate to the Mission in Geneva. In Telegram 764 from Damascus, May 18, Kissinger instructed that the Department not issue a strong statement on the Indian nuclear test. Official reaction was to be limited, and any statement would be to the effect that American policy does not favor nuclear proliferation in general because of its adverse effect on world stability. (Ibid.)

Chargé d’ Affaires Schneider relayed details of India’s nuclear test to Ambassador Moynihan, based on public statements by the chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 80 F 5, Subject Files 1974–77, AE–8. Secret; Immediate. It was drafted and approved by Schneider.

President Nixon met with Pakistan Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Ahmed to discuss the Indian nuclear test and other issues.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 4, May 23, 1974. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. Tab A is not printed.

The CIA research study “India: Developing Power or Developing Power Vacuum” assessed India as ripe for crisis due to outstanding social, economic, and political problems.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M01048A, Box 3, India. Confidential. Director of Central Intelligence Colby forwarded the study to the President on June 27 (Ibid.)

Pakistan Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Ahmed discussed U.S. military supply policy with Secretary of State Kissinger.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversations, June 1974-8 August 1974. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable.

Ambassador Byroade commented on Ambassador Moynihan's cable to the Department of State of June 6 and noted the reaction of "profound shock" to the Indian nuclear test in Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File 12 May-31 October 1974. Secret; Nodis. Moynihan's cable is not printed.

Ambassador Moynihan met with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to discuss nuclear energy and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Decentralized Subject Files 1973-74, Pak/India January-June 1974. Confidential. It was repeated to Bombay. Calcutta, Madras, Islamabad, and the Mission to IAEA in Vienna.

DCI Colby submitted intelligence that confirmed that the Indian Government was considering possible military applications of its nuclear capability but had not yet established a weapons program.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80-M01048A, Box 3. Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates Colby signed the original. Attached but not printed are an interagency intelligence memorandum on "Prospects for an Indian Nuclear Force" and [text not declassified].

Secretary Kissinger suggested, and President Nixon approved, a response to a letter sent by Prime Minister Bhutto on the eve of Nixon’s trip to Moscow that stated his concerns about Soviet, Indian, and Afghan ambitions in South Asia and the threat to Pakistan. Bhutto also requested the end of limitations on U.S. arms sales to Pakistan in light of the Indian nuclear test. Nixon’s response emphasized the U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s independence and integrity but did not explicitly discuss arms policy then under review.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Correspondence 1969–1970, Box 760 Pakistan. No classification marking. Nixon initialed his approval. Attached but not printed at Tab B is Bhutto’s June 24 letter.

Secretary of State Kissinger met in his office to review Indian-U.S. relations with a delegation that included Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh and Ambassador T. N. Kaul.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097-0933. It was drafted by Morley and cleared by NEA. Kissinger sent a lengthy summary of this conversation to Ambassador Moynihan in Telegram 170818 to New Delhi, August 6. (Ibid.)

Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul brought his science and economics attachés to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to review the state of Indian-U.S. relations following President Nixon's resignation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097-1159. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Morley and approved on August 15 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The text of the aide mémoire on the Tarapur nuclear reactor that Kaul presented Kissinger is in Telegram 175346 to New Delhi, August 10. (ibid.).

Ambassador Kaul of India met with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger and conveyed a letter of greetings from Prime Minister Gandhi.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. Attached but not printed at Tab A is Indira Gandhi’s August 20 letter. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted approximately 45 minutes. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office)

Following his inauguration, President Ford met with Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub Khan to discuss the sale of military supplies to Pakistan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, August 21, 1974. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House. On August 10, Kissinger met briefly with Yaqub to reassure him that a commitment to Pakistan's independence and integrity was a "central part of U.S. policy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097-1157)

Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Ambassador Kaul met with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. They discussed various issues of concern to Indian-U.S. bilateral relations and Kissinger's planned official visit to India in October.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 5, Ford Administration. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Secretary of State Kissinger discussed his upcoming official visit to Pakistan with Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Ahmed. They also discussed improving the effects of improved U.S. relations with India on U.S.-Pakistan relations as well as U.S. military and food aid to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097-2274. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable and approved on October 15 in S.

President Ford discussed U.S. arms and food aid to Pakistan with Foreign and Defense Minister Ahmed.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 6, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Kissinger authorized Ambassador Moynihan to inform the Indian Government of the sale of 300,000 tons of PL–480 wheat for 1975.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Limited Official Use; Immediate. It was drafted by Morley; cleared by EB/OFP, AID/FFP, USDA, Treasury, GC/AID/TFHA, and NEA; and approved by Kissinger. Moynihan reported disappointment on the part of the Indian officials when he relayed this amount. (Telegram 14249 from New Delhi, October 23; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, Telegrams to SecState NODIS (1))

Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft relayed to President Ford Kissinger's report on meetings with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh during his visit to India.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, Box 2, October 20-November 9, HAK Messages for President (1). Secret; Sensitive. Ford initialed the memorandum.

Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador Moynihan called on Indian Minister of Defense Swaran Singh at the Ministry of Defence to discuss the Simla negotiations and India's relations with its neighbors in South Asia and with China.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger 1973-1977, Entry 5403, Box 5, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, November 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Defense.

Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft relayed to President Ford Kissinger’s account of his meetings with Indian Cabinet Ministers of Finance, Food, and Defense.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, Box 2, October 20–November 9, HAK Messages for President (1). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum. On November 15, Kissinger briefed the Cabinet and the President on his trip. Kissinger reported: “As for South Asia, I went as a result of Indian importuning. I had cancelled it twice before. For their own purposes, the Indians have decided to warm up to us. It must be frustrating for the Soviet Union, after all the aid they had poured in. It is no credit to us—the Indians want hegemony on the subcontinent. We want to draw them away from the Soviet Union.” (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversations, Box 7, Ford Administration)

Ambassador Moynihan reported on Secretary of Kissinger's meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan in New Delhi.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. It was repeated immediate to Islamabad, Dhaka, Tehran, Moscow, Kabul, and Peking.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Prime Minister Bhutto during his official visit to Pakistan for a wide-ranging discussion of international issues. Although Bhutto did not specifically raise the issue of arms sales, he referred to the need to deal with India from a position of relative strength.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 5, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, November 1974. Secret. The meeting took place in the Prime Minister’s office.

Ambassador Byroade offered an assessment of Pakistan's foreign relations for the last quarter of 1974.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. It was repeated to Abu Dhabi, Colombo, Dhaka, Hong Kong, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Katmandu, Lahore, London, Manama, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, USLO Peking, and CINCPAC for Polad.

The telegram summarized Under Secretary Sisco's meeting with Ambassador Yaqub Khan on December 5 to explain the reasons why the United States would continue to abstain from voting on Pakistan's proposal in the General Assembly for a South Asia Nuclear Free Zone.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. It was drafted by David Thompson (IO/UNP); cleared by IO, NEA/PAB, and ACDA/IR; approved by Arnold Raphel (P). It was repeated to New Delhi, Colombo, Katmandu, Kabul, Dhaka, Bonn, London, and NATO.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with the subcommission chairs of the U.S.-Indian Joint Commission to discuss the work of the Commission and noted that the greatest opportunities would be in promoting educational and scientific cooperation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Limited Official Use; Exdis. It was drafted by Kux and approved on January 26 in S. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Ambassador-designate William B. Saxbe to discuss his appointment as Ambassador to India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Kux and approved on February 19 in S.

President Ford met with Prime Minister Bhutto during his official visit and discussed several issues of concern to Pakistan-U.S. relations, including military and food aid.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974-15 Aug. 1975. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Prime Minister Bhutto during his official visit to Washington to discuss Pakistan-U.S. relations and nuclear issues, including the South Asia Nuclear Free Zone proposal and Pakistan's relations with India and Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable and approved on May 11 in S. The meeting took place in Blair House. On February 6, Kissinger hosted a lunch for Bhutto and Senator Charles Percy attended. The memorandum of conversation of the meeting is ibid.

Chargé d'Affaires Schneider reported that Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh requested that the U.S. defer its announcement to resume arms sales to Pakistan until after Foreign Minister Chavan's visit to Washington in March.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to SecState NODIS (2). Secret; NIACT Immediate; Nodis.

Acting Assistant Secretary of State Sober reported that Indian Foreign Minister Chavan had postponed his visit to Washington for a meeting with the Joint Commission in response to the U.S. decision to change its arms policy toward Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, India, 1975 (Political Files): Lot 79 D 22, External Relations India 1975, Change in US Arms Policy. Confidential. It was drafted by Brown and cleared by NEA/INS.

The Department reported that it had successfully concluded negotiations for the sale of 800,000 tons of wheat to India under the PL-480 program.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Limited Official Use; Immediate. It was drafted by Morley; cleared by NEA/INS EB, AID, FFP, USDA, NEA/P; approved by NEA/INS.

President Ford altered U.S. policy by lifting the embargo on sales of lethal U.S. military equipment to Pakistan and India.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Presidential Country Files for South Asia, Box 27, Pakistan (5). Secret. A copy sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Ambassador Saxbe reported his initial impressions after his formal installation in New Delhi and forecast only gradual improvement in Indian-U.S. relations.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 151, Geopolitical File, Chronological File, India, 1 Jan.-30 Dec. 1975. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

Ambassador Saxbe reported high-level Indian public criticism of the United States and stated that the recent increase in anti-American rhetoric seemed directly tied to the change in U.S. arms policy toward Pakistan. He predicted that the rhetoric would grow harsher as elections in India approached.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Exdis. Telegram 5121 from New Delhi, April 16, summarized statements of the Indian Foreign Minister and Telegram 5200, April 7, reported that Indian officials were using the arms buildup of India's neighbors and the threat of an: "unmentioned 'sea power'" as an excuse for the state of emergency. (Both are ibid.)

Under Secretary Sisco remarked on the recent increase in public criticism of the United States. He advised Ambassador Saxbe to take a hard line, noting that in the past, this had dampened Indian criticism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. It was drafted by Brown; cleared by NEA; and approved by Sisco and Atherton.

The Department instructed Ambassador Saxbe to convey U.S. impatience with the current Indian high-level criticism of U.S. policy, to remind the Indian Government of U.S. restraint in commenting on the Indian nuclear test, and to point out the hypocrisy of their stance on U.S. arms policy in light of India’s arms agreements with the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Brown; cleared by Atherton; and approved by Kissinger. Kissinger refers to an article in The New York Times in which Saxbe publicly commented on the situation. (Bernard Weintraub, “Saxbe Says U.S. and India Grow Apart,” The New York Times, April 25, 1975, p. 4)

Ambassador Saxbe requested clarification for action. He felt that a hard line on Indian criticism of the United States could be dismissed as an empty threat in light of joint Indian-U.S. cultural programs and economic cooperation and U.S. food aid to India.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to SecState NODIS (2). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

Secretary of State Kissinger issued detailed instructions for Ambassador Saxbe to protest recent Indian high-level criticism of the United States and instructed him to emphasize that such public criticism, which endangered bilateral cooperation, should be handled within diplomatic channels.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams from SecState NODIS (3). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. It was drafted by Kux; cleared in substance by EB, S/P, and AID; cleared by Atherton; and approved by Kissinger.

Ambassador Saxbe related details of a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Chavan on May 16, in which he stated strong U.S. reaction to "extreme and unwarranted criticism" on the part of the Indian Government.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to SecState NODIS (3). Confidential; Nodis. In subsequent unprinted Telegram 7163 from New Delhi, May 30, Saxbe reported that the Indian Government had subsequently toned down its criticism.

The estimate "Near-Term Prospects for India" projected a period of domestic political and economic turmoil for India and speculated on the potential impact on it's foreign relations.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, NIE 31–7–75. Secret. According to the cover sheet, the following agencies participated in the preparation of the estimate: CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Energy Research and Development Administration, and the NSA. Intelligence personnel from the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also participated. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained becaused of the subject was outside of the Bureau's jurisdiction.

Ambassador Byroade informed Secretary of State Kissinger of an urgent personal request from Prime Minister Bhutto for an increase in PL–480 food aid from the United States.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974–15 Aug. 1975. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cherokee. On Kissinger’s instruction the Embassy conveyed, in telegram 6183 to Islamabad, July 8, the Secretary’s assurance that he was “deeply sympathetic” to Bhutto’s request but that no guarantees could be made at that time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

The Department forwarded the text of two letters sent to President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger from Prime Minister Bhutto. In the letters, Bhutto emphasized his concerns about threats to Pakistan from India and the involvement of China and the Soviet Union in such a conflict.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 1 Nov. 1974-15 August 1975. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Constable and approved by Atherton.

In response to the state of emergency declared in India, the Embassy urged a "wait-and-see" period in which the United States should avoid any reaction that would be perceived as meddling in an Indian domestic situation. The Embassy reported it had ceased contacts with opposition political leaders, avoided analysis of the situation in press comments, and limited travel of Embassy personnel outside of New Delhi.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to the SecState EXDIS (2). Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated to Islamabad, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.

Director of Central Intelligence Colby provided an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on arms shipments to India and Pakistan for the first half of 1975 in a semi-annual report in compliance with instructions set out in National Security Decision Memorandum 289 (Document 193). It noted that India's military imports—and thus its military advantage—continued to outpace Pakistan's, and that the Soviet Union continued to be the major source of Indian arms.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-131, NSDM 273-290. Top Secret; Noforn; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Controlled Dissem. Sent for information. The memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Information Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. It was concurred in by the Secretary of Defense. Ten pages of detail and tables, an 11-page annex, and a distribution list are not printed.

The Embassy summarized Ambassador Saxbe's meeting with Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh on recent attacks on the United States in the Indian press and rumors of U.S. covert activity in Indian internal affairs.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to the SecState EXDIS (2). Confidential; Exdis.

Indian Ambassador Kaul conveyed a letter from Foreign Minister Chavan to Secretary of State Kissinger. They discussed the U.S.-Indian Joint Commission, the state of emergency in India, and U.S. food aid to India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123-1708. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted on July 18 by Kux and approved on July 25 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

The Memorandum, "India's Political Prospects over the Next Year," assessed the impact of the recent declaration of emergency powers by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on India's foreign and domestic affairs.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01142A. Confidential. According to note on the summary page, the memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

Secretary of State Kissinger cabled a response to Prime Minister Bhutto's concerns about possible increased Soviet activity in South Asia and included further points for Ambassador Byroade to convey to Bhutto in person.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological File, 16 Aug. 1975-12 March 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. It was repeated immediate to the Department of State.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Ambassador Ahmed to discuss arms supplies for Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977, Entry 5403, Box 12, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, September 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers in New York, where Kissinger attended the UN General Assembly.

Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador Saxbe conferred about normalization of relations with India prior to their meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Chavan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123-2312. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Kux and approved on November 4 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

Indian Foreign Minister Chavan and Ambassador Kaul led a delegation to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador Saxbe. Chavan and Kissinger discussed the prospects for improving U.S.-Indian relations, the coup in Bangladesh, Indian relations with Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and China, and Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123-2254. Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted on October 15 by Kux and approved on November 4 by S.

Foreign Minister Chavan met with President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. They discussed the U.S.-Indian Joint Commission, the impact of oil prices on the Indian economy, and the state of emergency in India. Chavan also expressed his hope that President Ford would visit India.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Indian Foreign Minister Chavan met with Secretary of State Kissinger and discussed India's foreign relations and the coup in Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123-2242. Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted by Kux and approved on November 4 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

President Ford met with Ambassador Ahmed to discuss broad issues of concern to Pakistan-U.S. relations, including Pakistan's relations with India, Soviet and Chinese intentions in South Asia, food aid from the U.S., and military supplies.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 15, Ford Administration. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office of the White House.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Ambassador Ahmed to discuss Pakistan's relations with India and arms supply. Ahmed requested the sale of 110 A-7 fighter/attack aircraft.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 27, Pakistan (5). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the American Ambassador's Residence.

The memorandum summarized arms sales to India and Pakistan for the second half of 1975. It noted the continuing trend of Soviet arms supply to India and charted a growing gap in military capability between India and Pakistan.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-131, NSDM 273-290. Top Secret; SCI; Noforn; Orcon. Sent for information. The memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Information Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. It was concurred in by the Secretary of Defense. Eleven pages of detail and tables are not printed.

Ambassador Saxbe recommended that the United States withhold, limit, and delay joint cooperative projects, including foreign aid as a means of demonstrating official U.S. displeasure at occasional vociferous public criticism of the United States in India. Saxbe also indicated that he would ask United States Senator George McGovern to request from Prime Minister Gandhi specific citations of U.S. interference in Indian affairs during his upcoming meeting with her.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Niact Immediate; Stadis. McGovern met with Prime Minister Gandhi on January 9 and did not receive any specific allegations of U.S. interference. The Embassy in India summarized and commented on their meeting in telegrams 500 and 501 from New Delhi, January 10. (Ibid.)

The Embassy reported that Ambassador Saxbe lodged a formal complaint with Indian Foreign Minister Chavan concerning recent high-level Indian criticism of the United States, suggesting that further "unwarranted" criticism would make it difficult to continue any cooperative ventures.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State to SecState NODIS (3). Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only—Direct.

The Embassy reported the DCM's conversation with Indian Joint Secretary of the Americas Teja in which he informed the Indian Government that the U.S. would not proceed with its program of bilateral development assistance to India for fiscal year 1976 because of "insufficient mutual trust" between the U.S. and India.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State to SecState NODIS (3). Secret; Nodis.

Acting Secretary Sisco met with Indian Ambassador Kaul on January 23 to deny categorically any CIA activities in India and Bangladesh and request specific proof of the allegations. Sisco stated that recent Indian official statements had diminished U.S. confidence in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840096-1658. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. It was drafted by Brown; cleared by NEA and P; and approved by Sisco.

Ambassador Saxbe reported that he had protested the fact that Prime Minister Gandhi and other high Indian officials continued to criticize publicly the U.S. Saxbe agreed that the "hard line" was justified, but urged that U.S. arms sales to India's neighbors would deepen Indian suspicions and adversely affect Indian domestic and South Asian regional stability.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams to Secretary of State NODIS (3). Secret; Nodis.

Secretary of State Kissinger assured Ambassador Saxbe of his "full support" in expressing U.S. displeasure with recent official criticisms of the United States from the Indian Government. He also gave notice of recent decisions to withdraw the U.S. offer for developmental assistance for fiscal year 1976, to delay negotiations for PL—480 food assistance, and to deny an extension for satellite instructional television programming for India.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 12, India, State Telegrams from the Secretary of State NODIS (3). Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted by Dubs; cleared by E and NEA; and approved by Kissinger. Kissinger's cable is a direct response to Saxbe's request for reassurance of the Department's endorsement of his aggressive course of action. (Telegram 1510 from New Delhi, January 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

In a conversation with Ambassador Yaqub Khan, Under Secretary Sisco urged the reconsideration of the Pakistan Government's attempts to purchase nuclear processing facilities from France and West Germany.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, NSC Staff Files for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 20, Pakistan (1). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Nosenzo (PM/NPO); cleared by NEA/PAB; and approved by P. It was repeated immediate to Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and IAEA Vienna.

President Ford wrote to Prime Minister Bhutto with a warning of "considerable apprehension" in the United States over the worldwide spread of nuclear technology and urged him to not pursue its acquisition at this time.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, NSC Staff Files for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 20, Pakistan (2). No classification marking.

Ambassador Byroade expressed doubts about any hard line approach to persuade Prime Minister Bhutto to abandon his plans to develop nuclear technology in Pakistan.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 27, Pakistan, State Department Telegrams, to Secretary of State, Nodis (3). Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. In telegram 9747 from Paris, the Embassy reported that the Government of France had refused the U.S. request to bar sales of reprocessing materials to Pakistan (Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, NSC Staff Files for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 20, Pakistan (3). In Telegram 116392 to Tehran, May 12, Kissinger noted Bhutto's refusal to reconsider the project in a letter to Ford, March 30, and instructed the Ambassador to Iran to encourage the Shah to exert influence on Bhutto. (Ibid., Box 21, Pak-Nuclear (1).

Ambassador Yaqub Khan delivered a letter from Prime Minister Bhutto to Secretary of State Kissinger suggesting establishing a multilateral nuclear processing facility with Iran as a compromise to Pakistan buying a nuclear reprocessing plant. Kissinger and Yaqub also discussed other issues.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Peck. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

[4 pages not declassified]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 79-M00467A, Box 13, India. Secret; Sensitive. 4 pages not declassified.

The memorandum, "India: Present Scene, Future Prospects," assessed Indian domestic and foreign affairs and their projected course for the near future.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry File, Job 79–M00467A, India. Secret; Noforn. The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury jointly prepared the report. Under covering memorandum, not published, the Acting National Intelligence Officer for South and Southeast Asia and Africa, B.E. Layton, transmitted the report to Scrowcroft on May 24.

The Embassy offered a partially positive assessment of the Indian state of emergency on its first anniversary.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 4, India (3). Secret; Immediate. It was repeated to Colombo, Dhaka, Islamabad, Kabul, Katmandu, London, Moscow, Tehran, Bombay, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Madras, and CINCPAC Honolulu.

Secretary of State Kissinger conducted a high-level departmental meeting to discuss the sale of nuclear processing technology and arms to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted on July 12 by Peck and approved on October 12 by S. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.

Elliott and Oakley informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft of Secretary of State Kissinger's decisions regarding U.S. policy regarding the sale of nuclear materials to Pakistan. Kissinger instructed that the issue of U.S. military sales to Pakistan be kept separate, with one exception, from the reprocessing issue.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 27, Pakistan (6). Confidential; Sent for information. In telegram 9079 from Islamabad, August 30, Byroade urged Kissinger to "de-link" the nuclear processing issue from the A-7 fighter/attack aircraft sale, which he claimed was causing Bhutto to take a more rigid stance in favor of nuclear reprocessing, in light of public pressures on his government not to be perceived to bow to U.S. demands. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 203, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, Chronological Files, 5 August-18 December 1976)

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Indian Ambassador Kaul. They discussed Kissinger's recent visit to South Asia. Kaul also expressed concern about U.S. arms sales in the region and alleged that India is made a "scapegoat" for various foreign policy issues in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted by Ober and approved on October 12 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

Ambassador Saxbe reported that, based on recent conversations with Indian officials, that India was reacting with restraint to renewed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, but that sales could potentially have a negative impact on Indian-U.S. relations.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 4, India (4). Secret. It was repeated to Dakka, Islamabad, Moscow, and Tehran.

Secretary Kissinger met with Ambassador Yaqub Khan to discuss the resolution of the nuclear processing issue and arms supply.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 18, Nodis Memoranda of Conversations, September 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Pakistan Foreign and Defense Minister Ahmed to discuss the issues of arms supply, nuclear reprocessing, and other issues.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place is the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers while Kissinger was attending the UN General Assembly.

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Indian Foreign Minister Chavan and Ambassador-designate Kewal Singh. They discussed various issues related to bilateral relations, including the activities of the U.S.-Indian Joint Commission, the repurchase of spent Indian nuclear fuel, and U.S. arms sales to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Nodis. It was drafted by Kux and approved on November 11 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Kissinger was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly.

Account of Ambassador Saxbe's farewell call on Prime Minister Gandhi.

Source: National Archives, RG 84, New Delhi Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 111, 1976 Decentralized Subject Files, POL Indo-US 1976. Confidential. It was drafted by Schneider. Saxbe summarized this conversation in Telegram 16722 from New Delhi, November 17. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Secretary of State Kissinger met with Ambassador Byroade and Assistant Secretary Atherton just before their meeting with Ambassador Yaqub Khan concerning the Pakistani nuclear reprocessing issue.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 348, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, December 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Kissinger's meeting with Yaqub followed immediately afterward.

The memorandum assessed arms shipments to India and Pakistan during the second half of 1976. It reported that the U.S.S.R. remained India's largest military supplier, while China was Pakistan's major source of weapons.

Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-131, NSDM 273-290. Top Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Ten pages of detail and tables are not printed. The report was one produced semiannually in response to NSDM 289 and incorporates intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

President-elect Jimmy Carter acknowledged the greetings of Prime Minister Gandhi and expressed his hopes for the improvement of Indian-U.S. relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Unclassified; Priority.