

## Opening Negotiations, December 1972–July 1973

### 120. Editorial Note

On December 2, 1972, Secretary of State Rogers sent a memorandum to President Nixon regarding the Secretary's objectives at the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting, December 7–8, in Brussels. With regard to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) he wrote:

"On MBFR I will urge our Allies to support us in confining January's preparatory meeting to agreements on a firm date early next fall for convening the conference, on the agenda, and on procedures, avoiding discussion of the substantive issues which some of our Allies have wanted to open up. On CSCE, finally, I hope to generate a positive attitude about what the conference may be able to accomplish in opening up relations with eastern Europe. To that end I will stress the importance of maintaining a separate agenda item covering freedom of movement of people and ideas. I will also support the objective, already generally agreed among our Allies, of ensuring that any conference statement of principles will include a specific provision making it applicable to states within the same social system as well as among states in different systems. As you have probably noted, the Romanians have themselves already raised this issue in Helsinki. The nature of the opening and closing sessions of the conference—in particular whether it should open with a Ministerial session and close with a Ministerial or other high level session—will probably also be a matter of discussion; my objective will be to defer any decisions until we can make a better judgment as to how well our objectives are likely to progress in the conference." On December 5, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig communicated the President's approval of Rogers's proposed objectives in a memorandum to Eliot. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 262, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XII)

In the final communiqué of the NAC Ministerial meeting, December 8, the NATO Ministers stated with regard to CSCE "that their Governments would work constructively to establish necessary agreements in the multilateral preparatory talks" and "confirmed that it is the goal of their Governments to increase the security of all Europe through negotiations concerning such questions as principles guiding relations between the participants and through appropriate measures, including military ones, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability so as to contribute to the process of reducing the dangers of military confrontation; to improve cooperation in all fields; to

bring about closer, more open and freer relationships between all people in Europe; and to stimulate a wider flow of information and ideas.”

With regard to MBFR, the final communiqué reads: “The Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO’s integrated defense program noted with approval that the Governments of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey have proposed that the Governments of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union join them in exploratory talks on 31st January, 1973, on the question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. . . . Ministers hoped that these talks would make it possible to commence negotiations on this subject in the autumn of 1973. . . . Recalling the Declaration of the Council in Rome in May 1970, these Ministers confirmed their position that Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe should not operate to the military disadvantage of any side and should enhance stability and security in Europe as a whole. Their position is based on the conviction that the security of the Alliance is indivisible and that reductions in Central Europe should not diminish security in other areas.” With regard to the relationship between CSCE and MBFR, the communiqué reads: “While considering it inappropriate to establish formal and specific links, these Ministers reaffirmed their view that progress in each set of the different negotiations would have a favorable effect on the others.” The full text of the communiqué is in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO: Final Communiqués, 1949–1974*, pages 282–287.

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## 121. Editorial Note

On December 18, 1972, President Nixon suggested in a letter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin’s return to Moscow was an opportunity for a “full and frank exchange of views in the private channel.” Nixon wrote: “In European affairs, as you have pointed out, there are now new prospects for dealing with matters of security and cooperation and the reduction of armed forces. The initial contacts in Helsinki suggest that we can accelerate the preparations and define an agenda that will allow a full conference to be convened in June. We are also preparing for the initial talks on mutual reductions of armed forces. While the talks in January, as we have agreed, will be preliminary, we hope that some discussions can take place that will point up the issues that will be negotiated next autumn. Our Allies, as well as countries allied to the Soviet Union are deeply

involved in both of these negotiations, and I am not suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union can or should arrange the outcome without their participation or against their interests. Nevertheless, our two countries can facilitate the course of these talks and help ensure their success, and to this end we are prepared to remain in contact through this channel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14) The full text of the letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

On December 21, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff wrote in a memorandum to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger: “While the Helsinki CSCE preparatory talks are in recess (until January 15), the Soviets are badgering our representative about their concern that we will not honor our commitment to convene the Conference in June and restrict the preparatory talks to procedure.” Sonnenfeldt assured Kissinger that “the President’s letter to Brezhnev will take care of this. It mentioned June as the date and stated we could accelerate preparations for defining an agenda. The Soviets are going too far, however, in claiming that we agreed to discuss procedures only. And we should not abandon the effort to define more precisely what each committee will take up under main agenda headings when the talks resume. If this matter of our commitment to a date arises in normal channels, we will have to stick with our official line in our note of reply to the note given you last September, i.e., that June is a ‘reasonable target’ for convening the conference, if preparations justify it. If we don’t, we will have a major problem with the Allies.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 247, Agency Files, MBFR and CSCE, 1972)

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## 122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 20, 1972.

SUBJECT

CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Confidential. Hyland wrote on an attached correspondence profile: “No action necessary.”

Initial preparatory talks for CSCE, which opened November 22 at Helsinki, adjourned December 15. Progress was limited largely to procedural questions. The central issue of current East-West disagreement—the extent to which substantive issues will be tackled in the preparatory phase—will be addressed when talks resume January 15. The atmosphere of the talks thus far has been cordial and devoid of acrimony.

The representatives of the 34 participating states have proceeded at a deliberate pace, reaching agreement prior to the December 15 recess only on rules of procedure for the talks and—as a working hypothesis—on a three-stage format for CSCE (initial meeting of foreign ministers; detailed preparations in committees; concluding high-level meeting).

The Soviets pressed unsuccessfully for rapid agreement on “practical matters” like the agenda, organization, date and venue of the conference. However, a majority, including all the NATO Allies, held that CSCE must be carefully prepared through consideration of substantive questions at the Helsinki talks. Similarly, the Soviet preference for no holiday recess, or only a very short one, found no support outside the Warsaw Pact delegations.

In conformity with our positive approach to CSCE, I have instructed our delegation to make every effort to avoid polemical exchanges at Helsinki. It has developed good working relations with the Soviet delegation, while side-stepping several Soviet suggestions for stage-managing the proceedings through private understandings with us.

I am encouraged that the NATO Allies have approached the issues in a firm, businesslike manner, while holding frequent informal consultations in which the French usually participated. These inter-Allied discussions at Helsinki have meshed smoothly with the parallel consultations among the EC Nine. On the Warsaw Pact side, the Romanians boldly established an independent position from the outset, while the others have marched in lock-step with the Soviets.

When the talks resume in January, they will return to the disputed issue of the work program. Most delegations, despite Soviet objections, have insisted that it include the elaboration of terms of reference for the various preparatory committees that are likely to begin their work in phase two of CSCE itself, following the initial meeting of foreign ministers. When the work program for the preparatory talks is agreed upon, discussions will then likely turn to the CSCE agenda, where I expect two difficult issues to arise: the NATO proposal for discussion of the freer movement issue as a separate agenda topic; and Warsaw Pact insistence upon an agenda heading permitting consideration of the establishment of a permanent organization for European security and cooperation.

At that point, I would expect renewed press interest in the talks, stimulated by the prospect of controversy. Our delegation will continue its restrained approach in briefing media representatives, but experience suggests that others will speak more freely. We also will continue to work with our Allies to avoid exaggerated media emphasis upon the East-West differences that will inevitably come into the open as the talks proceed.

William P. Rogers

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**123. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 13, 1973.

SUBJECT

Your Discussion with Dobrynin on CSCE

You asked for a paper that you might give Dobrynin. Bill<sup>2</sup> and I have constructed a paper that addresses those issues that will probably trouble the Soviets once they digest the agenda, the committee structure, and the mandates that the West will table this week. (I sent you the Western document and comments on it while you were in Paris.)<sup>3</sup> It assumes that we want to cooperate with the Soviets to the extent that cooperation does not pit us against the Allies.

1. *Date.* We are committed to convene the conference in June, and most of the CSCE participants go along with this date. The problem is that some of our Allies condition this date on adequate progress in the preparatory talks, which could be defined in fairly stringent terms—such as full agreement on mandates for committees.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 214, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Background Papers ("Talkers"), Jan. 1972–Feb. 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote on an attached routing memorandum, "Good paper."

<sup>2</sup> William Hyland.

<sup>3</sup> According to a memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January 11, he forwarded a copy of telegram 160 from USNATO, January 10, which discussed these issues, to Kissinger as telegram Tohak 85. Sonnenfeldt's memorandum of January 11, along with telegram 160 (attached), is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR.

The Soviets will want to pin down the date (and the Helsinki site) without conditions. The obvious compromise path is to move simultaneously in Helsinki by fixing a tentative date while pursuing the agenda discussions.

There are some indications that the Soviets might want an earlier date than June. The French have mentioned April, and the Franco-Soviet communiqué<sup>4</sup> refers to the “nearest months to come.” *You might ask Dobrynin if they are considering another date.* While we would not oppose it in principle, there are some practical problems if there is to be a Brezhnev visit in May, or Presidential travel to Europe in April.

2. *Mandates.* The origin of the mandates for the working committees is the EC Nine, *under active French leadership* (you should not accept Dobrynin’s accusation of US blame for this approach). While the EC countries set considerable store by these mandates, there is no consensus on their disposition. The Western countries would prefer to negotiate agreed mandates, but realize the Soviets may not be willing. The USSR may decide, however, to table its own mandates or declarations so as not to be confined to Western texts. A viable compromise is to settle for a thorough discussion of the Western mandates and any Soviet or other proposals and agree that they will be considered by the relevant committees, but do not require prior agreement.

3. *Military Security Issues.* As reported to you in the earlier memorandum, the Western “confidence building measures” are minimal and have been supported by US in an effort to head off broader issues. Some of our Allies—Belgium and the Dutch—will probably break ranks, and Yugoslavia and Romania will almost certainly make some proposals on force movements and on MBFR. The real problem for the Soviets, therefore, is that this agenda item opens the door to a military-security debate. This is also a problem for us.

We can probably hold the line on our present proposals and develop an agreement on announcing major maneuvers and inviting observers which would represent a statement of intention, but not a legal or political commitment.

Our ability to work this out with the Soviets and the Allies would be facilitated by a smooth MBFR preparatory meeting, which may placate some of the Allies. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia and Romania will try to force more military issues into the discussion.

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<sup>4</sup> Pompidou met with Brezhnev in the Soviet Union January 11–12. A joint communiqué issued after the meeting reads in part: “The USSR and France attached great importance to the all-European conference on security and cooperation, and confirmed their determination to do all they could to ensure that the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki brought about an early mutual agreement, and also to ensure that the conference itself was convened as soon as possible in the coming months.” (*Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1973, p. 25740B)

4. *Permanent Machinery*. This is a Soviet desideratum that will be countered in the first instance by our concept of subsuming the issue within the mandates of the committees and using existing institutions. These committees might create some limited ad hoc groups to work beyond the Conference's termination. In other words, there might, for example, be an ad hoc economic group established to complete some specified work.

What the Soviets want, however, is some kind of pseudo political organ or secretariat that could serve as a bridge to the next conference, and perhaps allow some Soviet interference in Western affairs.

The current status is that the EC Nine have suggested to the NATO Allies a fallback position to inscribe on the agenda a separate item called "Follow-On to Recommendations and Results of the Conference." This would be undefined for now and negotiated after other work had been completed, and the participants could judge whether some follow-on machinery was necessary. Given the commitment of most Europeans to a successful Conference, it is likely that they will fall into some compromise scheme with the Soviets on permanent machinery.

This allows us some room to appear cooperative with the Soviets: (a) we can avoid opposing inscription on the agenda, (b) discuss the purposes and functions of the machinery before the ministers adopt the agenda.

In the attached paper (Tab A), which you may wish to give Dobrynin,<sup>5</sup> each of the foregoing compromises is set forth as a position on which the US could cooperate with the USSR in the Conference.

*If* you give this to Dobrynin, it will be important that when you come to some understanding with Dobrynin that arrangements will be made on this staff to permit the required monitoring and steering of the daily work in Helsinki to move to whatever agreements you have accepted.

At Tab A is the paper for Dobrynin.

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<sup>5</sup> Kissinger handed the paper to Dobrynin on January 17. No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 17 has been found, but see Document 143.

**Tab A<sup>6</sup>**

The United States will continue to support the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in June, 1973. It would facilitate agreement on this date by all participants, if there is progress in establishing an agenda.

We should aim for agreement on an agenda in as much detail as possible, and a general understanding of which committees would be established by the Foreign Ministers when they meet in June.

It would also be desirable to discuss the terms of reference or mandates for these committees and to consider proposals by all the participants including any documents the USSR might submit. Committee mandates need not be finally agreed at this time, if it is understood that the proposals made in this phase would be promptly considered by the working committees once these committees were established.

In light of the known views of many participants, it is unavoidable that the Conference should consider certain military security measures that will be useful in creating confidence in Europe. The US supports two limited measures: announcement in advance of major military maneuvers and invitations for observers to attend these maneuvers. In our view both measures could be voluntary and it would be left to each party to determine their implementation. Although a number of countries hold strong views on military security measures, the US is prepared to work to limit the military security measures to these items.

The US has considered the idea of establishing an institution to follow the work of the Conference after its formal adjournment. It would be preferable to handle as much as possible of the post-conference work through existing institutions or through temporary organs that might be required under each agenda heading. The US will not oppose inscription on the provisional agenda of items related to the establishment of a permanent organ. Before consideration of this by the Foreign Ministers and the opening of work by the Committees, there should be further discussions in this channel on the purposes and functions of a permanent institution. In any case, detailed discussion of this issue at Helsinki should logically come after discussion of other agenda items.

The US is willing to work with the Soviet side on the foregoing questions.

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<sup>6</sup> No classification marking.



124. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 17, 1973.

SUBJECT

Dobrynin's Papers on MBFR and CSCE;<sup>2</sup> Other Topics for Talk with Dobrynin: SALT, Science Commission

*MBFR*

Dobrynin gave you an advance copy of the Soviet reply to our note.<sup>3</sup> It contains the following points and problems.

1. *Site:*

The Soviets will propose *Vienna*, while we proposed *Geneva*. While *Vienna* poses no particular problem, this is calculated to serve two aims: it precludes *Vienna* as the future site of any CSCE work. Second, the Soviets propose that *Austria* issue the invitations to the initial MBFR talks, which means that they will be willing to fall in with the Soviet scheme of inviting "all Europeans" (see below).

—*We can go along with Vienna, but this is almost certain to set off a wrangle in NATO.*

2. *Participation*

There are two aspects: 1) who participates in the initial talks, and 2) who participates in the reductions.

—The Soviets accept our list of participants, including the "rotating observers" for the initial talks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 214, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Background Papers ("Talkers"), Jan. 1972–Feb. 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. The memorandum is misdated January 17, 1972. Kissinger wrote at the top of the memorandum: "CSCE—Who knows? How do we handle? Procedurally[,] mandates?" A third handwritten comment by Kissinger is illegible. At the bottom of the first page Kissinger wrote: "MFN—when will it be introduced?"

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are three papers from Dobrynin delivered to Kissinger's office on January 16. Dobrynin labeled the papers by hand: "talking points with Dr. Kissinger (*all-European conference*)," "talking points with Dr. Kissinger (*on reduction of armed forces*)," and "*text of Soviet reply on reduction of armed forces (not yet handed to the State Department)*." Dobrynin discussed the papers with Kissinger in two separate telephone conversations on January 16 at 7 a.m. and 7:10 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 17)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 119.

—They advocate that “*all Europeans*” should have the right to participate in the initial talks on an equal basis.

—Dobrynin’s talking points<sup>4</sup> state that they should be invited to express their views for “tactical reasons” presumably to placate Romania, Yugoslavia, etc.

—On the actual negotiations, the Soviets argue, as we do, that participation should not prejudice which countries will be involved in reductions.

—Dobrynin, therefore, proposes a “working body” of states (Benelux, FRG, Canada, US and UK; and the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and USSR) that would be the states whose forces would be reduced. *This excludes Hungary.*

In short, *the Soviets want us to agree that the Austrians can invite all European states to the initial talks, and to agree in private that the actual reduction areas exclude Hungary.*

### 3. *Agenda, Procedures at Initial Talks*

The note states that the purpose of the initial talks is to discuss matters of organization, procedures, determination of participants, time and site, and working out of proposals regarding the agenda.

*This is acceptable to us.*

### 4. *French Participation:*

The talking points, but not the note, state that the possibility of French participation in the “working body” should be foreseen.<sup>5</sup> This implies that French forces would be reduced, since the working body is composed of those states whose forces are to be considered for reduction.

### *Your Response*

You should raise some hell for their delay in replying especially since they have raised some thorny procedural problems.

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<sup>4</sup> Dobrynin’s attached talking points “on reduction of armed forces” read in part: “In our opinion, all European countries which would so desire should be also invited for tactical reasons to the negotiations themselves. These countries could be given an opportunity to express their views on major directions of solving the problem of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. However, the decisions with regard to the substance of that problem should be taken only by those states which themselves will carry out the reductions.”

<sup>5</sup> Dobrynin’s talking points read in part: “Though France, as is known, does not express a desire at the present stage to reduce its armed forces in the FRG, nevertheless, in our opinion, the possibility for its membership in the working body should be foreseen, since France is a party to the Potsdam Agreements and its troops are stationed on the territory of the FRG.”

—We are opposed to a blanket invitation of all European states. That is why at the summit and in September we held out for “Central Europe.”

—While Vienna may be alright, we had reasons to believe from the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact States that Geneva posed no problems; it is far more convenient for all concerned.

—*Possible compromise*: to drop the idea of inviting all European states to the *initial* talks, and to work out some formula that will allow them to make an appearance at the actual negotiations.

—If the Soviets start a long squabble over participation, we will have to slow down the Helsinki CSCE talks, since it was your understanding in Moscow that we would start in Helsinki last November if we had a guarantee of MBFR starting on January 31.

—Since it appears from the Soviet documents that Moscow is seeking to exclude Hungary from a possible agreement, we could compromise by 1) including Hungary in the working body of the negotiations, but 2) that this would not mean that we prejudge whether or not Hungary would be included in reductions. We want the eventual negotiations to consider a variety of possible reduction schemes and not prejudge the geographical area now.

(HAK Note: The formal Soviet note, as distinct from D’s “talking points,” does not engage the issue of Hungary directly. But it clearly will be an issue in the preparatory talks if the Soviets insist on excluding Hungary from the working body that their note says they want to agree on in the preliminary talks.)

### *MBFR Agenda*

Depending on how you judge the tactical situation you may want to give Dobrynin the paper at Tab A which lists the topics that we think should be considered by the main MBFR negotiating body next fall, i.e., the agenda. You should point out that the topics are phrased in a neutral manner and are designed to facilitate systematic discussions of all the issues. You should caution Dobrynin that not all Western countries see the eventual outcome of negotiations the same way and the Soviets should therefore be prepared for speeches in the preparatory talks that may not be wholly consistent with each other.

(HAK Note: The list of topics is taken directly from the “guidelines and agenda paper” developed laboriously in NATO.)<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram 285 from USNATO, January 17, contained the text of C–M(72), “Guidelines and Agenda Papers for Exploratory Talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe,” approved by the North Atlantic Council on January 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

## 2. CSCE

Dobrynin gave you a document on the *agenda*,<sup>7</sup> and a draft of a *declaration*.<sup>8</sup>

### *Agenda*

The Soviets have re-formulated two agenda items in an apparent attempt to take into account our positions. As a result *their formulation and the Western position have come fairly close.*

#### A. *Security*

“On ensuring European Security and on principles of relations between states in Europe, including certain measures of strengthening stability and confidence.” (Soviet)

“Questions of Security, including principles guiding relations between the participants and appropriate measures aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability with a view to reducing the dangers of military confrontation.” (Western proposal)

On this item, the Soviets have a apparently accepted our two confidence building measures: advance notification of maneuvers and invitational exchanges of observers at maneuvers.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to Dobrynin’s “talking points with Dr. Kissinger (*all-European conference*).”

<sup>8</sup> On January 15, a Soviet Embassy official hand-delivered to Kissinger’s office the Soviet draft “General Declaration on Foundations of European Security and Principles of Relations Between States in Europe.” The Soviet draft declaration is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE. Dobrynin informed Kennedy of the NSC staff in a telephone conversation at 8:10 p.m. on January 15 about the document’s forthcoming delivery: “This is a draft of the final document we would like to have adopted on the final stage of the European Security Conference. This was reintroduce [*sic*] Mr. Brezhnev to the President on a basis of confidential discussion in Moscow and then after Henry discussed with Mr. Brezhnev too this issue. So this is on a very confidential basis. We didn’t give it to the foreign office so don’t give it to the State Department.” Dobrynin reiterated, “It’s for Henry and the President.” (*Ibid.*, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 17, Chronological File)

<sup>9</sup> Dobrynin’s attached talking points on an “all-European conference” read in part: “With due regard for Dr. Kissinger’s observations, we would be prepared to consider, within the framework of the first point on the agenda, certain measures aimed at strengthening stability and confidence in Europe. By those measures we mean mutual notification of major military maneuvers in stipulated areas and of the exchange, by invitation, of observers at the maneuvers of that kind. The first point of the agenda of the all-European conference that we propose could be formulated as follows: ‘On ensuring European security and on principles of relations between states in Europe, including certain measures of strengthening stability and confidence.’”

### 3. *Human Contacts*

“On the expansion of cultural cooperation, contacts between organizations and people and on dissemination of information.” (Soviet)<sup>10</sup>

“Development of human contacts, broadening of cultural and educational exchanges and wider flow of information.” (Western)

*You should say*

*We are quite close on these two agenda items.* We also are close on the economic cooperation item.

—It is only a matter of some drafting changes, which could be accomplished by the delegation in Helsinki.

—We will work for an acceptable statement of both agenda items.

#### *CSCE Declaration*

The Soviet draft is fairly mild and poses no insurmountable problems for us. It bears down heavily on recognition of borders, and, most important, includes the establishment of periodic conferences and a “Consultative Committee” to prepare future conferences and for *political* consultations.

A major issue will be the European desire, including some of the Warsaw Pact, to strengthen this document to refute the Brezhnev doctrine. Also, they will want some statement on human contacts (i.e., freer movement).

*From our standpoint, we could probably live with much of this Soviet draft as the eventual outcome of the CSCE—and it bears some resemblance to a French draft<sup>11</sup> already tabled for discussion in NATO.*

*You should say*

We need to study this in some detail, *and talk to our Allies.*

—We assume the French have this.<sup>12</sup> Do the Soviets intend to table this in Helsinki or to work with us privately (*we would prefer that they table it*)?

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<sup>10</sup> Dobrynin’s attached talking points on an “all-European conference” read in part: “We agree to single out questions of cultural cooperation, contacts among people, and of increased information as a separate point of the agenda of the all-European conference and we suggest the following language: ‘On the expansion of cultural cooperation, contacts between organizations and people and on dissemination of information.’ It goes without saying that all that should be conditioned by strict respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country.”

<sup>11</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>12</sup> Dobrynin’s attached talking points on an “all-European conference” read in part: “We talked with President Pompidou along the same lines during the recent meeting with him and we intend to forward our considerations on the questions of preparing the

—Are they going to work with the French on this document?

—Ask him whether they expect us to give them in your channel a counterdraft.

—Is this the Soviet equivalent to our “mandates,” or will they table their versions of these as well?

(Note: It is important to determine the disposition of this document so we can make some plans on how to work in the Alliance.

You should give Dobrynin the paper we drafted on CSCE which lays out the issues we can work on with the Soviets (Tab B).<sup>13</sup>

I believe this paper remains valid even though we have received the Soviet texts in the meantime. In particular, you should note the way in which we are trying to compromise the issue of post-conference machinery (included as paragraphs XI a. and b., in the Soviet “General Declaration”). Incidentally, Dobrynin’s “talking points” do not raise this issue, presumably because you had not had a chance to discuss it yourself with Dobrynin.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

#### Tab A<sup>14</sup>

### Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

#### *Items for Inclusion on the Agenda for Negotiations*

1. *Area or Areas:* Delineation of Geographic Aspects of Negotiations.
2. *Phasing:* Timing and Stages in which Measures Might be Agreed and/or Carried Out.
3. *Principles:* Principles and Criteria.

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all-European conference to Chancellor Brandt.” In his telephone conversation with Kennedy on January 15, Dobrynin said about the draft declaration: “But this particular [*sic*] was given to Pompidou when he met with Mr. Brezhnev and today we are forwarding on a very basis [*sic*] through our private, through our private channels to Chancellor Brandt—not through the foreign office, but through some private channels we have there.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File)

<sup>13</sup> Printed as Tab A to Document 123.

<sup>14</sup> Top Secret. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: “Handed to Dobrynin by HAK, 1/17/73.”

4. *Constraints*: Arrangements to Enhance Stability and to Reduce the Danger of Miscalculation of the Intentions of Either Side and of Reducing Fear of Surprise Attack.

5. *Forces*: Determination of Forces to be Addressed.

6. *Size and Methods of Reductions*.

7. *Verification*: Means of Providing Assurances of Compliance with Obligations Assumed under an Agreement.

*Date and Venue*: Agreement on a site and on a date in the period between mid-September and October 9, for the start of negotiations.

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## 125. Editorial Note

During the second half of January 1973, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger held a series of confidential exchanges with West German Minister for Special Tasks Bahr and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the Soviet draft declaration on European security (see Document 124), draft mandates for a European security conference, and the opening of mutual and balanced force reduction talks.

On January 17, Bahr wrote in a confidential message to Kissinger in German: "Moscow informed the Chancellor [Brandt] about the draft resolution for the Helsinki Conference and also expressed a willingness to accept an exchange of observers [for military maneuvers] as a confidence-building measure and a minimum of cultural exchange and human contacts. This led the Chancellor to state that he considers substantial progress to be possible. I would be glad if we could agree to a substantive response to the Soviet ideas within the next two to three weeks." Bahr's message to Kissinger was attached to a memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January 18. Sonnenfeldt wrote: "Bahr also informed you that the Soviets had given the Germans the text of their CSCE resolution (which you already knew, I think) and had told them of their readiness to accept the idea of confidence-building measures, including observers at maneuvers, and a separate item on cultural and human contacts. This corresponds to Dobrynin's talking points given you the other day. The Soviets, incidentally, also gave the French a similar preview, with the additional point that they could accept advance notification of maneuvers as far east as the Western USSR. Curiously, Bahr does not say that the Soviets gave them a preview of their MBFR note. Bahr suggests to you that in the next two to three weeks we conform our responses to the Soviet suggestions on CSCE."

Sonnenfeldt attached a draft response to Bahr from Kissinger, dated January 18, which Kissinger initialed. The special-channel message to Bahr reads in part: "As regards CSCE, I would be interested in your comments on the substantive points in the Soviet draft declaration. I agree that we should discuss it in order to develop a common response." (Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence, #115–119; translated from the German by the editor)

On January 18, 1973, the Soviet Foreign Ministry presented the Embassy in Moscow with a note in response to the U.S. invitation of November 15, 1972, to the Soviet Union to attend talks on force reductions in Europe. The note reads in part: "The Soviet Government states its willingness to begin preparatory consultations toward negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe on January 31, 1973. As far as the place for conducting consultations is concerned, we propose that they take place in Vienna (Austria)." The note continues: "The Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that reducing armed forces and armaments will involve in the first instance Central Europe. We have no objections to the proposal of the U.S. Government, contained in its note of November 15, 1972, concerning participation in the preparatory consultations by Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, USSR, USA, Turkey, Federal Republic of Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Soviet Government considers that also other European states who indicate an appropriate interest should have the right to participate in such consultations on an equal basis. If some NATO countries prefer to participate in the consultations as observers and in rotation, as follows from the proposals of November 15, 1972, there is no objection to this." (Telegram 627 from Moscow, January 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

The following day, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed the Soviet note. A transcript of their telephone conversation on January 19 at 9:22 a.m. reads in part: "K[issinger]: Oh, one other suggestion I had for your consideration about that conference, the MBFR preliminary agenda conference. I was wondering, you have accepted the list of participants we have, but you said we should also invite all the others. D[obrynin]: Well, there was . . . K: I understand. Let me make this compromise suggestion to you. Supposing we stick, we have the original conference that will be composed of the countries that we've proposed. And that then we will agree at the conference to invite anybody else who wants to be heard. D: In this way original conference will be invited. K: They will say any other European country which wants to express its views should come to the meeting. D: No, no, I would like to understand. Because now . . . K: That was in our original letter. D: Yes, and when they



come in after some deliberations. K: Well, we could decide that. For example, after they come to Vienna they could do it. D: After they come to Vienna. And then proceed [omission in transcript] organ of conference which will handle it. K: That's right. D: The only difference is between . . . K: The original group and the working group. D: So the only real difference between your proposal and our proposal is that at the very beginning whether it should be invited all who want to participate, but when they arrive, then there will be a committee which will handle all the things. Your other proposal begins with . . . K: Who will then invite other countries. D: Okay, you make it as preliminary remarks. K: Right, and on Vienna as a site, I can tell you informally we are quite favorable, but we don't want to spend an enormous amount of capital with our allies to force them to do it. D: Yeah, I understand. K: But frankly, I mean this is between you and me, the British have been especially difficult, and we have now told them that they should be a little more quiet. This is strictly between you and me. D: My feeling is this proposal you mentioned, this is now so to speak in our confidential channel . . . K: That's right, but we haven't told the State Department yet. D: No, I understand. But this is [omission in transcript] because I will mention to Moscow that I talked to you . . . K: We'll support that. D: So in this case we still have now a proposal. K: That's correct." Dobrynin called again at 2:25 p.m. to clarify Kissinger's remarks. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, Chronological File)

On January 24, the North Atlantic Council announced in a press release that the Allied countries had replied to the notes from the five Warsaw Pact states inviting them to exploratory talks on MBFR, including the Soviet note to the United States of January 18, and had accepted January 31, 1973, as the opening date for consultations. On the venue of the talks, the press release noted that although "full advantage should be taken of the preparations that have already been made in Geneva," "Vienna is not ruled out if satisfactory arrangements can be made there in time." With regard to participants, the press release cautioned that although the Warsaw Pact states had accepted the list of participants proposed by NATO countries for the preparatory talks, the "question of participation" in the MBFR talks would exercise "a significant influence upon the development and results of the proposed talks." The issue of participation in the actual talks, however, could be "further discussed at the exploratory talks themselves." (Telegram 392 from USNATO, January 24; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

On January 24 at 5:49 p.m., Dobrynin phoned Kissinger to discuss the European security conference and MBFR. With regard to the European security conference, a transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: "D: I have just two paragraphs from Gromyko. One is about the European Conference. K: Yeah. D: You remember, you sug-

gested there was a little bit of distress with you that as a preliminary you suggested consultations, to make two or three phrases expressing what is in each point. K: Yeah. D: [omission in transcript] a mandate protocol or explanation of . . . K: Right. D: So, they discussed [omission in transcript] about it, and they thought this idea, and they gave me the letter to give to you and to the President our draft of [omission in transcript]. There are two or three phrases, maybe, no more. Points of the agenda. K: Can you send them over? D: Yes. I will send it to you." Dobrynin informed Kissinger that he would also be sending over a document on MBFR. "D: OK. The only thing in the second point is [omission in transcript] on about one point of Hungary, I would like to tell you orally when you read it. You remember the question, one, why we need Hungary. K: Yeah. D: Well, we give serious relation [*consideration?*] to this one. But it is a remark only for your consideration. Please do not tell anyone in State Department or to your allies. If you or some other countries make a real and feel that Hungary should be included not only as participant but then as negotiators the reduction troops from their territories, too. [*sic*] We could agree only under the provisions that they are prepared to do it, but then we will invite Italy to do the same. (Laughter) This is not impudent but [omission in transcript] because really the number of states which you propose includes all the members of the Warsaw Treaty [omission in transcript]. At the same time the socialist countries, you know, are easily stored [*sic*]. K: I understand. D: So even [omission in transcript], but if you read it, you will soon be agreed on the condition of Italy's [omission in transcript]. K: Well, now may I . . . you know that joke where Ribbentrop before the war went to a dinner party and met Churchill. D: What about? K: And Ribbentrop said, the next war will be different. We have Italy on our side. And Churchill said, that's only fair, we had them last time. D: (laughs)." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, Chronological File)

Later that day, Dobrynin's talking points on the "all-European conference" and on "reduction of troops to Europe" were delivered to Kissinger. The talking points on the European security conference listed "draft assignments for committees" at the conference, including "the first point of the agenda (European security)," "the second point of the agenda (economic cooperation)," "the third point of the agenda (cultural cooperation)," and "the fourth point of the agenda (regarding the creation of the Committee)." Both sets of talking points are *ibid.*, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE.

On January 25, Kissinger wrote in a special-channel message to Bahr: "Dobrynin has given me the texts of mandates for the Committees of the CSCE based on the four point agenda which the Soviets have already tabled in Helsinki. The mandates proposed by the Soviets are

much briefer than those tabled by the West, exclude any reference to confidence-building measures but include a mandate for the consultative committee which the Soviets want to have created by the CSCE. I have not so far informed our own agencies about this Soviet document and want to withhold comment to Dobrynin until I have a reaction from you. Dobrynin says the Soviets have provided the same texts to you and the French. Given the great interest which the European Nine have taken in the Western mandates tabled in Helsinki, I would greatly appreciate your judgment on how we might best proceed in the situation that now exists. There seem to be two basic choices: (1) attempt to work out a compromise between the Western and Soviet texts, a task that presumably will take a considerable amount of time and work, or (2) take the position that all suggestions for mandates should be given to the CSCE Committees when they begin their work. At Helsinki we would, under this choice, simply settle on the agenda headings. We are prepared to take the first course together with you. Your reaction would be extremely helpful." Bahr replied in a message to Kissinger in German on January 26: "I held out the prospect to the Soviets of a response for next week at the earliest because we will be able to determine our preference on the matter only this weekend. I will let you know for certain on Monday at the latest through this channel." (Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence, #115–119; translated from the German by the editor)

On January 25, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed the latter's talking points on MBFR during a telephone conversation at 6:30 p.m. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: "K: All right. On MBFR, let me tell you what we will do. First, in your reply, you insist on Vienna. You know, in a nice way. D: Yeah. K: The United States will support you. D: Yes. K: Secondly, on membership. We think the easiest solution would be the following, although that's essentially what I already told you at lunch. If you would accept our participants and if you would propose Romania and Bulgaria as observers, then we would agree at the Conference. If you want to exclude Hungary from the working group, we will agree with you. D: No, no; it's not quite clear. Because as of now, it's not really question about—really we don't specifically worry about Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. Really, it is not a problem for us. Because we discussed it with our allies and we could handle it in one way or another. So the question really I would like a more clearer [statement?] of your position. Well, there was a proposal originally— K: You see, the problem with us is if we exclude these southern countries now, I just can't imagine how we're going to handle it. D: This was a proposal you can invite all of them. K: But we don't want to invite the neutrals. D: Oh, this is a problem." Dobrynin then raised Moscow's concern that MBFR not become a bloc-to-bloc negotiation:

“D: One is proposing otherwise your very clear position bloc to bloc, Henry. It is so clear, bloc to bloc. There is no other way to do this. Because you’re just proposing exactly bloc to bloc. K: Well, is that bad? D: You know when you discuss in Moscow—at least in my presence—Gromyko tried to explain and in the presence of Brezhnev, and you just shake hands and said: Well, all right, though you don’t quite understand what does it mean, what you said (laughter) all right to. This I do remember. More than that, this is in a communiqué—or rather the paper you receive from us. You asked us to give you, and we give you paper. That is, everything you asked. That was in written form, and one phrase which is—and this would be on non-bloc, bloc [*basis?*]. So now you coming back to bloc basis.”

Kissinger subsequently phoned Sonnenfeldt to discuss Dobrynin’s remarks. A transcript of their telephone conversation at 6:30 p.m. reads in part: “K: Hal, I just talked to Dobrynin. And he says they can’t accept this. S[onnenfeldt]: They cannot? K: Now what he proposes is that we take this working group; that we confine the meeting to the working group, the preliminary meeting. And then say the working group has the right to invite others. And that we can propose the southern flank, and they’ll propose anyone else, including neutrals.” After briefly discussing the Soviet position, Kissinger asked, “Do you want to talk to Stoessel and see what he thinks?” Sonnenfeldt replied, “Yeah, if I can locate him someplace.”

The following morning, January 26, Kissinger and Stoessel discussed the Soviet proposal over the phone. “S[toessel]: On that MBFR business—I reflected on it, accounted [*sic*] with Hal also, and the way I come out is probably best to go for this restricted list. K: OK, and then have them come back in their note with a restricted list minus Hungary. S: Yeah. K: With the right then to invite others whose views should be hard. S: That’s right. Now they might want to say something to the effect that Hungary has informed them that it does not wish to participate. It’ll be a bit transparent, but that might help a bit. K: OK. S: Then we’ll take a lot of flak from the flag [*flank?*] countries, but I think we can handle it. K: OK. Good.”

In a phone conversation, apparently on January 26, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed once again the convocation of troop reduction talks. A transcript of their telephone conversation, marked “done before 27 Jan 1973,” reads in part: “D: Well, Henry, I received from Gromyko answer on this troop reduction business. Well, we agreed really what you suggest. In a sense just let them arrive, and we consider that it will be this way, that they will arrive—the Committee comes to Vienna because on the others we agreed upon. K: Right. D: And the idea is that they will arrive before the 31st of January, and ideas will begin effect on the date that was agreed upon in Moscow between you

and Brezhnev—the 31st as you suggested. At the same time there will be representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany and [omission in transcript], practically all from our side. And we assume all yours will be there at the beginning. Then they will discuss—I mean, about those who will compose this body for making decision along those lines we discussed upon. K: All right. D: And during this consultation we reserve the right to raise when it will be [omission in transcript] necessary about this neutral countries just as the right to raise during this preliminary consultation. K: Right. D: As you I understand reserve your right to exercise it. K: Right. D: (laughter) This is my impression, yes? K: That is correct. D: So this is answer just for you. K: But you will give us a formal answer?" At this point, Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviet Union would give a formal response to the Western notes of January 24 on January 27. He then read to Kissinger the text of the Soviet response before its official delivery. The telephone conversation continued: "K: Well, Anatol, you tell Gromyko that he has made a big effort and we will make a big effort. D: [omission in transcript] So, now, Henry, I hope by the way on both points—on European Conference, you remember, you sent to me your position? K: Yes, I have been in touch with Bahr. And he promised me an answer by Monday. D: Yeah, it will be very soon. K: And as soon as I—We are not the obstacle on that. D: I know. K: We can concert with the Europeans. And I will get in touch with the French after Rogers is out of there because they get too confused about our channels of communication." Dobrynin then discussed the Soviet draft agenda (mandates) and draft declaration for the European security conference (see Document 124). "D: But the only clear position I would like to make—please make sure that your Delegation in Helsinki—I am not thinking about the final document because they don't know about it—but I think about the so-to-speak mandate. K: Yeah. But I have to get some agreement from the Europeans first, Anatol. D: I know but— K: As soon as I have heard from Bahr, I will— D: I understand, but I think still a certain kind is up to you what kind of a preliminary they have to actually—on a working level they will— K: Yeah, I will— D: They shouldn't necessarily know that we are already involved on a high level but— K: No, no, I will calm them down. D: Yes, because otherwise in a little bit they will say some suggestions or objections and our people, without knowing it, they will report to Moscow Americans making fuss. So you see. K: No, I will calm them down." (All of the transcripts of telephone conversations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, Chronological File)

On January 27, Bahr wrote to Kissinger in a confidential message in German: "We will decide at the end of the week about the reply to

the Soviets. Your opinion regarding the following thoughts would be very important to me. I will propose to say the following to the Soviets: 'We will limit ourselves in Helsinki to determining the agenda headlines and designating the commissions, whose task will be to work out resolutions in the second phase of the conference. In doing this, they can make use of the various proposed mandates as working material.' If the Soviets accept the proposal, we will save time in Helsinki and avoid the risk of having to reach a compromise between the different conceptions of mandates, which would leave both sides dissatisfied, which could prove later to be an obstruction in working out the resolutions, and which in any case would not yet resolve the basic problems with regard to the resolutions. If the Soviets do not accept the proposal, our tactical position will then improve for the then necessary working out of compromise formulas for the mandates. I do not fail to recognize the difficulties of achieving the agreement of all the Allies to this proposal. In this regard, I would be interested in knowing how the French will react to the Soviet papers. We have not discussed it with them."

On January 29, Kissinger replied in a special-channel message to Bahr: "Your proposed reply to the Soviets corresponds to our own present thinking. If you should decide to proceed along that line, I think we could support it. It would be important to have your judgment how other Western governments would react, especially since the Nine took the lead in developing the detailed mandates tabled by the West. Would you be able to take a major role in persuading the European Allies that this is the wisest course to take? Should the Soviets refuse to accept the compromise solution of postponing the use of the various mandate proposals until the second phase, we do, as you indicate, face the problem of working out agreed mandate formulations. In this regard, what is your judgment as to the acceptability of the short Soviet version given to you and us? Incidentally, we have not talked to the French about the Soviet papers and have no private information regarding their attitude due to the absence of their Ambassador, who is our channel to Pompidou. In both contingencies, we have the problem of the Soviet proposal for some post-conference machinery. I would be interested in your view of this problem." (Both in Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence, Unindexed [1]; translated from the German by the editor)

On January 27, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered to the Embassy in Moscow its reply to the Western notes of January 24 on MBFR preparatory talks. The note reads in part: "The Soviet Government is sending to Vienna, Austria, by January 31, 1973, its representatives to conduct with representatives of other European States, the USA and Canada preparatory consultations on the question of mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The Soviet side pro-

ceeds from the premise that there will be determined already in the course of the preparatory consultations—through exchange of opinions both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis between representatives of the interested states assembled in Vienna—the composition of participants in a possible agreement or agreements concerning reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, on which in essence there are no disagreements. . . . In this, it stands to reason that those countries which will be reducing their own armed forces and armaments, as well as countries on whose territory forces subject to reduction are located, should participate in examining and deciding the substance of questions.” (Telegram 976 from Moscow, January 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR) On January 31, representatives of Eastern and Western states gathered in Vienna to discuss preparations for talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.

On February 9, Bahr replied to Kissinger’s message of January 29. In his confidential message, Bahr wrote: “Due to developments in Helsinki, I consider it no longer possible to pursue at this time my proposal of January 27. The Soviets have tabled in the meantime a part of their draft mandates. The discussion is in full swing. The other Western governments and the neutral states would not understand it if we now speak out in favor of breaking off the discussion and agree only to agenda headlines. If the negotiations in Helsinki come to a standstill, it will have to be decided whether to return to the earlier thoughts. Until then, we will work toward reaching an agreement on the basis of the Western proposals regarding the mandates for commissions and sub-commissions. I am positively inclined with regard to the question of follow-on organs because I see in them the possibility to secure for the United States an additional, institutionally-anchored right to participation in Europe. However, we have not yet discussed this question with the other Western governments. I am quite clear that there will be difficulties within the Alliance in reaching a common position. We must reach an understanding in the near future regarding how internal agreements can be reached for the shaping of opinion in the West. It can already be seen in Helsinki and Vienna that these multilateral events are much more difficult to navigate than something like the Berlin negotiations. Internally, the MBFR enterprise will be relatively easier for me than the enterprise of CSCE.” (Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Unindexed [1]; translated from the German by the editor)

**126. Memorandum for the President's Files by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Camp David, Maryland, February 2, 1973.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Prime Minister Heath and Sir Burke Trend, Friday, February 2, 1973, 4:00 p.m. Camp David

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The President saw the East-West situation in the following light: The Western heads of government would be meeting at a time when the Soviets had achieved strategic parity and had no public opinion to worry about. The Chinese were gaining ground in the world. There was a great isolationist current proceeding in the world, and the spreading fashionable view of *détente* at any price. This put the West at a serious bargaining disadvantage. On the plus side, there was the Sino-Soviet split. It was hard to understand the reasons for the Soviet view, given their style; the Chinese view of the situation was easier to comprehend. The President thought that this major split was likely to last. The Russians could never be too sure of Eastern Europe. Just as we in the West had the problem of a race to Moscow, in the East there was a race towards the West. At the Security Conference they wanted to talk about exchanges in contacts; this was for them running a risk of disintegration. That was our opportunity. There was a problem of Europe becoming inward-looking. We could stall on the European Conference, but public opinion would not permit it. People needed hope without giving up anything substantial.

The United States would play the Sino-Soviet game to the hilt. Their rivalry was desirable. We would reassure the Chinese in the case of Soviet attack.

The President then turned the discussion to the defense issues. As to forward-based systems, the problem was how to relate them to central systems which were the most important. On MBFR, the President emphasized that NATO needed substantial conventional forces. We had to be sure not to weaken this conventional strength through

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 27, Geopolitical File, Great Britain, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 4:15 to 6:45 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)



MBFR.<sup>2</sup> The President also stressed the need for a strategy to take care of alliance concerns about SALT I and SALT II. The United States would not be trapped by the Soviets. Yet if we looked at reality we had to understand that we were limited in raising defense budgets. Dr. Kissinger explained that we were using SALT II and the MBFR negotiations partly as a way of getting the Europeans to address defense issues seriously, and focus on the real question of security. Hopefully we could use these negotiations in the same way at home and head off or postpone Congressional pressures for unilateral cuts in our forces.

The President emphasized that we had to get a common US/UK position. We should have joint study groups. Military men, of course, didn't think anything can change. But we would have to address these issues. The Prime Minister raised the question of briefing the Europeans on trends in Soviet missiles. The President said that this would be done in the context of US/UK cooperation. With regard to SALT, MBFR and so forth, we had good communications.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>2</sup> In preparation for the meeting, Kissinger included in a briefing memorandum to the President on January 30 a talking point on MBFR: "On Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, [your objective is] to reassure the Prime Minister that we will not seek a *quick reduction with the USSR*, but need the appearance of progress in the negotiations to satisfy our critics at home and to move the Soviets toward concrete issues of actual troop cuts; US-Soviet reductions will be the least damaging, but the UK and the Europeans will have to sponsor it." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1336, Unfiled Material, 1973, 10 of 12)

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## 127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 15, 1973.

SUBJECT

CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT): Round II Ends

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR, 1973. Confidential. In an attached correspondence profile, Hyland wrote "no action necessary per Sonnenfeldt" on May 17.

During round II of the Helsinki talks, January 15 to February 9, participants established the outer limits of their positions on which actual negotiations will begin, presumably shortly after the opening of round III on February 26. The Soviets offered some notable concessions during round II—acceptance of a separate CSCE agenda item on human contacts and cultural relations (freer movement); inclusion of confidence-building measures under the agenda topic on security; and agreement that the MPT should draft language describing the general tasks (“mandates” in NATO terminology) of the committees to be established to deal with each agenda topic during the second phase of CSCE itself.

Differences emerged during round II on five issues likely to dominate the discussions during round III:

- the specific principles of interstate relations that should appear in the mandate of the CSCE committee on this topic;
- the text of the mandate under the human contacts agenda topic;
- military aspects of security, especially the question of MBFR/CSCE linkage;
- the Warsaw Pact proposal for a post-CSCE consultative committee;
- the procedural question of whether to reach agreement, during MPT, on CSCE phase II subcommittees and their mandates.

On all of these topics, the plenary debates during round II were led by the Soviets, on one side, and by various combinations of middle and smaller NATO Allies, plus neutrals, on the other.

We gave moderately-worded support to Western positions on some of these issues, and remained silent on others. Relations between the US and Soviet delegations were friendly, despite differences on substance, and the two consulted periodically. The US delegation has reported that some Allied and Western-oriented neutrals were alert for signs of US-Soviet efforts to dominate the talks but that those delegations found no basis for genuine concern.

The Soviets, during round III, will have to decide how to balance their desire for an early conclusion of MPT against their disinclination to make easy concessions to the Western participants. Most Allied and neutral delegations at Helsinki seemed fully aware of Moscow’s problem and to expect that the Soviets would move still closer to Western positions during round III.

Nevertheless, most Allies also appear to understand the need, at some point after the discussions resume, to fall back from some of the detail in the various mandates tabled at Helsinki by the NATO countries. We will be actively discussing this topic in NATO prior to the resumption of the talks on February 26, seeking Allied agreement on a compromise approach to allow MPT to end in time for a conference to be convened in the last week in June at the earliest.

The US delegation at Helsinki should, I believe, also try to help avoid unnecessary delay during round III by supporting more efficient work methods—for example, the establishment of working groups on various topics in lieu of exclusive reliance on plenary sessions. On most of the important issues of substance, however, we and our Allies are fairly close, and I believe we should not break ranks with them. While all of the other Allies, except France, favor some tie between CSCE and MBFR, we will continue to oppose any linkage.

William P. Rogers

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**128. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 20, 1973.

SUBJECT

MBFR Status

As a result of the NATO meeting on Monday, the Alliance has inched forward on the question of Hungarian-Italian participation.<sup>2</sup>

It is agreed that within the next day or two the Allies will put forward a proposal to lay aside the Hungarian question, but press for a private Soviet commitment that Hungary will in fact be included in the reduction zone without Italy. This will almost certainly be rejected, but the way will then be open for the US to gain support for its compromise: namely that Hungary's status be specifically designated as unresolved, but the status of all other participants will be defined.<sup>3</sup> (For us this compromise will be a way station to Hungary's exclusion. For

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 214, Geopolitical Files, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Background Papers ("Talkers"). Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Urgent; sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 906 from USNATO, February 20, reported on the North Atlantic Council meeting on February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR) The Soviets and Hungarians refused to permit Hungary to become a full-fledged participant in MBFR talks unless the Western participants agreed to Italy's full-fledged participation. (Intelligence Note RESN–61.10, March 1; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 26959 to Vienna, February 13, repeated to USNATO and all NATO capitals, instructed U.S. negotiators to seek such a "procedural compromise." It also stated: "US would prefer inclusion Hungary as one of twelve full participants, with Hungary one of countries in putative reductions area. If we cannot obtain Eastern agreement to its inclusion, as appears likely, omission of Hungary from status direct full participant

many Allies, thus far, it will still remain a step toward its eventual *inclusion*. So we obviously won't be out of the woods.)

—If the Soviets want to get on with MBFR business, they should accommodate us on this.

—If they want to be tough, they can insist on designating Italy as undefined, or insist that Hungary be dropped. In this latter case, the Alliance will have to face the consequences of the exclusion of Hungary—which all of the Allies are reluctant to do.

We have had extraordinary difficulty in persuading the Allies to the flexible on the Hungarian question.

—The Allies strenuously object to being “stampeded.”

—None of them believe the Soviets are determined, and all of them believe there is give in the Soviet position.

—The Benelux do not want to be committed to full participation if Hungary's status is undefined, but in the end they will not leave the Germans alone.

—The UK has been the toughest in all the discussions: they refuse to take the Soviets seriously, and are insistent that the Allies not start the entire exercise by making a substantive concession. (Rush's efforts have not convinced them otherwise though he made a very effective presentation.<sup>4</sup> I can't tell whether this is again just Foreign Office working level or all of Whitehall. Cromer told me he would make sure Downing St. understood our position.)

—None understand why we are in a hurry.

While complaining to you about our bad faith in not supporting the Soviet position as agreed privately,<sup>5</sup> the Soviet representatives in

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in MBFR would clearly be preferable to alternative outcomes: (a) collapse or prolonged stalemate of MBFR negotiation; (b) inclusion in full status and in reductions area also of Italy or other Allied flank countries; or (c) dropping Benelux states along with Hungary from full MBFR participation—any of which would not be in our interests.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 29670 to all NATO capitals reported on Rush's conversation with Cromer on February 15. (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> On February 13, Vorontsov handed a note to Scowcroft for Kissinger. It reads in part: “As the White House was earlier informed, Hungary could give its consent to be included among the participants of a prospective agreement on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe on condition that Italy is also included in that number.” The note recalled that at that time, the United States did not object to such an approach, but now “the American representatives in Vienna together with representatives of other Western countries firmly insist on including Hungary among the participants of prospective agreement and at the same time do not suggest to include Italy among those participants. We expect that the US representatives at the Vienna consultations will get appropriate instructions in this respect—that is, either they should not insist on including Hungary in the area of reductions, or should go in direction of additional inclusion of Italy into that area.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 38, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Background Papers)

Vienna as well as others in the Soviet bloc are going out of their way to convince our Allies that they will bargain about Hungary. For example, they have suggested to Dean various compromises, such as including Denmark or dropping Luxembourg. Only a few days ago, the Soviet representative told the Belgians (of all people) that the West should be “patient” since Moscow takes a while to make up its mind. The Hungarians have made it clear that they are outraged about the Soviet position and have even urged the West to be tough. Similar noises have come from the Poles and even the East Germans.

All of this suggests that the Soviets are deliberately prolonging the Hungarian affair and driving wedges between us and our Allies. Indeed, by raising the Hungarian-Italian issues so early they have made it impossible even to open the conference—which was not my understanding of how they would play the question.

It may also be that the actual Soviet aim is to include Italy. Gromyko has just emphasized this in Moscow to the departing Italian Ambassador, and as I pointed out in my message to you in Peking<sup>6</sup> there is some suggestion in Vorontsov’s complaint that you agreed to include Italy, rather than drop Hungary. This could explain the strange Soviet behavior on whether Hungary should be in or not.

Since Italian inclusion is clearly not in our interest and the Allies are even more adamantly opposed to Italian inclusion than Hungarian exclusion, you may want to remind Vorontsov that we have not agreed to make an effort to have Italy included, but only to drop Hungary.

Finally, whatever we agree on, the Allies will not agree to exclude Hungarian territory entirely. They (and we) will want to have some constraints on Soviet forces in Hungary. But this can wait till the negotiations really start next fall.

Attached at Tab A is a telegram from Strausz-Hupe which gives you the flavor of the problem we have with the Allies.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 827 from Brussels, February 16, is attached but not printed. It reported that the Belgians “are again disquieted by what they perceive as US disregard of their interests or, more accurately, of their equality of status within the Alliance. This feeling is intensified by vague suspicions that the US has some understanding with the USSR that take precedence over Allied consultations. The Soviet decision to withdraw Hungary from full participation, apparently made over the heads of the Hungarians (and other WP members) themselves, is, we suspect, seen by the Belgians not only as a forewarning of Soviet unpredictability but also as an instance of superpower manipulation.”

**129. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 21, 1973, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg Foreign Minister  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Jean Wagner, Luxembourg Ambassador  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Thorn: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I appreciate this opportunity to talk about our relations—European-American relations; there is a malaise at the moment.

Kissinger: Yes. The European ability to produce theological debates amazes me. I really sometimes wonder what can be done. If the pattern in MBFR does not change, I don't know what will happen. The Europeans keep trying to tie us down with legalisms. But the point is that we cannot be tied down with legalisms but only with substance. For two years we have been conducting the most intensive and meticulous technical studies. We have no preconceived notions. But the best way to keep us in Europe is to get a theory that will keep us there. Otherwise you can be sure that the Congress will drive us out. I keep hearing about US-Soviet deals. If we wanted to get out it would be the easiest thing for us to stimulate a resolution in the Congress.

Now as regards Hungary, we think it would be better to keep them out rather than putting Italy in. But this has become a religious issue now. In fact the troops do not threaten Western Europe. By now Hungary is a religious issue.

Thorn: Some people were thinking of Yugoslavia. There is a fear of a Soviet invasion.

Kissinger: But the cuts would only be 5–10% anyway. So there would be no difference.

Thorn: I have talked to the Dutch Foreign Minister and urged him to be flexible on the Hungary issue. But you know I have to tell you that there is widespread fear of a pre-agreement between you and the Soviets.

Kissinger: I can tell you that the only pre-agreement was to get a deal on a date that was far enough ahead to enable us to prepare the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 271, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. Confidential. Outside the system. The conversation took place in Kissinger's office.

talks properly. So the only pre-agreement was to get dates for CSCE and MBFR. As I told you, if we want to get a deal we can get Mansfield to put in a resolution. We would not need to negotiate with the Russians on MBFR. Now let me tell you another serious thing. The European reaction to our Vietnam bombing deeply offended the President. For him the Alliance is now more a matter of the head than the heart. We stayed in Vietnam for four years to demonstrate the validity of an alliance in the U.S. The only real issue in Vietnam was whether the US could be driven from disadvantage to disadvantage. If that had happened, it would have damaged the Alliance. That is why we did what we did. About the bombing—go to Hanoi. There is no street that is damaged in the city but only in the suburbs. I was frankly astounded by the accuracy of the bombing. We did not even see villages that were destroyed, at least on the route that we took. And there are the casualty figures: 1,000 killed. These are their own figures. That is certainly different from Europe in World War II. So you have to understand how deeply offended the President was by the reaction from the very Allies for whom he was safeguarding the US commitment.

But all of this is behind us now and the question is: how do we start talking? Take CSCE. We never believed in it. We want to get it over with. Otherwise people will think something really important is going on—though no one understands what. Why should there be a long debate about mandates. The best thing is to get nothing or just something banal. Moreover, you know that the Europeans drove us into the Conference. Now they are engaging in some sort of Wagnerian struggle about long or short mandates.

Thorn: So you are saying “not so much detail.”

Kissinger: Well, if it goes on a long time the people will think something is going on. It is better to get it over with.

Thorn: Do you object to “freedom of movement?” I mean, shouldn’t we take the offensive on this?

Kissinger: No, I don’t object. And I think it is all right to take the offensive but I think we should get relatively short mandates.

Thorn: Well it was always your representatives who used to talk about “careful preparation.” This is really a change in position.

Kissinger: Well, I think we are better off with relatively short mandates and with getting the Conference over with or just getting a banal result.

Thorn: What is your position about a follow-on organ?

Kissinger: Well we could consider something low key; something like a clearing house, but no important functions.

Thorn: I see.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

130. Letter From the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Vest) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)<sup>1</sup>

Helsinki, March 5, 1973.

Dear Walt:

Last week I had a chance to “see ourselves as others see us.” Henry Kissinger not too long ago talked with Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Thorn in Washington.<sup>2</sup> Thorn’s cable was repeated among other places to his representative at CSCE. He shared it with the other members of the 9 here where it created a stir, to put it gently.<sup>3</sup> He kindly let me read it as well, a fact which obviously should be protected.

Thorn reported an atmosphere of impatience, uninterest in Western European concerns, and a disposition to brush them aside casually—in short an autocratic heedlessness. The details were as follows:

a. MBFR—He bluntly told Thorn the Soviets were right to exclude Hungary so the Allies should accept the fact and get on with it. When Thorn protested that this was not simply an issue of political-military geography but was a fundamental question of how to treat with the Soviets, Kissinger made it clear that he knew best how to handle them.

b. He urged that Quarles<sup>4</sup> should be sacked because he was really not working out well in the MBFR situation in Vienna. (This was not

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Box 1, Correspondence, 1973. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation at the top by Stoessel to Springsteen reads: “Still more on the HAK–Thorn conversation.” Vest’s letter is attached to a reply from Stoessel, March 16, in which Stoessel wrote: “There is no doubt that Henry’s remarks have caused a stir. While he may have taken the line he did quite deliberately in the hopes of producing some results through shock treatment, I fear that he may have gone too far. In particular, his reference to dealing with the Soviets can only add fuel to the fire about US-Soviet conniving. I shared your letter with Ken Rush, who is also concerned and will do what he can to see that this sort of thing is not repeated. However, as you well know, this is a realm in which we in this building do not have much control.”

<sup>2</sup> See Document 129.

<sup>3</sup> The British delegation at the Helsinki talks reported that the Luxembourgers had briefed the EC-Nine representatives about Kissinger’s comments at a working dinner on March 1. According to the British report of the Luxembourgers’ comments, Kissinger said that the Europeans were being “thoroughly unhelpful” with regard to CSCE and MBFR; that the West “should let the Russians, as sponsors, have what they wanted, a short snappy Conference with little substance”; and that “freer movement had tactical uses but would lead to nothing.” (*Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series III, Volume II, *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975*, p. 103, fn 6)

<sup>4</sup> Bryan Edward Quarles van Ufford, head of the Netherlands delegation at the MBFR exploratory talks in Vienna.



a happy comment to Thorn who is a close personal friend of Quarles' dating from the times when the latter was Dutch Ambassador in Luxembourg. I suspect the starchy small Dutch Establishment will not forget this quickly, and my Luxembourg colleague reported the Dutch general reaction that the U.S. was acting like the Soviets who had complained to Bonn about Brunner<sup>5</sup> in CSCE.)

c. He denied that there was any US-Soviet collusion other than the original MBFR/CSCE timetable of last September which had been worked out with the Soviets and endorsed by the Allies. (Luxemburgers found this not too convincing in the light of US conduct of MBFR and Kissinger's conviction that he could handle the Soviets.)

d. He added that CSCE was of no importance to the US but MBFR was such a key internal political necessity that the Western Europeans should not ruffle the Soviets in any way in connection with CSCE, should dispose of the mandates as quickly as possible since they were of little importance anyway (the French will like that), and should also wind up the conference quickly before public expectations built up which could not be met.

e. Conclusion. Although U.S. has been more polite in diplomatic channels, this was Kissinger speaking and the EEC countries should look after their own interests very carefully since in the period ahead it seemed possible that the primary drive of U.S. policy would be accommodation to Soviet preferences rather than to those of its Allies.

You may well ask, so what's new. It has been clear to me, since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, that we value MBFR much more highly than CSCE. The geographical place of Hungary in MBFR has been argued for some years in NATO. However, the impact of the Thorn telegram bears watching. He is a respected politician in the European scene and as a Luxemburger is less suspect of special pleading than Foreign Ministers from one of the larger EEC countries. This will probably percolate through most of the Western European capitals and perhaps even reach the press. It will be fuel to the fairly large blaze of suspicion which already exists.

Meanwhile I stick to my last in Helsinki and urge that we work our way prudently through the CSCE mandates, meet the timetable for a late June conference opening date, point out that my position is based

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<sup>5</sup> Eduard Brunner, head of the Swiss delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

on NATO discussion and agreement, and do not propose to jump the NATO caucus to join the Soviets.<sup>6</sup>

Sincerely,

**George**

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<sup>6</sup> On March 8, B.J.P. Fall of the Eastern European and Soviet Department of the British Foreign Office reported on a conversation with Vest to Tickell. According to Fall, Vest had called Thorn's report of his conversation with Kissinger "basically accurate," but that he did not think that Kissinger had "given very deep thought to the question," and that "the President would want the American delegation to remain committed to the line agreed in NATO." (*Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series III, Volume II, *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975*, p. 103, fn. 6)

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### 131. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 5, 1973, 8:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Sir Thomas Brimelow, The Foreign Office  
Earl of Cromer, UK Ambassador to the United States  
Richard Sykes, Minister, UK Embassy

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

#### SUBJECTS

Currency Crisis; Nuclear Understanding; MBFR; NATO

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brimelow: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On MBFR, every model of MBFR that we have studied is advantageous to the Russians. So the question is, why do they show so little interest in it? Our judgment is that it is because it would be disadvantageous to them in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the Security Conference serves their purpose much better. But if they can get the Eastern Europeans reconciled

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 27, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Tabs A–D, regarding matters other than the European Security Conference or MBFR, are attached but not printed. The meeting took place at the British Embassy.

to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, I have always thought that they might then show more interest in MBFR. This is why they want a short sharp Conference.

In this draft treaty of theirs,<sup>2</sup> there is still this unqualified American commitment not to use nuclear weapons. That would remove the American nuclear umbrella.

Kissinger: That we will never accept.

Brimelow: That is cardinal.

Kissinger: There is no chance of our accepting that clause or anything like it. Actually they have added clauses, like Article III, that legally do not remove the American nuclear umbrella. The areas left exposed are now China and the Middle East.

Brimelow: Removing the American nuclear umbrella, plus their conventional advantage, would increase their political influence around the world.

Kissinger: No question.

Brimelow: I do not think they are contemplating major military moves against anybody, but they are concerned with the balance of force.

We have taken out the unqualified commitment.

You say your tactic is to engage the Russians in discussions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

*MBFR*

Kissinger: Let's talk about MBFR.

Brimelow: I want to make one remark first about the Hungary question. Mr. Thorn, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, has been going around Europe saying you were somewhat irritated by the way the question of Hungary was treated.<sup>3</sup> Let me explain our position. We in

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<sup>2</sup> Brimelow is referring to the Soviet draft treaty with the United States on the prevention of nuclear war, Tab D, which is not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 129. Kissinger subsequently discussed the British role in the Hungarian issue in a meeting with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other former Department officials in a meeting on November 28: "Last fall, the U.K. led the charge against us in NATO on MBFR. They made a big fuss about the fact that we had set a date to begin MBFR talks with the Soviets. This is something all the Foreign Ministers had wanted to fix and it is true that when the Secretary was in Moscow he talked with the Soviets and we agreed on a date. This episode left some feeling of acrimony. What really hurt was the argument about Hungary being in the MBFR talks. We were accused of sacrificing the security of Central Europe by dropping Hungary as a direct participant." Kissinger suggested "that this was not really a policy issue," but "the British raised it twice at the Presidential level and several times to the Secretary of State." Kissinger believed that such action "can only be ascribed to a British desire to be a spokesman in NATO against the U.S." (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential)

the UK feel no particular attachment toward Hungary's being a full participant. We can see some advantage in it because of Hungary's strategic position. But this is not decisive. But we were approached by the Federal Republic who said, "It is important to us that we shall not be the only country in Western Europe covered by MBFR." When the Benelux expressed interest in participating and then rejected it, the Federal Republic became concerned. I am told by Berndt von Staden that there was a formal decision before the election by the German cabinet that the Federal Republic should not be the only Western country; if the Benelux fell out, the Federal Republic would not be a full participant. So it depends on the Benelux, who say they will not if Hungary will not. I am not sure the Benelux are firm on this, but we felt it prudent to play it along.

We are not convinced that the attitude of the Warsaw Pact won't evolve, because the East Europeans have certain views and might have a certain influence. We certainly do not go along with the Soviet view that Italy be on the same par with Hungary. But the primary reason has been the attitude of the Federal Republic and the importance it attached to the question.

Kissinger: Let me explain our position. When Rowley<sup>4</sup> expressed your views on the tactics, we agreed immediately.

Brimelow: Yes.

Kissinger: Though it took us a time to restrain our more impetuous colleagues.

If Thorn understood me to say I was irritated by the Hungarian problem as such, he misunderstood my point. Because what irritated me was the deeper question—the constant accusations that we have made bilateral deals with the Soviets, and the attempt to engage us by procedures that (a) miss the point and (b) could not restrain us if we did not want to be restrained.

We want to use MBFR *for* the alliance and *for* defense. We could not have gotten ABM or MIRV if it had not been for SALT. There was no way we can come up with a serious position on MBFR without having a serious review of defense, and therefore we want an unemotional discussion of defense. The Europeans think we want MBFR as an excuse to get out of European defense. It is just the opposite.

Everyone knows Mansfield will hang his amendment on the first available bill. The fact that it is quiet now is irrelevant. We should be using this time for serious review.

The irritating thing about the Hungary debate is that—if people think Hungary might be used as a backup area to evade MBFR, that's

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<sup>4</sup> "Rowley" was Ambassador Cromer's nickname.

a serious point—but this attempt to enmesh us in endless procedural discussion—that’s what I was trying to tell the Foreign Minister.

Now, what was the so-called “deal” with the Soviets in September? We thought it clearly advantageous to commit the Soviets to an MBFR discussion and to begin with procedural discussions in effect a year in advance of the substance. We thought it was self-evidently to our common advantage. The Soviets were pressing us to make a substantive proposal—any proposal—and we refused.

On the Benelux: we think it obviously essential not to have Germany the focus of the control provisions. Why should the Benelux tie their policy to Hungary? I think it is to *their* advantage not to isolate Germany in MBFR.

Brimelow: That’s why I think they will change.

Kissinger: That’s why I saw their Foreign Minister, whom I like.

Maybe we have been too impetuous. We agreed with you.

If this continues, we will be unprepared in MBFR and will get hit by all our critics. Right now our critics are demoralized by the Vietnam experience and are looking around for a foreign policy issue. On this one, everything will be going for them: the balance of payments crisis, the economic question, Vietnamization. The only way to pull the teeth of it is to have an intellectual framework for a defense position. What if the Russians propose a 20 percent cut after the European security conference? Which they might well do if your analysis is correct.

Remember at the beginning of SALT: there was great pressure against MIRV and against ABM. We fought it by keeping the debate so esoteric that Congress was effectively excluded. This is why it’s so frustrating to see the Europeans attacking the President, who alone is preserving NATO. The whole bureaucracy is for cuts. Laird was sneaking troops out by the tens of thousands, and we made him put them back.

We want to get into a substantive discussion.

Brimelow: With the Russians or with the West Europeans?

Kissinger: No, with the West Europeans. If we do it with the Russians now they will beat us to death, given the state of disarray in NATO.

Brimelow: What is your time frame?

Kissinger: We will be having a meeting soon on MBFR of the highest priority. I would be delighted to have your people see the papers. If you want to give your views before our meetings, that is even better. But above all, you have to understand our strategy.

Brimelow: Without arguing against you, there has been a delay since 1968 when MBFR was first proposed, and there have been no substantive talks. And we have entered talks without any agreed substantive position.

Kissinger: Exactly. That's why we started it as only procedural. The situation is incredible. Whenever I analyze something, everything I touch turns to mush. We say we have 90 days' supplies, but when I look at it there are some things we have a 40 day supply of and some things we have a 110 days' supply of, so that the Defense Department has averaged it. This is idiocy. Obviously, the real length of time will be determined by the shortest critical items. And we and the Germans have entirely different ways of computing the consumption rates. It should not be beyond our capacity to standardize consumption rates in an allied army. And nuclear weapons—we have thousands of them there and [less than 1 line not declassified]

In the name of what can we resist cuts? We need something defensible. It is an odd alliance with the Europeans saying that unless it is guaranteed that the United States will be destroyed, the Europeans will do nothing.

The Europeans must face reality. If we waste this year in internal debates, we will be whipsawed by the Congress and the Soviets. If the Soviets start feeding stuff into Mansfield and the *New York Times*, we will lose the base for our policy.

The Hungarian thing is a sideshow. What bothers us is that it is symptomatic. They accuse us of private deals but don't say what the private deal is.

Cromer: There is not so much of this now. The only people doing their homework on MBFR are we and the Germans.

Kissinger: The Germans are not doing anything that I have seen.

Brimelow: The French are not authorized to do anything but they may start.

Kissinger: With the talks starting in the fall, they will start.

Brimelow: Too many people are talking to the Russians bilaterally. There has been no secrecy whatever.

Kissinger: Where does it happen, in the Secretariats?

Sonnenfeldt: Part of it is the insecurity of communications.

Cromer: And cocktail party talk.

Kissinger: If we expose ourselves as we have on Hungary, we are dead. If there are divisions, legitimized by the governments, the Congress will take the softest.

Brimelow: Let me read you a report we received from Helsinki of what Thorn is saying of his talk with you: "Kissinger said we should let the Russians have what they want on the European Security Conference, a short, snappy conference without substance. He also thought the Europeans were illogical if they oppose a consultative commission. But the United States was not supporting a consultative commission."

Kissinger: I did not say a word about the consultative commission. All I said was if we have to have a Conference it should be short and banal so that it does not do any harm. I had nothing to convince him of. I was told he was helpful and that he was insisting on seeing me. My basic point was that we should not play the Russian game and have a monumental debate on procedures so that it would look like the Conference was significant. We should make it short and snappy so that we can down-play it. I thought this was your appreciation.

Brimelow: In Bonn on the second of March we had a plenary meeting, and [FRG State Secretary]<sup>5</sup> Frank made a brief statement about the Conference on European Security, and expressed doubts about this permanent organ, which could be conceived as a vehicle for intervention based on the declaration, which, if the Russians have their way, would come out of this Conference. I said that since the Russians are now only proposing a conference of Ambassadors based on consensus, it might not amount to much. At this point Bahr said “Without opposing you, I have been turning over the idea in my mind that there might be some advantage of having a permanent organ if it were established in West Berlin.” This was new to us, and it seemed to be new to some officials there.

Kissinger: It’s new to me. Have you heard this? [To Sonnenfeldt]<sup>6</sup>

Sonnenfeldt: I have heard the argument that a permanent organ has the advantage of keeping the U.S. involved in Europe, but not this.

Brimelow: I have heard that argument, but the new thing is West Berlin. We were very careful not to commit ourselves.

Kissinger: Incidentally, it’s a total absurdity to think I would use the Luxembourg Foreign Minister to advocate a permanent organ when I do not think a permanent organ is a good idea.

Brimelow: We have been very reserved on this until we see what the final declaration looks like. If the Germans are going to want a permanent organ of some kind—and history shows that Bahr is a persistent man when he has an idea in his head—we shall want the declaration to be very carefully considered. And at the commission stage, because only there can you be tough and play hard against Russian ideas. And at this stage we must be very careful not to get exposed to time pressures. And this is our major qualification against the idea of a short and snappy conference.

Kissinger: You must understand my meeting was only ten or 15 minutes. But again, it’s symptomatic. My only point was to convey to him that we wanted to get it over with in order to make it meaning-

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<sup>5</sup> Brackets are in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Brackets are in the original.

less. If he had replied as you just did, that would fit into our strategy. Our objective is to prevent the Conference from being used against NATO; an organ would be used as a substitute for existing alliances. What you say is true; the declaration is important. But Thorn misunderstood me completely. I had been told he was the most pro-NATO of the Benelux foreign ministers, so I tried to use him to convey to the Benelux (a) the President's feeling about the Vietnam thing, and secondly, what I told you—our irritation at these constant accusations of bilateral dealings, and what I told you of our strategy of wanting to make the Conference as meaningless as possible.

Sonnenfeldt: Is his English not very good?

Brimelow: It's all right. He's a good foreign minister. He's anxious to keep NATO going; after all, Luxembourg is the weakest country. But he is also a tired and overworked man. At a Western European Union defense committee meeting last week he got everything wrong.

Kissinger: He got my conversation totally wrong.

Cromer: You ought to consult me in the future about your future chosen instruments!

Sonnenfeldt: You think he was taken aback by the full extent of the President's feelings on Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: I was trying to convey that the key was to have a common strategy and to get on with it, and not have this endless nitpicking.

Brimelow: Okay. We can probably get this straightened out.

Kissinger: That would be extremely helpful.

Brimelow: And on the MBFR we should agree on a common position.

Sonnenfeldt: And button down the procedures so that we can get into the substance.

Dr. Kissinger: And as quickly as possible. Though we can slip a few months.

## NATO

I want to say a few words about NATO in general. We have started a massive governmental effort. What it will produce, God only knows. What we want is, we envisage a process which this year would elaborate some common views on the nature of the political evolution, the military and economic. We should stop pretending we will agree on all categories. But we should agree on those areas where we should have a common position, we should agree on those areas where we have parallel positions, and we should agree on those areas where we can act independently—but we should discuss the limits of that independent action. If everything is ad hoc, there will be no framework.



We would also like discussions with you on whether we should have preliminary discussions among the allies and then a summit meeting, or whether we should have a series of bilateral meetings. We would like your ideas. We want to give it some intellectual framework. The Prime Minister and the President were eager to do this together in the first instance. The President wants to do this first closely with you.

If MBFR goes the way we want, the defense side should get a lot of that work done through MBFR. The next thing is to get the economic part of it out of the hands of the trade people.

Hopefully, we can avoid this malaise of every time we have contact with the Soviets . . .

I may use some excuse in May such as the Bilderberg Conference to go to Europe and to go around discussing with the Europeans.

Brimelow: You say we can see the MBFR papers. When will they be ready?

Kissinger: April 1st for some, May 1st for others. Some things you do so much better than we—this is not just flattery—because you have fewer people, and perhaps better people.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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**132. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 14, 1973.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Conversations on CSCE

As the cable at Tab A<sup>2</sup> indicates, members of the Soviet delegation in Helsinki at the CSCE have told our people that the United States has the Soviet draft of the final conference document. They have asked what the US delegation in Helsinki thinks of it and our delegation of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside System. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote at the top of the page: "Action taken. BS."

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 649 from Helsinki, March 13, is attached but not printed.

course replied they had not seen it. In addition, our delegation reports that the Romanians in Helsinki also have asked what the US delegation thought of the Soviet draft and expressed disbelief when told that the US delegation had not seen it.

This reporting cable of course is now circulating all over the State Department and I was called by the NATO desk. They asked of course if the White House knew anything about this document. You will recall that Dobrynin gave you this draft of the final Soviet document (Tab B) in mid-January and he said they had also given it to Pompidou and Brandt.<sup>3</sup> My recollection is that Bahr asked what we intended to do about it and was told by you we would take no action for the present.

The problem of course is how we explain to the Department of State the Soviet inquiry in Helsinki. I suggest that you should send to Rush the Soviet draft with a note that it was given to the President on the understanding that it would be closely held because it had been given to the French and German governments. In other words, we might claim that we had left it to Paris and Bonn to determine whether they wanted to make the existence of this known in the alliance, which they have not done. You might want to fuzz the date of actual receipt in order to obscure the question of how long we have held this.

Alternatively, we could claim that the Russians are talking about their mandates which were given to you at the same time they were published in Helsinki.

It is difficult to believe that the Soviet diplomats are so undisciplined or sloppy as to break the confidential channel. On the other hand, there is no adequate explanation of why they should embarrass you and the President by these revelations. One is led to believe that this is deliberate unless you accept the theory that after a month or two the Soviets do inform their own working level of the existence of confidential communications.

Please advise if you wish us to do anything about this.

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<sup>3</sup> Tab B is not printed. See footnote 8, Document 124.

**133. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1973.

SUBJECT

Wrap Up of CSCE

The preparatory talks are now in recess until April 25. In this last round a fair amount of progress was made in negotiating mandates, and the issues are probably sufficiently narrow that they can be resolved in the next round, provided the Allies do not become too intrigued with pressing the Soviets to the wall on minor issues.

The Soviets ended the round with a burst of impatience and some harsh language about stalling tactics. Apparently, they do not hold us responsible, (at least not in official contacts); we have in fact tried to prod the Allies to step up the pace. Nevertheless, it is likely that the Soviets are becoming disquieted by the drift of CSCE, and will toughen up in the next round.

The main issues seem to be the following.

*1. Security—Principles*

The Soviets have insisted that one clear, unqualified principle is the “inviolability of existing borders in Europe.” This is anathema to Bonn, and all of the Allies (with some French hesitation) have pressed for a link between renunciation of force and inviolability of boundaries—thus circumventing the *de jure* confirmation of existing borders.

The Germans, realizing that the Soviets are becoming tougher, have moved to a compromise that would maintain some tenuous linkage, but want to trade this concession for something on human contacts, or some expression on the principle of self-determination and human rights.

We should not have to do anything on this; the Germans can be expected to make their concession, probably in advance of, or during the Brezhnev visit.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1335, Unfiled Material, 1973, 5 of 12.

<sup>2</sup> Brezhnev visited West Germany for a summit meeting with Brandt May 18–21.

## 2. *Military Security—Confidence Building*

There are two issues: (1) a linkage between CSCE and MBFR, and (2) whether confidence building measures should include “restraints” on major “movements” rather than on maneuvers.

—We, the French and the Soviets are holding out against any direct link between CSCE and MBFR that might be made in a declaration. Almost all the other participants, in one way or another, want to emphasize military security.

—The probable outcome is some rhetorical reference to European military security, and some patronizing but affirmative references to the value of arms control, including MBFR. This would be satisfactory to us. The Soviets will probably find a way to live with it, but the French may balk at a blanket approval of various negotiations that they are boycotting or oppose.

The “movements” question is exceedingly pedantic. Our ritual formula includes maneuvers, exercise and major military movements that should be pre-announced. The Soviets resisted “movements,” partly because they did not know what exactly was involved. Upon examination we are not so sure of what the phrase really means, but some Allies, abetted by the Romanians and Yugoslavs, see a further restraint on the Soviets.

Presumably, we will end up with a definition of “movements” that refers to “across national boundaries,” but we may have to take a softer position with the Soviets, since there are all kinds of “movements” that we have no intention of announcing.

## 3. *Human Contacts*

As expected, the more we go into detail, the more the Soviets resist. Their tactic seems to be to cover whatever is agreed on “freer movement” with a general qualification limiting “European programs” to those that do not interfere with sovereignty, or internal legislation, or have as their purpose stimulating war propaganda, etc.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> On March 29, the Soviet representative to the Working Group on human contacts, Valerian Zorin, tabled a Soviet draft mandate in committee. According to a draft translation provided in telegram 833 from Helsinki, March 29, it reads in part: “The committee is entrusted with preparing a draft final document on the question of expanding cultural cooperation and contacts among organizations and people and the dissemination of information.” The translation continued: “Such cooperation should be implemented with respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country and facilitate the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding among peoples in Europe. It should not be utilized for propaganda or war, enmity and hatred among peoples, racial and national superiority.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

—The Soviets apparently are making their own tactical linkage between “inviolable” frontiers and human contacts, hinting that if they get their point on frontiers they will make concessions on human contacts.<sup>4</sup>

—The outcome seems to be a compromise that includes the Western language on freer movement, but does not commit the Soviets to adopt all the measures.

#### 4. *Economic Cooperation*

The contentious issue is the Eastern insistence that among the principles for European economic cooperation there be a principle of extending MFN and non-discrimination. The West opposes this, though the reasons are not quite clear. It may be that the EC wants to emphasize regional principles rather than bilateral concessions such as MFN. (We probably should shift to MFN as a principle in CSCE. It might be a face-saving way for the Soviets to revoke their emigration tax; if there is a declaration that includes freer movement of people and the MFN principle, the Soviets might have a plausible pretext for dropping their [emigration?] tax.)

#### 5. *Permanent Machinery*

This has been surprisingly quiescent. The Soviets apparently accept that it cannot be reasonably discussed until later. The Allies are, however, divided on the tactics. The French want to make a gesture toward some sort of coordinating committee that will have in its mandate future arrangements including another CSCE. The other Allies are thinking of a similar committee but do not want to concede on another CSCE, at least not yet. Our position has been that we cannot keep the idea of permanent machinery off the agenda, but should reduce its substance to an ad hoc sort of arrangement without any authority in the security area.

—We are somewhat hobbled on this issue. The State bureaucracy, especially USNATO, taking an earlier lead from the White House, has treated permanent machinery as anathema. Turning to a more conciliatory position—which we have already conceded to the Soviets—is proving difficult.

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 943 from Helsinki, April 7, reported that in a conversation with Vest, “Mendelevich confirmed that hard-line Soviet stance on human contacts during final week was tactical response to apparent desire certain Western delegations to establish trade-off between Baskets I and III.” (Ibid.) At the talks in Helsinki, the topics of discussion were divided into three “baskets”: Basket I (security); Basket II (economics, science and technology, and environment), and Basket III (human rights, cultural and informational exchange).

## 6. *Soviet-US*

Despite what the Soviets may be saying in your channel, as far as we can tell our Delegation has managed to steer carefully between the Soviets and the Allies. We have supported the Allied position, but tried to move the process toward a completion by June. We have supported the Soviets on excluding military security and on some form of permanent machinery.

You will recall that the Soviets badly undercut us by surfacing the fact that a draft declaration was given to you privately.<sup>5</sup> This is particularly touchy because both the Germans and French have the same draft as the British now have from us; each seems to be waiting to see who makes the first effort to move toward the Soviet draft.

I will do a separate memorandum incorporating the comments from State and the UK on the Soviet draft.<sup>6</sup>

## 7. *Dates*

We have been operating on the sequence given you in Moscow: namely, starting CSCE at the Ministerial level in late June. This could be a conflict with the Brezhnev visit, and you may wish to raise this problem of a target date with the Soviets. We are planning on about 7–10 days of speeches, and the endorsement of the agenda and mandates.

At Tab A is a brief State wrap up of CSCE.<sup>7</sup>

At Tab B is a reporting telegram from the Delegation.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 132.

<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>7</sup> The April 9 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger is attached but not printed.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 940 from Helsinki, April 6, is attached but not printed.

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## 134. Editorial Note

On April 10, 1973, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at 8:40 a.m. in the Map Room of the White House. Among the topics they discussed was the European security conference. Kissinger's memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Dobrynin then handed me a communication about the European Security Conference [Tab C], the gist of which was that progress had been disappointingly slow even though the Soviet Union had made major concessions. He wondered whether a more effective procedure might not be for him to meet with Rush

periodically on European Security Conference matters. I told him that it would be better for Stoessel to meet with Vorontsov and then they could pass their problems on to Dobrynin and me." The Soviet note complained that "the sluggishness and even, one may say, slackness with which the things are proceeding in Helsinki causes certain concern on our part." It asserted "that there should be no problems when principles of relations between states, which have already been expressed in many recent multilateral and bilateral documents, including Soviet-American ones, are being agreed." The note continued: "The Soviet side holds the position which facilitates agreement on the questions of the preparation of the conference, and it has repeatedly demonstrated that. We consented, for example, to include into the agenda the question of certain measures strengthening confidence and stability in Europe, and we worded it as it had been confidentially agreed between us through the talks between Dr. Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador. We expect that we will work together with you so that the measures on strengthening confidence and stability, as it was agreed between us, should be limited to a provision on mutual notifications about major military maneuvers in stipulated areas and by a provision about the possibility to exchange upon invitation observers at the maneuvers of such kind." The note concluded: "L.I. Brezhnev hopes that President Nixon would find it possible to keep the question of Helsinki consultations within the scope of his attention in order to promote by joint efforts their speedy completion." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16, Pt. 2)

Dobrynin and Kissinger also discussed the European security conference in a telephone conversation the same day at 12:54 p.m. The two confirmed that Soviet Minister Counselor Yuli Vorontsov would meet with Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Stoessel to discuss matters relating to the conference. Kissinger told Dobrynin that "I talked to the President, and he will take what you said very seriously." Their conversation continued: "D[obrynin]: [omission in transcript] about this European Conference, you know, because many of them, I mean your President, Brezhnev, Pompidou and Brandt, involved in their many international activities, so we've got to have some sort of schedule for consideration of President, Brandt, and [omission in transcript]. I tell you this for your guidance. Let's put it on the calendar of our bosses, so to speak, the following. The first stage—the foreign ministers level. June 27 or 28. For a meeting period of ten days—what do you think? K[issinger]: Right. D: Second stage: This is [omission in transcript] work. The middle of July. K: Right. I understand. D: And work until the end of September. K: Right. D: So it's July, August, September. And the third stage we come to is of the highest level. Around October or November, this would be schedule for governments to par-

ticipate. Roughly speaking. K: Okay. D: I tell you this right now for your own—but this is what Brezhnev would like to tell directly to President. K: I'd appreciate that, we'll appreciate that, and [it is?] not inconsistent with our own thinking. D: Just to put their mind into some kind of—because maybe they have some changes to make in the approximate—” (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File)

Following up the same day, the Soviet Embassy delivered a second message to Kissinger at 1:45 p.m. It proposed a timetable for the security conference: a first stage at the foreign minister level beginning on June 27 or 28, which would last “10–14 days”; a second stage for “committee work” beginning in the middle of July; and a third stage “at the highest level” to be held in October or November 1973. Dobrynin wrote to Kissinger in a note attached to the message: “As I told you, this message from L.I. Brezhnev goes also to President Pompidou and to Mr. Brandt.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16, Pt. 2)

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### 135. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 12, 1973, 10 a.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon  
 William P. Rogers, Secretary of State  
 Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense  
 Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 James Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA  
 Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, US Ambassador to NATO  
 Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 through 6/20/74, 2 of 5. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. In preparation for this NSC meeting, the Verification Panel met on March 29. In the meeting minutes, the Panel approved the following “summary of conclusions”: “It was agreed that: 1) Two issues will be put to the President at the NSC meeting on April 12: a) whether we should or should not link force improvements to MBFR; b) whether we should present only our preferred position or two or three options to our NATO allies for discussion. 2) The Working Group will develop an illustrative model of the elements from the nuclear option that might be incorporated into the other options. 3) Following the President’s decision, we will go to NATO with our approach during the last ten days of April.” (Ibid., Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 3-15-72 to 6-4-74, 4 of 5)



Kenneth Rush, Assistant to the President

Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on MBFR

The President: We are faced with a situation where any reduction is probably to our detriment. If we don't show some movement, the structure of NATO will come apart because of the lack of U.S. support.

We will have a hell of a time maintaining the military budget against Mansfield and the others.

We are keeping one step ahead of the sheriff. We can't say any agreement is better than none, though.

We have got to show movement; we have got to have something come of it.

SALT is somewhat like that. It may be good on its own—although there are lots of problems, like cheating, military cutback, etc. But the mood of the country is such that if we don't move in this context, we will cut unilaterally.

We still have some hawks; the polls are good. I talk hawkish, but let's face it.

Let's analyze the realities coldly, then see what it is we can live with.

Jim?

Schlesinger: (Briefs)

The President: Elliot?

Richardson: With Congress, we have devoted a lot of effort to show that NATO forces *are* capable.

The President: On the trip wire thing, say that if there is a confrontation, it will be nuclear. That is the best argument for a conventional capability.

Henry?

Kissinger: This is a superficial analysis. The Germans were inferior in two wars and nearly won. We should not kid ourselves that we have a balance.

Richardson: The Soviets have the same sort of interest in stability in Europe that we do. But we have to show that we don't have to depend on the trip wire.

Rogers: Henry's analysis, if you believe it, would indicate that our leadership is worse than the Warsaw Pact.

Kissinger: Elliot is correct about the Congressional presentation of the situation. But as things stand, we do not have a cohesive alliance. We have the dilemma of MBFR versus force improvements.

Rush: Europe is afraid we are leaving NATO. NATO is making force improvements and we should push for more, but not tied to MBFR.

Rogers: NATO is afraid we have already made a deal with the Soviet Union.

The President: I don't think the Soviet Union is too keen on MBFR.

Rogers: There is agreement in the government on how we should proceed.

The President: Henry?

Kissinger: (Begins his briefing at 10:33 a.m.)<sup>2</sup>

The President: Let's have no illusion—the whole thing fails if we don't keep our contribution level. We must show that if we keep strong, we can reduce later; *and* Europe must do its share.

Richardson: Arends has a study that is favorable to NATO and against unilateral reductions.

Kissinger: (Resumes his briefing, which is completed at 10:58 a.m.)

Rogers: I think we are generally agreed. We want to get going, show seriousness, and show that we haven't made a deal.

I like the two proposals,<sup>3</sup> plus implicit linkage and the force improvements.

Richardson: I think we should present both, but express a preference for reduction of stationed forces at as high a percentage as is negotiable.

We can also introduce the nuclear component,<sup>4</sup> as an illustrative approach.

The President: Tom?

Moorer: We should have in our minds how we want to come out.

On the Soviet side, all the stationed forces are Soviet; on ours they are British, Canadian, and U.S.

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger's talking points are *ibid.*, Box H-033, NSC Meeting MBFR 4/12/73.

<sup>3</sup> Kissinger's talking points presented two main options. The first was "a common manpower ceiling to be reached in two phases: first, a reduction of *stationed* forces, then *indigenous* forces; NATO would reduce its force levels by ten percent and the Pact would come down to a common manpower ceiling with NATO." The second option was a "*bi-lateral U.S. and Soviet reduction* of ground forces stationed in the NATO Guidelines Area reducing U.S. by 32,000 and the USSR by 64,000—in effect, a one-sixth reduction on both sides. The net result would be an approximate manpower parity in overall NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in the reduction area." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger's talking points presented a third option: "a *reduction of dissimilar threatening forces*, called a mixed package, in which approximately 20 percent of U.S. theater nuclear capability in West Germany and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would be withdrawn in return for removal of approximately 20 percent of the Soviets' forward armored capability." (*Ibid.*)

The first step should be a U.S. cut of ten percent and a Soviet cut of eighteen percent. We shouldn't get into the structure of the forces to be withdrawn.

Richardson: Collateral constraints could be important, like stationing of observers.

Farley: There will be lots of discussion.

Rumsfeld: We should say we may have a preference, but our final preference will depend on the final alliance consensus.

The President: Good point.

Kissinger: Agreed.

The President: We must recognize we must take the lead, without appearing to sell our position.

Rumsfeld: It should include the nuclear option, and collateral constraints.

Kissinger: With Hungary in, you can't have a common ceiling cut, only a percentage. A percentage cut is detrimental to NATO.

The President: We have no illusion but that improvement of forces *must* go along with MBFR. It is *essential* for support here at home. We have a tough selling job here. I have yet to talk to a NATO leader who talks in terms of selling to his people a strong NATO. There is no guts in the European elite.

Heath has problems. He wants to be strong, but has economic problems.

Brandt has problems. Look at their attitude toward our troops. Brandt is a muddle head anyway.

In Europe we have a bunch of ward heelers, not international leadership. They would want to be but their public won't allow it.

The old bipartisan leadership has gone. It's lost its guts. Unless we step up to the problem, no one will.

Rumsfeld: The argument that cuts leave us only with a nuclear option should be persuasive. Even peaceniks shouldn't want to be on that side of the argument.

The President: Kennedy had an overwhelming superiority. He didn't need other options. Now we have parity—so now we need an option other than all or nothing.

**136. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 13, 1973, 10:05–11:03 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary General Luns of NATO  
Van Campen  
a secretary  
Dr. Henry Kissinger  
Donald Rumsfeld, US Ambassador to NATO  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sec. General Luns: Can we talk a little about the non-circumvention clause?<sup>2</sup> You know my private opinion. The advisability that when we come to some sort of agreement with the Soviets that you could keep the option of having a non-circumvention clause. That you keep the option open . . .

Dr. Kissinger: There is no issue about that. There are two issues; should Hungary be part of the discussions and second, should there be a non-circumvention clause in the agreement. I think if you study the logistics, it is easier to move troops from Germany to Russia than from Germany to Hungary.

Should Hungary be part, and what is the substance of the negotiation. The participants have no way of knowing the subjects or proposals of the United States. Within the next two or three weeks we will present two or three possible ways of approaching the subject. We have never discussed it with the Soviets. There will be no question that we will have a non-circumvention clause in any agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1998 from Vienna, March 13, reported that the Belgian representative to the MBFR talks, Andraenessen, told Yuri Dubynin during the latter's visit to Brussels in February "that the main Allied interest in Hungary was not in Hungarian direct participation or in reductions of either Hungarian or Soviet forces, but in a non-circumvention agreement which would prevent the Soviets from introducing new forces into Hungary after an MBFR agreement was signed. According to the Belgian rep, Dubynin professed interest in this proposal and stated he thought it should not be too difficult to meet the Belgian interests." The telegram commented: "The Belgian rep, as with recent statements by the Netherlands rep, has unfortunately undercut the Allied tactical position in Vienna by putting to the Soviets a position which in its essence might be acceptable to Belgium and also to the US but which, being based on the premise that Hungary would be a special participant, goes beyond what the NAC has approved as an alliance position." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

Sec. General Luns: We will run into trouble if there is a general non-circumvention clause, because some of the countries, like Turkey, refuse to have it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are willing to have a non-circumvention clause that applies to Hungary. Our objective concerns the fact that European leaders, I am talking frankly, especially from the Low Countries, are saying that Kissinger made a private deal with the Russians. Some Belgian will say 'ah ha' no deal with Hungary because that is the best way to frustrate the Americans.

Sec. General Luns: That is no issue. NATO is unique, all is frank.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly since Rumsfeld has been there. (laugh)

Sec. General Luns: My deep conviction is that discussion is a good thing. There is no thought of being unpleasant to the United States, rather there is a general wish to conform to the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not saying in the NATO Council. There is this general feeling in Europe, I think the British do it in the discussions, and I have said this to them. What is the situation in respect to MBFR?

First, take the case of SALT, I am talking about our problem with SALT. We have been harassed by the leftists and peace groups. So we made it an issue, but a technical one. Thus we were better able to argue with them, as we were better informed. And in three and a half years we came up with an agreement. This is an example of what we want to do with MBFR. The only thing that is helping us now is that the Russians have not used their press and pushed us to reduce our forces.

Sec. General Luns: We say no.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Russians say reduce by 20% . . . Are we going to talk for another year about Hungary?

Sec. General Luns: Not in the preliminaries, is that going to place a deadlock in NATO?

Dr. Kissinger: We are willing to present our ideas on a substantive position. It is not in our interest to have Hungary in. What we want to propose is a common ceiling, which means we have to reduce less. They cut 80,000 and we cut 30,000 and add Hungary, they cut 150,000 and we cut 30,000. I doubt if that can be negotiated. Then we will be driven to a straight percentage cut. Say 10–15%.

Sec. General Luns: The Hungary question is settled. The non-circumvention clause of Hungary is acceptable to all. What is unacceptable is to have Italy dragged in with regard to the non-circumvention clause.

Dr. Kissinger: We have always said that you have every right to insist on that as part of the substantive position. I am in favor of a non-circumvention clause, especially applicable to Hungary.

Sec. General Luns: You will find NATO can be easy.

Amb. Rumsfeld: This is what I have been saying all along: that the United States agrees that if MBFR is successful, the US does not want a way to circumvent what has been agreed to.

Dr. Kissinger: All we want is that they should want it. I will give you a paper analyzing it.

Sec. General Luns: What makes the negotiations in NATO not so easy is, for one reason, you came up with your projections a little late. We have already done two studies.

Dr. Kissinger: Our government is run with a collection of sovereign departments, thus we have to get some consensus.

Sonnenfeldt: He is just a Secretary General here.

Dr. Kissinger: We made some very serious studies, which did not satisfy everyone and which were to the disadvantage of NATO. We have now come up with an approach—we believe that MBFR can be used as a device to have a serious discussion with NATO.

Sec. General: Then there are two things: NATO, and the hope that the US will have its study very soon.

Dr. Kissinger: You will have it by the first of May.

Sonnenfeldt: We should get out of Vienna as soon as possible so all of us can concentrate on substance.

Dr. Kissinger: How does one do this before agreeing on a position?

Sec. General Luns: There is the problem of the Turks, who feel very exposed. They are militarily weak. They feel there will be some sort of agreement that will not give them any advantages, but rather will be to their disadvantage.

Sonnenfeldt: You can't make any agreements with debating points.

Dr. Kissinger: If you could help us convince the Allies that we are really serious. We have every intention of coming up with a position that is satisfactory to every country.

We have consistently wanted to exclude the flank countries.

Sec. General Luns: Next Thursday at our luncheon I will make the point.

De Staercke has been around for the last 28 years, 5 years before NATO was founded.

In the discussion, Monsieur Van Campen, wouldn't you agree there is an understanding of the American position. Therefore, I don't think I would be wrong if I said that I understand things at the back of your mind. Your ultimate aim is to go to Congress and say that we have now arrived at an agreement where we can withdraw. Am I right?

Dr. Kissinger: No. We don't want to go to Congress just with that. We want to show that there is a rational defense policy. First, we have

to put the whole Atlantic relations on a fresh basis, in order to gain a substantive agreement we need new American elite support. The supporters of the present policy are men of the 50s and 60s. We don't have the sort of broad based support we want. We would like broad based economic negotiations. What we want to do is remove the malaise where it is said here that Europe is taking advantage of us. This can't be handled on a purely economic basis.

Second, we need some considerations; every Ally is conducting some kind of relations with the Russians. People are thinking of a condominium. Europe used to say "you are causing a war!" And Harold Wilson used to be here three times a year on how to conduct a European Security Conference. We didn't invent this trend.

Third, the security conference cannot change the fact that we are now approaching nuclear parity. What we need is a strategic agreement among the Allies. It is essential to show conventional forces are more important. Then you can go to the countries and ask do you want general nuclear war? We are in a very curious position. Force reductions have to be related to the need to maintain the defense of Europe. If our troops leave Europe they will most definitely be demobilized.

We are most prepared to have serious discussions with the Europeans. What I would like to tell you as an old personal friend—the Europeans can no longer behave like spoiled children. For the Europeans to attack the President is nonsense, total nonsense.

Sec. General Luns: I agree. You have shown great restraint.

Dr. Kissinger: Europe nearly destroyed the alliance: what was an affair of the heart is now an affair of the head.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sec. General Luns: I had a long conversation with Bahr, and I talked to the Chancellor. I had an excellent talk with Leber.

Bahr talked and gave me an insight which frightened me. He said, "It is obvious." I said, "What is obvious?" "Could you be a little more precise? Will they leave Europe this year?" Bahr said, "No, not this year." I said that the United States will remain in Europe if we do our part. I then said that it was not very wise to say the things he was saying. He then talked about other possibilities; the dissolution of NATO, that there would no longer be two military blocs in Europe, and some arrangement to make this possible.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum of April 12 about a "plan" that Bahr had allegedly discussed in an interview with West German journalist Otto Hahn in January

I then saw Leber, a great man. I know that Bahr made some remarks during the plane flight. He thinks that Germany is about to make deals with the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: They always have romantic ideas.<sup>4</sup>

Sec. General Luns: They have the option to become another Finland. I am rather comforted because the German Chancellor is a decent man. So is Schmidt.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he is alright.

Sec. General Luns: I agree, and Leber too. The ideas of Mr. Bahr are not the ideas of the German government.

Dr. Kissinger: Will his ideas become the ideas of the government?

Sec. General Luns: I don't know, I was all day with Leber. We talked about military and general matters.

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans are really insane. They have nothing to offer the Russians. The only thing they have left to offer the Russians is to wreck NATO. After that is done they will have nothing to offer them. The Russians will never permit a powerful bloc in Central Europe led by Germany. Only if Bonn becomes like Helsinki . . .

Sec. General Luns: Norway, France and the northern Benelux countries.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not worried.

Van Campen: But he is now insistent. Bahr said these things three years ago.

Sec. General Luns: He finally said, "You may be right and I am a little over optimistic."

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1969: "Bahr allegedly outlined a four-step Ostpolitik scenario consisting of: (1) Recognition of the GDR; (2) Nonviolence agreements and diplomatic relations with the East European countries; (3) Warsaw Pact–NATO negotiation on cutting American and Soviet forces in the two Germanies; (4) Creation of a Pan-European security system of the non-nuclear countries of Central Europe, whose territorial integrity the nuclear powers would guarantee. In response to a Hahn question about the last step, Bahr thought that the two alliances would have to be dissolved, being replaced by bilateral relationships between the two superpowers and between the remaining countries outside the security system. The opposition and right-wing press in the Federal Republic have hopped onto this answer to say that Bahr wants to dissolve NATO." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 263, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XIII)

<sup>4</sup> Sonnenfeldt wrote in his memorandum of April 12: "Hahn goes on in his article to note at length the supposed consistency of German Ostpolitik since 1969 with Bahr's plan. He speculates about the possibility of a prior understanding with eastern partners, about Bahr's larger national reunification objectives implicit in it, and about similarities between Bahr's conceptions and Bismarck's definition of Germany balancing between East and West, German romantic nationalism, and German propensities to overestimate their ability to control events in Europe."



Dr. Kissinger: To get to our original problem again, if the Germans go that route they will be crushed. If there is one basis to unify Western Europe, it is on an anti-German basis.

We want to achieve what you and I have discussed in some way for the last several years. We want some conspicuous achievement in US-European relations, some new declaration of friendship, not endless arguments.

Sec. General Luns: What about some sort of summitry?

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe, I don't want 500 cables running around the embassies.

Sec. General Luns: Tomorrow I see the Dutch press. I will be very general. I am concerned about the state of mind of American lawmakers that Europe is not pulling its weight, and American resentment that they are being attacked.

Dr. Kissinger: Don't give any concrete ideas. I am sorry but I have to give a speech tonight, and we will have to break off.

Sec. General Luns: I want to show you what I got from the Russian government. "Tab A"<sup>5</sup>

Sonnenfeldt: MBFR and military policy, we want to show we are reducing our troops with a credible defense policy for Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have troop reductions, they are not an objective in themselves. Our objective is the defense of Europe. It is essential and the context should be at the minimum level.

Sonnenfeldt: We don't want to simply defeat the Mansfield resolution, which we can do—but to have a concept.

Dr. Kissinger: You take it up with Richardson. Or you can get in touch with Don, who is an old associate of ours and absolutely discreet.

Sec. General Luns: I will do that.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Not attached and not found.

<sup>6</sup> Luns also met with President Nixon in the Oval Office at 11:30 a.m.; they discussed MBFR, along with other topics. According to a memorandum of their conversation for the President's files, Nixon told Luns that "there would be no deal with the Soviets at the expense of our Allies. The Soviets would like to use MBFR to undermine the alliance, but the United States would oppose this." The memorandum continued: "Secretary General Luns agreed that MBFR must not be used to undermine confidence in America. He cited the tactical difficulties in Vienna, where there was a passionate discussion about MBFR." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 280, Presidential File, Memcons)

137. National Security Decision Memorandum 211<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 16, 1973.

TO

Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

The President has approved the attached paper setting forth the approach of the United States to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe.<sup>2</sup> It should be provided to the Allies before the end of this month. The supporting annexes called for in the paper should also be made available to the Allies by that time.<sup>3</sup>

The objective of our consultations with the Allies should be to get them to focus on the outcome the Alliance should seek for MBFR before turning to the tactical problem of developing an Allied position for the negotiations in the fall. U.S. representatives should bear in mind that our analysis makes clear that indigenous reductions are disadvantageous to NATO and that stationed reductions including U.S./Soviet reductions are more advantageous.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's), Nos. 145–264. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Acting Director of ACDA. The NSDM was sent to USNATO in telegram 79255 on April 27; it was addressed eyes only for Rumsfeld. (Ibid., Box 263, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XIII)

<sup>2</sup> The attached paper, "U.S. Approach to MBFR," April 13, is not printed. The paper put forward the three alternative reduction concepts presented by Kissinger to the NSC meeting on April 12 (see footnotes 3 and 4, Document 135): "phased ten percent reductions in NATO stationed and then indigenous ground forces together with Soviet and [Warsaw] Pact indigenous reductions, respectively, to common ceilings for both sides; reduction to parity in overall NATO/Pact ground force levels in the Center Region by means of U.S. and Soviet reductions of one-sixth of their forces; [and/or] a mixed package illustrating an approximate 20 percent reduction of U.S. nuclear systems for 20 percent reduction in Soviet armored attack capability resulting in more defensively-oriented postures and approximate stationed ground force parity on both sides." "Each of these alternatives," the paper continues, "have been examined as possible outcomes of the negotiation. As such they would yield an outcome for MBFR that would be acceptable to the United States."

<sup>3</sup> The paper proposed that a series of annexes be attached and sent along with the paper: an annex with details of each of the three proposed reduction options; a separate annex discussing nuclear aspects of MBFR; and three additional annexes discussing "elements which would need to be considered in connection with our overall negotiating strategy but which are not of themselves functionally related to the specifics of the reduction approach we select," that is, "force limitation agreements, possible pre-reduction collateral constraints," and "verification measures."

Once the views of the Allies are available on the outcomes that would be acceptable, we will consider these views and provide the Allies with our preferences regarding the initial approach to be taken in the negotiations, including concrete proposals on reductions that should be developed jointly by the Allies.

United States representatives should make clear to the Allies the importance of reaching agreement on concrete reduction proposals before the negotiations begin in the fall. This does not necessarily imply that such proposals would be made at an early point in the negotiations. However, it is necessary in order to ensure that Allied negotiating tactics and presentations on substantive MBFR issues are consistent with the proposals the Allies will eventually advance.

The President wishes to emphasize the importance of an Allied commitment to further improvements in Allied forces in connection with MBFR. The Secretary of Defense should prepare a presentation on a program for U.S. and Allied force improvements to be delivered at the upcoming NATO Defense Ministers meeting. A draft of this presentation should be made available for review by May 15, 1973.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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### **138. Editorial Note**

Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti visited the United States April 17–18, 1973, for talks with U.S. officials, including President Nixon. Among the topics he discussed with Nixon were the European security conference and MBFR. A memorandum of Nixon's conversation with Andreotti in the Oval Office on the morning of April 17 reads in part: "The President stated that the European Security Conference is a prospect that Italy has supported. This Conference can be very helpful in reducing tensions between East and West. However, for the Communists it could be used as a device to lull the West into losing its sense of concern for maintaining adequate defenses. MBFR can become the basis of reducing the burden of maintaining the defense of Western Europe, but at the same time if we allow the fact that this Conference is to take place to lead us to lower our guard and relax on matters of our own defense, the Atlantic Alliance could practically come apart at the seams, which would be a happy result for the Soviet Union." Later in the conversation, the President returned to the topic:

"The President said that (1) it is essential to maintain the defense of the Atlantic Alliance, and therefore reductions could not be made under

any circumstances without a similar move on the other side; (2) secondly, the President said that the West could not afford to allow speeches and bland communiqués that might come out of the European Security Conference to lead to a dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance or to a moral weakening of the Alliance. No piece of paper would have any meaning without a moral commitment in our hearts and a determination to maintain our adherence and loyalty to that commitment, this is the strength of the Atlantic Alliance. If this is allowed to wither away, the Atlantic Alliance will be worth nothing, no matter what is written on the paper. There are of course forces in Europe as well as in the United States who would welcome dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance. There are many elements within the media of both our countries which are characterized by a new isolationist disease. Therefore it is for the leaders of all of our countries, particularly the big countries, to exert strong leadership in order to maintain the strength of the Alliance, because the Soviet Union could only be interested in negotiating these questions with a strong Atlantic Alliance and a strong United States. This is why there has been success in such negotiations heretofore. When you are playing a good game, you don't change your plays. The President went on to say that in his view it would not be an overstatement to say that the future of peace in Europe and in the world is founded upon the strength of the Atlantic Alliance, through the kind of cooperation we have seen over the past 25 years. In this respect, all of the leaders of Europe and also of Canada are important. But the future lies in one hand, a hand with five fingers—five men: Heath, Andreotti, Pompidou, Brandt, Nixon—all leading with a firm determination that despite the lack of support on the part of some of the media in their countries, we cannot countenance the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, if these countries were to be parochial, each going its separate way, then all of our hopes for building a structure of peace and achieving a genuine détente will crumble. It is up to us, the President repeated . . . five men." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversation, Presidential File, 1973–76)

During a second meeting in the Oval Office on the morning of April 18, "President Nixon asked Premier Andreotti what his feelings were with regard to MBFR. He asked if in his view the present consultations were progressing on a correct course. In this regard, the President reported to Premier Andreotti that several of the Senators with whom the Prime Minister had met the previous day told him that the Prime Minister had been very firm in his discussion of this matter with the members of the Senate Committee. President Nixon said that he was grateful to him for that.

"Prime Minister Andreotti expressed the view that the USSR in order to accede to a reduction of forces must act firmly vis-à-vis the military leadership in the Soviet Union, which requires something in

return from our side. So in the first place there must be a linkage between the European Security Conference, perhaps not legal but at least from the standpoint of timing, with the initial stage of MBFR. This of course could be fraught with dangers. Still it would be very useful for the West, and if properly managed within the NATO framework, as matters are being handled in Helsinki, it should be workable. Therefore as a first point, the Russians must be encouraged to see that in order to obtain the desired results on the European Security Conference, they will have to move forward on MBFR. Secondly, MBFR involves a value from a technical standpoint but is also symbolic as regards the direction in which we wish to move. Therefore it would be essential—and this in large measure would be a problem for the United States to consider—to set forth the timing for the achievement of a Europeanization of the defense of Europe [including burden sharing], and work toward linking this process to MBFR.

“President Nixon assured Prime Minister Andreotti that the United States would make every effort to maintain our strength and our commitment until there is a mutual reduction in forces. The President went on to say that the Prime Minister’s words regarding burden sharing would be music to the ears of many members of Congress. We are aware of the problems that this involves for the European countries. However, we also have to face a problem here, of which Prime Minister Andreotti would probably be aware as the result of his conversation with some of our Senators, for example, who think that because we have met with the Soviets, the world is now a safer place, and that we can reduce our forces unilaterally.

“Premier Andreotti commented at this point that the fall of Rome came about when Rome began to see its enemies as they wished to see them, and not as they actually were. It seems that all of the opposition elements in the world came to adopt a philosophy based on which they are more inclined to yield up their position, which in reality often is a matter of cowardice, convincing themselves that their adversaries have become good, and there is no more evil in the world. Had not President Nixon been able to count upon the armed might of the United States and of NATO to back him he could not have pursued the policies he has developed. Therefore it is in this direction that our commitment and responsibility lie. It is doubtful that Kosygin himself would have been able to accept the President’s policies had they not been backed with strength.

“President Nixon said that he could not agree more fully. Without this strength the Big Five could hardly be effective in bringing public opinion to see reality. This, the President said, was his and the Prime Minister’s responsibility.” (Memorandum for the President’s Files, April 18; *ibid.*) The brackets are in the original.

139. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 18, 1973, 4:45 p.m.

WS: Hello Henry. I saw Vorontsov yesterday about CSCE.<sup>2</sup>

HK: Right.

WS: And he was complaining [about] slow progress and so on. I told him about our concern about their stand on human contact issue and that this has bothered our allies and this is stiffening them about the inviolability issue.

HK: Right.

WS: And ah—well, he took this all down and asked, well, you don't have anything specific to suggest? And I said no—you should talk to the allies. Now Dobrynin called me this afternoon, saying he had heard what I had told Vorontsov and he was very surprised and he asked had I heard from you? I said no, all I knew was that Ken Rush had talked to you and told me that Vorontsov would be seeing me about this CSCE meeting—that's all I knew. And Dobrynin said "Oh, I have to call Henry because what we want is a very confidential exchange," and I gather, you know, he wants to agree on some language. I said well, I don't know anything about that.

HK: Well, that is what they have in mind—they do want a very confidential exchange—now I am not sure I would agree to agree on some language—

WS: I'm afraid of that because we'll get into a nutcracker again with the allies.

HK: But if you can call them along a bit.

WS: Yeah, well that is what I was trying to do—I complained about this Orin (sp?) statement about human contact. I said I felt we were really on the verge of working on—

HK: But the intention was that there would be some preliminary talks between you and them.

WS: Uh huh.

HK: To see whether we could narrow the differences a bit—

WS: Yeah, yeah. Well, I can see him again. As I say I am reluctant to get into actual language because of a—

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of this meeting has been found.

HK: They have a central committee meeting next Monday—I wonder whether you can't stall them through that.

WS: Sure. Yeah. You mean hold off any further contact—

HK: No, tell him you have since talked to me and you are willing to have, you know, some exchange, but I wouldn't agree to anything final—and you can tell him that it was agreed that the final decision, if any, would be made by Dobrynin and me.

WS: Yeah. Should we suggest illustrative language or—

HK: Well, if you think you can sell it.

WS: Yeah, or maybe we can be a little more specific on the points that bother us.

HK: Yeah, I think that would be my first step.

WS: Yeah, because I really think it is for the allies, mainly the French and the Italians, they are very concerned; they think something can be worked out in Helsinki, but the Soviets have got to give a little. And then on this inviolability of frontiers, it is not ourselves that are holding the thing up, I think it is the Germans, and they are prepared to move, but they want some give from the Soviets on the human contacts.

HK: Well why don't you explain that problem to them and say we are willing—but it is also partly between them and the allies—but show you have had some instructions to be helpful. Can you do that?

WS: Sure, sure, sure.

HK: Good, thank you.

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#### 140. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 19, 1973, 1:15–1:45 p.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

Sir Burke Trend  
Sir Thomas Brimelow  
Ambassador Cromer  
Mr. Richard A. Sykes, Minister

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 27, Geopolitical File, Great Britain, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place at the British Embassy.

Patrick Nairne  
 Charles Powell, First Secretary  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff  
 William Hyland, NSC Staff  
 Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sir Trend: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] What about the military thing and MBFR?

Dr. Kissinger: We do feel agreed about MBFR.

Our grievance is that we simply do not accept the proposal that Hungary is a major consideration of the West. We agree that Hungary should be protected by a non-circumvention clause.<sup>2</sup> I don't agree with the view of Luns that Hungary will be a repository for the Soviets.<sup>3</sup>

There is no dispute on our side that Hungary should be covered by a non-circumvention clause. You have seen the options that we have developed. You will see that we are aiming not for a big cut, but we want a common ceiling established. I have seen that we need a general approach, and I think that a common ceiling is the best approach. The common ceiling requires a disproportionate cut by the Soviets of 1½ to 1 or 2 to 1. If you include Hungary and insist on a common ceiling, you have 5 to 1. You are, therefore, driven to percentage cuts. Then you will not get into very dangerous levels of cuts. We believe the maximum cut would be around 15% and we prefer around 10%. This would affect 7–8,000 troops in Hungary. Nobody can tell us that these troops affect the security of Western Europe. The insistence [*inclusion*] of Hungary makes it difficult to insist on a common ceiling, and forces us to make percentage cuts, which are not in our interest.

We have made a serious attempt to deal with MBFR as a security problem. We will not use it as the European vehicle of Vietnamization. We will use it for a security debate and to quiet down our domestic situation. I do so at the minimum level we consider realistic. We realize that at the precise time when it most important, all our governments are under pressure to dismantle. We think it is imperative to address the security debate.

Amb. Cromer: We think it was you who introduced Hungary anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be.

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<sup>2</sup> A non-circumvention clause would prevent the re-stationing of forces withdrawn by the Warsaw Pact and NATO as part of an MBFR agreement in other NATO or Warsaw Pact countries outside the reductions area.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 136.



Sir Brimelow: I have here the reply of Sir Alec (Douglas-Home). He reads . . . (re Hungary in MBFR)<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Kissinger: We will accept this.

Sir Brimelow: This is terribly important.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never questioned that. We have never had the view that Hungary should be excluded.

Sir Brimelow: This is a matter in which our Ministers are interested. They do attach much importance to bringing Hungary into MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: They don't have to be at the table to have the area covered by a non-circumvention clause. This would certainly be a legitimate subject of discussion.

Sir Brimelow: Would you like to keep that? (refers to reply of Sir Alec Douglas-Home—[Tab A])<sup>5</sup>

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Sir Brimelow: I think that letter calls for a reply from Secretary Rogers, not Kissinger.

Sonnenfeldt: Your people certainly stonewalled in Brussels.

Sir Brimelow: Yes, as you say, they have stonewalled. Ted Peck<sup>6</sup> wrote "as foreseen, we are in the minority of one," and we will have to consider how to reply to Luns' appeal.

Dr. Kissinger: If you can't give way gracefully . . .

Sonnenfeldt: How much can we put ourselves formally on paper? We have to give some assurance that we are serious.

Dr. Kissinger: We will develop a common position before the negotiations.

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<sup>4</sup> Douglas-Home's note, addressed to Rogers, is not attached. The text of the note was sent to London in telegram 76685, April 24, and reads in part: "I hope that you do not think that we have been unreasonable about Hungary, but the issue seems to us of real importance." Douglas-Home voiced the opinion "that the outcome of the discussions in Vienna pre-judges the Hungarian issue in favor of the Warsaw Pact" and that "the ground lost will be very difficult to recover later on." "Hungarian exclusion from any MBFR agreements," he added, "could have considerable impact on the Balkans, and in particular Yugoslavia." He continued: "I think it very important that we should as a minimum objective stick to the decision taken in the Council on 12 March that the Warsaw Pact countries should not be free to circumvent MBFR agreements, for instance by building up Soviet forces in Hungary, and that the question of Hungary's inclusion in a constraints area should be kept open." Douglas-Home wrote that "in this case I would be ready to accept in the interests of Alliance solidarity the recommendation of the Allied negotiators in Vienna. I would do so with some misgiving." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 730, Country Files, United Kingdom, Vol. 8)

<sup>5</sup> Brackets are in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Sir Edward Peck, U.K. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Sir Trend: We are disposed to reconsider our attitudes.

Sir Brimelow: Sir Alec will reply to Secretary General Luns unless you want a further discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's get an answer to Sir Alec.<sup>7</sup>

Sir Trend: When we reach substantial negotiations, you will insure that Hungary will be covered by the non-circumvention clause?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we accept what Sir Alec has said. What we want to do now is to debate on how to phrase the non-circumvention clause.

Amb. Cromer: You can use my good office.

Sonnenfeldt: We are half way there with the unilateral Western statements made in Vienna.

Sir Brimelow: We are not happy with the unilateral statements made in Vienna.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never questioned that the substance of the issues relating to Hungary should be part of the actual negotiating position, which I assure you will be a common one.

Sir Brimelow: Sir Alec has said that he would be ready to accept it, but would do so with some misgivings.

Dr. Kissinger: Someday tell me what you are trying to achieve. What is it you are giving up with misgivings?

Sir Brimelow: "The attitude which we have hitherto adopted."  
(laughter)

Sir Trend: Now, MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to MBFR, we will put before the NATO Council a paper boiled down,<sup>8</sup> but what your people saw. There are two options for third countries in a separate status. We should use the nuclear option as a building block. We do not believe that this can be presented as the only Western option. I don't think the Soviets would accept it. Therefore, we have two options; do we want to operate in two stages by the usual U.S. cut in regard to Soviet forces. Or do we want simply a cut of U.S. to Soviet forces where percentage equilibrium leads to a common ceiling on both sides.

Sir Trend: What do you favor?

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<sup>7</sup> Rogers's reply to Douglas-Home, sent to London in telegram 76685, April 24, reads: "I agree entirely that the Soviets should not be free to circumvent or undermine MBFR agreements by augmenting their forces in Hungary. To this end, we will join fully in Allied efforts to achieve agreement with the Warsaw Pact participants in the negotiations themselves on provisions designed to preclude circumvention of MBFR agreements reached. With regard to Hungary's inclusion in the constraints area, I agree that this issue should continue to be kept open."

<sup>8</sup> See Document 137.

Dr. Kissinger: In the first option you have 10 and 10.<sup>9</sup> I favor the second option where the number of forces cut is slightly less. Option one is a 38,000 cut. We don't like indigenous force cuts. Look at what would happen in the countries concerned, we would be trading good German divisions for second rate Czech divisions. We would on the whole prefer the second option, but we are not going to press it.

Sir Trend: How will the Russians react?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no feeling for this. Prior to the Summit they offered a 5% US-Soviet cut.<sup>10</sup> We refused to discuss it and we have never had a serious discussion on MBFR. My impression is that they are very badly organized in this and find it difficult to find a bureaucrat to propose anything.

On the nuclear package, which is not a separable package, one can make arguments for both. We have many more than can possibly be ever used. We have 5,000 in the Central Front. They can be used as a compensation for some inequality of number.

Amb. Cromer: These are ten times more than the last time we have discussed it.

Dr. Kissinger: Ten is the number that NATO has agreed on. I have my futile task to get the President to understand this. We are not going to press that at all. What is your view?

Mr. Nairne: We like the common ceiling approach and the great emphasis on European security. Where is the starting point? How do you see this beginning?

Dr. Kissinger: You mean the starting date of negotiations?

Mr. Nairne: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: If I were to conduct a negotiation I wouldn't say anything about nuclear war first. Then you make options, and they

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<sup>9</sup> See footnote 2, Document 137.

<sup>10</sup> No record of the Soviet offer has been found. In a memorandum to Kissinger on April 12, 1972, Sonnenfeldt provided information for Kissinger's next meeting with Dobrynin. Under the heading "MBFR" Sonnenfeldt wrote: "My recollection is that you owe some sort of response. We now have a paper on principles which you will get shortly. It is based on what is already common ground with the allies. You may want to indicate that the President will be prepared to discuss principles in Moscow. (The other two possibilities—an effort to agree on a 'quick and dirty' reduction, and an understanding on negotiating procedures—have many problems and pitfalls.)" In the margin of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote, "5%." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Sonnenfeldt Papers, 1 of 2) According to the memorandum of Kissinger's conversation with Dobrynin on April 12, the only topics of conversation were Vietnam and Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Moscow. (Ibid., Files, Box 493, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1972, Vol. 10) For the full text of Sonnenfeldt's memorandum and Kissinger's memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 93 and 94.

will scream at inequality. After a deadlock we could introduce nuclear elements.

Mr. Nairne: The percentage element would be quite low to begin with?

Dr. Kissinger: Not just to begin with, this is the only negotiation. We would pick a draft that would result in a common ceiling.

Sonnenfeldt: What preliminary proposals do you start with?

Dr. Kissinger: I hate to give up the common ceiling, I might start at that and stick at that. If you say ten, then you have yielded a principle that is dangerous.

Amb. Cromer: A common ceiling means sixteen.

Sonnenfeldt: It happens to be the only way you can get it.

Dr. Kissinger: You have the advantage of an equal cut and an equal outcome.

Amb. Cromer: But you are really in a heading position.

Dr. Kissinger: But if you start yelling about inequality where we get rid of a little more than they in the specialized weapons . . .

Mr. Nairne: We want something from them.

Sonnenfeldt: Obviously.

Dr. Kissinger: Our military had one option which was 40 Pershings and 60 RF-4s for 140,000 Russians. Unfortunately, we don't have the personnel to be able to negotiate this.

Mr. Nairne: The whole way that Europe looks upon tactical nuclear weapons is part of the strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but what we would do with them and their number might inhibit the President from using them at all.

Mr. Nairne: I think 15% would be a high figure.

Sir Trend: Have you contemplated what would happen if no agreement is made with the Russians?

Dr. Kissinger: If we have used it to put before our people as a policy that makes sense, and we can put this before the Soviets . . . We will fight for it. If we can put before Congress and the public a rational plan, elaborate what our defense strategy is and the reason the Soviets won't accept it, we will be o.k.

I believe the tide is going to turn, again if it weren't for Watergate . . .

Sir Trend: There isn't much sign of this in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Look at the POWs. This is not a defeatist country. Unfortunately our intellectuals are out of whack.

Sir Trend: Is there, then, a rational defense policy?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and this we want more than a rational MBFR policy.

Mr. Nairne: This raises a dilemma.

Dr. Kissinger: In this country we believe we can do both. I don't know if the European Allies can do both.

Mr. Nairne: We would like to, but the prospect of MBFR makes one believe that one will have a tremendous task.

Dr. Kissinger: The great danger will be if the whole détente policy makes people think they don't need defense at all.

(There is general agreement among all present.)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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#### 141. Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 19, 1973.

##### SUBJECT

US-Soviet Views on CSCE Preparatory Negotiations

I saw the Soviet DCM, Yuly Vorontsov, this afternoon to discuss with him our respective views on various issues concerning the preparatory talks in Helsinki for a CSCE.<sup>2</sup>

I went over with Vorontsov the main points I had made in my talk with him April 17:<sup>3</sup> (1) the Western side at Helsinki had been taken aback by the harshness of Zorin's statements toward the end of Phase III in Helsinki concerning Basket III on Human Contacts; (2) this, in turn, had stiffened the stance of the Allies concerning the issue of Inviolability of Frontiers in Basket I; and (3) if progress were to be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE. Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> A summary of the conversation was sent to USNATO in telegram 76683, April 24, which is attached but not printed. The same day, the Mission replied in telegram 2025: "As authorized, US rep drew on refel in briefing POLADs. To avoid sparking Allied concerns, US rep did not mention Vorontsov reference in para 1 to collaboration of US and Soviet MPT delegations and his statement at end of para 3 concerning position allegedly taken by US MPT del on non-use of force/frontier inviolability issue and Gromyko's hope for more 'active' US posture. We also felt it better not to mention Asst Secretary Stoessel's point that US MPT del had in fact encouraged other Allied dels to move more rapidly (para 5) and not to draw direct trade-off between human contacts and frontier inviolability (para 6)." Another copy of the telegram is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 139.

achieved on the Inviolability of Frontiers issue, it was essential for the Soviets to display flexibility on Human Contacts and to do so in bilateral contacts with the members of the European Community.

Vorontsov said the points I had made were understood and he knew that the authorities in Moscow were taking a careful look at the question of Human Contacts. He thought that Zorin probably had been too "literal" in his statement and he was sure that some flexibility was possible. He thought it would be desirable if work in Helsinki on the resumption of the preparatory talks in Phase IV could concentrate on Basket III—Human Contacts. With progress there, he hoped there could be progress in other areas. In general, he deplored the linkage between various items and said this caused a bad reaction in Moscow. At the same time, he agreed with me that all delegations approached the negotiations from the standpoint of what the over-all results would be in terms of the whole package.

#### *Human Contacts*

At Vorontsov's request, I reviewed with him in some detail the various drafts which have been proposed in Helsinki for Basket III and made certain suggestions in that connection. Concerning the Soviet draft "Chapeau," I said that the reference to "laws and customs" was objectionable and probably would not be accepted by the West. I thought this point could be covered by reference to "sovereignty and non-interference." I thought that such reference probably could be introduced into the Austrian "Chapeau" draft.<sup>4</sup>

I noted the last sentence of the first paragraph of the Soviet "Chapeau" draft about non-utilization of cultural contacts and information for propaganda of war, etc. I said we had difficulty with this sentence since it seemed to imply that countries would utilize contacts for these purposes. Vorontsov said he understood, but still felt that something was needed to indicate that contacts for dissemination of information should not be used to the detriment of good relations between states.

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<sup>4</sup> At an April 2 working group meeting on human contacts in Helsinki, an Austrian representative tabled the following proposed "chapeau" for the human contacts mandate: "With the aim of contributing to the strengthening of peace and understanding among the peoples of Europe, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and irrespective of differences in their political, social, and economic systems, the committee/sub-committee shall be charged with examining and summarizing in a final document all opportunities of cooperation aimed at creating better conditions for personal meetings between people and solving humanitarian problems, as well as the creation of improved facilities for the provision of information and deeper cultural relations. In this connection, it shall draw upon not only ready existing forms of cooperation but also new forms that are appropriate to these aims. The committee shall also consider the extent to which already existing institutions can be involved in the achievement of these aims." (Telegram 882 from Helsinki, April 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

I agreed that it might be possible to work out some generalized language to make this point.

In connection with the Danish points (1) (A) (B) and (C) on Marriage, Family Reunification, and Travel,<sup>5</sup> I made the following comments. I said that the first two points on Marriage and Family Reunification were of particular interest to the FRG and Canada. I thought that it should be possible to work out some general language which by implication could cover these points, perhaps along the lines of the Austrian “Chapeau” which speaks of “better conditions for personal meetings between people and solving humanitarian problems.” I said that the U.S. was particularly interested in the travel item although I did not feel we would insist on the exact language of Danish paragraph (1) (C).

So far as the remainder of the mandate on Basket III—culture, education, and information—I said this should present no major problem. I noted, however, that we were interested in the point on dissemination of and access to foreign books and periodicals, while the Italians seemed particularly attached to the point on distribution of films. Vorontsov wondered whether it was necessary to go into the cultural and educational questions in such detail, but I pointed out that some of the Warsaw Pact countries, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, seemed especially interested in spelling these matters out in some detail. As a general point, I noted that we felt the Eastern drafts on these subjects tended to stress too much contacts between organizations and pay insufficient attention to contacts between people.

Concluding the discussion on Human Contacts, I said I thought there was a basis on the background of work already done for a common approach; however, this would require some “give” on the Soviet part. Vorontsov seemed to feel that the points I had made were not unacceptable and he agreed that the elements of a common approach were present.

#### *Frontier Inviolability*

Vorontsov then raised the question of Frontier Inviolability and said he hoped we could agree that this principle could be cited in the text of principles guiding relations between states in a way which would not link it or subordinate it to other principles and which would be similar to the form in which it appeared in the US-Soviet Moscow Declaration.

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 849 from Helsinki, April 2, reported that the Danish representative to the working group on human contacts tabled a draft mandate that included provisions on marriage and family reunification. (Ibid.)

In reply, I said I was informed that Ambassador Brunner, Chief of the FRG delegation in Helsinki, had outlined orally to Ambassador Mendeleevich a compromise approach on Frontier Inviolability which we understood would meet the Soviet needs.<sup>6</sup> I was not in a position to give him the detailed language of the FRG proposal, although I understood that it cited the principle of Frontier Inviolability in the same way it was cited in the Soviet-FRG Treaty. This formulation would be acceptable to us and, I thought, to most of our Allies.

I emphasized that this question of Frontier Inviolability was of primary concern to the FRG, which had in mind the undesirability of making the CSCE document a substitute for a final peace treaty. We were not as deeply concerned with the precise formulation of the frontier issue as the FRG, but we understood the FRG concerns and supported the FRG fully. I thought that, if the Soviets could consult bilaterally with the FRG delegation, they would find that there would be a willingness to compromise on a common approach. However, I stressed again that this could only come about if the Soviets demonstrated flexibility concerning Human Contacts.

Vorontsov seemed pleased with my comments on this issue and said he saw some light ahead.

#### *Other Issues*

I referred briefly to Basket II on economic cooperation and to the phrase “military movements” in the mandate on Confidence Building Measures, saying that I did not feel the differences between us on these points would be difficult to overcome. Vorontsov agreed and showed no desire to get into a discussion of details.

Concluding our conversation, I said I would report to my superiors on our discussion and Vorontsov said that he would do likewise. He thought we had made good progress and he hoped we could continue to be in touch if there were further problems. He noted that it was sometimes easier to work these things out on a “quiet, discreet”

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<sup>6</sup> Telegram 770 from Helsinki, March 24, reads in part: “FRG Del here has firm instructions approved at cabinet level, to agree to a compromise with Soviets involving only tenuous linkage between frontier inviolability and nonuse of force. Specifically, it would entail MPT agreement to a principles mandate containing following elements: (a) ‘principles and purposes of UN Charter’—but no other multilateral or bilateral texts—would be cited as source for CSCE declaration on principles; (b) separate listing of frontier inviolability in catalogue of principles—but provided that it appears immediately after principle of nonuse of force. In return for this move toward Soviet position, FRG would also insist upon inclusion of principles of self-determination and human rights in mandate catalogue. FRG has not yet offered this compromise in any MPT gathering, but we have every reason to believe that Ambassador Brunner has privately and clearly signaled it to Soviet Ambassador Mendeleevich.” (Ibid.)



bilateral basis rather than in a multilateral framework as in Helsinki. I cautioned against efforts to arrive at detailed agreements on a bilateral basis, particularly in Washington. I thought the contacts in Helsinki between the U.S. and Soviet delegations had been very useful and frank and said that it was important that our representatives have the maximum flexibility to work out formulations on the spot in the light of developments in Helsinki. Vorontsov agreed and said that the Soviet delegation would have flexibility. He emphasized that Ambassador Mendeleovich should be our primary contact in Helsinki in the Soviet delegation.

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## 142. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 21, 1973, 11:50 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Vasile Pungan, Counselor to the President of Romania  
Ambassador Bogdan of Romania  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

V. Pungan: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] This is an oral message.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Kissinger: For the sake of my stenographer may we have a copy of that?

V. Pungan: No, this is an oral message.

Dr. Kissinger: After you finish may she go over it with you?

Amb. Bogdan: Certainly.

V. Pungan: (continues reading) [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Map Room at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> The text is of an oral message from President Ceausescu to President Nixon; a copy of the complete transcribed message is *ibid.*

2) Taking as a starting point the strengthening of the process of détente in the world, I would like to present a few considerations relating to some of the pending issues. First of all in connection with European Security, as it is known Romania attaches great significance to that achievement in Europe of a cooperation based on principles of full equality, to the creation of an environment apt to guarantee the security and independence of every nation, and to assure the non-interference into domestic affairs. With that in view Romania is firmly acting for the preparation and the actual taking place of the European Security Conference on security and cooperation.

The progress of the Helsinki talks is well known, and I don't want to refer to it again. It is our evaluation that important steps have been taken toward solutions, and that conditions for convening the Conference have been created. However, I could not avoid mentioning that from the development of the preparatory talks in Helsinki and from the exchanges of views I had with representatives of other states, the impression emerged that the United States has reservations and showed somewhat less diminished interest in the taking place of the Conference. We would be only glad to see such assessments and impressions disproved by reality. Romania attaches a great significance to the participation of the United States in process, preparation and holding of the Conference, aware that the position of the United States can have an important role in the works of the Conference and in the favorable solution of European matters. For these reasons we would be interested to see the United States showing a greater interest and contributing more actively to the achievement of understanding, taking into account the interests of all nations and leading to strengthening the peace and security of Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have anything specific in mind?

V. Pungan: To help [*hold?*] the conference as soon as possible and to have on the agenda the real problems of security.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what?

V. Pungan: I have questions that are really important for security like disarmament and force reduction.

Dr. Kissinger: You want force reduction?

V. Pungan: In a separate part.

Dr. Kissinger: Go ahead and finish your letter.

V. Pungan: The second aspect is represented by the talks taking place in Vienna—your reduction of armed forces.

Dr. Kissinger: Balanced?

V. Pungan: Yes, and some other term.

Amb. Bogdan: Ours in original.

Dr. Kissinger: You have a Romanian term?

Amb. Bogdan: Measures of [omission in original text] and military disengagement.

V. Pungan: (continues reading) B) A second aspect relating to the situation in Europe is represented by the talks taking place in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces. As you are well aware, Mr. President, Romania has been constantly preoccupied and vitally interested in the reduction of forces in Central Europe, eventually in the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the reduction of national troops under appropriate conditions. Although in Vienna the subject matter is going to be the reduction of troops in Central Europe, Romania is vitally interested to participate in these talks, both in the preparatory and in the substantive stages, to express her views on all problems. It is understandable that the problem of reduction and withdrawal of troops is of equal concern for Romania as well as for other states because it is an essential part of European security as a whole and of the security of every single European state.

Of course we want to make it clear that our participation in the preparatory and substantive negotiations does not mean any desire from our part to become a signatory of the agreements to be concluded. These agreements should be signed by the states directly concerned. However, it would be necessary in our view, that the United States agree with the participation of Romania and other interested states in these negotiations under the conditions I have mentioned before.

At the same time Romania would like to see reduction of troops arrived at in other zones. We are particularly interested in the Balkans area. We would welcome with satisfaction any manifestation of the United States' understanding and interest in a meeting among the Balkan countries leading to peace and cooperation in the area.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there an agreed upon definition of Balkan area? Does that include Greece?

Sonnenfeldt: And Hungary?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Hungary?

V. Pungan: Of course Greece is included. Hungary would have to be discussed.

Dr. Kissinger: And Turkey?

V. Pungan: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The Ukraine?

V. Pungan: No.

Amb. Bogdan: Prior to this Cyprus was not an independent state.

Dr. Kissinger: That is not a security factor. Then it would include Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Albania. Why did you leave out Hungary?

V. Pungan: For historical reasons.

Amb. Bogdan: Exactly, that was the Balkan entente<sup>3</sup> before the war.

Sonnenfeldt: But they are all your friends?

V. Pungan: (finishes the message) In so far as she is concerned, Romania considers that in addition to the Balkan countries other interested countries could take part in such a meeting. We have in mind, in this context, in the first place the USSR as well as the United States.

C) Based on the interest of Romania in all these questions we would highly appreciate if the United States showed a more active interest in their solutions. I am raising this aspect because the impression has been created in Romania and not only in Romania, that the United States is preoccupied by her bilateral relations with other states. In so far as Europe is concerned, she would prefer not to commit herself actively in favor of a positive settlement in the interest of all states of the European problems. We attach a particular importance to the beginning of normalization of the relations between the United States and China. In our view this event is of historical significance for the normalization of the international life. We attach an equal importance to agreements and the understandings reached between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We look upon them as contributions to the building of a better world, a world of peace. At the same time we would not like the implementation of these arrangements becoming in any way detrimental to the European security, to the interests of other states including the interests of Romania.

I have brought this to your attention, Mr. President, a few thoughts preoccupying me in connection with the evolution and perspectives of today's international life, with the hope that they will be properly understood. They are inspired by the desire motivating Romania's policy of developing friendly relations with all the states of the world, and of placing as the basis of these relations the principles of full equality, independence and sovereignty. Obviously Romania, within limits of her possibilities, is determined to act for détente and cooperation. We would like to see our relations with the United States taking a more active role within the context of the present atmosphere of détente and cooperation. Such a development would be in the interests of our two peoples and at the same time in the interest of peace and understanding of the world at large.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>3</sup> The Balkan Entente was an informal defensive alliance formed among Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece in 1934 to protect each state's territorial integrity.

Dr. Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] In regard to the European Security Conference we have never held any objections to the Security Conference. It is not as clear to us what the advantages are, but we have agreed to participation and cooperation. There you have a forum with every Foreign Minister in Europe using it as a field of exercising his ingenuity. And every department head has an opportunity to draft his own proposal. We would like limited agenda items. We would be willing to speed up procedures for short term agreements, especially with our allies in Europe. We are in a positive position. We will not be obstacles and are willing to mave rapidly to a conclusion.

V. Pungan: We have discussed this with our people in Europe. We want the United States to understand what Romania expects from security. We want the United States to play a more active role.

Dr. Kissinger: Your objectives are clear. We don't quarrel; it is also conceivable that the European Security Conference will degenerate into a morass of platitudes. What you say may come about naturally.

V. Pungan: We expect other states to go along with us.

Dr. Kissinger: What you are attempting to do is absolutely clear. What others are trying to do is also clear, and the two are not necessarily compatible.

Amb. Bogdan: You spoke about the passivity of the United States and the brilliance of the Foreign Deputies. We want to be more active. I believe we share the same concern that it might lead to the consecrated division in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We should certainly be willing to discuss with you on a private basis some understanding of outcomes, get your views, and talk seriously. In the present state of discussion it is not easy for us to know in which direction to exert pressure.

V. Pungan: I think it is important to start proposals, create conditions, and to expect an outcome.

Dr. Kissinger: Our view is to be fairly general and have brief agenda items. Western Europe wants detailed items.

Amb. Bogdan: It is not the length that is important, but the subject. We want to refine. There is always the problem of the subject. Of course the military issues should be discussed.

Dr. Kissinger: Force reduction, that is a different thing. Of course, let me know what exclusions you want.

V. Pungan: It is necessary to agree. It is necessary to keep in contact and to follow objectives.

Dr. Kissinger: To complicate intervention of outside forces in Europe is our policy. We are interested in what concretely should be done. I can't guarantee how much pressure we will put on our allies.

On force reduction—it is a complex issue because we want to avoid force reduction becoming as general and confused as the European Security Conference. We don't want to open up a host of issues that will make it insoluble.

We thought not to include the Balkans, but only the Central Front. As I understand the discussions don't exclude the various countries listening in. But we do think that the actual negotiations should be conducted in a more restricted form. We are prepared to exchange ideas on a bilateral basis and to have your reaction. We would talk seriously.

V. Pungan: We would like the possibility to tell you what we have in mind. The results of these negotiations are important for the security of the whole of Europe. Of course, the agreements should be signed by the countries involved in them, but we think it is important for us to be there.

Amb. Bogdan: I think it a good idea to present a more detailed agenda.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we have your ideas independent of participation in the discussion?

Amb. Bogdan: We have had some at the level of the State Department.

V. Pungan: It is a good idea to talk in principle.

Dr. Kissinger: On the issue of Balkan security, I have never studied that problem. My studies stopped in 1914. Those talks about the negotiation of a little sliver of land, whose name I don't remember, do you? I have not studied the problem. I don't think the United States has studied it in great detail. I will look into it to find out what the implications are, since every Romanian project is more complicated than it looks. We will look on it with interest. We are not directly involved. We are not as involved there as in Western Europe. Let me study it. I won't be able to give you a formal answer before you leave.

V. Pungan: We are also studying it.

Amb. Bogdan: We have repeated it so many times that we are coming to understand it ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: (laughing) That is the great problem of diplomacy. People think once you have proposed something you understand it completely.

V. Pungan: If we have new elements, I will keep you informed.

Dr. Kissinger: Big power diplomacy, I take it for an axiom that we cannot let it be used to undermine the interests of other countries. I think some parts of big power diplomacy might even strengthen the position of smaller countries. Smaller countries have the potential of weakening it. Our discussions in Peking and Moscow are in the same order. We will not knowingly make an agreement that sacrifices the

interests of other countries. Sometimes we don't know what the other's interests are. We expect Brezhnev to be here this summer, if there are any points that might come up to which you are especially sensitive . . . You can be certain we will talk very seriously. With Peking we have never discussed Eastern Europe in concrete terms. My impression is that the leaders there wish you well. Our settled policy is not to support newer relations at the expense of the older ones. But, some tendencies can develop. Is there any other subject?

We attach importance to staying in close touch. My life is so busy that I cannot always participate in the discussion, but Sonnenfeldt has my total confidence.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger: We are dedicated and believe for many reasons that it (the ESC) should be a success and in what we started in 1969 we shall make a major effort.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In a subsequent meeting on April 27, Kissinger informed Pungan that Nixon had read the oral note from Ceausescu. The memorandum of conversation reads in part: "Dr. Kissinger: In respect to the European Security Conference we don't disagree with the general tone of your President's observations. We will be no obstacle to the constructive outcome. Our difficulty is that there are so many ideas floating around in Helsinki. We usually let these ideas run around for a while until they crystallize. Otherwise we would have constant problems with every country from Luxembourg to Liechtenstein. Is Liechtenstein there? Sonnenfeldt: Yes. Amb. Bogdan: Even San Marino. Dr. Kissinger: We can't negotiate bilaterally with every participant in the European Security Conference. But we are always ready to hear your ideas put to us bilaterally. On any other matters go to Sonnenfeldt, and after he has left either Hyland or Eagleburger. Regarding MBFR, we are less sympathetic to procedural than to substantive matters. Mr. Ambassador, why do you look so crushed? Amb. Bogdan: Substantive rather than procedural, no, I am not. Dr. Kissinger: We would like to keep the number of participants of Romania [*sic*] at a manageable level." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5)

143. **Letter From the Soviet Leadership to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, undated.

Confidence building measures at the All-European conference on Security and Cooperation

The question of confidence building measures has been already agreed upon through this confidential channel.

On January 17 Dr. Kissinger stated the following position of the US which, as he said at that time, was approved by the President for transmitting to Moscow:

"The US supports two limited measures: announcement in advance of major military maneuvers and invitations for observers to attend these maneuvers. In our view both measures could be voluntary and it would be left to each party to determine their implementation".<sup>2</sup>

Precisely in such terms we formulated our proposal to include in the agenda of the All-European conference the question on some measures for strengthening stability and trust in Europe.

That is why we have naturally counted upon cooperation between our delegations at the multinational consultations in Helsinki towards limiting the measures for strengthening trust and stability by the two provisions which were named to us by the White House and accepted by the Soviet leadership.

Meanwhile in Helsinki the US delegation stands for also including among the measures aimed at strengthening trust and stability of a provision, concerning prior notification about large movements of forces.

Maybe there is a misunderstanding here, and we hope that the position of the US delegation in Helsinki will be brought to conformity with our confidential agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16, Pt. 2. Stamped "Classified by Henry A. Kissinger." A handwritten notation at the top of the first page reads: "Delivered at 3:25 p.m., Apr. 24, 1973." An attached, typewritten note from Dobrynin to Kissinger reads: "Dear Henry, Enclosed is the material I mentioned to you on Saturday (just to remind)." At the bottom of the note, Dobrynin added by hand: "Thanks for the text of your speech. Most illuminating." A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin the same day at 6:25 p.m. reads in part: "D[obrynin]: That was a good speech you gave yesterday. K[issinger]: [Omission in transcript] about the European Security Conference. D: I think it was a good speech in general. It was large scale speech. You make a quite good presentation." (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File) For the text of Kissinger's speech of April 23 on the "Year of Europe," see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 14, 1973, pp. 593-598.

<sup>2</sup> See Tab A to Document 123.



**144. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1973, 3:24 p.m.

WS: Henry, on this question of movement, I checked with our fellows here and I gather the problem is primarily an ally one—some of the allies have been pressing for mention of movement, in addition to maneuvers.

HK: Yeah, but can we stick on maneuvers?

WS: Well, I think we can, what we are in the process of doing now is—

HK: Because I have now told Dobrynin after our talk.<sup>2</sup>

WS: Uh huh. Uh huh.

HK: I tell you our allies are getting totally obnoxious.

WS: Oh I know, they are very difficult. They are concerned that there may be major deployment—

HK: Yeah, but major deployments we have every capability of catching.

WS: Yeah. The idea is to suggest language which wouldn't mention movement, but which would describe what we are concerned about.

HK: Well, the problem is that they do have a point that last January we did tell them maneuvers.

WS: Yes. Right. Well this has come up since, now George Bastin (sp?)<sup>3</sup> the last phase there had a talk with Mendelevich and described our concern—ally concern.<sup>4</sup>

HK: Yeah, but the trouble with Gromyko is raising and now we are going to try to fix some of this with your talks with Vorontsov is—we make an understanding with him and then our guys in Helsinki act as though there is no relationship at all. And they did come to its opposition when they accepted it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 20, Chronological. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently George Vest.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 861 from Helsinki, April 2, reported on a meeting between Vest and Mendelevich on March 31. It reads in part: "Confidence building measures. Vest explained again our general view that 'major military movements' will be large, not concealable, and thus prior notification will have political significance for smaller powers. Mendelevich expressed interest in explanation. He noted Yugoslavs had used word 'restraint' on military movements and maneuvers in their proposal on CBM's (Helsinki 487) and said his initial reaction was positive if this word was taken as implying self-restraint." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

WS: Yeah. George could be in touch there and would be in touch, anyway bilaterally to explain the problem.

HK: Well, we understand the problem.

WS: It would certainly help with the allies if we could have another go at it. Maybe not mentioning movement and then if the Soviets simply can't buy it, then we just fall off.

HK: Okay, let me try that.

WS: All right. For us to go now and then try to drop it would cause great problems, I'm afraid.

HK: Right. Okay. Good.

WS: Bye.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 83486 to Helsinki, May 3, instructed Vest to meet "as soon as possible" with Mendelevich "to discuss inclusion of term 'major military movements' in CBM's." The telegram continued: "Begin FYI: Based on indications we have received, Soviets will not accept 'movements.' However, we believe it is essential that you make a strong case to Mendelevich on this issue in order to provide a basis for proposing to Allies that they put forward a compromise formulation designed to work toward agreement." Telegram 1157 from Helsinki, May 3, replied that Vest had met with Mendelevich that day to "present case for 'major military movements.'" Mendelevich, it reported, "as anticipated, was resolutely negative and had no alternative formula." The telegram continued: "Recommend that Vest be authorized to inform Allied dels here as soon as possible of Soviet attitude." (Both *ibid.*)

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## 145. Editorial Note

On May 1–2, 1973, West German Chancellor Brandt visited Washington for talks with President Nixon. Among the topics for discussion were the European security conference and mutual balanced force reductions. In an undated memorandum to Nixon regarding the visit, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger wrote: "Bilateral Ostpolitik is at the end of the beginning. The Chancellor is talking more about multilateralizing it, by which he means the Federal Republic's participating influentially in the MBFR and CSCE negotiations with the East. The strategic target of his Eastern policy has always been the GDR. This policy has aimed at creating circumstances which will enable the two Germanies to reunify or confederate some day in some way. For all the apparent Eastern policy success, however, progress toward this ultimate goal has been slow. Indeed, by signing a 'Basic Treaty' with the GDR late last fall, accepting it as a state, and agreeing to its membership in the UN, Brandt may have defeated his long-term purpose. The East Germans are steadfastly resisting a closer relationship. The West Germans count on Brezhnev to put pressure on his GDR

ally. This is a familiar situation, and it must tempt Brandt to offer concessions to Moscow—perhaps in the CSCE context. Brezhnev will see these and probably others in the economic field. *You may wish to caution Brandt against breaking Western ranks in East-West negotiations, even on an issue as vital to German national aspirations as the GDR.* The Chancellor's imminent meeting with Brezhnev will heighten his interest in our policies toward the Soviets. He is mistrustful of their aims in Europe, but he has engaged them for his own ends. He is concerned about our SALT negotiations, our MBFR positions, and the continuing post-Moscow Summit momentum in US-Soviet relations generally. *You will want to explain to him how you relate our bilateral relations with the Soviets in SALT and on other issues to the wider East-West negotiating in MBFR and the CSCE.*" (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 297, Memoranda to the President, 1973, May, Folder 1)

Brandt and Nixon discussed the CSCE and MBFR during a meeting in the Oval Office on May 1 at 10:45 a.m. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "Brandt then described his agenda for the summit meeting with Brezhnev. It would deal mostly with bilateral technical matters, and would call for more political consultation. Brezhnev also had sent a note calling for a meeting of heads of state for the finale of the European Security Conference. Chancellor Brandt was dubious about the desirability of this. The President remarked that he was dubious about the Security Conference. The Chancellor said he believed they have proceeded not too badly. The Conference had an integrating effect in bringing Europeans together." The memorandum reported Brandt's further comments: "The objective of Brezhnev, the Chancellor continued, may be to divide the US and Europe. But the alliance was our top priority. We should not allow our summits to undo it. NATO was a guarantee for the stability of the Warsaw Pact, however, because ending NATO would also mean the end of the Warsaw Pact. Minister Bahr commented that the Soviets now accept the US role in Europe. They have now accepted the US as an organic part of the European Security Conference, and in MBFR, etc. The President asked for the Chancellor's views on MBFR. The Chancellor said he didn't know too much about it, but he favored cutting some indigenous forces along with stationed forces." (Memorandum for the President's Files, May 1; *ibid.*, Box CL 138, Geopolitical File, Europe, Year of Europe, Memoranda of Conversation)

In advance of Brandt's arrival, West German Minister for Special Tasks Bahr met with Kissinger and National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt on April 30 to discuss CSCE, MBFR, and other topics. No record of their conversation has been found. For a German record of the conversation, see *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1973, Volume I, pages 610–614.

**146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1973, 1451Z.

84507. For Mr. Kissinger from Ted Eliot. Moscow Code Room—Secretary Rogers requests that this message be delivered directly to Mr. Kissinger.

Subject: Inviolability of borders in connection with CSCE.

1. The Secretary has asked that I bring to your attention his particular interest in the way the question of the inviolability of borders is dealt with in the CSCE discussions. During the Brandt visit Foreign Minister Scheel strongly emphasized the German view that any provision in a principles declaration reached at a conference on cooperation and security in Europe dealing with this question must be coupled directly with the principle of the non-use of force.<sup>2</sup>

2. There had been some indications prior to the visit that the Germans were moving away from insistence on this point. Scheel, strongly supported by Minister Egon Bahr and Ambassador Brunner, the German representative at Helsinki, very forcefully expressed the reasons why they feel the Federal Republic must continue to insist that the two concepts be connected. In the German view, the acceptance of a separate principle of inviolability of frontiers would mean a territorial freeze in Europe which could be changed, if at all, only with the participation and permission of the USSR. Thus, the eventual elimination of frontiers within a united Western Europe would not be possible. Similarly, in the specific case of Germany the eventual goal of the elimination of the division between the GDR and the FRG would be defeated. Bahr pointed out in addition that to accept without qualification the inviolability of frontiers in the case of Germany would be contrary to the principle of the continuing rights and responsibilities of the four powers for Germany as a whole (presumably on the theory that this could be construed as a final settlement of the German question).

3. Scheel argued that while the communiqué agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow did not link in sequence the inviolability of frontiers to the non-use of force, the Germans had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 722, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XXIX. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Sutterlin; cleared by Stoessel, McGuire, and Harold Russell (L/EUR); and approved by Robert M. Miller (S/S).

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 85775 to Bonn, May 5, summarized the comments of Scheel and Brunner during Brandt's visit at a luncheon with Rogers on May 1, particularly their views on the inviolability of frontiers in the context of the CSCE. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

succeeded in doing this in their Moscow treaty. They wish to avoid losing at CSCE what they were able to maintain in Moscow. They are convinced that if a territorial freeze is established which is subject to change only through the permission of the Soviet Union the Soviets will not only have gained a major objective in Helsinki but also an enhanced potential for influence in Western Europe.

4. The Secretary considers that these are important points which the US side must bear in mind as the CSCE discussions progress. The Germans have shown some willingness to find compromise language in an effort to bridge drafting problems with the Soviets. It is clear, however, that they are not prepared to drop a linkage between the inviolability of frontiers and the non-use of force. The Secretary considers that this position has intrinsic merit from the US point of view quite apart from the support which we would be well advised in any event to render the Germans on this subject.

**Rogers**

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#### 147. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Zavidovo, May 6, 1973, 12:15–2:40 p.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Victor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter  
  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff  
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff  
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff  
Richard Campbell, NSC Staff

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Kissinger's Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Winter Garden at the Politburo Villa. All brackets, with the exception of those that indicate omitted material, are in the original. Kissinger visited Moscow May 4–9. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

## SUBJECTS

CSCE, MBFR; Nuclear Agreement, UN Membership for FRG and GDR

Gromyko: As I said as you came in, I suggest we talk about European affairs. That is how we agreed with the General Secretary,<sup>2</sup> and if we have time we might pass on to other matters.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: I would like to put forward the general idea that we might start off by talking about the all-European Security Conference. Here, strokes all that consider preparatory work, but the consultations seem to be lacking the necessary dynamism, if I may use that word, and considering the understanding we reached to begin the Conference in June. That seems to be the general view.

Several days ago your representative at Helsinki suggested to our representative, that perhaps it would be wise at this time to officially inform the Finns in the nearest future that we have in view convening the actual Conference at the end of June, so they could start the necessary preparations.<sup>3</sup> That suggestion made by your representative is certainly in line with our wishes. And if that is the case perhaps we can reach an understanding among our two delegations to exert their efforts with allies and friends to give it that dynamism which I said the consultations lack.

Kissinger: Who handles the Swedes?

When we were here in September, we agreed in principle to the convening of the Security Conference at the end of June. We maintain our position. There is no reason to delay the opening of the Conference. We believe it is possible to open then. We have already talked with Brandt in Washington in that sense; we expressed our view. We see no obstacle on his side.

The difficulty on the Security Conference is not between you and us. The difficulty is that the Foreign Ministries in almost every country that have been inactive before, now have been given something to do. There are endless papers and preparations. There is no issue between you and us. The problem is in other countries.

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<sup>2</sup> Kissinger wrote to Nixon about his trip in a memorandum on May 11: "There was not much to discuss on Europe, since most of the issues are tactical, and Brezhnev left them to Gromyko. Their main interest is that the European Security Conference start in late June. On MBFR, they offered to begin some discreet bilateral talks during the summer. They seemed unprepared to discuss the substance of MBFR and frankly, I think they are quite unsure of how to proceed." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 17) The full text of the memorandum is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

We believe the schedule we agreed upon with the General Secretary will be kept.

There is another question of whether the final meeting will be at the Head of State level or the Foreign Minister level. It will in any event be at the Politburo level. [Gromyko and Dobrynin smile]

Gromyko: We are certainly pleased with your confirming the time limits we agreed upon last year, to hold the Conference at the end of June. We believe we should on both sides continue our efforts to stick to that time limit and to act accordingly with allies and other participants to the Conference. So if there are any waverers, we can bring influence to bear.

As regards the suggestion to have the Conference in three stages, Comrade Dobrynin informed me that just before his departure you informed him of the idea of the first two stages—the Foreign Ministers and then the Commission.<sup>4</sup> You have reservations with the third stage—but are giving it sympathetic consideration.

Kissinger: If the first two go well, it will be all right for the heads to meet. If not, the Foreign Ministers.

Gromyko: We think to hold the final stage at the highest level would be in the interest of all sides. No one could deny that a meeting at the highest level would be significant. The very fact of a meeting of the highest statesmen would be of paramount importance. Therefore I wish to say on behalf of the General Secretary, we are earnestly hoping that the President and you as the closest assistant will have that goal.

We appreciate your remark that it will be—at least in the Soviet Union—at the Politburo level.

Kissinger: I told your Ambassador the American equivalent of the Politburo, but I doubt he reported it.

Gromyko: He didn't. It is the most confidential part of the confidential channel!

Kissinger: We won't be the obstacle to such a meeting, I believe, if matters take a reasonable course. This is one subject that the President and the General Secretary might discuss in the United States. It is not a matter of principle for us.

Gromyko: We don't think that a meeting at the highest level will be protracted. It should be well prepared.

Kissinger: How many heads are there?

Sonnenfeldt: Thirty-one.

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<sup>4</sup> No record of this communication has been found.

Kissinger: I insist that Princess Grace be included. I already consulted her preliminarily in Washington. Her attitude was positive.

Gromyko: Thirty-four heads.

Kissinger: Including Liechtenstein and the Vatican.

Sonnenfeldt: The Vatican can give an invocation.

Kissinger: All thirty-four will want to speak. They are not usually selected for their retiring natures.

Gromyko: Who will represent Spain?

Kissinger: Franco. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Maybe we should stop there and not go deeper!

Kissinger: San Marino will be there too.

Dobrynin: Yes.

Kissinger: Did you know that San Marino's Foreign Minister was in China?

Gromyko: Really? Did they conclude a Treaty against us?

Kissinger: I don't know, but the Chinese Foreign Minister was going to go there on his European tour. I don't know why.

We will give it sympathetic consideration. If all goes well, there won't be any problem.

Gromyko: As for representation at the highest level, there can be cases where a country can choose who it wishes to represent it. As for the United States and the Soviet Union, it is clear who will represent them.

Kissinger: We will give it sympathetic consideration. It is not a question of principle for us. It won't be a problem.

Gromyko: We could briefly discuss certain other matters—I list them not in order of importance. I recall you had a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin on the possibility of exchange of information on military maneuvers, and the possible exchange of observers at those maneuvers, with the aim of lessening tensions. Also we mentioned an exchange of observers on a voluntary basis. The suggestion was then made by others at Helsinki, not by the United States and the Soviet Union, on the exchange of information on large scale troop movements, within borders or without, regardless of maneuvers. This goes beyond the understanding between us, and we accepted your idea. It would lead us into a jungle which we could not escape. The problem of what is considered a large-scale movement. Where is the criterion by which to judge? So we think the suggestion is an unconvincing one, and we should abide by our previous understanding.

We want to raise this because we think the U.S. representative at Helsinki doesn't always stick to the understanding we reached.

Dobrynin tells me instructions have been sent to your representative at Helsinki, but we don't know what the instructions are.



Kissinger: Let me explain. We have discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin the scenario we plan to follow. Our difficulties arise from the fact that our own allies are taking extremely strong positions. It is difficult for us not to support our allies in the discussions. Our instructions are for our representative to talk to your representative on the suggestion of maneuvers. We expect you will reject our proposal. If our intelligence is correct, you won't accept—though we don't tell you how to run your Foreign Office. Our representative will then tell our allies that we made a major effort.

Gromyko: Thank you for that clarification, which concerns your tactical approach. I appreciate your understanding of our situation.

Kissinger: But our Ambassador doesn't yet know this. After he reports your negative reaction, we will send him new instructions.

Gromyko: It is clear, clear. I trust you will agree that regarding the question of large-scale maneuvers, there will be as many views as there are states in the world. It is not in our interest to engage in a dispute on this.

Kissinger: If there are any difficulties, your Ambassador will let me know and I will straighten it out.

Gromyko: I trust most probably your attention has been drawn to the question of the principle of inviolability of borders in the list of major political principles. You know one of the Commissions at work in Helsinki is at work on political principles. In our view, the principle of inviolability of boundaries should occupy the principal place, and we are operating from the assumption that our two sides have an understanding on that.

Kissinger: When did we do that?

Gromyko: There is no need to go into the positions of previous U.S. Presidents, but suffice it to say it was in the Communiqué last May.<sup>5</sup> Suffice it to say, we expect the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed from the joint line as expressed in the Communiqué and that it will be reflected in the principles and will occupy the first priority place it deserves.

Kissinger: In the Communiqué we had both the inviolability of frontiers and the renunciation of force. The German position is to accept the inviolability of frontiers in the context of renunciation of force, but in a sense that preserves the possibility of German reunification or European unification. The Germans are prepared to have the same language as in the Moscow Treaty.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 98.

Gromyko: Nothing in the Moscow Treaty has that language about the context.

Kissinger: Basically this is a matter between you and the Germans, whom you will be seeing soon. We are not urging the Germans in any particular direction.

As the Germans explained to us in Washington,<sup>6</sup> their concern is that they want inviolability linked sequentially with renunciation and we of course agree. But this is a matter for you to discuss with them.

Gromyko: The notion that the principle of inviolability of boundaries should be reflected in context with the question of the non-use of force is a false and artificial invention. It suffices to read the Soviet-Federal Republic of Germany treaty to see they are listed as two separate points. In fact we drew West Germany's attention to this fact, and they agreed with us there were no grounds for the view. This is what they said to us, and they have abided by this understanding. But they have said since that non-use of force should be in the first position and inviolability should be in the second. You can't have it that one principle absorbs or swallows the others; they should be equal. The West Germans corrected their position—at least they say they understand our position. But they still say they want non-use first and inviolability second—not in the sense of interdependability but by enumeration.

[Kissinger:] You know how wars begin. We think inviolability should be first. But in the Soviet-German Treaty you listed non-use first and non-violability second.

Gromyko: They are not listed in that way to show any interdependability—but because that Treaty was written in ascending order. [laughter]

Kissinger: [Showing Gromyko the final page of the Soviet-FRG Treaty, on which his signature is the last] I must point out that your ego is rising to my level: The signatures rise to Gromyko! [Laughter]

If I may quote the Foreign Minister, it would help us with Bonn. Because they pointed out that in the Moscow Communiqué we listed the non-use of force last. We neglected to point out that it was written in rising order and that your Treaty had it first.

Gromyko: We are not suggesting in any way that in listing principles we should explain that the first one is of the first importance and that the others are in declining scale. But surely as politicians we must realize what the situation is. When I referred to the Soviet-German Treaty, I did so only as . . .

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 145.

Kissinger: It is an almost Talmudic point. I think that if non-violability is second and renunciation is first it could be solved. But it is between you and the Germans. I must tell you the Germans made an extremely strong case to us, and you can expect very strong representations from them in Bonn.

Gromyko: In what sense?

Kissinger: The Germans claim that the implication of Articles 2 and 3 [of the Soviet-German Treaty] is that they have agreed to inviolability only in the context of nonuse—"in accordance with the foregoing purposes." That is their view. They can't agree to something which prevents changes of frontiers by peaceful means. It also would rule out the unification of Europe. They haven't explained to me how they can achieve both the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe. But I can't solve all problems.

Gromyko: Let me give you the precise explanation on this score. That is their unilateral interpretation. It is not a bilateral one. In the negotiations, we did not set that as an objective. That is my first point. My second point is that when the Treaty was already drafted and in the final stage and Foreign Minister Scheel came to Moscow and raised it in conversation with me whether it might be possible to make even some slight and weak linkage—not even in the sense of interdependence or subordination, but just some weak linking—to that I said there is no question, and we will not accept any moving of any comma or anything in this Treaty. That was the only time this came up.

Third, it is sometimes asked, what is the situation? Does the Soviet Union categorically rule out completely the possibility of any voluntary corrections or rectification of borders? This was something that the West German representatives raised during the negotiations with them on the Treaty. We said that wasn't the issue at stake; we didn't want the Treaty to include any clause which could in any way justify a revanchist political struggle in favor of a change of boundaries. We could not give our blessing to a struggle for a change of boundaries. This was what we wanted. They are trying to substitute one question for another.

You say this is primarily between the Soviet Union and West Germany. We are in contact with them on this point. What they say is, let's list that principle [inviolability] but as a separate and independent principle. But recognizing it as separate and independent they are taking a realistic stand. But we think it should be first and we want to support our stand. This reflects the view of President Nixon, because it is in the US-Soviet Communiqué. I keep showing you the document but you don't want to look.

Kissinger: I understand it. I am following the theory of the Foreign Minister who said that in the Soviet-German Treaty it was rising.

Kornienko: It doesn't mean every document is in that form!

Kissinger: Don't you have a standard form?

I won't play any games. We don't think any one is more important than others. [In the US-Soviet Communiqué] they are also related because they are in the same sentence.

In our nuclear document we try to link Article I and II with the language "in accordance with the purposes of Article I."<sup>7</sup> I would be disconcerted to hear that these are not interrelated, since the Foreign Minister says Article 2 and 3 of the German Treaty are not interrelated.

Gromyko: All the principles are interrelated. All principles of international relationships are, and one can't say that some are for the short term and the others last for 150 years. We would have complete chaos.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] Back to the Germans. You get in touch with us after your consultation with Bonn. We have no fixed view on the order of clauses and principles. We will certainly place no obstacles to the Germans and you. Let us know through your Ambassador.

Gromyko: We will certainly inform you after our visit on how matters stand.

So we can end our discussion of this.

Now another question that arises is one that concerns the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the context of the European Conference.<sup>8</sup> We proceed from the fact that it would not be in either your or our interest to make the subject of the Middle East a subject of the discussion of the Conference or reflected in the document in any way. We have enough business on Europe. Otherwise we would have to invite representatives of the Middle East, North Africa and Israel. We would have to stop up our ears because they would all be willing to swear.

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<sup>7</sup> Kissinger was in Moscow mainly to discuss a draft U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. For Kissinger's account of the conversations and the final agreement, signed on June 22, see *White House Years*, pp. 282–285.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 836 from Helsinki, March 30, reported: "Turkish MPT del is pressing for language which would lay heavy emphasis on link between European and Mediterranean security and is suggesting that specific reference to Mediterranean appear in each mandate." The telegram noted that several Allied representatives "reacted adversely" to this approach. The telegram continued: "Canada and US cautioned that such an open-ended approach could 'lay a trail of powder' right to the Middle East tinder box, and Norwegian rep was not enthusiastic about even mentioning Mediterranean aspect. UK noted strong reservation of the Nine towards any far-reaching formulas concerning the Med." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Kissinger: We basically agree with you.<sup>9</sup> It may be that Cyprus or Greece may want some reference, but we basically don't want to get into the Mediterranean.

Gromyko: We are pleased to hear your attitude. If a country like Greece wants to say something in its statement, that is okay. But no discussion of the issue or inclusion in the final document.

Kissinger: We see it the same way—no wide-ranging discussion. But if when we meet, we find some countries won't sign the document without some reference in the document, then you and we should have reference. We can leave it to the Conference. I notice that some Africans are invited to submit written views.

We won't encourage that.

Gromyko: The important thing is not to discuss that question. Princess Grace might want to circulate a document and we can't prevent her.

Kissinger: I must confess that I am more interested from the point of view of personality than in her documents.

I would have to go to Monaco to explain the intractability of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It is a long subject.

Dobrynin: Two weeks it would take!

Gromyko: Then we would have to go to explain our position.

Kissinger: Peaceful competition! We don't claim exclusive rights!

Gromyko: Another question relative to the European Conference, which will probably come under item 3 of the agenda as it is today—exchange of people and cultural ties. We want you to know we are in no way afraid of the cultural exchange of people. But the sole point is—here, no one should try to grab someone by the throat and claim that one has forced that. The sole point is, this should take place on the basis of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are not the only one. There are many other countries who feel the same way. If this is the view of our two countries then there will be no difficulty at the Conference. We should rule out being bogged down in detailed discussions and trying to trip up someone.

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<sup>9</sup> An undated briefing paper prepared by the NSC staff for Kissinger's trip to Moscow, entitled "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," reads in part: "It appears that the Allies will be successful in heading off pressures by some MPT participants for active discussion of Mediterranean issues at CSCE, and for representation of interested North African states, by: supporting the inclusion of very general references in the mandates on agenda items I and II, along the lines proposed by the Swiss ('the committee should not lose sight of the close connection between security on the continent of Europe and in the Mediterranean region'); and by proposing a formula for certain North African states to make their views known (short of direct participation as observers) in the second stage of CSCE, e.g., the right to have written views circulated, as has been done at MPT." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE)

There have never been any difficulties in negotiating cultural exchanges with the United States. We are doing it right now.

Kissinger: I can assure the Foreign Minister we are not approaching human contacts particularly with the aim of embarrassing the Soviet Union. We approach it concretely, not as a means to accomplish something abstract. We will treat it as embodying and reflecting the principles we have agreed upon.

Gromyko: I listen to that with satisfaction. That is exactly how we see it.

Kissinger: On many of these, after we have stated our general principles, we should stay in contact as specific issues come up.

Gromyko: There is another matter: we gave you our draft of the possible final draft of the document on political issues [Tab A].<sup>10</sup> I am sure you have reviewed it. We did it with the aim of setting up on common ground.

Kissinger: We have studied your proposition and we have many comments and amendments and suggestions.

There are two problems: the evolution of the preliminary Conference has affected some of your draft.

We have not informed the French and the Germans. Have you?

Gromyko: Not concretely.

Kissinger: Not to the French at all. Some to the Germans. I was talking about it with Bahr in September.<sup>11</sup> But I didn't show a draft.

Gromyko: You have studied it completely?

Kissinger: What we would like to do is do a counterdraft, after consultation with our allies. We would like your authorization to do it in a formal way.<sup>12</sup> We will talk to the three and we will let you have our views by the end of the month.

<sup>10</sup> On January 15, a Soviet Embassy official hand-delivered to Kennedy of the NSC staff the Soviet draft "General Declaration on Foundations of European Security and Principles of Relations Between States in Europe." The Soviet draft declaration is *ibid.* For a summary of relevant portions, see Document 124.

<sup>11</sup> See Document 125.

<sup>12</sup> The briefing paper on CSCE prepared by the NSC staff for Kissinger's trip reads with regard to the "Soviet draft declaration": "The draft Dobrynin gave you remains dormant, and to some extent has been overtaken by the changes in the Soviet position and the work of the Conference since the Soviets submitted it to us in January." The paper continued: "The main problem is that within NATO we have a parallel document, which will eventually be tabled, and is substantially different from the Soviet draft. *When this comes up, you might say:* —We have treated this confidentially, even though some of our Allies also seem to have a Soviet draft; —To make any progress, we need permission from the Soviets to discuss it with the French, Germans and British; —In reviewing the text, it would seem that some of it is outdated by developments in Helsinki, where there has been a convergence on a number of principles; —If the Soviet side agrees, we could prepare a draft in the West and submit it to the Soviet side. All of this seems premature, however, since the Conference is in an early stage and the working group will begin developing texts this summer."

Gromyko: All right.

The draft we handed you dealt with preliminary matters. It is not a principal question whether it would be one or two. You are free not to wait until our new draft. Let's leave it open, whether it will be an all-embracing document or two documents—on political matters and then on economic and cultural matters. Maybe one, maybe two.

As to the agenda, now we should look about the possibility of establishing some kind of organ—a committee, or commission. I would like to say a few words.

As I said at Camp David, we have no special interest in an organ. The Soviet Union will continue to exist even if it is not set up—but nevertheless, we feel it could be useful linkage between the Conference and a later meeting on troop reduction. Just a consultative, purely consultative organ for preparation for consultation by governments. This would be all right. We think at least there is nothing bad in it.

Kissinger: How do you visualize the consultative organ?

Gromyko: Since it will function between the first Conference and the second, in idea it will be permanent. It is a matter of convenience and open for consideration. We are open minded. One thing more: it should be written that it will be consultative.

Kissinger: We will reserve our judgment. We had thought of some kind of administrative organ for distributing papers—as a sort of a clearing house.

Gromyko: All right. In Vienna, it looks like the Hungary question has been solved. What is going on?

Kissinger: It took three months. It nearly broke up the NATO alliance. Our debates with our allies are more serious than with you.

Gromyko: If you ever need advice on allies, let us know.

Kissinger: We will help you.

Gromyko: By September–October, the all-European Conference will be over. I hope, in view of the mountain of paper. Last fall we agreed on September–October.

Dobrynin: Can we at least agree on a time interval between the end of the CSCE and the beginning of MBFR?

Gromyko: And you suggest?

Kissinger: Say one month?

Gromyko: I think it would be acceptable. I will tell the General Secretary.

Kissinger: Good.

Gromyko: Do you have any bright ideas for this?

Kissinger: It would be constructive if you pulled your forces out of East Germany. It would create a good atmosphere.

You are asking me in what direction the Conference should go and what it should accomplish?

Gromyko: Yes. It is a sort of goal.

Kissinger: We submitted our analyses to our allies. Do you have it? My understanding is that whenever we distribute something to our allies you get in it in 48 hours. Is it true?

Gromyko: Why 48?

Dobrynin: Sometimes we get a distorted view from the allies and want to hear it from the horse's mouth!

Gromyko: You can wait until you are ready.

Kissinger: No, we are ready. We want to treat this as seriously as SALT. We are genuinely trying to examine what proposals we can make which both sides can feel improves their security or at least doesn't hurt it. One question is whether the reductions should include only stationed or also national forces. The difficulty with national forces is it is hard to monitor reductions. And national forces are not of the quality of stationed forces. I am thinking of the Polish Army band.

The second point, what I said about maneuvers in connection with the CSCE—if it is not addressed in the CSCE it will at least have to be addressed in MBFR.

Another issue is whether we speak in terms of units or in terms of numbers. Do you say three regiments, or 50 men from each regiment? If we say 50 men it is harder to verify whether they have left. This will have to be addressed—for both sides.

Then ceilings. I joke about all Soviet forces. We won't reject it. But probably they will be smaller margins.

In the President's Foreign Policy Report we discuss this quite openly. In the Arms Control section.<sup>13</sup> It discusses our philosophy, though not the numbers.

We are genuinely interested in achieving some common ceiling.

Then the countries in the area should not be used to circumvent the agreement. Some allies fear you might put into Budapest what you take from Central Europe. I asked why would they do it in Budapest if they can put them in Brest, which is closer to Central Europe.

Dobrynin: When?

Kissinger: June, July. When the General Secretary comes we can begin discussion.

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<sup>13</sup> For the relevant section of the President's Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, May 3, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1973*, pp. 498–500.



Of course, we look at it from our point of view. And certainly we are approaching it without giving ourselves the benefit of the doubt. But we also consider your point of view. So we are not making insolent proposals.

Once we know the views of our allies—by June or July—we can begin to exchange ideas.<sup>14</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>14</sup> In a letter dated May 13, which Dobrynin handed Kissinger on May 15, Brezhnev wrote Nixon with regard to Kissinger's visit and the European security conference: "No special difficulties appeared in the exchange of opinion with Dr. Kissinger on European questions, including those related to the preparation and the holding of the all-European conference. Apparently, our representatives have to continue to maintain regular contacts on these matters. There will be, of course, enough here for you and me to talk about—in a wider and more long-term perspective." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Brezhnev–Nixon Exchanges, 1973) The full text of the letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

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#### 148. Editorial Note

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger contacted West German officials in the wake of his visit to Moscow to inform them about his discussions in Moscow on the European security conference and MBFR. On May 7, 1973, he sent President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft a message that reads in part: "Please send message in special channel to Minister Egon Bahr in Bonn from me as follows: 'Soviets have raised with me inviolability of frontiers question in connection with CSCE mandate. They have insisted that this issue must be listed separately and first, before renunciation of force. I have pointed out that we will only accept what you accept on this matter. I explained your position that the frontier issue should be dealt with in the context of non-use of force, as it was in your treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviets insisted that this is an incorrect unilateral interpretation of your treaty and that, although listed in Article 3, after non-use of force, inviolability of frontiers stands alone and paramount. I told Soviets we have no independent interpretation of this matter, nor an independent position in the CSCE and that we would be guided by whatever they and you work out. I repeated this position when Soviets specifically asked us to support their position. The matter was left that they would talk to you during Brezhnev's visit and we would see where things

stood.'” (Telegram Haktó 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, Haktó & Misc)

On May 12, National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt sent a memorandum to Kissinger about the latter’s upcoming meeting with West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden later the same day: “CSCE Declaration: Von Staden and the Foreign Ministry may not know that Germans have a Soviet text. You probably should notify Bahr of agreement with the Soviets that the Four can now consult so that Bahr can feed it into the German bureaucracy, rather than you.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 271, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File) The same day, Kissinger sent a backchannel message to Bahr: “During my talks in Zavidovo, the Soviets agreed that the US, Federal Republic, Britain and France can consult on the draft text of a declaration for the European Security Conference which the Soviets gave to you, us and the French several weeks ago. We would like to have the State Department proceed with the respective allied foreign offices to develop a Western response to the Soviet draft and would like to begin early the week of May 14. Could you send me confirmation that you have no objection to the State Department’s raising this with your foreign office?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1973)

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#### 149. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 12, 1973, 12:40–1:45 p.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Berndt von Staden of the Federal Republic of Germany  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff  
Kathleen Anne Ryan, NSC Staff

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, Europe, Year of Europe, Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. All brackets, with the exception of those that indicate omitted material, are in the original.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the timing of MBFR, they [the Soviets] proposed that it should take place one month after the completion of the European Security Conference.<sup>2</sup> We said that was all right, as long as it was no later than October 30. They said that is academic. I don't think this is true. Thus we will have to say that this point is disagreed.

von Staden: That means they want the third stage to end 30 days before, and they still want a Summit.

Kissinger: Yes, we didn't commit ourselves. We took the position that you did.

von Staden: In the Soviet's view, the second stage will start immediately after the Foreign Ministers' meeting?

Kissinger: Yes. The European attitude on the Security Conference is beyond my comprehension. What the advantage to any State is of dragging the process out, I don't understand.

von Staden: We don't want to, but we are under the time pressure of the second phase.

Kissinger: It won't be from us.

von Staden: The Soviets are trying to put us under pressure.

Kissinger: They never rejected it.

von Staden: They are making the link. This is their attitude.

Kissinger: Their interest is that the change be settled before MBFR. That is their definition of linkage.

von Staden: The United States' interests are to have MBFR begin before October 30?

Kissinger: By the end of October.

von Staden: What is the particular meaning?

Kissinger: None, just to have a date. It should be before Congress adjourns.

Now, this is really all that happened on the subjects in Moscow.

von Staden: May I add some more questions?

The Berlin question didn't come up at all?

Kissinger: No.

von Staden: That is pretty much the center of our concern. Then there are two other points. The CSCE—the continuing organizational

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 147.

institutions of the conference and the other third basket cultural exchanges, etc.

Kissinger: On culture they are very much for it. They want to avoid that which is a means of undermining their system.

In regard to continuing organizations, they want something that has no vote, that does act by a majority vote. That is a continuing clearing house for contact. They use Bahr's view that it is a continuing way of being related there.

von Staden: There is in my country and in Europe a school of thought which assumes that the Soviets are interested in an American presence. I have never been sure to what extent this is true, but some people feel that way.

Your attitude is unchanged?

Kissinger: Our attitude is . . . I didn't make any comment to him,<sup>3</sup> I just listened to him. I just listened to what he had to say. So I made no comment to him at all. Our attitude is that we are willing to consider some sort of a purely administrative security type of thing, but we have not reached that point in any NATO discussion, much less than with them.

von Staden: It is something we like very much and are always pressing. [Do] you have any suggestions as to what we might raise with the Soviets in Berlin?

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Do you Hal? I don't have any. I would try to avoid giving them the impression that you are very nationalistic and semi-neutralistic, which I know you won't.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] We<sup>4</sup> don't agree on everything. If we approach it with the attitude there is a meeting of minds . . . Take the MBFR debates if there is anything more stupid . . . it shows a total lack of analysis.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

von Staden: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] As far as Hungary is concerned, I find it very interesting what you say. I don't consider this a great success for the West.

Kissinger: The European attitude is ridiculous. If we have a common ceiling, we need a reduction of 6 to 1 in our favor. The maximum

<sup>3</sup> Gromyko.

<sup>4</sup> The United States and Europe.

study is 15 percent, about 8,000 troops in Hungary. Do these 8,000 troops upset the total?

von Staden: I have never seen that argument in all my reading.

Kissinger: If you have a common ceiling without Hungary you have a one and one-half to one ratio. If you introduce Hungary you have 60,000 to 90,000 more troops. This transforms the ratio to five and one-half to one. That they will never accept. You will get fewer troops out of Europe and you prevent the most sensible approach.

Sonnenfeldt: You keep Hungary in the area, and if you keep Hungary out you can have a non-circumvention clause.

Kissinger: Our assessment is based on military not political considerations.

von Staden: I was never quite convinced that the Hungary case was of wide importance. My considerations were not on these data.

Kissinger: The idea of a private deal to exclude Hungary is ridiculous. Our analysis was what we really needed was a non-circumvention clause and to have Hungary and Italy out. We were better off without Hungary than with it.

von Staden: Ambassador Roth and his aide are both fine.

Kissinger: Roth is a first-class man. I am using it as an example. This sort of debate should be about how to improve. We are trying to reduce by our approach.

I wish you the best success for the Brezhnev visit. You will let us know?

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## 150. Editorial Note

On May 16, 1973, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council Donald Rumsfeld sent a backchannel message to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger. "The NAC," Rumsfeld wrote, "is pressing for a briefing on your meeting with Brezhnev. In addition we are now getting press questions as to whether U.S. has briefed NAC on the meeting." On May 21, Rumsfeld addressed the NAC about Kissinger's trip on the basis of talking points prepared by Sonnenfeldt. Telegram 2489 from USNATO, May 21, reported that at the NAC session, "some allies expressed concern at report of discussion between Brezhnev and Dr. Kissinger on CSCE-MBFR timetable." The telegram continued: "Spierenburg (Netherlands) asked if US was ready to accept June 30 date for ministerial CSCE without knowing

definitely date of MBFR conference. Does US go along with idea that CSCE should be completed before MBFR gets underway, even though no one believes that CSCE will be over by October? He asserted that Allies again coming under severe pressure to make premature concessions to the Soviets. If Allies agree that MBFR beginning depends upon completion of CSCE, then they are in the worst of all possible positions. They should not accept June 30 date without having fixed MBFR date." Rumsfeld told the NAC (reported in telegram 2491 from USNATO) with regard to Kissinger's Moscow conversations: "Neither the preparatory talks at Vienna nor any point of substance was discussed. The Soviets did however put forward the proposition that actual negotiations should begin one month after the conclusion of the CSCE. Upon questioning by Dr. Kissinger they indicated that while that might or might not occur before October, he wanted it understood that the MBFR negotiations must in any event begin no later than the end of October. The Soviets indicated that in their view they expected the CSCE to be completed by September. They did not, however, specifically accept Dr. Kissinger's position and this is therefore a matter that remains open and subject to negotiations and agreement between the Allies and the other side." (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 263, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XIII)

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## 151. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Paris, May 17, 1973, 5:24–7:10 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Michel Jobert, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador John Irwin II  
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff  
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Foreign Minister's office in the Quai d'Orsai.

Kissinger: I have told your Ambassador in substance about our talks with Brezhnev,<sup>2</sup> but if you have any questions.

Jobert: You saw a lot of him.

Kissinger: Yes, 25 hours of talks, and 4 days in isolation at this hunting lodge.

Jobert: He is a jolly good fellow.

Kissinger: Not of great precision of mind. He is a nice man.

Jobert: Relatively open.

Kissinger: Yes, and probably committed to the improvement of relations, for whatever reason. We had a theoretical discussion about inviolability of borders and renunciation of force. We support the German position but saw no point in arguing with the Russians. It is basically between them and the Germans. They want a heads-of-government meeting at the end of the Security Conference. What is your view?

Jobert: We will wait and see.

Kissinger: That is our position.

Jobert: Brezhnev told us the last stage could be at Paris!

Kissinger: The Soviets gave us a draft declaration of the final outcome of the Conference.<sup>3</sup>

Jobert: I have not seen it.

Kissinger: You have one. With the permission of the Soviets, we gave it to the British. We would like to take it out of our channel and put it into regular channels.

Jobert: Are you impassioned with this Conference?

Kissinger: No! Our only difference with the Europeans is we want to get it over with quickly. Our feeling is that the more time we invest in it, the more significance it will seem to have. Our aim is to limit the damage, not to see some positive good from it.

Jobert: You want to see it happen in June?

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<sup>2</sup> Kissinger briefed Kosciuszko-Morizet on his Moscow talks on May 14: "The other matter we discussed [in Moscow] was the European Security Conference. It is mostly a German-Soviet problem. The issue is the inviolability of frontiers." Kissinger stated: "this is not an issue where we have bilateral problems. With respect to MBFR, the only thing discussed of substance was the opening of the negotiations. We agree that it should be no later than thirty days after the ending of the European Security Conference. We said it should begin by October 30. The Soviets said this was stupid because the Conference will have been finished a month before then. They said this was a moot question. I happen to believe they are wrong. We have to say the date is disagreed. I don't think Brezhnev will break relations if we don't start the conference on October 30." (Memorandum of conversation, May 14; *ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 124.

Kissinger: Only because of our general strategy to get it behind us. They want some permanent machinery. We are not very happy with this.

Jobert: We neither.

Kissinger: The maximum we could foresee is some secretariat that would pass papers around.

On MBFR—I know you won't consider your career unfulfilled here if it never happens. The Soviets said it can be a month after CSCE. I said that was OK as long as it was no later than October 31. Gromyko said that was academic, because the CSCE will be over by September. I don't believe him. So it is unresolved.

They are pressing us for a concrete MBFR proposal, but we have held off until consultation with our allies.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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## 152. Editorial Note

Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev visited Bonn for four days of talks with West German Chancellor Brandt May 18–22, 1973. Among the topics they discussed were the European security conference and MBFR. At the end of the visit on May 22, Brandt invited Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand to Palais Schaumburg to discuss his talks with Brezhnev. The same day, Hillenbrand reported Brandt's comments in telegram 7381 from Bonn:

"CSCE. Brezhnev pressed for rapid movement on the security conference, asking why it would not be possible, after the conclusion of Phase I, for the experts simply to stay on and begin their work right away. This would make it possible to hold the final session of the conference (which Brezhnev wanted held at the level of heads of government) before the end of the year. Brezhnev did not insist that the first phase begin before the end of June; on the contrary, he indicated that a slight delay might be desirable from the Soviet standpoint since Gromyko would just have returned from the visit to the U.S. and would need a little time to organize himself. In view of this, he suggested that the 3rd of July might be a reasonable opening date. Brandt said he tried to calm Brezhnev's eagerness for rapid movement by pointing out that it would make sense to begin the committee phase only after summer vacation, say, in September. Brezhnev showed no understanding for this, arguing that summer vacations should not be allowed to interfere



when truly great things are afoot. Brandt also made clear to the General Secretary that the FRG preferred to remain flexible as to the level at which the final act of the conference should take place. Ascribing these views to Foreign Minister Scheel, Brandt told Brezhnev that the level should perhaps depend on the success of the first two phases: if the results were excellent, they should perhaps indeed receive the imprimatur of heads of government; but if they were only mediocre, attendance of the foreign ministers at the final session might have to do. As for the site of the final conference, Brezhnev appeared to have no strong preferences. He mentioned Paris but said he was open to many alternatives including even Bonn or Moscow. However, he was opposed to Helsinki. Brandt said the FRG had a certain preference for Vienna for the final stage and thought that Geneva would be suitable for the committee phase. However, these were not strong preferences. In pressing for greater urgency on CSCE, Brezhnev told Brandt that the U.S. had agreed that it was important to get this conference behind us. Brandt said his reply to this was that the FRG would not put itself in the position of being responsible for a failure to complete the CSCE process this year.

“MBFR. Brandt said Brezhnev had made clear that, although preparations in Vienna could continue, genuine negotiations on MBFR could only begin after all phases of CSCE had been concluded. In discussing the substance of MBFR, Brandt said, Brezhnev was extremely specific about confidence-building measures and rather vague about reductions as such. He obviously attributed great importance to the former and went into considerable detail in talking about the value of having observers at maneuvers and exchanging information on troop movements of any significant size. (In this connection, Brandt mentioned that Defense Minister Leber had been pointed out to Brezhnev on the first evening of the visit as the man who had claimed that the Soviet Union was introducing large numbers of new military units into the Central European area. Brezhnev said that this illustrated why it was important for the two sides to keep each other mutually informed.) As for reductions proper, Brandt said that Brezhnev had taken a very cautious approach—even more cautious than the one the Germans understood he had taken in his recent talks with Mr. Kissinger, as reported to Allies by USDel NATO. He said that initial reductions had to be regarded as symbolic in character, and that further reductions could only be made in stages over a long period. It was important to preserve the existing balance between stationed troops and indigenous troops. Brezhnev pointed out that one area, that of strategic weapons, had to be discussed bilaterally between the USSR and the U.S.; he also made clear, however, that he did not mean to include tactical nuclear weapons under this heading. In response to a question from me, Brandt said that Brezhnev had not touched at all on the subject of forward based systems (FBS).” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Bahr also reported on the discussion of CSCE and MBFR during the Brezhnev visit in a backchannel message to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, received in Washington on May 22: "The Russians aroused the impression that they are fairly united with the USA that the third phase of the CSCE should take place still in this year. The Chancellor was very reserved; he is of the opinion that this is impossible on practical grounds, but he nevertheless said: This will not fail on our account if the others reach an understanding on it." Kissinger thanked Bahr for the update in an undated backchannel message and stated: "We have no agreement with the Russians to complete CSCE this year. As you know, however, the White House has never viewed CSCE with great enthusiasm and therefore would just as soon see it over with. We will of course be guided by the consensus of the Allies on this question. Meanwhile, we will continue to stick to the position that MBFR must begin no later than the end of October, whatever the status of CSCE at that time." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1973)

On May 26, Brezhnev wrote a letter to President Nixon on his visit to Bonn; the Soviet Embassy delivered the letter, along with a cover memorandum from Ambassador Dobrynin, to President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft on May 28. In the letter, Brezhnev informed Nixon about his Bonn discussions on CSCE and MBFR:

"Considerable attention was paid at the Bonn negotiations to the discussion of the issues, related to strengthening European security and specifically to the preparation of the forthcoming all-European conference.

"Our side expressed its firm conviction that the Conference should not only be started but also completed this year. Otherwise the interest of the peoples in the most important problem of securing lasting peace in Europe may decrease and the whole work in that direction will be regarded as a bureaucratic long-drawn-out procedure of small importance. Such turn of affairs, as we think, should not be permitted. We also talked about the desirability to start the second stage of the all-European conference (committees work) immediately after the Ministers' meeting in order to complete it within one month or one month and a half. Chancellor Brandt assured me that the FRG Government will not object to the speediest holding of the Conference with the view of completing all its stages already this year. The West-German side also agreed in principle that the third stage of the Conference be held at the highest level and that at the outcome of the Conference there will be created a consultative organ which could become a link with consequent all-European forums. The FRG representatives noted, however, that both those questions should be more precisely determined with the results of the second stage taken into account.

“In the talks we exchanged also certain general considerations with regard to a possible reduction of armed forces and armaments in the area of Central Europe. Chancellor Brandt reaffirmed his opinion, expressed earlier, that such a reduction should cover both foreign and national troops of appropriate states. Our side expressed conviction that the reduction can be successful only when it does not actually cause damage to the interests of either side and does not change the existing alignment of forces. We told the Chancellor that for the beginning we could agree to a small symbolical reduction of armed forces and armaments. The specific sizes and forms are yet to be agreed. It is important that the peoples receive confidence in the seriousness of our intentions and feel that certain results have already been achieved.

“Chancellor Brandt expressed the opinion that, though this question was complex and the talks might be quite prolonged, there was still a prospect for reducing the general level of armaments in Europe so that none of the affected states would have a diminished sense of security.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 17)

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**153. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1973.

SUBJECT

Soviet Draft of a CSCE Final Declaration

In response to your request to Assistant Secretary Stoessel, he called in separately FRG Ambassador von Staden and the UK and French Ministers (Sykes and de La Gorce) on May 21, to invite the views of their Governments on both the substance of the January Soviet draft of a final CSCE declaration and the tactics for dealing with it. All three undertook to be back in touch with us soon.

This was the first occasion on which the Department has mentioned the Soviet draft to other Governments. In passing on to the three

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Secret; Limdis.

Embassies copies of the attached annotated text containing the Department's comments on various passages, Mr. Stoessel:

—underlined the confidentiality of this consultation;

—referred to the circumstances under which the draft was received by all four of the Allies, noting that, for our part, we had taken no other action than an internal study of the draft;<sup>2</sup>

—reported that the Soviets had asked you, during your recent visit to the USSR, for reactions, and had expressed understanding for your response that you wished first to consult with our Allies;

—noted that the draft, while clearly contrary in various respects to Allied positions, seemed to have been somewhat overtaken by events at the preparatory talks in Helsinki; nevertheless, we would wish to be prepared to deal with the possibility that the Soviets may table this draft or something like it as early as the initial CSCE meeting of foreign ministers anticipated in late June; and

—invited their views on the substance of the draft, the advisability and method of proceeding with possible broader Alliance consultations, what response might be given the Soviets should they again raise this matter during Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June, and how the Allies should treat this or other similar documents placed on the table at the initial CSCE ministerial.

Von Staden was quite familiar with the Soviet draft, which he confirmed was received from the Soviets in Bonn. The Germans had not consulted with other Allied Governments, and had replied simply that many points in the draft were unacceptable. To his knowledge, the matter was left at that.

Von Staden expressed concern at this evidence of a Soviet effort to bypass the essentially inductive approach to CSCE discussions devised with some effort at MPT and, speaking personally, cautioned that a quadripartite response to the Soviets would be adversely received not only by our other Allies but also by the wider circle of Western and non-aligned CSCE states.

British Minister Sykes noted that preliminary British comments on the draft had been given earlier to Mr. Sonnenfeldt,<sup>3</sup> but undertook to bring these up to date. Speaking personally, he saw no objection to an initial discussion of the Soviet draft in the NATO Council, which he thought should probably be followed rather quickly by broader Western consultations in Helsinki.

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<sup>2</sup> An undated, annotated version of the Soviet draft with comments by the NSC staff is *ibid.*, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

French Minister de La Gorce was apparently not familiar with the Soviet draft, nor any French-Soviet consultations concerning it, but undertook to obtain reactions from Paris.

The attached copy of the Soviet draft containing Departmental annotations<sup>4</sup> has been updated to take into account recent developments in the Helsinki talks. Also attached is the latest version of the Allied draft of a CSCE declaration of principles of inter-state relations,<sup>5</sup> which is still rather heavily bracketted. Without a significantly greater effort of will in Allied capitals, this draft is not likely to be in shape for presentation to the Soviets by the time of the Brezhnev visit to Washington.

Further, we would also anticipate objections from at least some Allies to our providing this Allied text to the Soviets prior to the conference. Most of the Allies appear to favor a minimum of substantive discussions at the initial meeting of foreign ministers and the employment in the second phase of the conference of the “bottom up” or inductive approach employed successfully at MPT. Thus, we believe most would prefer not to table Allied texts at the outset, particularly if the Soviets could be persuaded to exercise similar restraint.

**Kenneth Rush**

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed.

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## 154. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Reykjavik, May 31, 1973, 10:15 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

President Pompidou  
Mr. Andronikoff (Notetaker)

President Nixon  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Mr. Alec Toumayan (Notetaker)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Kjarvalsstadir. Nixon and Pompidou met for a two-day summit in Reykjavik May 31–June 1.

## SUBJECT

The Year of Europe

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Pompidou: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I do not think the U.S. can afford to leave Europe. You can pull out 10,000 or 20,000 GIs; this will not matter. It will be a token. It will impress some and worry some. Either the Soviet Union pushes its pawns and it can do so militarily or half militarily, half politically. Will the U.S. accept this or seek a loophole or consider that its interests are at stake? If the U.S. chooses a loophole, the figures are there to show that Europe cannot defend itself. If the U.S. decides that it is vital to act, then it will not shirk its responsibility regardless of their weight. In 1940, a French politician wrote that the French didn't want to die for Danzig.<sup>2</sup> No doubt many Americans are ready to say now that Americans must not die for either Paris or London. The result of not wanting to die for Danzig is that we died altogether at the time.

Dr. Kissinger: This attitude provoked the death of many countries even though it is illogical. The President has said he does not want to withdraw more than 10,000 to 20,000, but unless we make an enormous effort, Congress will want to legislate the withdrawal of 75,000 to 100,000 men by September or October. This may be illogical but it is a fact. That is why the President seeks a political basis on which he can stand against what would not be in our interests.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Nixon: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] Let me give you an example, on MBFR where you feel as I do. I keep dangling this in front of Congress to keep them from cutting funds. Yet I have seen no plan that is satisfactory. It will be very difficult for any country to sit down and negotiate when the Soviet Union speaks for the entire Warsaw Pact. So it is important that you, Heath, Brandt and I talk of these things. With the Italians also, if we only knew who he is.

President Pompidou: Leone told me he will come even if there is a crisis, and there will be a crisis. On MBFR we are outside but we have an opinion. We found many good things in the latest information given

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<sup>2</sup> Reference to the Free City of Danzig, placed under League of Nations mandate at the end of World War I. The Baltic port sat atop the strip of German lands ceded to Poland at the end of World War I, dubbed the "Polish corridor," because they divided East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Poland's refusal in 1939 to accede to Nazi Germany's demands to return this territory, along with Danzig, to Germany led to the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and sparked World War II.

to us by U.S. representatives. We think one must not touch national forces, for this is the beginning of a neutralization of Europe.

President Nixon: We are happy that this is the French view because this places a new restraint on some of our allies.

President Pompidou: We thought we had persuaded Brandt but recently he spoke of national forces again, and he is an independent man who does not speak lightly.

Dr. Kissinger: Not only that, but it means swapping good German divisions for bad Polish and Czech divisions.

President Pompidou: I speak of Brandt. He came from the U.S. with a good impression that he had convinced you.<sup>3</sup>

President Nixon: Of what?

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 145.

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**155. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1973, 1:45 p.m.

HK: Hello, Walt?

AS: Hello, Henry.

K: Dobrynin complains to me that our guy in Helsinki is leading the charge on the troop movement,<sup>2</sup> now I promised Dobrynin, I prom-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 20, Chronological File. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> No record of Kissinger's conversation with Dobrynin has been found. Telegram 99029 to Helsinki, May 23, reported that Vorontsov had "raised the issue of prior notification of major military movements" in a conversation with Stoessel on May 22. Speaking for Dobrynin, Vorontsov said that Moscow assumed "that there is full understanding by the US of the Soviet view that such notification should not be included in the security mandate. It appeared still to be causing difficulties in Helsinki, however, and Moscow would like the US to do what it could to remove this stumbling block. Stoessel agreed that we had a clear understanding of the Soviet view on this subject." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

ised Gromyko and I promised Brezhnev that we would get off troop movements and stick to maneuvers.

AS: Henry, we have and I just saw him this morning—indicated they have reached agreement there on a formulation which is satisfactory to the Soviets.

K: Oh really?

AS: Yeah, so I think we are okay, just a second, Henry, let me check this. Henry, I'm sure that is true.

K: Okay, I'll tell him Monday.<sup>3</sup>

AS: Yeah, really it shouldn't be a problem. They agreed to have the second phase study this question and make reports on it.

K: Now, look there is another idea—first of all can I get your comments on our draft communiqué<sup>4</sup> soon?

AS: Yeah, we are working on that right now, we'll get that over this afternoon.

K: Good, if I could have it this afternoon, I would appreciate it, because I may have a meeting on it tomorrow.

K: Now, here is another idea that I discussed with Dobrynin this morning<sup>5</sup>—has to do with the MBFR thing. They would consider setting a fixed date for the MBFR if we put into the communiqué a phrase saying that Brezhnev and the President agreed on the desirability of concluding the European Security Conference this year.

AS: Yeah, all phases.

K: On the desirability, you know. But I won't see him until next week—can you think about that?

AS: Yeah, I think still this would cause some problems—we could just say on desirability concluding the CSCE as soon as possible.

K: That of course—

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<sup>3</sup> At 1:50 p.m. on June 2, Kissinger phoned Dobrynin. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: "HK [Kissinger]: First on troop movements, I am told you don't know what the hell you are talking about. They've already settled it. AD [Dobrynin]: In what way? I just received a telegram on Friday signed by Gromyko that I need to approach you, but you were in Iceland. HK: Our people tell me that on Saturday morning that they got a tele—they seemed to have settled it today. AD: You are just telling me what I am telling you but I am telling you what exactly what was yesterday or even today, so in what way is it settled? HK: I haven't looked at it, but that they say they and you agreed on a formulation that's acceptable." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 20, Chronological File)

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger is referring to the draft communiqué for Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to the United States. Regarding the final communiqué, see Document 163.

<sup>5</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.



AS: They were worried they were going to string this thing out and use MBFR to weigh the thing. Then we'll think about that one.

K: Do you want to see if we can come up with something?

AS: Yeah.

K: Okay.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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## 156. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 4, 1973, 9:15–11:50 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet

Earl of Cromer, UK Ambassador

Richard Sykes, Minister

Charles Powell, First Secretary

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff

William Hyland, NSC Senior Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Trend: On MBFR, are we back in your good books?

Kissinger: I haven't heard any complaints lately.

Trend: You were so unhappy last time we met.<sup>2</sup>

Kissinger: You should be aware of one thing the Russians have proposed to us, on MBFR and CSCE. I am beginning to think I understand the Asian mind better than the European mind! Last year the Europeans were complaining we had to set a date for the opening of MBFR; now they are complaining we are trying to delay it.

As I told you, at Zavidovo Gromyko said it was academic because CSCE would be over by the end of September. Now they said if we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 23, United Kingdom (5). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the United Kingdom Embassy Chancery.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 140.

agree to end CSCE this year, they will agree to fix a date for the MBFR opening even if it is prior to the closing of CSCE. This is the proposition they put to me.<sup>3</sup> I understand Brandt is willing to end CSCE this year.

Sykes: Three to four months may be needed, on the commissions. But we really can not fix a date because we don't know how it will go.

Kissinger: What would you say if we had a vague phrase in our Communiqué<sup>4</sup> that we don't oppose ending CSCE this year, or something like that?

Sykes: I don't think you should do that; you will become a hostage.

Kissinger: We don't care about CSCE. But would it be worth some small price in order to get MBFR?

Cromer: If it is just set as an objective, there is no price.

Kissinger: But CSCE now need not be over first. We have to have MBFR discussions going on when Congress reconvenes next January. You know this.

Sykes: Yes.

Cromer: The question is whether the Russians want a definitive date of before the end of this year.

Kissinger: A definitive date would be impossible to deliver.

Sykes: I don't see how London would object to setting a date as an objective, if MBFR can begin before.

Kissinger: Could you get me an answer?

Sykes: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 155.

<sup>4</sup> Apparent reference to the joint communiqué for Brezhnev's upcoming visit; see Document 163.

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## 157. Editorial Note

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded in Helsinki on June 8, 1973. In a memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, June 11, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Wells Stabler stated: "MPT was successfully concluded on June 8, with ad referendum agreement

among representatives on a 'final' MPT document (no bracketed language remains) and on a procedure whereby participating states will advise the Government of Finland by June 25 of their intention to attend the initial CSCE Meeting of Foreign Ministers on July 3. This notification will signify acceptance of the final MPT document as the basis of CSCE, thus obviating the need for any further gathering prior to CSCE itself. In the absence of an agreed date for the opening of MBFR negotiations, most of our Allies prefer that notifications to the Finns on CSCE attendance be delayed until the question of linkage can be discussed further at the NAC Ministerial in Copenhagen on June 14–15. Consistent with our view that withholding agreement to open CSCE on schedule is not the course most likely to bring the Soviets to agree to open MBFR negotiations by October 30, it is our present intention—subject to the views of the Secretary, following his discussions with Allied foreign ministers in Copenhagen—to notify the Finns, soon after the Copenhagen meeting, of our intention to participate." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 EUR) For the Final Recommendations from the Multilateral Preparatory Talks on CSCE, approved in Helsinki on June 8, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1973, pages 181–188.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed CSCE with French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert during his trip to Paris, June 6–10, for talks with the North Vietnamese on the ceasefire in Vietnam. On the morning of June 8, in response to Jobert's question whether Kissinger was "following what is happening at Helsinki," Kissinger replied: "No. But apparently Gromyko follows it, and every once in a while comes to appeal to me for help. Then I have to study the problem. I have intervened only once." Kissinger confided: "Frankly, our attitude toward the [European Security] Conference is one of great indifference, that it doesn't do too much damage." The conversation continued: "Jobert: How long will you stay at Helsinki? Dr. Kissinger: I luckily don't have to go there. The Secretary of State goes. Shall we agree we will make an effort to keep our participation as brief as possible? We have no interest in a long drawn-out meeting." Jobert then stated: "I don't think the ESC Summit is such a good idea." Kissinger replied: "We are not for it. We will cooperate with you to prevent it." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File)

**158. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, June 9, 1973, 8:30–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security  
Council Operations  
Mr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General, NATO

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Our MBFR experiences in Vienna are indicative of the general problem. Now there is a general attempt to down-play the role of the NAC in MBFR, while emphasizing the role of the ad hoc group in Vienna. The Belgians have warned us that if they cannot have a plenary meeting of the ad hoc group in Vienna to state their position, they are likely to pull out altogether.

Something is going on that we are not all aware of. Ministers agreed last year to link CSCE and MBFR. Now we have a date on CSCE, but nothing on MBFR. There is some concern that this represents a bargain you may have made in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: What bargain?

Mr. Luns: An agreement with the Soviets on the beginning date for MBFR. The impression is that the U.S. is prepared to drop insisting that MBFR begin this fall, while agreeing to go ahead with the CSCE. I would hope that any decision in this regard could await Ministerial discussion at Copenhagen.

Dr. Kissinger: I have made no deals with the Soviets on MBFR.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I was concerned recently to see a newspaper report which mentioned the 16 percent figure for MBFR force reductions. This led some in NATO, I know, once again to be concerned about a U.S.–USSR MBFR deal.

Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you flatly that there has been no discussion on the substance of MBFR with the Soviets. I have never talked to them about the subject, except in terms of a starting date. Dobrynin has sought on several occasions to get me to give him some indication

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 335, Department of State, Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Secret; Sensitive.

of the size reduction we are thinking about. I have never given him any figure; I have refused any discussion about a figure. If there had been any discussion with the Soviets about the size of reductions, it would have been in my channel. I can state flatly that no figures have been exchanged with the Soviets.

I can tell you, however, that while I am agnostic about the issue, I am inclined to think that the option containing the 16 percent reduction is the best of the three.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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### 159. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

#### SUBJECT

European Issues

Note: Our NATO Allies are particularly sensitive about US-Soviet discussions on the European Security Conference and on MBFR. The material below is consistent with agreed Allied positions. In your comments to Brezhnev you should find occasion to state that these are issues on which we must take account of the views of Allies, and maintain close consultations with them.

#### 1. *Timing of MBFR–CSCE*

Last fall, we negotiated with the Soviet Union a schedule in which the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) would start formally in June/July and the actual negotiations on mutual force reductions (MBFR) would start in September/October of this year. We want to keep to this schedule so that the start of MBFR negotiations will have an impact on a probable Congressional debate expected this fall over reducing U.S. troops in Europe. *Our position therefore is that MBFR must start no later than October 30, 1973.*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Discussions with Brezhnev. Secret; Sensitive.

—*The Soviets have taken the position that MBFR should start only after CSCE is completed. We cannot accept such a tight linkage since CSCE may last until sometime in 1974.*

—Our Allies are looking to us to solve this problem.

—We have told the Soviets that while we are prepared to honor the timetable and proceed with the CSCE in early July, the Conference cannot be expected to make progress until a date is set for MBFR and that this date can be no later than October 30.

—The Soviets have indicated that they might be prepared to set a date for MBFR before the end of the year if we agree to get CSCE concluded by the end of the year. While we could accept the end of CSCE by year's end as a goal to work toward, this would be highly divisive with the Allies, especially the French and British who do not want to be under time pressure. They also feel that the Soviets had already accepted September/October for MBFR and we would thus buy the same horse twice. This option is therefore probably not feasible for us.<sup>2</sup>

—Dobrynin now hints that they will accept our date, if, in turn, you agree to take part in the final phase of the Conference as a summit level gathering. *In your discussion you could say, while we cannot offer a firm guarantee on such a summit, given Allied resistance to it, we could agree to consider the idea if Brezhnev confirms the MBFR date for October 30.*

## 2. Substantive Issues

As far as the substance of the Conference is concerned, *we have no major disagreements with the Soviets.* There are four main divisions for the future work (1) principles of relations among the participating states; e.g., respect for territorial integrity, non-use of force, etc.; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; (3) human contacts; and (4) establishing some institutions to follow the Conference. After the

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<sup>2</sup> In a telephone conversation on June 10, Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger of a disagreement on CSCE and MBFR in the draft communiqué for Nixon's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: "HAK: Look, my judgment is that they agreed to an MBFR start anytime this year; that's good enough. Don't you? S[onnenfeldt]: Well, it may be good enough for us. I think we have an alliance problem. HAK: Why should the Allies object whether it starts December 31 or November 1? S: Well, who knows. The Allies are on their high horse. They take the position we sold this once back in September, and the Russians are making us sell it the second time and their linkage with the CSCE. Everybody is reluctant to accept the terminal date with the CSCE because they somehow think that puts us under time pressure. HAK: That I can understand, but what if the Russians unconditionally accept it? S: If the Russians unconditionally accept some date this year, I think that's all right, but if they accept it with a matrix (?), then I think we have a problem." (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 20, Chronological)

first Foreign Ministers meeting, which is set for July 3 in Helsinki, there will be committees and subcommittees established to work out final agreements. The final product will be a series of declarations and some agreements in the cultural and economic field.

*Your Main Points*

A. *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*

The preparations have been careful, as we both agreed last May that they should be; even though somewhat protracted this will guarantee smoother work in the next phase.

—We have now met the timetable that we worked out last September in Moscow.

—We can continue to work with the Soviet delegations on the substance, and to blend this with exchanges in the private channels.

—There is a limit on how far we can go in prearranging a conference with so many involved; in any case, we should be satisfied with a modest outcome.

—On the *timing*, we cannot guarantee when it will be finished, but as far as we are concerned around the turn of the year is a reasonable target. Certainly by the late winter the talks should be winding up.

—We should both be careful to respect the interests of other countries involved and not seem to be dictating either substance or procedures.<sup>3</sup>

—Whether or not CSCE should be completed with a summit meeting of all the leaders is worth considering, if the results justify it. You do not rule it out, provided we can foresee the beginning of talks on mutual force reductions.

B. *On MBFR:*

—Your view is that the net result must be to increase the confidence in the military balance, so that neither side seems to have an offensive advantage.

—This means that US forces cannot be treated as all others, because we withdraw 3,000 miles, while Soviet forces could be on the Polish border.

—Therefore, the objective should be at a balance of equal in numbers; this means that US-Soviet reductions would be about two Soviet for one American, so that there is a resultant parity. The size of the initial cut could be negotiated, but you agree that in the beginning it should be moderate (do not quote a percentage, lest Brezhnev claim that you have reached agreement).

—*We are prepared to begin talks this fall, as agreed last year.* (If the Soviets have not agreed on a specific date, you should press Brezhnev to accept October 30.)

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<sup>3</sup> Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

Meanwhile, some very discreet exchanges could begin in the private channel.

—In any case, whatever the right proportion of reductions, it will be necessary to work out measures that build confidence, such as limiting maneuvers in the area of reduction and possibly stationing observers at key crossing points.

—Finally, there has to be some guarantee that the agreement will not be circumvented through other countries such as Hungary.

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## 160. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 14, 1973, 10 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Your Meetings with Brezhnev

This is your basic memorandum. It contains a review of all the major issues that are likely to arise in your discussions, and provides talking points on each.

More detailed papers on the major subjects for your background and use are also enclosed in this book.<sup>2</sup>

Additional background material is in a separate briefing book.<sup>3</sup> Also in the separate books are your conversations at the last summit,<sup>4</sup> and my conversations in Zavidovo.<sup>5</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Meetings with Brezhnev, Memoranda from Kissinger. Secret; Sensitive. A notation at the top of the first page indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Other portions of the briefing book are *ibid.* For the briefing paper on European issues, see Document 159.

<sup>3</sup> Additional background material is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Meetings with Brezhnev, Memoranda from Kissinger.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 94–98.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 147.



### 3. *International Questions*

#### A. *Europe*

Brezhnev was not particularly interested in the details of the *European Security Conference*, or of *Mutual Force Reductions* and asked that I take them up with Gromyko, who of course was extremely well informed.

*Brezhnev's main objectives* seem to be:

—That the European Security Conference become a symbol of a new era of relaxed tension in Europe, flowing from the agreements with West Germany.

—He will press you for agreement to a timetable, that would complete the conference by the end of the year, and have the final stage as a massive summit meeting of 34 leaders.<sup>6</sup>

—As for the substance the Soviets have been driven by pressure from all sides to agree to an increase in contacts and freer movement of people and dissemination of information.

—In return, they have nailed down some general principles on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders that shore up the status quo.

On MBFR, Brezhnev has not said much. A year ago he said that the best approach was a symbolic reduction, of about 10 percent, in order to build confidence.

—He took the same position with Brandt when he visited Bonn<sup>7</sup> and added that it would be worth adding some measures such as exchange of observers and limits on maneuvers (a position the West has long espoused).

—Gromyko probed me for our position on the substance, even though it probably has been available through Soviet intelligence since we presented it to NATO. Gromyko did propose, however, that we begin some very private discussions on MBFR over the summer; and I told him we would consider it.

#### *Our Position*

Of course we must be very sensitive to the Allied reaction on MBFR. We cannot seem to be negotiating any substance on their behalf.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the Alliance is just beginning to pull themselves together to take a long, hard look at the substance.

In general we see three possible outcomes:

1. A 10 percent cut in NATO stationed (“foreign”) forces, and a reciprocal Soviet cut of numbers that would bring their total down to

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<sup>6</sup> Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 152.

<sup>8</sup> Nixon underlined the entire sentence, along with “MBFR” at the end of the previous sentence.

a common ceiling in the area. (West Germany, the Benelux, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.) The second phase would be a cut of ten percent for the national or indigenous NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

2. The second approach would be a mixed package in which the Soviets would reduce their tank forces—that is about one Soviet tank army of ten divisions—and we would reduce about 1,000 nuclear warheads.

3. The third approach would limit the reductions only to the US and Soviet forces; we would cut by about 15 percent and the Soviets by some numbers sufficient to create parity (about a 2 to 1 reduction) in the zone of reductions.

The NATO inclination is for the first approach, mainly because the Germans feel under domestic political pressure to make a reduction if others do so.

—As you told Pompidou,<sup>9</sup> for sound military-security reasons we oppose cutting national forces, and trading good NATO forces for second rate Polish and Czech divisions.

*Therefore, we favor a Soviet-American cut, as long as the result can be rationalized as creating a parity in the area.*

*On the European Conference on Security and Cooperation:*

We have no vital interest at stake; indeed, our main aim was to concede some of the atmospherics to the Soviets while protecting the substance. Since the Soviets want to dilute the NATO system by suggesting that a new system of “collective security” is emerging, we want to keep the outcome very general.

As far as the substance of the Conference is concerned, we have no major disagreements with the Soviets. There are four main divisions for the future work (1) principles of relations among the participating states; e.g. respect for territorial integrity, non-use of force, etc.; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; (3) human contacts; and (4) establishing some institutions to follow the Conference. After the first Foreign Ministers meeting, which is set for July 3 in Helsinki, there will be committees and subcommittees established to work out final agreements.

Presumably, they will start working in the committees in Geneva by early September, and could conceivably finish by the end of the year, but this is doubtful, given the record of the preparatory talks that began in November and are just now winding up.

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 154.

The final product will be a series of declarations and some agreements in the cultural and economic field. The Soviets want the final meeting to be a summit. The Soviets have given us privately a draft of the final document, and we have discussed it with the UK, the French and Germans. It is out of date, but I imagine Brezhnev or Gromyko will press us to react. The Allies want to stay loose on this, and we should accommodate them.

*Your Main Points*

*Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*

The preparations have been careful, as we both agreed last May that they should be; even though somewhat protracted this will guarantee smoother work in the next phase.

—We have now met the timetable that we worked out last September in Moscow.

—We can continue to work with the Soviet delegations on the substance, and to blend this with exchanges in the private channels.

—There is a limit on how far we can go in prearranging a conference with so many involved; in any case, we should be satisfied with a modest outcome.

—On the *timing*, we cannot guarantee when it will be finished, but around the turn of the year is a reasonable target. Certainly by the late winter the talks will be winding up.<sup>10</sup>

—Whether or not they should be completed with a summit meeting of all the leaders is worth considering, if the results justify it. You do not rule it out.

*On MBFR:*

—Your view is that the net result must be to increase the confidence in the military balance, so that neither side seems to have an offensive advantage.

—This means that US forces cannot be treated as all others, because we withdraw 3,000 miles, while Soviet forces could be on the Polish border.<sup>11</sup>

—Therefore, the balance should be at least equal in numbers which means that US-Soviet reductions would be about two Soviet for one American, so that there is a resultant parity. The size of the initial cut could be negotiated, but you agree that in the beginning it should be moderate (do not quote a percentage, lest Brezhnev claim that you have reached agreement).

—*We are prepared to begin talks this fall, as agreed last year.* (If the Soviets have not agreed on a specific date, you should press Brezhnev to accept October 30.)<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Nixon highlighted this paragraph.

<sup>11</sup> Nixon highlighted this and the previous paragraph.

<sup>12</sup> Nixon underlined "accept October 30."

Meanwhile, some very discreet exchanges could begin in the private channel.

—In any case, whatever the right proportion of reductions, it will be necessary to work out measures that build confidence, such as limiting maneuvers in the area of reduction and possibly stationing observers at key crossing points.

—Finally, there has to be some guarantee that the agreement will not be circumvented through other countries such as Hungary.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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## 161. Editorial Note

On June 19, 1973, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger sent President Nixon a memorandum updating him on the negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet delegations on the final communiqué for Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's visit. With regard to the European security conference and MBFR, Kissinger's memorandum reads:

"The Soviets want the communiqué to say that the final stage of the European Security Conference should be held at the summit level. Several of our Allies object to any such commitment at this time, as do we. The possibility of a concluding summit meeting might provide the West with some leverage during the earlier stages of the Conference. For the communiqué, we have tentatively proposed to say that if progress in the Conference warrants it, the idea of a summit level final stage may be considered.

"We have, however, tied this possible concession to the Soviets to their accepting a date certain for the beginning of MBFR talks—October 30. Thus far the Soviets have refused to set this date, although they had earlier agreed to the start of MBFR in September/October. It is important for Congressional reasons that we should get a fixed starting date. Consequently, we are holding out, in the communiqué negotiations, for a trade-off between our vague commitment to the possibility of a summit-level final stage of CSCE and the setting of October 30 as the start of MBFR." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 18)

## 162. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Camp David, June 20, 1973.

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary of State William P. Rogers  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev  
Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Mr. A.M. Alexandrov  
Mr. G.M. Tsukanov  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] The other point at issue is with regard to CSCE and the starting date of MBFR. The positions vary in that your side definitely wants a summit committed for CSCE but the allies do not want it. We are in a tough spot there. Regarding MBFR, we consider it important to state the date for starting—October 30th. You have indicated you want to leave it open; it is very important to us because of the allies and because Congress wants progress. If you could come with us on the October 30th date we could take language “considering” a summit. It would cause some problems for us with the allies but we would be prepared to do it. Those, Mr. General Secretary, are the only issues left. If we could reach agreement we would have the communiqué all set and of course the SALT agreement tomorrow would then be in order.

Brezhnev: Has your position on MBFR since the meeting in Moscow undergone any changes?

President: We consulted with our allies, though I don't think we can say now what the details are. But we can have constructive and very concrete negotiations. There is no change in principle from last year.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Brezhnev Visit, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 1:37 to 3:07 p.m. in Laurel Lodge. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) All brackets, with the exception of those that indicate omitted material, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

[At this point photographers entered the room to take pictures.]

Brezhnev: You remember Mr. President, when the idea was first advanced to have the CSCE in Paris. We discussed it in Moscow and also in Oreand with Brandt and we were proposing 1972. But then there were many consultations and discussions. We can now note with gratification that all parties favor the conference and that July 3rd has been chosen for starting at the Foreign Minister's level. Then there will be commissions. And then the third stage. What do you say to this? It should end this year so that it does not drag on and people will lose interest. So we should agree to 1973 for the ending. If we can agree on this, the other problems will be easier.

President: It is difficult to set the end before the conference begins. There are a great number of nations involved and it would not be realistic. We, ourselves, have no objection but we cannot speak for our allies and you would have similar problems with yours. All I can say is that we can press forward to get a conclusion as soon as possible. You and I can agree to that as a goal.

Brezhnev: I did not mean that I wanted to select a definite date, a month or a day for the end. I merely was talking about the end of 1973. It could be anytime in December, say. It would have a great significance in Europe and the world. The matter was first raised during 1972. Pompidou first took the initiative when I was in Paris and he supported it. It was set out in the communiqué at the time. Several others felt the conference would be held in 1972, certainly France did. Then it transpired that it was not held. Now it seems that even 1973 will pass without result. We should try to do something definite. The word allies has a relative sense. After all the two of us are allies in working out things. Any way, our allies support the end of 1973. We favor saying that we should end all stages, including the last one at the summit by the end of 1973. If we could do that, then we can set the start of mutual force reduction negotiations, since you say you have a problem with your allies on this.

It seemed to me that from the previous discussions with Brandt, Pompidou and you we could say in a gentlemanly fashion that this has been solved. Sometime ago I met Pompidou at Zaslavl. I met him half way by saying that the commissions should meet one and one-half months after the Foreign Ministers. Pompidou did not raise any questions about ending the conference in 1973. So the French don't oppose it and in Bonn we also discussed this with Brandt—and I informed you in detail—and he also did not object. I don't see anyone who opposes this except perhaps the British. Certainly the others don't. I don't see any significant objection. Anyway, our joint voice is generally heeded in the world. If we don't speak out it won't be taken seriously. So if we could agree, then we could agree on the points you raised.

So, I believe if we could get full understanding on all these questions we would just have one. I agree that it is very knotty.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: Keep in mind that in regard to the Salt principles,<sup>2</sup> if they are to be signed tomorrow, it is very important to set the 1974 date. Because Friday's agreement has to be coupled with specific things on strategic arms. So the date, not just the vague 1974–1975, is very important. The same applies to the starting date for MBFR in relation to Friday. We have to put meat on the bones. It is very important.

CSCE is a different problem. The starting date has been set for July 3. We both are not dragging our feet. But from contacts with the allies, we know they don't want a commitment to a concluding date. When you say that Pompidou and Brandt don't oppose, it is quite different from what you are saying, which is to settle between us a precise date. Perhaps we could try to give this to our colleagues for drafting: "And therefore they are of the view that it should proceed as expeditiously as possible." That is on page 9 [of the draft communiqué].<sup>3</sup> That way we would not be committing our allies. This would come in the sentence: "The USA and the USSR proceed from the assumption . . ."

Brezhnev: If we take that form of words it might seem that we are creating haste and are afraid of something. We should get an acceptable form of words but not a specific date, just this year. This would give the allies greater assurance. This would not be diktat, it would just be that we favor it and it would mean that we still have six months to complete the work. If this were done, I could then think over the date for the start of the mutual troop reductions.

President: Let me suggest a procedure. This item, MBFR, and the Middle East will not be decided today because they are in the communiqué. If we could make progress it would be fine but it could be finished later. On the other hand, the SALT principles have to be decided today. The note that was just handed to Dr. Kissinger was whether the two press secretaries can announce today that we can have a SALT Agreement. I feel very strongly that the SALT principles will be a shattering disappointment if we fail to put in 1974. Also it would be consistent with our meeting in Moscow in 1974. For example, we would never have had an agreement in Moscow last year if we had not set a goal for ourselves. I

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<sup>2</sup> On June 21, Nixon and Brezhnev signed "Basic Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation." For the text of the agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 23, 1973, pp. 158–160.

<sup>3</sup> The draft communiqué is in the briefing book prepared for the President; see Document 161 and footnote 2 thereto. See also Document 162.

would suggest that if we could get that item settled, which is separate from CSCE, then the experts could work on CSCE and MBFR.

Brezhnev: I certainly cannot object that these two are interrelated and of great importance to us and the world but I would like you to agree that settling a time limit for CSCE is also very important. I would like a private talk before we reach final decisions on all these questions. I have a feeling, a sixth sense, that a little discussion between us could lead to a settlement including all those questions in the communiqué. Certainly I am guided by an earnest desire to reach mutually satisfactory solutions on all these questions. I suggest we adjourn and have a discussion while our colleagues have a discussion on other matters. I am sure we can agree today and then have an easier day tomorrow.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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### 163. Editorial Note

On June 24, 1973, President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev signed a final communiqué at the end of Brezhnev's visit to the United States; it reads in part: "The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire, guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint USA–USSR Communiqué adopted in Moscow in May 1972, to continue their separate and joint contributions to strengthening peaceful relations in Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies. In this connection satisfaction was expressed with the fact that as a result of common efforts by many States, including the USA and the USSR, the preparatory work has been successfully completed for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. [. . .] Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward the Conference, both Sides will make efforts to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the assumption that progress in the work of the Conference will produce possibilities for completing it at the highest level. [. . .] [The United States and the USSR] attach great importance to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both Sides state their readiness to make, along with other States, their contribution to the achievement of mutually acceptable decisions on the substance of this problem, based on the strict observance of the principle of the undiminished security of any of the parties." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 23, 1973, page 132)



164. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 28, 1973.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with the NATO Permanent Representatives

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

3. MBFR–CSCE

There has been a reasonably good discussion in the Alliance about MBFR, and before the summer vacation the Allies would hope to hear our preferences among the three general alternatives: (I) stationed and indigenous cuts of 10 percent to a common ceiling; (II) a mixed package tanks for nuclear weapons, and (III) US-Soviet cut of about 15–16 percent for a common ceiling.

All, save the FRG, prefer the US-Soviet cut, but they are now more concerned to be involved in the negotiating process, and to create a wide system of constraints.

(Incidentally, this is the group that created the Hungarian nightmare.)

*Your Talking Points*

—You are pleased that NATO is grappling with the substantive options and has recovered [*received*] our input in a good and constructive spirit.

—You are aware that all want to hear our preferences among the various options; we should stop quibbling about words like “balanced”; substance is what counts, not words.

—Our view is that if MBFR is not to be destructive of Western unity, the outcome must be a consensus, in which all the allies play a full role.

—We have deliberately not taken a stand, lest we be thought to have already arranged the outcome with the Soviets.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1336, Unfiled Material, 1973, 10 of 12. Secret. Attached but not printed are Tab A, a list of participants at the upcoming meeting; Tab B, telegram 126546 to all NATO capitals, June 28, summarizing Secretary Rogers's briefing to the North Atlantic Council on Brezhnev's visit; Tab C, telegram 3026 from USNATO, June 22, on the NAC's discussion of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war; and Tab D, telegram 3008 from USNATO, June 21, on Rumsfeld's consultations with the NAC on SALT.

—In fact, for very sound military reasons, we believe a Soviet-American reduction is the most advantageous, and that reducing national forces can be dangerous; trading good allied divisions for second-rate Czech and Polish divisions is unwise.

—Nevertheless, we recognize that each ally has a domestic problem, as we do, and that cutting national forces may be unavoidable; in any case, this stage should be deferred for as long as possible.

—We agree that constraints are important, and that there must be a tight non-circumvention clause; this has always been our position and the debate about Hungary struck us as needless.

#### CSCE

They will all be wondering what bargain we may have reached with the Soviets, and what we expect from CSCE. You should not be defensive on the communiqué,<sup>2</sup> but take the offensive in explaining why some symbolism may be to our advantage.

#### *Your Talking Points*

—We have always been skeptical about this Conference, and have engaged in it, first to force the pace on the Berlin negotiations, and then to commit the Soviets on MBFR.

—We should not expect to drive the Soviets out of Eastern Europe through declarations; the more we turn this into a confrontation, the more difficult it will be to explain why we compromised, as will be inevitable.

—Our view is to terminate the Conference with the least damage; thus we can accelerate the pace; in fact, we get more from the Soviets under deadlines than they do from us.

—As for a final summit, our view is that it may be unavoidable; all of the Eastern side will attend at the summit level and so will the neutrals, the West will isolate themselves, so it should not be turned into a confrontation.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 163.

165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 28, 1973.

SUBJECT

US Position at the CSCE Ministerial Meeting, July, 1973

In connection with the forthcoming CSCE ministerial meeting to be held at Helsinki beginning on July 3, the attached general briefing paper<sup>2</sup> and objectives and issues paper have been prepared for my use. I intend, at Helsinki, to proceed generally along the lines suggested in these papers, which are fully consonant with our approach to CSCE.

While at Helsinki, I will also be opening the Azores base negotiations in conversations with the Portuguese Foreign Minister.

**William P. Rogers**

**Attachment**

Washington, June 1973.

CSCE MINISTERIAL

OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES PAPER

*I. Objectives*

US participation in successive stages of CSCE will:

—constitute a further demonstration to our Allies and to other European governments of our determination to remain actively and con-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 264, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XVI. Confidential. On July 4, Kissinger sent this memorandum to the President and informed him that the Ministerial meeting of the CSCE would open at Helsinki on July 3 and was not expected to last more than a week to 10 days. Its main purpose, Kissinger stated, was “to endorse the recommendations of the earlier CSCE preparatory talks for the procedures to be followed in the detailed, stage II, expert-level CSCE negotiations which will follow, as well as to decide on the opening date for the stage II negotiations. The question as to whether the final, stage III phase of CSCE should be at the summit level will not be decided during the Ministerial meeting. At this point, most Western participants prefer to leave the issue open; the US position is that the level of participation for the final phase of the conference should be decided during phase II of the negotiations.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State briefing paper, dated June 1973, is attached but not printed.

structively involved in discussions and negotiations relating to European security and cooperation, on a broadly multilateral as well as on a bilateral basis;

—provide an opportunity to seek to lower the barriers to East-West communications and exchanges in various fields, thereby contributing to a more stable European order. At the same time, we wish to avoid exaggerated public expectations that could erode NATO defense efforts and Alliance solidarity.

## II. Issues

### A. Security Issues—Principles Guiding Relations Among States

The Warsaw Pact states will regard an agreed CSCE document on principles as a major contribution to European security because it will convey, in their view, a measure of recognition of the territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe, and thus of the permanent division of Germany. To some extent, Moscow and its Allies will see this text as the functional equivalent of a World War II peace treaty.

Most Western participants believe, in contrast, that the major value of such a document would derive from the added inhibitions it might place upon coercive Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. The FRG holds that a CSCE declaration on this subject should not be seen as confirming the division of Germany.

*US Position.* The text of a CSCE declaration should make clear that the principles are to be applied unreservedly by all participants in their relations with all others and thus be incompatible, on its face, with the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty within the "Socialist commonwealth." However, the document will enhance only marginally, if at all, the security of Western participants, which will continue to rest on the Atlantic Alliance. It is important, therefore, that Western public opinion avoid the erroneous conclusion that agreement at CSCE on principles of relations will permit the Allies to reduce their defense efforts.

We envisage a declaration of intent, not a legally binding text. The document thus could not be a surrogate World War II peace treaty, and the special rights and responsibilities in Germany of the quadripartite powers would remain unaffected.

### B. Security Issues—Military Aspects

At issue here is whether the conference should have broad latitude to address general military security issues, including MBFR (as some Allies, most neutrals, and Romania will urge), or whether there should be no substantive MBFR/CSCE linkage, with CSCE negotiations limited to confidence-building measures (exchanges of observers at maneuvers; advance notification of maneuvers; and consideration of advance notification of major troop movements).

*US Position.* MBFR can be most effectively negotiated by those states whose forces or territory are directly involved, and CSCE agreement on MBFR principles would only complicate the already difficult MBFR negotiations.

*C. Cooperation Issues in the Economic, Scientific/Technological and Environmental Fields*

Few contentious issues engaging our interest are likely to arise at the Ministerial under this rubric. The Warsaw Pact states, however, will lay propaganda emphasis on “pan-European” projects, thus implying a marginal North American role in East-West cooperation in Europe.

*US Position.* We intend to participate actively in East-West cooperation in these fields.

*D. Issues of Human Contacts, Dissemination of Information, and Cultural and Educational Exchanges*

Most Western participants believe that some lowering of the barriers in this field is essential to enhanced European security and cooperation. Western European governments, moreover, feel under public opinion and parliamentary pressures to use Soviet interest in détente to achieve progress in this area. The Warsaw Pact states, however, will resist any implied commitment to significant changes and will assert the primacy of the state in all aspects of these matters.

*US Position.* The conference should find practical ways to reduce some of the obstacles to contacts between people and to the freer flow of information and ideas. Better understanding among peoples will allay suspicions and make a positive contribution to European security. However, we do not seek to undermine existing political and social systems and recognize that progress in this area can only be gradual.

*E. Issue of Follow-up to the Conference*

The Warsaw Pact states and some neutrals will stress the need to set up a “consultative committee” to continue multilateral discussions on European security and cooperation and to prepare for further high-level conferences.

*US Position.* We have joined our Allies in taking a reserved view of follow-on-machinery, which we believe in any case should not have a political or security role.

*F. Organizational and Procedural Issues*

*1. Open or Closed Ministerial Working Sessions*

While the inaugural and closing sessions will be open to the media, working sessions will be closed unless Ministers decide otherwise by consensus. While we would prefer closed sessions in the interest of efficiency, a large majority of your colleagues have indicated a preference for open sessions so that their own statements will be fully reported to domestic audiences.

*US Position.* We should join the majority in favor of open working sessions.

### 2. *Opening Date of CSCE Stage II*

Warsaw Pact states will likely propose opening stage II in July, as soon as possible after the Ministerial, and working through the summer to permit the third and final stage to convene in the fall. All Western European participants, in contrast, will prefer to begin stage II in September.

*US Position.* We are flexible on the opening date and are prepared to support the majority viewpoint.

### 3. *Level of Participation at Stage III of CSCE*

Although not a matter for decision at the meeting, Warsaw Pact foreign ministers will undoubtedly urge that stage III be convened at the highest level. Most Western participants would prefer to leave the issue open.

*US Position.* The level of participation at stage III should be decided during stage II.

### 4. *The Role of Nonparticipant States*

The Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff may insist—as did the Maltese representative during the MPT—that representatives of the Arab states bordering the Mediterranean be allowed to appear before the conference and to state their views—despite the likely opposition of all other participants.

*US Position.* We do not wish representatives of nonparticipant states to appear personally before the meeting, but would let others take the lead in opposing any such proposal. We could agree, however, to permitting interested states to circulate their views in writing.

### G. *Final Communiqué*

Most Allies would prefer a short text which does not address CSCE substantive issues. The Soviets, however, may prefer a more pretentious document that tends to prejudge, indirectly at least, some of the substantive issues to be dealt with in succeeding stages. (The drafting mechanisms will likely resemble the communiqué drafting process at NATO Ministerials.)

*US Position.* A short non-substantive communiqué, to which would be attached the MPT report, is suitable to mark the closing of the initial stage of a three-stage conference.

**166. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

San Clemente, California, June 30, 1973, 9:41–11:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

NATO Ambassadors (See Attached List)<sup>2</sup>

Secretary General Luns opened the meeting by asking Dr. Kissinger if he would care to make a statement.

Dr. Kissinger: With this group it might be better for me to answer questions rather than make a formal presentation. I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you. I have been talking with the Secretary General from time to time and he suggested that I meet with the Council. I am pleased that we are meeting earlier than I had anticipated.

Let me make a few observations on some key problems. I have read the cables about the discussion in this group on the agreements we concluded with the Soviet Union and the discussions on MBFR.<sup>3</sup> Incidentally, the discussion on the participation of Hungary in MBFR nearly destroyed my sanity. Let me make some fundamental points. First, there is an underlying feeling in Europe that perhaps the U.S. is working toward a condominium with the Soviet Union and attaching less importance to the Alliance and that, conditions having changed, we are reassessing our alliance. Conditions have in fact changed, and I want to state the position of this Administration in regard to NATO, to Europe, to the Soviet Union. From the first day of this Administration we have considered relations with Europe central to American foreign policy. That is why the President's first trip was to Europe and to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 280, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Western White House.

<sup>2</sup> The list is not attached. According to the list provided by Sonnenfeldt (see Document 164), present were Luns, NATO Deputy Secretary-General P. Pansa Cedronio, and the following Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council: Andre de Staercke (Belgium), Albano Nogueira (Portugal), F. Catalano di Melilli (Italy), Franz Krapf (FRG), Thomas A. Tomasson (Iceland), Rolf T. Busch (Norway), Arthur R. Menzies (Canada), Peter Buwalda (Deputy Permanent Representative, Netherlands), Orhan Eralp (Turkey), Donald Rumsfeld (United States) and F. De Rose (France). The United Kingdom, Greece, Luxembourg, and Denmark were represented by their Chiefs of Mission in Washington: Lord Cromer (UK), Ambassador Ioannis Sorokos (Greece), Ambassador Jean Wagner (Luxembourg), and Minister-Counselor Hans J. Christensen (Denmark). Also present were General Johannes Steinhoff (FRG), Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; Stoessel, Sonnenfeldt, and Hyland. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1336, Unfiled Material, 1973, 10 of 12)

<sup>3</sup> Attached to Document 164; see footnote 1 thereto.

the North Atlantic Council. We also have had to consider that we are conducting foreign policy under extremely difficult circumstances. We did not invent the new strategic balance. We inherited a changed strategic relationship. Whereas the Kennedy Administration dealt with the Soviet Union when the Soviets had 80 ICBMs that were liquid fueled and took ten minutes to prepare, we face over 1,000 ICBMs that can be fired immediately. This is a fact of life.

Second, you are all aware from our domestic press of the growth of isolationist sentiment in this country. The very group that carried out our post-war foreign policy, and the very people who founded NATO, are now neo-isolationists. It is not this Administration that wants to reduce our forces in Europe. It is absurd to think that we would use MBFR to obtain a bilateral deal to get us out of Europe. If we wanted to do this we could simply wait and let ourselves be raped by the Congress. We have trouble enough getting our legislation through the Congress without complicating it by deals with the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

As for MBFR there has been a lot of talk about the title and what happened to the word "balance."<sup>4</sup> I want to put this to you bluntly. The future of the negotiation will not be determined by whether "balance" appears in the title, but by what elements of security lie behind our proposals. We must be sure that we do not weaken security in these negotiations. We say that American forces must be kept in Europe, so when you criticize us on MBFR you are fighting the wrong enemy. At the same time, the only way to deal with the pressures from our Congress is to transform these negotiations from an abstract dispute into a concrete discussion of security issues. Then we can tell the Congress we are in the midst of serious negotiations on security and we can also handle on this basis any Soviet proposals.

When this Administration came into office people wanted us to move fast on SALT. In fact, everything that was being said about SALT at that time one can now read about MBFR, e.g., that we should move

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 126546 to all NATO capitals, June 28, reported on Rogers's briefing to the NAC on Brezhnev's visit to the United States. It reads in part: "MBFR: The question was raised whether the Soviets had explained why they object to the word 'balanced' in the phrase 'mutual and balanced force reductions.' The Secretary said that the Soviets have avoided accepting the word for some time because they claim they do not understand precisely what it means. The important issue is not the word itself, but the concept, which is that reductions should not be to the advantage of either side. The title for the talks used in the communiqué is the one worked out in Vienna: 'negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)



faster, we should limit our forces, etc. We resisted on SALT because we said it was a technical issue and once the debate was transferred to technical grounds we could handle our critics because we knew what we were talking about.

We were troubled by the Hungarian issue. There were only 5,000 troops, more or less, involved but we were concerned because what we wanted to do was to concentrate on security issues, to become very concrete so that we would get on a level that we could negotiate with the Soviet Union. I can tell you we have made no private deals with the Soviet Union on troop levels. Indeed, we would not need to make such a deal. We must define a concrete security position and be able to defend it so if the Soviet Union makes what appears to be a reasonable offer we will be in a position to preempt it and to defend our position in public. In the forthcoming discussions with you we will be urging very concrete agreements.

On the European Conference, we had not wanted it. We were driven into it and we have been willing to participate. Our aim is to keep it from becoming a cosmic confrontation so that people will not think something of major substance has been achieved. However, you will not be under any pressures from us. All we want is to keep the Conference from becoming a massive affair so people will not believe something of great importance has been achieved.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary General Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I agree that it is not the letter "B" that is important, but the contents. I read in your communiqué with the Soviets the stress on undiminished security.<sup>5</sup> You say the U.S. had no interest in the CSCE, so that it will not lead to a success and euphoria. But there are countries in Europe that believe it can achieve meaningful results. The danger of euphoria, of course, is present. Finally, I want to stress that the timely information to the Council and consultations in the Council remain of great value to our security, meaning the feeling of security on the part of the Allies.

Dr. Kissinger: One word on the CSCE. You correctly stated our attitude, though it is hard to separate our views from the concrete issues before the Conference. We do not believe, however, that the USSR will be pried out of Eastern Europe by inadvertence or by declarations. If we sometimes do not push an issue it is because we do not want a cosmic confrontation. We are in favor of ending the Conference sooner rather than later and avoiding deadlocks whose resolution would be considered a great success but not warranted by the substance.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 163.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Menzies: I would like for you to comment on the MBFR negotiations. In light of your discussion with the Soviet Union, what incentives do you believe there are for Soviet reductions and what approach should we take to the negotiations?

Dr. Kissinger: On the substance, we gave the Soviets no encouragement that they could discuss substance with us until NATO was prepared to negotiate. They have indicated in various places that they wanted bilateral discussions. But we have not done so. The only clue we have is that Brezhnev said he was thinking of rather small initial cuts, but he did not get into numbers or percentage, and the question was dropped on the negotiations. We think they must be on a multilateral basis. But there must be a better way of resolving NATO differences more expeditiously and less legalistic debate. The practical issue is if in multilateral negotiations we show the Soviets a concrete position, they will try to split us. Our purpose is to preserve our commitments and not allow the Soviets to drive a wedge.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger: I would doubt they would bargain about troops and trade. In any case, the amount of troops involved is fairly small as far as savings are concerned. One factor may be, however, to use MBFR to bring pressure on China.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

At the summit meeting, if you carefully read every agreement made, you will find no agreement last year or this year that did not take in account the preeminence of our Alliance. They were not at the expense of others—whether in SALT, MBFR or the European Conference. This was clearly understood, and rather vigorously discussed last week, but in the context of negotiation rather than confrontation. Brezhnev knows, and I know that we can take no action at the Soviet-American level, at the expense of others; or take action without consulting our allies. Your concerns are expressed at the MBFR date, which we got, or at the CSCE which was difficult. These were all decided together with you. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

**167. Editorial Note**

On July 2, 1973, President Nixon sent a backchannel message to Secretary of State Rogers, who was in Helsinki for the Ministerial meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, July 3–8. Nixon's message reads in part: "Here are some views I wanted to pass on to you relating to the Helsinki conference. I am somewhat concerned that the press treatment of the conference may be raising excessive hopes in people's minds concerning the eventual accomplishments of the CSCE. I am sure you have this in mind, but I want to be certain that all members of our delegation maintain a positive but low-key posture at Helsinki. This is not an exercise that we started, and we have no interest in generating more euphoria than already exists. In your private and public comments, therefore, I think it would be best to stay away from references to past historical events like the Congress of Vienna and from suggestions that this conference in and of itself will produce peace and cooperation between East and West in Europe. I would also like to be sure that the possibility of a final summit at this conference is not promoted by any of our people since as you know I have considerable doubt about getting involved in such an operation." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1973)

In an undated memorandum attached to a copy of Rogers's June 28 memorandum to the President (Document 165) President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft wrote President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger: "Henry—We did *not* know what Rogers was going to say at the CSCE. The only thing we got was the attached memo to the President with *general* proposed U.S. positions and nothing about a speech." At the bottom of the routing memorandum, Kissinger wrote, "That's what I thought." (Ibid., Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR) The text of Secretary Rogers's speech to the Ministerial conference of the CSCE is in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1973, pages 177–181.

**168. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Prague, July 8, 1973, 1758Z.

Secto 58/1570. Subject: CSCE Ministerial: Secretary–Gromyko luncheon and bilateral July 7.

1. *Summary*: Bilateral luncheon July 7 provided occasion for Secretary and Gromyko to review various matters relating to second stage of CSCE. Gromyko stressed Soviet view that conference should produce binding results and that all other issues before conference should be considered secondary to security aspect. Secretary noted that principles of relations to be agreed on by conference would be general in nature and therefore would not take the form of a treaty but of course the US would fully respect any agreements entered into. On security issue, Secretary pointed to diversity of viewpoints represented at conference and underlined US view that progress on cooperation issues in humanitarian area would also enhance security and constituted important goal of conference which could be attained within framework of respect for national sovereignty. Gromyko urged continued US-Soviet cooperation on conference matters and suggested possibility of bilateral consultations on MBFR. Secretary pointed out US still in process of developing position for MBFR negotiations and Gromyko replied the same was true for his government. *End summary*.

2. Gromyko hosted luncheon at Soviet Embassy for Secretary July 7 immediately following final session of CSCE first stage. Mood was cordial with Soviets clearly gratified at success their last ditch leadership in working out compromise on Maltese-Arab issue which prevented Ministerial from ending on sour note induced by impasse over communiqué (septel).<sup>2</sup> Discussion following luncheon provided occasion for serious exchange of views on issues facing second stage of conference.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Map Room, D, 2 of 2. Secret. Repeated to Moscow and USNATO. Rogers visited Czechoslovakia July 8–9 to sign a consular convention.

<sup>2</sup> Not identified. Telegram 1815 from Helsinki, July 4, reported that the afternoon session of the CSCE Ministerial meeting “opened with Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff calling attention to his proposal that Algerian and Tunisian FonMins be invited to address meeting. Spain supported Malta but Bulgarian rep proposed remand matter to official level working group. Greek, Swiss, and other ministers endorsed Bulgarian suggestion. Mintoff said working group must reach prompt decision.” Telegram 1586 from Ottawa reported: “Towards end of [CSCE Ministerial] session, when it appeared no communiqué might be issued, [Canadian CSCE Coordinator] Hooper reports Soviet del took up cudgels with Maltese and ‘persuaded’ Mintoff to accept final language. Hooper describes Gromyko as furious, and quotes him as calling Mintoff unbalanced and untrustworthy.” (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

3. Proposals on agenda items. Gromyko asked whether US intended to submit concrete proposals during second stage. Secretary responded affirmatively but indicated we did not yet know precise form proposals would take. Gromyko noted that proposals submitted by Soviets and other socialist countries on various agenda items represented effort to get ball rolling.

4. Pace of stage II. Gromyko expressed concern that second stage of CSCE might become unduly prolonged and expressed hope this could be avoided. Secretary observed that US had agreed in joint communiqué during Brezhnev visit that conference should move forward as expeditiously as possible. He said we fully intended to live up to this understanding but that pace of proceedings would also depend on positions adopted by others.

5. Binding nature of undertakings. Gromyko reiterated standard Soviet view that any documents or undertakings resulting from conference should have maximum binding force so that Europe would not have to “live with triggers cocked” but could have genuine peace. Secretary emphasized that US would not enter into undertakings we did not intend to respect. He noted, however, that any “principles” that would be agreed on by conference would necessarily be general in form. Accordingly, while we are prepared to give them our full support this would not carry the same operational obligation which more specific agreements would carry. As for other agreements that might result from conference, Secretary drew distinction between agreements requiring Congressional approval and those that did not require Congressional approval to enter into force. He expressed the view that agreements likely to result from CSCE would probably, but not necessarily, be of latter type. In any event the US was prepared to support any agreements reached fully and without reservation.

6. Representation of stage II. Secretary asked Gromyko for Soviet views on nature and level at which participants should be represented during stage II discussions. Gromyko said representation should be at high level commensurate with increased importance of stage II over MPT, although experts would again be present. In Soviet case, he assumed Deputy Foreign Minister would be appointed to attend stage II who would represent USSR on coordinating committee and possibly also on one or another of the special committees. He emphasized that representatives must be at responsible level and empowered to speak with full authority of their government in order to keep matters moving.

7. Relative importance of CSCE issues. Gromyko made special point of stressing primacy of security issue over all others at conference. He claimed this in no way implied any under-estimation by USSR of other matters before conference, such as cultural cooperation, family ties (which he noted seemed to be particular concern of FRG Foreign Min-

ister Scheel), exchanges of people and information, and other humanitarian issues. Gromyko said there can and should be agreement on certain principles relating to these other issues: Soviets “were not afraid of them,” but history and common sense showed that main issue before conference was to make Europe a continent of peace. Accordingly, issues other than security necessarily had to be secondary, and conference should not try to get into field of bilateral agreements between states. In addition, such matters as marriages between citizens of different states, taxes for visas, and information questions should only be considered on the basis of respect for the laws of each individual state and with regard to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Only thus could mutual understanding be assured. Otherwise, the conference could become a modern-day Tower of Babel.

8. Secretary replied that US fully intended to deal realistically with issues before conference. Fact remained that there were 35 participants each of which had its own viewpoint. US agreed that security was key issue but we viewed cooperation in humanitarian area as complementary factor which made realization of genuine security more likely. Purpose of conference was obviously not to interfere in internal affairs of other states, but guidelines established by MPT suggested that the conference should, without abandoning principle of sovereignty, give serious consideration to how progress could be achieved on such matters as improving exchanges of people and information. These goals did not need to be seen as inconsistent with principle of sovereignty. Important thing was to carry on the work begun by MPT guided by spirit of seeing what could be done to improve conditions contributing to greater security and cooperation. Secretary said he felt progress achieved thus far was exceptional, and leaders of both Soviet and US delegations to preparatory talks deserve to be congratulated.

9. Gromyko expressed satisfaction that US and Soviet linking seemed to be moving along parallel lines and agreed that results of [garble] were “very good.” He expressed hope that US and Soviets could continue to cooperate on conference matters and should be alert to attempts that might be made by “some quarters” to impede mutual understanding. He urged that US and USSR not lose sight of main objective and depart from track we had taken together, which was source of “great satisfaction” to both our countries and to Europeans in general.

10. MBFR. In brief closing remark on MBFR talks to begin Oct. 30, Gromyko suggested possibility of bilateral discussions after US and Soviets had had chance to review their respective positions. Secretary noted that this was matter for future since we were still working on position for the negotiations. Gromyko said Soviet position likewise not fully developed.

**169. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 10, 1973.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Report on the European Security Conference

The Secretary has cabled you a summary of the results of the Foreign Ministers session that opened the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> The Conference endorsed an agenda<sup>3</sup> and agreed that working groups would take up the agenda on September 18 in Geneva. The main subjects will be (1) general principles governing relations among the participating states, including certain military restraints such as the pre-announcement of maneuvers; (2) cooperation in economic relations; and (3) increased contacts, including freer movement of peoples, ideas and information. In addition, a special working group will consider what permanent institutions might be created to carry on after the Conference ends.

The Secretary reports that the Soviets emphasized the inviolability of existing boundaries in Europe, and the necessity to reconcile any freer movement of people, etc., with national sovereignty and laws. The Secretary believes that the united front presented by the Western Allies will make it difficult for the Soviets to achieve their objective of affirming the immutability of borders. Both he and many of the Western ministers went on record favoring peaceful change of boundaries, mainly to conciliate the German position, which holds that the FRG–GDR boundary can be changed through peaceful unification. The Secretary also believes that the Soviets will be under considerable pressure to modify their present restrictive practices in the areas of human contacts and the flow of information and ideas.

The Secretary was struck by the realistic attitude of the allies' ministers; while all of them share the hope for progress, none believes that the Conference will be a panacea, nor will the allies feed public eupho-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 287, Agency Files, State, Vol. XIX. Secret. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a retyped copy of telegram Secto 45/1895 from Helsinki, July 7. The original telegram is *ibid.*, Box 673, Country Files, Europe, Finland, Vol. I.

<sup>3</sup> On July 3, the Ministerial meeting of the CSCE adopted the Final Recommendations drafted and approved at the multilateral preparatory talks, including an agenda and procedures for conducting negotiations at Geneva. For the text of the Final Recommendations, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1973, pp. 181–188.

ria. Indeed, they are trying to convey to public opinion that the CSCE is only a limited step and that NATO's defense must be maintained.

On the final phase—which the Soviets want to be at the summit and before the end of the year—the Secretary comments that he found considerable reserve on a final summit, and that the amount of work remaining suggests a much later terminal date.

*Comment:* This first phase was essentially procedural. It has been agreed in advance that no real substance would be taken up, and after a round of speeches a bland communiqué would be issued.<sup>4</sup> Despite the Western solidarity on the border question and on greater human contacts the long preparatory session suggests that, in fact, it is an illusion to expect the Soviets to change their internal system as a result of a declaration in Helsinki, and none of the participants has been willing to risk the failure of the Conference on this point.

As for holding the last phase at the summit, it is quite likely that as the conference proceeds there will be a growing desire on the part of many countries to attend a final summit. Though much work remains there is so little of substantive value involved in this conference it could be completed within 2–3 months, except for the interminable squabbling that is produced by trying to draft a declaration with the participation of 35 representatives, who are each pressing some particular national point of view. In any case, the first phase seems to have passed without any damage to the Western position, which is about all we can realistically expect from this exercise.

The Secretary now departs for Czechoslovakia.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For the text of the communiqué, adopted July 7, see *ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>5</sup> Rogers visited Prague July 8–9 to sign a consular convention.



170. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 12, 1973, 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation between FRG Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger

PARTICIPANTS

*FRG*

Walter Scheel

Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister

Berndt von Staden

Ambassador to the United States

Helmut Roth (for part of conversation)

Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Foreign Office

Guido Brunner

Head of Planning Office, Foreign Office

Heinz Henry Weber

Counselor, Foreign Office (Interpreter)

*United States*

Dr. Kissinger

Mr. Sonnenfeldt

Mr. Hyland

Mr. Stoessel

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Scheel noted that de Gaulle had initiated the détente policy with the East. The FRG had been one of the last to take this up, but it had done its duty and had removed obstacles to relations with the GDR. Now we have moved into the multilateral phase of détente with CSCE and MBFR. Both are test cases. NATO will have to prove that it can pursue a coherent détente policy. This had been most successful at Helsinki. It will be more difficult with regard to MBFR, where there is a tendency toward a legalistic approach. Mr. Scheel did not like this.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 139, Geopolitical File, Europe, Year of Europe, Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel. The conversation took place in Kissinger's office. Scheel visited Washington July 11–12 to discuss the European security conference and MBFR with administration officials.

<sup>2</sup> In a meeting on July 16, Kissinger discussed MBFR with Italian Foreign Ministry officials Secretary General Roberto Gaja, Director of Political Affairs Roberto Ducci, and Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "On force reductions, Mr. Ducci said the Italians share with the French a fear of the creation of a special zone in Central Europe which could come about through reduction of national forces and the imposition of special constraints. He asked if Dr. Kissinger had discussed this with Mr. Scheel. Dr. Kissinger said he had talked with Mr. Scheel about

Dr. Kissinger agreed, saying that the formalistic approach to problems diverts energy to peripheral issues.

Mr. Scheel said that NATO can prove its worth. The negotiations will be a test for both sides. We shall see if only declarations are possible or whether concrete steps can be taken. The difficulties must be clearly stated, since détente can be jeopardized if the issues are not understood.

On CSCE, Mr. Scheel commented that he knew Dr. Kissinger was not very partial to it. However, he had to say that nothing had encouraged the political development of the European Community so much as the CSCE. As a result of the CSCE, decisions will have to be taken in connection with security matters and about contacts between people. Mr. Scheel said that he wanted to see the U.S. as a partner in these matters from the beginning. Dr. Kissinger said he agreed that this was a good approach.

Mr. Scheel said that it was also of great internal importance for the European countries. The CSCE was an instrument which could be used against the Brezhnev doctrine. He recalled that just after the Helsinki meeting there had been a shooting at the Berlin wall; countries everywhere had said that this was against the CSCE. Now, all actions will be measured against the CSCE, and this could have an influence on the Brezhnev doctrine.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger commented with regard to the CSCE that he had assumed it probably would result in a series of platitudes. Maybe he had been wrong. He had felt that, if platitudes were to be the only result, it was better to accomplish this with a minimum of effort and without great confrontations which would result in meaningless decisions. We did not wish to contribute to what might be the Soviet strategy of submerging existing institutions by creating new ones and by issuing meaningless declarations. We will not work against substantive results if it seems possible to achieve them. Dr. Kissinger mentioned that he had liked Mr. Scheel's speech in Helsinki.

Mr. Scheel said he shared Dr. Kissinger's views. The CSCE should not camouflage differences between the two sides. At the same time, he thought there was some hope that the Soviet Union, in an effort to

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this. We do not think it would be a good idea to include national forces in the first stage of force reduction. It would mean trading good German forces for bad Czech and Polish forces; moreover, they would be demobilized. Mr. Scheel wants to insert the principle that a reduction of national forces could be considered in Phase 2 of the negotiations. It is difficult to object to this. Dr. Kissinger said he would be talking with Mr. Leber this week on this matter." (Ibid.)

achieve results in the area of security and economic contacts, might be prepared to make concessions in the field of greater communications and human contacts. Like the U.S., the FRG was absolutely against the creation of European institutions which would substitute for existing ones. In particular, the FRG did not support a permanent organization to follow the CSCE. The FRG would like to transfer CSCE decisions to existing organizations like the ECE. If it turns out that there is no appropriate organization for a task to be done, then one might think of establishing a new one, such as in the field of youth exchanges.

Mr. Scheel said that the FRG did not want a European court of appeal, which could be an organ for permanent interference in the political development of Europe. This is just what the Soviets would like. This would be fatal. This is why we need to make clear in a declaration that there are priorities, with Atlantic cooperation first and then East-West cooperation.

Dr. Kissinger said he had no disagreement with what Mr. Scheel had said. We also want to avoid European institutions—even including the U.S.—which would replace existing institutions. However, we would not object to establishing something if the need exists, such as in the area of youth exchanges.

So far as human contacts are concerned, Dr. Kissinger said, we will support this concept. We may have to decide how far we want to push on it. He felt it was not inconceivable that the Soviets might move in this area during the second phase. He had seen Ambassador Dobrynin two days ago, who had indicated that the Soviets at least are thinking about the question of human contacts.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

So far as force reductions are concerned, Dr. Kissinger said we felt we could avoid Congressional action this year, but we can't give a guarantee beyond that. We need MBFR and a clear statement of strategy. Military people in general do not like to change anything.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger said we want to keep as many forces in Europe as we can. If MBFR is used skillfully and if the talks with our Allies about a declaration go well, then this will be helpful. However, if there is nothing but haggling, then it will make the task very difficult.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found. See Document 171.

Dr. Kissinger said we should give serious consideration to a heads of government meeting when the President is in Europe. It would be inexplicable if the CSCE ends with a summit meeting<sup>4</sup> (and he felt that the odds were better than even that this would be the case, even though all of us are reserved about such a meeting) and if the leaders of Western Europe could not agree on meeting with President Nixon. If this were to happen, then we would refuse to attend a CSCE summit.

Mr. Scheel said he fully agreed. We cannot prepare for a CSCE summit without making preparations for it through a West European summit with President Nixon.

Mr. Scheel recalled that the last summit had been in Paris. Dr. Kissinger said this would be satisfactory; it would thus be an ad hoc meeting, which we would slightly prefer in any case. Dr. Kissinger suggested that we might think of a formulation by which the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers would meet with the President in NATO. Then there could be a meeting with the European Community Foreign Ministers, following which there would be an ad hoc summit meeting in Paris. Mr. Scheel felt this would be satisfactory.

With regard to the NATO meeting, Dr. Kissinger said we do not want it organized the way it was the last time, with the European members asking questions and the U.S. answering. Rather, the meeting should consider common questions and the discussion should be on a common basis.

Mr. Scheel agreed and said this was something which should be taken up in NATO and in the EC. He thought that this approach and the series of meetings envisaged by Dr. Kissinger should make it easier for the French to agree. The meeting in Paris could be looked upon as a preparation for the CSCE summit.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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<sup>4</sup> The issue of a CSCE summit also arose in Kissinger's conversation with Italian Foreign Ministry officials on July 16: "Dr. Kissinger said that in the first place we do not favor a CSCE summit, but that we know no European leader—with the possible exception of the British—who might refuse a summit meeting. He assumed, therefore, that, with some progress in Phase II, there would be a summit sometime in the early spring. He could assure Mr. Ducci that there would be no tie-in between this summit meeting and the President's visit to the Soviet Union."

**171. Editorial Note**

On July 13, 1973, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin asked President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger about the outcome of West German Foreign Minister Scheel's visit to Washington (see Document 170). A transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with Dobrynin at 4:37 p.m. reads in part: "K[issinger]: One thing I could tell you is I think that if you proceeded along the line that you and I discussed on human contacts [at CSCE]— D[obrynin]: Yeah. K: We could then help you to speed things up. D: And just how do you mean? K: Well, if you came forward—you know, if you made a forthcoming suggestion at the opening of the Commission, then I think we could use that to convince our European allies that we are making progress and that it's now necessary to speed things up. You see what I mean? D: Yeah, I understand. And Scheel is of the same opinion? K: Well, Scheel is of the opinion—I didn't put it to Scheel that way because I wanted it to look spontaneous. D: I understand. K: But I talked to Scheel in a sense that will make it easy for us to take the initiative—you know, to support you. D: I understand. K: I told Scheel that in our view if he showed some—you know, if you showed some response, that we then had an obligation to be flexible. D: Yeah, I understand. K: And he agreed. D: I see. It's along the lines. Okay. I already send yesterday to Gromyko change what you mentioned to me. Of course in a general way." The conversation continued: "K: You can now tell him that I talked to Scheel in a way that prepared the ground for that without, of course, mentioning my conversations with you. D: No, I understand. This is clear." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 28, Anatoli Dobrynin File)