

Moscow Summit, December 1971–May 1972

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Terceira, Azores, December 13, 1971, 9 a.m.

PRESENT

The President
President Pompidou
Mr. Andronikof
Major General Walters

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[President Nixon:] Militarily it was vital to the U.S. to preserve Europe and to remain and not to reduce its forces unless on a very clear multilateral basis such as a reduction vis-à-vis the Communist bloc would be disastrous. MBFR had begun in 1968 before he was elected. U.S. policy was that it must be pursued on a multilateral basis. We had yet to find any formula by which such a reduction would not downgrade our interests in relation to the Soviet bloc. We could continue the Brosio discussions and consult to the extent that President Pompidou desired. Personally the President was very skeptical. His concern was that MBFR be used simply to obtain a U.S. withdrawal. Only with a visible U.S. presence could we maintain our interest. The Soviets know this and that is why they want us out as soon as possible.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Pompidou then said that he had three remarks to make about what the President had said. Brezhnev had spoken a great deal about MBFR. He drew an idyllic picture of almost no soldiers in Europe in 10 years. In any case, France will not diminish her military

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Beginning December 12, 1971. Top Secret. The meeting took place at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroísmo. A more complete transcript of the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. In preparation for the summit meeting between Nixon and Pompidou, December 13–14 in the Azores, Kissinger sent Nixon a briefing memorandum on December 10 that advised: "On East-West questions (MBFR, European Conference), the differences are relatively minor and, in any case, greater between the two foreign offices than between yourself and Pompidou." Nixon wrote back in the margin of the memorandum: "MBFR—(1) We go forward—(2) Consult with CES." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 473, President's Trip Files, Azores Visit—Meeting with President Pompidou, 12/13–14/71)

effort. She will pursue it whatever happens. The President commented that this was “good.”

President Pompidou said that he had told Chancellor Brandt about what the President had said of the danger that negotiations might be a pretext for U.S. opinion to demand the departure from Europe of the U.S. Forces. The Chancellor had replied that the U.S. Forces should not leave unless the Russians went too. President Pompidou said he must admit that he did not understand the German attitude on this point. They should be the most hostile to the reductions envisaged in MBFR. After all, they would be the first to be endangered. He must say that Brandt had told him that he was hostile to the neutralization or “Finlandization” of Germany. But the day the U.S. leaves Germany, the U.K. and France will not be far behind and then Germany would not be far from neutralization.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Pompidou said that the U.S. view of things was more world wide than that of France because of our means. This was why he considered the time favorable to commit Europe in a procedure of détente which could backfire but that Soviets could reverse only by a theatrical or forceful move. They are very concerned by Asia, China and their discussions with the U.S. on nuclear matters. They want peace in Europe. He believed that the Soviets harbored the illusion that the French, Germans, Italians and other countries could give them considerable economic aid. These are illusions and he had said so publicly. One could only sell to the Russians in exchange for what one buys and this was not much. No one could give unlimited credit. The European picture was very favorable except on MBFR on which he had already given the President his views. The French were not disposed to reduce their arms effort. One word about the problem of a European Security Conference. This point is evident. A security conference is beginning to be discussed seriously. He believed that all European countries were agreed on holding such a conference but felt that if the U.S. preferred a later date they would be agreeable to keeping the U.S. happy. Until, however, the U.S. agreed, there could be no real serious preparation of such a conference. Why did the French believe that such a conference could be of interest? They felt that communism as such represented by communist regimes was false from the economic and social point of view in many so called Socialist nations. Poles, Romanians and especially the Czechs and Hungarians wanted to shake off the tutelage. They believe that with the Western bloc divided and the Eastern bloc united that they lost. He felt that on one side there were the free countries who were independent and France felt that she was. On the other side there were countries who wanted to take steps towards freedom

and independence. If the superpowers or the West (that is, the U.S.) feel that this liberty and independence is bad, then harm is done. The Russians feel it is bad but cannot stop it.

President Pompidou had been struck in his last talks with the Romanian President and Foreign Minister by their anguish at the idea that multilateral preparations and meetings on this conference might be delayed. They believe that when all are seated around a table they will be protected and not until then. The U.S. and France did not have exactly the same view. The problem is one of interpretation of the situation rather than that of a disagreement on goals.

President Nixon replied that, first of all, as to the matter of whether there would be a European Security Conference the question as President Pompidou had implied was one of timing and tactics. As President Pompidou had indicated, we believed that until the German treaties are finished plans for a European Security Conference cannot be implemented. We also believed that it was vitally important that extensive discussions among ourselves be held with regard to the agenda. He agreed with the French President that there was some possibility that this conference might not be an unmixed blessing for the Soviets although they very much wanted it. The extent to which it opens up to the West the Eastern countries to whom President Pompidou referred can be a leavening factor in the attitude of those countries. We have in each case to distinguish between the leadership and the countries. The people of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had demonstrated on several occasions that there was nothing that they would like better than to get rid of Soviet influence and leadership. Certainly a country like Romania where Ceaucescu is a devoted Stalinist is also devotedly a Romanian and to the extent that he can safely do so he takes an independent line from time to time. The President's views long term were the same as President Pompidou's. There are risks for the Soviets in such a conference just as they think it contains risks for us. They feel it will have the effect all over Western Europe of creating a false atmosphere of security and will lead to the letting down of our guard and the belief that real peace is just around the corner and that the cold war is finished. His own view in summary was that in a deliberate way we should move towards such a conference but have in mind the fact that we should harbor no illusions as to the Soviet aims in holding it. Our planning should be such as to serve our purposes while they will attempt to serve theirs.

Overhanging the whole area of Soviet-U.S. relations is the sober, sombre fact that if the Soviet leader decided to risk nuclear war and the U.S. was involved, he knew that he had the power to kill 70 million Americans and we had the power to kill 70 million Russians. The U.S. President knows this too. There are limitations on power and a

restraining influence not because of love but because of fear. It was essential that the two nations pursue the negotiating track rather than the confrontation track. We have impressed this on the Soviets with regard to Southern Asia in the last 24 hours. The President wished to add in regard to the desire for détente that he totally agreed with President Pompidou. The people of the U.S. and Europe wanted it, at least a majority of them did. In Europe perhaps for different reasons. The Germans want it because the Soviets can give them East Germany; U.K., France and Italy because they are convinced that we live in a dangerous world. The danger presently represented by nuclear war, not the loss of 3,000 men as at Pearl Harbor. The whole place would be turned into a graveyard. No one wanted that. It was very important to look at the two attitudes on détente. Some sought a European Conference on the naive assumption that the Soviet aims have changed and that their designs in Europe and in the rest of the world are basically peaceful. On the other hand, some who seek détente on our side have no illusions and recognize that a different relationship and good relations between Europe and the USSR and the U.S. and the USSR are a practical necessity, that there are dangers in a policy of confrontation. But we must have no illusions about the basic aims of the Communist States. They are quite different from one another. Even if they wanted it would be impossible for European or U.S. leaders to take an intransigent stand and refuse to talk. Ten years ago this was possible in the U.S. It is no longer. On the other hand, it is important that the leaders recognize that naive public opinion often demands talks that will make the whole world peaceful. We should seek such negotiations but for the right reason. By the facts of Soviet power, the risks of confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere are unacceptable. Therefore, we should seek to lessen the risk of war and seek, as President Pompidou had indicated, to make Europe a more viable area and to open Eastern Europe whose peoples' hearts are with the West.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

84. Editorial Note

President Nixon met with British Prime Minister Edward Heath for a summit in Bermuda from December 20 to 21, 1971. On the first day of the summit, they discussed CSCE and MBFR in a closed session from 1:30 to 5 p.m. President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Secretary to the Cabinet Burke Trend were also present.

“Prime Minister Heath asked whether Pompidou had raised the defense problem. ‘Not directly,’ the President replied. ‘I indicated bearishness towards MBFR. He shared that view. I reassured him with regard to our withdrawal; the U.S. was not going to withdraw from Europe. With respect to a European Security Conference, he took quite well our view that (1) Berlin has to be wrapped up first, and (2) we had to be concrete in the subjects being discussed. We don’t want a conference in 1972, an election year. We allies should discuss the matter first. Pompidou stressed that a Conference could have a salutary effect on the countries of Eastern Europe, leavening their policies.’ [Then why do the Soviets press for it?—HK] Dr. Kissinger then explained the U.S. philosophy on MBFR and the European Security Conference in greater detail.

“‘Will you be under enormous pressure to yield on MBFR in Moscow?’ the Prime Minister wanted to know. The President said no, we will just have discussions on it between Dr. Kissinger and Dobrynin. They have excluded MBFR from the agenda of a Security Conference. ‘Why do they want a Conference then?’ the Prime Minister asked. ‘Because it is a meaningless exercise and can also lead to the disintegration of the West’s alliances,’ Dr. Kissinger suggested. The President noted that it was a public-relations problem: ‘We will have to give as much rhetoric as we can without yielding anything real. The Romanians may be wrong; a Conference may strengthen Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Maybe the Soviets want it as a way of bringing pressure on the Chinese; the Soviets are paranoid about the Chinese. It may also be related to the German problem.’ The Prime Minister noted that it might be a way of looking for European confirmation of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. ‘The Soviets now accuse us of being an obstacle to détente,’ he added. The President asked how this affected the Heath Government’s public support. The Prime Minister replied that 80 percent of the British public supported his position. ‘Then what about Pompidou’s argument that public opinion demands it?’ the President wondered. The Prime Minister asked if the President would be in a position to agree to such a Conference in 1973. The President said we would have to look at it seriously then.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, 1971)

On December 21, the U.S. and British delegations met in plenary session with Heath and Nixon. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home raised the issues of a European conference and MBFR in the context of discussions that he had held with Secretary of State Rogers the previous day: “Turning to Europe, Sir Alec said he and the Secretary had agreed that the beginning of 1973 was the most realistic time to think about the convening of a conference on European security and cooperation. The Secretary added that, under this timetable, the multilateral preparations need not take place until the fall of 1972.

Sir Alec observed that the Soviets might not like the agenda the West would propose and perhaps were beginning to appreciate that they were not going to get everything out of the conference they wanted. Perhaps it would be a good thing if such a conference created some sort of permanent machinery, the function of which would be to try to improve the situation between East and West. The Secretary said there would be ample opportunity to give attention to the multilateral preparatory conference at the next NATO Ministerial meeting on May 30–31. As far as the MBFR is concerned, Sir Alec said, the more we look at the subject the less margin for safety there seems to be. The President commented that we are on exactly the same track. For us the subject is essentially a holding action to avoid Congressional action that would unilaterally reduce our military presence in Europe. Therefore we must make supporting statements. The Secretary said it was hard to conclude that the Soviets were really serious about MBFR. For them it seemed to be essentially a way to get the security conference. We did not think we were under pressure as to timing.

“The President noted that, if the Soviets reduced their troops in Eastern Europe, their influence would go down. In the conversation which he had had with Gromyko last fall, the latter had talked ad infinitum on the security conference, but included only one sentence on MBFR. Dr. Kissinger commented that even balanced reductions would leave us a very thin margin. The first ten percent of any reductions were essentially free because they could not be verified. The President said that, to the extent the United Kingdom can take a harder line on MBFR than we, this is helpful. The program for an additional billion dollars of European defense expenditures for 1972 was also helpful, since it indicates that the Europeans are not hell-bent to reduce their forces. We must maintain our strength as we seek peace and détente.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 950, VIP Visits, Heath Visit (Bermuda), December 1971, 2 of 2) A record of Rogers’s conversation with Home on December 20 is in telegram 233196 to London, December 30. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 5415, Box 531, Summit Consultations, Vol. I of II, 12/6/71–1/8/72)

85. Editorial Note

West German Chancellor Brandt met with President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida, December 28–29, 1971. Among the topics they discussed were a European security conference and MBFR.

In preparation for the meeting, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger wrote Nixon on December 24 that he should emphasize to Brandt that "in our dealings with the USSR, we will make no arrangements at the expense of the Allies and intend to continue the closest consultations on such matters as a European Conference and troop reductions, which will not be resolved bilaterally with the USSR." In a section entitled "Soviet Relations and European Security," Kissinger proposed that Nixon stress the following points in his conversations with Brandt:

"You are working for a genuine détente with the USSR, and the Chancellor's policies have been in a parallel direction.

"—There are elements in Soviet conduct that suggest they may want a better relationship with the US (and with Germany), but there are also aspects of their policies—especially outside of Europe—that are sobering;

"—There is the dangerous tendency to seek marginal, tactical advantage even though this sort of policy cannot help but jeopardize any longer term relationship;

"—What concerns you now is that having achieved some solid results, as in the Berlin agreements, we not allow the Soviets to begin to play the Allies off against each other;

"—There are some tactical differences in the Alliance—on such issues as the timing of a European conference, or the precise approaches to negotiating troop reductions; these are of no great consequence unless we allow the Soviets to enlarge on our small differences and inflate them into major issues;

"—On European Security, you believe a Conference with the Warsaw Pact must be deferred, while the West concentrates on its own preparations. The Conference must not become a substitute security arrangement for NATO, which is what the Soviets want;

"—Similarly, improved East-West trade and economic arrangements must not dilute the unity of the EEC, or our Atlantic partnership;

"—Germany is the primary object and potential victim of hasty or ill-conceived agreements, whether on European security or mutual troop reductions;

"—On the latter—negotiated troop reductions—we rule out any bilateral bargain with the USSR; any agreement must come through the Allied consensus." The President underlined portions of the advice. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 918, VIP Visits, Brandt Visit Key Biscayne, December 1971, 1 of 3) The full text of the memorandum is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

Brandt met privately with Nixon at the latter's residence in Key Biscayne on December 28 at 1:30 p.m., accompanied only by President's

Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig and Ulrich Sahn of the West German Chancellery. A memorandum of conversation prepared by Haig reads with regard to CSCE and MBFR as follows: "President Nixon stated that he would like to discuss first the Soviet summit meeting scheduled for May. This meeting had been most carefully prepared and followed specific and concrete achievements on issues of concern to the United States and the Soviets. The President recalled that he had at the previous meeting told Chancellor Brandt at the time of that meeting that the moment was not propitious for such a meeting with the Soviet leadership, but events over the past year had now crystallized in a way which offered some promise for a constructive meeting in Moscow. The President reassured Chancellor Brandt that the discussions in Moscow would in no sense result in agreements arrived at the expense of old friends. He stated that both the summit in Peking and the summit in Moscow had been undertaken with a firm commitment to that underlying philosophy. The issue of MBFR was a topic which could only be pursued within such a philosophy. No discussions should be held with the Soviets on this issue until the most careful consultation and preparation had been completed by the Western powers and only then could the topic be discussed by them with the Soviets."

Haig's account continues: "President Nixon stated that the issue of MBFR must also be approached with the greatest caution and care. He noted that Prime Minister Heath expressed this same concept as had the French. General Haig noted that no U.S. studies had come up with formulas which would not hurt Western European security, and for this reason discussion of balanced force reductions should be in terms of principles and most carefully approached. Chancellor Brandt stated that he agreed fully with this appraisal. Nevertheless, ultimately the subject will have to be looked at most carefully. President Nixon stated that it is a topic on which hope must be held out but reductions would only make sense if they did not hurt the alliance. In this regard, the increase of a billion dollars in force improvements by the Allies had been most helpful in the U.S. ability to hold the line on its own force levels. President Nixon stated that he sensed that even the Soviets are beginning to have doubts about the MBFR. Chancellor Brandt's reply was that it is probable that the Soviets have not even really studied the subject." For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 335.

At a second private meeting on December 29 at 9:30 a.m., Nixon and Brandt discussed a European security conference and mutual and balanced force reductions. Again, Haig prepared a record of the meeting, which reads in part:

"At this point, President Nixon, Chancellor Brandt, General Haig, and Mr. Sahn were joined by Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign

Minister Scheel. Secretary Rogers stated that concerning the European Security Conference, there should be no firm schedule on such a meeting, and it should not be considered until after the Protocol in May or June, and also until after the Ministerial Meeting on May 30–31. He stated that the initial meetings could occur as early as perhaps September or October, with further discussions in the Spring of 1973. Foreign Minister Scheel agreed that it would be difficult to fix a schedule for the actual convening of a European Security Conference at this point.

“President Nixon stated that the best he could assess at this point was that the Conference would focus on political and economic issues.

“Chancellor Brandt stated that there would have to be some improvement in political coordination and organization before a Conference could be convened. Foreign Minister Scheel stated that it was essential that a summit be held with the new European Economic Community and that the role of the United States be defined with respect to the European Community on economic matters. Secretary Rogers stated that maybe this could occur in August or September. Chancellor Brandt stated that that was too soon, since the Olympic Games would be hosted in Munich in August.

“President Nixon stated that he would like to see the Games, but that in any event, it is essential that the European Security Conference be kept in clear focus. It is obvious that the Soviets want such a Conference, but within the United States—especially within the Congress—there is a great tendency to assume that the Conference itself would be tantamount for justification for mutual balanced force reductions, noting that many seek to give this impression. It also tends to build expectations for unilateral U.S. reductions. For this reason, it is essential that the planning prior to the Security Conference be complete and detailed, and that no hopes be raised that it can be a substitute for continued essential defense sacrifices. In essence, the European Security Conference is a misnomer. The United States does not believe that hardware can be given for software. Therefore, all of the allies must move in the most deliberate fashion, express a willingness to discuss the issue with the Soviets, but, above all, achieve complete alignment of views among the Western allies before entering into any kind of a Conference.

“Secretary Rogers stated that the Soviets now do not seem particularly interested in mutual balanced force reductions. German Foreign Minister Scheel agreed, but stated that perhaps Soviet intentions to link force reductions with the European Security Conference and to have such a Conference serve as a substitute vehicle for achieving their end.

“Chancellor Brandt said that all the governments must have a forum to express their concerns and their hopes. The European countries wish to raise the Brezhnev Doctrine, the issues of sovereignty, etc.

“The Romanian said he would feel safer if such a Conference were held. Thus, many of the eastern European states hope to achieve additional security from it by obtaining a principle for the renunciation of force or some other type of reassurance not in terms of pure military security but rather in terms of political assurances which would lead to additional security for the eastern states.

“President Nixon stated that it is obvious that the Romanians would wish to see a European Security Conference.

“Secretary Rogers added that the Scandinavians, Belgium and Netherlands are also interested.

“Foreign Minister Scheel stated that even France was somewhat interested since they wished to ease the independence movement in eastern Europe.

“Secretary Rogers stated that this is what the United States would seek out of such a Conference.

“Chancellor Brandt stated that the mutual balanced force reduction issue in his view is a matter which the Soviets are interested in but haven’t had sufficient time to study. The Soviets are also aware that the French are strongly opposed to balanced force reductions but he wondered about the status of the Brosio visit to Moscow.

“Foreign Minister Scheel stated that the Soviets have not replied to the Brosio initiative. He knows that when he asked about it in Moscow the Soviets had stated that this was not a problem, especially with respect to Brosio’s known views, but rather the Soviets were delaying because they were not sure themselves what their own views would be on MBFR. Secretary Rogers stated that the U.S. had been unable to get a commitment from the Soviets on the issue. Foreign Minister Scheel stated that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had raised the issue of MBFR with him over a year ago and even referred to asymmetrical reductions. At that time, Gromyko was interested in getting MBFR discussions started if only in a symbolic sense. Secretary Rogers replied that since that time, however, the Soviets had said nothing. Secretary Rogers stated, in any event, it is not a problem that has to be faced for a while. Foreign Minister Scheel stated that MBFR is a long-time political problem which will continue after his retirement.” For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 336.

Rogers and Scheel also discussed MBFR and a conference on European security in a separate meeting on December 28. A memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with MBFR is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO. A memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with a European security conference is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 686, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. X.

86. Editorial Note

At the beginning of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into an exchange of opinions regarding topics of discussion at the planned summit meeting in Moscow between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, scheduled for May 1972. Among the topics discussed by the two sides were a Europe security conference and mutual and balanced force reductions. In a letter dated January 17, Brezhnev wrote Nixon: "We consider it important, proceeding from the favorable situation, to undertake further concrete steps that would consolidate the détente and safeguard security in Europe, and we count on a constructive approach to those questions on the part of the U.S. A confidential exchange of views, suggested by you, regarding the Conference on European security and cooperation would, I believe, be useful indeed."

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presented Brezhnev's letter to Kissinger during a private meeting at the Soviet Embassy on the evening of January 21. According to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's memorandum of the conversation: "We then discussed the European security conference. Dobrynin asked whom on our side he should be in touch with; I had told Gromyko that I was in charge, but Rogers had told him the opposite. I told him I would have to check with the President, but in any event issues of principle should be checked with me. He said that they are now prepared not to force the pace of the European Security Conference, but they hoped that some direction could be indicated at the summit." For the full text of both the memorandum of conversation and Brezhnev's letter, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 39.

After Secretary of State Rogers informed Nixon on February 1 that he was planning to meet with Dobrynin, Nixon sent him guidelines for the meeting in a memorandum dated February 3: "On European security, as you know, my views are to move as slowly and cautiously as feasible. In fact, since meeting with Gromyko, I have told Luns, Heath, Brandt and Pompidou in discussing this subject that there can be no conference this year and that while we do not reject the idea, we cannot agree to it even in principle until we have had an opportunity to evaluate with our allies and later with the Soviet what the substance of such a conference would be. In other words, discussion of the European Security Conference—but without commitment—should be our line at this point." For the full text of Nixon's memorandum, see *ibid.*, Document 44.

When Rogers met with Dobrynin on February 4, both a European security conference and MBFR were topics of discussion. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part:

“*CSCE*. Dobrynin said that his government is eager to discuss convening a European Conference with us. The Secretary indicated that we may have something to say at a later date, but made no commitment to discuss the subject.

“*MBFR*. The Secretary asked why the Soviets objected to our term ‘balanced’ force reductions. Dobrynin asked for a definition of the word, and when the Secretary remarked that ‘balanced’ meant essentially that reductions should not result in a net advantage to either side, Dobrynin said that this was close to the position taken by the recent Warsaw Pact statement.

“The Secretary asked particularly about the Brosio mission. Dobrynin said several times that there had been no decision, either to receive or not to receive Brosio. When the Secretary pressed him about when he expected an answer, he said, ‘I do not expect an answer.’

“During this discussion Dobrynin referred to the ‘bloc-to-bloc’ implications of the Brosio mission. The Secretary pointed out that the nature of MBFR was such that the subject was inevitably of primary concern to the members of the two alliances. Dobrynin conceded that the major involvement in negotiations would be by the two alliances, but said that non-members—he named the Scandinavians, Spain and Yugoslavia—had a clear interest and we must avoid any impression of trying to decide the fate of others. In an allusion to France, Dobrynin also noted that not all NATO members agreed on the ‘bloc-to-bloc’ approach.” For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 45.

On February 15, Nixon replied to Brezhnev’s letter of January 17. He wrote the Soviet leader:

“As preparatory discussions between our two governments intensify in the remaining weeks preceding our meeting, I believe that it might be helpful to outline for you my views on the topics which should be reserved for discussion within the existing confidential channel and those which would be better left to normal negotiations between the representatives of our governments. In my view, the topics best suited for the existing confidential channel would include: discussion of the future developments in the Middle East, the situation in Southeast Asia, and those broad policy questions dealing with arms control, especially the outcome of the crucial talks on the limitation of strategic arms and perhaps some preliminary exchanges on Mutual Force Reduction.”

Nixon’s letter continued:

“Finally, I have previously set forth my views concerning the European question. It is my hope that the Berlin agreement which is now

complete in its essential parts will soon be brought into force. This is precisely the kind of concrete step to which you refer in your letter. I continue to believe that in Europe, as elsewhere, a true détente can best be achieved by precise and concrete understanding. That is why I suggested in my last letter that informal and private exchanges to clarify the concrete objectives of a possible multilateral conference would be helpful. Preliminary discussions on this topic would also be best confined to the existing confidential channel. I will, of course, be prepared to discuss these matters during our meetings in Moscow in the expectation that such a discussion would make subsequent discussions in regular channels and eventual negotiations between all the interested governments fruitful." For the full text of the letter, see *ibid.*, Document 51.

87. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 29, 1972, 3:06–4:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

Issues in European Security Conference and MBFR

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	<i>CIA</i>
<i>State</i>	Richard Helms
Martin Hillenbrand	James P. Hanrahan
Joseph McGuire	<i>ACDA</i>
Herbert Spiro	Philip Farley
Ronald Spiers	John [<i>James?</i>] Leonard
<i>Defense</i>	Olaf Grobel
Kenneth Rush	<i>NSC Staff</i>
Larry Eagleburger	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Warren Nutter	Philip Odeen
John Morse	William Hyland
<i>JCS</i>	Lt. Col. Jack Merritt
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles	Lt. Michael Power
Major Gen. Willis D. Crittenger	Mark Wandler

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-113, SRG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

Three questions concerning MBFR and CSCE would be put before the President for decision:

- (1) Should MBFR be linked with CSCE?
- (2) If so, what kind of linkage do we want—one which controls phasing of MBFR and CSCE, or one which controls the organizations?
- (3) Should discussion of MBFR principles and stabilizing measures be split off from the special group and be put into the CSCE forum?

Dr. Kissinger: This looks like it's going to be another one of those talmudic topics. As I understand it, we have two major issues. The first is how much of a record do we want to create on the exploratory talks. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Marty, am I correct in thinking that the Brosio mission is not going to get off the ground?²

Mr. Hillenbrand: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: The issue, then, is how much of a record do we want to make before the Summit. The second issue is how to relate MBFR to the Security Conference. There are many variations of this relationship. We also have to see if we want to move the exploratory talks into the framework of the Conference. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) What is your view, Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our view is that we should keep the Brosio exercise in a state of potential being at least until the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers on May 30 and 31. The Foreign Ministers may consider appointing another representative—such as Harmel, or the British Ambassador to Moscow—or they may consider transferring the exploratory talks to another body. If the latter were done, it would very likely be a special body which would work in tandem with the CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think the Allies would want to make another formal request to the Soviets?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Some countries would want to do that. We have been stalling on this because we don't think it is needed right now. We

² See Document 86. In a meeting on February 29, Raymond Garthoff, Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs, asked Vorontsov about receiving Brosio, NATO's "explorer" for MBFR talks. "Vorontsov replied that there was no need for 'exploration'; the Soviet policy was not a Dark Continent requiring Stanley and Livingston 'explorers.' Why, he asked, should the Soviet Government let someone who was not competent to negotiate come and subject them to a battery of questions?" Vorontsov said the Soviet Union "was ready to discuss MBFR on an equal basis at any time" and that "his authorities had suggested US-USSR talks; surely our Allies trust us." Vorontsov said that the Soviets "were convinced that the US Government did not wish to go forward with MBFR negotiations at this time." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL US-USSR)

want to wait for the May meeting. Bilaterally, we—and the Allies—can tell the Soviets that Brosio is still there and still available. There are a lot of bilateral contacts between the NATO countries and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) Ken, what do you think?

Mr. Rush: In my view, there are two main aspects we have to take into consideration. First, for domestic reasons, I think it is important that we continue to push for MBFR. Second, given the procedural and substantive aspects of MBFR, I think we should keep the Brosio initiative alive until the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think we should make another formal *démarche*?

Mr. Rush: No, I don't. I do think, though, that we can make some political hay here when the President is in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: In what way? With an agreement, for example, to begin preparatory discussions on MBFR?

Mr. Rush: Yes. Or perhaps an agreement to receive Brosio.

Dr. Kissinger: They won't do that [receive Brosio].³

Mr. Hillenbrand: They have already refused to receive him.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps they would receive Harmel.

Mr. Rush: What I am really saying is that anything in the Moscow communiqué which gives MBFR a pat on the back is in our interest.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the Allies feel if we negotiated MBFR as a bilateral issue with the Soviets?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Allies are relying on assurances given them by the President. MBFR can come up, of course, at the Summit, but the President is not going to be negotiating on behalf of the Allies. To the degree that we can get a NATO position before the Summit, they will let the President conduct some exploratory discussions. I think it is urgent, therefore, that we feed our thinking into NATO within the next six to eight weeks—so that we can get a consensus on something for the President to say, other than just the U.S. ideas.

Mr. Rush: It may also be possible to do some substantive work on MBFR in Moscow. Perhaps the communiqué can give the MBFR concept a pat on the back.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There isn't enough time to get a substantive position ready for Presidential consideration.

Dr. Kissinger: We could try to give MBFR a pat on the back and try to devise some method of advancing negotiations by an exploratory group, but we could not begin substantive discussions. Suppose we

³ All brackets are in the original.

gave MBFR a pat on the back and reached some sort of an agreement on procedures. If so, would that go beyond the NATO framework?

Mr. Hillenbrand: No, a pat on the back would not. So far, though, we have no common view on procedures. That's why we should get Presidential decisions and put them before NATO. Then the President can say something to the Soviets, feeling that he has Alliance support.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless the treaties are ratified,⁴ we may not wish to probe any deeper on a Security Conference.

Mr. Rush: Let me say a word about the treaties, if I may. Bahr called me yesterday, Henry, before he saw you, and he expressed some optimism about the outcome of the voting. I had also investigated the vote problem before I left Germany. The Bundestag votes on May 4, and if there are 249 votes for ratification the whole thing is just about over. Then, of course, the Bundesrat votes. If the Bundesrat sends the treaties back, there will probably be another vote in the Bundestag in June. In any case, we should know in early May if there is a problem in Germany. My prognosis is that the treaties will be ratified.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's take a look at the second problem now. As I understand it, we will not make a new appeal on the Brosio mission. As the occasion arises, we will call attention to the fact that Brosio is still available. At the Summit, we will consider discussion of MBFR at the Security Conference, and we will see if we can try to push MBFR.

All of our papers assume, and I suppose this seems reasonable enough, that we want MBFR. But is that really so?⁵ One weird aspect of this whole situation is that we seem to be sliding into a Security Conference which we don't want. Is the same thing true about MBFR? As I understand it, the Europeans want MBFR because it won't hurt them and because it will keep us in Europe. Do they want MBFR for its own sake?

Mr. Hillenbrand: They want it mainly as a weapon to use against Mansfield-type threats.

Dr. Kissinger: Does anybody here want MBFR on its merits? (to Mr. Farley) Phil?

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 76.

⁵ Kissinger discussed MBFR with Laird in a telephone conversation on January 22. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: "K[issinger]: The only trouble I am having is with the MBFR. L[aird]: I am not sure that we want to get wetted [sic] on that. K: Why not? L: Well, I will talk to you about it. K: But how can we recommend something if it is bad? L: I don't think our studies have come far enough to make that judgment. They are still really in the preparatory state. K: Well, no one has raised that point before. L: Well, you know that I have put Larry [Eagleburger] in charge of that." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 12, Chronological File)

Mr. Farley: We are proceeding on the same basis that Ken (Mr. Rush) is—showing activity. Otherwise, the situation will be worse if we are forced to make unilateral reductions.

Dr. Kissinger: On its merits, then, nobody here—and none of the allies—comes to the conclusion that MBFR is desirable in its own right. In all the options we have studied, I have not found anything that would not worsen our situation, if only slightly.

Mr. Rush: I'm not so sure that we shouldn't have MBFR. It can be used to prevent unilateral reductions of forces on our part. It might be possible to stretch the exercise out over ten years or so, and include various types of constraints. Perhaps we could avoid making other types of reductions which would be even less advantageous to us than MBFR. I say we should have MBFR and stretch it out over a period of eight or ten years—with minimum reductions and perhaps certain limitations.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our view is that MBFR is a tactical necessity. Things could be even worse without it.

Mr. Helms: Anybody who attended the meetings we have had during the last year knows that it is almost impossible to work out any scenario which is remotely advantageous to us.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. Not one of the fifteen options we studied was advantageous to the West. The best we could say was that some of them would not leave us in a much weaker position.

Gen. Knowles: That's true if certain constraints are not negotiated.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We should not underestimate the fact that MBFR influences Congressional attitudes. This may even be the single most important consideration about MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: The President is in a much better position than I am to judge the political necessities. It may very well be that the case for MBFR is overwhelming—if we would be forced to make unilateral cuts without it. However, the President should know that negotiations will not improve our position. At best, the negotiations will only cut our losses. In addition, if some of the assumptions in the studies—on reinforcement capabilities, for example, or the ability to react—are wrong, then our situation will be even worse. Some of these assumptions may very well be wrong.

Let's assume, however, that we want to push for MBFR. The State paper gives five options.⁶ Within those five, there are, I think, three fundamental options. The first is to maintain total separation of MBFR and CSCE. This is our present position. The second is to establish some

⁶ Attached; printed below.

sort of linkage between MBFR and the Conference. This could be done in two ways: (1) by maintaining procedural separation but trying to move both issues by conditioning progress in preparing the Conference with progress toward MBFR and (2) by creating a special MBFR group to deal with MBFR in tandem with preparations for the Conference. The third fundamental option is to discuss MBFR in the Conference. We could discuss “stabilizing” measures—that is, collateral constraints—in the preparatory phase of the Conference, or we could put MBFR on the agenda.

These are the key concepts, I think, although I realize there are some variations to them. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Do you agree, Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes. You outlined the basic options, but there are some nuances you didn’t mention.

Dr. Kissinger: As I recall, we first separated MBFR and CSCE because the Soviets wanted them separated and because we didn’t think the CSCE was a good forum in which to discuss MBFR. We thought the Conference would have too many non-NATO countries which would not have a great interest in strict constraints.

Mr. Rush: I think we should still keep the two completely separate. MBFR might drag on for eight or ten years, with perhaps a little step here and a little step there during that time. If we tie MBFR in with the CES, its timing will become that of CES, and we will lose the freedom of movement we now have with MBFR. If the two are linked together, the thirty countries involved in CES, even if some are loosely allied, will insist on participating in the MBFR discussions—and they will give an overall push to the negotiations. We will start bargaining on topics which are not advantageous to us. And this will suit the Russians, whose primary purpose in the Conference is to bring about division within the Alliance. They can do this better on MBFR than on any other issue.

Dr. Kissinger: But that will also be true even if the two issues are kept on separate tracks.

Mr. Rush: Only those countries which are actually concerned should participate in MBFR. I feel that the substantive issues of MBFR are so complex and so important that we should not allow thirty nations to get involved in the negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly how many nations will be there?

Mr. Hillenbrand: There will be 34 participants—countries and organizations. The Common Market, for example, will take part in the discussions on economic cooperation. Some people also say the Vatican may participate in some discussions. At most, there will be 34 participants.

Dr. Kissinger: Will Malta be there?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we can throw Mintoff at them.

Mr. Hillenbrand: He can be the negotiator.

Mr. Rush: Let me repeat again that I don't think such things as troop limitations or area limitations are proper subjects for the CES to get involved in.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) I want to see if I understand your position. Suppose we set up a special group of the Conference to undertake preparatory discussions of MBFR. When the Conference convenes, it gives its blessing to this special group, and then the group conducts autonomous negotiations, using the CSCE blessing as a trigger. Do you still have objections to that?

Mr. Rush: Yes. Once the two are linked, the 34 nations in the CES will try to assert control of the MBFR talks. The MBFR talks are likely to go slow, while the CES will go much faster. If there is success in CES, there will be pressure to achieve something in MBFR. There may also very well be an attempt to introduce the subject of arms limitations at MBFR. The net result will be timing, subject and party participant links which we don't want.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it correct to say that you don't even want a tenuous linkage? What if the Conference is merely used to trigger MBFR, much the same way we linked CES to the German treaties?

Mr. Rush: That kind of linkage has its pluses and minuses, like the other options. We have had so many linkages, though, that I think it's rather late to bring in another one now.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our view is somewhat different. If our primary motivation for MBFR is to counter Mansfield-type threats, keeping it on a separate track means that no progress will be made and that our ability to use it will eventually disappear. However, if we link MBFR with the Conference, which will get a lot of publicity and be a major East-West event, MBFR will also get some of this publicity and appeal. We think we can safeguard the MBFR talks by detaching them from the main Conference body and by getting an advance agreement that only those nations concerned with MBFR—either by troops or territory—will take part in the negotiations. The Soviets have already said they would discuss MBFR in a body created by the CSCE or in another suitable forum. This suitable forum could be a special body working in tandem with CSCE.

Another factor is that there is pressure in NATO for linking MBFR and the Conference. The pressure is coming from Germany, and from a few other countries, too. I doubt that we can hold out indefinitely for complete separation. Incidentally, this pressure for linkage will be reflected here. The line may be that the U.S. is killing MBFR by keeping it separate from the CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: If we push MBFR, the Europeans may push the CSCE because they really want to kill MBFR.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is one element of their reasoning. Each course has its advantages and disadvantages. We support Option 3: linking MBFR to CSCE via a special MBFR group to discuss MBFR in tandem with a preparation for CSCE. [See attached paper]

Mr. Rush: I think the consensus is that we are not anxious to push MBFR or the CES. If that is so, we should keep the two on separate tracks. Then, if there are pressures, we can yield a bit on MBFR, perhaps after a year or so. In any case, we will have postponed both MBFR and CES. Right now, though, I'm reluctant to give up on MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: We may be better able to achieve delay if we link them.

Mr. Rush: I think linkage will cause an acceleration. The Russians want a CES, and they see linkage as a good way of bringing it about.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Russian view is in many ways similar to our own. We both say that the Conference is not a suitable forum in which to negotiate MBFR. We both say a suitable forum would be a special group consisting of those nations directly concerned with MBFR. We would propose, therefore, to take them at their word and create a special group to work in tandem with the group preparing CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Would this be a group of the CSCE?

Mr. Hillenbrand: It would be set up prior to CSCE. We would tell the Soviets it would be a six or seven-nation body working in tandem with the Conference. At the most, the Conference would give the group a general blessing, and it would let the group's work continue after the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Farley) Phil, what do you think?

Mr. Farley: In general, I am sympathetic to Marty's view. We can exercise better control of the talks if they are conducted within a small group. Marty's device takes advantage of the preparatory phase of the CSCE to make a breakthrough on MBFR. If we want to use the Conference to bless MBFR, this should be decided in NATO, and preparations should get underway so that we will have a position ready for the meeting in Helsinki [preparatory meeting for CSCE].

Dr. Kissinger: We have been hurt on this linkage issue. For the first three years, we were told that linkage would thwart the CSCE. Now we're told that failure to link will thwart it.

Mr. Rush: As I see it, we have two courses of action. The first is to have two separate bodies discussing MBFR and CSCE. The second is to create some kind of a link between the two bodies.

Dr. Kissinger: It's also possible to have the two bodies linked conceptually. For example, we could say that unless there is progress in A, we will not go forward with B.

Mr. Rush: Yes. That's possible. However, I think 1 and 3 are the preferred options.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you object to the Conference monitoring the MBFR talks?

Mr. Rush: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What if the MBFR group is linked to the Conference in terms of progress, not organization?

Mr. Hillenbrand: It was never the intention to have the larger group monitor the smaller. Whether we want to make setting up of the MBFR group dependent on progress in the CSCE is another matter. I doubt that it could be done now. The momentum of the Conference being linked to the ratification of the German treaties can't be turned around. NATO, in general, would prefer to see no link between MBFR and CSCE, although some countries would like to see some aspects of MBFR discussed in the Conference. We don't think that is a good idea.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. It would be the lousiest way of proceeding—and we would have all the disadvantages of the huge forum.

Mr. Farley: You are right. I think I am less doctrinaire, though, than others about insisting that the CSCE not discuss matters relating to MBFR.

Gen. Knowles: The trick of handling MBFR in the Conference is to control the discussion of the principles and to use these discussions as an educational tool. The JCS favors a modification of Option 3A. The Conference would discuss MBFR in a broad context, and the real work would be done by a special group.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) Dick?

Mr. Helms: We can fiddle around with Option 3. Judging from the paper, this option gives us the most flexibility. I think we can start with it.

Dr. Kissinger: If the President made his decisions within the next two weeks, should we take them up with NATO before the Summit?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That depends on what the President decides. If he chooses Option 3, it would be good to take it up with NATO before the Summit. That way we would have a NATO consensus for the President to use in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me try to sum up the NATO position, as I understand it. If we drop MBFR, they will be unhappy because they think we will make unilateral withdrawals. If we set up a special body to conduct MBFR negotiations, they won't like that either—although I really don't know why.

Mr. Hillenbrand: They won't like it if we say we want MBFR, but in a separate track from CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Would NATO object to the view Ken [Rush] expressed?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, if it means Option 1.

Dr. Kissinger: If MBFR and CSCE are separate, then, NATO will be unhappy.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, and there will be pressure to go the CSCE route.

Dr. Kissinger: If MBFR and CSCE are separate—but linked—bodies, we will still get objections because some of the countries in the Conference will want more of a voice in the MBFR negotiations.

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think most of the countries would accept Option 3 as the middle ground.

Dr. Kissinger: Will the countries that want the Conference to assert control over MBFR be satisfied with just a formal role for the Conference and separate institutions? What is the difference between Options 1 and 3, unless the Conference exercises control over MBFR?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Option 1 implies no linkage at all. Option 3 implies linkage, but not CSCE control over the linkage.

Mr. Helms: CSCE would in effect be sprinkling holy water over MBFR.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That's right. The Conference would simply give its blessing.

Dr. Kissinger: Would most countries settle for that?

Mr. Hillenbrand: If the U.S. goes for Option 3, I think most countries would support it.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the same thing be true if we go for Option 1?

Mr. Hillenbrand: No. There are already pressures in NATO for Option 3A.

Dr. Kissinger: Is anybody in favor of discussing principles of MBFR and stabilizing measures in the Conference, while conducting the actual negotiations in a special body?

Gen. Knowles: The Germans feel military security must be considered at the Conference.

Mr. Rush: I think they can be brought around. I have talked to Brandt and Scheel about this.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Hillenbrand) You need decisions in the next two weeks, don't you, so that we can have discussions within the Alliance?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Mr. Rush: The Germans are basically afraid that we will use MBFR as a cover for troop withdrawals. As you know, they are floundering around.

Dr. Kissinger: The President has to decide whether or not to establish a link between MBFR and CSCE. If he decides on linkage, he

can choose one which controls the phasing or one which controls the organizations. Finally, the President has to decide if he wants to split off discussion of principles and stabilizing measures from the separate forum and put it into the CSCE. I will try to get the answers to these questions within two weeks.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Good. There are two other ancillary points I would like to bring up, however. The first is the need for agreement on the Presidential decisions in NATO. Our approach to this is pragmatic. If we see dangers developing in NATO, for example, we can review our approach. This will be an on-going process. The second is the Brosio mission. There is pressure in NATO for issuing a statement telling the Soviets and the world that Brosio is still alive. I don't see any great objection to such a statement.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sonnenfeldt) Hal, what do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It might create a problem if the statement is so worded that it generates a categorical Soviet rejection.

Dr. Kissinger: Who in NATO is creating this pressure?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The British—and others—have said that we should do something about Brosio before May.

Dr. Kissinger: I see the British, and they tell me they are horrified by MBFR.

Mr. Hillenbrand: They have an inner inconsistency, but they do want to help us.

Attachment

Interagency Paper

Washington, undated.

MBFR/CSCE OPTIONS

Option 1:

Maintain total separation between CSCE and MBFR—*current policy*.

Option 2:

Maintain current procedural separation but condition progress in preparation for CSCE on progress towards MBFR.

Option 3:

Link MBFR to CSCE via a special MBFR group to discuss MBFR “in tandem” with preparation for CSCE. CSCE might establish a follow-on MBFR group.

Option 3a:

Discuss stabilizing measures in CSCE preparation and remand to MBFR body for drawing up separate agreement which would be open to all states for accession.

Option 4:

Deal with MBFR in CSCE Plenary. Either reach broad agreement on or negotiate Principles and/or stabilizing measures.

Option 5:

Advocate establishment by CSCE Ministerial of machinery for MBFR negotiations.

88. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 4, 1972, 10:45 a.m.

R: This is not the subject of most importance at the moment. I read the memorandum of your meeting on the European Security Conference and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.²

K: Did I have one?

R: Yes, the SRG.

K: Oh yes, I thought you meant something else.

R: I hope the President doesn't decide this in a new and specific way. I think up to now it's been just right. I am well aware of the problems of the different departments and agencies, but I think the way we have played it in the past is just right. Suppose for instance the President said no linkage—we would be in an impossible position in NATO.

K: I'll talk to you before we send the memo. He wants some linkage, but he'll leave it loose how to do it.

R: The Russians [omission in original transcript] with the European Security Conference—they don't want it.

K: I think Defense is wrong in this.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 13, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² See Document 87.

R: I do too. So leave it loose.

K: Let me check. He may not want it completely loose, but not as rigid as Defense wants it.

R: Not to say that no direct linkage discussions will take place, but say that before any decisions are made it ought to come back to me.

K: Before he sends out a directive, why don't I read it to you and see if you can live with it.

R: Fine.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

89. National Security Decision Memorandum 162¹

Washington, undated.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe

The following guidance has been approved by the President.

The contents of NSDM 142² remain valid, except as affected by the directives in this memorandum.

Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE)

The United States' position should be to proceed in preparing an Allied position for CSCE that reflects a maximum consensus. It would be preferable, however, that the East-West multilateral preparatory phase not begin until after the US Presidential elections. The possibility of a high level Allied meeting prior to the beginning of the multilateral preparatory talks should be kept open, though such a meeting is not a condition for US participation in CSCE.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 482, President's Trip Files, MBFR–CSCE Backup Book, Part 1. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disclaim Agency.

² Document 81.

In dealing with both CSCE issues and procedures, Allied unity should take precedence. US policy is that a careful multilateral exploration should precede the opening of a Conference. These preparatory explorations should be substantive rather than purely procedural. Allied interest in curtailing the multilateral preparatory phase may be taken into account, provided there is an understanding in the Alliance that during this phase some substantive discussions will be conducted on each of the agenda items proposed by the Alliance.

As noted above the US would not object to a general discussion on Military Security Issues in CSCE, but it would not be acceptable to aim for agreements that limited or reduced forces in Europe. Rather, the US would prefer to limit discussion to some general measures of constraint that might be suitable for adoption by European states. Such constraints might be related, in CSCE, to a declaration of principles governing relations between states.

MBFR

The US continues to support separate and distinct negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe; an exploratory discussion as the first step toward such negotiations continues to be US policy. In the period between now and the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 30–31, the US will continue to support the Allied proposal for an exploratory mission led by Mr. Brosio. After the President's meetings in the USSR, the US would be willing to consider a review of alternatives to the Brosio mission.

MBFR and CSCE

Concerning the relationship between MBFR and CSCE, the US position is that the former is not an issue that should be negotiated by the CSCE. Should the preparatory discussions of CSCE begin before any exploration of MBFR with the USSR or other Warsaw Pact countries, the US objective in these circumstances would be to use the fact of CSCE preparations to establish contacts for the simultaneous exploration of MBFR. The establishment of a special group of states directly involved in MBFR in Central Europe would be an acceptable procedure for exchanging views on MBFR. Alternatively, or in addition, the US would be willing to consider a general discussion in CSCE of Military Security Issues, including some general aspects of MBFR; in this context, however, the main objective would be to reach an understanding that MBFR negotiations will be initiated in a separate forum by a specified date.

In general, the relationship between MBFR and CSCE should be minimal. No authority should be established by CSCE over the course or content of MBFR negotiations. The overall objective of the US is to obtain a commitment from the USSR to begin discussion of MBFR before the CSCE has concluded its work.

Allied Consultations

The reaction of the NATO Allies to this approach should be sought promptly. The goal of consultations should be to develop a consensus in advance of the NATO Ministerial meeting.

An interagency paper on collateral constraints that might be appropriate for discussion at a CSCE should be developed and forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. A separate paper on constraints suitable to MBFR should also be prepared for submission to NATO.

Henry A. Kissinger

90. Editorial Note

On April 17, 1972, National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt sent President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger a memorandum on "issues for Presidential decision" before Kissinger's departure for Moscow for his April 19–25 secret trip. The goal of Kissinger's trip was to preview with the Soviets potential topics of discussion at Nixon's planned summit with Brezhnev in Moscow. With regard to European security and mutual and balanced force reductions, Sonnenfeldt wrote Kissinger:

"The decision here is, first, for authority to talk bilaterally to the Soviets. This follows logically from previous confidential exchanges, though these related to Europe generally (ESC) rather than to MBFR. This is a delicate problem because of European sensitivities. Moreover, we are committed not to talk specifically about ESC until after the Berlin agreement takes effect. No such restriction exists on MBFR.

"The major current hangup relates to the *interrelationship between ESC and MBFR*. We have always wanted to keep them separate, largely for Congressional reasons but also because it makes no sense to have large numbers of European governments involved in MBFR negotiations that affect only a few countries.

"If the German treaties are ratified and Berlin is settled, ESC preparations should begin next fall. The old imperative (Congressional) of holding open the possibility of MBFR while hanging back on ESC will no longer be valid then. We already have a USG decision to establish a tenuous link between MBFR and ESC, that is, to use the occasion of ESC preparations to try to get MBFR talks started also. This is worth trying out on the Soviets.

"We also have a set of MBFR principles developed by the Verification Panel and generally consistent with what NATO has been do-

ing. Brosio would have made an effort to probe the Soviets on some of these.

“On balance, it seems wisest to confine preparatory work with the Soviets to the procedural issues.

“ESC is a Soviet desideratum. We should stick to the NATO approach on timing. A Presidential decision might be made (1) that we can assure the Soviets we will cooperate with ESC preparations after Berlin, and (2) that we are prepared to maintain contact with them to help structure the conference most usefully.”

On April 19, Kissinger wrote in a memorandum to President Nixon with regard to European security:

“The next major subject—of particular interest to the Soviets—is Europe. As you know, they have been eager to engage us in bilateral talks about their conference proposal but so far they have not shown much interest in *MBFR*. Our own interest in *MBFR* has been largely the result of our need to counter Senator Mansfield with a positive position. While at the moment our domestic pressures for troop reductions are manageable they could of course arise again, and we would probably be in a stronger position to meet them if we had some sort of *MBFR* negotiation in prospect with the Soviets.

“We have already in various ways agreed in principle to preparations for a *European conference* once the Berlin agreement takes effect. Although the conference idea remains nebulous, we could try to use our agreement to proceed with conference preparations as a means to get the Russians to agree to *MBFR* preparations. As part of this latter process we could attempt to develop certain principles. As you know, however, we have had little success in coming up with any substantive *MBFR* position that is both negotiable and in our security interest. Consequently, our main interest will continue to be to use *MBFR talks* to prevent the unraveling of NATO through unilateral troop cuts.”

At the end of the memorandum, Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendations, but added the handwritten notation: “OK—as modified by RN’s oral instructions.” For the complete text of both Sonnenfeldt’s and Kissinger’s memoranda, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 125.

Nixon instructed Kissinger regarding the latter’s trip in the course of a private conversation in the Oval Office on April 19. Among the topics Nixon discussed with Kissinger were a European security conference and *MBFR*. A transcript of their conversation reads in part:

“Nixon: [turning pages] European security concerns me. I think we’re getting sucked in there.

“Kissinger: But there we’re pretty well sucked in.

“Nixon: Now, what are you going to do? Have European security without any linkage with *MBFR*?

“Kissinger: Well, that’s what most of our allies want. And that’s what—

“Nixon: I know. Let me tell you, when you have European security you can damn near forget NATO. It’s going to be very—

“Kissinger: That I’m convinced of too.

“Nixon: But I am also rather convinced that NATO is done anyway so that’s—just between you and me. That’s nothing to—

“Kissinger: I think European security won’t hurt it as much as MF—MBFR will.

“Nixon: Well, maybe then we’ll just take European security and talk about peace and good will and exchange. Is that what you mean?

“Kissinger: That would have a slight advantage. But that is not a decision which we now need to take.

“Nixon: No, I know.

“Kissinger: Because—

“Nixon: On the other hand, they’ll want to announce a European security conference.

“Kissinger: At the summit.

“Nixon: That’s right. But you’ve got to be ready to tell them we’re willing. Bilateral issues—just don’t give anything, you know, we won’t [unclear] a goddamn thing—unless we get something on Vietnam. It’s cold turkey. And I mean not a goddamn thing. [unclear] They know that—they know that Vietnam is an indispensable ingredient of anything we do in the other area. Don’t you agree?

“Kissinger: That’s right.” For a more complete transcript of the conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 126. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

91. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 22, 1972, 11 a.m.–4:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Mr. Samoteykin, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Mr. John Negroponte, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Basic Principles; Vietnam; SALT; European Security; Bilateral Relations;
Announcement of Visit; Summit Arrangements; China

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have invested so much in the Berlin agreement that we are in favor of ratification of these agreements. In light of these discussions, we will see what additional steps we can take to assist ratification.

Brezhnev: We know that, and that is why we said we value President Nixon's position regarding European matters very highly. I have said so publicly, too, in our Central Committee. My feeling is that European problems will be discussed in a favorable spirit.

Kissinger: We expect it too.

Brezhnev: We feel sure that when President Nixon hears what we have to say he will see that we are not trying to inject any "underwater rocks" in our European policy. We are not self-centered.

Kissinger: Will you be introducing new European matters at the Summit?

Brezhnev: We would like perhaps to have something to say on the European Conference. The general position and attitude of the U.S.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Guest House on Vorobyevskii Road. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 139.

Administration is known to us, that is to say, agreement in principle. What is needed is just a few specifics. By that time we may have ready in written form how to conclude a European Conference, that is to say the basic principles for a European Conference. Possibly even before the May meeting, we could agree on or discuss certain additional points bilaterally.

Kissinger: You will find it easier to discuss with President if there have been prior exchanges, so he's not confronted with entirely new matters when he gets here.

Brezhnev: We will follow the channel.

Kissinger: May I raise in this connection the problem of mutual force reductions? In your considerations regarding the European Security Conference, has your thinking reached the point where you would be willing to have parallel discussions on force reductions?

Brezhnev: Just to return to European affairs generally, there will be discussed the ratification of the treaties, the Berlin agreement, agreement on principles of convening a conference, and the relation of the GDR to the FRG. Then on a purely confidential basis we would certainly like to know the answers to such questions as when the U.S. would support the admissions of both Germanies to the U.N.

With respect to force reductions, that question is one that we do not intend to withdraw from the agenda, but perhaps it is one that should not be linked too closely to the Summit so as not to impede matters of top priority. But at some stage we would be ready in the future to discuss it on a confidential basis bilaterally. Of course, the general portent of our proposals on this score is to have the least possible number of troops in Europe, reducing to a minimum the risk of war in Europe. At some stage, we will certainly start to talk to you on this. Even if at first there is only a very slight reduction, the mere fact of a reduction will have a tremendous significance. It will be a token of our desire for a reduction of tensions and a token of goodwill and spirit of confidence. No one is implying that we will have 3 million and you will have 600. There can be no unacceptable proposals made in this field. Mutually acceptable principles will have to be found. There can be no unilateral advantage.

Kissinger: How about if side by side with preparations for a European Security Conference we begin discussions on reductions, directed at basic principles?

Brezhnev: In general, that would be a very good thing. But what we both have to bear in mind is that the merging of these 2 issues would divert attention from the main issues. Because it is to be foreseen that with respect to a European Security Conference hundreds of questions will come up. Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark can all raise questions.

Kissinger: You like chaos.

Brezhnev: On the contrary. So let's get this question out of the way first.

Kissinger: We do not think force reductions should be discussed at a European Security Conference, because a European Security Conference is a much larger forum. We think a force reduction should be discussed in a parallel body among the countries whose forces would be reduced.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, of course it is certainly possible that the Conference itself could say something favorable on approaching it. Perhaps the Conference could set up a special body or another organization with the necessary diplomatic and military personnel—naturally with the participation of countries concerned. On this question, we could use our bilateral channel to conduct quiet and steady discussions on this. But at the forthcoming meeting, we should register our general attitude and desire to advance to a European Security Conference.²

Kissinger: Assuming that ratification goes through, which we expect, we are prepared to do this. But our attitude is that side by side, we would have discussions on this subject in a separate forum.

Brezhnev: We are certainly in agreement to start in the confidential channel. As soon as we feel we have come to a common approach, we can then involve more openly the others who are concerned. Because of course attitudes and positions of states in this are different. Brandt at the Crimea asked me, should we also discuss Luxembourg and its 94 policemen? Should this be covered?

Kissinger: That is consistent with his practice of always getting to the fundamentals of an issue.³

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² In a subsequent meeting on April 24 from 11:15 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., Brezhnev made a similar appeal to Kissinger: "Also, we [the United States and the Soviet Union] should, we feel, take the necessary steps for the preparation and convening of a European Security Conference. I am sure you understand well and can convey this to the President." (Memorandum of conversation, April 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons) For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 159.

³ On April 24, Kissinger sent Nixon a message regarding his trip to Moscow. With regard to a European security conference and MBFR he wrote: "Brezhnev at least agreed to consider our concept of separate explorations on MBFR in parallel with those on a European Security Conference. We have no assurance he will actually carry this out, however." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons) For the full text of the message, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 161.

92. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Rogers visited Europe from May 2 to 10, 1972, for consultations with the NATO allies about the Moscow summit. He visited Iceland (May 2–3), the United Kingdom (May 3–4), Belgium (May 4–5), Luxembourg (May 5–6), and the Federal Republic of Germany (May 6–7). On May 17, Rogers reported in a memorandum to President Nixon: “Although European interest in the Moscow discussions is very great, we did not detect any serious concern that you would be arriving at agreements with the Soviets behind the backs of our Allies—a fear which, as you know, has periodically arisen during the post-World War II period. Government leaders and the public media appear to have taken you at your word that you will not be negotiating bilaterally on matters of broad European interest, such as the Conference on European Security and Cooperation and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.” Rogers continued: “It is only fair to note that there are still a number of differences in the West between various approaches to certain aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, but none of these seem to be of such a fundamental nature as to make ultimate agreement unlikely. Further work will have to be done in NATO on this, and the Europeans are hoping that your bilateral exchanges with the Soviets will draw from them a clearer description of their own thinking than has yet been obtained. This should then prove valuable as we move towards an alliance consensus in the next phase of NATO discussion.” (National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 5415, Box 524, S’s 5/72 Pre-Summit Consultation Follow-Up)

In the wake of Rogers’s trip, Ralph J. McGuire, Director of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, wrote a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand on May 19 about the “relationship of the Moscow Communiqué and US positions on CSCE and MBFR.” McGuire wrote: “Recalling our discussion with the Secretary in Luxembourg on CSCE issues, and his desire to press the Soviets hard on the Brezhnev Doctrine and to take a strong stand on freer movement, it occurs to me that both of these positions could be undermined by formulations that might be agreed in the Moscow communiqué.” McGuire noted: “The passage on principles, in the draft communiqué which the Secretary sent the President before his European trip, probably should be strengthened somewhat in the light of the Luxembourg conversation.” McGuire attached a memorandum “enumerating the possible interrelationships between the Moscow Communiqué and CSCE.” (Ibid., Bureau of European Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Records Relating to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lot 80 D 188, NN3–059–00–017, Box 1, European Security, May 1972)

On May 19, Rogers forwarded to Nixon suggested language for the final communiqué for the Moscow summit. An attachment to Rogers's memorandum, "Sensitive Areas," reads in part as follows: "In the specific areas listed below, we should avoid the following:

"CSCE. 1. Any general statement of principles that omits reference to freer movement or refers to it only obliquely; 2. Recognition or respect for existing frontiers or their inviolability; 3. Emphasis on respect for treaty obligations (because of the Soviet-Czech treaty and the Brezhnev Doctrine); 4. Any reference to 'peaceful coexistence.'

"MBFR. 1. Listing or defining states that should participate in MBFR explorations or negotiations, or the specific countries involved in the area of possible reductions; 2. The mention of specific dates for explorations or talks; 3. The term 'equal security' (which the Soviets related to FBS; the NATO formula is 'undiminished security')." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 475, President's Trip Files, President's Moscow Trip, May 1972, Pt. 3)

On the same day, May 19, Rogers sent the President the Second Interim Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The report, he told Nixon in a covering memorandum, "summarizes the current status of issues related to CSCE and recommends positions we should take during future NATO consultations." The task force report, along with Rogers's memorandum, is *ibid.*, Box 286, Agency Files, State, Vol. 16. A revised version of the report, Tab L of the White House's MBFR–CSCE Backup Book used at the Moscow summit, is *ibid.*, Box 482, President's Trip Files, MBFR–CSCE Backup Book, Part 2.

93. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Salzburg, Austria, May 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Moscow Discussions Tuesday, May 23, 1972

This memorandum summarizes the issues that will come up in the first set of your discussions on Tuesday and provides talking points.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

4. *European Security Conference*. (Our title: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—CSCE)

This is Brezhnev's major European initiative and he intends to get your commitment to prompt beginning of preparations and to the holding of the actual conference as early as this year.

We have long been on record as agreeing to a properly prepared and substantive conference (though, in fact, the problems of getting a mutually agreed agenda for a substantive conference are considerable). Our reservations have stemmed from our concern that the conference will be a propaganda circus, produce false euphoria and open up differences among NATO allies. We and the NATO allies have been working intensively on more substantive positions to present at a conference, especially proposals that would stimulate freedom of movement and undercut Soviet pretensions to hegemony in Eastern Europe (Brezhnev Doctrine).

Although Brezhnev has frequently suggested through the private channel that we jointly develop a position, and you have indicated a willingness to explore the objectives of a meaningful conference, little of substance has in fact occurred.

We and the Allies are committed to begin "multilateral" explorations on a conference once the Berlin agreement is in effect. Nevertheless you should use our agreement on the timing of these preparatory explorations to get Brezhnev's agreement to early explorations on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, The President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972, Part 1. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the first page reads: "The President has seen." President Nixon visited Austria May 20–22 on his way to the summit meeting in the Soviet Union. For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 253.

European troop reductions (MBFR), in which we are interested. You should also take into account the sensitivities of our Allies to anything that smacks of US-Soviet collusion against them.

Key Points to Emphasize

In respect to Brezhnev's urgings for early preparations and a conference this year, *you should*:

—Agree to the beginning of multilateral preparations later this year, subject to agreement among all countries concerned;

—Note that you cannot visualize preparations for a truly meaningful conference to be completed rapidly and you believe that it would be soundest to consider holding a conference some time in 1973.

As regards substance, *you should indicate that*:

—We would agree that a conference should deal with the *principles* of relations among European states; such principles would include:

- sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity;
- non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs;
- the right of people in each country to shape their own destiny.

—There could be certain agreed measures to improve *physical security*, such as restraints on movements of armed forces, exchanges of observers, notification of maneuvers. (Note: We want to keep MBFR as such out of a conference because we would only want countries concerned to be involved in negotiations.)

—There should be expanded cultural exchange and concrete arrangements for increased economic and technological cooperation.

The Soviets advocate some sort of permanent machinery to come out of the conference. *You should*:

—Stress that if new institutions are to be created they should have carefully worked out terms of reference;

—Note that military questions are highly complex and delicate and could best be dealt with directly by the countries concerned.

Finally, if Brezhnev stalls on MBFR and suggests that this subject should only be dealt with after a conference has met, *you should*:

—Press our desire to move ahead in parallel on a conference and MBFR.

5. *MBFR*. Your discussion of this topic, on which the Soviets have remained reluctant, should be largely procedural. We have a need, for Congressional reasons, to have a process of negotiations underway; but we are less certain that early positive results are achievable. The Soviets, apart from showing reluctance to begin talks (e.g. their refusal to receive Brosio, the NATO explorer), have so far given little evidence that they have done any substantive homework comparable to the massive studies undertaken by NATO and ourselves.

The Soviets are aware that geography confers advantages on them. On the other hand, their forces in Eastern Europe have internal security functions. Consequently, while the Soviets might be interested in reductions that would enable them to shift forces eastward, they have displayed much hesitation. They may of course hope that they will be spared “mutual” cuts by growing pressures in the West for unilateral ones. In addition, the Soviets have shown great sensitivity to the term “balanced,” the *B* in MBFR, because they see in it a Western effort to obtain larger Soviet reductions as a compensation for our geographic disadvantage.

It is possible that in Moscow, as a “concession,” Brezhnev might propose quick and symbolic equal reductions and try to get a joint US-Soviet agreement to this effect. Our studies have shown this to be of questionable desirability (it would not be verifiable and would tend to accentuate present Soviet military advantages); moreover, a US-Soviet *fait accompli* on this subject would damage our Alliance relationship.

Key Points to Emphasize

In these circumstances *you should*:

—Seek Brezhnev’s agreement to MBFR explorations by countries concerned in parallel with the preparatory work on the CSCE.

—Agree that there can be private US-Soviet contact on this, but that the specific exploratory work should not be purely bilateral.

On *substance*, you should indicate that:

—Reductions should involve both foreign and local forces in Central Europe, although an initial phase could concentrate on foreign (ie. US and Soviet) forces;

—It would be best to concentrate in the first instance on ground forces;

—Nuclear weapons may present too complex a problem in the first stage of talks.

—There should be verification so that an agreement will not lead to misunderstandings and bickering (this could involve inspection, or, as in SALT, measures that are arranged in a way that each side can observe them by its unilateral means).

Note: As regards the European questions you could refer to the fact that the final communiqué on which there has already been considerable work by both sides will, of course, deal at some length with European questions.

One matter, not covered above, relates to frontiers in Europe. The Soviets are anxious to have us recognize their “inviolability.” But since they interpret this word as meaning “unchangeable” even by negotiation there is a problem for us in accepting it. We have no intention our-

selves to see frontiers changed but because we maintain that the ultimate frontiers of a united Germany should be set in a peace treaty we have to maintain flexibility. Consequently, when Brezhnev raises this matter, *you should*:

—State that we are quite willing to recognize the principle of “territorial integrity,” but do not wish to infringe on the right of sovereign states to seek peaceful arrangements concerning their frontiers.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

94. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 22, 1972, 6:15–8:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
The President
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Interpreter (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I should like further to say a few words about Europe. I would very much like you to be very clear in your mind, Mr. President, that the Europe policy of the Soviet Union pursues the most honest and constructive goals and is devoid of any subterfuges—even though there is certainly no lack in the wide world of people who want to muddy the water and propound all sorts of pernicious fabrications. The Russian people and all the other peoples of the Soviet Union have suffered quite enough from wars that have originated on the European soil. We do not want this to be repeated anew. We want to rule out such a possibility. That is the objective of our Europe policy. I believe that the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, The President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the General Secretary's Office in the Kremlin. For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 257.

United States too cannot be interested in a repetition of all that has happened in the past. We believe that the United States is in sympathy with the achievement of détente in Europe and the strengthening of European peace. If that is so then you and we have before us a vast scope for cooperation to these ends. And we are hoping that it will be carried into effect under the hallmark of good will and a constructive approach. This hope of ours rests on a certain degree of practical experience. We do genuinely value the cooperation that we had with you at the time of the preparation of the agreement on West Berlin. We also value the steps taken by the American side to promote the ratification of the treaties signed by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland. Permit me to express the hope that you and we will continue that good practice in matters including the preparation of the all-Europe conference.

As regards that conference I should like to say the following. This question too we seek to approach as realists. It is obvious that it will not prove possible to solve all the complex problems existing in Europe at one go. But we would think that such a conference if it passes successfully can lay a good foundation for cooperation between all European states.

I believe there is nothing in this that could be opposed by the United States or Canada.

We have on many occasions spoken publicly on this matter and I should not like to take up your time with a repetition of what has already been said. I believe we could discuss this matter in greater detail later and find mutual understanding.

I believe it would be a good thing to register our common positive attitude to the conference in the joint communiqué which will reflect the results of our talks. Such mutual understanding would have great meaning and significance.

The President: This is more a matter of form than substance. I was discussing this question on my way to Moscow with Kissinger and Rogers. I think we could reach understanding and that includes the question of timing. The other European countries will certainly be expecting us to mention this subject in our communiqué so we have to find a way of doing it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe they will certainly be expecting us to do so. I also feel that we could agree without any public announcement to begin consultations on matters relating to the all-Europe conference on a bilateral basis.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

95. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 24, 1972, 11:40 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA

Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Leonid Zamyatin, Director of TASS

The President

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member

Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

SUBJECTS

Economic Relations; Europe

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Europe

General Secretary Brezhnev: Shall we now turn to the subject that has been suggested we discuss this morning, Europe? If you have no objections, I would like to make a few opening remarks on that question. A discussion of the problems relating to Europe is a very important one indeed, and I believe the reasons for that are understood perfectly well on both sides. Europe is indeed an area which is one of the most densely populated ones in the world. It is an area of enormous economic potential; an area of ancient culture and science. All of these are important matters.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 487, President's Trip Files, The President's Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972, Part 1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall in the Grand Kremlin Palace. For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 265.

On the other hand, it is also an area where in the past many large-scale wars originated. I need only to mention two world wars and especially the last one which the U.S. was dragged into also. And those wars, particularly the last one, involved very much human suffering and sacrifice. It had a very bad aftermath and had a long term effect on the situation in Europe generally.

The question therefore is how to make this area an area of peace and tranquility so that all the peoples of Europe can live in conditions of security, so that we too, and both of us, can be confident that the situation in Europe would not deteriorate. This is certainly not an easy thing to achieve, but it is something that should be the focus of our attention.

In Europe, we have sufficient and quite rich experience of cooperation on various matters. There has been the fighting cooperation of our two nations during the Second World War. There was the fruitful cooperation at the time of the Potsdam Agreement. There has been comparable experience in the post-war period. We regard particularly highly the cooperation of our two nations in the talks on the Berlin agreement and in the matters of the Soviet Union–Federal Republic of Germany and Poland–Federal Republic of Germany Treaties.

However much we value the cooperation in the past, we should not belittle the importance of our role in ensuring the future of Europe, because there are still in Europe the unresolved problems. Very much in the policies of the United States and Soviet Union about Europe would favor not only the interests of Europeans, but also the interests of your country and ours. I should like to say quite frankly that if the U.S. is prepared to take measures to remove the survivals of the past policies of the cold war, the outcome would be an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. That, too, is a very important aspect of this problem.

And I would like at this point to emphasize again the significance of the concerted policies we both pursued with regard to the problems of West Berlin and the ratification of the treaty. At the same time I wish to state firmly that our line with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany would not be anti-American in character. This is something we said in all frankness to Chancellor Brandt, and this is something we will abide by very strictly. And as a practical step let me say that on May 31 our Supreme Soviet will be ratifying the treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany. As we pointed out in the past, immediately after that we will sign the final protocol on West Berlin so that can be put into effect too. In our view that will not only serve to improve the legal relations between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Poland. It will also have a beneficial effect on the general atmosphere in Europe.

Secretary Rogers: I suggested to Mr. Gromyko that we make the signing on June 3.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think that seems to be a very acceptable date. We have promised to sign it immediately after ratifying; that is something expected by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Secretary Rogers: There is some suggestion that we delay until June 16, but June 3 is better for us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We feel the sooner the better. We promised they would come into force at the same time, so it seems logical to do it on June 3.

Secretary Rogers: We will try to work it out with the others.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Good, the British and the French.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be a very good thing indeed. In our common policy in Europe it will also be most important to continue to pursue a firm line and not even conceive of the possibility of the violation of boundaries of Europe as they have taken shape in the post-war period. That also is one of the paramount tasks of current foreign policies.

And I would now like to tell you frankly, Mr. President, there have been erroneous, fallacious interpretations of our policy with respect to Europe. Sometimes this is a lack of true knowledge, but more frequently it is deliberate rumors spread to the effect that the goal of our policies is to break the ties that the U.S. has developed with European states. We wish to state in these negotiations that this is very far from the truth. The initiatives that we are taking in Europe, and particularly on the question of European security, pursue a goal that is totally different. We pursue our objective in the interest of not only the European states; we pursue it also with the goal of maintaining and protecting the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, if of course, like ourselves, the United States seeks to make Europe tranquil and secure.

In confirmation with what I have said with regard to the goal of the Soviet policy in Europe, we will take into account the role played by the U.S. and and U.S.-Soviet cooperation both during World War II and the post-war period, particularly in the earlier talks on the problem of West Berlin and the matter of the ratification of the treaties. We believe it quite normal that in all matters relating to the European Conference and the solution of all serious problems relating to Europe, the United States should participate on an equal footing, even though the United States is not an European nation. This review is confirmation of our views and attitude to the U.S. and to the U.S. being able to defend its own interests in Europe.

Another question to which we attach great importance is the question of preparing and convening an all-European Security Conference.

The reason why we attach importance to this is as follows: We do not see the Conference as an aim in itself. We regard it as one of the possible means that can help bring to fruition the turn that has been discernible toward the normalization of the situation and strengthening of the prospects of securing lasting peace in the continent.

I should like to add the following. Despite the different approaches taken by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to several matters affecting European politics, the strengthening of security in Europe does in our view correspond to the long-term interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. And if we both act in that direction—in a direction of building up the guarantee of security of European states—that will insure that there will be no more nuclear war and there will be tranquility in Europe to a far greater extent than attempts to insure that tranquility through the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

We believe that a turn for the better has become discernible in Europe today, and it will be in our view useful if we could take advantage of that fact in order to strengthen that feeling of security and begin a joint effort to prepare for the convening of a European Security Conference. We should therefore endeavor to begin preliminary bilateral consultations on those matters and in a preliminary way we might say a few words about that at this meeting. And we are counting on the positive attitude of the United States toward this matter. We have expressed our views publicly on this question on many occasions and so have quite a few other European states.

As you know, we have spoken in favor of convening this conference even as early as the end of this year. It is quite clear that in one blow it may certainly not prove possible to resolve all the complex problems of Europe, but the important thing is to launch the conference, to get the conference going. It might prove expedient to prolong its work. The important thing is to begin the work, to begin the preparations for the conference.

As in any question such preparations can assume a different form, but as a first suggestion perhaps we could discuss the following: we first begin multilateral consultations in Helsinki. Then, in the first stage of the conference itself the Foreign Ministers of the European states and the United States and Canada could meet to work out an agenda of the conference, to create the necessary bodies, commissions, secretariat and so forth. And then those bodies could get to work in order to elaborate and submit various specific proposals for the consideration of the governments of the European states and the United States and Canada.

Certainly this is not the one and only possible form of addressing ourselves to this problem. Other forms can also be discussed. We are just submitting our own view. This form has in it nothing that can be

construed as running against any participants in the conference. Whatever conversations we have on this topic, we should certainly like to emphasize the significance for future developments of our two sides publicly saying something in principle on the problem relating to the European Conference at the conclusion of our meetings here. And you have in principle given your consent to that first meeting. I wish to emphasize that it would be very important indeed to say something at the conclusion on these subjects because if we don't there might be all sorts of wrong opinions and misunderstandings in Europe. People would start saying that the U.S. or the Soviet Union was changing their policy. Even if so, by making public reference we would be doing a very good thing and therefore justify the hopes the people in Europe have placed in these talks and in the people of our countries.

And now we have through joint cooperation settled the matter of the ratification of the treaties and the question of West Berlin, another important matter arises and that is a simultaneous admission of the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, to the United Nations. The possible solution to this question would certainly remove much tension in Europe and the sources of friction between us on those grounds. This is a major issue, and we feel we should be entitled to count on the positive attitude of your part on this also. Although it is an international problem, it also relates to bilateral relations between our two countries. It would help to create a better climate for the relations between us. And that is something to which you made frequent reference during this visit, Mr. President.

Another major issue which concerns not only improving the general climate and relations between our two countries and the relations of our two countries with the states of Europe, but also in line with the interest of generally improving the situation in the world, is the question of the military/political groupings in Europe. You are, I trust, familiar with our position on these matters. We are prepared, together with our allies, to disband military/political groupings in Europe towards a first step to really disbanding military organizations, and we are prepared to initiate consultations with you on this subject.

Those, Mr. President, are in our view just the basic issues we could discuss and talk about with relation to Europe.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, you correctly pointed out our position of agreeing in principle to the European Security Conference, or a European Security and Cooperation Conference. As you know, we have, and you have, the problem of not deciding at this meeting the future of Europe. It is very important, while we agree in principle, that we consult with our allies, you with yours and we with ours. Therefore it is very important that whatever we state here, we will follow through with consultations with our allies.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's quite natural.

Chairman Kosygin: Do you think the time will come when there are no allies on your part or on ours, that we are common allies?

The President: Surely. It will take time.

Chairman Kosygin: That's what we want to achieve. As long as you have your allies and we ours, we are at loggerheads.

The President: It is very important we recognize that smaller nations are very sensitive about the relations between the two great powers. Small nations object to having their fate decided by larger ones.

General Secretary Brezhnev: It should not offend them.

Chairman Kosygin: That in fact is why we are so categorically opposed to allegations, these Chinese allegations, about the two superpowers combining to settle all the questions of the world, the affairs of smaller countries. We, for our part, have the immutable position that we respect other countries. And that is our attitude.

[There was a brief discussion about Kosygin and a Deputy Prime Minister for Science.]²

The President: He is making a private deal with Mr. Kosygin. As the first nation to send a manned mission to Mars, I will go along.

Chairman Kosygin: I can stand it, can you?

The President: It will take nine months. We will get to know each other very well.

Chairman Kosygin: We will take cognac.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: How could you go without the Foreign Ministers?

Chairman Podgorny: This is not a private deal. We have to give honest thought to who flies.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps first there should be a preliminary flight of foreign ministers.

The President: If the foreign ministers don't come back, we won't go.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We call Dr. Kissinger to order—keep him away from submarines.

Chairman Kosygin: If we don't come back, everything will be clear.

The President: Getting to the practical points, as I know the General Secretary likes to do, stated frankly, I see these problems. First to have a meeting this year, 1972, the first meeting of the European Security Conference, would not be possible. It poses for us rather considerable problems. We have elections and the aftermath, and it also

² These and all subsequent brackets are in the original.

poses the problem of participation. We can talk in terms of a meeting in 1973. We can have preliminary discussions take place in the fall of this year. That is realistic. One of the reasons that this meeting we are having now is producing such solid results is because it was well prepared. In a meeting involving all the countries of Europe, the preparations, of course, would be very important. Whereas we two might agree on an agenda, smaller nations have various ideas, and it will take time. 1973 is the time for the meeting to aim for rather than trying to compress it and get it done in 1972.

Secretary Rogers: Our allies agree with this. Some of them have elections this fall, like Canada.

The President: You have to know whether you are dealing with a government that will survive or one that's gone. Preliminary discussions at the proper level, the exploratory discussions, could go forward at the times the European nations and all of us agree.

It's your thought that these should take place at Helsinki?

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's where the idea of a conference came to life. Some work has already begun. Since Finland was the initiator we feel that Helsinki should be the city. That seems the general trend of public opinion, that it should be held in Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In fact practically all the countries concerned have indicated their preference for Helsinki, and the U.S. has not in fact registered a negative attitude.

Secretary Rogers: We are talking about preliminary talks, not the conference itself.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's exactly our understanding.

The President: The second point, with regard to UN representation of East Germany, this is a problem where we, of course, will have to be guided by the attitude of the Federal Republic. And when the Federal Republic has discussed this matter and indicated it is ready to move forward, we will, of course, cooperate. We will be prepared to discuss it with the British and the French. There is the very sensitive problem of four-power rights that might be affected by this action.

The situation with regard to what the General Secretary was referring to concerning military forces and military blocs is of course much more difficult and is going to require a great deal of time. As the General Secretary and all the representatives here of the Soviet Government are aware, there have been considerable discussions in the NATO community in regard to the possibility of mutual balanced force reductions. This is naturally a matter that cannot be decided in a large conference involving a number of nations that do not have forces. That is why we are suggesting, I know this is a matter of previous discussion. . . .

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, there are such states as Luxembourg, with 90 policemen.

The President: . . . we have suggested that there should be parallel discussions on the problem of force reductions, parallel discussions at the time going forward with discussions on the European Conference.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, how do you visualize that in practice? Let us assume that we have the procedure on the conference that I have suggested, the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Helsinki to discuss matters on the agenda, working bodies, the secretariat, etc. In your view they would also discuss the question of force reductions in parallel? Is that your thinking generally?

The President: No. That was the point I was making. We thought that is too large a body for that. Let the countries involved, with forces involved, have discussions; that is the point Dr. Kissinger made in discussions with the General Secretary before.

Chairman Kosygin: But they should proceed in parallel.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In parallel, but different bodies discussing the two different subjects.

Secretary Rogers: We might have the subjects on the agenda and agree to discuss maybe simultaneously, maybe shortly thereafter.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Or perhaps we really need not have them in parallel, perhaps first agree to getting the question of the European Conference out of the way, and then force reductions. But if we discuss the two very important matters of the European Security Conference and force reductions in parallel, perhaps they would get in the way of each other.

The President: If we wait until a multilateral conference, we may never get to parallel discussions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That matter could be dealt with in parallel but different bodies altogether. We support the earliest possible discussion of that but without hinging these questions together. The crux lies in not tying up these two problems as far as substance is concerned.

Secretary Rogers: I think that as a matter of logic if you are going to have a conference dealing with security certainly one of the most important aspects is forces. Certainly any conference that didn't cover forces would be lacking something.

The President: Let me suggest, Mr. General Secretary, a procedure for your consideration. I would like to do some thinking on how we do this tactically, the date and so forth. If we could have Rogers and Gromyko have a discussion also and then report back to us, maybe Friday, and by Friday then we can consider this question. They could give us some options.

[General Secretary Brezhnev stands up.]

Chairman Kosygin/General Secretary Brezhnev: Okay.

Chairman Kosygin: Because indeed it would be a very good thing if Secretary Rogers and Gromyko could work on this for our consideration, a kind of program for both of us working toward a European Conference. This would indeed help us remove many questions that otherwise would take months of time.

The President: This is too big a group for technical matters.

Chairman Kosygin: Although certainly there are many people in Europe who live under the impression, perhaps false, that we are holding back preparations for the Conference. If we come to an agreement on this, it would be very useful to remove this impression.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Many people in Europe think you oppose the Conference.

The President: Let me emphasize again that although we come to agreement, we must be careful not to irritate our friends—all our friends, we consider all Europe our friends. For example, we wouldn't want to anger Albania. (laughter) We don't want to anger them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is a very noble intention.

Secretary Rogers: We don't want to make Luxembourg mad.

Chairman Kosygin: We heed the words of Luxembourg too.

If, for example, we tell Albania that you regard them as best friend, they will be very glad.

Chairman Podgorny: We are prepared to heed the voice of Luxembourg but Albania takes a different view.

Chairman Kosygin: No exceptions. If they don't want to take part, what can we do?

The President: Take a country like Austria. It is very important. It is small but in the heart of Europe. We should heed its voice.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The voice of every country should be heeded.

I think we can accept as a basis the view by the President to make Secretary Rogers and Comrade Gromyko get to work, perhaps throughout the night. While we enjoy our sleep they will do work. We have to cherish our time.

The President: They will not see the ballet.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am sure he's seen "Swan Lake."

Secretary Rogers: Not here. I am looking forward to it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Mr. President, that I feel completes the discussion.

The President: I think we have a direction set. Also on the trade side there will be further discussions with Flanigan and Kosygin.

General Secretary Brezhnev: At nighttime too.

Chairman Kosygin: How shall we divide it? Half the time for me and half the time for Gromyko?

[The Soviet side then suggested that an announcement for both sides be made concerning this meeting. It contained the facts of the date of the meeting, the participants, the atmosphere and that there were signatures of the space and science and technology agreements. President Nixon suggested that the topic for discussion for the meeting be termed “European matters” rather than “European security.” The Soviet side accepted this, and the text of the announcement was agreed to. The meeting then concluded.]

96. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 27, 1972, 1106Z.

Secto 40/5041. Subject: Memorandum of conversation.

1. Following is cleared memorandum of conversation between Secretary Rogers and Gromyko May 25.

2. *Begin text:*

SUBJECT

European Issues

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. side

Secretary Rogers

Mr. Hillenbrand

Mr. Matlock

Soviet side

Andrei Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR in U.S.

G.M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, MFA

Eduard Zaitsev, Interpreter

Date: May 25, 1972, 4:15–4:55 P. M.

Place: St. Catherine’s Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 475, President’s Trip Files, Moscow Trip, May 1972, Pt. 4. Secret; Nodis.

CSCE

Gromyko opened by requesting the Secretary's views on means of proceeding with preliminary consultations for the "Conference on European Security." The Secretary said that we feel the CSCE must be prepared carefully and we cannot take part in it until 1973 in view of our elections. We can, however, participate in a multilateral preliminary conference in late November. We have no objection to increased bilateral talks in the interim but believe that there is no point in trying to hold the preliminary conference before the latter part of November because of upcoming elections in several countries involved, including our own.

Subsequently in the conversation, Gromyko asked whether we have in mind early 1973 for the European Conference. The Secretary said that it is preferable to wait to see how the preliminary conference goes and that in any case the timing is something for all participants to decide.

Gromyko inquired at what level the Secretary envisages the conference. The Secretary replied that the CSCE itself would presumably be at the foreign minister level. Gromyko asked whether we have in mind a higher level meeting following the conference of foreign ministers. The Secretary informed him we had not been thinking in those terms. Gromyko then asked about the British view on the format of the conference and was told that the British are flexible and apparently would accept either the U.S. position (a single meeting of foreign ministers) or the French position (two meetings of foreign ministers). Gromyko pressed as to whether the U.S. would support a heads of state meeting. The Secretary replied that this is not ruled out, but he feels we would probably not support it. This is one of the subjects we can talk about in Helsinki. He asked whether the Soviets are thinking in these terms. Gromyko answered that his government is weighing all possibilities. A heads of state meeting is not excluded—it could be a good idea.

The Secretary gave Gromyko our draft communiqué language on CSCE (attached). Gromyko read it without comment, then returned to his earlier question as to whether we can have a preliminary exchange of views on the CSCE. The Secretary agreed that we can, but pointed out the necessity of obtaining the views of other participants, since we must not make it look as if we are imposing a decision on the others.

The Secretary requested Gromyko's views on the topics to be dealt with in a CSCE. Gromyko said that any questions could be discussed, then listed the following which the Soviet Government considers desirable:

—general improvement of relations (political, economic and other) among the European countries.

—territorial integrity (i.e., status quo), the inviolability of borders (e.g., as in the FRG–USSR treaty).

—non-application of force in relations among European countries.

—improvement of economic relations.

—technical and scientific cooperation.

—cultural relations.

The Secretary commented that, as the President had said, it is important for the conference to have concrete results. It should not aim just at creating an atmosphere, although that has some value. He agreed that there should be principles governing relations between states, so long as these apply uniformly. We consider the freer movement of people, ideas and information important. He noted the reference to mutually advantageous contacts in the Warsaw Pact statement and said he assumed that it referred to such movement. Environment is another important topic.

Gromyko observed that environment should be included and asked how we feel about a permanent organ established by the CSCE. The Secretary said we need time to think about this. Gromyko explained that he was not proposing an organization with a large permanent apparatus, but merely a consultative organ. The Secretary said we have not excluded this possibility, but we have questions about it. New organizations tend to grow like the UN and result in much talk and little action.

Gromyko then asked about the territorial question and renunciation of force. The Secretary observed that renunciation of force is fine, but if one talks about borders, one must ask which borders, since we do not consider it appropriate to be involved in territorial disputes. Gromyko said they are thinking of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders as a principle, not with specific application to border disputes.

Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary meant in his earlier comments that there is nothing to talk about until November. The Secretary replied that we are prepared to have bilateral conversations, but for the reason he had stated, we felt multilateral consultations should not begin until late November.

The Secretary referred to the President's request the previous day for options as to how we might proceed with MBFR.² He said we regretted that the Soviet Government had not seen fit to receive Brosio

² See Document 95.

and wondered if we could not start exploratory talks by designating someone to conduct them. Gromyko asked who would designate the representative, and the Secretary replied that, so far as our side is concerned, NATO would. Gromyko said that in that case the situation would be the same as with Brosio: the Soviet Government was opposed to Brosio because he represented a group. The same would be the case with any other NATO representative. The Secretary observed that the only way to avoid having a representative of groups is to use the entire interested group, that is hold a conference.

Gromyko asked whether the United States could designate a representative who could speak for our group. It is difficult for the Soviet Government to deal with a representative who represents a bloc or an alliance. Mentioning France, he noted that some other countries have the same opinion. He realizes that developments may occur in the negotiation of force reductions in such a way that groups may form. But the Soviet Union remains opposed to bloc-to-bloc negotiation in the juridical sense.

The Secretary said he sees no other way to approach the question since the United States cannot leave the impression that it is making plans for other countries. Gromyko said that Brezhnev told the President yesterday that we can perhaps exchange views on a bilateral basis.

The Secretary then returned to the President's request for options and presented to Gromyko the following draft list of four options:

1. Exploratory talks on MBFR between relevant states to begin prior to multilateral preparatory talks for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

2. Exploratory talks on MBFR between relevant states to begin in parallel but in different bodies at Helsinki at same time as the multilateral preparatory talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

3. Exploratory talks on MBFR between relevant states to begin in separate body and after commencement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

4. Multilateral talks on MBFR take place in a special body created by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Gromyko read the list and, in regard to the second, asked whether "relevant states" meant all possible participants in the European conference. The Secretary explained that this is not the meaning.

Regarding the relationship of MBFR and the CSCE, Gromyko said that he understood it had been agreed at the meeting with the President the day before that force reductions would not be discussed at the European conference. The Secretary said that MBFR would not be negotiated at the CSCE but said that it could be discussed in a general way. Gromyko then observed that in the Soviet view force reductions could be handled

parallel to the European conference, after the conference, or perhaps in an organ of the conference, but not at the conference itself. The Secretary agreed it should not be negotiated at the conference itself.

Gromyko inquired whether the options the Secretary has presented represented the State Department view. The Secretary explained that the options were merely suggestive, in order to meet the President's request to present options. We will appreciate Soviet comments or suggestions.

The Secretary presented draft language on MBFR for the communiqué (attached). Gromyko read it and observed that force reduction should be mentioned, but he doubted that it needed to be treated at such length. The Secretary told him we are flexible on that point.

Berlin Protocol

The possibility of signing the Berlin Protocol on June 3 was discussed. Gromyko said that June 3 is acceptable in principle, but that the Soviets will not sign the protocol until the ratification instruments of the Moscow Treaty are deposited and the treaty is in force. He said that the Supreme Soviet would meet May 31 to ratify the treaty, and that the Soviet Government is attempting to arrange for deposit of the ratification on June 2. He hoped to hear from the Germans the next day as to whether this would be possible.

Attachments: Communiqué Language on CSCE and MBFR.

Attachment No. 1.

Communiqué Language for CSCE
(Preliminary draft)

The U.S. and the USSR are in accord that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin at a date to be agreed by the countries concerned after the signature of the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may deal in a concrete way with specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe.

Attachment No. 2.

Communiqué Language for MBFR
(Preliminary draft)

Recognizing that the military situation in Europe has been relatively stable for the past several years, and that this situation has favored the development of relations between East and West, the two sides addressed current aspects of military security in Europe. Partic-

ularly, they discussed further contributions to stability and security that could be achieved through the reciprocal reductions of forces in Central Europe. Any agreement must be consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all parties.

They agreed that, subject to the concurrence of their allies, explorations looking toward negotiations should begin as soon as practicable. If they are not initiated sooner, explorations could open concurrently with initial multilateral talks preparatory to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Discussions on force reductions could initially clarify the views of both sides on key issues, including a work program for negotiations covering such matters as general guidelines and collateral constraints, as well as aspects of reductions.

Rogers

97. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 27, 1972, 2:10–4:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Leonid M. Shevchenko, Aide to Chairman Podgorny
 Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
 Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Communiqué; SALT (briefly at beginning and end)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger's Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Mr. Kissinger's Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. All brackets, with the exception of those indicating omitted material, are in the original. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace. For the full text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 288.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It would not affect our text.² Health. In the last phrase, instead of “Soviet leaders and the President of the U.S.,” let us use my favorite word “sides.”

Dr. Kissinger: “The two sides pledge full support”? O.K.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Europe. Instead of “arena,” try “hotbed.”

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t like “hotbed.”

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Suppose we say “Where both world wars began.”

[Mr. Lord and Dr. Kissinger confer.]

Dr. Kissinger: My colleague says you don’t do justice to the Napoleonic wars if you say only world wars. How about the Schleswig-Holstein question? O.K.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: In the last phrase of the paragraph, why not say “inviolability”?

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we could slip it out without your noticing. Our problem is that “inviolability” implies not even the possibility of raising a territorial question in peaceful terms.

Is that right, Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We prefer to stay with this phrase.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: [Thinks for a moment.] Maybe there is another English phrase.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you phrase this “inviolability” point? Give me a sentence.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: I would say like this: “They consider that the inviolability of borders of the states of Europe must be observed.”

Dr. Kissinger: How about “They agree that the territorial integrity of all states must be inviolable.”

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It omits borders. Your previous governments—Johnson, Kennedy—always said borders should be inviolable. There was no difference between us. The previous U.S. Government was far ahead of the German Government in this respect.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have the exact [German-Soviet] treaty? What is the exact phrase the Germans use?

[Gromyko tells Bratchikov to go out to get it.]

Dr. Kissinger: [Points jokingly to the chandelier over the table]: There is a camera in it. Ivan the Terrible invented it.

² Reference is to the draft text of the communiqué for the summit. See Document 98.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: No, Ivan the Terrible invented the air conditioning in this room!

Mr. Bratchikov: [Enters with the Treaty language, and reads]: "The sides consider as inviolable now and in the future the borders between all states in Europe." There is another clause, "The sides confirm the obligation to unswervingly observe the territorial integrity of all the states of Europe in their present borders."

Fon. Min. Gromyko: We quoted the Treaty language.

[There followed a long conference on the U.S. side.]

Dr. Kissinger: We will let you know this evening. We will try to find some way of accommodating your thinking.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Good, it will be very good.

Dr. Kissinger: No previous Administration has put it into a joint document with the Soviet Union. It is one thing to do it this way, and another thing to do it in private statements. And not at the highest level.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: President Kennedy told me

Dr. Kissinger: We are not contesting the inviolability of frontiers. Our concern is that we don't want to get involved in the debate. You know, in the German Bundestag, the debate over the permanence of the borders. Hillenbrand will check at the Hotel the English text of the Soviet-German treaty. We will try to find a paraphrase.

We are also checking the Berlin treaty to see how Berlin is mentioned.

[There was a short break.]

Mr. Korniyenko: And on the reduction of forces, you still don't want "foreign and national"?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Mr. Korniyenko: Why not?

Dr. Kissinger: Because we want to leave open which forces will be reduced.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: You are against the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic into the UN?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: At the appropriate time?

Dr. Kissinger: It isn't in here.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It is in our text.

Dr. Kissinger: Our position is that we will not oppose it if the Germans propose it. But we don't want to get ahead of the Germans. You will have no difficulty with us if the Federal Republic of Germany proposes it.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: About Berlin, we will do it the same.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: [On CSCE]: “Concrete preparations should begin.”

Dr. Kissinger: We would prefer to omit “in the near future.” Just, “after the signature.”

Fon. Min. Gromyko: That makes it still sooner.

Dr. Kissinger: I know what you are saying. As the President said in the meeting, we don’t think these conversations can begin until the fall.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Can’t we mention “national and foreign” forces?

Dr. Kissinger: No, we took it out.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: And just “armed forces,” not armaments?

Dr. Kissinger: Armaments is OK.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: What does “reciprocal” mean?

Dr. Kissinger: Both sides. Would you prefer “mutual and balanced”?!

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Reciprocal means “by agreement.” All right, keep this word.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

98. Editorial Note

At the conclusion of the summit meeting in Moscow on May 29, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union released a final joint communiqué. The section of the communiqué devoted to Europe discussed both European security and MBFR. It reads in part: “Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts. They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.”

The communiqué continues: “The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine détente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference

in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force. The US and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay. Both sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pages 901–902)

President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev also signed a joint statement entitled "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The statement as it relates to Europe reads that the United States and Soviet Union agreed as follows:

"First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

"[Omitted here is the second point.]

"Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

"Fourth. The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

"[Omitted here are the fifth through tenth points.]

Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states. The development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR." (Ibid., pages 898–899)