

Basket III, May–December 1974

204. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Jerusalem¹

Washington, May 18, 1974, 0032Z.

Tosec 764/104436. Subject: CSCE: Discussion with Dobrynin on Basket 3. Ref: Jerusalem 897 (Secto 446).² From Sonnenfeldt and Hartman.

1. In response to your request, this message gives our reading of an acceptable outcome under Basket 3. It provides suggested talking points for your use with Dobrynin, and inventories for your background Allied and Eastern positions on the most sensitive topics.

2. With regard to our approach, we think it would be prudent to make clear to Dobrynin that we are not in a position to “deliver” our Allies with respect to the content of Basket 3 texts, but will do our best to facilitate compromise.

3. Suggested talking points for your use with Dobrynin:

—Our “thoughts” on the content of Basket 3 are necessarily colored by what we feel our Allies will find acceptable. In advancing our thoughts, we do so with the caution that they may have to be adjusted to the views of our Allies, although we will seek to be helpful in assisting in the emergence of compromise formulations.

—Against that background, we believe the final package under Basket 3 must include liberally worded declaratory texts pledging participants to (a) facilitate family reunification and visits, and (b) improve dissemination of and access to foreign books and publications. These will be indispensable to overall success of CSCE.

—Moreover, we believe that agreement on three or four of the following matters should be reflected in Basket 3:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files, Soviet Union, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 21. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Streater, cleared by Hartman and Deputy Executive Secretary William H. Luers, and approved by Sonnenfeldt.

² In telegram Secto 446/897 from Jerusalem, May 15, Kissinger wrote to Sonnenfeldt and Hartman: “The understanding Dobrynin has of my talks on Basket III is essentially correct. I did agree that we would try to work out some ‘top of our head’ type ideas on Basket III. You should work up some thoughts along these lines and forward them to me for my consideration. Tell Dobrynin that I will discuss our thoughts with him after my return.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 216, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological File)

—A code of conduct pledging improved working conditions for journalists;

—Acceptance in principle of freer contacts for religious purposes;

—Some indication of willingness to permit opening of foreign libraries and reading rooms in several cities in all CSCE participant states;

—General language on stimulating freer travel, including statements on giving to citizens of all participating states facilities allowing them to travel more freely and on the general principle of freer movement;

—Indication of willingness to reduce internal travel controls, along lines of extending the recent relaxation of controls on foreign diplomatic travel in the USSR to journalists, businessmen, and others;

—Language on cessation of radio jamming, which could be interpreted as an assurance that jamming of official broadcasts in vernacular languages (VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle) would not be resumed.

—On all of the above issues, we believe the texts should be generally worded, establishing a political and moral obligation on participants, but not entailing binding commitments to specific and detailed courses of action.

End talking points.

4. Background: An “acceptable” outcome under Basket 3 will depend upon what Western governments believe they can successfully portray to their parliaments and public opinion as constituting, or foreshadowing some tangible improvement over present Eastern practices. A judgment now of how Western European political leaders will gauge the temper of public attitudes on this issue is necessarily tentative. Undoubtedly the Western Europeans will press for language in Basket 3 texts that implies an element of automaticity, while the Warsaw Pact countries will insist on formulas that would leave everything in the hands of national authorities. In the US, Basket 3 issues have so far attracted little attention. However, we can anticipate considerable congressional and public interest in the CSCE text on family reunification.

5. In addition to the key Basket 3 issues, set out below, we expect voluminous further drafting on less controversial matters, particularly cultural and educational exchanges, which will have little impact on Western public opinion. However, the sheer bulk of the texts on topics of secondary importance will slow drafting work and add to Moscow’s sense of frustration.

6. Key issues: Allied and Eastern positions. The following are the likely key topics, which are discussed in more detail below:

A. Human contacts:

—family visits;

—reunification of families;

—relaxation of other travel controls (e.g. lowering of restrictions on exit visas and reduction of closed zones).

B. Freer flow of information and ideas:

- better working conditions for journalists;
- freer dissemination of foreign books and publications;
- cessation of radio jamming;
- contacts for religious purposes (a Vatican proposal on this subject cuts across both areas of human contacts and freer flow of information and ideas).

7. Family visits—we expect a generally satisfactory outcome here. The Soviets have already acquiesced in provisional registration of a text that would pledge governments to relax restrictions on temporary family visits. Ultimate agreement on the remaining bracketed portions should not prove too difficult.

8. Family reunification—the FRG and Canada have shown the greatest interest in this issue, which has not yet been squarely joined in the Geneva discussions. The FRG and others will urge agreement on a liberally phrased code of conduct on this issue. This is a major issue for the West, and the Soviets will need to make some concessions.

9. Relaxation of exit controls—a UK proposal on tourism would have participants undertake to give “their citizens all the necessary facilities to travel freely. . . ,” and the Danes have tabled a paper with introductory language for measures aimed at stimulating freer travel containing a straightforward statement on the general principle of freer movement. This issue has less political appeal in the West than the question of family-related travel, but some Soviet give will be needed, and clearly the current Western positions will need to be watered down.

10. Relaxation of internal travel controls—a Belgian proposal calls for a reduction of closed zones, without prejudice to the right to forbid access to security areas. However, the Western countries have not yet pressed the point forcefully. The Soviets recently eased restrictions on travel by foreign officials in the USSR and may make a comparable gesture for non-official travelers, but they will resist explicit CSCE undertakings on this.

11. Dissemination of foreign books and publications—the Italians, Dutch and Swiss have tabled texts calling for relaxation of censorship and controls on books and periodicals. A French proposal would have participants pledge “to encourage the creation of sales outlets for foreign books” in major cities and the opening within their territory of libraries and reading rooms by other participant governments. The Soviets will resist these proposals.

12. Working conditions for journalists—the FRG and Switzerland have tabled texts in Geneva that would have the participants accept a liberally-phrased code of conduct on this subject. Moscow may eventually agree to mildly positive language and perhaps make small adjustments in actual practices. It will be difficult, however, to get

Soviet agreement to anything that the Western press corps would consider very significant. But we should try.

13. Freedom of assembly for religious purposes—a Vatican proposal cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and calls for individual and collective religious contacts within and among participant countries. Vatican representatives are enrolling co-sponsors, and we should seek some Soviet concessions here.

14. Cessation of radio jamming—the Swiss proposal already cited also calls on participants to “guarantee unhindered reception of radio and television programs originating in other participating states.” It would now apply only to the jamming of RL and RFE since the Soviets, last September, unilaterally stopped the jamming of broadcasts in vernacular languages by VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle. Further significant progress in this area is unlikely, although several Western countries may press for language like that in the Swiss text as a hedge against a later resumption of Eastern jamming of official broadcasts.

15. Even though Soviets have indicated they wish to deal with substance of Basket III in Geneva (Tosec 667),³ we assume it would still be useful for you to convey to Dobrynin “our thoughts” after your return.⁴

Rush

³ Not found.

⁴ No record of Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin has been found.

205. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Jerusalem¹

Washington, May 23, 1974, 0054Z.

Tosec 936/107929. Subject: CSCE: Confidence-building measures (CBM’s). From Sonnenfeldt and Hartman.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files, Soviet Union, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 21. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Streater, cleared by Hartman and Deputy Executive Secretary Dudley W. Miller, and approved by Sonnenfeldt.

1. Our Allies and the Soviets are still firmly dug in on this issue, which is thus stalemated at CSCE. Both sides want us to help break the impasse, and we need your guidance on next steps.

2. You will recall that, after your conversation with Gromyko in Geneva, we told Ramsbotham here in low key on May 2 (Tosec 224)² of the need for the UK to show more flexibility on the criteria for pre-announcement of maneuvers. In our discussion, Ramsbotham mentioned your conversation with Callaghan March 28³ and claimed that you had given a general blessing to the UK approach to CBM's. He added that Callaghan has reviewed the UK position and wanted US support for a meaningful CBM on maneuvers. He asked explicitly that we be less taciturn on this issue at Geneva. The British are still willing ultimately to drop prior notification of major troop movements, as a tradeoff against some Soviet give on maneuvers.

3. On May 22, Von Staden approached us here under instructions and made a strong request for a substantive CBM on maneuvers, leaving a lengthy paper which in summary made the following points:⁴

Begin summary of FRG paper: For the FRG, a satisfactory solution of the CBM issue is essential for an overall satisfactory result of stage II. The extent of Soviet territory included within the zone of prior notification of maneuvers remains the essential criterion. Other aspects of the measure are of less importance. The starting point for negotiations on area should remain "in Europe." However, the FRG would ultimately accept a wide band of Soviet territory, extending 700–500 kilometers from the western frontier of the USSR.

The German position on the area of application of CBMs relates above all to the likely application of stabilizing and other collateral measures in MBFR. These will apply exclusively to states in the NATO guideline area and will therefore focus on the FRG. Bonn wishes to avoid the creation of zones in Europe with a special political status. If CSCE CBMs apply to a considerable portion of Soviet territory, this would counterbalance, in its political effect, the narrower application of MBFR stabilizing measures. FRG willingness to accept commitments

² Tosec 224, March 1, deals with an unrelated matter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.) No record of the conversation with Ramsbotham has been found. For the record of Kissinger's meeting with Gromyko in Geneva, see Document 201.

³ See footnote 4, Document 202.

⁴ Telegram 107909 to Vienna for the Delegation to MBFR, May 24, contains a record of Von Staden's conversation with Sonnenfeldt and Hartman, along with the complete text of the FRG's paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

to MBFR stabilizing and other measures “which subject the NATO guideline area and by this the FRG territory to special political obligations will not fail to be influenced by a satisfactory solution of the CBM problem in Geneva.” Moreover, preannouncement of maneuvers should be given, not only to neighboring states, but to all CSCE participants.

FRG is aware that the US will continue to oppose advance notification of troop movements. FRG could eventually agree to drop CBM on movements if geographical area of maneuver CBM could be established according to German interests. We realize that these interests can hardly be accomplished without active American support in Geneva. We therefore emphatically request that the American Government support this CBM position. *End summary.*

4. Meanwhile, on May 15, Soviet Ambassador Mendeleevich made a long statement in Geneva⁵ reiterating the minimalist Soviet position on the maneuver CBM, emphasizing that CSCE agreements in this area should not undermine the military balance in Europe. This reflects, our delegation believes, an underlying fear that the Western side is seeking, through CBMs, intelligence information on Soviet military activities. Mendeleevich added that, if détente flourishes over the next 5–7 years, the content of the maneuver CBM could be strengthened.

5. Specifically, Mendeleevich said that preannouncement should be limited to army or army corps maneuvers in border zones, the width of which could be negotiated. Five days advance notification would be given to neighboring states in most cases, but to all CSCE participants in the case of multilateral maneuvers.

6. In this chicken-egg situation, if we do nothing the issue will remain deadlocked in Geneva, and we can expect continuing and conflicting pressures from the Soviets on one side and the British on the other. While you have told us you do not wish this resolved before the Moscow summit, we will have need to continue to try to work out with Callaghan an approach that comes to grips with the problem. But, we believe that to prime the pump we need to play a more active role now entailing essentially the following scenario:

A. Instruct our delegation in Geneva to give more positive support to the UK/FRG position on maneuvers repeat maneuvers.

B. Meanwhile, reassure the Soviets privately that our higher profile in Geneva on this issue is the indispensable prerequisite to per-

⁵ Telegram 3060 from Geneva, May 16, which reported on Mendeleevich’s statement and the Western delegations’ reaction, is *ibid.*

suading the British and Germans to lower their sights somewhat on the specific points of contention.

C. Reiterate to the Soviets, at the same time, that they too must make concessions if the CBM issue is to be resolved.

7. If you approve the foregoing scenario, we would propose to make the following points to Dobrynin here (alternatively, Stoessel could make them to Korniyenko in Moscow or Sherer to Kovalyev in Geneva).

A. Following your discussion with Gromyko in Geneva, we approached the British and suggested they should be more flexible and realistic with respect to the criteria governing preannouncement of maneuvers.

B. Our impression, however, is that the British are reviewing their position, but are unlikely to make significant concessions until they are persuaded that the Soviets will meet them part way.

C. We believe our other Allies will continue to support the British on this: specifically, the FRG is opposed to limiting the area for preannouncement to narrow bands along frontiers and also believes preannouncement should be made to all CSCE participants.

D. Ambassador Mendelevich's firm reiteration of the minimalist Soviet position in Geneva on May 15 has probably stiffened the Allied attitudes.

E. Meanwhile, our major Allies are urging us to be more outspoken in Geneva in support of the UK proposal on preannouncement of maneuvers.

F. We, therefore, will instruct our delegation to make a statement in Geneva giving general support to the UK proposal on preannouncement of maneuvers, a step we believe is indispensable if we are ultimately to persuade the British, Germans and others to move toward compromise.

G. After our delegation has spoken in Geneva, we will continue our attempts to bring our Allies to accept reasonable compromises on the outstanding issues. However, we are not confident of success unless the Soviets also show willingness to compromise.

H. If asked for our views about the shape of a possible compromise we would propose to tell Soviets that we think the following criteria for preannouncement of maneuvers would be ultimately acceptable: thirty days advance notice, given to all CSCE participants, of maneuvers at level of reinforced division or higher on territory of all European participants in CSCE, including USSR, though announcements of maneuvers in USSR would cover only those taking place within, say, 700 kilometers of the western frontier of the USSR.

8. You will also have seen Geneva 3226,⁶ which we just received. It reflects the deep pessimism among the delegations of the Nine at Geneva, who may recommend a joint *démarche* by the Nine to the Soviets indicating that unless progress can be made soon on Basket 3 and CBMs the Nine would be prepared to adjourn CSCE phase II, possibly in July, either *sine die* or until some specified time (no date given) in the future. This kind of sentiment, which doubtless is widely shared in Western European capitals, will incline the Allies to further dig in, unless the Soviets shortly take some forthcoming steps with regard to Basket 3 and CBMs. While we have made our concern clear to the Soviets about the likely result of their continued foot dragging, we believe it would be timely for us to reiterate to the Soviets that Western and neutral dissatisfaction with their recent behavior at CSCE could result in a serious setback at CSCE, which is likely to be portrayed, particularly by the Western European press, as a major failure of East-West diplomacy. If you agree, we would plan to inform Dobrynin of our concern soonest, reporting to him the current mood of the Nine as reflected in Geneva 3226.

Rush

⁶ Telegram 3226 from Geneva, May 22, reported: "EC-Nine delegation heads here are in process of drafting report to political directors, for consideration at EC-Nine political committee meeting in Bonn May 27–28. Soviet intransigence over past weeks has led Nine delegations to a deeply pessimistic appraisal of the current state of CSCE negotiations. We now understand Nine delegation heads may recommend to political directors that they be authorized to make joint *démarche* to Soviets, indicating that unless progress can be made soon on Basket III and military subjects, the Nine would be prepared simply to adjourn CSCE phase two, possibly in July. This adjournment could be either *sine die*, or until some unspecified time in the future. While the Nine delegation heads have not yet put their ideas on paper and are still considering a broad spectrum of ideas on presentation and emphasis, they appear to be unanimous in favoring a strong *démarche* of some kind." (Ibid.)

206. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Damascus, May 28/29, 1974, midnight–12:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief of USA Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

SUBJECTS

Syrian-Israeli Disengagement; Palestinians; CSCE; SALT

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Secretary Kissinger: How about our bilateral relationships? I see the Finns have introduced the proposal that we talked about in Cyprus.²

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I don't know whether they have introduced it.

Secretary Kissinger: I gather the tactics were worked out in Washington.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I do not believe it has been introduced yet.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 216, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological File. Secret; Exdis. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. Kissinger was in Syria to discuss the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Kissinger briefly discussed CSCE with Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abd al-Halim Khaddam on May 28: "Kissinger: I had my eyes on Princess Grace's daughter myself. Khaddam: If European security could be achieved at this level, it would be good. [Laughter] Kissinger: If I were your President, I wouldn't worry about the European Security Conference. If it achieves security, it will be an accident. Khaddam: European security is no longer important to the rest of the world. The powers now are fifth-rate powers; the countries that caused World War I have lost influence even on the continent. European security no longer has world dimensions. Kissinger: Exactly. Khaddam: The concerns seem to be things of internal significance. Boundaries, economic issues. Kissinger: They have Foreign Offices but no longer the power to conduct diplomacy." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, MemCons—HAK & Presidential)

² See Document 203.

Secretary Kissinger: We will help manage it. We are having a lot of trouble with the Europeans regarding the Summit. I have sent a letter recently.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Personalities in Europe have changed. I hope you will do something.

Secretary Kissinger: We will move it along as I told you we would when we spoke in Geneva.³

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We have not approached either the French or the new Chancellor of Germany.

Secretary Kissinger: We approached Scheel, Callaghan,⁴ and a number of others individually. So far we have not had a very positive response.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I can't say that the French took a negative stance. We haven't approached them. I think this new government will be more flexible.

Secretary Kissinger: So was Brandt.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Definitely. I don't see how Schmidt and Giscard can take a more negative stance.

Secretary Kissinger: I have exchanged personal letters with them. They are good friends.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ See Document 201.

⁴ Kissinger's letter to Scheel is in telegram Secto 21/2643 from Geneva, April 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850071–2338) Kissinger's letter to Callaghan is in telegram Secto 22/2644 from Geneva, April 29. (Ibid., P850071–2340)

207. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 31, 1974.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held over breakfast from 8:33 to 10:25 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Report on Secretary Kissinger's Middle East Trip and President's Forthcoming
Trips to the Middle East and USSR

Kissinger: On SALT, maybe an agreement in principle is possible.
On MBFR. . . .

President: Which would have enormous domestic impact.

Kissinger: . . . a 5% US-Soviet cut is conceivable.

President: We should lay the groundwork with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: That could give minor problems with the Europeans.
The Soviet Union is waiting to see how CSCE works out. We are hold-
ing up CSCE until you get to Moscow.

Maybe you can get something in MBFR for CSCE.

President: We want to show new progress on MBFR to avert uni-
lateral cuts here.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-
curity conference or MBFR.]

**208. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs (Stabler) to Secretary of State
Kissinger¹**

Washington, June 6, 1974.

CSCE: "The Laws and Customs" Issue in Basket 3

*The Finns tabled in Geneva on June 5 two proposals which broadly con-
form with the prior US-Soviet understanding for dealing with this issue.
However, contrary to Dobrynin's earlier suggestion that further con-
tacts take place only in Washington or Moscow, the second-ranking So-
viet delegate in Geneva, Dubinin, approached Sherer directly, saying*

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet-Summit-1974. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Streator and sent through Sonnenfeldt. In a covering note, Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger: "For your meeting with Dobrynin, I am attaching revised materials on CSCE to reflect late developments, as well as updates on bilateral matters."

that the operation had been set in motion and that it was now up to the US delegation to ensure its success. Dubinin added that “the scale of the means used to achieve the objective should match the scale on which the agreement had been reached.” (Geneva 3582 at Tab B)²

*Sherer, who is not fully privy to our talks with the Soviets on this matter, needs instructions on next steps, and we propose sending him the guidance at Tab A.*³

Discussion

The two Finnish proposals tabled in Geneva on June 5 are the following:

—An amendment to the paragraph on the *principle of non-intervention* which provides that participants will “respect the political, economic and cultural foundations of other participating states as well as their right to determine their own legislative and regulatory systems.”

—An amendment to the Finnish draft basket 3 preamble reading as follows: “Convinced that cooperation conducive to creating better conditions for increased cultural and educational exchanges, for broader dissemination of information, for contacts between people, and for the solution of humanitarian problems *should take place in full respect for the principles defined in the document on the principles guiding relations among the participating states.*” (This replaces a similar but less satisfactory Finnish formulation earlier tabled in CSCE that we cabled to you in Jerusalem; we do not know why the Finns revised it.)⁴

These texts follow the general lines of our understanding with the Soviets, but with the following points of difference:

—We told the Soviets we could support language on respect for “legislative and regulatory systems,” *provided* it appeared in the *sovereignty* and *not* the *non-intervention* paragraph of the principles declaration. We pointed out that we proposed to the Allies last November in Geneva a comparable approach in the non-intervention paragraph but they rejected it. Therefore, we preferred to try it out in the sovereignty paragraph this time.

—We did not agree to support the formula, “respect the political, economic and cultural foundations of other participating states.”

The Soviets may have deliberately added some negotiating fat to the proposal which they may agree to trim off later. Possibly, too, they may themselves propose shifting the “legislative and regulatory systems” language from the non-intervention to the sovereignty paragraph.

EC Nine delegations at Geneva caucused after the Finnish proposal was tabled and decided that the language on “legislative and regulatory systems”

² Telegram 3582 from Geneva, June 6, is attached but not printed.

³ The attachment is a draft version of Document 210.

⁴ Not found.

was absolutely out of the question," a position echoed by some neutral delegations.⁵ While we had expected an adverse reaction, Western European irritation has been compounded by several weeks of Soviet stalling on basket 3. They see the Soviet hand behind the Finnish move and interpret it as another sign of Moscow's obstinacy in basket 3.

The Agreed Scenario

After lengthy discussions in Moscow and Washington, you approved and we conveyed to Dobrynin here on May 13 our agreement to a scenario, outlined below. Dobrynin later told us Moscow agreed to our scenario, entailing the following steps:

1. The Finns tabled the proposal in Geneva.
2. The Soviet side indicates its reaction in CSCE. (The Soviets have not yet reacted to the Finnish package.)
3. US delegation initially remains silent or noncommittal on the Finnish package.
4. At an early meeting of the NATO caucus the US argues in favor of the Finnish compromise. (We told Dobrynin that our success at this point will depend heavily on the progress being made on basket 3 substance and that the Allies, despite our best efforts, will bracket the Finnish language on baskets 1 and 3 pending agreement on specific substantive issues in basket 3).
5. If appropriate, US supports the compromise in NAC discussions. (We originally had in mind possible discussions in the NAC in permanent session. Because of the delay in getting the Finnish proposal on the table, the first occasion for NAC discussion is likely to arise at the Ottawa Ministerial.)
6. Pause for reflection. (We pointed out that the Allies will want to give the Finnish proposal careful consideration in capitals and will need a reasonable amount of time to digest the issue.)
7. Next steps. (If, as is possible, Allied CSCE delegations remain opposed, we would be prepared to pursue further steps to obtain acceptance of the compromise, including bilateral approaches if appropriate.)
8. At a later stage, we would speak in favor of the Finnish proposal in CSCE. (We would also, if appropriate, point to the need for concrete results in basket 3 to balance our support for the Finnish proposal.)

⁵ Telegram 3582 from Geneva (attached) reported that "Swiss delegate said he saw no possibility that phrase on 'legislative and regulatory systems' would be accepted by EC-Nine or some neutrals." The telegram continued: "NATO caucus on principles discussed Finnish initiative afternoon of June 5, following EC-Nine caucus on same subject. Nine had decided that Finnish proposal for language on 'legislative and regulatory systems' was 'absolutely out of the question.' "

We added to Dobrynin, pursuant to your instructions, that we will carry out fully our part of the understanding to achieve Allied agreement.

Based on the scenario, above, *the next move is up to the Soviets*; they should indicate in Geneva their reaction to the Finnish proposal. *We should also disabuse them of the idea*, which Dubinin reflected in his conversation with Sherer, *that it is now up to the US to bring this matter to a successful conclusion*. As we pointed out on several occasions to Dobrynin during the May 13 conversation, *our success in gaining Allied acceptance of this compromise approach will depend on the progress being made in Geneva on basket 3 substance*, and this will entail Soviet concessions.

If our delegation jumps into the fray too quickly in Geneva, the Allies will suspect a prior US-Soviet understanding and stiffen their opposition to the Finnish proposal. Moreover, given the current Geneva atmosphere of smoldering Western resentment at Soviet tactics on basket three, we believe Sherer's initial approach to this issue in the NATO caucus should be in very low key.

Finally, we doubt that we can make much progress with the Allies on this, in the immediate future, at delegation level in Geneva. However, the issue will very likely arise at the Ottawa Ministerial, giving you an opportunity to urge your colleagues to reflect on the possibilities for a reasonable compromise based on the Finnish proposal, and entailing Soviet concessions on issues in basket 3. *We anticipate that your persuasive efforts would then be reflected in instructions from Allied capitals to NATO delegation heads in Geneva*, leading to more realistic attitudes there.

Recommendation

That you approve the instructions at Tab A.⁶

⁶ There is no indication of Kissinger's approval or disapproval, but he did approve the instructions; see Document 210. Also see Document 209.

209. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt)¹

Washington, June 7, 1974, 6:35 p.m.

K: Hal, one other thing on that CSCE matter. Sheerer (phonetic) [Sherer] claimed he had no instructions. Which may be true. Now I've cleared the instructions you've given me here,² but I wanted to make it a little clearer that he can talk to the NATO caucus and support it, but he also ought to suppose [*oppose?*] it at the conference.

S: Well, he'll be alone.

K: First, he has to talk to the NATO caucus.

S: Well, that's what we promised to do and that's what he'll be instructed to go ahead and do now.

K: Good. But in the sense of producing an agreement.

S: Yes. As soon as that goes out, he'll do that. He wasn't instructed because . . .

K: Yes, but he [was?] supposed to take an active role in getting agreement.

S: Yes, he wasn't instructed because . . .

K: And he will do that within a day or two of getting his instructions.

S: In the NATO caucus?

K: Yes.

S: He'll start doing it there.

K: And he will inform then the Soviet person there of where we stand.

S: He'll keep them informed.

K: OK, good, thank you.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 26, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Kissinger is apparently referring to a draft version of Document 210.

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, June 8, 1974, 1536Z.

121749. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 preamble. Geneva eyes only for Ambassador Sherer. Ref: Geneva 3582.²

1. You should take no action on the Finnish proposals in Baskets 1 and 3 until the Soviets have commented on them in appropriate CSCE committees. You may tell Soviet delegation that you have firm instructions on this point, which are in precise conformity with understanding reached between our two governments. You should add that, after the Soviets have reacted, you plan to argue in favor of the Finnish proposal at an early NATO caucus meeting. In that connection, you should reiterate that our ultimate success in persuading the Allies to accept this approach will depend heavily on progress with respect to specific issues in Basket 3, thus contesting Dubinin's suggestion to you that success of this undertaking now depends entirely on US efforts. You should say that need for progress on specific Basket 3 issues was made very clear to Soviet representatives when we conveyed to them our proposals for dealing with this issue.

2. After Soviet delegation has taken position on Finnish proposal in CSCE, you should give it very general and low-key support in a NATO caucus meeting, and in private discussions with chiefs of key NATO delegations, where you could make following general points:

—We understand and support the Allied wish for progress in the Basket 3 area, although realistically we must not set our sights too high;

—This is obviously a sensitive ideological issue for Moscow, and it may turn out that the Soviets will be somewhat more generous on Basket 3 issues if they can point to language that protects their doctrinal position;

—Thus it is possible that the Finnish proposal can help move us toward Basket 3 solution acceptable to all sides;

—At the same time, we agree that the Soviets, for their part, should begin to move toward Western positions on Basket 3 specifics, and have been pressing them on this point.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Streator and cleared by Sonnenfeldt, Stabler, and Samuel E. Fry (S/S). Approved by Kissinger. Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Stoessel.

² See footnote 2, Document 208.

3. You should then report fully on Allied reactions and the general state of play in Geneva and await further instructions.

4. *FYI only.* We conveyed to Dobrynin here on May 13 a suggested scenario for handling this issue in CSCE, and Dobrynin later indicated Moscow's agreement. Dobrynin also expressed preference for continuing US-Soviet contacts on this issue either in Moscow or in Washington. Soviet delegation in Geneva therefore may not be fully informed on understanding reached.

5. Agreed scenario provided that, after Finns table proposals in Geneva, following initial steps would be taken in sequence:

A. Soviet side would comment, in CSCE, on Finnish texts. (We indicated our understanding that the USSR might wish to register initial opposition to Finnish proposal before agreeing to fall back to it.)

B. US delegation initially would remain silent or noncommittal on the Finnish proposal, to avoid arousing suspicions of a prior US-Soviet understanding.

C. Later, at a meeting of the NATO caucus, we would argue in favor of the Finnish compromise. (We told Dobrynin that we expected initial Allied resistance and that the success of the operation at this point will probably depend on progress being made in discussions on Basket 3.)

5. Regarding the substance of the Finnish proposal, we agreed with the Soviets that the specific language on respect for "legislative and regulatory systems" should go in the sovereignty, not the nonintervention, paragraph of the principles declaration. Furthermore, we did not agree to support the formula in the Finnish text referring to respect for "the political, economic and cultural foundations of other participating states." In contrast, the Finnish Basket 3 preambular language is in conformity with the US-Soviet understanding. *End FYI.*

Kissinger

211. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Nixon¹

Moscow, undated.

I would like to express to you, dear Mr. President, some considerations regarding the situation that is shaping up at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We shall certainly touch on this theme during our forthcoming talks in Moscow. However, in view of the urgency of this issue it is useful even now, in our opinion, to exchange views on it.

The completion of the Conference has been unjustifiedly delayed. The deliberations in Geneva have been going on extremely slow, sometimes the proceedings are being bogged down in trivia. It looks like the trivia overshadows the principal mission of the Conference, i.e. to consolidate the relaxation of tensions in Europe and beyond, to provide for peace and reliable security, which are the only conditions that can make a wide-range cooperation between the states in various fields possible. Sometimes we are confronted with proposals—I would like to note at once that they come not from the US—which are either plainly unacceptable or are not yet ripe for a decision, while the discussions on them result in unproductive waste of efforts and time. Some people start talking to the effect that the work of the Conference should be suspended for the summer or even for a longer period of time.

The Conference has been going on already for almost a year. Practically all the questions under discussion have been thoroughly reviewed, many of them several times over. On a number of aspects, including some major and important ones, agreement has been reached among all the participants with the balance of interests of the sides being found, and those interests are of course far from being homogeneous. We view that as an encouraging basis for the final success of the Conference.

As for the still unresolved questions, it appeared here with adequate certainty as well what was common in the positions of the participants and where they differ. Actually it is clear to everyone which proposals can be accepted and which cannot.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 21. No classification marking. A notation at the top of the letter reads: "Delivered from Soviet Embassy, 7:00 p.m., Sat., 6/8/74." Dobrynin informed Kissinger of the letter's arrival in a telephone conversation on June 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 26, Chronological File)

If to remain on the realistic grounds, then it is possible to reach relatively soon mutually acceptable decisions on the pending questions related to all items on the agenda. In other words it is quite possible to secure in a document agreements which would correspond to the degree of the relaxation of tensions achieved at present in Europe and in the world as a whole, to the level of mutual understanding, being established between the states after a long period of tensions and mistrust.

In future, with the deepening of present positive processes in the world, the results of the Conference, this first international forum in the modern history of Europe, could be expanded and enriched along the line of relaxation and confidence.

With such an approach the assets accumulated at the Conference allow, so to say, to enter the final lap, to make the final thrust towards the completion of the work of the Conference within the shortest period of time, and mainly, with solid achievements which would reflect the coincidence of interests of all the participants, above all in the cardinal question of strengthening peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

I hope you will agree with me that to put the Conference in a top gear a strong political impetus is needed, and first of all the one coming from the top leaders of the countries, interested in its success. The Soviet-American mutual understanding on the issues of the Conference has always been of prime importance for moving the Conference ahead. It pertains also to the known understanding reached between A.A. Gromyko and H. Kissinger which, we hope, will make it possible to untangle the questions of item 3 of the Agenda discussed at this time in Geneva.

We would like to hope that now too at this turning phase of a sort in the work of the Conference, both our countries will act in the spirit of the established mutual understanding and will jointly facilitate the speediest conclusion of this major international undertaking.

There is one more point to which I would like to draw your attention. We believe that one of the possibilities to make the work of the Conference more active is for the countries, which of course would desire to do so, to send to the conclusive part of the second stage of the Conference in Geneva the representatives of a sufficiently high rank who would be authorized to make appropriate decisions there.

We are convinced as before that the results of the Conference would have historical importance for all the future course of events in Europe in the direction of peace, relaxation of tensions and cooperation and they deserve to be sealed by the authority of the supreme leaders of the participating states. There are objective possibilities for bringing the Conference within a short period of time to a successful conclusion. We believe that they should be used to the fullest extent.

212. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bad Reichenhall, June 11, 1974, 3:15–5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Gunther Van Well, Political Director
Mr. Dannenbring, Chief, North American Desk
Mr. Kinkel, Personal Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Miss Siebourg (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Genscher: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the Geneva Conference [CSCE].

Kissinger: Yes.

Genscher: First, there is one special problem: the declaration on the Mediterranean.²

Kissinger: Our idea is not to have one Mediterranean declaration but to have it split up in its various elements.³ If that is done, we would not be so worried about substance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in Grand Hotel Axelmannstein in Bad Reichenhall, Bavaria. The brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.

² Telegram 1725 from Geneva, March 15, reported: "At NATO delegation heads' caucus March 14, Italian rep said EC-Nine had taken 'political decision' to support Italian idea of a 'general declaration' on the Mediterranean, to be included in final CSCE document. Italian rep said such a declaration would be best way to handle Mediterranean in final document, since it would demonstrate importance to Europe of Mediterranean area and give satisfaction to non-participating Mediterranean states which have made contributions to CSCE. Declaration would be unilateral and would not be negotiated with non-participating states. It could be added as separate part of final document at end of section on agenda item I (security)." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

³ Telegram 2919 from Geneva, May 10, reported: "As foreseen reftel, we circulated to interested NATO delegations May 9 a paper giving 'illustrative examples' of how references to the Mediterranean could be introduced under existing CSCE agenda items. We explained that we had drawn language from existing documents such as Helsinki recommendations and Dutch draft framework paper, but that our suggestions were purely illustrative, and that we were not necessarily wedded to the language. We stressed that we hoped some solution could be found along these lines, since we remained firmly

Genscher: We don't really differ with you. It would be less than a special declaration; it would be an intention to extend the field of the Continent geographically. While flying over I defined it this way: We don't want to extend the European house but to make a declaration out of our window. So it is not an institutionalization.

There is a certain time pressure. We must inform some of our partners very soon. Within the next 24–48 hours.

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister I will talk with my colleagues tonight and let him know tomorrow.

Van Well: If the declaration of the Nine is dead, that means there will be more declarations—with Spain, with Malta, etc.

Kissinger: Will they be worse? What if we oppose them?

Van Well: There will be some in the Nine who will want them.

Kissinger: But what if the Nine want them and we oppose?

Van Well: It will be a messy situation.

Kissinger: Yes.

Van Well: Israel wants it.

Kissinger: Our objection has nothing to do with Israel.

We will let you know in the course of tomorrow. In the course of tomorrow.

Genscher: The other matter; I suppose you know yesterday's declaration.

Kissinger: Is it public?

Genscher: Yes. [Reads] "The Foreign Ministers of the Nine talked about CSCE; they confirmed their intention of following the policy of détente. . . . It is not the principle of peaceful relations that is important, but cooperation in public, economic, and measures for human contact. That is why the meetings of the Conference are being supported by a large measure of public opinion.

"Ministers recall the particular endeavors which the Nine have made to meet the concerns of other participant states, in particular, where the declaration of principles is concerned. However, they wish to explain their disillusion at the lack of progress achieved at Geneva, in particular on measures so important as human contacts, the flow of information, admittance to cultural achievements, as well as confidence-building

opposed to the idea of a separate CSCE declaration on the Mediterranean. Our illustrative paper, coupled with our arguments and firm resistance to a separate declaration, seems to have swayed several interested NATO delegations, and we drew support from Turkey, Greece and Portugal. Netherlands, Belgium and UK urged compromise along lines we had suggested, and only French and Italians defended separate declaration." (Ibid.)

measures in the field of security. They regret also that in certain parts of the declaration of principles there is not yet agreement.

“Ministers reaffirm their determination to continue their efforts to contribute constructively to the work of the conference. They hope their continuing will for conciliation and progress will be shared by all and that the Geneva talks, in all areas covered by the Helsinki mandate, will achieve the material results that alone will set the stage for the final phase.”

Not mentioned in this declaration is the important question of peaceful changes of frontiers. This is a point which, as everyone understands—we don’t insist on this—but there was full agreement on this. The French side sees this very much from the angle of the rights of the four powers. It is only natural we should attach a high price to the idea that this should be clarified. In the field of human contacts.

Kissinger: Should we bring this to a conclusion? Or should we let it go along?

Genscher: As said here and as we believe, we should continue to work, but policies should not be dictated by time pressure.

Kissinger: I agree.

Genscher: First, there shouldn’t be any negative result. If we had a formula that everything was put to question, it would be a negative aspect.

Kissinger: We have not yet seen your proposal on peaceful change.

Van Well: Now the Nine have a position on it. A fortnight ago we submitted it to NATO.⁴ Our point was that in making this position clear.

Kissinger: But you have never given us a text.

Hillenbrand: Not in the Bonn Group.

Van Well: We have been in touch on this—the Nine with the 15. Now there is a discussion just opened on the Four,⁵ on the question of

⁴ On May 28, the EC Political Committee approved a report on CSCE. According to telegram 3085 from USNATO, the EC-Nine’s report reads in part: “The German delegation has illustrated the possible linkage of the text on peaceful change of frontiers to the first principle [i.e., inviolability of frontiers] in case a considerably modified and positive formula were inserted in this new context. As a temporary measure, it proposed the following text, which could be inserted after the 27 lines of the text already registered: ‘The sovereignty of the participating states includes, in accordance with international law, the right to modify their frontiers through peaceful means and by agreement and nothing in the present declaration will affect this right.’ However, the linkage of peaceful change to the first principle is not acceptable to all the delegations among the Nine. Moreover, the [EC-Nine’s CSCE] subcommittee is of the opinion that there are few chances of obtaining the formula mentioned above.” (Ibid.)

⁵ Telegram 9153 from Bonn, June 7, which reported on the discussions in Bonn on quadripartite rights in Germany in the context of CSCE, is *ibid.*

quadrupartite rights, to make clear that the new discussion doesn't qualify the quadrupartite rights. It is being prepared now for Ottawa.

Kissinger: In principle we are in favor of what you are trying to do. We will discuss this at Ottawa.

Genscher: We will discuss.

Kissinger: It would help us. In principle we have no difficulties.

Genscher: We also see consequences about European Union if we don't adopt this policy of peaceful change. Next we have fields of human contacts.

Kissinger: We need a Talmudic student to know what is going on. We have been studying the Finnish proposal these last weeks. In principle it looks like it may be possible. Referring back to the preamble. . . .

Van Well: There is the question of family reunions.

Kissinger: We shouldn't discuss until. . . . In the Finnish ideas, in the general preamble there is some reference to human contacts in the preamble.

I think we have to discuss the preamble. Whatever the Soviets want—before going on to substance.

We don't notice any great progress on the substance in the cause of Basket III.

Van Well: Complete stagnation.

Genscher: This is why we talked about deception in this field.

[A message is brought in for General Scowcroft.]

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister about my press conference.⁶

Genscher: I heard it with great interest.

Kissinger: My staff is encouraged because they think they see a terminal point to their suffering!

My problem with the European Security Conference is, if it had never been invented, my life wouldn't be unfulfilled. Second, the substance bores me to death. I have studied none of it. If Gromyko would get off my back complaining every two weeks about the lack of American cooperation—which is true.

Why don't we use the Finnish proposal as a bridge to a common position on substance?

Van Well: The problem is the Soviets of course want to emphasize non-intervention. In the declaration of principles we have the principle of human rights, the principle of self-determination, the principle

⁶ For the text of Secretary Kissinger's news conference on June 6, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 24, 1974, pp. 700–709.

of cooperation—which is detailed. If they only want to pick up in Basket III the principle of non-intervention, that gives that principle a particular role.

Kissinger: But the Finnish proposal only refers to the preamble, not to that principle.

Van Well: They refer to that principle.

Kissinger: The Preambular language of Basket III refers to all the principles of Basket I. In Basket I there is a reference to non-intervention.

Van Well: Yes.

Kissinger: But it doesn't single out that principle.

Genscher: What is the Soviet view?

Kissinger: I have no way of knowing.

Genscher: That is the point.

Kissinger: If we could settle this we could get to the substance of Basket III. There are some questions we have about the language in the Finnish proposal.

We have no information on the Soviet view. Do you have any information?

Van Well: No, but we assume the Finns would not stick their necks out without. . . .

Kissinger: That is our instinct. But I have given instructions to our Ambassador to be generally favorable to the Finnish proposal provided our NATO allies don't disagree.⁷

Van Well: That is very helpful. We will give instructions tomorrow.

Genscher: I have practically finished what I have been told to tell you.

Kissinger: Let me ask. We are going to Moscow. We will be harassed about the level at which the conference should end.

I wrote you a letter once—or to your predecessor—about the level.⁸ There are two problems. I know everyone's formal position is that the level depends on the substance.

Genscher: Yes.

Kissinger: But we know what the substance is. Given the substance, what is the Federal Republic's view on the level?

Genscher: The Chancellor discussed this with the Soviet Ambassador and said we don't exclude the highest level, but it depends on the conclusion.

⁷ See Document 210.

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 206.

Kissinger: But we pretty well know what the conclusion is. We have no interest—we just don't want the allies to take different views. I know Brandt told us once that he wanted to do it at the summit. I don't know Schmidt's view.

Genscher: We don't want to push, but I said at the press conference that the quality is more important than the time pressure. But at this stage, I think it would go too far to meet the points of the other side and that it would exclude all interests of the other side in the direction of new movement.

Kissinger: But it keeps going in circles. Including what we see, what substance do we want?

Van Well: Scheel wrote you about four concrete points,⁹ and we have told the Russians those and the Nine agreed with our four points. The question is whether we get to the last phase. Progress so far is not satisfactory.

Kissinger: We didn't want a conference in the first place, so we won't spend sleepless nights over it.

But do we want to sell a summit in return for Soviet concessions? Or do we not want a summit? We have to be clear. With Brandt, we had the feeling he wanted one and therefore we had the feeling it probably would be held.

Van Well: It is spelled out in the letter. We were prepared to go to the summit if there is satisfaction on the four points.

Kissinger: All right. Now I understand. Can you sum up what they mean concretely?

Van Well: The first is the wording and placement of peaceful change. The Soviets have bagged the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Second is the equal quality of all principles. They are moving on that. They also agreed in principle on peaceful change. The third point is confidence-building measures. We want to get out of this limit to Central Europe. All participants should take part. The fourth is some concrete points in Basket III; family reunions, family contacts, and marriages.

Kissinger: So confidence-building measures is the hard one.

Van Well: Yes.

Kissinger: Basket III may become unlocked if the Finnish proposal works. And peaceful change we will see, on the basis of the Bonn Group.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁹ Not found.

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, June 13, 1974, 0046Z.

125456. Subject: CSCE: Mediterranean Declaration. Geneva for Ambassador Sherer, US CSCE Del.

1. Taking into account the views of the Nine conveyed in the May 30 call on Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary Hartman by FRG Ambassador Von Staden² and to Ambassador Hillenbrand by Van Well (Bonn 8578),³ and based upon the Secretary's June 11 discussion with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher at Salzburg,⁴ the Secretary indicated to Genscher that the US would drop our objection to tabling by the Nine of a separate declaration on the Mediterranean.

2. Accordingly, in NATO caucus June 13 you should draw on the following talking points:

—We have carefully considered the views expressed in the North Atlantic Council and to the United States by the EC Nine and others on the proposal of Italy for a separate CSCE Mediterranean declaration.

—In the course of Secretary Kissinger's meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher on June 11, the Secretary indicated to him as chairman of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine that the United States is prepared to join in agreement to the tabling in CSCE of the Italian draft as a basis for further discussion among the CSCE participants.

—The United States welcomed the opportunities to consult with the Allies on the proposed Mediterranean declaration, both in the North Atlantic Council and with the Nine members of the EC.

—We are prepared to join a consensus of the Allies on this matter and would hope that a decision could be reached at today's meetings to table the Italian proposal.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Streator and cleared by Sonnenfeldt, Lowenstein, and Luers (S/S); approved by Hartman. Repeated to all NATO capitals, Moscow, Dublin, and the Mission to the EC in Brussels.

² Von Staden met with Sonnenfeldt and the Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Wells Stabler on May 30. A memorandum of their conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron.

³ Not found.

⁴ See Document 212. Kissinger's meeting with Genscher took place in Bad Reichenhall, not Salzburg.

3. For USNATO, USEC, NATO capitals and Dublin: you may draw on paragraph 2, above, in informing Allies and Irish on US position concerning Mediterranean declaration.⁵

Sisco

⁵ Telegram 3353 from USNATO, June 13, reported: "U.S. rep informed Senior Po-lads on June 13 of U.S. decision to support Italy and EC-Nine on tabling of Mediter-ranean declaration. Decision was heartily welcomed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

214. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Ottawa, June 18, 1974, 10:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

June 18 Quadripartite Dinner in Ottawa

MAJOR PARTICIPANTS

French (host)

Jacques Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Francois Puaux, Director of Political Affairs
Emanuel de Margerie, Director of European Section

United States

The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

German

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther van Well, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Office

British

James Callaghan, Foreign Secretary
Sir John Killick, Deputy Undersecretary
Charles Wiggin, Assistant Undersecretary

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-curity conference or MBFR.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Scott George, Director of the Office of Central European Affairs, and cleared by Hartman.

II. CSCE

Sauvagnargues. Now let us turn to the next subject, which is CSCE. Here we have two problems: that of the possibility of modifying borders and that of quadripartite rights and responsibilities. I personally have strong views. After having read the Bonn Group papers² I see no method of achieving a way out given the Soviet attitude. The only sure protection is to say that existing agreements which have been subscribed to by States or which concern them are not affected. The FRG position is quite understandable, but these objections are not really valid. Nobody can really invoke the Potsdam agreement³ now. Of course the GDR can argue that a new CSCE agreement invalidates everything agreed before, but my own opinion is that such an allegation is of no significance. Now as to a simple disclaimer, I don't think this is appropriate and we could not get a Four Power disclaimer.

The Secretary. Why couldn't we?

Sauvagnargues. Because the Soviets won't agree.

The Secretary. How would you handle the question?

Sauvagnargues. I would add language to the effect that treaties subscribed to by States or which concern them are not affected. I don't see any better solution.

The Secretary. Does this mean you don't care where peaceful change language is placed?

Sauvagnargues. We don't care and we have told the Germans this. There is no good place; they all have drawbacks.

Genscher. Well, there can be places where it would be of overwhelming importance but it is important to decide soon.

Sauvagnargues. Normally it should be placed in the principle of inviolability of frontiers, but the Soviets strongly oppose this.

Callaghan. Not having any language makes it difficult to say where it should be placed. Shouldn't they work on this in Geneva? In other words figure out what we want to do and where to put it?

The Secretary. Just what is the wording that you want?

Van Well. Partly it is a matter of commas, but also the Soviets put in something about international law which we find objectionable.

² Telegram 9467 from Bonn, June 14, contained the draft text of a Bonn Group study on CSCE and Germany and Berlin-related questions for use as the basis of discussion at the meeting on June 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

³ For relevant excerpts of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, which established four-power rights in occupied Germany, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 54–65.

Sauvagnargues. The whole thing is negative in tone and should be changed so as to be positive.⁴ That is, the positive approach is to say borders can be changed by peaceful agreement. The present language reads the other way around, i.e. can be changed *only* by peaceful agreement, making it sound restrictive and negative.

Genscher. Since this point is disputed, this shows the Soviets don't want to admit the possibility of peaceful change. This doesn't affect only Germany but all of Europe.

Sauvagnargues. The only good formula is that sovereignty includes the power to change borders when there is peaceful agreement to do so.

Callaghan. We ourselves are not draftsmen. Let us tell our people to work out language, try it out and come back for further instructions.

The Secretary. We have three problems. First, the wording of the peaceful change language; second, placement of it; third, protection of the rights we already have. We mustn't get those confused. We will accept any placement acceptable to the FRG and our Allies. We will still have to put it up to the Soviets. Now, with respect to protecting existing rights, I am attracted to what Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues says, rather than having a separate formal disclaimer.

Van Well. The point is that before we enter the second reading, we will have to decide where to place the language. We think under the inviolability of frontiers is all right but if the Soviets say "no," put it under the sovereignty principle, we must re-phrase it and turn it from negative to positive.

The Secretary. I have difficulty understanding why a sentence which would be acceptable in one place would be unacceptable in another.

Sauvagnargues. The Soviets want inviolability to be "pure;" that is—no possibility of change. So if one includes in the inviolability principle something about change—of any sort—this runs counter to the

⁴ The draft Bonn Group study reads in part: "The text on the peaceful change of frontiers provisionally registered with reservations on 5 April in Geneva runs as follows: 'The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed only in accordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement.'" The study continues: "The formula quoted is insufficient. The reference to conformity with international law creates the impression that the admissibility of peaceful change of frontiers is not an inherent consequence of international law but is subject to additional specific conditions besides those concerning peaceful means and agreement. According to the Soviet interpretation of the inviolability of frontiers and of territorial integrity this could then amount to the exclusion of a change of frontiers in Germany through peaceful means and by agreement in realization of the option of German unity. The minimum, therefore, that must be assured is that the reference to international law should appear in the sentence in a manner which avoids that risk." (Telegram 9467 from Bonn, June 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

concept of pure inviolability which the Soviets seem so strongly attached to.

The Secretary. I can't understand why this is important. In fact, I will be surprised if there are ten human beings who remain to understand the document 30 minutes after it is signed.

Sauvagnargues. Let me see if I can sum up. (The Secretary. I am glad you have the nerve to try.) We must have inviolability of frontiers but put in a positive way. The most likely way is with sovereignty and peaceful change.

The Secretary. But this would call for us to ask the Soviets to change a text which is already registered.

Van Well. Yes, but it was registered subject to placement and to all principles being equal in value, also the text can be adjusted depending on placement.

Sauvagnargues. Let me try to sum up again. We do try again to get the best possible formula on peaceful change, making no reference to international law. Also we try in the Bonn Group to work further on the quadripartite rights problem.

The Secretary. On the second point there is no problem with us. But on the first, it is very difficult to re-open agreed language, because that means in effect that we are withdrawing a registered text.

Van Well. We can accept the text if it is registered in the inviolability principle. If the Soviets object, it is up to them to make proposals.

Genscher. I think it is understandable that this reservation was entered only by the FRG. We will not be able to sign unless the problem of peaceful change is settled. If they keep bothering us about this they must have some motive.

Sauvagnargues. Summing up again, we must put the principle in a positive way.

Callaghan. It should be put in the inviolability principle. The idea would be that frontiers can't be violated, but they can be changed by agreement. Let's have our experts work this out, negotiate it with the Russians, and God help them!

The Secretary. I'm in agreement it should be in the inviolability principle, but the problem of changing an already-agreed text is very difficult. As to the disclaimer problem, I like the idea of the French Foreign Minister about putting this in the Tenth Principle. Why don't we just wait and see what happens. We never wanted CSCE in the first place.

Callaghan. I detected this in what you said earlier.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

215. Editorial Note

In a meeting with Department of State officers and National Security Council staff members on June 21, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed ongoing negotiations with the Soviets in the context of the upcoming summit meeting between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. A memorandum of the conversation of the meeting reads in part:

“Sonnenfeldt: In CSCE, we will just have to wait until Moscow, where we can be sure that Brezhnev will unload on the President.

“Secretary: They say the present text [of the draft U.S.-Soviet communiqué] is less than last year. And you know that CSCE is going to end in a summit.

“Sonnenfeldt: But we are saying more this year. We are really giving them more than in the past.

“Secretary: Then let’s stick for awhile. I wonder what makes them think that in the communiqué they can make us change our well-thought-out positions.”

Later, discussion turned to MBFR:

“Sonnenfeldt: What about MBFR?

“Secretary: Dobrynin said they would continue to stick with their present position.

“Sonnenfeldt: And we should stick to ours. Did you give him any indication we would compromise?

“Secretary: No. The President wants it, but any deal in Moscow would get us into a terrible mess with the Allies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet-Summit, 1974)

216. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 21, 1974, 0940Z.

3950. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Department pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel. Subj: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: Geneva 3946² and previous.

1. Kovalev came to see me evening of June 20 with his two principal lieutenants, Dubinin (Basket III) and Mendelevich (Basket I). He said he was very interested in completing the Basket III preamble operation quickly, before it got out of control, and proposed trying to register the fourth Finnish para for the Basket III preamble at next Wednesday's meeting of Committee III, with registration of the Finnish language on "legislative and regulatory systems" the following day.

2. We explained the complex and interlocking issues which, in the Western view, were raised by this matter, and told Kovalev that many Western and neutral countries were trying to build an elaborate negotiating package for trade-off when the two Finnish proposals are accepted.³ We said we did not think it would be possible to register quickly the Finnish language for the Basket III preamble in the present CSCE atmosphere, without some dramatic move on the part of the Soviets, since a CSCE agreement dating from last February stipulates that progress on Basket III preamble and specifics will move ahead in parallel. On the other hand, we suggested that, if the two texts on access to printed information and reunification of families, which are presently holding up progress in Basket III, could be registered before next Wednesday's meeting, the situation would appear quite different, and we would be able to support immediate registration of the Finnish preambular paragraph.

3. We also explained that movement of this kind by the Soviets might undercut efforts to build a negotiating package, but pointed out that there were, in fact, several related issues which would clearly have to be settled at the same time. These appear to us to be: (1) full texts of the principles on sovereign equality and non-intervention; (2) full text of Basket III preamble; (3) commitment by Soviets not to try to reintroduce "laws and customs" type of language in Basket III "mini-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 3946 from Geneva, June 20, is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850095–2182.

³ Regarding the Finnish proposals, see Document 208.

preambles” (preceding each sub-section of Basket III document), and (4) progress on Basket III specifics.

4. Kovalev and his lieutenants seemed to think much of this would be possible. They agreed to make every effort to register the text on access to printed information by Monday or Tuesday of next week, although if they insist on their present phraseology for this item such registration way prove difficult. On family reunification they appeared to be flexible on most points, except transfer of savings of persons who emigrate (see Geneva 3009),⁴ and promised to make a major effort also to register this text next week. They said they had received instructions to allow Finnish para for non-intervention principle to be transferred to principle of sovereign equality, although they would insist on agreed US-Soviet language on determining legislative and regulatory systems. They said they were prepared, as a final compromise, to accept full Basket III preamble proposed as compromise by Finns, and would not try to reintroduce their “laws and customs” language in “mini-preambles” unless Western countries tried to insert unacceptable language.

5. I told Kovalev I would use June 21 NATO caucus to try to encourage Western flexibility to allow early registration of texts on access to printed information and family reunification. If one or preferably both of these texts could be registered by next Wednesday, we would support in Committee III meeting compromise acceptance and immediate registration of Finnish version of Basket III preamble, or at least paragraph 4 including general reference to the principles. Nevertheless, we cautioned Soviets that this was extremely complex operation, and while we would do our best, they should not be upset if there was some slippage. They agreed.

6. Would appreciate Department’s approval of this course of action and any additional guidance which may seem appropriate.

Dale

⁴ Telegram 3009 from Geneva, May 14, is *ibid*.

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, June 22, 1974, 0039Z.

134543. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 preamble. Geneva eyes only for Ambassador Sherer, US CSCE Del. From Sonnenfeldt and Hartman. Ref: Geneva 3950.²

1. Concur in general approach your proposed para 5 reftel, entailing efforts to encourage early registration of texts on access to printed information and family reunification, followed by registration of at least para 4 of Finnish Basket 3 preamble.

2. Per para 4 reftel, you should encourage Soviets to allow Finnish para for non-intervention principle to be transferred to sovereign equality (bearing in mind, per State 132019,³ that we are not committed to support “foundations” language). You should also encourage Soviets not to try to reintroduce “laws and customs” language in “mini-preambles” within Basket 3.

Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Streator; cleared by Hartman and Miller; and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel.

² Document 216.

³ Telegram 132019 to Geneva, June 22, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840172–2114.

218. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 22, 1974, 1400Z.

3986. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Dept pass Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel. Sub: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: State 134543² and previous.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Document 217.

1. Subsequent to conversation reported Geneva 3950,³ we have had three long and detailed discussions with Soviets concerning Basket III preamble operation, culminating in Saturday morning meeting with Kovalev, Dubinin and Mendelevich. Soviets are pressing hard for simultaneous registration of Finnish language for principle of non-intervention and Basket III preamble by Wednesday,⁴ which we think may be overly ambitious, but which we will try our best to help along.

2. We informed Soviets of our impression that Western group was drifting toward an attitude of treating this whole issue as a key conference item which should not be settled until much later, when Soviets have shown what they are willing to concede in terms of Basket III specifics. We said that if they hope to conclude this operation quickly, some dramatic breakthrough was required which would improve conference atmosphere and make Western and neutral delegations more receptive to the Finnish solution.

3. The Soviets recognize the need for something dramatic and are apparently prepared to make an effort to register the text on access to printed information by Tuesday in order to provide this element. But they insist that the two parts of the Finnish solution must be approved simultaneously, and of course this makes the whole project much more difficult. We suggested a step-by-step operation: (1) register text on access to printed information; (2) register fourth Finnish para of Basket III preamble; (3) register Finnish language on legislative and regulatory systems in principle of sovereign equality. Soviets said they could not accept this approach without a guarantee that the language in the principles would be accepted. We suggested they accept Finnish para 4 for Basket III preamble with specific proviso that this was on condition that satisfactory language would be agreed in the principles. They refused and said they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by getting this language introduced by the Finns; now it was up to us to fulfill our part of the bargain by getting it approved. They were willing to be helpful in this, but it was basically a US problem and if it was necessary, perhaps an effort in capitals was required.

4. We indicated that real problem was not eventual satisfactory solution to this issue, but trying to achieve it all simultaneously, in a very short time, in a conference where atmosphere has been getting more and more negative ever since the Easter break, primarily because of Soviet resistance to progress on Basket III specifics. We were willing to try whatever looked possible, but in the circumstances we thought this would be most difficult to accomplish by Wednesday.

³ Document 216.

⁴ June 26.

5. At this point Kovalev brought out the text of a new Finnish proposal which he said had been conveyed to Soviets and to the FRG Basket I representative last night. Text of Finnish proposal is as follows.

Components of a “deal” to be made between the heads of delegations:

(1) the fourth sentence of the Finnish proposal to be redrafted as follows: Therefore each of them will not intervene against the political, economic and cultural elements of other participating states and will respect the right to determine their laws and regulations.

(2) The above mentioned sentence to be located under the first principle (sovereign equality).

(3) The fourth paragraph of the Finnish proposal in the preamble of item III to be accepted.

(4) Assurance by all parties that no safeguard clauses nor any reference to the principles or to laws and regulations will be included in the so-called mini-preambles of the Basket III.

We have no indication yet of FRG or Nine opinion of above proposal.

6. Kovalev asked for our views on this, and we told him that it looked like a useful contribution. Language of para (1) would have to be altered to fit context of sovereign equality principle, but otherwise it looked promising. We cautioned him however, that even with this Finnish proposal it would be difficult to complete this whole operation by Wednesday. We said that phrase “laws and regulations” might be more acceptable to some Western delegations than “legislative and regulatory systems” and suggested that Soviets consider this language as a possible fallback position, in case legislative and regulatory systems proved totally unacceptable. Soviets said they would convey this suggestion to Moscow, and would reflect on this possibility. With regard to the paper as a whole, they planned to meet with Finns this evening to discuss it more fully. Main problem they foresaw was that of finding a mechanism, such as an informal meeting of delegation heads, at which such a package deal could be agreed, in order to have the whole thing approved at once. They said they would be back in touch with us, and we arranged a further meeting for Sunday, June 23.

7. As for Basket III specifics, Soviets still realized need to improve conference atmosphere, and would try to register the text on access to printed information by Tuesday of next week. To assist in this process, we arranged a meeting between US and Soviet Basket III reps for Saturday afternoon. We plan to advise Soviets on what may be acceptable so Soviets can put forward a workable text on Monday.

8. *FYI:* Soviets here appear to be unaware that need for progress on Basket III specifics was ever mentioned to them when original agreement on this problem was reached, as indicated in para 1 of State

121749.⁵ This has made our dealings with them considerably more difficult, since they take the view that getting the Finnish solution accepted is our sole responsibility. *End FYI.*

Dale

⁵ Document 210.

219. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 24, 1974, 0924Z.

3988. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Department pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel. Subj: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: Geneva 3986.²

1. Subsequent to transmission of reftel, we have been informed that acting head of FRG delegation (Von Groll) briefed EC-Nine caucus June 21 on the Secretary's discussion with Genscher³ about Finnish proposals for Basket III preamble and related language for insertion in principles. Von Groll's briefing may well have fueled suspicions of a US-Soviet deal on this subject. Since EC-Nine caucus included experts from Baskets I and III, we assume this information will be known throughout the conference within a few days.

2. We have taken position thus far that there is no US-Soviet understanding, and that Bad Reichenhall meeting took place several days after we had reported the Finnish proposals to Washington. We have also pointed out that our opposition to Finnish-proposed language on "foundations" shows that we are not a party to any "deal," but of course our support for the general concept of the Finnish solution is well known, and Von Groll's briefing has contributed to the rumors which are circulating here on this subject. In these circumstances, we are reviewing the actions we had planned in support of the Finnish solution, and will certainly be forced to take a less active role, at least for

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Document 218.

³ See Document 212.

the time being. It must also be recognized that resentment toward possible US-Soviet collusion may strengthen resistance to the Finnish solution, and render full achievement more difficult. The Soviets, who are pressing hard for immediate adoption of the Finnish solution, will undoubtedly be unhappy with any obvious reluctance on our part to move quickly.

3. Additionally, we believe that growing press interest in CSCE, coupled with West European apprehension about leakage of this story to the press a reasonable possibility. The Department should be prepared to deal with this situation, should it arise.

4. We believe West European suspicions of a US-Soviet understanding on this issue make it all the more important that the Moscow summit meeting be used to press the Soviets for reasonable concessions on Basket III and military issues. Such concessions will be essential if we are to be able to justify to our European Allies our support for a compromise on the Basket III preamble issue at this time.

5. In these somewhat altered circumstances, we would appreciate any further guidance the Department may wish to provide, especially as to how we should respond to Soviet pressures for quick action. We would also be grateful for the Department's guidance on how we should react to queries from our Allies, and possibly also from the press, on this matter.

Dale

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, June 25, 1974, 0133Z.

135958. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 preamble. Ref: Geneva 3988.² Geneva eyes only for Amb Sherer.

1. In further conversations with Soviet delegation on this issue, you should remind them that, while we undertook to try to persuade

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Streator; cleared by Hartman and Miller; and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel.

² Document 219.

Western participants to accept Finnish compromise package for handling this issue, we repeatedly pointed out that we expected Western resistance. You should add that we will continue our quiet persuasive efforts with Western delegations but that, given current Allied attitudes, strong pressure from US would prejudice chances of eventual Western acceptance of Finnish package.

2. In responding to any questions from Allies, you could make following points:

—We support Finnish compromise package as reasonable solution to a difficult issue involving highly sensitive ideological considerations on Eastern and Western sides;

—We have also discussed this issue bilaterally with other delegations at Geneva and we assume many other Allied delegations have had similar bilateral contacts;

—As others may also have found, we found that, while the Soviets initially preferred the explicit reference to “laws and customs” in draft Basket 3 preamble tabled by Bulgarians, they later apparently began to see merit in indirect compromise approach embodied in Finnish package;

—As Hartman told NAC on March 29,³ after Secretary’s visit to Moscow, Brezhnev mentioned “customs” in connection with Basket 3 only in his introductory remarks, but he repeatedly mentioned domestic laws;

—This may have presaged Soviet willingness to drop “customs,” which of course does not figure in Finnish package;

—We agree that progress in Basket 3 specifics is indispensable, have repeatedly made this point to Soviets, and will continue to make it;

—We hope Allies will continue to see Finnish proposal, plus satisfactory texts on Basket 3 specifics, as constituting acceptable outcome under third agenda item.

3. If questioned by journalists on Finnish proposal, you should decline comment on grounds that this is subject currently under negotiation.

Kissinger

³ See Document 197.

221. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 25, 1974, 1230Z.

4020. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Dept pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Sherer. Subj CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref State 135958.²

1. Kovalev, accompanied by Dubinin and Mendelevich, called on me June 25 to exchange views on status of Basket III preamble operation. I gave them our latest information on package deal being promoted by neutrals (Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Cyprus, Malta, and Yugoslavia). This currently consists of the following elements: (1) inclusion in list of principles of some wording on “laws and regulations,” not yet drafted; (2) this language to be moved to principle of sovereign equality; (3) agreement on all four paragraphs of Basket III preamble using Finnish model; (4) agreement on so-called “mini preambles” preceding each section of Basket III document; (5) agreement on specific texts currently under discussion in Basket III (probably those on reunification of families and access to printed information); (6) simultaneous registration of all above texts; (7) agreement to move on to discussion of principle of human rights during period of 7–10 days required to work out the package deal.

2. Kovalev expressed “disappointment” on receiving this news. He said it was important to move quickly to finish this operation, which could become “dangerous” if discussion moved on to principle of human rights. Instead, the proposed package deal was expanding. He clearly did not believe USDel had acted forcefully enough during last few days, and claimed Soviets had done everything they could to advance the operation. Kovalev recalled that this operation was only part of a broader US-Soviet understanding, and indicated he would report to Moscow his conclusion that we have not made enough effort on this issue.

3. In reply to Kovalev, I drew on para 1 of reftel, and stressed that our primary objective is eventual successful completion of the operation; too much pressure for early completion may well prejudice chances of eventual Western acceptance. I also repeated that we have said clearly and for many weeks that significant progress on Basket III

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850095–2190. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Document 220.

specifics is required if there is to be any chance of success; up to now, the Soviets have not produced formulations with which the Nine can agree. In view of present situation, we had concluded it would be a mistake for US to support Finnish version of Basket III preamble at June 26 meeting of Committee III, as we had earlier thought possible if some specific Basket III text could be registered in advance. Since Soviets insist on simultaneous registration of Finnish language for the principles, such an initiative by US at this time could not succeed. I emphasized that the only apparent disagreement between us was on tactics and timing; the Soviets want quick action, while we believe gentle persuasion has better chance of success.

4. Kovalev reiterated his unhappiness, but said Soviets would continue their efforts to register text on access to printed information. They would also try to discourage neutral package-building, and would oppose discussion of human rights principle at this time. He asked for our cooperation in this effort, and we agreed to be in close contact.

5. Kovalev expressed more disappointment at this meeting than he has previously. He was apparently under instruction to complete our compromise agreement before the Moscow summit and has not produced. If the Soviets make a fuss about this in Moscow we should not hesitate to put the blame at their door. Had they come forward with Basket III specifics immediately after the Easter break the whole mood of the conference would have been different and the Finnish compromise proposals, when finally tabled on June 5, would have received a more enthusiastic reception. There simply has not been time between June 5 and today to work out language on Basket III specifics that is agreeable to all.

Dale

222. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Mission in Geneva¹

Brussels, June 26, 1974, 2351Z.

Secto 35/4588. For Sherer from Sonnenfeldt and Hartman. Subject: Finnish invitation to Stage III in July. Ref: A) Geneva 4072,² B) State 137770 (Tosec 64) Notal.³

On assumption Allies are aware of Finnish proposal in Geneva 4072, in consultation with Allied colleagues prior to coordinating committee meeting June 27, or thereafter as appropriate, you should inform them that you believe Allies should state in response to Finnish proposal that, providing Stage II work could be completed by July 20, Allies would in principle not object to beginning Stage III then; however, this does not appear to be a realistic option in light of progress to date in Stage II. You should also tell Allied reps that you would be prepared to support this position in coordinating committee. Should the issue arise in discussion with the Allies, you should make clear we not attempting to set a target date for conclusion of Stage II or opening of Stage III.

Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of State. Secretary Kissinger was accompanying President Nixon to a meeting of NATO Heads of Government in Brussels.

² Telegram 4072 from Geneva, June 26, reported: "We have been informed that Finns will use June 27 meeting of coordinating committee to issue formal invitation to Stage III in Helsinki during period July 20–30. While most delegations will undoubtedly remain silent, possibility cannot be excluded that Soviets will say they are prepared to accept. In such a situation several Western delegations are prepared to refuse, and Finns will draw formal conclusion that a third stage in July is not possible. USDel will remain silent on this subject unless otherwise instructed by opening of business June 27." (Ibid.)

³ Telegram Tosec 64/137770 to Brussels forwarded the text of telegram 4072 from Geneva and proposed a response. (Ibid.)

223. **Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State**¹

Geneva, June 27, 1974, 1750Z.

4100. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Department pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel—Moscow hold for the Secretary's party. Subj: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: Geneva 4076.²

1. Following friendly lunch (reported septel)³ given by Kovalev to honor President Nixon's arrival Moscow, NATO delegation chiefs caucused at American Mission. Despite my strong support for some type of package deal which would enable conference to get off dead center it was almost unanimous opinion that any deal would have to be very carefully studied and should not be entered into at this time. Even the efforts by neutrals which have been reported previously were rejected and several delegations including French, Canadian and Dutch advocated avoiding encouraging of further efforts by neutrals.

2. Though many dels appealed to acknowledge that some form of "escape clause" to afford Soviets minimal Basket III protection would eventually have to be inserted in the principles, there was substantial disagreement as to the timing or language for such a concession. French del made the point that Soviet renunciation of insistence upon reference to "laws and customs" in Basket III preamble was not a concession by Soviets but that the inclusion of the Finnish 4th para would be a concession by the West which wanted no paragraph of any kind in Basket III preamble. Consequently, he concluded that there could be no trade-off between Basket I "legislative and regulatory systems" reference and Finnish para 4 of Basket III preamble since both items represent Western concessions.

Abrams

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 4076 from Geneva, June 26, reported that "neutrals are in process of refining their 'package deal' on Basket III preamble, and have today informed us that it would consist of the following elements: (1) inclusion of language on 'right of each participating state to determine its own laws and regulations' in principle of sovereign equality; (2) agreement on all paragraphs of Basket III preamble according to new draft prepared by neutrals, which contains same general reference to the principles as did Finnish draft; (3) agreement on texts of 'mini-preambles' to precede each section of Basket III document, according to new neutral drafts; (4) simultaneous registration of all above texts." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850095-2192)

³ Not further identified.

224. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Brussels, June 27, 1974.

SUBJECT

Your Talks with Brezhnev on the European Security Conference

A major conflict has developed between our Western European Allies and the Soviets over the content and procedures of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). *The issue* is that the Europeans want to demonstrate that the Conference has yielded significant results in terms of reducing the barriers to exchange of information, the movement of people and related humanitarian and cultural issues. As indicated in your meeting with the heads of government in Brussels² until the Europeans receive satisfaction from the Soviets they will not agree to a timetable for completing the present work of the Conference or to a final summit.

The Soviets recognize that they will have to make concessions, but they are determined to do so only if they have an assurance that any such agreements to freer exchanges are covered by a blanket provision that all such questions are subject to the internal regulatory and legal systems of the parties involved.

A compromise to this effect (called the Finnish compromise) is on the table in the negotiations.³ It has been met with Western scepticism; as agreed with Gromyko, we are supporting it but not putting pressure on for its adoption.

Brezhnev will:

—complain bitterly that the Conference is encountering unreasonable obstacles by so called cold warriors.

—claim that a summit had been agreed to in principle by Pompidou and Brandt, and was reflected in the communiqué of his last meeting with you.

—protest that the USSR will not be opened up to hostile propaganda and degenerate culture.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files, Europe, USSR, President's Talks with Brezhnev on SALT. Secret; Sensitive.

² President Nixon met with the NATO Heads of Government in a plenary session of the North Atlantic Council on June 26. Telegram 4584 from Brussels, June 26, contains a summary of the leaders' speeches. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

³ See Document 208.

—say that if the final results do not justify it, he would not even send his foreign minister let alone go himself.

Your strategy:

You can agree that the talks have been extraordinarily slow, but at the same time you should play on his avowed interest in significant results to emphasize that many in Europe feel very strongly about showing that the rigid barriers and division of the cold war period are being gradually reduced.

—You could cite your talks with Wilson, Schmidt and Rumor⁴ to this effect.

—You could say that in light of the present situation, it would be best to pick a future target date in September and attempt to use the intervening period for settling the remaining issues—and we will work closely with the Soviets' delegation; cite the "Finnish compromise" as an example of how we can make some headway.

—You should reiterate that there are real life issues:

—such as reunification of divided families, better conditions for journalists, exchange of magazines, etc.—on which the USSR needs to show some willingness to accommodate the position of others; this is the real meaning of a Conference on "Cooperation."

On the summit:

You agree with him that neither you nor he would not want to attend a conference that accomplished little.

—thus the summit, which you will not oppose—is tied to good results.

—you and he should not try to dictate this but let matters take their course—once others see that the Conference is succeeding they will want to attend.

⁴ No record of Nixon's conversations with Wilson or Schmidt have been found. A memorandum of Nixon's conversation with Rumor in Brussels on June 26 reads in part: "[The President:] There is one major problem on which I want the Prime Minister's advice, and that is CSCE. Many European governments oppose having a summit unless there is more substance, for example, on confidence-building measures and freedom of movement. Should we hang tough for more substance before agreeing to a summit? Or should we agree without their making all the concessions some of our countries want? Rumor: I agree with Belgium. I don't wish a summit for its own sake; it would give the impression we are settling just for the status quo. On the other hand, if there are Soviet concessions, then we can only judge when we know what the concessions are. We can't get everything, but we should get most of what we started out for. The President: I agree. There should be no agreement for its own sake or at the expense of our allies." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential)

Military Security

—We want to have major military maneuvers announced about 50 days in advance; the Soviets want only 5–10 days preannouncement.

—We want all maneuvers above a threshold of 10,000–12,000 men included; the Soviets say an Army Corps—40,000.

—We want the preannouncement and exchange of observers to apply to “Europe”; the Soviets want it to apply only to border zones—with a zone of 100 km along their Western frontiers.

—The West (but not the US) want also to include all “major military movements,” the Soviets oppose it outright.

You may want to make the following points:

—the Conference must give all peoples confidence that military tensions are being lowered.

—preannouncement of maneuvers and an exchange of observers are agreed by all, the only issues are ones of definition and application.

—there is room for compromise.

—we can cooperate with the Soviets’ delegation, if we know what the Soviets will settle for on this issue.

225. Editorial Note

President Nixon and his party arrived in Moscow on June 27, 1974, for a summit meeting with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. During the first session on the morning of June 28 at 10:45 a.m., Nixon discussed the European security conference and MBFR in his opening statement. According to a memorandum of conversation, the President stated: “In a third area, the two strongest nations can and must work to find ways to work together in what might be called crisis areas in other parts of the world. Here we have the European Security Conference. We can discuss where problems are arising, which we are familiar with. Related to this is the reduction of forces in Europe. On our part we desire to have very frank discussions because Europe is a critical area of the world, and our two great nations should reduce to a very minimum conflicts between themselves in this area. We have a problem here which the General Secretary and his colleagues are very familiar with. It is more difficult for us to speak for our allies than for the General Secretary to speak for his. For example, I made a commitment to conclude the CSCE by the end of 1973. We have done as well as we can, and we are continuing to try, and perhaps with the Finnish

compromise, which the General Secretary is familiar with, and other working level compromises, we can break the logjam at the Conference. I emphasize here that just as with MFN, where we made a commitment, we will not drag our feet, but will show goodwill and make progress, though there are problems—(1) political problems in the US, with which the General Secretary is familiar, and (2) problems of political influence in the Atlantic Community.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

226. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, June 29, 1974, 11:12 a.m.–1:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorniy, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA

Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary

Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division

Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President Nixon

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the President

Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in St. Catherine’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

Major General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State

Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Test Ban; Mediterranean Nuclear Ban; CSCE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Brezhnev: Well, could we then turn to the European Conference?

Nixon: All right.

Brezhnev: We have already had several consultations on this matter. Now, when we are sitting across the table, we should try and gain a clear idea as to our joint actions and aims in this matter.

Nixon: Before the General Secretary raises European matters, I want to reiterate what I said to the Foreign Minister.² We made a commitment to try to get our European allies on track so there is sufficient substance to get a summit. That is our goal. We have had a problem, quite candidly, getting our European allies to agree on the substance. We could discuss among ourselves what can be done to get the substance straight. We can agree on certain things as on supporting the Finnish proposal, which has been a very constructive development.

The various items which are in question, I would like for Dr. Kissinger to run over briefly, and I will state positions as we go. Movements and maneuvers, for example, where our positions are more in tandem than with extreme positions, and so forth.

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, we have been discussing with the Soviet Union how to move the European Security Conference forward. First, on specific issues and then on the level of Phase III. On specific issues, there are three major ones.

What is generally called confidence-building measures—maneuvers and so forth, and notification. On the so-called confidence-building measures, we have stated our view to the Soviet leaders, and as you correctly said, we have tried to move matters into a more reasonable framework, that is, to limit the area in which notification is necessary, to increase the size of the unit about whose movement notifi-

² See Document 199.

ation is required. We have worked primarily with the British on this, when we were in Brussels with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.³

The second issue is what is generally called Basket III. This has two aspects. How to relate the general principles of Basket III to specific clauses. [Gromyko and Brezhnev confer behind Podgorny's back.] The Foreign Minister and we worked out a compromise solution, the so-called Finnish solution, that on the basis of close coordination was tabled. We are supporting the Finnish position. But we are having massive difficulties with our European allies. I think the only way to solve this deadlock is to agree on the content of Basket III and link it to the Finnish position.

The third issue is: Germans have raised the issue of peaceful change. They would like it in the same paragraph as inviolability of frontiers; or if it goes into another paragraph, on sovereignty, then they would like to change the sentence. We have taken the position with our allies, Mr. President, that if these changes can be achieved, then we would approve a high-level meeting for Phase III.

At the NATO meeting we agreed we should reach an agreement concretely on the content of Basket III.

This is where we stand on the issue of the European Security Conference.

Gromyko: Here I must say this area, CSCE, is really one where we should invent an artificial heart, because the pulse is really not there.

Nixon: And brain too.

Gromyko: The trouble is, each participant in the Conference thinks his brain is the best one too. But that can be handled.

I would like to explain our position. With respect to the so-called Basket III, which includes social, humanitarian, information, culture, etc., the situation briefly is as follows: Some of the participants in the conference are advancing dozens and I would even say hundreds of second-rate proposals. Literally piles of proposals: Reuniting families, cultural ties. Some go so far as to say we have the right to open a movie theatre, a club, in another country.

Kissinger: A cabaret.

Gromyko: Or the right to sell newspapers at news stands whether they like it or not. Some of them have such an obsession with this that they have completely forgotten the objective of reducing the war danger in concentrating on these second-rate matters.

How do we react to these innumerable proposals? We say in response that we are in favor of development of scientific and cultural and all other ties. We are in favor of solving all humanitarian issues;

³ See footnote 4, Document 224.

we are in favor, within reasonable limits, of lower fees for visas; we are in favor of Mr. Smith being allowed to marry Miss Jones.

We are not against measures. But we believe it is necessary in all this to respect national laws and regulations. This is the principle of the UN Charter. If this principle is embodied in a document, this will take care of the matter. Because whether a large country or a small country, its laws must be respected. [Brezhnev gets up and goes out.]

Therefore if this question is resolved, the question of respect for the laws of each country concerned, all the problems that relate to Basket III will be solved and no country that participates in the Conference will have anything to fear. This is the subject of many discussions with the United States, and we worked out a formula ensuring respect for laws and administrative regulations in each country. We found a third country to introduce a compromise; the Finns volunteered. I can't say we were completely happy with what the Finns proposed, but it could provide some degree of understanding. [Brezhnev returns.]

There were some who reacted positively immediately. There were others who, as Dr. Kissinger correctly said, without directly rejecting the Finnish proposal, try to link it to other things not related to it. How? For example, the West Germans advanced a new idea with respect to a question that had been resolved. It had been resolved that the question of peaceful change of frontiers should be included in the document. Now the West Germans say "Let's review the situation," and they try to connect the formula on peaceful change with the formula on inviolability. The purpose obviously is to try to weaken the principle of inviolability.

We had the impression the United States would promptly take a firm line in this matter. Unfortunately this is not so. As I said, West Germany has taken a stand aimed at weakening the principle and trying to link it to the Third Basket with which it has no relation.

We think we should stand on the basis of our previous understanding. If we do that, we can achieve progress on Basket III. It is a question of the influence the United States can exert on its allies. Your possibilities are greater than the concrete manifestations. We would like you to work a little more actively. We believe it is a matter of honor for the United States and the Soviet Union and others who came out in favor of this formulation to stick with it in its undiluted form.

I have therefore covered two of the questions mentioned by Dr. Kissinger, Basket III and inviolability of frontiers, which has now been raised again although it had been agreed upon. The phrase on peaceful change we continue to think should be linked with sovereignty.

[Brezhnev gets up and confers with Dobrynin and Korniyenko; Hartman confers with Dr. Kissinger, while Gromyko talks.]

As regards the question of confidence-building measures, including such items as maneuvers, sizeable troop movements—although even there, some define it in a certain way—security zones, etc. This question has been inflated so much by some that unrealistic decisions are made.

How can you expect the Soviet Union to do nothing else but write out accounts of all its troop movements in the European part of its territory? I am sure you understand this, but there are many who believe it. The United States I know takes a skeptical view. But we would appreciate the United States to use more of its influence with its allies. We have made a technical approach in Geneva.

And the last question, with respect to the level of the third and final phase of the Conference: The West European countries through their representatives at Geneva said they are not opposed to a summit but it depends on the work of the second phase. From what the President has said today and several occasions previously, the statements repeatedly made by Dr. Kissinger, it will be obvious you are taking a more positive view of the work of the third [*second*] stage. Nonetheless, certain reservations are evident in your voice.

If we base ourselves on the standard arguments marshalled by some participants, that is, that the highest level for the third stage is justified only if the second stage gives positive results, then any step can be seen as inadequate. Nobody has succeeded in giving actual criteria on whether it would be justified, no letter or agreement. Therefore any outcome of Stage Two can be used as a pretext against the summit level. So we would like the United States to come out more definitely on holding a summit.

Generally speaking, most European participants are in favor of holding a summit, but this general situation that I have outlined is standing in the way of it.

Finally, we believe the United States, Mr. President, could say its weighty word in favor of a time limit for ending the Conference. There are many time limits in the past that didn't come off. This left a negative impression. If this one would stick, this would give the entire affair a more positive aspect.

Brezhnev: We have always understood that your need to see a successful outcome is a joint desire of both of us. And we continue to hope this is so. On the other hand, we cannot but agree with the remarks by Comrade Gromyko that our joint role at the Conference is very great. We could do more than we did before. Indeed, that Basket is really being inflated to such an extent.

Let me just cite one fact in this connection. In our last meeting at Pitsunda with Pompidou,⁴ he too spoke out in favor of proceeding with the European Security Conference as soon as possible and he had unfavorable remarks about some of the tactics used to prolong it. It was a bit inconvenient, but I just had to show him one of the proposals that had been made just before by the French delegation. The proposal was that any country, France for example, should be entitled to open a movie theatre in the Soviet Union, governed by French administration, governed by French rules. He was very surprised and said he would immediately give instructions to have it removed.

All this is by way of confirming what Comrade Gromyko just said. Since you and I, Mr. President, are agreed to follow the line of détente, the line of developing good relations between our two peoples, we should agree to take more vigorous action at the European Security Conference and to register our stand along these lines in our final communiqué.

Nixon: I think no useful purpose is served by going into more detail on the enormous number of proposals which are in the Conference. Dr. Kissinger at NATO was alone, with the British and French on the other side, on the German proposal to link the principle of inviolability of frontiers with peaceful change. We are trying to bring our allies along but we can't dictate to them. Now, I suggest, in addition to having some positive language in the communiqué, that we ask our people at the Foreign Office level, whoever is designated by you on your side and whoever is designated by Kissinger on our side, to see if they can sort out how we can get through the details.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Nixon: I would expect this, Mr. General Secretary . . .

Brezhnev: We have got to get this matter off dead center.

Nixon: I would respectfully suggest, Mr. General Secretary, that we should not haggle too much with dotting i's and crossing the t's. In other words, if we want a meeting at the highest level, we ought to be prepared, to the greatest extent possible, to adjust the language of various provisions in a way that will soothe the sensitivities of our allies. The language isn't going to change the fact.

I recall, for example, 15 years ago, Premier Khrushchev and I had a rather extended discussion about a resolution that had just passed our Congress about "liberation of captive peoples." The language there wasn't operative; we were really talking about theory, not a fact.

The Lithuanians I saw dancing last night didn't seem to be captives.

But to return to the point, I propose we get our experts working. Where there is possible "give" on language to see to the sensitivities

⁴ Pompidou visited the Soviet Union March 11–13.

of the Western allies, if it isn't going to have any great significance . . . It would not be, in other words, to have the Conference fail to take place because of a quibble over language. That would be unfortunate.

All they insist on is that it be substantive enough to justify a meeting at the highest level.

Brezhnev: That is true, but there are some things that concern matters of principle and are not minor matters.

Nixon: I understand. That is why I suggest the experts get together. I know language can sometimes be enormously important.

Kissinger: Maybe Hartman and Sonnenfeldt on our side, and Korniyenko, could go over it, and your man in Geneva, and that way we could have an agreed content.

Brezhnev: We will agree to that.

Nixon: I agree.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

227. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Moscow, June 30, 1974.

SUBJECT

The Basket III Case

In my discussion with Korniyenko today I led him through the whole problem of Basket III in Geneva. We reviewed together what had been agreed at Helsinki, namely that proposals would be prepared in Stage II on:

1. *Human Contacts*—to facilitate freer movement including reunification of families, travel for personal or professional reasons, etc.

2. *Information*—to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information; improving conditions for journalists, etc.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 229, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Summits, 1974, June–July, Chronological File. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt wrote a note at the top of the first page: "HAK: I think you should agree with Gromyko on giving instructions to Sherer and Kovalyev in Geneva to carry on where we left off with Korniyenko."

3. *Cooperation in the field of culture*—to facilitate cooperation and exchanges in this area.

4. *Cooperation in the field of education*—to promote greater interchange.

I said that the Europeans felt a deal had been struck in Helsinki that, in return for agreement to write detailed principles (Basket I) which the Soviets wanted, the Soviets agreed to write proposals on human contacts (Basket III). The Europeans are now reluctant to consider further compromise (the Finnish proposal) until they see some evidence that the Soviets are making good on their part of the bargain.

Korniyenko made the usual disparaging remarks about “hundreds of proposals about minor matters that could not possibly be the subject of major international undertakings to compare with the grand declaration of principles.” I advised him that the first step on the road to positive thinking on this subject was to stop making the problem more massive than it is. The Finnish text will eventually protect their position and the job now was to agree to a selection of texts that in effect were largely hortatory. I then gave him, as an example, the two attached texts. The first is an old Canadian text (Tab A) on family reunification. The second is a revised text which we helped guide through the NATO caucus (Tab B).² Our delegation had made every effort to get a text the Soviets could accept. At a meeting on June 26 between the Soviet delegation and a small group of NATO representatives,³ the Soviet delegation paid virtually no attention to this effort. I asked Korniyenko to examine the text carefully and tell me why they could not accept it.

I also gave Korniyenko the titles of a few proposals—I stressed that I did not know if these were the latest ones—on:

contacts and travel (Belgian);
working conditions for journalists (FRG);
printed information (Italy);
freer flow of information (Swiss); and
cultural cooperation (France).

I stressed that progress in registering these texts would make progress on the Finnish compromise possible and indeed might even get us through Stage II.

Korniyenko agreed to get detailed information and texts from his staff in Moscow. He ended by saying that his representative hesitated to give

² Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.

³ Telegram 4110 from Geneva, June 28, contains a summary of the revised text and an account of the meeting on June 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

on Basket III for fear of being pushed to do more and more. I advised him to get some frank advice from Ambassador Sherer who would give him his best advice on how to make progress.

I frankly think that this is as far as we should go in Moscow. We do not have the latest texts or the arcane expertise to give very good advice from here. If you want to go further, in addition to advising close contact with Sherer, the attached paper (Tab C) could be given to Gromyko.⁴ It lists areas where proposals should be agreed.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs⁵

Substance of Basket III

While we cannot give an agreed Western view on an acceptable substantive outcome in Basket III, we can offer our best assessment of the areas that must be covered. We would of course seek to be helpful in seeking compromise formulations.

We believe the final package under basket 3 must include liberally worded declaratory texts pledging participants to (a) facilitate family reunification, and (b) improve access to information of various forms. These will be indispensable, our Allies believe, to overall success of CSCE.

Moreover, we believe that agreement on most of the following matters should be reflected in basket 3:

—A code of conduct pledging improved working conditions for journalists;

—Acceptance in principle of freer contacts for religious purposes;

—Some indication of willingness to permit opening of foreign libraries and reading rooms in several cities in all CSCE participant states;

—General language on stimulating freer travel, including statements on giving to citizens of all participating states facilities allowing them to travel more freely and on the general principle of freer movement;

—Indication of willingness to reduce internal travel controls, along lines of extending the recent relaxation of controls on foreign diplomatic travel in the USSR to journalists, businessmen, and others;

⁴ There is no indication that the paper at Tab C was given to Gromyko.

⁵ No classification marking.

—Language on cessation of radio jamming, which could be interpreted as an assurance that jamming of official broadcasts in vernacular languages (VOA, BBC, and Deutsche Welle) would not be resumed.

On all of the above issues, we believe the texts should be generally worded, establishing a political and moral obligation on participants, but not entailing binding commitments to specific and detailed courses of action.

228. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, July 2, 1974, 4:25–6:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorniy, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA

Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary

Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division

Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President Nixon

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. USA (ret), Assistant to the President

Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary

M. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State

Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff

Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

SUBJECTS

Tour d'horizon (Middle East, SALT, CSCE, MBFR, Southeast Asia)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I also would like to mention we did briefly touch upon the question of the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe. But that, I say, was only briefly touched upon without any detailed discussion. In fact, it was only mentioned, without any elaboration.²

This morning we discussed how to exchange between us in terms of the general situation in Europe. We know in the talks in Vienna there are some who want to include the reduction of national forces, and others who are opposed to the reduction of national forces. We know you don't want these talks to relate to air forces. There are various points of view. So proceeding from our general belief that one cannot do all things in just two years time—that is too small a period—maybe we could all agree that without renouncing our attempts, we continue our efforts but conclude that this question is not yet ripe for a solution.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Nixon: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the question of troops in Europe, we touched upon it only briefly, the General Secretary and I. Here, of course, the proper forum is Vienna because the interests of European allies and the Warsaw Pact—both our allies—are involved. I would hope in the communiqué we could have a strong statement to the effect that we didn't just push this aside lightly and that we are continuing to have intensive and balanced discussions. For example, the General Secretary's suggestion—made only as a preliminary matter, which is not on the table for negotiation—of a 5% reduction on both sides, is one approach. And I would hope we could preserve our efforts to get a more forthcoming discussion on this issue. Because I think while the European Security Conference is not directly connected with MBFR the two questions will inevitably have to be considered together at some point.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: Just one more question, which we need not go into in any detail again. I mention it because we are here in our full delegations. We have agreed to act together and jointly in the European Security Conference so as to make relations between us irreversible, in that as other areas. So one confirmation of that will confirm our efforts.

² See Document 225.

Nixon: I made a commitment to the General Secretary in Camp David, on the porch overlooking Shangri-la, on that subject.³ We did not reach the goal we set at the end of the year. But we have sincerely tried. And as we indicated in our meeting the other day, we will give renewed impetus as a result of our discussions here to what we agreed to so as to achieve the objectives we set at Camp David.

Brezhnev: Good.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the European Security Conference, we have completed discussions on the paragraph that explains our common objective,⁴ and our associates have worked out a means of working out Basket III.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ No record of this conversation has been found. Regarding the summit meeting at Camp David, see Documents 162 and 163.

⁴ Kissinger is referring to the final joint communiqué; see Document 229.

⁵ See Document 227.

229. Editorial Note

At the conclusion of President Nixon's summit meeting with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow, the two sides issued a joint communiqué on July 3, 1974. Among the matters included in the joint communiqué were the European security conference and balanced force reductions:

"Both Sides welcome the major contribution which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making to this beneficial process. They consider that substantial progress has already been achieved at the Conference on many significant questions. They believe that this progress indicates that the present stage of the Conference will produce agreed documents of great international significance expressing the determination of the participating states to build their mutual relations on a solid jointly elaborated basis. The US and USSR will make every effort, in cooperation with the other participants, to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems.

"Both Sides expressed their conviction that successful completion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be an

outstanding event in the interests of establishing a lasting peace. Proceeding from this assumption the USA and the USSR expressed themselves in favor of the final stage of the Conference taking place at an early date. Both Sides also proceed from the assumption that the results of the negotiations will permit the Conference to be concluded at the highest level, which would correspond to the historic significance of the Conference for the future of Europe and lend greater authority to the importance of the Conference's decisions."

The communiqué continues: "The USA and the USSR believe that, in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe, the relaxation of political tension on this continent should be accompanied by measures to reduce military tensions.

"They therefore attach great importance to the current negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, in which they are participating. The two Sides expressed the hope that these negotiations will result in concrete decisions ensuring the undiminished security of any of the parties and preventing unilateral military advantages." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 29, 1974, page 188)

230. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Dusseldorf, July 3, 1974, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher
Dr. Walter Gehlhof, State Secretary, Foreign Office

The Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Genscher: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] What about the CSCE?

Secretary: We had a long talk about the CSCE. We said that Basket III had to have real content so that we could consider the issue of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1653. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved by J. Covey (S). The meeting took place at the airport in Dusseldorf.

whether or not there should be a Summit. I made clear that we were not opposed or in favor of a Summit as a matter of principle. I think we must now address the questions that I posed in Ottawa.²

I also raised the question of “peaceful change.” They rejected putting this language into the inviolability principle. Brezhnev didn’t give the impression that he had a detailed understanding of this question. They are willing to have the reference to peaceful change in the sovereignty principle but they say that the text of the peaceful change language is already agreed. I said that if a reference to peaceful change were to be put in a principle other than inviolability the words would have to be changed for it to make any sense. They asked how? I said that I had no fixed Western position but I thought that if the “only” could be taken out and the reference to “international law” put at the beginning, we might find an acceptable formula. Gromyko didn’t say “no” but on the other hand he never raised it again either. I said either they should take the sentence as agreed and put it in the inviolability principle or accept the changed sentence and put it in the sovereignty principle. If you agree on the wording of the sentence to be put in the sovereignty principle, I could tell Dobrynin in Washington.

Genscher: That may be better than my doing it with Falin. Okay.

Secretary: I urged that there be greater content in Basket III in order to get acceptance of the Finnish formula which we favor. Our discussion of that was inconclusive however.

Genscher: I think that the Basket IIIa which deals with information is very difficult for the Russians. But IIIb on humanitarian concerns is much more important for our people. We’ll review the peaceful change language and talk again in Munich.

Secretary: There was very little discussion in Moscow on MBFR. They really do want a CSCE Summit but they didn’t press it obnoxiously. Could we split Basket III into two—humanitarian and information—and then make a real effort on the first?

Genscher: Yes, I have talked to the Belgians about it and the Canadians and they both seem to feel that way.

Secretary: Can’t the West agree on a unified list of things instead of everyone’s pet schemes? Then the Soviets would know the dimensions of the problem.

Gehlhoff: Do you think that they really worry about that?

Secretary: Yes. It is also good for us to have this idea so that we can make some decision about a Summit question. Why don’t we get a consolidated list among ourselves?

² See Document 214.

Genscher: Good idea. We are ready to do this.

Secretary: If you want, you could send von Well to see us.

Genscher: We could.

Secretary: Maybe we could agree on eight or nine points.

231. Editorial Note

After accompanying President Nixon to Moscow, Secretary of State Kissinger visited Brussels (July 3–4, 1974), Paris (July 4–5), Rome (July 5–6), Munich (July 6–8), London (July 8–9), and Madrid (July 9). During his stop in Brussels, he briefed the North Atlantic Council on July 4 regarding the results of the summit meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. Telegram 3764 from USNATO, July 5, reported on the Secretary's address and the ensuing discussion with NATO representatives. It reads in part:

"Regarding Europe, the Secretary said that first, it was his impression that the Soviet Union is not prepared to make any significant progress right now on MBFR. On CSCE, Mr. Kissinger said the Soviets pressed us very hard for conclusion of the present phase as soon as possible, and for a CSCE summit. He said the U.S. view is as related to the allies previously. Essentially there are two questions: a) does any result now foreseeable justify a summit? and b) if the answer to (a) is affirmative, what would be that result? The Secretary wished to emphasize two things: First, the United States has no agreement with the Soviet Union to produce a CSCE summit. Secondly, the United States would like to remove the whole debate with its allies about approach to CSCE from the level of theology. To do so, he said, we should seek answers together to the two questions he outlined above. He said the U.S. is prepared to work with its allies. The question is, can we together set down a list of eight or ten things we can agree upon which would amount to a successful outcome of the conference? He said that the U.S. was ready to work with its allies. The U.S. would not press its allies either on the substance of the outcome or on the level at which the outcome should be reached. In turn the U.S. did not want to be pressed either. In sum, he said, it is now up to the allies to clarify their own position in consultation with each other. He intended to raise this subject in further detail with the allies he will be seeing bilaterally later during his present European trip."

The telegram continued: "Van Elslande (Belgian Foreign Minister) thanked the Secretary for his complete presentation which contained

a number of interesting details. He further thanked the Secretary for consulting with the allies so promptly after conclusion of the Moscow summit. Van Elslande said he was thankful for the Secretary's clarification on CSCE since, at the time he read the summit communiqué, he had the 'not entirely happy' impression that the U.S. and USSR felt that a conclusion to CSCE might be possible immediately. He noted that the Secretary had now put CSCE back in the context of the Ottawa discussions. He noted that problems remained to be solved before there could be a conclusion to Stage II. Van Elslande asked the Secretary if he thought it possible for the Geneva negotiations to be held up during a period this summer while the allies undertake consultations prior to a resumption, next September. In recent consultations with the Germans, Van Elslande had learned of possible new Soviet MBFR proposals. He asked if the Secretary knew of these and what they might mean for the future."

The telegram noted Kissinger's reply: "Responding to Van Elslande's question on CSCE, the Secretary said that the U.S. position was as he had outlined it before, and remained as outlined, regardless of possible interpretations of the Moscow communiqué. The Secretary urged that the allies consult immediately on what would be a satisfactory conclusion to the CSCE. He did not exclude allied consultations continuing after July, and did not foresee that an agreement in CSCE could be reached by the end of this month. He advised, however, that any recess be undertaken with the greatest discretion in a non-provocative way and in the context of the holiday which is normal for August. With regard to CSCE negotiating tactics, the Secretary urged that the allies move from the present 'bureaucratic' approach, in which every country has a 'shopping list' of what it wants out of Basket III, and into discussion of the 6, 8 or 12 items which can be agreed upon as essential. He suggested that the definition of these essential items be undertaken now in consultations in NATO, in Geneva or in both places. The Secretary said it was important not to turn the Geneva negotiations into a drafting exercise. It was also important not to give the Soviets the impression that the West was engaged in a deliberate campaign of obstructionism. The allies should define what they are after and stick to it. The United States would not push beyond the allied consensus on CSCE, just as it hoped not to be pushed on CSCE outcomes."

The telegraphic account continued: "With regard to MBFR, the Secretary said that nothing had been said in Moscow which went beyond known Soviet positions previously expressed in Vienna, and he noted the Soviets seemed reluctant to be drawn beyond that point. There had been a verbatim repetition of what the Soviets had said in Vienna and they could not be drawn into further discussion. The Secretary's impression is that the Soviets will not move until they know what CSCE

does." The telegram continued: "On MBFR, Krapf asked if the Soviets had given the impression that they were interested only in small symbolic reductions as a prelude to forgetting MBFR, or were they prepared to consider non-U.S. forces. The Secretary repeated that nothing new had emerged from MBFR discussions at the summit. The Soviets had recognized differences with NATO over air and rocket reductions but did not make a special issue of indigenous forces. The Secretary said his impression was that the Soviets wanted to avoid having to make decisions on MBFR. Moreover, they seemed to want to avoid having discussions that might indicate the possibility of an agreement. They therefore seemed afraid to give any affirmative answers that might put them in the need of making firm decisions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

On July 5, Kissinger reported in a message to the President, sent through President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, on the results of his ongoing consultations with the allies: "My discussions in Western Europe thus far have shown substantial support for the results of your Moscow visit. The Europeans have also been highly complimentary about our briefings and consultations before and since the Moscow visit. As a result of the Brussels summit, your bilateral talks there and the earlier Ottawa meeting, European leaders felt they were on the inside. The only potentially troublesome issue is that of the conclusion of the European security conference where the Europeans continue to suspect some sort of U.S.-Soviet deal. I have taken a very strong line, pointing out that it was Western Europe that got us into this conference in the first place, over our own skepticism, that the idea of transforming the Soviet system through 'Basket Three' is absurd and that it was absolutely essential for the West to get a common line on how we want the conference to end. The Germans have been most receptive to these points and Foreign Minister Genscher indicated the other night that they would like to coordinate positions with us. I have also stressed to the French in particular that we are not committed to a summit conclusion but will not be maneuvered into a position where they and others signal a willingness to go to the summit—as Brandt and Pompidou did last year—and we are left alone in opposition. I think the upshot of the discussions will be an effort to harmonize Western positions." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 140, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File)

232. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, July 4, 1974, 8:30–11:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation following Dinner hosted by French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues

PARTICIPANTS

(See Guest List attached)²

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: How do you see the CSCE Conference developing? Are you pressing for a summit? The Soviets seem keen to have one.

Secretary: We are not particularly interested in a summit. We are not pressing anyone on this. If we wanted to press anyone on it, we would do it in a straightforward way.

Sauvagnargues: This whole debate seems to be useless. We probably should support the détente forces in the Soviet Union.

Secretary: What I am saying is this. Every Western leader has been saying that he is willing to go to the summit if the results of this conference warrant it. What we have to determine is what results would warrant a summit. No country knows what it wants. We should do two things: 1) We should decide among ourselves if there is any result that we could imagine that would justify a summit; and 2) we should write down what it is we want so that we can discuss it sensibly with the Soviets. We are willing to say that no outcome justifies a summit, but we ought to take into consideration that there may be broader collateral benefits to having a summit. But no European government has been asked by us to go to a summit.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting took place in the Quai d'Orsay.

² Attached but not printed. The dinner guests from the French side included Sauvagnargues; Geoffroy de Courcel, Secretary General of the Quai d'Orsay; Claude-Pierre Brossolette, Secretary General of the Elysée; Serge Boidevaix, Chef de Cabinet for the Prime Minister; Maurice Ulrich, Director de Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Raoul Delay, Director of Information and Press Services at the Quai d'Orsay. The dinner guests from the American side included Kissinger, Irwin, Sonnenfeldt, Hartman, and Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

Sauvagnargues: I can't see that there is anything in Baskets I or III which would make it worth having such a meeting but perhaps it is unavoidable.

Secretary: But we should speak with some clarity in Moscow.

Sauvagnargues: Perhaps we can't prevent it.

Secretary: We have not decided to go to a summit.

Sauvagnargues: Whether we pass on to Stage III we should agree to define the results. There has been some small progress and the whole exercise is not completely in deficit. We should define the minimum results obtainable, but my staff doesn't like to do this and give it to the Soviets in advance.

Puau:³ The danger is putting it in writing. We may lose from that tactic.

Secretary: Why should we keep our objectives from the Soviets? Why don't we give a piece of paper to them?

Puau: They know very well what we want.

Secretary: There is the trouble. We need to put down point by point what we want. So that the Soviets can see what we are asking. What the totality of our position is.

De Courcel: I don't think there is any result that justifies a summit.

Secretary: Why don't we write the 10, 15 or 6 major things that we want to come out of the conference and give it to the Soviets. I see two possibilities which could come out of this: a suspicious atmosphere if you think we have already agreed to a summit and I can see a deterioration in our relations with the Soviets.

Sauvagnargues: I think the whole thing is a mistake.

Secretary: If your President tells us that he does not wish to see a summit meeting, we would accept that and then consider how to conclude this whole exercise.

Sauvagnargues: We must avoid a permanent organization.

Secretary: As you know, we opposed this whole conference from the beginning. I believe that we should decide now if we don't want a summit and then we should decide how to conclude below the summit level. The worst situation I foresee is one of total stalemate. So you should just tell us what you want.

Sauvagnargues: We should finish this up as soon as possible and treat détente as a continuing process.

³ Francois Puau, Director of Political Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, was among the after-dinner guests.

Secretary: The question is how to conclude. We have to exercise some leadership. No Foreign Minister has ever read the papers that have to do with Basket III, certainly I have not.

Sauvagnargues: I have not.

Secretary: Frankly we opposed this conference and we certainly never liked the idea of a summit but we have the feeling that others have already given this away. I don't know if President Pompidou made a commitment but I am pretty sure Brandt did.

Sauvagnargues: I think that's true.

Secretary: We have never asked anyone to go to the summit. What we need is a common strategy; the worst outcome would be a stalemate.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: I told the Germans that we should find some way to finish this exercise in the CSCE. It would be dangerous and senseless to have a stalemate. If we don't want a Summit we should tell the Soviets so.

233. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Miesbach, July 6, 1974, 12:20–3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther Van Well, Political Director

Amb. Berndt Von Staden, Ambassador to U.S.A.

Mr. Dannenbring, Chief, North American Desk

Mr. Von Pachelbel, Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman

Mr. Weber, Foreign Ministry

Dr. Kinkel, Chef de Cabinet of Minister Genscher

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, Ambassador to FRG

Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1974. Secret. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at Gut Vogelsang in Miesbach, Bavaria.

(Secretary Kissinger and Minister Genscher walked in the garden before the group convened for lunch. After social conversation, the following exchange took place at luncheon between Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Van Well:)

Kissinger: We will not drive Europe to the Summit.

Van Well: It may not be realistic not to go.

Kissinger: Then we should sell the Summit for better texts.

I have the impression from Moscow that the Russians will not agree to the substance of Basket III until they know the nature of the overall program. Because they're afraid they'll be continually asked for more. I think if we promise them a summit we can get nine tenths of what we ask for.

Van Well: We should be careful not to break apart, in the West. The problem is if we then see the result and it is bad.

Kissinger: But we can't afford not to have a conclusion.

You'll be under no time pressure from us.

Von Staden: We have to see what the time of it is.

Kissinger: What I'm afraid of also is: We'll start out being very tough and then we'll end up selling it for nothing. If your view is the dominant one, we should sell the summit for concessions. The worst situation is to have a deadlock and get exhausted and the governments will give in.

Van Well: They'll certainly come to the third phase with their top people. We'll be in the embarrassing situation of accepting something we don't regard as sufficient.

Kissinger: If you ask my frank opinion, the Russians can force a summit. Because if the East Europeans all go there with their heads of government, the West will look ridiculous.

Van Well: Yes.

Sonnenfeldt: Did the Pope say he will go?

Kissinger: He spoke well of the European Security Conference, really.²

Van Well: We'll speak to the French in this direction. We don't want to have divergence among the Nine and NATO.

Kissinger: You shouldn't.

Van Well: In addition, there is lots of drafting to be done.

Kissinger: And CBM's. I don't think we should have it until fall.

² A memorandum of Kissinger's conversation with Pope Paul VI on July 5 is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860119-0589.

Van Well: We need a few weeks for drafting anyway. We can conclude the big setup in Geneva by the end of July.

Sonnenfeldt: That may make it easier for the Russians, to keep the coordination group continuing.

Kissinger: You'll hear the peculiar argument from the French that it will be difficult to keep the 10 points secret from the Russians once we agree on them. We should tell them the purpose is to present them to the Russians.

Van Well: This is the classic French style. The apparatus continues with the old policy until it is reversed by the political level. The first sign of a change of position never comes from the apparatus.

Sonnenfeldt: As opposed to our system, where the ideas all come from the apparatus.

Kissinger: In our system the apparatus never pays attention to the political level either before or after.

We also have Basket II and CBM's to do.

Let me ask you, Mr. Van Well, since you are so dominating this discussion: Have you read all the documents?

Van Well: That will teach me to keep quiet. (Laughter)

Kissinger: Have you, Arthur?

Hartman: Yes! I've even redrafted some of them.

Genscher: (stands) I have permission from the Bavarian Government to welcome you here. So I can give you our warm welcome here. I'm hoping for the best for our talks and also for the football game. (All drink a toast.)

Hartman: The Dutch Foreign Minister will be watching!

Kissinger: (rises) On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to thank you for the welcome. And we are all glad that our consultation can be so extensive. (Laughter)

Seriously, in the short period we have known each other, a spirit of friendship has developed between us. Tomorrow I have to maintain our formal neutrality. But here, in the absence of the Dutch Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, I can show my true feeling. (Laughter)

(After lunch, out on the patio, the group sat around the table for coffee.)

Genscher: I would like Van Well to report on the subject we briefly discussed in Duesseldorf, with the wording we drafted.

Van Well: The formula you discussed in Moscow is a great step forward and would be quite acceptable to us. There is only one point—the formula we advanced had one point: "Nothing in the declaration works against this principle," so that the other principles wouldn't be seen as *lex specialis* with respect to the first principle. We would like

to maintain the formula in the French draft. All the principles are of equal value and would be read in light of the others. So the first principle isn't being relativized³ by the other principles. If that could be maintained—and it's being discussed already in Geneva and the Soviets are receptive—it would be a great advance. To put "international law" in front and delete "only."

Kissinger: I'd prefer not to have to go back to the Russians with another change. We would be glad to support what you want in the tenth principle.

Sauvagnargues—he's going to Moscow—asked me if I can give him the content of what I discussed with Gromyko. May I give him this?

Van Well: Yes.

Genscher: We'll see him Monday.

Kissinger: So we'll both give it to him. I'll answer his cable.⁴

Genscher: Do you think it is possible to take this line that Van Well suggested?

Kissinger: I discussed this with Van Well at lunch. If we give them the summit we can get what we want. The worst thing is to have a deadlock and then get pushed to it. It's hard to say a document agreed by 35 nations isn't worth a summit. Especially if the East Europeans all go.

Sonnenfeldt: I think this formula has a chance. The addition to the tenth principle is another matter.

Van Well: In the reservation we put down on the fourth of April, it was there.

Kissinger: What is this point that Sauvagnargues mentioned?

Van Well: It is not a German point but a tripartite point. He says the principle of sovereignty might be invoked by the GDR against your

³ "Revitalized" in English.

⁴ The cable containing Sauvagnargues' request has not been found. Telegram Secto 203/1037 from Munich to Paris, July 6, contained Kissinger's reply: "You may tell Foreign Minister [Sauvagnargues] that Secretary has informed Genscher of his discussion in Moscow on CSCE 'peaceful change' as follows: —Secretary told Soviets that Germans still preferred 'peaceful change' language to be attached to 'inviolability' principle. If Soviets objected to that, then 'peaceful change' language itself would have to be altered to make it appropriate for use in another principle, for example, sovereignty. —Brezhnev said but this question already agreed. But language in sovereignty principle as accepted in Geneva. —After Secretary said again language could be changed, they said how. Secretary suggested 'in accordance with international law, the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.' Soviets didn't say 'no' but didn't raise again either. Secretary agreed with Genscher to mention it again to Dobrynin in Washington." The account continued: "At meeting today, Genscher confirmed language quoted in para 1 and said he would also discuss it with French Foreign Minister on Monday." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

right of access to Berlin. So far our idea is that it is not a legal document but a declaration of principles. But the Soviets will certainly use it as an “important document.” So what we need is in Article 10–2: “This does not affect existing documents signed by participating states or states concerned by them.” This means the Quadripartite Agreement and also us, because we’re “concerned.”

Kissinger: (to Sonnenfeldt and Hartman:) Do we have any problem with this?

Sonnenfeldt: It is all right with us.

Genscher: If we can get this other point, and this way preserve an agreed position, we can live with it. It is not very pleasant for us for domestic reasons, but we can live with it.

Kissinger: Is it better to have it or not to have it?

Genscher: I think it is better to have it, frankly. Better to have it.

Since we are speaking about these rights and responsibilities, we have a question about the Moscow communiqué portion about the Quadripartite Treaty. At the end of the communiqué, there is a statement about “strict and consistent . . .

Sonnenfeldt: . . . implementation.”⁵

Genscher: In the GDR text they say it means “fulfillment.” People wonder why you didn’t use the wording of “strict application and observance.”

Kissinger: There was no reason. Absolutely no reason. It was wording that was not offensive to us.

Genscher: I told the new French Ambassador that “strict” was what the Russians wanted and “fulfillment” was what we wanted, to fill it in.

Sonnenfeldt: Absolutely.

Kissinger: Absolutely. It was not a political decision. We didn’t even discuss it.

Genscher: We didn’t make a fuss. We noticed it was referred to as the “Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.”⁶ (?) It used to be West Berlin.

Kissinger: The communiqué should have been signed by Sonnenfeldt and Korniyenko.

⁵ The joint U.S.-Soviet communiqué issued at the conclusion of President Nixon’s visit to Moscow on July 3 included a passage on Berlin: “Both Sides also stressed that the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, must continue to play a key role in ensuring stability and détente in Europe. The US and USSR consider that the strict and consistent implementation of this Agreement by all parties concerned is an essential condition for the maintenance and strengthening of mutual confidence and stability in the center of Europe.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 29, 1974, p. 188)

⁶ It is unclear to which passage of the U.S.-Soviet communiqué Genscher is referring; none of the passages uses the phrase “Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.”

Van Well: We wanted “full application” meaning “maintenance and development of ties.” The German press hasn’t taken it up.

Kissinger: If the German press does take it up, it would help if you take our position. We don’t need another story about European disappointment with the communiqué. All the people who will be most isolationist are now on this.

There is no significance to it. We would not accept any such interpretation.

Genscher: We will take the opportunity to invite the American correspondents in Bonn on background to state our position.

Kissinger: That’s the best. To us, the most significant thing in Moscow was that they didn’t press us to take positions contrary to you. Compared to last year.

Sonnenfeldt: Could you avoid saying that you brought us around to your point of view, and say instead there was never any difference of view?

Genscher: Yes.

Sonnenfeldt: The American press will immediately say we went out ahead of the Europeans and the Europeans pulled us back. They are already saying this about CSCE.

Van Well: This came out of Ottawa. They said this before.

Kissinger: Our press is looking for things to attack the President with. We are going to have a merry month.

Genscher: We have no more on CSCE.

Van Well: We will talk further Monday and Tuesday.⁷

Kissinger: We are for that.

Van Well: Then the political discussion on Wednesday, and we would very much like to have a discussion in NATO. We would like to have unanimity in NATO.

Kissinger: That is fine.

Van Well: The question is who should sound out the Soviets once we have the 10 points.

Kissinger: We can decide on that. We can do it or we can designate someone. We have no fixed idea. What is your idea? If the French want to do it, we have no objection.

Hartman: A small group of countries met in Geneva; they might be a good group to do it.

Kissinger: We haven’t thought about who should do it. We don’t want, in order to bring the French back, to lean over backward so they

⁷ July 8 and 9.

are rewarded for a year of impossible behavior. Just because they are doing what all the others were doing normally.

Van Well: It might be a good occasion to let Sauvagnargues do it.

Kissinger: He goes next week (to Moscow).

Van Well: Too quick.

Kissinger: I don't mind him presenting peaceful change. I presented it as our idea, not endorsed by the allied position.

Van Well: You could do it with Dobrynin.

Kissinger: I will do it on Wednesday. We are dropping "only."

Van Well: On CBM's, there is a question as to whether we should agree only to the so-called "border zones."

Kissinger: I think the Soviets will agree to some distance beyond the borders, but not 900 kilometers.

Van Well: They already agreed to 100 kilometers. It is impractical that each country have border zones. It is only a Soviet problem; all other countries accepted the whole country.

Genscher: Practically the result is the same, if you include wide border areas. If you say 200 kilometers, it would mean practically all of France, or us, or Austria. So I feel this idea circulated by the Russians, namely a coastal strip to be included—but how could we get Italy or us?

Kissinger: If they are accepting the whole country, why be so complicated? I think they might agree to 200, 250.

Van Well: They have already talked about 300.

Kissinger: Then we have to agree on the size of the unit.

Van Well: These are not central points with us.

Genscher: This should be on a voluntary basis. Should it include military districts?

Kissinger: You would prefer having 200–300 kilometers in the Soviet Union and all of the territory of the rest of the European states?

Van Well: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it is no problem. I think they will accept that.

How should we do it? Geneva?

Van Well: It should be according to the rules of the Geneva group.

Kissinger: All right. Give your delegation your instructions. (to Hartman:) Make sure Sherer knows of this conversation.

Van Well: Ask for 500; otherwise we will get 200 if you ask for 300.

Genscher: You think 300 is possible?

Kissinger: Let's stick to 500 and agree we will settle for 300. And we will not do less than 300.

Van Well: There is another point. All these things are interconnected. Basket III depends very much on the Preamble. We agree that

the Finnish draft is very good with respect to the general declaration of principles. The Soviets accept the general declaration of principles only if there is reference to the “political, economic, and cultural foundation of states” and “respect for laws and regulations.”

Kissinger: I don’t believe that; I think they will drop it out. That is my instinct. Every time I spoke with Gromyko I heard him say he needs something on laws and regulations; I never heard him insist on political institutions.

Hartman: They don’t like mini-preambles but I don’t think we do either.

Van Well: The problem now is in Basket I, not in Basket III. If we could drop “each State respects the political order of the others.”

Kissinger: I agree.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

234. Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, July 7, 1974, 2:45–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Sir Thomas Brimelow, Permanent Under Secretary and Head of Diplomatic Service

Sir Peter Ramsbotham, Ambassador to U.S.A.

Sir John Killick, Deputy Under Secretary

Sir Donald Maitland, Deputy Under Secretary

Tom McNally, Political Secretary to Callaghan

John Thomson, Assistant Under Secretary

Lord Nicholas Gordon-Lennox, Head of North American Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Walter Annenberg, Ambassador to Court of St. James’s

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, United Kingdom (17). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.

Earl Sohm, DCM
Alan James, Political Counselor
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

SALT; Aircraft Sales to USSR; Indochina; Spain; Middle East; CSCE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Callaghan: [He picks up his briefing paper on CSCE, which he gives Kissinger, Tab A.]² “General objectives.” They list five things. We don’t have time for all five now.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets were predictable, pressing for a rapid conclusion, but not as obnoxiously as last year. My impression is: we have 23 papers and the Soviets may fear that if they give in once, they will be asked for continual concessions. My impression is, if we can agree on concrete things, they tell me the substance won’t be all that difficult.

On peaceful change, I gave them that text Van Well did in Ottawa. I frankly can’t tell the difference. They reject totally the idea that the text, once registered, can be reopened. They totally reject putting it into the inviolability principle. With respect to the sovereignty principle, I gave them my recollection of what Van Well had done. I have since confirmed it with Van Well.³ Gromyko told me he would have experts study it; he usually doesn’t need experts on matters dealing with Germany. So maybe they will absorb it if they know it is the last concession. But Genscher is happy with it if the Russians will accept it.

Secretary Callaghan [Reads from paragraph 3 of his paper at Tab A:]⁴ “We should work for a sizeable area.” Isn’t that reasonable?

Secretary Kissinger: Can we agree on what it means?

Secretary Callaghan: The Europeans?

Secretary Kissinger: The Europeans and Americans. My impression, based on nothing, is that they would accept 250–300 kilometers.

² The undated paper, “CSCE: General Objectives,” is attached but not printed.

³ Telegram Tosec 440/147348, July 9, reported on Ambassador Cash’s conversation earlier the same day with Van Well in Bonn: “Van Well stated that everything will be carried out exactly as agreed in Munich.” It continued: “With regard to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Van Well expressed the hope that the USG would proceed on the basis of what the Secretary and Genscher had agreed in Munich.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁴ Point 3 of the British paper at Tab A, “Confidence-building measures,” reads as follows: “We want a text covering notification of maneuvers which would in practice involve all major participants in notifying the more important maneuvers which took place on their territory to all interested parties (in the case of the Soviet Union, only a part of its territory would be involved; but we should work for a sizeable area).”

Mr. Thomson: As long as we hold tight now.

Secretary Callaghan: I am sure we can agree. Dr. Kissinger keeps telling us to get a position. [He picks up his paper again.] On economic questions—this is only words.⁵

Sir Killick: No problem there.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this is a problem.

Secretary Callaghan: Human contacts—I think we should stick with that one.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Secretary Callaghan: 5(B)—information.⁶

Secretary Kissinger: Genscher says he doesn't give a damn. I think we can get what we want if we just sit down and write it down.

Sir Killick: It is like a chicken-and-egg problem—we can't say we are satisfied until we see it.

Secretary Kissinger: The French have ingenious theories—that there can't be an agreement because then there will be a summit. [Laughter] But having gone this far, we can't stymie an important Soviet policy without paying a price.

Secretary Callaghan: If we get these, I will go to the summit.

Secretary Kissinger: The Germans—whom I didn't press or even express an opinion to—seemed to be willing to go to the summit if there is agreement at Geneva. If 35 nations agree on something, it is hard to keep out of a summit, especially if all the Europeans come.

We will support 5(a) [on human contacts].⁷

Secretary Callaghan: Who drafts it?

Secretary Kissinger: We will instruct our people to work with yours in Geneva, or elsewhere.

Sir Killick: We may have to resort to a highest common denominator—the Germans are most interested in families, the French in information . . .

⁵ Point 4 of the British paper, "Economic questions," reads as follows: "We want texts which will encourage a practical approach to the development of co-operation without prejudging questions (such as most favored nation treatment), which should be dealt with in negotiations designed to secure effective reciprocity."

⁶ Point 5(b) of the British paper, "Information," reads as follows: "This is perhaps the most sensitive area. We should be able to get agreement to a gradual improvement of present practices, particularly over access to information; and we should keep up the pressure for better working conditions for journalists."

⁷ Point 5(a) of the British paper, "Human contacts," reads as follows: "We should be able to get a degree of endorsement of the general objective of freer movement, and some helpful specific provisions on the humanitarian issues: marriages and family reunification."

Secretary Kissinger: Let's write it down.

Secretary Callaghan: Let's start doing this so the Russians will see we are in earnest.

Secretary Kissinger: If we are seen to be deliberately obstructing, we will pay an enormous price.

All we have now is a multiplication of Western desiderata.

The French have a theory that it's a problem how to keep from the Russians the five things once we have an agreed text. [Laughter] I thought we wanted to give it to the Russians.

Secretary Callaghan: How do we handle it?

Secretary Kissinger: We should get together in NATO, or Geneva, or both, and work out these texts. We should put down our real position—on paragraphs 3 and 5—and present it to the Russians as a package and say, "If you give us this, we will go to the summit." We'll get 95 percent. They are such chisellers.

Secretary Callaghan: If we ask for 105 percent, we will get 100 percent!

You have to go to the Prime Minister's now.

[There was a brief discussion of what to say to the press. Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Hartman then departed on foot to No. 10 Downing Street.]

235. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, July 12, 1974, 10:09 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatoly.

D: Hello, Henry. I am really glad to hear your voice.

K: I am so busy doing your work in the European Security Conference and elsewhere that we're not in contact anymore.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 28, Anatoli Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

D: Well, for a change I think it is useful. Really. To do something . . . well, Henry have to thank you for the opportunity to meet on Monday because I go for a rather long vacation on Tuesday.

K: Ok, can we have lunch on Monday.²

D: Yes, that is very good. Yes, and if you don't mind to look through on those agreements which have an understanding on what we are going to do from an organizational point of view. When we will begin it and . . .

K: Absolutely. And also I want to tell you what we have done on the European Security Conference, because I think we have got it in a very positive direction now, if you cooperate a little bit on Basket III.

D: Well, do you have any concrete suggestions? This is important.

K: I think we have broken the back on the Summit idea.

D: Already.

K: I think we are well on the way. But don't go around saying this.

D: No, no, no.

K: No, you won't, but sometimes your people in the lower regions are not as subtle as you are.

D: On this only Gromyko and myself are looking, otherwise he will keep this close to his heart. It is a project he likes very much.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² No record of this lunch meeting on July 15 has been found.

236. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt)**¹

Washington, July 19, 1974.

CSCE: Allied Study of Minimum Desired Results

We face, as you are aware, an uphill effort in achieving Allied agreement to pursue a study of minimum CSCE results that would justify a summit. The Nine paper presented in NAC² is hardly more than a checklist of issues before CSCE, and the Nine apparently have no intention now of moving toward (a) narrowing the contentious issues in Basket 3 by excluding some Western desiderata now on the table in Geneva; or (b) defining more precisely their desiderata on various topics. The Nine position doubtless stems from recognition that they would be in domestic trouble, if the press and opposition parties got wind that the Allies were backing-off on Basket 3 issues which have not really been discussed yet with the Soviets. Nor do *they* feel under any time pressure to define satisfactory results before the autumn *after* the East-West debate resumes. In fact, the more we emphasize time pressures, the more their suspicions are aroused.

The issue then is how to nudge the Allies along toward a more precise and realistic definition of objectives in *Basket 3* and toward an agreed fallback position on CBM's, without pressing them so hard we would risk a new US-European confrontation, but in a way that this autumn we would be in a position to show the Soviets that we have made a strong effort to bring CSCE to a conclusion.

We need not expend much effort on other CSCE issues, for the outline of satisfactory results on principles is in hand, Basket 2 issues are out of the woods, and conference follow-up will not be ripe for debate until the first three agenda items are largely cleared away.

But on CBM's, we will need to keep pressing the Allies, and especially the EC members, to come to an explicit understanding on the fall-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 11, POL 3-1 CSCE General. Secret; Exdis; Sensitive. Drafted by Streator and Floyd with the concurrence of Lowenstein. At the top of the memorandum, Hartman wrote: "Arva [Floyd] has done a 1st class job on this and I recommend we get these messages out fast. I see no issues for the Secretary." Sonnenfeldt wrote, "I agree!" Tabs E-H are attached but not printed.

² On July 15, the French Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, de Rose, presented a paper approved by the EC-Nine on minimum objectives at the CSCE. Telegram 3900 from USNATO, July 15, contains the text of the paper. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

back positions that the British and Germans have signaled to us bilaterally. We informed the NAC on July 10,³ and instructed Rumsfeld to reiterate on July 17 and July 19,⁴ what we think the fallback should be:

—On maneuvers, thirty days prior notification for reinforced division and above (about 20,000 men) taking place on the land mass of Europe, but in the European USSR, including only a broad band of territory on its Western border.

—Drop prior notification of troop movements.

We will also need to press the Allies to have a serious discussion on Basket 3 over the next weeks, and to get the results of the discussion recorded in a document that is more than a checklist of issues.

The Secretary should raise this problem with Genscher, and we will provide a paper and talking points for their forthcoming meeting. We may also want to move bilaterally with the British and French, depending on progress in NAC and at Geneva, where the study will be prepared for NAC review.

Beyond this, we need to give Bud Sherer detailed guidance on the Basket 3 issues for his use in priming the study pump at Geneva.

To refresh your memory, here is a list of the 12 Basket 3 issues which the EC Nine believe should be the subject of CSCE texts:

A. *Human Contacts*

1. Family Visits (Registered Text)
2. Family Reunification
3. Marriages
4. Right to Travel

B. *Information*

5. Written Information
6. Radio/TV
7. Working Conditions for Journalists

C. *Culture*

8. Access to Literary Works, etc.
9. Exchanges
10. Contacts among Artists

D. *Education*

11. Contacts between Educators and Scientists (Registered Text)
12. Access to Educational and Scientific Institutions (Registered Text)

³ Telegram Secto 229/4339 from Madrid to USNATO, July 9, provided an outline for Rumsfeld's opening remarks to the North Atlantic Council on July 10. (Ibid.)

⁴ Telegrams 153816, July 16, and 156180, July 18, transmitted the instructions to Rumsfeld. (Ibid.)

Three of these texts (family visits; contacts between educators and scientists; and access to educational and scientific institutions—at Tab E) have already been registered in Geneva and are not likely to be seriously controversial. A fourth document (written information) has been under active discussion in Geneva for some time and may soon be registered; the current version of this paper on access to information, complementing an already registered text on dissemination of information, is at Tab F. As for the sensitive family reunification issue, the NATO caucus at Geneva produced a text on this in June and presented it informally to the Soviets (Tab G). Given the intense FRG interest in it, we believe it is too hot to handle in the NATO caucus and we should not propose tampering with it. Eventually, we might ask the Secretary to discuss the matter bilaterally with Genscher, if the Soviets find the text too much to swallow.

On the marriage issue, the Norwegian draft (Tab H) should not be too hard for the Soviets to digest, except for the passage that would require issuance of exit permits for the children of married couples (the defector problem). We believe we should leave it to the Soviets to eliminate children.

Our delegation in Geneva believes the two remaining topics under the cultural subheading (exchanges and contacts) are not key issues and should not provoke serious controversy.

The EC Nine have not listed two texts tabled by the Vatican, one on religious contacts and the other on access to religious information, although several of their delegations have expressed general support for them. Our judgment is that the Vatican, which has greatly strengthened its relations with Eastern European countries in recent years, is astute enough not to insist on the impossible and that the Soviets will make a few symbolic concessions. In any event, I do not think we should put ourselves in the middle of this issue.

That leaves four texts that we believe the Allies should now discuss in detail with a view toward cutting out some non-negotiable fat. We have developed guidance to Sherer on each in the draft telegram at the tabs shown, and have also included the corresponding Western text(s), as well as spread sheets comparing the specific substantive aspects of the texts in play.

- Working Conditions for Journalists (Tab A)⁵
- Right to Travel (Tab B)⁶

⁵ Tab A is the draft text of Document 237.

⁶ Tab B is the draft text of telegram 157019 to Geneva, July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

—Broadcast and Filmed Information (Tab C)⁷

—Access to Literary Works (Tab D)⁸

Overall guidance to Sherer on the approach he should take to the review of Basket 3 issues is included in the draft telegram at Tab A. In summary, our proposed revisions would blunt the cutting edge of all four texts, especially those on journalists, radio broadcasts and access to literary works.

The Allies will not be pleased with our suggested changes to texts they have sponsored, and some of their disgruntlement is certain to leak to the media. But if we do not begin to move on these texts now, we will not have put the Allies on early notice that we are serious about searching for middle ground, and we will not be in a position to argue with the Soviets that we tried to meet some of their concerns. We come closest in these telegrams to having it both ways, that is neither antagonizing the Soviets or seeming to sell-out the Allies. If we push any harder, however, we may find ourselves isolated.

Recommendation

That you approve the telegrams at Tabs A–D.

⁷ Tab C is the draft text of telegram 157020 to Geneva, July 19. (Ibid.)

⁸ Tab D is the draft text of telegram 157018 to Geneva, July 19. (Ibid.)

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, July 19, 1974, 2103Z.

157032. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 issues. Geneva for Ambassador Sherer, US CSCE Del.

1. NAC discussions and other reports of Nine views indicate that we confront an uphill effort to reach Allied agreement on minimum

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Streater and cleared by Hartman, Lowenstein, Humphrey (EUR/SOV), Small (L), Robert Anderson (S/PRS), Wozniak (USIA), and Fry (S/S). Approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to USNATO, Moscow, and NATO capitals.

satisfactory CSCE results.² Nonetheless, we wish to pursue this exercise, for we believe that only through intra-Allied debate on the issues at play can we begin to bring the Allies to consider the choices they will need to make, especially with regard to Basket 3 and CBM's. Thus, you should take a strong lead in the work of the NATO caucus in Geneva, pressing for the development of the text of a study which clearly identifies the issues in Basket 3, and that fleshes out in reasonable detail principal Allied objectives in these areas.

2. For the purposes of this exercise, we are prepared generally to accept the Nine paper³ as it relates to Baskets 1 and 2, though we may have editorial changes to suggest. The portion of Basket 1 on CBM's can be left to be worked out in NATO. (For USNATO: we assume SPC will develop contribution on CBM's, and you should base your approach on previous guidance, including Madrid 4339.)⁴

3. With regard to Basket 3, your objective should be to stimulate a discussion of each of the texts, including anticipated Eastern attitudes toward each. Based on the discussion, the operative elements of each text should be set out succinctly so that in the ensuing NAC review PermReps will be in a position also to discuss them. Where there are differences in Allied views, bracketed texts should be included, together with an indication of respective national positions, as a further aid to NAC review. Finally, you should strive to elicit a rough order of priority among the texts, looking toward a narrowing of the number to, say, six to eight. While we may not be able to get agreement at this stage to paring the number down, prioritization now would help with this later in NAC discussion.

4. As a contribution to this exercise, we will provide you with suggested drafts on selected issues, drawing on the helpful suggestions in Geneva 4464.⁵ The first of these texts, on working conditions for jour-

² In telegram 4464 from Geneva, July 13, Sherer sent operative language on key Basket III issues and strongly urged the Department to reconsider its intention to try to reach agreed texts on these points at NATO. He believed that there would be considerable resistance to such an initiative, but that such resistance would be substantially less if the drafting of texts was left to the NATO caucus in Geneva. Sherer stated: "Our allies fear that if we set out our minimum essential requirements in specific drafts, we will be forced to negotiate for less. For this reason, they would prefer objectives to be listed in outline form, as in the EC-9 paper on this subject (Geneva 4443), with flexibility left to negotiators in Geneva to adapt texts as necessary. If we advance in NATO drafts which are clearly aimed toward compromise, allied fears will be reinforced, and their resistance to this project may well be strengthened. It is only after confronting rigid Soviet resistance that our allies will be willing to accept compromise texts." (Ibid.) Telegram 4443 from Geneva, July 12, is *ibid.*

³ See footnote 2, Document 236.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 236.

⁵ See footnote 2 above.

nalists, is provided below. Others will follow by septels on broadcast information, travel, access to literary works.⁶ As you will note, we have moderated some of the texts to render them more realistic in terms of negotiability with the Soviets.

5. Consistent with the approach outlined above, our drafts, too, will cover what we regard as the key operative passages.

6. We do not intend to provide a text on the family reunification issue because of its sensitivity for the FRG. We also note that an Allied paper on this issue has been largely agreed in the NATO caucus and has been discussed with the Soviets. On the marriage issue, we can support the Norwegian paper as a succinct statement of Allied desiderata. Nor do we plan at this time to provide you with texts on secondary, and probably non-controversial, issues of cultural exchanges and cultural contacts.

7. There follows the text covering working conditions for journalists:

Begin text. That visas and residence permits for journalists and their technical staffs be granted as expeditiously as possible. That steps be taken to grant journalists greater freedom of travel within participating states in pursuit of their professional activities and that the necessary travel permits be granted within a reasonable period of time.

That journalists not be subject to expulsion for normal professional activities.

That steps will be taken to facilitate journalists' contacts, in pursuit of their professional activities, with officials of the participating states, as well as with private individuals.

That journalists be allowed to carry with them equipment and materials necessary for the exercise of their profession.

That journalists be allowed to transmit, fully and without delay, the materials which are the results of their professional activity. *End text.*

Ingersoll

⁶ See footnotes 6–8, Document 236.

238. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 23, 1974, 1800Z.

4724. Subj: CSCE: Consultations on essentials. Refs: State 157032,² State 157020, State 157018, State 157019,³ State 158622.⁴

1. US rep (Sherer) presented US views on further Allied consultations on essentials at NATO delegation heads' caucus July 23. Drawing fully on reftels, Sherer proposed work program for remainder of this week to come to agreed document prior to CSCE recess.

2. Immediate unanimous reaction of Allied delegation heads was bitter and resentful. Noting there had been no agreement in NAC on timing or nature of this exercise, delegation heads expressed "surprise" and "shock" that US should make what they considered such an unreasonable and imprudent proposal. As foreshadowed by our earlier cables on this subject, delegation heads questioned utility and wisdom of exercise proposed by US and recalled fact that Basket III texts already exist which were drafted through long consultation process in EC-9 and NATO, based in large part on US inputs. New texts could only be written after these texts had been fully discussed in the CSCE drafting process.

3. Allied delegation heads further suggested that US presentation indicated "extreme under-estimation of the importance of CSCE," and recalled that in NAC discussions all delegations except US were unanimous in agreeing that this exercise cannot and should not be done at this time.

4. In view of informal CSCE meeting to discuss neutral package deal for Basket III preamble (see septel),⁵ NATO delegation heads' caucus was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Moscow, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, and USNATO.

² Document 237.

³ See footnotes 6–8, Document 236.

⁴ Telegram 158622 to Geneva, July 23, reads as follows: "Further to State 157032, it may help you to keep feet of Allied reps to the fire as you press for definition of minimum acceptable CSCE outcomes to indicate that we envisage exchanges at ministerial level as the exercise proceeds. We have recommended, for example, that the Secretary raise it this week with Foreign Minister Genscher during the latter's visit to the US. You may also state that we are prepared to take the issues to appropriately high political levels in other governments as necessary to resolve them." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁵ Not further identified.

cut short, and it was agreed to resume this discussion afternoon of July 24. With delegates due to begin departing from Geneva on July 25, this will leave very little time for drafting of any NATO caucus paper before the recess. Nevertheless, some NATO delegations are looking for a way to make a gesture toward US position this week. In these circumstances our objective at next NATO caucus will be to put together some kind of paper, hopefully including US suggested texts, even if these have to be annexed or bracketed to make the arrangement acceptable.

5. We are not optimistic that any paper can be agreed before the recess, but whatever can be managed will certainly fall far short of what we have proposed.

Abrams

239. Editorial Note

On July 26, 1974, the Department of State sent to the Mission in Geneva telegram 161424, cleared by Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman and approved in its substance by Secretary of State Kissinger. The telegram instructed the United States delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: "You should table as soon as possible the following language for inclusion in principle one on sovereign equality: 'In accordance with international law, the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.' " For the origins of this language on "peaceful change," see Document 233. Telegram 4839 from Geneva, July 26, reported that the delegation tabled the formulation on peaceful change the same morning. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Telegram 161424 was sent in direct response to a request from the West German Foreign Office. In telegram 11610 from Bonn, July 23, the Embassy reported that "the FRG is asking the U.S. CSCE delegation to table the agreed language on 'peaceful change' and Bonn thinks it must be done yet this week before the recess." The West German Foreign Office had said "U.S. introduction would be natural since the Secretary had raised this matter with the Soviets." (Ibid.)

240. Memorandum of Conversation¹

San Clemente, California, July 26, 1974, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Martin Hillenbrand, Ambassador to Bonn

German Side

Hans Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Gunther Van Well, Political Director
Berndt Von Staden, Ambassador to US
Dr. Weber, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] With respect to the CSCE, which I discussed with the Chancellor in Brussels,² we understand your position on peaceful change and its importance to you. It is a difficult subject to discuss with the Soviets but we are trying our best to get the Soviets to accept our position. We have taken note of recent disturbances on the autobahn,³ and we will drag our feet on the East German thing, having in mind that this sort of harassment must not be allowed to plague our relations.

Genscher: Our two governments are in agreement on CSCE. If satisfactory solutions can be found, we should be prepared to move ahead, perhaps ending in a summit. The possibility of a summit should be integrated into our negotiating position. The issue of peaceful change is not only important to Germany, but also to Europe. An absolute freeze of borders could also be contrary to European unity. We have been grateful for your support in this matter. With reference to the autobahn, our general line should be that if the Soviets do not accept the impor-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, June 1–August 8, 1974, 1 of 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the President's office.

² No record of Nixon's conversation with Schmidt on June 26 has been found.

³ In telegram 1256 from Berlin, July 26, the Mission reported: "East Germans appear to have initiated some harassment of transit traffic in wake of establishment of Federal Environmental Agency in West Berlin. Mission has learned so far of five cases, starting morning July 26, in which private autos were stopped at crossing points (Hirschberg, Drewitz, Marienborn and Staaken) and passenger either asked if they worked for the FEA or were simply told that reason for delay was because of establishment of FEA. Delays varied from ten minutes to hour, after which all travelers were permitted to proceed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

tance of Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement, they will endanger détente policy. I am grateful you are prepared to drag your feet on GDR relations until the situation is clarified.⁴ The Eastern side must recognize that they cannot have their cake and eat it too. What we want is that the Four Power Agreement be maintained, and this is not an unreasonable position.

President: You can be sure that, as far as the peaceful change issue is concerned, I fully agree that this is not only a sensitive matter for Germany, but also for a divided Europe. Our Russian friends cannot take the position that they can simply draw a line down the middle of Europe, on one side of which nothing can change but the other side of which is a happy hunting ground for them. If change is tolerable in Western Europe then the same should also apply to Eastern Europe. The question is not only how to get language, but also how actually to bring about peaceful change in Eastern Europe. Anyone who has visited Eastern Europe as I have cannot help but feel the tragedy of the millions of people under communist governments. The Eastern European countries have a long background of standing up for their independence; they do not like foreign domination. I am therefore totally in agreement on the principle, but you and Secretary Kissinger will still have to work out the language. We should not at this point in history ratify the Iron Curtain, as the Soviets want us to do.

Genscher: We must look to the internal dynamics of development. We can see this operating in the GDR, to large portions of which West German TV is available. I went to the GDR recently in a private capacity for the first time since I left it in 1952. I was astonished at the hearty welcome I received and at the fact that I was widely recognized. This was entirely due to people having seen my face on TV. This confirms the importance of Basket III in the CSCE negotiations. But more important than making newspapers and magazines available is the possibility of travelling into these areas. It is, for example, more important that a man in Kiev be able to receive his sister from New York on a visit than that he have access to daily editions of the *New York Times*.

President: I agree that it is communication that matters. TV is indeed important.

Genscher: If one could agree on exchange of TV broadcasts, this would be great progress.

Secretary: The President would be glad to give up Walter Cronkite⁵ and a few others.

⁴ The United States did not establish an Embassy in the German Democratic Republic until December 9, 1974.

⁵ Chief editor and anchorman for the Columbia Broadcasting System's evening news.

Genscher: I have a few commentators also whom we would gladly exchange.

President: The important thing to convey to Chancellor Schmidt and to your colleagues is that the unity of the Big Four is indispensable at this juncture. The instability of the whole southern tier would only be given greater impetus if there is disunity in the northern tier. Therefore, there must be close consultations and communications between the Federal Republic, the United States, Britain and France—and also Italy. We will do our best in this connection. We must not permit economic issues to divide us. We must maintain and strengthen NATO and not reduce its strength except in the context of mutual reductions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 1, 1974.

SUBJECT

Farewell Call; CSCE; Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Netherlands

Ambassador Rijnhard van Lynden

Maxime de Jonge, Counselor, Netherlands Embassy

US

The Secretary

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Katherine Shirley, EUR/WE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Van Lynden: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Foreign Minister van der Stoel did ask me to bring up one point. He asked me to stress the importance he attaches to CSCE and especially to the question of Basket III. He has the feeling we ought to be more difficult, not to be giving in.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, June 1–August 8, 1974, 1 of 3. Confidential. Drafted by Shirley and approved by Hartman.

The Secretary: Are we giving in? I have some difficulty understanding European thinking. On the one hand, they want to take a strong position. On the other they don't want to write it down. We don't care about CSCE. We were against the conference in the first place. Our only concern now is that it not do any damage. We want to discuss the substance of a Basket III. I count myself among the large group of foreign ministers who has not read the papers on Basket III. I don't think any of them have. I don't think Hartman even has.

Mr. Hartman: Yes, I have. I even changed some of the language of the text.

Van Lynden: I have not read them either.

The Secretary: Let's stop theoretical debate then and start drafting. When we have a draft, then you can object and we'll talk about it.

Van Lynden: I believe there is an EC-Nine draft, but yours is more elastic.

Mr. Hartman: When you read the texts, you will find the operative paragraphs of our texts don't differ much. We've taken out some of the abrasive language but the operative paragraphs are much the same.

The Secretary: (to Mr. Hartman) Will you do a wrap-up on CSCE for me?

Mr. Hartman: We just did one.

The Secretary: Where is it?

Mr. Hartman: You must still have it.

The Secretary: This building is one big conspiracy to keep me from exercising control over foreign policy. First they don't show me the papers. Then they send them to me too late. And then they schedule me so that I don't have time to read them. It's a three part effort.

Van Lynden: The details of the CSCE escape me.

The Secretary: I don't have the impression there is a big debate going on.

Mr. Hartman: What we want is a discussion of the texts before September. But this didn't work out in Geneva because it conflicted with the European vacation.

The Secretary: Can't it be done in NATO?

Mr. Hartman: Yes and with the participation of the representatives to Geneva. (to Ambassador van Lynden) We'd like to hear your Government's comments.

The Secretary: There's not going to be a quarrel over CSCE.

Mr. Hartman: I just wish the Dutch would do one thing. Please find the reference in the documents to the cabaret in Moscow. The Soviets are always getting excited about it, and we can't find the reference.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

242. Editorial Note

On August 8, 1974, Richard M. Nixon announced his resignation as President of the United States. Vice President Gerald R. Ford assumed the Presidency at noon on August 9.

On August 9, Secretary of State Kissinger wrote in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko: "Regardless of what you may hear or read in the next few weeks, I can assure you personally that President Ford intends to continue and develop further the policies that have guided our relations with the USSR under President Nixon. He has asked me to remain in office and to devote special attention to Soviet affairs." Kissinger continued: "The change in the Presidency will not end the criticism that our policy toward the Soviet Union has been subjected to over this past year. I will soon make a major speech on this subject, which will commit the new Administration to the process of improving Soviet-American relations. But I hope that in Moscow the most serious thought will be given to the substantive issues facing us—in CSCE, MBFR, and SALT—so that there will be no loss of momentum when these negotiations resume." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 27, USSR, The "D" File)

Kissinger also met with the Ambassadors of the NATO Allies at 2 p.m. on August 9. In preparation for the meeting, Counselor Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum on August 8. With regard to the European security conference and MBFR, Sonnenfeldt wrote: "As you know, it has become fashionable in some NATO circles to howl with the wolves on détente; the standard points are that we are being soft on CSCE, too eager on MBFR, and sacrificing European economic interests (in the Trade Bill) to our Soviet interests. Although on this occasion you should not raise these matters yourself, it is possible that one of the representatives will do so. In that event, you should be firm and crisp." (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official) A memorandum for the President's file about Kissinger's meeting with the NATO Ambassadors on August 9 reads in part: "Looking at the current items on the US-European agenda, Secretary Kissinger said with regard to CSCE that our consultations are proceeding satisfactorily. On MBFR, we should soon have occasion to discuss the Allies' position." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 13, NATO)

243. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 15, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On CSCE—we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans. It includes some basic principles, something on human contacts, no change of frontiers, and what they call “confidence-building measures.”

The Soviet Union wants it as a substitute for a peace treaty. They more or less have that. The big hang-up is on freedom of movement. It is meaningless—it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it.

What you will face is whether to conclude it at the summit level or foreign minister level. My guess is the Europeans will decide on a summit. We have positioned with the Soviet Union, so we look like we are ahead of the Europeans.

The President: What is the timetable?

Kissinger: Maybe next March. The Soviet Union wants it this year, but that is not possible. If you meet Brezhnev in December, they won't want it before that.

There are no decisions to make now.

When you meet Gromyko the end of September you should give him the impression we are trying to be helpful.

There is no implementation in the treaty.

On MBFR—we made an absurd proposal which couldn't fly. Now we are modifying it. The Soviets should cut more than us, but not so much. Then we should add the nuclear package—32 Pershings, 54 F-4, 1,000 nuclear warheads. It is strategically insignificant, but it does have the consequence of establishing some ceiling on our nuclear forces.

[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

[1 line not declassified] If we could get the Soviets to do it in MBFR, it would satisfy our allies and give the Soviet Union a facesaving way out.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

Your coming into office will give a big boost. They will be looking for a success, especially if you make a meeting in December conditional.

The President: I have told Brent MBFR is more popular here than SALT.

Kissinger: At the VFW, you might give a tough Defense-oriented speech. It would be good for the Soviets.

The President: I have been doing that, and with no apologies.

Kissinger: We can probably get a 15–20,000 cut in MBFR. Maybe in December. We will have to manage with the allies so it doesn't look like bilateralism.

I will focus with Dobrynin on SALT and MBFR.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

244. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 26, 1974, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Romanian Relations; CSCE; Cyprus; Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Romania

Vasile Pungan, Counselor to President Ceausescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador

United States

The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Nicholas G. Andrews, Director, EUR/EE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the specific issues which you discussed—first, the European Security Conference, as I remember. As you know, the European Security Conference was not our invention. We do not feel overwhelmed with responsibility as a result of our attendance. We are not an obstacle to the resolution of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097–1296. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Andrews.

Basket 3 issues which reflect the views of the Western Europeans. Communist countries specialize in the holding of power; they will not allow themselves to be outmaneuvered and lose power. An international transaction to undermine that power is an absurdity. When their power is threatened, they will take means to protect themselves.

I do not attach as much importance to these matters. Bucharest will survive. The major impetus does not come from us. We are not against it. We are willing to settle issues if others are willing. We are for confidence-building measures and other standards of international relations. I have a political science department in this building which follows these things. We will cooperate in bringing it to a conclusion. We are working toward common agreement with the Western Europeans. We are not willing to spend capital on these matters. We do not want a Dutch cabaret in Moscow. We will not fall on our swords. We will be restrained. We want to finish it but we won't weaken our relations with our Allies on these issues. If you have any influence on the Western Europeans, exercise it. It is getting late to finish it this year. When do they meet?

Sonnenfeldt: The first week in September.

Pungan: It is not a problem how many remain to be solved. But some are difficult.

Secretary: Have you read all the papers involved in Basket 3?

Pungan: No.

Secretary: I have not met any Foreign Minister who has read them all. Our positions are similar. We urged the Western Europeans to adopt a position. But they argued: if we have a position, it will become known to the Soviets. That is the point of the entire Conference—to let the Soviets know our position.

Sonnenfeldt: We do have a difference with Romania on follow-on machinery.

Pungan: Some countries like Romania need follow-on machinery more, they need security machinery. Really you can help us here.

Bogdan: Especially on follow-on machinery.

Secretary: We are not so eager. For exactly the same reason that you want it. In your case you want it so that powerful neighboring powers will exercise restraint. In ours, we don't want those powers becoming involved in Western European affairs who are not there already.

Pungan: You would have power in an area where you did not have it before. Except in frontier areas where it would not be very good.

Secretary: Follow-on machinery will not help us in Belgrade.

Pungan: Perhaps . . .

Secretary: Follow-on machinery will not do anything for us in Eastern European countries—in non-market economies, as Senator Jackson

puts it. We are willing to say something but not as elaborate as you would like.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Bogdan: If you would agree to follow-on machinery . . .

Secretary: You seize Bessarabia and then ask for mediation. I've heard folk songs performed by Russian singers and I must say the Moldavian ones sound more Central European. I think we saw a group perform in Moscow.

Sonnenfeldt: There was a Moldavian folk dance group.

Bogdan: The group toured Canada a few years ago.

Secretary: In general, when you look at your list, on the European Security Conference, we don't differ very much. We will use our influence to bring about a more rapid conclusion to the Conference short of undermining our relations with our Western European Allies who, as you know, are subject to a slight personality complex.²

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² A memorandum of Pungan's conversation with President Ford on August 27, which covered the same points as his meeting with Kissinger, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5.

245. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 28, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Let me spend five minutes on CSCE.

The original proposal by the Soviet Union in the early 1960's excluded the United States. Its purpose was to present a substitute for a peace treaty and to create the mood that NATO was no longer necessary. We originally opposed it but gradually changed because all the European leaders pleaded for it and Brandt cut the ground out from under us by recognizing East Germany. Brandt is a good example of a flashy guy with no substance behind it.

Your tactical problem with the CSCE Summit is the Europeans say they don't want a Summit but if you oppose it, they will come out for it and drag you into it. So you have got to stay a half step ahead. But with the Soviets, don't commit yourself so the Soviets can use it against us with the Europeans.

The document has four major parts, including the statement of principles, then the three baskets. One is conference [*confidence*]-building (military) measures, economic matters, and human contacts.

The document is meaningless. The big issue is the question of the inviolability of frontiers as against peaceful change—where the peaceful change will be. Now the big issue is peaceful contacts. The Europeans are trying to work on the Communist parties so they are pushing this. The Communists have gone along with much of it. We have asked the Europeans to put down all their demands in writing so we can put it to the Soviets, and they don't want to.

We are now at Stage II. The Soviets want to have a Summit before the end of the year. I think it would be better in the Spring.

The President: I think it is mandatory to come after the first of the year.

Kissinger: I think you have to make the trip through Europe first. I would go to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. We haven't been invited there, but there is some merit in the Soviets seeing a welcome in even a loyal satellite—no President has ever been there [Hungary].²

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² Brackets are in the original.

246. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, September 13, 1974, 2325Z.

4974. Subj: CSCE: NAC consultations on satisfactory outcome. Dept please pass info Geneva for USDel CSCE. For Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer.

1. The NAC agreed that there should be further discussions of CSCE in Brussels, but we got no support in the Council for our suggestion that the Allies, in Geneva, should draft more realistic texts on central Basket III issues. French del (Andreani), in response to my question, said the Nine wanted to tidy up their Basket III texts already tabled in Geneva and make them more compact. However, they do not propose at this stage to modify them substantively. UK (Peck) doubted wisdom of drawing up next [*new?*] texts which represented minimum Western requirements plus some negotiating fat. British believed, Peck said, it would be better tactics to stick with present Western positions. FRG (Brunner) did not speak to this issue at all. Canadians (Shenstone) endorsed position of Nine and said Allies should be prepared for a long haul in Geneva.

2. Everybody else who spoke also supported Nine's position, as it was set out by Andreani, that a first reading of all Basket III texts is essential and that only thereafter, when Allies have had the Soviet reaction to all Western proposals, would it be possible to prepare for final trade-offs. Norwegians and Danes urged that Allies, for internal purposes, should set mid-December as a target date for the completion of Stage II, but nobody supported them.

3. Andreani said four U.S. Basket III texts provided last July² were useful and would help the Nine and the Allies as they reflect upon the shape of the likely final compromise. No one else spoke to our papers except the Canadians who said (erroneously) that the U.S. text on reading rooms³ was no different from the Western proposals tabled in Geneva.

4. Allied statements in the NAC conflicted with indications earlier gleaned by our Geneva delegation that the Nine intend both to streamline their Basket III texts editorially and to make them more realistic substantively. While the NAC session was thus frankly disappointing, I do not believe we should take it as the last word of our Allies on the sub-

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 16, NATO, State Department Telegrams, Tosec State, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Documents 236 and 237.

³ Telegram 157018 to Geneva, July 19, transmitted the U.S. draft text for access to literary works. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

ject. Most who spoke were still objecting to the idea of preparing agreed fallback positions (their interpretation of “minimum requirements”) which should be conveyed to the Soviets. They and their governments have not yet had time, of course, to digest the suggestion in my statement⁴ that we attempt agreement on more realistic Basket III texts which—while less ambitious than the “wish lists” now on the table—would still give Western delegations some negotiating room.

5. In next week’s caucus of NATO delegation heads in Geneva, we will press our position again. I propose to suggest that Allies take the list of essential Basket III elements drawn up by the EC-9 (para 25 of their paper)⁵ and attempt to draft, in the Basket III caucus, specific language under each of the points listed, working both from new EC texts and from the four papers we put forward in July.

Rumsfeld

⁴ Telegram 4977 from USNATO, September 14, contains the text of Sherer’s statement before the NAC on September 13. (Ibid.)

⁵ Telegram 4443 from Geneva, July 12, contained portions of the EC-9’s approved paper on minimum essential requirements for Basket III. Paragraph 29 listed as major topics “freer movement and contacts” between East and West, “larger and freer distribution” and “improvement of access” to information, “more complete access” to culture and cultural “exchanges and contacts,” and “direct contacts” in education. (Ibid.) See also footnote 2, Document 237.

247. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1974, 11:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Call on President Ford

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Side

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File (19). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.

U.S. Side

The President

Secretary Kissinger

Ambassador Stoessel

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: Now I would like to touch on European affairs, including European security. Much has been done by the US and the Soviet Union acting together with regard to policy concerning Europe.

The President: I agree. I also feel there are areas where we could make more progress, but please proceed.

Gromyko: There was a time in the history of our relations when we were partners in a joint struggle against the aggressor and we shed blood for a common cause. This is embedded in human memory and always will be. Now, we have reached a level which shows the advantage of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the US in connection with European security in our own interest and in the general interest of other countries. This should not be weakened in any way and nothing should be allowed to disturb this. We feel that together we can do much more which would entirely meet the interests of strengthening European security and improving our own relations.

First, about the conference on European security and the successful completion of its work with positive results. As you know, the second stage is now in progress in Geneva. I would like to say, for the Soviet leadership and for Leonid Brezhnev personally, that we attach great importance to finishing the work of the conference with positive results.

However, we see some artificial and unjustified delays in the conference. We feel that the completion of the conference, and especially holding the third phase at the highest level, would give a new impulse to security in Europe as well as to US-Soviet relations.

We know that some say that the US and the Soviets are acting together in unison. Even if people do say this, we don't feel we should give up our cooperation or sacrifice the advantages which could accrue from such cooperation.

Secretary Kissinger can confirm that when we have reached an agreement and find a common language, then things move forward as a rule. But when we don't have agreement, then there is no progress, and we go in circles.

Lately, there have been some hitches in our cooperation in Geneva. We ask ourselves whether this means a change in US policy about what has been agreed or whether this is a chance occurrence. We would like to work for a successful completion of the conference with good results. We would like to urge you to cooperate with the Soviet Union

to bring the conference to a successful conclusion. We have many other things to do after the conference and we want to get to them.

The Secretary: I think Ambassador Dobrynin has a microphone in our office!

The President: When I said that we could do more, I had in mind the security conference and also the force reduction talks. I feel we can work together even better than we did in the war. I am not familiar with the difficulties you mentioned at Geneva, although I know there are some problems about Basket III.

The Secretary: I will talk at lunch with the Foreign Minister about this. The trouble, Mr. President, is with our European allies. Speaking very frankly, every country wants to extract something from the Soviet Union. I've told all of them that the Soviet Union won't be overthrown without noticing it, and certainly not because of things like increased circulation of newspapers and so on. I don't know how many projects have been submitted in Basket III, but there is a big pile. We've tried to reduce that and to explain to our allies that the Soviet Union has difficulty in making concessions on one issue when it doesn't know what else it may be asked to concede on.

We've had enormous difficulties with our friends to get one document; now they are going through all of the projects and reading them. There is no deliberate policy on our part to slow down the conference. We remain on the course as we discussed it at the summit.

This whole thing is one of the weirdest negotiations I have ever seen. I talked with one foreign minister in Europe and said we needed one position. I didn't care what it was, but we needed one position. He objected that the Russians would find out about it. But, of course, that's the point—we want them to!

We do need more flexibility from the Soviet side, but I also see the Foreign Minister's problem. He has to know what he is dealing with.

Gromyko: Two or three issues at Geneva have become barriers which have not yet been surmounted.

First is the inviolability of frontiers. We have been in agreement with the US on this going back to the time of Kennedy. Of course, Roosevelt's position on this was known. At the conference in Geneva, everyone agreed on one formula. But lately, we have heard that some don't like this formula and we have heard that the US wanted to change it.

The Secretary: That's not true!

Gromyko: We should talk further about this matter.

Second is the question of military movements. Some countries want us to build a great accounting house and to devote all of our efforts to this so that when one division moves from one place to another we can report on it, as if we had nothing else to do. What does

this have to do with security in the present day—what does this contribute to confidence? Initially, we knew Secretary Kissinger's position on this, but at Geneva, unfortunately, the voice of the US has not been heard. I repeat, that the movement of one or two divisions from one point to another does not affect the real security of a country.

I think the US is under pressure from Luxembourg on this.

The Secretary: We see you are being pressed by Bulgaria!

Gromyko: A country like West Germany, for obvious reasons, is cautious on this and other similar questions. However, they say that we might solve this question with a voluntary exchange of observers on the basis of reciprocity. The Germans mentioned this to me in Bonn in passing.

To conclude on this point, we hope we can work more closely together and achieve greater mutual understanding at the conference.

The Secretary: On the security conference, I would say, first, that you have to be a Talmudic student to understand it. On the question of the inviolability of frontiers, this is a German issue and not a problem for the US. Following the change of government in Germany—in which Eastern Europe was not totally uninvolved—they asked for a change. We gave two versions to you but didn't get an answer.

On troop movements, the issue is the size of the unit and the area. It is no secret that our means of information are better than those of our allies.

Gromyko: We proceed from that assumption.

The Secretary: This is primarily a European problem. We don't know what the Germans said to you. If they come to us there will be no problem. I have had instructions from the President to work on the basis of our previous understanding.

The President: That is right. There is no change in our policy. The lack of progress on Basket III seems to be holding things up.

The Secretary: If we could get something on these other points, it might help on Basket III.

Gromyko: On Basket III, I have always favored shaking some things out of the basket, but I believe the issues essentially have been resolved.

The Secretary: Some of our allies have to show that they have extorted from you what you already have agreed to.

Gromyko: Now about the reduction of forces and the Vienna talks. This is a very important issue. You agree that it is complicated and we feel it is, too. Its solution obviously requires time and I feel our efforts should continue. But we believe the Western participants must give up the idea of some kind of a common ceiling for forces on both sides.

Some say they don't like Soviet tanks in Europe. They say there are too many of them and that we should withdraw a full tank division. We should take 1700 out.

The Secretary: I'm for it!

Gromyko: The Western participants say we should reduce our forces twice as much as reductions on the Western side. But they refuse to reduce their air force, nuclear arms and bases in Western Europe. We could demand that these be removed, but we don't take that approach.

We should scrupulously observe the principle of no harm to the security of either side and we should preserve the co-relation of forces in Western Europe today.

We favor a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We should go in this direction. We should make the best effort we can.

The Western participants say that only the US and Soviets should reduce and the others should be left as they are. Reductions for them would come in the indefinite future in a second phase. There is nothing precise about this and no figures are given. Everything will be subject to negotiations.

We should think more about all of this. Perhaps in the next meeting with Secretary Kissinger we could try to find a new approach to the whole problem which would serve our common interests.

The President: As I recall, we offered to take out 29,000; you should take out 68,000.² I also recall that the Soviet Union talked in terms of a 5% reduction.

The Secretary: The Soviet Union has gone through an evolution on this point. In the Brezhnev–Nixon meeting in 1973, Brezhnev proposed a rapid 5% reduction to get things started.³ Since then, the Soviet position has evolved in a more complicated way.

Gromyko: Brezhnev's suggestion did not constitute a broad program of action. It covered only a partial aspect. It was an illustration of the possible dimension of a first step involving US and Soviet forces.

If the US and Soviet sides reduce, it won't help if the others increase their forces.

The Secretary: But the Foreign Minister knows that if we reduce, there must be a ceiling on the forces of the others. Whatever either of us reduces cannot be replaced by increases by the others.

² See footnote 2, Document 345.

³ See Documents 162 and 163.

Gromyko: It is not enough to talk about US-Soviet reductions and a concurrent freeze of the others. We should agree on a definite stage for the reduction of the forces of the other countries.

Also, a first step reduction of US-Soviet forces with concurrent conditions poses very complicated problems. In subsequent meetings we should discuss this.

The Secretary: The President met with Stanley Resor on Saturday⁴ and you can also read what I said in my testimony yesterday.⁵ It is hard to attest to the success of détente if armed forces are always going up.

All of this really doesn't make much difference in practical terms. However, we are looking at new approaches.

Gromyko: Your argument works both ways.

The President: I am glad you brought this question up. We are interested in new approaches and this is something we should discuss later.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁴ See Document 350.

⁵ In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19, Kissinger said that in the coming months the United States would strive, among other things, "to complete the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, so that security will be enhanced for all the countries of Europe" and "to conclude the conference on European security and cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human aspirations." (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 14, 1974, p. 519)

248. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1974, 3–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Soviets:

H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S.:

The Secretary

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

Walter Stoessel, American Ambassador to USSR

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Secretary: We certainly described² all the nuances of CSCE to the President³ but I think he was a little confused by Basket III.

Gromyko: Yes, I'd like to cut the bottom out of that Basket.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: Seriously, on CSCE, can we discuss that a little further? I was a little confused by something you said when we were talking to the President. You said that the Germans mentioned something about voluntary observers.

Gromyko: Yes, they said that the observers would be invited by the country in which the maneuver is taking place. Then there is the question of troop movements. Can't we agree that that matter can be postponed for later discussion and study?

Secretary: We're relaxed about that problem. We know what you're doing anyway. We think that the size of the force which should be notified for maneuvers should be a reinforced division of, say, 40,000.

Hartman: I think you mean 20,000. A division is about 15,000 and a reinforced division would be roughly 20,000.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug.–Sept. 1974. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman on September 21. The conversation took place in the Soviet Embassy. Gromyko was visiting the United States to attend the United Nations General Assembly.

² Sonnenfeldt struck out "expressed" and wrote in "described" by hand.

³ See Document 247.

Gromyko: That is an artificial number. It would be impossible. We would have so many clerical problems.

Secretary: Do you move a division that often?

Gromyko: What importance does this have to Luxembourg? This is like using a microscope.

Secretary: How can we proceed in CSCE?

Gromyko: We have to agree on the question of maneuvers and troop movements.⁴ On the latter we should put it off for further study. Maybe we should examine this question of voluntary observers. This would be a moral obligation and would be much more flexible.

Secretary: Are you saying that a moral obligation is heavier than a legal one or are you saying if it's moral you don't have to carry it out?

Gromyko: As a rule it will be carried out.

Secretary: Just when you maneuver with nuclear weapons and we want to observe, you will not want us to.

Gromyko: As a rule it will be carried out. I have a feeling that the Basket III problem is behind us.

Secretary: Why?

Gromyko: Because we agreed on the Finnish compromise which makes it easier. Then we have the question of the relations among⁵ the principles. We think that the formulation should be "the principles should be equally strictly observed."⁶

Hartman: We have been talking about the equal validity of the principles.

Gromyko: Equal validity is nonsense. How can you say that the question of frontier inviolability and giving visas are equally important. Some of the principles are fundamental.

Secretary: All of the principles are equal but you are saying equally strictly observed. The thing that concerns us is that they be observed. I would be willing to examine your formulation. What did Genscher say?

Gromyko: Genscher's attitude was positive.

Secretary: I am not intelligent enough to understand all these matters. To me it sounds all right. I will take it up with Callaghan and Genscher.

⁴ Sonnenfeldt struck out "numbers" and wrote in "movements" by hand.

⁵ Sonnenfeldt struck out "between" and wrote in "among" by hand.

⁶ Reference is to point 11 of the French draft declaration of principles for the CSCE; see Document 176.

Gromyko: On the peaceful change formula you have now tabled a new text which seems to imply that the most important purpose of international law is to change frontiers.⁷ That is the current U.S. draft.

Secretary: Where did you get that this was a U.S. draft? What did Genscher say?

Gromyko: He said that it was an American proposal.

Secretary: You can see that Hartman has a lot to learn about diplomacy. Historically, let me say that we pointed out that it would be difficult to change the language we had originally agreed. This change is a German proposal. They are the ones who have the main concern. On maneuvers we will look at the problem again and I will talk to you on Tuesday.⁸ On the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, you made the observation which implied to the President that if we include air and nuclear⁹ forces you would be willing to include a tank army. Is that correct?

Gromyko: Other countries must be prepared to reduce their forces.

Secretary: In the first stage?

Gromyko: If not in the first stage, then we should define the second stage and specify what will happen.

Secretary: You mean that we should decide what is the end result of the second stage? For example, we could agree that the first stage has a certain numerical reduction or are we just talking about the principle of the second stage?

Gromyko: No, we would have to have numbers and precise times.¹⁰

Secretary: Then we are talking about negotiating both the first and the second stage.

Gromyko: If numbers are not mentioned, then when will we reach agreement on this? My idea is to agree to reduce X and then X should be multiplied by 10.

Secretary: In practice you would then be negotiating both stages but there would be a difference of timing.

Gromyko: What we would be doing is leaving some details for later decision, for example, the kinds of forces and armaments.¹¹

Secretary: What you are saying is that following the reduction of this first stage, there would be a second stage. The only difference is timing.

⁷ See Document 239.

⁸ September 24; see Document 250.

⁹ Sonnenfeldt added "and nuclear" by hand.

¹⁰ Sonnenfeldt added "and precise times" by hand.

¹¹ Sonnenfeldt bracketed and struck out "and the time of fulfillment" at the end of this sentence.

Gromyko: It will be a question of fulfillment and the degree of specificity.

Secretary: If you are worried about escaping obligations, you want to specify what happens in the second stage.

Gromyko: Yes. Otherwise we are talking generalities. There should be a general obligation to reduce by all countries.

Secretary: I don't believe we are going to finish this year. We haven't even begun to look at the second stage.

Gromyko: It would be helpful in getting through the CSCE to be able to have progress in Vienna.¹² Politically, it would help us. Why is that difficult?

Secretary: Are you prepared to accept a common ceiling at the end of the second stage?

Gromyko: At the end? That would depend on the ceiling. I do not reject it.

Secretary: If you can accept that we can discuss this in greater detail, we are prepared to include tactical air if that would help.

Gromyko: What kind of ceiling are you talking about? Is it possible to avoid a ceiling? You could have American and Soviet cuts and then other countries could reduce numbers as well. After that, it would be much easier to discuss a ceiling.¹³

Secretary: I am talking about a common ceiling.

Korniyenko: What the Secretary means by a common ceiling are equal forces on both sides.

Gromyko: No, that is not what I mean.

Secretary: But then you are offering me nothing. Obviously if you agree to a cut there is a ceiling but you cannot argue in the strategic field that we have more warheads than you do and therefore must cut greater numbers, while at the same time you argue that you cannot cut

¹² The Department followed up on Gromyko's comment on MBFR in telegram 214661 to Geneva, September 28, suggesting "that Soviets are widely calling Allied attention to possibility that MBFR negotiations could be advanced if CSCE were successfully concluded." Noting that "the Soviets thus are establishing a procedural linkage between MBFR and CSCE," the telegram continued, "you should raise this matter and propose a general exchange of Allied views in NAC on implications of the Soviet stance" and proposed "turning the present situation to Allied advantage" by establishing a "reverse linkage" of "making progress on CSCE contingent upon Eastern movement in MBFR." In telegram 9838 from USNATO, December 13, the Mission replied: "Luns said that the Alliance had studied the possibility of establishing a 'reverse linkage' between CSCE and MBFR and had determined that, although such a linkage might not be desirable at the present time, it should be kept in mind as a future possibility." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

¹³ Sonnenfeldt struck out the phrase "that is not projected" at the end of this sentence.

your forces more when you have greater numbers. We are prepared to be realistic and specific in the categories where we have an advantage. If we are ahead, we make a greater cut. For example, in air forces and nuclear forces we would cut more in such a program—that would not be excluded. This is not a proposal but I am just citing an example.

Gromyko: The general idea of an equal ceiling I do not like.

Secretary: But as I said that is no concession. You are just talking about an agreed ceiling.

Gromyko: Yes, an agreed ceiling.

Secretary: It is not clear to me how we can consider both stages if at the end of the second stage we don't reach agreement on a common-equal-ceiling.

Gromyko: That is impossible. Maybe after five stages. Why, after the second stage?

Secretary: We could have a first stage only or we can have a first stage plus agreement to a second stage whose ultimate objective is a common ceiling.

Gromyko: At the end of the second stage? How long would that take?

Secretary: We are open-minded.

Gromyko: I do not see the possibility. This would be against our security interests because we will reduce more than you.

Secretary: This is not just a common ceiling of U.S. and Soviet forces. This would be the whole NATO area versus the Warsaw Pact.

Gromyko: You would have all of the advantages. You tell us we have more tanks.

Secretary: We do not insist on an equal ceiling in all parts including equipment. What we are talking about are equal numbers of personnel. Maybe you have a tank for every three men and maybe we have a tank for every ten men. It is up to each side.

Gromyko: I do not think this will facilitate an agreement.

Secretary: Maybe we shouldn't agree on a second stage but agree on a first stage and no principles and say that the negotiation of the second stage would begin in three to six months.

Gromyko: What if it doesn't come about?

Sonnenfeldt: We have no interest in stopping because we are interested in moving toward a common ceiling.

Gromyko: With a common ceiling we go down more.

Secretary: How can you maintain the principle of equality in the strategic area and not here. I remember your General Secretary telling us that we have 10,000 warheads and you only have 3,000 warheads. He insisted that we move toward a common level.

Gromyko: We like equality but we mean equal security.

Secretary: In the strategic field you tell us that we are ahead in a ratio of three to one and that we should move to an equal level.

Gromyko: No, we wish to take in many factors. What we must do is to define the correlation of the numbers. We want equal security, not¹⁴ equal numbers of personnel.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

¹⁴ At this point, Sonnenfeldt struck out “in” and replaced it with a comma and “not.”

249. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 24, 1974, 1:45–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher

PARTICIPANTS

German

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Mr. Guenther Van Well, Political Director, FRG Foreign Ministry
Ambassador to US Berndt Von Staden

Guenther Verheugen, Counselor (Special Assistant to Foreign Minister)
Otto Von Der Gablentz, Counselor (European Policy Questions)

American

The Secretary

Under Secretary Joseph Sisco

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman

Mr. Scott George, EUR/CE Director (Notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097–2023. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by George. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers.

Genscher: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] What did Gromyko say when you saw him?²

The Secretary: A number of things. One was that you, or the German side in Bonn, had told him that the CSCE peaceful change language was a US draft and that you did not care much about it one way or another.

Genscher: That really tops everything. This is not at all what was said.

The Secretary: It seemed inconceivable to me, knowing your views and knowing that this is a domestic issue in the Federal Republic.

Van Well: The record is quite clear. This was an EC-9 formulation which was put forward by the US.

The Secretary: I questioned Gromyko. He told me the Germans said this is absolutely US language; we are not too much interested in it. He also said to me, and to the President, that the Soviets and FRG have more or less agreed on CSCE, Basket III is no longer a problem, and CSCE can probably conclude with a Summit meeting.

Genscher: This is not at all the case.

Van Well: Gromyko did say that the only important thing to us Soviets is non-intervention. The Foreign Minister said that we never intended to use Basket III as a means of intervention. That is all that was said on this subject. Perhaps Gromyko misunderstood this in some way.

The Secretary: Gromyko was not interested in talking specifics to us. He said that everything is settled on Basket III, or at least he left that very strong impression. Since we had heard nothing from you indicating any change in your position since June or July, we could not understand what Gromyko meant. But he certainly left us with the impression that everything had been settled with you in Bonn. Was this subject raised at the Schmidt–Gromyko meeting?³

Genscher: It was only discussed marginally at the meeting.

The Secretary: Gromyko brought up the question of equal application of the various principles instead of equal validity of principles. We said that since this was a new formulation we wanted to study it. The only language formulation we discussed was the peaceful change formulation which Gromyko rejected because of the implication that international law not only permits peaceful change but requires it.

² See Documents 247 and 248.

³ Gromyko visited Bonn on September 16. At a news conference following a meeting with Gromyko, Schmidt said that he anticipated that the European security conference would be completed by the end of the year and that he would support a summit meeting for the final stage of the CSCE. (Craig R. Whitney, "West German Chief for Summit Meeting at European Parley," *New York Times*, September 17, 1974, p. 4)

Other than discussing this language he mentioned only the question of CBM observers, on which I believe he accurately stated your position, and indicated that Basket III is all settled.

Genscher: In our discussion with Gromyko he said that some proposals must be more important than others. But he said there is no use to talk about which is dominant. All should be fully respected and should constitute a whole.

The Secretary: That he didn't tell us. I don't mind your telling him exactly what we are telling you. We said that we would have to talk with you before talking with him further.

Genscher: I told him that our position is that there should be no dominant or less dominant, no major or minor principles. I want to reiterate very strongly, Mr. Secretary, that we have not changed our position from what it was at Ottawa or Meisbach (*sic*).⁴

The Secretary: Let's not worry about this, but if you want to change back to your original view on peaceful change this will be OK with us.

Genscher: You and I know that the Soviet Union is really interested in only one principle. I made it very clear to Gromyko that we believe all of them should have equal value.

The Secretary: We can stick to the original text if it is put in the inviolability section or we can put the new one in the sovereignty section. I told Gromyko we would stick with the FRG on this question.

Hartman: Let's not kid ourselves. The new formulation does change the meaning somewhat.

The Secretary: Yes, the implication is that international law *requires* peaceful change of frontiers. I didn't even suggest putting your language in the inviolability section because they have already rejected this. Gromyko talked to me about substance saying that since the FRG didn't care we might as well settle the matter between us.

Van Well: Gromyko went back to our Moscow negotiations and said that borders can be changed peacefully. Our Foreign Minister said that we are not talking about minor border adjustments but the possibility of total elimination of borders and the creation of new entities, such as the European Union. Incidentally, I think we are smart to have our own interpreter for these meetings because we have our own record to point to and don't have to depend on what they said, according to their interpreter.

The Secretary: I would not want to have talks with them when their records are the only ones.

⁴ As in the original. Regarding the meeting in Miesbach, see Document 233.

Genscher: Can you give me any idea of what the President would like to talk about when I meet with him?⁵

The Secretary: This is entirely up to you but one possibility would be to give your views about Bonn–Washington ties, also the energy meeting, perhaps force reductions. But the President will not be intimately familiar with CSCE.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁵ Genscher met with President Ford and Kissinger in the Oval Office on September 26 from 5:35 to 6:05 p.m. No record of the conversation has been found.

250. Editorial Note

On September 24, 1974, after the session of the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary of State Kissinger met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko before a dinner banquet at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. They had a brief conversation about the issue of peaceful change of borders at the European security conference. The relevant portion of the memorandum of conversation reads:

“Secretary: I spoke to Genscher about the problem of the peaceful change language. His view was that if we agreed on the old phrase it should go in the principle on the inviolability of frontiers, but if we change the placing of this item to the sovereignty principle, then the language would have to be adjusted and it was this new language which we tabled in Geneva in July at the German request. Genscher said he would talk to you further about this.

“Gromyko: What is your preference?

“Secretary: We can support the old or the new language.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860140–1333)

251. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1974, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between the Secretary and French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues

PARTICIPANTS

France

Jean Sauvagnargues, French Minister for Foreign Affairs
Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, French Ambassador
Francois Puaux, Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Constantin Andronikoff, Minister-Counselor, Interpreter

United States

The Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Richard D. Vine, Director, EUR/WE, notetaker

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: On the conference on European security, there doesn't appear to be much to say except for the formula on peaceful change. This is something on which we could have major difficulties with the Soviets. I talked to Gromyko about this, but we have to support the Germans in this matter.

The Secretary: Where did we get that new German formula? There is a new formula.² Apparently Genscher and Dobrynin met here and Dobrynin put forth new language.

Puaux: I'm happy about that, but I don't know the details.

Sonnenfeldt: It is still based on the American version, but removes the word "only" from its present place and puts it so that it only modifies "peaceful change" and not "international law."

The Secretary: That might meet one of the German concerns if it qualifies "peaceful means."

Sauvagnargues: What a good solution! Do the Russians agree?

The Secretary: It's a Russian formulation.

Sonnenfeldt: The Germans have not yet agreed to the formula, they are still examining it.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 140, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Secretary's office.

² See Document 252.

The Secretary: We can talk to Genscher about it at Camp David. Excuse me, I should take this telephone call. (Discussion of the formula during the Secretary's absence. Sonnenfeldt gives the formula to Puaux, making clear that this formula does not have Genscher's final approval. Secretary returns after an absence of a minute or so.)

Sauvagnargues: As far as Basket Three items are concerned, we are proceeding to a first reading in Geneva.

The Secretary: The only question in my mind is which European will be the first formally to agree to a summit. I suspect that Schmidt will do so in Moscow. I find the subject boring. We won't be the first. It will be some European. My impression is that Schmidt has already agreed to a summit, although I don't know that. The longer we prolong the negotiations, the more significance will be attached to the outcome. We should best end this with decency as soon as we can.

Sauvagnargues: But you have no objection to our proceeding with a first reading?

Sonnenfeldt: The Russians object violently.

The Secretary: Our view is that we should have a common position to present. Even if the Soviets were prepared to make concessions, they would have to make them to one country which would use the concessions for domestic purposes and evoke similar demands from other countries. It would be a never-ending process. We must have a common view, before or after the first reading, of the limits beyond which we will not push. Are they meeting now?

Sonnenfeldt: The meeting is set for Thursday.

The Secretary: So there has been no first meeting?

Sonnenfeldt: The Russians are still opposed and we must decide.

Puaux: We are all agreed in the Nine and so are the neutrals. If the U.S. takes a stand in the Coordinating Group we can proceed.

The Secretary: There's been a lot of speculation that we had an arrangement with the Soviets on this. But there are no longer any Nixon interests. You would agree, Mr. Ambassador, (to Kosciusko-Morizet) that the CSCE can do nothing for us domestically. If anything, it's a slight liability. It is not a major issue. As I see it, the outcome is clear and we should not try to prolong beyond a reasonable period.

Sauvagnargues: But we'll need something in Basket Three.

The Secretary: Can we agree on a common position after a first reading?

Sauvagnargues: I agree with your basic position. I think we have still to agree on how to present that position, and that is something we must discuss.

The Secretary: The Russians are not going to make any concessions until they know that they will mean something in terms of

getting a final agreement. That is the biggest technical problem for them at the moment.

Puaux: If we go through the first meeting with brackets, the Soviets will probably insist on their own language and formulations in the brackets. For them that will be a big bargain.

The Secretary: We are not opposed to that.

Puaux: Yes, but you don't seem prepared to say that publicly.

The Secretary: Why hasn't that been done?

Sonnenfeldt: I thought it had been agreed. We had better get out new instructions to our delegation to make that point clear.

Sauvagnargues: We should make a determined effort to hold the Soviets to normal negotiating procedures. They seem to think they are exempt. If they don't agree, then we shall have to think of something else.

The Secretary: I have the impression that the Russians were prepared to come and go through this exercise.

Sonnenfeldt: We'll get some new instructions out to our delegation.

The Secretary: I admit that I spend no sleepless nights over this.

Sauvagnargues: I don't either. But in the public mind, the Russians appear to be getting some assurances and we have to make sure that there is an appropriate balance.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

252. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 28, 1974.

Mr. Secretary:

I asked Art Hartman to tell the Germans that they should pursue this issue, which is principally of concern to them, directly with the Soviets. Art has done this. I think it is pointless for us to act as middlemen.

If you agree, I will also tell Vorontsov that as far as you are concerned this is chiefly a matter between the FRG and the USSR and that we will review it only after we have indication that Bonn and Moscow are able to come to terms on it.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official. Confidential.

The confusion on the texts is really incomprehensible since Gromyko is steeped in the subject and would hardly hand personally to Genscher a text with a typographical error going directly to the heart of the dispute. All the more reason for us to stay clear of this whole issue for a while.

Approve line to Vorontsov²

Other

HS

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger³

Washington, September 28, 1974.

CSCE: Soviet "Peaceful Changes" Formulation

Soviet Minister-Counselor Vorontsov Friday evening brought me the Russian-language text of the "new formulation" on peaceful change. He explained that in order to cut down confusion and misunderstanding, Gromyko had decided henceforth to provide only Russian texts on this question. Gromyko gave the text to Genscher yesterday, and asked that Vorontsov bring in the text to be given to you.

One further round of confusion occurred when we discovered that the Russian text given us was not identical to the text given Genscher.

As given to us, the translated formulation reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can change only in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.

As given to the Germans, it reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law only by peaceful means and by agreement.

² Kissinger initialed his approval. Sonnenfeldt spoke with Vorontsov on September 30 and informed him accordingly. Vorontsov replied, "that is fair enough," and said he would cable the U.S. stance to Moscow. (Memorandum for the record, September 30; *ibid.*)

³ Drafted by the Deputy Director for Soviet Union Affairs Mark J. Garrison and cleared by Streator. Sent through Sonnenfeldt.

Thus in the formulation given us, “only” has been moved to apply to “in accordance with international law” as well as to “by peaceful means and by agreement.”

In addition, there is a distinction between “can change” (using a reflexive verb) and “can be changed” (using a participle).

The confusion between the two versions has now been cleared up. Vorontsov checked with the Gromyko delegation in New York and confirmed that the version given us is the correct one. The wrong text was given to Genscher due to a “typing error” (which will be “investigated”). Vorontsov asked if we could inform the Germans now, which we are doing.⁴ He said his side would make its apologies to the Germans later.

⁴ Hartman highlighted this sentence and wrote in the margin: “We have also told the Germans that they should pursue this with the Soviets.”

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 28, 1974, 7:30–8:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France

Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Ambassador of France

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Gromyko has warmed up a bit. He used to be quite blank-faced.

Kissinger: I think he is the most reliable—or I did until last night. They gave us a formulation for CSCE. They said it was the same as they gave the Germans, but in fact they gave us an old one.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 4, France, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place during breakfast in the First Floor Family Dining Room at the White House.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: MBFR is going nowhere, yes?

President: Not so far.

Kissinger: We could get something if we linked it to CSCE. But that gives you a problem.

Sauvagnargues: We are critical of MBFR, so a link with CSCE would bring us problems. I know it is useful to you domestically.

President: We have a problem with Congress every year on the troops in Europe. Each year it gets closer. Who knows what will happen next year? We are trying to hold out for mutual withdrawal.

Kosciusko-Morizet: The pressure in Congress this year doesn't seem so high.

President: That is true. But if we get a more liberal Congress in January, our margin would evaporate.

Kissinger: And before the '76 elections, they will try to develop some foreign policy issues. Our European troops are a likely candidate.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

254. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, October 4, 1974.

Mr. Secretary,

I have prepared an up-date for your luncheon with Dobrynin on the following:²

Tab A—The Trade Bill

Tab B—Moscow talks on nuclear issues

Tab C—CSCE

Tab D—MBFR

Tab E—Chemical Weapons

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, October 1974. Secret; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the first page, "List of participants."

² Tabs A–B and E–I are attached but not printed. No record of Kissinger's luncheon meeting with Dobrynin has been found.

Tab F—Environmental Warfare

Tab G—The Grain Deal

Tab H—UN Financing

Tab I—The EXIM Bank Bill

HS

Tab C³

CSCE

CSCE continues at a snail's pace. We informed the Allies October 2 that we will support the Nine in calling for a first reading of the Basket III texts. But the Soviets may not ever agree to a first reading of texts which they say are propagandistic, and the Europeans probably do not have the stomach to face a prolonged deadlock in the Conference. So the Nine in Geneva are already looking for ways to fall back gracefully, perhaps to a compromise package deal on human contacts like the one that broke the Basket III preamble impasse in July.

For your amusement, Van Well talked to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn a few days ago and was told that the Soviet formulation on peaceful change given by Gromyko to Genscher was the official one. You remember Vorontsov assured us that he had checked with Gromyko and that the version given to us was the correct one. And to compound the mischief, the Soviets have added commas to what they gave Genscher here. To recapitulate:

As given to us, the translated formulation reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can change only in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.

As given to the Germans here, it reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law only by peaceful means and by agreement.

As given to Van Well in Bonn, it reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, only by peaceful means, and by agreement.

³ Confidential; Exdis.

In any event, the Western delegations in Geneva are fully aware of the differences in the texts and Sherer is telling the Germans that we expect them and the Soviets to sort out the confusion. I told Vorontsov the same thing.

I don't see any point in your pushing Dobrynin on CSCE until you decide how we want to play the issue of linkage with MBFR. As you asked, we have initiated a discussion of linkage at NATO and should soon begin to get instructed responses from the Allies.

Tab D⁴

MBFR

There has been no movement in Vienna since the talks resumed September 16. Meanwhile we are working with our Allies in NATO on the introduction of air manpower into the talks (in accordance with the NSDM).⁵ In view of your recent go-around with Gromyko on MBFR,⁶ there seems little more that can usefully be said to Dobrynin before you leave for Moscow.

⁴ Secret; Eyes Only.

⁵ Document 351.

⁶ See Document 248.

255. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 5, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister: Cyprus, CSCE, and the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Romania

George Macovescu, Foreign Minister

Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the US

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Andrews. The conversation took place in the Secretary's office.

Ion Datcu, Romanian Ambassador to the UN
Nicolae Mateescu, Aide to the Foreign Minister (Note Taker)

United States

The Secretary

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

A. Denis Clift, NSC

Nicholas G. Andrews, Director, EUR/EE (Note Taker)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Macovescu: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I would like to come back to another subject, European security. We think the United States must play their own role in international affairs.

Kissinger: Separate from whom? Concretely, what role should we play in European security?

Macovescu: For a long time we have been involved in this problem. For a long time, I have the impression about American policy that the Department of State is not interested in the security conference in Europe. For what reason?

Kissinger: I can tell you why. We are not uninterested in a European security conference even if we see it as nothing spectacular. I can understand your interest in it. You want to be able to avoid great power pressures on your country. If I were the Romanian Foreign Minister, I would pursue the same policies.

Macovescu: At the same time, the United States should be interested in this matter. There is movement in Europe at this time, things are happening. The United States is absent.

Kissinger: We are present.

Macovescu: We would like to see you more active. We would like to see more specific movement than is going on now. Two years ago I was surprised—you were not here then as chief of this department—here in the Department they didn't know exactly the problems of security.

Kissinger: Do they know now?

Sonnenfeldt: The State Department was more favorable to European security than the National Security Council staff. Your Ambassador can get out his dispatches.

Bogdan: It is more complex than that.

Kissinger: There are two separate problems. One is European security. The other is what contribution the conference will make to European security.

Macovescu: Yes, but taking into consideration the role the United States is playing in the world, I would like to see a bigger role.

Kissinger: We are not against it. But what can we concretely do to foster . . .

Macovescu: You must pay attention to what is going on.

Kissinger: I am paying attention although the effort is taxing my limited brain power to follow everything that is going on in Geneva. I learn a position and then our European friends produce variations on it and I have to learn it all over again. We are actively involved and we are prepared to do our part. But we are not prepared to jeopardize the interests of our allies to get the conference concluded. Our allies, whose bureaucracy constantly grows, come up with complicated problems that no one can understand. We are not willing to spend much capital with our allies to force them to a conclusion.

Macovescu: No. I know the Third Committee problems on human contacts. I know there are some reasonable demands and some not so desirable. Security should not deal with the question of a movie theatre in Moscow. You know you have an American library in Bucharest and we have a Romanian library in New York. I understand that our Soviet friends are not interested in this today, but perhaps they will be tomorrow.

Kissinger: I know the Basket 3 problem. A distinctive feature of the Communist system is that it specializes in the ability to hold power. The elite which brought it to power will not lose it without noticing it. Therefore, while we are for the free exchange of peoples, it will not make any difference to communist political control. No one has accused President Ceausescu of an absence of political control. We may have USIS officers in Bucharest, and *New York Times* correspondents, but they will not affect your political control. I am all for Basket 3, therefore we supported it. We are under no illusion as to what it will produce.

Macovescu: We are for Basket 3. We will have two million tourists in Romania this year.

Kissinger: Without the slightest effect on your political control. You can have five million tourists, and nothing would change.

Sonnenfeldt: Not simultaneously.

Bogdan: It depends what brings them.

Datcu: Coming in cars.

Bogdan: There is also the institutional concept at the conference.

Kissinger: On the institutional concept, your and our attitudes are apt to be different. You want an institutional concept in order to protect yourselves from the Soviets. I am speaking frankly. We are not eager for that because we do not want the Soviets to extend their institutional influence in Western Europe. It would affect our allies and we don't want such a precedent.

Macovescu: If we close our discussions of European security, then security is one conference. It is not enough. Security is a long process. We believe we have to have all countries participate, including the United States.

Kissinger: We won't join anything that includes Sweden.

Bogdan: If you weigh the risk involved, you will find there is a gain.

Kissinger: We can find a solution to this.

Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets meanwhile have cooled down on follow-on steps.

Bogdan: That is not a reason for the United States to oppose follow-on steps.

Sonnenfeldt: Because they think it would interfere with their interests.

Macovescu: Because it would carry on a continuous process.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

256. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 8, 1974, 1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Polish:

Edward Gierek, First Secretary of Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party

Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Vice Premier and Chairman of State Planning Commission

Stefan Olszowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Richard Frelek, Member of Secretariat of Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party

Dr. Witold Trampczynski, Polish Ambassador

Jerzy Waszczuk, Director, First Secretary's Office, Central Committee of Polish United Workers' Party

Marian Kruczkowski, First Deputy Director of the Press, Propaganda and Publications, Department of the Central Committee

Romuald Spasowski, Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S.:

The Secretary

The Deputy Secretary

Ambassador Richard T. Davies

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff, Box 72, October 1974, Poland, First Secretary Gierek (12). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The conversation took place in the Secretary's dining room.

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Senator H. H. Humphrey
Senator Charles Percy
Representative Clement Zablocki²

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gierek: For us in Poland the prime importance is given to a successful conclusion of the CSCE conference. This establishment of a new relationship in Europe is of historic importance.

Secretary: By the way, I am doing a sociological survey to determine which Foreign Minister has read all of the CSCE documents. Let me hasten to add that I have not.

Olszowski: You are putting me in a difficult position.

Secretary: To my knowledge Gromyko is the only one that claims he's read all the documents.

Olszowski: In fact, we are studying very seriously the Helsinki communiqué.

Secretary: We have too. We are interested in bringing the conference to an early end and we will cooperate to do this. Speaking very frankly, we are not prepared, however, to jeopardize our relationship with our Western European allies in order to achieve agreement. Even when we might personally be inclined to go along with the position, we will not urge our European allies to do this. But even with that qualification I believe that the conference can be concluded the first part of next year.

Gierek: This would be an achievement for peace in this part of the world but it would also have good effects in other parts as well.

Secretary: The major issues seem to be in connection with the principles on the specific language dealing with "peaceful change." This is primarily a problem between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.

Gierek: And us.

Secretary: We have no frontiers we want to change.

Gierek: We don't either.

Secretary: It is not our impression that this problem will be difficult to solve. There is also the question of CBMs and Basket III. Here the difficulty seems to be that the documents are accumulating. We are trying to reduce the 13 or 14 proposals to one document that can be negotiated. Our allies, however, want to go through the process of a

² Humphrey was a Democrat from Minnesota; Percy, a Republican from Illinois; and Zablocki, a Democrat from Illinois.

first reading. We support a first reading and when it is concluded we will attempt to get a single position that can be negotiated. Personally, I believe that the Communists will not change their regimes without noticing it. It's a good idea to have these exchanges of persons and ideas. But that does not seem to us a major area of difficulty. My impression is that the conference can be successfully concluded early in 1975.

Olszowski: One matter of concern is that the fall session in Geneva seemed to start smoothly but quickly came to a standstill.

Secretary: That couldn't have been a very smooth beginning then.

Olszowski: I agree, but there are too many problems and they must be reduced. We must seek to elaborate what is on the table. In Basket I the key is the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and that seems to be on the way to agreement. Basket II also seems near completion. On Basket III we think it would be worthwhile to take a realistic look at what is acceptable. As far as Polish practice is concerned, there are no serious obstacles for us. Looking realistically there should be proposals that both sides can accept if we select the proposals carefully. In fact, this brings us to the last question which is the post-conference body. Perhaps we could select some formulas to agree on now and leave others for the continuing machinery to work out later.

Gierek: As far as Basket III is concerned there are 13 to 15 million people who visit Poland each year (*sic*).³ Sixty to eighty percent are from the West—Scandinavia, Germany, France, etc. We will have several tens of thousands of Americans. We have no objection to that. In addition, 8 million (*sic*)⁴ Poles visit outside Poland—in Czechoslovakia, France, Scandinavia and even Spain.

Secretary: I don't think Poland will have difficulty with this area but what about the Soviets?

Gierek: It is true there may be some difficulties for them.

Secretary: We approach this whole matter in a constructive spirit. We don't wish to push these matters in a way that will humiliate the Soviet Union. After the first reading we will try to find some compromises. The authors of these proposals need a first reading to satisfy their pride. As far as the United States is concerned, we could do it either way. This is a procedural issue and once we have settled it we can then move toward a conclusion. On the inviolability issue, if you want my honest view, only the lawyers understand the differences between the various formulations on peaceful change. No one is going to be able to change a frontier by pointing to a paragraph in the CSCE Dec-

³ As in the original.

⁴ As in the original.

laration. The main issue now seems to be over the placement of the word “only.” The West Germans have a difficult domestic policy issue. We have told the FRG and the Soviets to work it out. We have no quarrel with the old registered text or with the new text. The problem, Chuck (turning to Senator Percy), is that the German lawyers feel that the phrase “only under international law can frontiers be changed peacefully” means nothing because international law has nothing to say about changing frontiers and, therefore, they want a phrase “according to international law frontiers can only be changed peacefully and by agreement.”

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Olszowski: That is a very interesting subject but may I go back to the other subject for a moment. On the CSCE it is not only the Soviets who have difficulty with Basket III. There are others as well. For example, the Turks are not happy with some of the proposals for exchange of information.

Secretary: You mean the Turks want to oppose Basket III because they don't want newspapers to come in?

Olszowski: That seems to be the problem.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: I am not informed but does Albania participate in the CSCE?

Gierek: No.

Olszowski: They have made speeches and public statements saying that they consider the conference disgusting.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

257. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 11 a.m.–2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU
Central Committee

Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member CPSU Politburo

Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United States

Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev

Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of
State

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State

A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Secretary Kissinger's Visit to USSR, October 1974

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Brezhnev: One last matter affecting us is that of the All European Conference. If you have any reproaches regarding our position I'm sure you will make them. There are no hidden dangers in the USSR position, no one-sided advantages. The Conference must serve the interests of all the participants. But, how is the United States acting?

I don't want to criticize your President. But, in practice, we don't feel that at Geneva the United States is acting vigorously with the So-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, October 1974. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Clift. The conversation took place in the Old Politburo Room in the Council of Ministers Building in the Kremlin. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976. Secretary Kissinger visited the Soviet Union October 23–27, as part of a longer trip to the Soviet Union, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Tunisia from October 23 to November 9.

viet Union to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. I am sure that if the United States and the President wanted to act, agreement would be achieved rapidly. The United States and Soviet Union would not be showing hegemony, but would be safeguarding peace in Europe. If the United States took a stand, your friends would act. Now we have new delays, another interval. Then they will say it is too cold, then too hot. It is being dragged out. We feel the United States is far too passive. In words, the United States says it wants to act. At the conference, the United States sits in silence. France takes one position. The FRG has its position. We think the United States should take a resolute position. The Netherlands, Turkey and others are dragging it out. But, when questions regarding our territory to the Urals are raised, then European Security is really not the subject.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 6–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
 Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
 Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
 Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 (Interpreter)
 Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
 Asian Affairs

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, October 1974. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in the Old Politburo Room in the Council of Ministers Building in the Kremlin. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Jackson Amendment; CSCE; Middle East; Nuclear War

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Kissinger: Let me turn to the European Security Conference.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: The General Secretary stated we were insufficiently cooperative.

Brezhnev: That's not right; I said "not enough activity [aktivnost']." There is cooperation; "activity" is another question.

Kissinger: One of the difficulties, quite frankly, on the European Security Conference, is that some of the issues are so absurd that it's very hard to apply political influence to them. On some issues there are only three people in the world—in whom the Foreign Minister belongs—who understand what they're all about. I frankly, even after a night's reflection, Mr. Foreign Minister, don't understand the difference between "each principle has equal validity" and "each principle should be equally observed." I tell you now I will accept either formulation if the other participants agree, whichever it is.

Gromyko: That is only part of the general formula being suggested. Because there is also "equally valid and interdependent," which the Germans want.

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Why do the nutty Germans want "interdependent?"

Sonnenfeldt: [To Kissinger] It's a French point.

Gromyko: Actually we understand the line pursued by proponents of that formula. When they say the principles should be interdependent—actually it's "each principle should be equally valid and interdependent"—they mean that if someone says, say, that a humane principle isn't being observed, for example, means that the others should not be observed.

Kissinger: But it works both ways.

Gromyko: It's like little wheels in a watch. If one stops revolving, the others do.

Kissinger: If you claim one isn't being observed, you can also say the others aren't applicable. It's much more dangerous to the Germans than to you.

Gromyko: Our point of view is different. We believe that even if somebody doesn't observe one principle, it doesn't mean an end should

be put to observance of all the rest. Let's say some shouter, say in West Germany—but let's not name any countries—says because some principle, say a humane principle—someone is refused an exit visa—then all the other principles, like inviolability of frontiers, shouldn't be observed either. The objective position would be to say that all principles, from A to Z—10 or 11 or what have you—should be equally strictly observed.

Kissinger: My difficulty is I don't understand half of the issues being argued about. I understand this one, but let me be perfectly frank. If you have a concrete negotiation, you can go and use influence. But when the issue is where to place one phrase, whether to put it before or after another one, it's extremely difficult to use the prestige of the United States to put pressure and be accused of betraying an ally. What's happened with the European Security Conference is that every government is using it for purely domestic purposes, proving how tough it can be because it's running no risk. In Ottawa I told them what the result would be. But it's impossible to put pressure on a stupid point.

Gromyko: Tell them more energetically.

Kissinger: I don't want to go through all this before the General Secretary. Let me give you my own prediction. I believe it must be wound up. It's impossible to keep it going on these issues. It's an affront to logic. Probably the end of March is a reasonable time it should be wound up. Thirdly, what are the issues? On the principles, it's "peaceful change" and this point about "equally observed" and "equal validity."

Gromyko: That's two separate questions.

Kissinger: That's two separate questions. These are essentially German questions. No one else is interested in them. Then there is Basket III, and there is Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence-Building Measures will be settled, whatever the proposals are, because the difference between 50 and 100 kilometers, and between 20,000 and 40,000, can be compromised. So we're talking about Basket III and peaceful change.

With respect to Basket III, after the first reading, we have the approval of our allies to develop a common position. Until there is a common position, we understand your reluctance to compromise.

Regarding the two German points, Mr. Sonnenfeldt is leaving to see Schmidt before Schmidt comes here. He will express my personal view.

Gromyko: [To Sonnenfeldt] We will look at you!

Kissinger: And he may even be on time for Schmidt.

And you'll see President Ford, and he will see Schmidt in Washington. We think it has to be brought to a conclusion. And it's between you, us, and Schmidt. Maybe also Giscard, whom we'll also see on the 15th. December will be a good time to work this out.

I wonder whether the Foreign Minister's fertile mind, aided by Korniyenko, can come up with an idea on peaceful change—even if it's only to move the word “only” around in the center. So Genscher can say he's got a victory on something. I frankly don't believe that at the level of the Foreign Offices this can be settled, so when President Ford and Schmidt and Giscard meet, it can probably be settled.

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we shouldn't now endeavor to go into every detail on this. Perhaps you and Gromyko and Korniyenko can spend some time on it before you leave.

Kissinger: [To Sukhodrev] Did you translate what I said about the end of March?

Sukhodrev: Yes. The conclusion of the Conference.

Kissinger: All I can do is repeat: The President and you will discuss it at Vladivostok, and by the end of December we can bring it to a concrete point.

Brezhnev: Since the United States is also a participant in the European Security Conference, we have a very earnest desire to write into the European Security Conference that the United States should notify us about all movements of its Navy and all movements of its troops in the United States all the way to California.

Kissinger: Dobrynin knows it anyway.

Brezhnev: Dobrynin hasn't told me about it. Because otherwise you say it doesn't concern the United States; that it's a German question, a French question. Let's all build confidence.

Kissinger: But the summer house where Dobrynin spends all his time has more electronic equipment . . . It goes out to the Atlantic. You want to cover California too?

Brezhnev: All the way to California.

Kissinger: I think the question of military maneuvers will be settled.

Brezhnev: You know, the unfortunate thing is, I turned out to be the author of this proposal about notification of troop movements. It sometimes happens that a man proceeds from the best of intentions and makes a mistake in not predicting what form it takes in someone else's eyes. I am admitting it very frankly. We had a discussion with the late President Pompidou at Zaslavoye, and the question didn't even exist then. I said to him, “Let's do something to strengthen confidence. After all, any army doesn't just live in barracks and go out to mess room. They conduct maneuvers; they move tanks and planes. Let's invite your representatives, and anyone's representatives, to attend these maneuvers to observe them, and that would strengthen confidence.” No sooner did I say this than it was turned into an idea of opening up the whole Soviet Union, to the Urals. The question didn't exist before I mentioned it.

Aleksandrov: You let the genie out of the bottle!

Brezhnev: I let the genie out of the bottle, and now every country is coming back at me—the Greeks, the Turks, the Dutch, Belgium.

Kissinger: Anyone who can get the Greeks and Turks to agree on anything has already accomplished something.

Brezhnev: If that is so, we have to report to you and Canada about any troop movement.

Aleksandrov: Let you and Canada report!

Kissinger: We already know what you're doing.

Brezhnev: Of course.

Kissinger: Not every company, but every substantial movement.

Brezhnev: In the last ten years, we've had no more than two major military exercises, "Dniepr" and "Dvina." One was "Dniepr," when the Kiev Military District was supposed to mount an offensive against the Belorussian Military District. Who won, I can't say, because there was no real firing. But all the general officers there watched the Air Force come in with correct precision, and other movements. So if Grechko favors the Kiev Military District, he just announces Kiev has won. If for some reason he supports Belorussia, he announces they won. Thank God I wasn't present; I'd have said they both won.

The only extenuating factor for me is that I came out for that proposal guided by the noblest of intentions. But now others have turned it into a principle.

Kissinger: I'm aware of the differences of opinion that exist.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I raise the point by way of suggesting voluntary observers—that is, if we want to invite them, we do, and if we don't, we don't. In short, I think we should at some point discuss it in greater detail, especially taking into account your view of reaching a solution.

One thing that troubles me is that you seem to agree with those who emphasize the great difficulty of reaching agreement on peaceful change of frontiers.

The second point is I'm sick and tired of endless delays in bringing the Conference to a close. It was once to be ended in 1972. Then it was supposed to be in 1973, then in 1974. Now we hear it's March 1975.

Kissinger: I myself think March 1975 is realistic. Don't you?

Gromyko: If that is so, it's only because there are some who artificially cling to that time limit, who try artificially to hold back on it.

Kissinger: There is no issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. If I had a major concern here, I'd insist on it. The General Secretary knows I'm not exactly bashful about stating my views. So it's a question of how between the two of us we can manage the ending of the Conference. It's now practically impossible to do it in November.

May I make a concrete proposal, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: We will make an effort in the next two months to move our allies to a conclusion. You will see Schmidt and Giscard, and you let us know what you discussed with them with respect to this Conference. We will see Schmidt and Giscard, and we'll let you know what we discussed. So as to avoid confusion. Then early in January, you may wish to send Korniyenko, or maybe you'd send Gromyko, to America, and we could after all these discussions see where we are.

Gromyko: The important thing is that in our contacts with Schmidt and Giscard we should act from one and the same position and not in different positions.

Kissinger: I agree. But I think we should do it in parallel, but not give the impression we have an agreement.

Gromyko: The French would be overenthusiastic if they felt we were acting jointly with you.

Kissinger: They would be delighted.

Brezhnev: I certainly agree we don't need to use virtually the same words in expounding our position with Giscard and Schmidt, but we should act in parallel and in one and the same direction.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Perhaps you could have a word or two with the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: The basic thing is to talk in parallel.

Kissinger: Our basic talk with Schmidt is not when Sonnenfeldt is there, but when the President meets with Schmidt in Washington. But I'll send a message to Schmidt through Sonnenfeldt that we believe the Conference should be brought to a conclusion.

Brezhnev: When I say we should act along the same line, I mean while you are here in Moscow, you and Gromyko should agree on the main principles. Because if those basic principles are agreed on between us, Sonnenfeldt can be given more explicit instructions.

Kissinger: We can have a talk, but in our view the realistic time to make progress is when the President sees Schmidt.

Brezhnev: It's certainly true that more concrete results can be achieved in a summit, but at the lower level some preliminary work can be done.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And I certainly could not conceive of this question not being touched upon when I meet President Ford.

Kissinger: No question. We are prepared to discuss it.

Are we finished with this question?

Gromyko: In effect, you were replying to the observations made by the General Secretary this morning.

Kissinger: That's correct.

Gromyko: Because the questions we did mention regarding the European Security Conference are the issues that are now holding up the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And my point is that your basic problem is not the United States.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

259. Editorial Note

On the evening of October 26, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger met with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev for a final session of talks before departing Moscow for India the following day. A memorandum of conversation of the meeting reads in part: "Brezhnev: Those very small minor amendments to the overall communiqué we've made in the belief that it might be useful in terms of Vladivostok. Kissinger: I agree. You can understand our problem on MBFR. Brezhnev: We can accept it. Kissinger: And we accept. If you make many more concessions like this you'll have Alaska by next year. (Sukhodrev translates; Gromyko translates again and Brezhnev and Soviet side laugh.)" The memorandum continues: "Kissinger: Now, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going to talk to Schmidt; then, we will talk to Schmidt when he comes to Washington. If we keep each other informed on how that concerns CSCE we can make some progress. Brezhnev: I agree. Kissinger: We'll keep you informed." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President's Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974, Japan, Korea, and USSR, General [19]) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

The final joint communiqué issued at the end of Kissinger's visit, October 27, reads in part: "Noting the progress achieved by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the two sides will continue to work actively for its successful conclusion at an early date. They also believe that it is possible to achieve progress at the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe." (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 25, 1974, page 704)

On October 28, Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman met with West German Chancellor

Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher in Bonn to brief them on Kissinger's conversations in Moscow. Sonnenfeldt and Hartman reported to Kissinger the same day on their meetings in Bonn: "We next reviewed the CSCE discussion, noting that the Soviets were mostly concerned with the 'peaceful change' principle and with the question of 'equal validity' and 'interdependence' of principles. We said that we had told the Soviets that we would accept whatever they might work out with the Germans who were principally interested in these points. We told Schmidt that it was our feeling that the Geneva conference ought to be brought to a fairly quick end since it was becoming increasingly counter-productive. We noted that following his own visit to Moscow and the President's talks in Vladivostok there will be a series of intra-Western meetings which will provide an opportunity of reviewing the status of the conference. After that we ought to be able to reach a conclusion on how best to bring the conference to an end. We stressed that it was important that all the Western nations were united in their strategy and tactics in this regard and urged him not to take any steps of his own in Moscow beyond possibly getting some agreement on the two outstanding principles. Schmidt commented that it had been his impression that the U.S. wanted a quick conclusion at the summit level. We pointed out that this was incorrect and that on the contrary we had had reason to believe that both Pompidou and Brandt had earlier committed themselves to a summit conclusion. In any event, we stressed, it was now important that we should all be together on this matter. Schmidt indicated that his only interest was in the 'peaceful change' principle." (Telegram 16889 from Bonn, October 27; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 3, Nodis Letters, HAK 1973–74, Folder 7)

After Moscow, Kissinger traveled to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. On November 3, he visited Romania, where he held talks with President Ceausescu. Kissinger summarized his conversations in a message to the President (Hakto 107) on November 4. With regard to the European security conference, the message reads: "We [Kissinger and Ceausescu] then turned to Europe, which we agreed was problem number one. Ceausescu raised anew Romanian desires for some sort of follow-up mechanism after CSCE as a way to inhibit Soviet intervention. I had earlier agreed with the foreign minister [Macovescu] that our representatives in Geneva would meet soon on this question. Ceausescu also stressed Romanian concern over the potential latitude that certain language in the UN Charter could offer the Soviets for interference in former enemy states like Romania. Throughout this part of the talk ran the old Romanian refrain of worry

about our working out deals with the Soviets at their expense, but I assured him flatly that we would seek no condominium with the USSR." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President's Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974, Japan, Korea, and USSR, Hako [7]) A memorandum of Kissinger's earlier conversation the same day with Foreign Minister Macovescu is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official.

260. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 12, 1974, 11:15 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria
Hannes Androsch, Minister of Finance

President Gerald Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kreisky: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I think we can get something at the Conference in Helsinki, if he [Brezhnev] understands we need to get something so it is not just a show.

President: Basket III.

Kissinger: The problem is not us but Western Europe. Each European leader wants to show a success to its Parliament. If we could get a consolidated European position, we could get some Soviet concessions. If you would help on this . . .

Kreisky: Yes. Sweden is with us. To establish an energy agency of the west is very significant. Like the EPU in its time. It is important not only for Europe, but also eventually the Soviet Union and Poland. There will be a network of pipelines from the East. This should be discussed in CSCE. It will be important for the follow-on conference. Energy cooperation is going on now.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.

The next question is: some small results should come from the Vienna MBFR talks. There should be results because of opinion, not only in Europe, but also the Soviet Union. Brezhnev too needs results. He is not in trouble but he has been trying for four years. We shouldn't just say us all the time.

Kissinger: I agree. This generation has a four-year stake in these negotiations. They also have the fear of war in their bones. Our problem in every multilateral negotiation—we have Jackson, but also the Europeans, who pleaded with us in '69 for concessions and now accuse us of selling out. Any way you can help . . .

Kreisky: Yes. The next generation nobody knows. Also the Chinese attitude. Chou tried to tell us not to believe in the Soviet Union, détente, etc. But they are Communists too, so there is some strategy there too.

I am glad you are going to meet Brezhnev in Vladivostok. Brezhnev is very serious—that is his real weakness. Khrushchev was not. Kosygin is the most honest and brightest. He is running the country economically. Brezhnev doesn't know that. Kosygin was against Czechoslovakia.

Kissinger: Kosygin is by far the most intelligent. Brezhnev is very emotional.

Kreisky: He is very Russian.

President: I am looking forward to meeting him. We are hoping for meaningful progress which will lead to something next summer. You know Resor who is there on MBFR. It is our allies that are creating the problem. Every time we try to formulate something, they block us . . .

Kissinger: Basically the Europeans aren't scared, so they feel free to be tough. They make Talmudic arguments. Some of them have made a proposal which might have a chance, but by the time the Europeans get through with it . . . On SALT we have a good chance.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

261. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, 2:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR

General Secretary Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

SUBJECT

Middle East, CSCE, Trade Bill

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I suggest, Mr. General Secretary, that perhaps we should now turn to the question of the European Security Conference, a subject in which we both are very interested.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let's do that.

The President: We hope that there can be some real movement in this area. I believe we have to work between ourselves to reach possible solutions, and I think we can do it. What is your view as to what should be done to move the Conference to its final successful conclusion?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I would like to turn this question back to you. There are a lot of artificial, invented issues in Geneva. All issues regarding security have been practically solved, but what is braking progress is the so-called Basket III. Let's clean up that basket and everything will be solved. What is the United States concern in this area?

The Secretary: I would like to see that Dutch cabaret opened in Moscow so that I can visit it.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 4, Nodis Memcons, Jan. 1974, Folder 2. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Okeanskaya Sanatorium near Vladivostok. President Ford visited Vladivostok for a summit meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev from November 23 to 27. The complete text of the memorandum of this conversation, along with other documentation on the Vladivostok summit, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Give us time to build it.

The Secretary: May I ask what you discussed with Schmidt,² since he will be visiting the President in a couple of weeks. As I told you in October, we would be prepared to talk with Schmidt and Giscard to expedite matters. But in order not to work at cross purposes, it would be useful to know what you discussed with Schmidt.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Generally speaking, Schmidt did not object to concluding the conference. In essence, what the Germans are concerned about is the question of reunification. (Gromyko corrected Brezhnev's terminology by saying that the issue in question was that of peaceful change of boundaries.) So the question is where to place this point in the document. The basic principle is that borders should be inviolable and that states are to remain independent. A reference to peaceful change of boundaries could be placed somewhere, but the Germans came up with language the effect of which is to suggest that the primary purpose of international law is change of boundaries.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I fully agree with comrade Brezhnev's comments. I must also say that as of late the United States influence on the conference has diminished and that somehow the United States has become passive in Geneva. We regard this as part of United States policy. When the United States wanted to give a push to the conference, it did it rather well. Dr. Kissinger will remember that when the question of principles was discussed, more specifically that of non-interference, the United States acted together with us and we succeeded in persuading others. But recently the situation has deteriorated. To turn to specific issues, I want to point out that neither in joint Soviet-American nor in separate United States documents is there specific reference to the United States endorsing the holding of the third stage of the conference at the highest level. Even in today's communiqué there's no such reference. This is my first point. My second point is that United States representatives in Geneva either don't have or, if they do, are concealing and not implementing instructions to bring the conference to an end as soon as possible. All delegations should be instructed to conclude the conference by say January 1 or 15, or some other specific date. Many delegations are looking to you for taking the lead.

The Secretary: Here's another complaint in addition to several others. Never before did I hear praise for our cooperation, but at least today, several months later, we heard that we had done something.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² Schmidt visited Moscow from October 28 to 31.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: To continue, all delegations in Geneva should be instructed to finish the conference by a certain definite date. It would be good if we here could agree to act in such a way as to end Stage II by January 1 and have Stage III take place at the highest level sometime in January. As regards Basket III, the United States has demonstrated some sober judgment. But why do certain countries insist on imposing on others foreign institutions, even organizations managed by foreigners? Why would someone come as guest if he is not invited? We will have a cabaret if we want it. That's my third point. My fourth point is regarding the question of borders. The main aspect of this problem, that is inviolability, has been agreed upon and there are no difficulties. As to peaceful change, one question is where to place that point. But then a new formulation appeared and the Germans told us that it was the United States who had proposed it. In his conversations with us, Dr. Kissinger was indignant and said that this was an FRG and not a United States proposal. Nevertheless, this new language has been floating around ever since, and its thrust is that the main purpose of international law is change of borders. Let us jointly convince the FRG not to drag out this issue. Now let me turn to my fifth point. It relates to the issue of the significance of principles. Some maintain that all principles, be they on cabarets or on inviolability of borders, are of equal significance. Of course, one cannot agree to this proposition. But this is exactly what some are trying to impose on us. In our view, all principles should be strictly observed, so let us both pursue this line, not only in the corridors but at the negotiating table as well. Now to my sixth point. In Geneva, certain measures relating to military détente have been under discussion. They pertain to such things as maneuvers and movement of troops. As regards movement of troops, it seems that this issue is being left for the future, but on maneuvers some people want us to give information about everything that goes on in the area up to the Urals, even as regards the activities of small units. In our view, a solution of this problem should be such as would lessen tensions and suspicions. But the approach I just referred to would have the contrary result. Long ago, we agreed on exchanging observers at maneuvers, but now this issue threatens to become an obstacle, because it is artificially exaggerated. So efforts should be made to resolve all these issues. Otherwise, the conference will not be concluded.

The Secretary: I will not give a six-point answer, partly because some of the issues are so complicated that I have a hard time understanding them. In fact, I believe that Mr. Gromyko is the only Foreign Minister who understands all the issues. My comments will relate to three points: first, principles; second, Basket III; and third, movement of troops. The problem of principles is essentially a German problem. The issue of equal validity or placement is a mystery to me, it is one

that required Kantian education to understand. We do not believe that it can have any effect on the real situation, because no one will change the borders merely because the word “only” appears at the end of a CSCE document. As the President said, he will raise this question with Schmidt and try to convince the Germans to review their position. Then we will inform you.

The President: I will meet with Schmidt and Giscard and will discuss these CSCE issues with them in order to try to develop a method for solving all the points raised by the Foreign Minister.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I’ll make only a few brief comments, since comrade Gromyko has made a full presentation on this problem. I was pleased to see in one of your letters, Mr. President, the statement that you will seek the earliest conclusion of the Geneva conference and then sign the documents at the highest level.³ I’m a businesslike man and I believe you. I hope, therefore, that every effort will be made to this end. Do you think that the conference could be concluded by January 1, with the final stage at the highest level taking place in January?

The Secretary: Absolutely impossible.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Why?

The Secretary: Let’s be realistic. The second reading of Basket III has not yet been completed. In fact, you still owe us some formulations regarding that Basket. So, realistically, the conference could be concluded by the end of March, with Stage II terminating by the end of February and Stage III taking place in March or April.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can we agree that Stage II should end in the second half of February?

The Secretary: With a major effort, perhaps that might be possible, but we will be able to give you an honest estimate after our discussions with Schmidt and Giscard. To be perfectly frank, there is not one United States objective for which we would want to prolong the conference but, on the other hand, we don’t want to antagonize our allies. We believe the conference has been dragging too long and that by now no one really understands the issues, except perhaps Gromyko.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can we have at least a tentative date?

The Secretary: Perhaps March or April.

The President: I will talk with Schmidt and Giscard and attempt to get them to move in this area.

(At this point, Assistant Secretary Hartman left the room.)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

³ No such letter has been found.

262. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, December 5, 1974, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger (presiding as Chairman)

D	Mr. Ingersoll
P	Mr. Sisco
T	Mr. Maw
C	Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF	Mr. Blake
ARA	Mr. Rogers
EA	Mr. Hummel (Acting)
EUR	Mr. Hartman
NEA	Mr. Sober (Acting)
INR	Mr. Hyland
S/P	Mr. Lord
EB	Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/PRS	Mr. Anderson
PM	Mr. Stern
IO	Mr. Buffum
H	Mr. Holton
L	Mr. Aldrich (Acting)
S/S	Mr. Springsteen
S	Mr. Bremer

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Hartman: On the CSCE matters that we'll be discussing on the side in today's meetings, while you're talking to Schmidt and to Genscher, Schmidt has brought with him four state secretaries on the economic side and some of the political people from the Foreign Office. So what we've arranged is that Tom Enders² and Jack Bennet³ will be talking to them in the Cabinet Room.

Secretary Kissinger: Can you explain to them the difference between "equally observed" and "equal validity"?⁴ It passes my understanding. What is the intellectual difference?

Mr. Hartman: The intellectual difference is that if you say that all the principles have equal validity—

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 5, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternatives.

² Assistant Secretary of State for Economic-Business Affairs.

³ Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs.

⁴ The word "identity" was crossed out by an unknown hand and replaced with "validity" here and in Hartman's response.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Hartman: —then you're saying that the Soviet Union cannot say that the inviolability of frontiers is the most important principle. And that's the one that has to be applied above all.

Secretary Kissinger: If you say they must be equally observed, how can they say it then?

Mr. Hartman: Well, you see, if you observe the inviolability principle strictly—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Hartman: —it makes it less likely that you can persuade people that there is a case for peaceful change, because the Soviet Union will interpret that as saying that really inviolability means no change.

Secretary Kissinger: I mean, you guys are of course professionals, having worked in this field for so many years and having seen amateurs come and go.

Does anyone here understand that difference? If it's equal validity, then you cannot say one is more important than the other. But if they're equally observed, then you can say it's more important than the other?

It's beyond my comprehension.

Mr. Hartman: Well, it's a political issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Does anyone understand it intellectually? I mean, at least, the peaceful-change argument is nuts, but understandable. (Laughter.)

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The difference is between subjective observation and objective observation—regardless of whether you observe them or not.

Secretary Kissinger: And they must be equally observed?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It depends on how you act with respect to them, which is why the Germans don't like that.

Secretary Kissinger: But, in other words, as long as they have equal validity, observation doesn't make any difference.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You have a legal and metaphysical case for arguing they're all equal. (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: Until there is some failure to observe.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Like the difference between a traffic law and laws against murder.

Secretary Kissinger: You might want to reconsider that! (Laughter.)

Mr. Maw: I understand the physics of this, but not the law.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember an intelligence report at the end of the war that said the the secret dream of every German is to be hit by a car, with a light in the street in his favor. (Laughter.)

I don't know—my problem is I do not know how to resolve these issues. The one on peaceful change is only absurd, but at least I can grasp it intellectually. The absurdity of that is the placement of the word "only" will not determine whether there is a change in frontiers in Europe. In fact, there isn't going to be a goddamn thing written in these principles. It isn't going to make the damndest difference as to whether there is peaceful change or not.

No one is going to point to a clause of principles and say only because it qualifies international law it prohibits peaceful change, while it only qualifies peaceful change. It permits it.

I think this is childish. This is German domestic politics.

Mr. Hartman: Exactly. So let's forget the substance.

Secretary Kissinger: It's absurd. I must say in Vladivostok the President turned to me and said, "What's going on here?" (Laughter.)

Mr. Ingersoll: You couldn't explain it, heh?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can explain.

Speaking of "equal validity," as I understand the German position, they will accept a sentence on peaceful change if it is in the section on inviolability of frontiers—although if you're a metaphysicist, it doesn't make a damn bit of difference where it appears if it's "equal validity."

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It doesn't have any equal validity, in the first place. It has psychological and [omission in original minutes] validity. You are modifying the inviolability principle, but if you put it there—if you put it someplace else—

Secretary Kissinger: As long as you change the frontier.

Mr. Hartman: Only if you put in the French sentence, which says the principle should be interpreted in terms of the other principles. In other words, there's a connection between the other principles.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, come on; the whole thing is totally ridiculous!

Mr. Hartman: It is. I think the Germans are coming around to the view that the longer they stick on these questions dealing with the principles, the more the finger is going to be pointed at them for holding up this conference.

Now, if we can get an early agreement on a minimum package in the humanitarian third basket—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But we can't get there until we get a common position.

Mr. Hartman: Well, there are indications now that the French are now saying the conference ought to be brought to an early conclusion.

Secretary Kissinger: There's only one issue: Who's going to sell out whom?

And I think Giscard is selling out us.

Mr. Hartman: Fine.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless Schmidt has already sold out in Moscow.

Mr. Hartman: Well, if he has, he doesn't seem to have gotten anything for it in terms of his own concerns.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think the Europeans are all taking a position—I think with two exceptions: Norway and Denmark—that we must no longer hurry.

Secretary Kissinger: Because we've gotten so much up to now? What have we gotten; what exactly have we gotten? (Laughter.)

I heard Trudeau on this subject. He said—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He's got a real domestic issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The family issue. And that's an issue for him. He and the Germans there are the only ones that have an issue on Basket 3. Everyone else is pursuing—

Mr. Hartman: But if over this period someone from the Western side—and it doesn't necessarily have to be us; if we can keep the French out, it would be fine—he could come to the Soviet Union and say, "Here is what you've got to accept in Basket 3, but to really wind up this conference you have to show some sensitivity to these ridiculous issues that the Germans are raising. Make that the trade. This is how you can end that conference early. Otherwise you drag it out."

We may not want to, but that seems to be the position, it seems to me.

Secretary Kissinger: I just want someone else to get blamed for ending it late. What do we get for ending it early?

Mr. Hartman: Except to get rid of it.

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't mind extending it beyond the next extension.⁵ They may not want to blow up the Middle East before the European Security Conference.

Mr. Hartman: They've got every other linkage; you might as well have that one! (Laughter.)

Mr. Hyland: Keep it open until after Brezhnev's visit to the Middle East.

⁵ After the staff meeting, Kissinger met with President Ford in the Oval Office from 9:20 to 10:15 a.m. (Ford Library, President's Daily Diary) Kissinger told Ford: "On CSCE, no deal with Brezhnev. We don't want it done before early February, but then we should work together to get it settled." (Memorandum of conversation, December 5; *ibid.*, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7)

Secretary Kissinger: That for sure.

Mr. Hyland: Then we shouldn't try to straighten out that language. We should let that stalemate continue.

Secretary Kissinger: But we can discuss that with Schmidt and tell him we shouldn't settle it before early February. But isn't it true that after it's all settled that it would still take months?

Mr. Hartman: I think the Finns said that it would take six weeks for them to get ready for a final meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: That's going to be the most unbelievable circus. You have how many heads of state there?

Mr. Hartman: No—but someone was suggesting that we ought to get a cruise ship and send it up to Helsinki with the number of people.

Mr. Hyland: 34.

Secretary Kissinger: Why are we going to have so many people?

Mr. Hartman: Because if the President goes there, we have a lot of people.

Secretary Kissinger: But they're all going to speak, aren't they?

Mr. Hartman: Oh, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: There's no way of terminating a conference like this without having every head of state having spoken at least once.

Is the Pope coming too?

Mr. Hartman: It could be. I just want to make sure whether we should bring Butz! (Laughter.)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

263. Editorial Note

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Washington from December 5 to 6, 1974, primarily to discuss economic matters with President Ford. On December 3, Kissinger briefed Ford about Schmidt's upcoming visit: "On CSCE, it is time to bring it to a close, but don't do it in any way that looks like collusion. Schmidt is a better guy to deal with than Brandt." (Memorandum of conversation, December 3; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6)

When Ford met with Schmidt on December 6, Kissinger raised CSCE: "We [Kissinger and Genscher] talked about CSCE. We thought

after February we should push for a conclusion. The trade-off could be a compromise on Basket III in return for movement on the two principles of major interest to you [the Germans]. A move on Basket III must be done with a unified Western position.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1974)

264. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 5, 1974, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

US Briefing on Vladivostok Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

German

Mr. Guenther van Well, Assistant Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Klaus Blech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Helmut Roth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Georg Massion, Counselor, Federal Chancellery
Mr. Guenter Verheugen, Head of the Working Group “Analysis and Information,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, Counselor and Head of the North American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Hans Guenter Sulimma, Counselor, Deputy Head of the Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Carl Lahusen, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

US

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Scott George, Director, EUR/CE
Mr. Jan Lodal, NSC
Mr. D. Clift, NSC
Mr. Gerald Helman, Deputy Director, EUR/RPM
Mr. Herbert E. Wilgis, EUR/CE
Mr. Steven E. Steiner, EUR/CE

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Soviet Union, November–December 1974, Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wilgis and Steiner with concurrence by George. Approved by Robert Blackwill (C) on December 23. The conversation took place in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. The Foreign Office officials were accompanying Schmidt on his visit to Washington from December 5 to 6.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Part II—MBFR

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There was almost no discussion of MFBR at Vladivostok. What discussion there was was in informal sessions. Brezhnev complained that Secretary Schlesinger had announced that two additional combat brigades would be stationed in Europe. The President replied that this move would not be necessary if we had an MBFR agreement.² The Soviets gave us no advance notice of the freeze proposal they made in Vienna.³ The reason there was no more discussion of MBFR in Vladivostok was because of our concentration on SALT.

Ambassador Roth: Was there any discussion of CSCE/MBFR linkage?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We do not think that Gromyko's remark about this linkage is very significant.⁴ We should discuss our tactics and strategy.

Mr. van Well: We should discuss what our reaction should be to the Soviet freeze proposal. We think they made this proposal because the NATO Ministerial meeting is coming up. The Soviets always make proposals just before a NATO Ministerial. When we were in Moscow Brezhnev said that CSCE should provide the political groundwork. After this groundwork is laid we can then go on to discuss troop and weapons reductions. Now the Soviet proposal is unacceptable to us. The question is whether we should reject it out of hand or make a counter proposal. The German suggestion is that we make a counter proposal. It would be good for NATO's public image.

² During a press conference in Germany on November 5, Schlesinger announced that the United States would be replacing 18,000 support troops in Germany with two combat brigades. (Craig R. Whitney, "Schlesinger Bids Europe Build Forces," *New York Times*, November 6, 1974, p. 4) The exchange between Brezhnev and Ford at the Vladivostok summit took place during their conversation on November 23 at 2 p.m. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1977, Memcons and Reports, November 23–24, 1974, Vladivostok Summit [1]) The memorandum of the conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

³ Telegram 453 from the delegation to the MBFR talks, November 27, reported that in an informal session between Eastern and Western representatives at the MBFR talks the previous day, "Soviet rep Khlestov presented in writing a proposal to freeze all manpower in the area of reductions for the duration of the negotiations. In their preliminary response, Allied reps said this proposal was impractical because there was no East-West agreement on the numerical force totals of either side and undesirable because it would nonetheless contractualize the present East-West force relationship and create national ceilings on the forces of individual direct participants." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁴ See Document 248.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have not yet reached a firm conclusion. Obviously the Soviet proposal is not acceptable. We think the question is how to convey this feeling without appearing totally obstructionist.

Mr. Lodal: Our tentative feeling is that we are close to the end of the present negotiating session. The Soviets know the elements of our proposal. They also know we need time to consider their proposal. So we do not have to reject it. But we can tell them that it does not help much. We will see if we can work it in in some way. We should then wrap up this session and do some serious work during the break.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have no time to table a counter proposal in this session.

Ambassador Roth: The question is what do we do with the British [*Soviet?*] proposal. We do not think that we can prepare a detailed counter proposal for delivery in this session. The NAC should discuss various scenarios.

Mr. Hartman: NATO's basic position is known to the Soviets. We should take the recess and then prepare separate scenarios.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We are still sorting out our ideas. We will make some suggestions in Brussels in a few days. We have noticed some speculation in the German press that we made a deal in SALT on dropping FBS in favor of putting the nuclear package into MBFR. This speculation is totally wrong.

Mr. van Well: We are concerned over the public effect of the Soviet proposal before the NATO Ministerial. There could be criticism in the German press if the Soviet freeze is contrasted to NATO's putting in two new brigades. The strongest argument against the Soviet proposal is that we need some agreement on data before we can agree to freeze.

Mr. Hartman: Do you think MBFR should be discussed in the NATO communiqué?

Mr. van Well: Yes, and we should prepare contingency language in case the Soviets leak their freeze proposal.

Mr. Lodal: I agree.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: And we can do this without disclosing the Soviet proposal?

Ambassador Roth: Perhaps we can use the Soviet proposal to get the data question on the table.

Mr. van Well: The Soviet representatives tell us that the West has responded to all the Soviet points except one. That is the inclusion of nuclear elements. They are waiting for our response on this point. What are the US thoughts? Should NATO take this up after the recess?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We are thinking about this but we have reached no conclusions. If we do make a decision we will then consult with you.

Mr. van Well: The recent Brookings study⁵ has provoked much discussion in the German press. We do not comment on this.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Neither do we.

Ambassador Roth: We have just received the US paper on the inclusion of air manpower.⁶ We are concerned that you are making this proposal at this time. This is a very sensitive question for Germany. We want to protect against the possibility of future reductions of German air manpower. Our Minister of Defense is very concerned about this possibility.

Mr. Lodal: The US suggestion is that reductions of air manpower can be permitted up to 15% of total reductions. Permitted not required. This is the US intention, to reduce our air manpower 15%. In addition we want to set a ceiling of 15% for the Soviets.

As you know, air manpower can be reintroduced quickly so we do not want the Soviets to reduce more than 15%. We still want reductions in Soviet ground forces.

Ambassador Roth: We are concerned that the US proposal prejudices the final outcome.

Mr. Lodal: It is a touchy question. What is German thinking on Option III?⁷

Mr. van Well: We are cautious. Let the Soviets show their interest. In principle we do not oppose its introduction. However, the figures used in the Brookings report were a shock. The psychological implications on Option III are important.

(Mr. Lodal left the meeting at this point.)

Part III—CSCE

Mr. Hartman: We would like to begin our discussion of CSCE by ascertaining the results of your Moscow trip. For our part, it came up only in a side conversation in Vladivostok⁸ during the SALT discussions. Gromyko listed five or six areas where he thought progress had been made in CSCE, and he asked whether we could wind up the conference by January 1. The Secretary replied that this was impossible.

⁵ Apparent reference to a Brookings Institution study by Jeffrey Record that proposed reducing U.S. tactical nuclear warheads in Europe from 7,000 to 2,000. (Telegram 18703 from Bonn, December 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁶ In telegram 263866 to USNATO, November 30, the Department transmitted a paper for discussion in NATO on this issue. In telegram 265622 to Bonn, December 3, the Department instructed the Embassy to discuss the paper with West German officials with the goal of obtaining Allied approval for including air manpower in MBFR negotiations in Vienna in 1975. (Ibid.)

⁷ A reference to the U.S. proposal for MBFR, under discussion in NATO, to reduce U.S. tactical nuclear capability in Europe by 20 percent in return for a 20 percent reduction in Soviet armor; see Document 137.

⁸ See Document 261.

The Soviets then asked whether the conference could conclude in February. The U.S. side replied that perhaps with good will and the necessary compromises this could be done. However, there would be need for further progress in Basket III.

Mr. van Well: I would like to begin with some general remarks about CSCE. First, we consider that we should continue on the present course and complete the first reading in Geneva.

Mr. Hartman: When could this be completed?

Ambassador Blech: It is hard to say. We have just heard that some progress has been made on Principle VIII (self-determination), which had been a major hurdle. The problems here were created by other Western Europeans who wanted a “balancing sentence” to the effect that self-determination should not be used from the outside to dismember another country. Such a “balancing sentence” could be paralyzing. Principle IX, on the other hand, is not too much of a problem, but non-discrimination remains a difficult question. In addition, there are major problems on peaceful change and Principle X, namely the question of equal validity and interpreting each of the principles in the context of all the others.

Mr. van Well: This (equal validity) is the only detail which the Chancellor raised with Brezhnev in Moscow.

Mr. Hartman: It strikes us as a theological question.

Ambassador Blech: This question is not theological for us. I have the impression that the Soviets have the wrong notion of German aims and that they assume that equal validity builds a position to allow the FRG to say at some future point that without peaceful change and self-determination, we do not have to respect the other principles. We have tried to explain to the Soviets that this is not the FRG goal and that we do not contest the validity of the other principles. Our question deals with the matter of interpretation, not the validity, of the other principles—namely, that no principle should be subordinate or undercut another. When peaceful change was moved out of Principle III and put into Principle I, we have the problem of someone saying that Principle III (inviolability) derogates the possibility of peaceful change in regard to Central Europe. We must make it clear therefore that the concept of peaceful change in Principle I is not qualified by the inviolability precept. We could do this by saying in Principle I that nothing in the over-all declaration qualifies it. However, this formulation was dropped at Geneva.

We are prepared to discuss suitable formulations and to try to find one to satisfy both FRG needs and Soviet and Eastern European concerns. I want to emphasize, however, that this does not deal only with the German problem, but should be considered a general principle. The principle of self-determination should not be used to dismember a

country in violation of Principles I and IV. We have not offered a formulation on this, as the French have a draft which they think adequately expresses our view. As in the Helsinki declaration, all principles should be respected and applied equally.

There is also a problem of interpretation in this regard. The French formula is satisfactory, but there are misunderstandings on the Soviet side. Sauvagnargues in Moscow unintentionally referred to a "lien entre les principes," which the Soviets took to mean that all of the principles are tied together. The FRG has been avoiding discussion of the interdependence of the principles, and we still think we can sell the French formula to the Soviets.

Mr. van Well: As I said, we need to complete the first reading. This can't be done, however, until there is an agreement on CBM's. We therefore need a CBM's text at the first reading, as this can't be put off until the last minute. Then there is the question of whether we should wait to resolve peaceful change and equal validity until the beginning of the second reading. Neither we nor the Soviets like leaving this issue open. But how can we resolve it? The Soviets are trying to isolate us on this issue and they succeeded in doing so on April 5.⁹ They tried this again, when in September and October they handed out three different versions of their proposal. Gromyko said in Moscow (October 28–30) "you are responsible", and he pointed his finger at Foreign Minister Genscher. The Soviets consider that we are backtracking and that the April 5 text is the only valid one. This could be a disruptive issue, and we must be careful.

Peaceful change has a key role in our parliamentary debates and has important domestic political implications. The formula worked out by the U.S. in July¹⁰ is known to the Soviets. If it is the FRG which must reach a compromise with the Soviets, we would come out with less than the U.S. formula. We then would take the blame for diminishing the Secretary of State's formula.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets are adamantly opposed to the July formula.

Mr. van Well: I would like to say something about our tactics in CSCE, and the Foreign Minister agrees with what I am about to say.

⁹ Telegram 5891 from Bonn, April 11, reported that West German Foreign Minister Frank had "expressed distaste for 'premature compromise' of this issue [i.e., inviolability of frontiers at CSCE]. He voiced displeasure that pressure for solution coming from Western (i.e., US and France) as well as Eastern countries and that Allies had left FRG in isolation on point of major significance to Bonn." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) The Soviet and West German delegations to the CSCE in Geneva reached a compromise on April 5; for a summary of the compromise, see Document 198.

¹⁰ See footnote 4, Document 233.

First, the FRG prefers that the U.S. now pursue this with the Soviets. We have not discussed this recently with the other members of the EC-Nine, but the Nine Foreign Ministers earlier gave their approval to the text developed by the Secretary of State and agreed that the U.S. should table this text at Geneva. We consider that it is best for this to be pursued now in Washington by the Secretary of State as it was he who discussed it in Moscow.

The Soviets say that the U.S. formula looks like an appeal to change frontiers. This is ridiculous. The FRG is not wedded to any particular formulation, but is wary of the Soviet claim that peaceful change must be based on "international law." The Soviets have their own definition of "international law." We are not unhappy with the formula Gromyko gave us in New York, and we would like to pursue this.¹¹

We also have a question concerning the interdependence of the principles. The U.S. made an interesting breakthrough in the communiqué on the Gierek visit in stating that all of the principles are inter-related.¹² This is good as a start, as it indicates that all of the principles form one whole. The French are very interested in this and will be firm. They wish to take the initiative. The FRG does not want to be out in front alone vis-à-vis the Soviets. The Soviets want to discuss this bilaterally with us, but we are opposed to this.

Another point is that we do not want to end up with an imbalance of Western vis-à-vis Eastern bracketing after the first reading. We therefore need a presentable text on CBM's. Our leverage here is that the Soviets want an early conclusion to the conference. Time pressures are mounting on them, as they would like to have a conclusion in time for their May 8 celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the German capitulation and the East Berlin meeting of Communist parties scheduled for the same date. The Soviets are also very interested in the follow-up, but we don't have much room for maneuver there.

Mr. Hartman: The Romanians pressed us hard on the question of follow-up and said that the Western position does not take account of the changed situation. They consider the follow-up essential to keep the West involved in the East. They claim they have some neutral support, possibly including Yugoslavia.¹³

Ambassador Blech: We don't deny that Romanian interests may coincide with ours, but when they conflict with Soviet interests the Ro-

¹¹ See Document 252.

¹² For the text of the "Joint Statement on Principles of United States-Polish relations," signed by President Ford and First Secretary Gierek on October 9, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 4, 1974, pp. 603–604.

¹³ See Document 259.

manians fall flat. If, on the other hand, their proposals *don't* elicit Soviet pressure, we must be even more alert.

Mr. Hartman: What is necessary on CBM's?

Ambassador Roth: There is some possibility of reaching agreement on the size of forces, but we must avoid the Soviets' zone proposal¹⁴ and define the area to be included within the Soviet Union. The question of who should be informed should not be too difficult to settle.

Mr. Hartman: But not until the Soviets give up their zone proposal.

Mr. van Well: The British are carrying the ball on that point.

Mr. Hartman: Yes, but they (the British) are still pushing us hard on movements.

Mr. van Well: Callaghan raised the follow-up question with us in Bonn on November 10. Foreign Minister Genscher said that regularization of meetings on the ambassadorial level could be discussed in the first review. We envision this as being in 1977, as we will need two years to evaluate the situation following the conclusion of the conference.

Ambassador Blech: Ambassador Kovalev recently tried to push me back to the April 5 formula, and I tried to push him back to the Soviet formula presented in New York. Kovalev replied that he "didn't know" anything about that. Kovalev emphasized that the third condition, namely the formulation "in accordance with international law," is necessary. But I asked how could there be a peaceful change of borders which is not in accordance with international law. Kovalev gave the Munich Agreement as an example. I replied that this is not a good example, as Czechoslovakia was not consulted and the agreement was reached under the threat of force, which violates the other principles involved in CSCE. I think the Soviets could fall back to the two-condition formula (presented in New York) if they conclude that they have no hope of achieving the three conditions by dividing the West.

Mr. Hartman: What is the relationship of Basket III to our final bargaining tactics? How much push will be necessary and how does Basket III interconnect with the other issues?

Ambassador Blech: We have no indication that the Soviets connect them. Some Basket III questions are on the way to resolution, for example, family reunification and mixed marriages. The Soviets have been surprisingly generous here because they want to move things.

¹⁴ With regard to confidence-building measures, the Soviets were taking the position at the CSCE in Geneva that any requirement for prior notification of military maneuvers should apply only to border zones. (Telegram 2804 from Geneva, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Mr. van Well: We don't feel ourselves to be under pressure from the other Western Europeans. To the contrary, they told us to be firm. I personally think the Soviets link German flexibility in CSCE to the Berlin situation, and I agree with Mr. Hartman that the Soviets are under GDR pressure on this. Gromyko told us in Gymnich that "some," rather than "we," have difficulties with this. The Soviets then saw confusion in the West, and they became more rigid.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They are very rigid now.

Mr. Hartman: We predicted in Ottawa that this would be difficult.

Ambassador Blech: My GDR colleague said it would be a tremendous problem for them and that the CSCE declaration cannot have one millimeter more than our bilateral treaties. I replied that it cannot have a millimeter less. However, it is impossible to transfer the bilateral setting to the multilateral.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I personally feel that the more we fuss over one issue in CSCE, the more difficulties we will have on others. The mere reference to peaceful change has significant political and psychological impact to the Soviets. We therefore should not be too juridical on this, and we should not lose sight of our other goals.

Ambassador Blech: We realize that the final conference document would not be legally binding, but the East would nonetheless consider it as such. The West therefore would not be in a position to defend itself by saying it is not legally binding.

Mr. Hartman: We might want to have an Allied meeting on CSCE before the NATO consultation in order to give us more focus. I do not know how our principals would react to this, however, as this is my personal idea. Such a meeting would give us a public context to clarify our efforts.

Mr. van Well: This is a good idea.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We must nonetheless keep the political character of the CSCE talks in mind. Over-emphasizing one issue could remove the political basis for resolving the others.

265. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, December 9, 1974, 8 a.m.

PRESENT

The Secretary of State—Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Ingersoll
Mr. Maw
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Mulcahy
Mr. Bowdler
Mr. Hummel
Mr. Stabler
Mr. Atherton
Mr. Hyland
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Enders
Mr. Anderson
Ambassador McCloskey
Mr. Stern
Governor Holton
Ambassador Buffum
Mr. Eagleburger
Mr. Springsteen

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Kissinger: I want to hear first about this French communiqué with the Soviets.² I have yet to read the text.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 5, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret. An attached summary of the meeting reads in part: "The Franco-Soviet summit and CSCE. The Secretary directed EUR to draft a telegram of protest to Paris, info NATO capitals. The French return to Jobert's style of operations." Telegram 270186 to Paris, December 10, contained the text of the U.S. démarche. Because Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues was too busy with preparations for an upcoming EC-9 summit, Secretary General de Courcel of the French Foreign Ministry received Rush the same day. Rush reported de Courcel's reaction in telegram 29642 from Paris, December 10: "De Courcel responded that our interpretation of the French-Soviet summit communiqué is completely unfounded, and there is no cause for concern with respect to France's continued adherence to the precondition that Stage II results must be considered satisfactory before any commitment to a summit can be made." (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

² The communiqué signed by Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing at the end of Brezhnev's visit to Paris, December 4–7, reads in part: "The two parties noted that in the course of the second phase of the Geneva conference, substantial progress has been made, notably in recent weeks, in preparing the final drafts of the definitive documents. France and the Soviet Union declare themselves resolved to intensify their efforts to resolve the suspended questions within the framework imposed by the schedule agreed at Helsinki and by the conclusion of the second phase of the conference. They note that favorable conditions have been created for the conclusion of the conference within a brief time and for holding its third phase and for the signature of the final documents at the highest level." (Telegram 29497 from Paris, December 7; *ibid.*)

Mr. Stabler: On the summit, you mean. Well, on that, it is quite true that they have gone much further than anybody else. They have indicated—

Secretary Kissinger: Can I hear the text? Incidentally, where is Hartman?

Mr. Stabler: He left last night for London. He had a commitment there today.

Secretary Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Stabler: Well, apparently he is speaking to a group of bankers, financial people. I think it was arranged some time ago. It says the two sides pointed out considerable progress was made during the second stage of the Geneva Conference particularly in the last week, in preparing the drafts of the final documents. "The Soviet Union and France declared their determination to step up efforts in considering questions which are not yet agreed upon within the framework of the agenda adopted in Helsinki, so as to conclude the second stage of the conference. They state that good prerequisites have been created for the conclusion of the conference at an early date, for holding its third stage, and for signing its final documents at summit level."

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know damned well if we had said this, the Europeans would be climbing the walls.

Mr. Stabler: And that is particularly so—

Secretary Kissinger: If you remember that dinner—I forget when it was—we had at the Quai D'Orsay, when the French would not let us say privately that the efforts had to be speeded up.³ In July.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Even in Ottawa.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. But in July. They would not even let us put down a desirable position on paper, lest it leak to the Soviets.

Mr. Stabler: It is also quite true that as far as the Schmidt visit in Moscow⁴ is concerned, that that was absolutely just completely devoid of anything: discussed questions relating to the Conference on Security Cooperation, they would agree to its successful conclusion as soon as possible. And there is absolutely total refusal on the part of the Germans to agree to any reference to the level at all. So they sidestepped it neatly.

Secretary Kissinger: We could have at successive summit meetings gone quite far in that direction. And time and again we have been dis-

³ See Document 232.

⁴ Schmidt visited Moscow October 28–31.

suaded by the Europeans, and time and again the Europeans have told us that this would be handled on a united basis. I don't think we should take it. I have always known—as you know, I have always said the only question is which European will sell out first. In fact, I said it to Schmidt last week.⁵ I said if he didn't do it, then Giscard would certainly do it, and if he doesn't do it, Wilson will do it. But somebody is going to do it. It is no great loss to us.

Mr. Stabler: There is one press report, which I have no way of checking at the moment. It said that he agreed to this in exchange for concessions by the Soviets to Basket Three.

Secretary Kissinger: That too is not acceptable. Supposing we came back from a summit meeting and said we had bought the following concessions.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have known for ten days that the Soviets and the French are working out a basket—one portion of the Basket Three.

Secretary Kissinger: What is Basket One?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Basket One is the Declaration of Principles. On one of the humanitarian paragraphs in Basket Three they have been—I think the Germans told us, didn't they—or maybe even the French themselves, in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: But the basic point is—I couldn't care less what they do in the European Security Conference. They can write it in Swahili for all I care. But that isn't the point to me at all. The Conference can never end up with a meaningful document. And I think precisely because it wasn't meaningful, it seems to me totally undermining confidence. Or am I wrong? What do you think, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You know, I think everybody has been talking to the Russians on their own. And we have been, I think, the most meticulous in telling everybody what we have been talking about, when it has come to points of substance. And the French, if they are dickering with the Soviets on Basket Three—

Secretary Kissinger: Both on substance and procedure, we have stuck meticulously to the agreements. I mean we have even privately never gone beyond saying we won't be an obstacle, but it depends on our allies—and it is not an issue on which we are going to fight our allies—which is fair enough.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think that the French are undoubtedly further along than anybody else in talking privately to the Soviets.

Secretary Kissinger: Shall we make a point to some of the other countries?

⁵ No record of this conversation has been found. Regarding Schmidt's Washington visit, see Document 263.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I would imagine that Giscard will make it.

Secretary Kissinger: Giscard is not yet the United States.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes—I think we ought to make a point that we can all run this thing on our own, or we can do it together.

Secretary Kissinger: And that sort of procedure has rather profound consequences in our perception of how far we can go in allied cooperation. I don't give a damn about the conference. But precisely because nothing big was involved—the procedures are—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, the point is that we have always had the strongest reservations about multilateral dealings with the Soviets. And precisely—

Secretary Kissinger: Bilateral dealings.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I mean about going into this multilateral congress type of diplomacy—in part because it is so tempting for individuals to make deals.

Secretary Kissinger: But the fact is that you know we could have gotten something from the Soviets on a number of occasions, if we had been willing to go as far as this. You know that we desisted. We went through that whole second reading exercise, which is a fraud.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That was the point I was going to make.

Secretary Kissinger: We let four months go by, because the Europeans said they didn't even want to put down their optimum position on paper, much less what they may have settled for here. And then to be confronted by a communiqué, without warning, that gives it all away, that seems to me impossible.

Mr. Hyland: But the French will say this is pretty close to what was in the U.S.-Soviet communiqué over a year ago.⁶

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There we said we are proceeding from the premise, rather than the premise has been created.

Mr. Hyland: The French will say that broke the ice on the summit.

Secretary Kissinger: Nonsense. They never said that to us for a year. We didn't have it in this year's summit, we didn't have it in Vladivostok.

Mr. Hyland: We had it in San Clemente.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have had the same formula. But the main point—

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is that we never made a move on substance, and that we never made a move towards the summit—and that we never said that the premise has been fulfilled.

⁶ See Document 163.

Mr. Hyland: But we don't know what Brezhnev told Giscard, either. Knowing Brezhnev, he probably said "The Americans will agree to this. In fact, they want it."

Secretary Kissinger: There is always a telegraph or telephone.

Mr. Hyland: He did this to Pompidou a year ago.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He has done it to everybody at various times. But I think we can fairly make the point to the Europeans that this is going to be even more important than MBFR, where you actually move troops around; if this is going to be the pattern.

Mr. Stabler: For instance, do you make the point directly to the Europeans, or do we start first by asking the French what precisely this means. It seems to me just on the eve of the Martinique meeting—

Secretary Kissinger: I don't give a damn about the eve of the Martinique meeting. I think it is ridiculous for Giscard to be a great hero with Brezhnev, and then to go next week and meet the President and be a great hero with the President. I mean that is the tawdriest kind of politics.

Mr. Stabler: I wonder whether we ought to go there first, rather than going round to the Europeans at this moment. I mean we may get to that point. But I wonder if we ought not to try first—indicate what we are surprised on this point, and see what they have to say.

Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be like the producers' conference. By the time the French get through explaining it, they were carrying out our proposals, they were doing us a favor. What can this mean? Did we tell the French about what was discussed at Vladivostok?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I had the Ambassador in.⁷

Secretary Kissinger: So they can be under no misapprehension.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes—we talked to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Was it clear to them that we had not agreed to anything?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We were specifically asked by the Ambassador whether this passage on CSC in the communiqué meant any advance, and we specifically told them that it did not. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

⁷ Telegram Tosec 468/260370 to Paris, November 26, reported on Sonnenfeldt and Hartman's conversation with the French Ambassador. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 140, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File)

266. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1974.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] The French—you will have a difficult time in Martinique. Giscard will be charming and go all out to have a visible success. But look at what he did on CSCE with Brezhnev.² They said things on the Middle East without consultation; they agreed to all the things on Cyprus we knocked out of our communiqué.

We must show Europe that we can't be at the mercy of any European who sells us out at will. Tell Giscard he can be an ally or neutral but not both. I would be noticeably cooler to Giscard than to Schmidt. I thought I would be tough at NATO. The others don't want to have to choose between France and us. I think we have to make them choose. I think the problem is endemic—three French Presidents have now done the same—and we have to show the Europeans they can't get away with it.

President: Will Schmidt raise hell about CSCE?

Kissinger: The German nightmare is to have to choose between France and us.

[Discussed the internal French political system.]³

The French have either been governed by kings or anarchy since the French Revolution. Giscard's inherent political position is weak.

For 15 years the French have systematically undermined us.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place from 9:20 to 10:20 a.m. in the Oval Office. (Ibid., Staff Secretary's File, President's Daily Diary)

² See Document 265.

³ Brackets are in the original.

267. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Martinique, December 15, 1974, 4:30–6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Pierre Fourcade, Minister of Economy and Finance (Second Half)
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury (Second Half)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Defense Cooperation; CSCE; F-104 Replacement; Monetary Issues

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Giscard: Let me turn to CSCE for a moment. I had a long talk with Brezhnev on this. I studied it before, and was not confident about our claims that the Basket III problems—education, information—I am not sure the thing can be solved this way. The same practical technical solution can be made without having to have the principle of free access. What irritates Brezhnev is the linking of inviolability of borders with peaceful change.

Kissinger: As I understand the German position, the sentence as written is okay if it follows the inviolability of frontiers. If it is in the section on security, then they want a change. I think it is absurd. No frontier will change on the basis of a sentence in a document.

Giscard: We did not commit ourselves to a summit meeting, but I said we would try to find a solution to the several problems. I don't know why Brezhnev would like a summit in April . . .

Kissinger: He wants it before the anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 8. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Hotel Meridien. Ford and Giscard d'Estaing met in Martinique December 14–15.

President: We had a 45-minute presentation by Gromyko on CSCE.² We feel strongly about SALT. He went into great detail. On CSCE we think we must move in conjunction with our allies. We told them June–July.

Kissinger: We would prefer after the anniversary; they want a joint celebration. They want to reenact the meeting of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe. We have refused a celebration on German soil.

On the whole, we think it is better to end in May or June rather than April, but not to say that—just to conduct the negotiation so it works out that way.

Giscard: They think this is the final price of the war, and that is why they want it before May. It is for him the last price of détente also.

Kissinger: We could finish Phase II in April and announce it for June.

Giscard: We need to work it out with the allies . . .

Sauvagnargues: We did not enter into specific drafting on peaceful change.

Kissinger: The Soviets say you did. This is a case where consultation would help.

Sauvagnargues: We will give you the notes of the meeting.

Kissinger: If we just move so that Phase II ends in April.

Giscard: Yes, it would take at least a month to set it up. I asked Brezhnev how he envisaged the signature. He said he would speak five minutes. He is afraid of reopening the negotiations so he wants just a formal meeting.³

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² See Document 247.

³ In a meeting with Ambassador von Staden on December 18, Hartman summarized the outcome of the Franco-U.S. summit with regard to CSCE. He said that the “discussion of CSCE at Martinique had been brief and quite general. We had not proposed to the French the holding of a summit of the Western countries as we had suggested to German Foreign Minister Genscher. Mr. Hartman added that prior to the Martinique meeting, the Secretary had held a more detailed discussion about CSCE matters with French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 18; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1974) A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Sauvagnargues on December 12 is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860133–2636.