

# Managing the Department of State

## 291. Editorial Note

Documentation on participation of the Department of State and Secretary of State Rogers in the National Security Council system is in the chapter on the NSC system. Included is documentation on Rogers' relationships with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger and on the views and concerns expressed both in the White House and the Department of State about the functioning of the NSC system and the respective roles of the two agencies in shaping foreign policy. Documentation on foreign economic policy, including the Department of State's conflict with the Department of Commerce over control of U.S. foreign economic and commercial functions, is in the chapter on foreign economic policy. For documentation on the President's efforts to restructure the foreign assistance program, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Documents 1–147.

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## 292. Memorandum From the Counselor-Designate (Pedersen) to Secretary of State-Designate Rogers<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 30, 1968.

RE

Executive Leadership of Department

A number of studies over recent years have advocated designating the number three man in the Department as either "Executive" Under Secretary or "Permanent" Under Secretary. They recommend appointing a career officer to the position, and giving him full responsibility for the management of the Department, both in administration and in the execution of policy decisions. The concept is that the Secretary has so many responsibilities to the President, with foreign diplomats, in decision making, and in crises that he cannot "run"

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 8. Confidential.

the Department; similarly that the job has become so large that the Under Secretary must be a true alter-ego and therefore does not have time to run the Department either.

The Herter Committee made such a recommendation in 1962 and the Foreign Service Association, under new and younger leadership, did so also in a report in 1968.<sup>2</sup> Legislation would be required to establish such a title (and the supporters of such a change favor it); the function could, however, be bestowed without legislation.

Three main motivations are involved in the recommendations for an "Executive" Under Secretary: (a) A feeling that the Department has not been adequately "managed" either from an administrative or substantive point of view and is therefore not fully responsive to policy decisions, (b) a feeling that the Department does not adequately exercise its policy authority over operational activities of other agencies abroad, specifically AID and military assistance, but also USIA and others, and (c) a desire to further continuity and stability in policy and administrative practices at the professional level.

In spite of the persistence of such views, successive Secretaries of State have not adopted such recommendations. Politically-appointed Under Secretaries such as Ball and Dillon have exercised varying degrees of control over the operations of the Department, partly determined by their own personalities and partly by the nature of responsibility the Secretary was prepared to assign to them; professional diplomats have been given influential advisory but not really executive roles. Rusk's own view is that the secret to effective operation of the Department is delegation of authority (essentially to the Assistant Secretary level), and he does not favor an "Executive" Under Secretary.

After reading a great deal of the literature, my own view is that while it is correct that there is a need for better administration and execution of decisions in the Department, the designation of responsibility for the operation of the Department to one man at the third level would cause more problems than it would solve. If fully executed in accordance with the recommendations, the office would in my view have too much authority vis-à-vis the Secretary and political leadership; it would also centralize too many functions in one man, who in effect would have to filter and be responsible for all activities and functions of the Department before they reached the Secretary. To administer the Department, to recommend and execute policy decisions, and to supervise and coordinate the foreign policy activities of other agencies are immense and disparate tasks.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the American Foreign Service Association report, "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," see *Foreign Service Journal*, vol. 45, no. 11, part II, November 1968.

On the other hand there are now seven people at Under and Deputy Under Secretary level (including ACDA, AID and Peace Corps), and fourteen at Assistant Secretary level, plus probably a dozen detached people, who report directly to the Secretary of State. While most (not all) of these people need to have direct access to the Secretary, the Secretary does need effective intermediate screening and executive assistance procedures. The Under and Deputy Under Secretary positions are, of course, intended for such functions. I believe that, with the right delegation of responsibilities to these positions (and the right people in them), the present system can be made to work effectively and responsively to the decisions of the President and Secretary, at the same time meeting the criticisms leveled at the current situation.

Top level policy and executive responsibilities might be allocated as follows (present and altered organization sheets attached):<sup>3</sup>

*Recommendations*

1. Under Secretary. The Under Secretary should be a real alter-ego of the Secretary. He should take on some of the Secretary's conference responsibilities. He should receive many ambassadors. He should participate in policy decisions and he should undertake special responsibilities (e.g. Biafra).

2. Under Secretary for Economic (or Political) Affairs (title is optional under the law). This Under Secretary should have as his primary assignment responsibility for supervision and general direction of economic and military assistance programs as given to the Department by law. Primary coordination point within the Department on AID, Peace Corps, USIA matters. Supervision of the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Supervision of "non-operational" bureaus: Public Affairs, INR, Policy Planning Council, and of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

3. Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. This Deputy Under Secretary should have as his primary assignment responsibility for supervising the "operating" bureaus of the Department and for assuring "execution" by them of decisions made by the Secretary and President: African Affairs, European Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, International Organization Affairs, Legal Adviser, and International Scientific and Technological Affairs, and of Politico-Military Affairs.

4. Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. This Deputy Under Secretary should have responsibilities as at present: Security and Consular Affairs, Administrative Offices and Programs, Director General of Foreign Service, plus Inspector General of Foreign Assistance (presently attached directly to the Secretary).

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

5. Auxiliary Positions. Protocol, Congressional Relations, Ambassadors at Large, the Counsellor, and the Executive Secretariat to report directly to the Secretary/Under Secretary. Ambassadors at Large to be appointed as needed and given responsibility for a specific task, e.g. Biafra, Israeli-Arab settlement. The Counsellor can supervise the Executive Secretariat, as you suggested, if you would like an extra substantive review of recommendations coming to you; if so it should be in the nature of independent advice, not line authority. The Counsellor could also supervise Policy Planning (which he formerly directed), although I have suggested above that it might be placed under the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, who will be responsible for forward planning of operational programs such as economic and military assistance.

6. Methods of Operation. Maximum delegation of authority of decision to Assistant Secretaries within their areas of responsibility. Access to Secretary by Assistant Secretaries to be retained fully i.e., Deputy Under Secretaries to be a review point but not a decision point on policies. For example, policy memoranda from operating bureaus would come "through" the Deputy Under Secretary, who might comment on them, but would not require his concurrence or his resolving differences between bureaus. The Under Secretaries would work with you as a team in an inner cabinet and would meet with you regularly for that purpose. (The heads of ACDA, AID, Peace Corps, and USIA should also be included with this group at regular intervals.)

*Comment:* There might be a number of modifications of detail in how such an approach would be organized. I have not talked to anyone yet, and there may be technical or personnel problems of which I am not aware.

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### 293. Memorandum From President-Elect Nixon to Secretary of State-Designate Rogers<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 7, 1969.

At the beginning of a new Administration I believe that an analysis of the qualifications of all of our Ambassadors abroad, career as well

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Secretary Rogers Files: Lot 73 D 443, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Printed from an unsigned copy.

as non-career, should be made. While the great majority of career men will probably be retained in their present posts, the beginning of a new Administration is a good time to move some of the dead wood out and to move some of the unqualified men from one post to a less sensitive one.

In my travels abroad I have, of course, seen the usual number of political appointees who weren't qualified for the job they held, but I have also seen a number of career men who were pretty inadequate and who should be replaced.

I think a very hard-headed analysis should be made just as soon as we take over on January 20 so that any changes can be made within the first two or three months that we are in office. If we delay beyond that point we will be subject to the charge of being vindictive, personal or political. Changes at this time, of course, will be expected.

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#### 294. Editorial Note

Documentation on Presidential appointments to ambassadorships and top positions in the Department of State can be found in several files. Most of the material deals with appointments of specific individuals to specific positions rather than the general process of Presidential appointments. Especially valuable for ambassadorial appointments are the files of President's Assistant Peter Flanigan, who played a key role in the White House appointment process for ambassadors. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan Files) Flanigan's material is contained in several folders in boxes 12–14: PMF—Special Ambassador Files; Ambassadors—Broad Memoranda; Ambassadors Miscellaneous; Ruth Farkas; and Special Files. Complementing Flanigan's files in the Nixon Presidential Materials, though not as rich in relevant material, are several other files, including: 1) NSC Files, Agency Files, Department of State; 2) White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, FO 2 (for ambassadorial appointments) and PE 2 (for more general material on appointments); and 3) White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FO 2 (for ambassadorial appointments). Also very useful are H. R. Haldeman's diaries, which are available on compact disc. (*The Haldeman Diaries: Complete Multimedia Edition*)

In addition to the Nixon Presidential Materials, the files of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson at the National Archives (RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695) and the papers of Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson at the Library

of Congress provide helpful material on appointments. Johnson's notes of his telephone conversations during 1969 ("Telcons, personal") include many conversations regarding appointments both to ambassadorships and to positions in the Department of State. Richardson's papers include some memoranda (Box 83, "Ambassadorial Assignments") and a considerable number of "telcons" (Box 104) concerning appointments during 1969 and the first half of 1970. For example, there are notes of more than 30 of Richardson's telephone conversations concerning the appointment of Ray Cline as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and notes of at least 8 of his conversations concerning the appointment of William Macomber as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

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**295. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State-Designate Rogers and the Under Secretary of State-Designate (Richardson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Two Administrative Suggestions

You undoubtedly will want to take your time looking at a variety of matters concerning the personnel structure of the Department of State. Almost everyone agrees that many improvements can be made. There are two specific items that deserve immediate attention, though, and I wanted you to have my suggestions on these.

I.

*First*, I have long since joined the chorus of critics of the promotion system. The last promotion boards, for example, failed to promote a number of people I regard as outstanding, several of whom are likely to leave the State Department as a result. At the same time, there has never been a Secretary or an Under Secretary who did not feel that the top ranks of the Foreign Service were full of names of men not good enough to be used in the Department's most responsible jobs. At least there were obviously better men at lower ranks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 8. No classification marking.

Only belatedly has it occurred to me that the Secretary and Under Secretary have no business complaining about the choices made by the promotion boards if they don't take the trouble to name the officers who are to sit on these boards. For some time now the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration has appointed the promotion boards, although he has no good way of knowing the type of substantive officer the Department needs. He's in a very different line of work. By picking the selection boards he plays a major role in deciding who will be promoted—a role that should be played by the men ultimately responsible for the quality of the Department's output (the Secretary and the Under Secretary). Moreover, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration often cannot pull good enough men from their daily assignments even to perform this job, which is crucial to the health of the Service. You can and should.

Most Foreign Service officers would like nothing better than to respond wholeheartedly to the policy guidance of the President's appointees. Unfortunately they must now also reckon on the career implications of their relations with senior men in the Service—some of whom have different ideas than you have about either substance or, more likely, style of operations. If you appoint the promotion boards, the built-in conflict is reduced if not resolved.

In short, the promotion system should reflect substantive operators' views of the type of men they need and the only way this can be done is by your picking the men who will do the promoting. I would ask the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration to come up with a long list of possible names from which the Under Secretary could choose after consulting with the Secretary. This may seem like a lot of your time invested in a minor matter but the matter is not minor. The whole character of our foreign policy is affected by the decisions we make as to who gets ahead in the Foreign Service.

You should be careful to keep in a low key your presentation to the Foreign Service of any such change in the method of choosing the promotion boards. A good deal of reverence is paid (for example, by the recent report of the American Foreign Service Association),<sup>2</sup> to the notion that the Foreign Service should be almost entirely self-regulating. I couldn't disagree more and I think the results prove my case. But I would anticipate some reactions that the politicians were trying to destroy the purity of the career service. The whole notion that there is something "pure" about these decisions being made by the senior administrative officer of the Department, who is also appointed by the President, seems ridiculous to me.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 292.

## II.

*Second*, the American Foreign Service Association recommended some time ago that we create an ombudsman to process the complaints of any of our people dissatisfied with the treatment they have received at the hands of our administrative machinery. Rightly or wrongly, a deep-seated suspicion of the honorableness of the Administrative area has been with us for some time and remains, as even a superficial investigation will confirm. People feel they are treated shabbily and have no recourse.

I would have gone ahead and set up an ombudsman procedure in the last few months, but I was concerned that it would look like a political move made in light of the election. The fears inevitably created by any change in administration would make such an action particularly desirable from your point of view. It would give just the right signal to the personnel of the Department and to the public at large. Moreover, congressional pressures in this direction (most recently evidenced by the Ervin bill) are building up at a fairly good pace. By taking this step on your own you can help control developments.

I have done some thinking on how I would handle the ombudsman proposal. Attaching these responsibilities to the Legal Adviser's Office makes the most sense. The Legal Adviser already represents a moral force in the Department. He is never subject to the pressures that a career officer can feel even when he is appointed Assistant Secretary. The Legal Adviser has had and, I assume, will continue to have good access to both of you. Whether he would want to appoint a special man to this responsibility or give it to one of his present assistants isn't crucial. What is, is that there be a more formal and adequate grievance recourse than we now have.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> At a February 16 meeting with Richardson, Katzenbach reemphasized the points made in this memorandum and made a number of additional recommendations, primarily concerning personnel policies. Among other things he advised Richardson to "identify really able young people and get them on the fast track," encourage more interchanges between State and CIA, and, above all, start matching the personnel structure to the jobs. He also stated that the Policy Planning Council "has never been really effective" and was a waste of taxpayers' money and that the Seventh Floor needed more staff, so long as the staff "doesn't try to push itself into line operations—so long as not layering." (Richardson, Notes of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 89, Chronological File)



**296. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Counsel (Ehrlichman)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1969.

At an early date next week, I would like for you to have a visit with Bill Rogers with regard to the announcements of Ambassadors. I believe our appointments at State up to this time have been good, but we are catching hell from a great number of our friends for our failure to put RN people in positions in the State Department except for Rogers, while all of the other appointments are considered to be either State Department careerists or at best pro-Rockefeller types.<sup>2</sup> This does not concern me because I think Rogers will control the situation, but it does pose potential political problems for the future. We can cure it, or at least substantially cool it, by announcing in the near future a number of ambassadorial appointments. What is particularly important is that the blatant Johnson political appointees in ambassadorial posts must be removed immediately. I want Carter Burgess, Bill Costello who wrote a vicious book which was considered by legal experts to be libelous against RN, and approximately 16 others of this type to be removed just as quickly as possible. If we do not have replacements for them, let their Deputies stay there in charge until we get replacements for them.

I learned yesterday that this Administration has been the slowest of any new Administration in history in making ambassadorial appointments (other than simply transferring careerists around). We must move on this this week or we are going to have a very difficult situation developed among some of RN's closest friends and supporters, both in Congress and outside.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 9, EX FO 2. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> In his diary entry for February 1, Haldeman wrote the following: "Session in afternoon with K[issinger] and Harlow, mainly about ambassadors and key appointments. [President] upset by press reports that he's not changing people, especially in State. Ordered me to have resignations of all non-career ambassadors and all LBJ political appointees on his desk Monday. Said he'll write them and 'accept resignation with pleasure.' Feels we haven't done enough to get in good new people that are ours. He's right. Problem is need to deal with Democratic Congress, and P isn't tough enough with his Cabinet officers. Won't *make* them fire incumbents and/or take our political recommendations. Ehrlichman now in charge of this, we'll see how he can produce." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

**297. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 11, 1969.

We have laid on a staff meeting for you in your conference room at 9:30 this morning. It will include the ranking offers in ACDA, USIA and the Peace Corps and all officials in the Department and AID through Assistant Secretary level.<sup>2</sup>

I have not asked them to make reports around the room as has usually been the case in this meeting, on the assumption that you would want to raise a few points yourself this time.

I would suggest that you might cover the following matters:

1. *Organization of the Department*

Explain a) that Mr. Richardson will be your alter ego and exercise the major responsibility of the Department for the direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities abroad;

b) that Mr. Johnson will have primary responsibility for coordination and supervision of day-to-day operations of the functional and geographical bureaus;

c) that a Deputy Under Secretary will be appointed for Economic Affairs who will have primary responsibility for the coordination of economic assistance and the economic functions of the Department;

d) that I will be an adviser to you on major foreign policy problems and give general guidance to the Executive Secretariat; and

e) that you intend to rely heavily on your Assistant Secretaries and will look to them to exercise extensive authority within their respective jurisdictions.

2. *NSC Machinery*

Attached is the memorandum from you that we have now started to use on preparation of NSC materials.<sup>3</sup> You might want to elaborate on the NSC a little, as some of them (and certainly their staffs) may still be concerned. I would recommend that you emphasize there are two different processes. First, their roles in the NSC channel of stating

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, Chron File. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> According to Rogers' Appointment Book, the staff meeting began shortly after 9:30 a.m.; his next appointment was not until 10:15 a.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers Appointment Books)

<sup>3</sup> Not attached.

as clearly and honestly as possible to the President the alternative courses of action he could follow on a given problem that would be consistent with U.S. interests. Second, the preparation by them as a State Department matter of a recommendation to you as to the policy position you should take among these alternatives in the NSC, stating the judgments for and against this and other alternatives as clearly as possible.<sup>4</sup>

### 3. *General Relations with the White House*

There are numerous requests coming from various members of the NSC staff to the Department for information and studies. While we should be as cooperative as possible we also want to keep the system under control. You might tell the Assistant Secretaries that we do want to be cooperative but (a) that Mr. Kissinger has made clear to us that nothing is a formal request unless it has been conveyed by him to the Secretary, Under Secretaries or Ambassador Pedersen, and (b) a request that all information to be transmitted to Mr. Kissinger should be sent out through S/S. If the Assistant Secretaries feel they are being overloaded they should let you know.

### 4. *Broad Prospective of Foreign Policy*

You might note that in your first message to the Department<sup>5</sup> you called special attention to the agencies of the Department (AID and the Peace Corps) and to those closely associated with us (ACDA and USIA). You might observe that as modern foreign policy is composed not just of government to government diplomacy but of a vast web of relationships—military, economic, scientific, cultural and informational you feel that all of them must be fully integrated into our foreign policy. Accordingly, you intend to include personnel and ideas from all of these agencies fully within your own deliberations, and you encourage them to participate with the rest of the Department.

### 5. *Young People*

In a similar vein you might point out that you are very much interested in improving the reputation and reality of the Department's

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<sup>4</sup> In talking points Pedersen first prepared for the staff meeting on January 22, the day on which it was originally scheduled, he devoted half his memorandum to "NSC Machinery." He stated that the Department of State was being given "the key role" in the NSC policymaking process "in particular through being asked to chair NSC interdepartmental committees charged with presenting such policy alternatives to the President." He also emphasized that "the President has reaffirmed the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas, and for the supervision and direction of economic assistance, military assistance and sales programs." (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73D443, Miscellaneous Hold)

<sup>5</sup> For text of the message, January 22, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 10, 1969, pp. 125–126.

relationships with young people, both inside and outside the building. Your comment about new ideas in your first statement to the Department was therefore a real one and you look to them as Assistant Secretaries to encourage young people to express their views. You will rely on the Assistant Secretaries to sit down and evaluate such views but you believe the young, the impatient and even rebellious should be assured they can have their views considered and evaluated on their merits. Whenever a young person feels that his views should be transmitted to the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary should permit this to be done. You will also be taking further institutional steps in this area, on which you are not yet fully decided.

6. *Country Directors*

Partly as a general policy and partly also to encourage the younger people, you want the Assistant Secretaries to feel free to bring with them to appointments with you their Country Directors or other responsible officers as they choose. As the counterparts of the Ambassadors overseas, you expect to look to the Country Directors for much advice and you hope to have a chance to meet them as rapidly as possible as the occasions permit.

Richard F. Pedersen<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**298. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 14, 1969.

Jim Linen also leaned hard on the fact that Graham Martin was now "in pasture" as Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. He says that Martin fell out of favor because of his opposition to McNamara's positions and because he was not in step with some of the State Department's Asia hands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President's Personal Files, RN Memos, 1968-Dec 1969, #1 Feb '69. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy.

I have great personal confidence in Graham Martin and believe he should be brought back into the foreign service. I think he would be an excellent appointment for Tokyo, Bonn or Pakistan if he would accept one of these. If you think well of this suggestion put this in the form of a memo from me to Rogers. My purpose here, among others, is not to let the State Department play its usual game of promoting their favorites and kicking out those who may disagree with their policies from time to time.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Nixon appointed Martin Ambassador to Italy in September 1969. He served until February 1973 and then in June 1973 was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam.

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**299. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and Representative Louis Wyman<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1969.

Wyman was calling for 2 reasons:

1. *Ruth Farkas*, who has all kinds of degrees; much-travelled; great deal of civic work (then read from her résumé); requested that if it came to ELR for him to look at her file in connection with her desire to be appointed an ambassador; she would be great. ELR said he would. Wyman then said that if the President is going to put women into any of these posts, she is interested, because of her years of travel, in Australia; Wyman added that he realized Australia was a plum and ELR responded that it was also a difficult post. Wyman said that if in our judgment it can't be Australia, that Denmark would be excellent if we looked at her background.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons. No classification marking. Drafted on March 22. Wyman was a Republican Representative from New Hampshire.

<sup>2</sup> Farkas was nominated that summer as Ambassador to Costa Rica but was not appointed to the position. (Memorandum from Richardson to Rogers, July 17; *ibid.*, Box CL 2, Personnel-General File; and Memorandum from Flanigan to Harlow, November 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan Files, Box 14, Special Files) In May 1973 Farkas became Ambassador to Luxembourg.

ELR then said that Wyman was entitled to know the following, on a purely personal-communication basis from him to Wyman: that we are trying to operate within a mandate which includes on the one side a general directive from RMN that he wants to reduce overall the total number of non-career appointments; meanwhile, we get from the WH a considerable number of names they say, in effect, that want taken care of. We spend a great deal of time on the phone talking about where to fit them in, competing claims, which posts to career, etc. The question of who are among the non-career people who get into this process depends on names coming to us from the WH. If we were to say Farkas sounds marvelous, in effect, she would be treated as a career appointment because she wouldn't be on the WH list. As a practical matter, it is necessary for her friends to get her on the WH list. If we get the name from there, we can do business.<sup>3</sup>

Wyman said that he hadn't understood this; what did ELR mean, get her on the WH list—who through? ELR said that we deal with Flanigan.

Wyman said he had understood she had already come over, that that was why he called ELR, and asked if it had not yet come over. ELR said it was a question of competing claims—that he was being very candid with Wyman—say, they have 40 people, but RMN says appoint 25: you could be 26th on the list, too bad. We have a certain amount of room to consider who would fit well where and we obviously would squawk if they asked us to appoint anyone who wasn't qualified. ELR reiterated that he would appreciate it if, in whatever Wyman does at the WH, to do it without referring to this information. He then said that WRH had seen Mrs. Farkas and was impressed by her.

Wyman ended the conversation by saying that if ELR ever needed anything on the Hill to let him know.

(*Note:* Wyman never mentioned a second matter, as he said in his opening sentence; perhaps both concerned Farkas.)

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<sup>3</sup> In his memoir, *The Right Hand of Power*, U. Alexis Johnson discussed how he and Richardson screened the political candidates for ambassadorships sent to them by Flanigan. After interviewing them separately, Johnson and Richardson compared notes and, for those who "passed," discussed what posts might be best. They then negotiated their preferences with Flanigan. "We did not have to accept all of them, but we certainly could not reject them en masse either, since the President clearly wanted them. Besides many distinguished ambassadors have been political." This crop of candidates, however, surprised Johnson by "how dense they were." (pp. 519–520)

**300. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Flanigan) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1969.

The President has indicated an interest in having more of the experienced, younger members of the Foreign Service Organization appointed to ambassadorships. He feels that benefits would accrue both to the service, in terms of moving its able members who are not yet ambassadors up the ladder faster, and to the country, in terms of having young, seasoned, and energetic representatives abroad. Would you please make every effort to suggest some of these members of the Organization for ambassadorial posts.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 83, Ambassadorial Assignments. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> In a March 17 memorandum to Hastings, Haldeman had indicated that the President wanted the names of the five most outstanding young men in the Department: "people in the 25 to 40 year of age group who have demonstrated loyalty, exceptional management ability, and initiative." (Ibid., Box CL 2, Personnel—General File)

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**301. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

A Seventh Floor Planning and Coordination Staff<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 102, Seventh-floor Staff. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy.

<sup>2</sup> A Seventh Floor planning and coordination staff was first proposed to Richardson by two members of his office, Jonathan Moore and Arthur Hartman. Moore forwarded the proposal to Richardson under cover of a lengthy explanatory memorandum, March 1, in which he stated that their "basic pitch" was "to improve analytical, evaluative and coordinational staffing of the Seventh Floor" through "better organization of existing resources" and thus without creating a larger bureaucracy. "A strong feature of the plan is that it would establish an integrated staff in place of a system of fragmented, uncoordinated, and even competing staff elements. This is so, even though small personal staffs would still remain for each of the principal officers on the Seventh Floor." (Ibid.) Richardson discussed the proposal with Rogers and on April 2 circulated a draft for comment to Johnson, Samuels, Rimestad, and Pedersen. (Memorandum from Richardson, April 2; *ibid.*, Box CL 2, Chron File)

*The Problem:*—The Secretary of State, in directing the conduct of foreign policy and advising the President on foreign policy issues, should be in a position to take into account all relevant global, functional, and long-range considerations. The Secretary's principal Seventh Floor associates, to the extent that they exercise comparable functions, should be in a similar position. They should be able to draw on the resources of a compact staff for analysis and advice not subject to the understandable—and even desirable—parochialism of the regional bureaus. Similarly, they need a centralized organ for substantive follow-up and monitoring of action decisions. As matters stand, the Secretary of State and his principal associates lack the staff back-up necessary to meet these requirements.

The NSC staff has the function of seeing to it that all pertinent points of view—not that of any one Department or combination of Departments—are systematically brought to bear on major national security issues requiring Presidential decisions.

Within the Department of State, the regional Assistant Secretaries, with the assistance of their deputies and the regional Interdepartmental Group secretary, are able to ensure that recommendations coming up from a country director or ambassador are reviewed in the light of policies applicable to the region as a whole.

The Seventh Floor should have a capability which meets broader geographic and more complex functional problems. A regional or functional bureau's recommendations to the Secretary with respect to a matter affecting its own interests should be looked at from other perspectives. Politico-military recommendations should be considered in the light of their economic implications. Before an immediate operational decision is taken, its longer-range aspects should be examined.

The revitalized NSC system, meanwhile, has placed increased responsibility on the Department, notably the Assistant Secretaries, for coordinating the definition of policy issues and options within the Executive Branch. This in turn calls upon the Seventh Floor to provide effective policy guidance and review for the bureaus with respect to NSC projects from the standpoint of Seventh Floor interests.

The closest we now get to the kind of across-the-board substantive staff backup required for these purposes is through the Policy Planning Council and the staff of the Under Secretaries Committee (formerly the SIG staff). In fact, however, the deliberations of the Policy Planning Council all too seldom affect operational decisions, and the role of the Under Secretaries Committee staff extends only to matters referred to the Committee by the NSC.

*The Proposal:*—Having now had the chance to observe the operations of the Department for a couple of months and to talk to a good many people, I believe that the Policy Planning Council and the Un-



der Secretaries Committee staff should be modified and brought into a direct relationship to each other as elements of a Planning and Coordination Staff, which would have the following functions:

1. To assist the principal officers of the Department in reviewing and coordinating bureau recommendations, not only within their own framework, but also from the perspective of other regions, other functions, and longer time spans.
2. To assist the principal officers in guiding the Department's participation in the NSC system through: (a) the substantive review of NSC/IG papers; (b) preparation for meetings of the NSC, NSC Review Group, and NSC Under Secretaries Committee; and (c) monitoring the follow-up of NSC decisions.
3. To carry out planning and program analysis activities transcending bureau lines—a function which would also back up and tie in with Departmental research programs.

Modification of the Policy Planning Council, which is an integral element of this proposal, will encounter the objection that it involves a symbolic lessening of the importance State attaches to policy planning. The short answer, I believe, is that it would make policy planning more relevant—and thus more important—by taking it out of limbo and relating it directly to the Department's on-going responsibilities.

*The Staff:*—Under a Staff Director with rank equivalent to an Assistant Secretary, the new staff would serve as a collective resource for all of the principal Seventh Floor officers. It would not insert itself in the line of authority between Seventh Floor officers and Assistant Secretaries. Nor would it take on bureau functions for itself. Much of its work, rather, would involve coordination among the bureaus and obtaining a hearing for other viewpoints in the Department outside the regional bureaus.

The staff should be composed of high caliber officers of broad-gauge abilities, who can handle both short-range operational problems and longer-range program planning and analysis. Their number should, for the present, be limited to about seventeen in all, including the Staff Director.<sup>3</sup> The staff would be made up of two groups. One would include five officers with expertise in each of the geographical regions, one for politico-military affairs, one for economic assistance, two system analysts, one economist, and one political or social scientist.

This permanent group should be supplemented by a separate but connected group of about five Senior Policy Planning Advisers drawn in part from the academic community and research institutions. Those drawn from outside the Department should serve for at least one year.

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<sup>3</sup> This would be three less than the total number of slots now allotted to the Policy Planning Council (15) and the Under Secretaries Committee (5). [Footnote in the source text.]

The senior advisers would undertake particular planning or program evaluation projects. Their role, in general, would be to challenge established points of view, develop new ideas on how to solve difficult programs, and serve as a communications link with academic specialists in foreign affairs.

*The Staff Role:*—Ideally, the Staff Director should be the Department's representative on the NSC Review Group. This is desirable given the staff's responsibilities in assisting the principal officers in guiding the Department's participation in the NSC system—through briefings for the Secretary and the Under Secretary prior to NSC meetings, maintaining close liaison with the NSC/IGs and ad hoc groups, reviewing the output of these groups, and absorbing the functions of the staff of the Under Secretaries Committee.

In carrying out its functions, the proposed staff would not compete or overlap with S/S, the other collective, common staff service on the Seventh Floor. S/S would continue to handle informational and administrative aspects of the NSC system. In addition, S/S would see to it that the new staff received all appropriate material going to the Secretary and Under Secretaries. INR and J/PM would remain as sources to be drawn upon by the Seventh Floor and would continue to operate as bureaus.

In a word, the staff would supplement, but not supplant, the bureaus. Its aim would simply be to assure that the Seventh Floor will have available on important issues the full spectrum of responsible advice the Department has to offer. It would not be a "layer" between the Assistant Secretaries and the Seventh Floor. It would receive lateral distribution of papers destined for Seventh Floor principals, but would not "clear" such papers.

A similar restraint should be observed in its monitoring or follow-up function. In many cases, this would be manifested only in providing assurances to the principals that necessary actions were being taken; in other words, it would exercise a watching brief.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> On July 3 Rogers announced the formation of the new Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC) and the designation of William I. Cargo as its Staff Director. He indicated that the Policy Planning Council's functions would be "amalgamated into and given special identity within the new staff" and policy planning would thereby gain "more impact on continuing operational decisions." For text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 28, 1969, pp. 74–75. In an October 13 memorandum, Cargo notified his staff that henceforth S/PC would be responsible for coordinating NSC action assignments within the Department. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363, S/PC Organization) Cargo discussed his activities and experiences as Staff Director for 4 years in his memoir, *Wherever the Road Leads*. (pp. 636–691) He noted that Richardson was a strong supporter of S/PC but that Richardson's successor as Under Secretary, John Irwin, who took office in September 1970, "seemed to have little interest in policy planning" and thus "the relationship of S/PC to the top of the State Department changed rather radically with Richardson's departure." (pp. 647–649)

**302. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Rimestad) and all Assistant Secretaries and Bureau Chiefs<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Personnel Policy

This Administration is committed to a thorough reexamination of the foreign affairs establishment with a view toward a more effective use of the unique human resources found there. We desire to examine the size, shape, functions and purposes of the career services, to review the processes for selection, promotion and assignment of personnel, and to develop comprehensive policy objectives for our personnel system. We hope to build upon the initiatives in these directions already undertaken by the Department and to undertake long-range planning efforts designed to achieve these objectives. In this undertakings we intend to seek the participation of all those affected, directly or indirectly.

As first steps, we wish, among other things, to:

1. Identify younger officers of exceptional ability from within the career service and to move these officers into positions of higher responsibility.
2. Promote an even greater interchange of talent among geographic and functional areas of expertise within the Department.
3. Expand interchange among the several foreign affairs agencies, State, AID, USIA, ACDA and the Peace Corps.
4. Increase the opportunities for career officers to move temporarily into other disciplines—business, universities, foundations and the like—without loss of career contact with the foreign service system.
5. Bring into the Department selected individuals of exceptional talent from outside the career system.

I hope to meet with you along with members of my staff and representatives of the personnel system in the near future to discuss these and related matters. Included in your preparation for this discussion should be consideration of the following points:

1. The requirements for improvement in country, regional and functional expertise in your bureau or area, i.e., an overall projection of your personnel needs in view of the above objectives.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 1. No classification marking.

2. The problems, if any, from your point of view in carrying out the above objectives.

3. Your recommendations as to how best to implement each of the above objectives in your bureau or area.

Working together, with the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration coordinating the process, we can, I feel sure, achieve these objectives in a balanced and orderly fashion.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On May 21, 1970, Richardson forwarded to Haldeman a statement entitled "Reform at the Department of State: A Progress Report" that Haldeman had requested. According to the report, among the steps initiated by the Nixon administration were the following: 1) "career personnel have been encouraged to participate in exchange programs with business, foundations, the academic world, [and] Congressional committee staffs"; 2) "over 400 career officers have been detailed to other Federal agencies to broaden their managerial experience"; 3) steps have been taken "to elevate younger officers of exceptional ability into positions of higher responsibility"; 4) a greater interchange of talent is being promoted among geographic and functional areas of the Department"; and 5) "vigorous new men" have been introduced into policy-making positions, including "fifty-five new noncareer employees in executive and senior level positions," 32 new noncareer ambassadors, and 51 new career ambassadors. (Ibid., ORG 2)

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### 303. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Counsel (Ehrlichman)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Staff Cuts Abroad

In connection with the question of reducing the number of U.S. government personnel overseas, I have reviewed the following:

1. Your memo of April 18 to Bob Mayo<sup>2</sup> regarding the President's desire to:

a. Reduce employment in Japan, the Philippines, India, Germany, and England by amounts varying between 50 and 66% percent.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 32, Overseas Government Personnel. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> A copy is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Haig Special File, Box 1006, Suspense.

b. With regard to U.S.I.A., “abolish television news units abroad and retain only libraries.”

c. Cut MAAGs and “other military units” by 50 percent.

d. In Italy, “reduce the number of political counselors from eight to one and reduce the staff economists to one.”

2. BOB’s answer to your memo of April 13.<sup>3</sup>

3. Under Secretary Richardson’s reply to your memo of April 17 regarding the general applicability of the personnel reduction techniques employed during “Operation Topsy” in Brazil.<sup>4</sup>

BOB and Elliot Richardson have raised some questions about the validity of any selective approach to personnel cuts. As I see it, their most important points are:

1. Cuts in the areas indicated by the President should be undertaken as a part of a systematic effort to reduce all types of U.S. government employment abroad. Such an effort would recommend cuts in the number of employees reporting to Ambassadors from all agencies, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and perhaps U.S. forces. When all of these categories are included, U.S. government employment abroad totals roughly 1.5 million of which only 5,000 are American employees of the Foreign Service carried on the State Department rolls and only 2,000 are foreign service officers.

2. Substantial personnel reduction efforts have already been made. As a result, civilian employment in countries outside Southeast Asia will have dropped to 106,426 on September 30, 1969 as compared with 112,237 on June 30, 1967 (over the same period employment in Southeast Asia rose from 83,317 to 103,761). Much of this reduction is due to the “BALPA” program which cut the number of employees reporting to Ambassadors from 49,000 to 41,000.<sup>5</sup> The six countries mentioned by the President were among these subjected to intensive review under “BALPA.” Personnel cuts in the six countries averaged 20 percent. By way of comparison, the cut in Brazil under Ambassador Tuthill’s “Operation Topsy,” which took

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<sup>3</sup> A copy of Mayo’s April 25 response to Ehrlichman’s April 18 memorandum is *ibid.*, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 32, Overseas Government Personnel.

<sup>4</sup> Richardson’s May 1 memorandum is *ibid.* Operation Topsy was an exercise instituted in 1967 by John Tuthill, Ambassador to Brazil, to trim U.S. programs and reduce U.S. personnel in Brazil.

<sup>5</sup> BALPA was initiated by a January 18, 1968, memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk and Bureau of the Budget Director Schultze in which President Johnson directed that, as part of his program for dealing with the balance of payments problem, the number of American personnel overseas under the jurisdiction of U.S. diplomatic missions (except for Vietnam) be reduced by 10 percent and that “very large U.S. missions” undergo bigger reductions.” For text, see *Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–69*, Book I, pp. 34–35. Documentation on BALPA is in the Department of State, O/MS—Management Staff Files: Lot 70 D 474, BALPA Subject Files, 1968.

place at the same time as the "BALPA" exercise and received considerable favorable publicity, was only 16 percent.

3. A number of studies are now taking place which have overseas manpower implications. They include studies of troop commitments in Europe, our foreign base structure and the organization of military groups in Latin America, Europe and Korea. All such efforts should be closely coordinated.

4. It was possible to make the "BALPA" cuts while leaving most of the services and programs of our missions abroad intact. On the other hand, future cuts may involve eliminating whole programs of lesser priority. According to Elliot Richardson this implies that future cuts will have to be planned in Washington, where program decisions can be made on the basis of interagency consultations.

I believe these points are well taken. I also concur with Elliot Richardson's recommendation that what is needed now is a strong mandate from the President to pursue personnel reduction activities vigorously and the establishment of a mechanism with authority to initiate studies or require of agencies phased reduction plans. One way of emphasizing the President's commitment to a streamlined presence abroad would be to appoint a "Blue Ribbon Commission" to study our overseas programs and make recommendations on personnel cuts. However, an "in-house" effort, which worked with a minimum of publicity, would probably give faster and more effective results.

The Presidential mandate envisaged by Elliot Richardson could appropriately be given in the form of a National Security Study Memorandum which would direct that one of the arrangements below be set up to make recommendations to the President on personnel reductions:

1. An interagency group under the Chairmanship of Elliot Richardson which would include representation from all agencies with employees abroad.

2. A State/BOB/DOD/NSC task force under the direction of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. Such a task force could be required to consult with other agencies, with Ambassadors and military commanders in the field and with the NSC staff as appropriate.

3. An NSC-led task force.

The following considerations are relevant:

1. A group which included all agencies represented abroad would probably be too unwieldy although it would increase the agencies' sense of being given a fair hearing.

2. State, BOB and DOD already have considerable experience in designing personnel reduction schemes.

3. An NSC-led effort would clearly be identified as a Presidential effort. A State-chaired effort under Richardson can work well also. It would have the advantage that the department most concerned with overseas activities would play a leading role. It would have the disadvantage that other agencies might want a State-chaired effort. On

balance, I would prefer a White House-run effort chaired either by you, Mayo or me.

In accordance with the above, I would suggest the following:

1. Insure that the President is fully informed regarding the results of the earlier "BALPA" and "Topsy" exercises.
2. Inform the President of the current views of State and BOB on personnel reductions.
3. Seek the President's concurrence in the implementation of a general and systematic approach to overseas personnel cuts which would consider the political, budgetary and balance of payment repercussion of such cuts as well as their program implication.
4. Discuss the alternative organizational arrangements for studying and implementing personnel reductions with Bob Mayo and Elliot Richardson.

If you agree, I will prepare a memorandum for the President outlining the issues and suggesting that an appropriate National Security Study Memorandum be issued. I would also be happy to discuss this matter with you further.

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#### 304. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant (Haldeman)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 16, 1969.

I am not satisfied with the progress that has been made with regard to the cuts in personnel. Before the Inauguration I ordered a one-third cut in USIA, AID, military personnel except in combat zones like Vietnam and Korea and Western Europe. Nothing whatever has been done to carry this out except paper work. I want you to put a man on it, perhaps Butterfield, and to give me a report in a week as to what has happened. I do not consider anything more important that I will be doing from an administrative standpoint than this. I know that everybody on the staff disagrees with my approach here but this is something I feel very strongly about and I want action on it immediately. I shall expect a report on my desk by Monday of next week.<sup>2</sup> As

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Butterfield Files, Box 8, Memoranda Received. No classification marking. The President wrote "Re: Personnel Cuts" at the top of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The President underlined the last 10 words of this sentence.

a matter of fact, I don't want a report, I simply want to know what has been done to carry out my directives that a one-third cut is to be made in personnel in these areas in every mission abroad. I think the only way to do it is for a directive signed by me to each of the agencies ordering such a cut. You are going to get strong resistance from Shakespeare, Hannah, Rogers and also from Defense on this. But I know what I am talking about and even if I didn't I have such strong feelings about it I have made the decision and I want it carried out immediately.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Haldeman forwarded the memorandum to Butterfield under cover of a June 17 memorandum in which he asked Butterfield to check with Flanigan, Ehrlichman, and anyone else involved, pull together a status report, and "lay out a plan of action to get the President's directives carried out. This is going to be tough but he is deadly serious about the necessity of getting it done and done quickly." Butterfield forwarded a 9-page status report and action plan to the President on June 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Butterfield Files, Box 1, Alexander Butterfield (June 1969))

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### 305. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) and Representative Wayne Hays<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 15, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion of the possible appointment of Arthur Ross to a position in the Department of State.]

ELR said on another subject, when he gets a little better informed about the problems of the administration of the Foreign Service, he would like to come up and see Hays. Said he's chairman of the Board, has spent a fair amount of time trying to get familiarized with it, including a review of the various proposals contained in the legislation which Hays introduced.<sup>2</sup> Mentioned we now have a new Director Gen—John Burns.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons. No classification marking. Hays (D-Ohio) was Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on State Department Organization.

<sup>2</sup> For information on the Hays bill, H.R. 6277, which was passed by the House in September 1965 but failed of enactment in the Senate, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 38 and footnote 4 thereto.



Hays immediately told ELR not to waste his time coming up to see him—won't handle any bills or hold hearings on it unless we get it through the Senate first. Went into a long harangue about how hard he'd worked on the other legislation, getting it through the House, only to have it die in the Senate, where Pell<sup>3</sup> really tied it up (because he didn't like the selecting out thing). If we get it thru the Senate, then he might be willing to consider it. ELR said he'd read the history of that legislation—but said that we didn't have in mind any legislation at least at this point; said he wanted to understand the whole situation better before doing anything—and would simply like to get Hays' views of the problems and opportunities.

Hays said he'd be glad to see him any time—said he had made his own position clear to Bill Macomber about legislation on this subject; he's fed up with the Senate doing things like that—said the staff of the FRC<sup>4</sup> was sympathetic to his position and the bill's position, but couldn't get it through Pell.

ELR reiterated that we don't have any legislation in mind right now—maybe by the first of the year, we might have some suggestions that ought to be embodied in legislation, but certainly now we had no such thoughts.

Hays reiterated that he'd sit down any time w/ELR.

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<sup>3</sup> Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island).

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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**306. Telegram From Acting Secretary of State (Richardson) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 25, 1969, 1349Z.

Tosec 48/123315. Subject: Reduction in Overseas Personnel.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 4–1. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brewster on July 24, cleared by Findley Burns and Brown, and approved by Richardson.

1. State 123273, July 24, 1969,<sup>2</sup> contains Kissinger's July 21 directive on overseas personnel reduction<sup>3</sup> and a brief explanation of how we plan to conduct the exercise, but I thought that you would want to have additional details both for your own information and in order to answer questions which will no doubt be put to you by the Ambassadors and others as you go along.

2. The principal points in the directive are that it: (a) requires a 10% reduction in directly hired overseas American civilians and certain American overseas military which will total approximately 14,900 military and 5,100 civilians; (b) each Agency with overseas personnel "will be required to meet the 10% quota and reductions will be made on a country-by-country basis, insofar as practicable"; (c) civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam will be cut by more than 10%; (d) account should be taken of "national security priorities and special local problems, without prejudice to the objective of 10% for each agency"; and (e) the reductions do not apply to "US military forces committed to NATO or in Berlin or essential to their support, to forces stationed in Korea or Viet-Nam, or to units stationed elsewhere in Southeast Asia that are directly engaged in related military operations."

3. Although the Under Secretary's Committee to which responsibility has been assigned for planning the reductions will meet to resolve disputes and to make the final report, much of the actual work will be carried out by a Working Group of the Committee chaired by Findley Burns and on which State, DOD, CIA, USIA, AID, BOB and the NSC Staff are represented and by a State staff reporting directly to me headed by Robert Brewster.

4. Primary responsibility to make the reductions will rest with the agencies themselves. As I see the process working, the agencies will in late August inform the Working Group of their proposed reductions. Where these reductions affect either policy objectives or the responsibilities of the Chiefs of Mission they will be reviewed by the Department's regional Assistant Secretaries who will in many cases wish to consult the respective Ambassadors regarding them. While I have not informed the other agencies of this, I am meeting July 28 with our regional Assistant Secretaries and certain other Departmental officials to ask them to identify 10 or 12 major "target areas": countries such as India, Germany, the Philippines, Thailand, etc., where we may wish to press agencies to take larger than 10% reduction.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969-1972; *International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972*, Document 25.

5. I have asked John Burns, Director General-designate, to direct and coordinate the reduction in the State Department's overseas operation. I would think that, given the brevity of the September 30 deadline, the regional geographic bureaus and other Departmental offices will have to take the initiative and propose reductions in State personnel and clear these with Ambassadors.<sup>4</sup>

6. I would expect that some of our Ambassadors and other US officials as well will have questions regarding the reduction. Three questions I would anticipate are the following: (a) "Why is there another reduction abroad after the BALPA (Balance of Payments Reduction Program) exercise carried out by the last Administration?" I suggest that in reply you outline frankly the President's personal and continuing concern at the size of the American presence abroad and emphasize that this current directive had its origin in the President's firmly-held view that there were too many Americans abroad. (b) "Are Ambassadors going to be given a chance to make our recommendations on where cuts should be made?" The September 30 deadline is so short we do not have time to seek Ambassadors' recommendations on specific reductions as was done in the last Administration's BALPA exercise. All Ambassadors will, however, have an opportunity to comment on the proposed State reductions, and they will be consulted on other agencies' proposed reductions by State Assistant Secretaries as need arises. I would also think that Ambassadors in the "target" countries would be asked their views and recommendations by our Assistant Secretaries. (c) "What will Department do with the people who will be returning to Washington as a result of this exercise?" There is no easy answer to this one. I have asked John Burns to study the problem urgently, including the question of whether some type of special legislation is required. I think the most you can say at this juncture is that we are very aware of this problem, are studying it on an urgent basis, and will advise the field as soon as we have some answers.

**Richardson**

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<sup>4</sup> In a November 7 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that, in response to the directive, reductions had been agreed upon of 5,777 directly-hired American civilian employees, 1,408 directly-hired local employees, and 14,937 overseas military personnel. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 372, Presidential Directive on Reduction of U.S. Personnel Overseas) In a November 26 press release, the White House announced that a review conducted by the Department of State of its overseas offices in connection with the directive had resulted in a decision to restructure its consular posts. Nineteen consular posts slated for closing were listed. (Ibid.) Documentation on further overseas personnel reductions (OPRED) is *ibid.*; and also *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER 4–1.

307. Memorandum From the Executive Assistant (Hastings) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 13, 1969.

RE

Harry Dent

I had a little ol' southern lullaby chat with Harry Dent last night. Off the record and all that, his observations may be summarized as follows:

1. The President is very down on this Department and is continuously peppering his chats with his confidants with barbs aimed here. He stated in a recent staff meeting that the entire Department of State had opposed his trip but that he brought off a great success despite State's opposition. HAK was at his side during this conversation, smiling broadly.

I noted, with a similar clandestine tone, that with the President's permission you had briefed our senior officers on the President's views about his trip<sup>2</sup> and that this presentation was very well received. I also noted that you had made a strong pitch re cooperation with Presidential objectives, once set, and re an aggressively cooperative and forthcoming approach toward implementation of Presidential policies, once made.

I also pointed out that the President's impression of total State opposition to the trip wasn't fair or accurate. While there may have been some instances of backsliding, cooperation on the whole had been there. We speculated then as to the source (or at least one source) of the President's impression.

2. Dent indicated that the President, Rogers Morton and he had all made pitches at the Camp David cabinet meeting re the need for more loyal Nixon men in high office. Why hadn't WPR ever gotten the message that by not making greater changes and by not bringing in more new loyalists, he was simply ensuring HAK dominance? Dent thought that the HAK situation would be intolerable to Secretary Rogers. Nixon needed greater confidence in the Department as a whole and more new faces was a strong step in that direction.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box CL 2, Personnel—General File. Confidential; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Reference to Nixon's July 26–August 3 around-the-world trip.

Dent was taking a lot of flak about Nixon's sell-out on his promise to clean house here. This flak, which also hits Morton and surely gets to the President, tended only to reinforce Nixon's aversion to the Department as is.

I promised to get to Dent a little fact sheet on our turnover, our new faces, our non-career ambassadors (including Strausz-Hupe) and our redemption of Nixon's pledge by our personnel reform efforts. He said that he and Rogers Morton could use this to rebut the flak.

3. Reports on you personally continued to be very high, "even from HAK staff members."

WRH

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**308. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State  
(Richardson) to the President's Assistant (Flanigan)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relative Proportions of Career and Non-Career Ambassadors

For your information the material that follows updates my memorandum to you of May 29<sup>2</sup> on the above subject:

1. *Appointments made by President Nixon as of September 10:*

	<i>Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Non-Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Announced	39	62	24	38
Total <sup>3</sup>	45	62.5	27	37.5

*Note:* These figures show that as we approach the end of this year's round of Ambassadorial appointments, we are settling in towards roughly a five to three ratio as between career and non-career ap-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box CL 2, Chron File. Confidential; Limdis. Annexes A, B, and C are not attached.

<sup>2</sup> A copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan Files, Box 13, Ambassadors—Broad Memoranda.

<sup>3</sup> In addition to the 63 appointments already announced, this group includes nine nominations currently in the clearances process. Complete lists of the President's career and non-career appointments are attached at Annexes A and B respectively. Note that these figures include only country ambassadors; representation to international bodies (e.g., NATO, OAS) are not included. [Footnote in the source text.]

pointments. The limited number of appointments which we foresee as occurring during the balance of 1969 (e.g. for Guinea, Malawi, Sweden, Uganda and Venezuela) are probably not going to alter the present ratio of about 63 percent to 37 percent by more than a percentage point or two, one way or the other.

2. *Holdovers from Previous Administration (as of September 10):*

<i>Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Non-Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>
27	84	5	16

*Note:* All Ambassadors who have been or will be replaced by new appointments included in No. 1 above (including those still unannounced) have been excluded from this count. Except as noted in Annex C, most of the 32 remaining holdovers counted here seem likely to stay on through the rest of this calendar year.

3. *Total (1 and 2 combined):*

<i>Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Non-Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>
72	69	32	31

*Note:* This puts the present total proportion of career officers somewhat above average by comparison with the records of the preceding three administrations.<sup>4</sup> For convenience, I repeat here material in my earlier memorandum, showing the records of these three administrations based on the two dates (on a January 1 and July 1 basis) for each which establish its high and low water marks for the proportion of career appointments:

	<i>Total Posts</i>	<i>Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Non-Career</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Eisenhower—1/1/59	76	53	70	23	30
7/1/55	69	38	55	31	45
Kennedy—7/1/61	93	69	74	24	26
7/1/62	92	59	64	33	36
Johnson—7/1/65	104	78	75	26	25
1/1/69	108	68	63	40	37

Elliot L. Richardson<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign Service from 1966 to 1969, later wrote in his memoir, *Safir*, pp. 195–198, that he thought “for a general average of what the ratio should be, I would say that 75% career and 25% [non-career] is about right.” Steeves had substantial misgivings about the impact of non-career appointments on career officers in the Foreign Service, but he also believed that non-career appointees had an “important place. Not only do we need the leavening influence from outside disciplines, but specific skills have to be sought outside the Foreign Service.”

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**309. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

Organizational Changes for Latin America

You have stated you want to make significant organizational changes for handling Latin American affairs in the bureaucracy. I believe it would be desirable to announce this intention in your October 31 speech.<sup>2</sup>

State has so far confined its thinking on reorganization to upgrading the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Deputy Under Secretary. They believe they may need to seek legislation for this. They have not considered any steps relating to administration of development assistance, or to the problem of inter-agency coordination.

You have indicated your desire to up-grade that post to Under Secretary. I agree that this would be preferable to Deputy Under Secretary. This step will probably also require legislation, however, especially to clarify the designation of the No. 3 spot in the top echelon as well as the relationship to other top positions. I believe it would therefore be desirable to inform State now of your decision and instruct them to begin to draw up plans to implement it.

Some additional steps you may wish to consider or have staffed by the agencies to achieve more comprehensive change and greater efficiency, and for possible inclusion in the speech are:

1. *A new or additional title for the new Under Secretary*—e.g., Coordinator of Western Hemisphere Affairs—to replace the current title of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, Department of State, Vol. IV, 10–1–69. Confidential. Sent for action. Vaky forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for his signature under cover of an October 21 memorandum in which he stated that he had not discussed any of the measures with State and that no one in State was “doing anything.” Vaky commented further that 1) “State opposes an Under Secretary position, because that complicates their top echelon organization”; 2) State would “most likely oppose the inclusion of Canada in the new area”; and 3) AID would be “very opposed to an organizational change for aid to Latin America.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In his remarks on October 31 at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Press Association the President announced that he was “directing a major reorganization and upgrading of the United States Government structure for dealing with Western Hemisphere affairs,” including preparation of a legislative request “raising the rank of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Under Secretary—thus giving the hemisphere special representation.” For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 893–901.

Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. This title could probably be granted immediately while legislation is pending to elevate the rank to Under Secretary. You could thus announce on October 31 that you are designating the Assistant Secretary as Coordinator and that you are seeking legislation to elevate his rank to Under Secretary.

2. *Inclusion of the Office of Canadian Affairs in the Under Secretary's jurisdiction.* This could be done administratively.

3. *A new organizational arrangement for administering Western Hemisphere development assistance, separate from AID.* This would be a bold step. It would signify your intention to give our programs new directions, new style and new people. It would permit more flexibility in carrying out aid programs for Latin America. There are two basic organizational options:

*Option A: Establish a new autonomous agency within State*—The Western Hemisphere Development Agency—*independent of AID.* This could be done quickly by Executive Order. The agency could be headed by a new Administrator for Western Hemisphere Development with Assistant Secretary rank, who would be responsible directly to the Under Secretary for the Western Hemisphere.

(Under this option the organization and lines of authority would be neater; the new Under Secretary would have two senior deputies: an Assistant Secretary, equivalent to the present position, for traditional State functions; and the Administrator, with equivalent rank, for development assistance matters.)

*Option B: Establish a new agency or corporation outside of State,* with policy guidance from the new Under Secretary. This option would probably require new legislation. (Rockefeller recommends a corporation—the Institute for Western Hemisphere Development—under a new aid agency in the Executive Office of the President.)<sup>3</sup>

Action to implement the first two steps could be started immediately and announced in your October 31 speech. If you agree, State should be directed to work with the Budget Bureau to prepare the necessary directives.

The third step—a new aid organization for Latin America—is more complex and requires further staffing. However, you do not need to decide on the details of a specific organizational pattern now. The issue for the speech is whether you should announce your intention to establish a new and separate organization for aid to the hemisphere. I suggest that the Budget Bureau, which has responsibility and compe-

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<sup>3</sup> The recommendation was included in Nelson Rockefeller's *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas; The Official Report of a United States Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).



tence in the area of organizational management, be directed to do a quick study of possible new organizational arrangements for aid to Latin America, taking into account the views of the relevant agencies. You can then decide whether you want to take action on a new arrangement immediately, or direct the Peterson Commission to recommend a new organization for aid to Latin America in its report.

*Recommendations:*

1. That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A directing implementing actions to establish a new Under Secretary position and title for Western Hemisphere affairs, and inclusion of Canada in his jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup>

2. That you authorize me to initiate a quick staff study on a new organizational arrangement for aid to the Western Hemisphere.

Approve<sup>5</sup>

Disapprove

See Me

3. That you authorize reference to these measures in your October 31 speech.

Approve<sup>6</sup>

Disapprove

See Me

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<sup>4</sup> Signed by the President and dated October 27. Nixon instructed Rogers to prepare, in coordination with BOB, any necessary directive for his signature and any necessary legislation. (Ibid.) Attached but not printed.

<sup>5</sup> The President checked this option. In an October 27 memorandum to Rogers, Robert Mayo (BOB), and John Hannah (AID), Kissinger indicated that the President wanted BOB, in coordination with State and AID, to prepare by October 29 a staff study “analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a new agency, separate from AID, to administer U.S. development assistance to Western Hemisphere nations.” (Ibid.)

<sup>6</sup> The President checked this option.

**310. Letter From President Nixon to All United States Ambassadors Abroad<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 9, 1969.

Dear —:

Your mission as American Ambassador to—is of the utmost significance to our country and to me personally. I wish you every success in this endeavor.

I attach the greatest importance to my Constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our relations with other countries. As the personal representative of the President of the United States, you share these responsibilities in the country to which you are accredited.

You will, of course, report to me through and normally<sup>2</sup> receive your instructions from the Secretary of State who has responsibility not only for the activities of the Department of State but also for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of United States Government activities overseas.

I believe that all possible measures should be taken to improve and tighten the processes of foreign policy implementation abroad. I know I can count on your full support in directing the activities of all elements of the United States Mission to achieve this objective. To assure you and all concerned that you have my full personal backing, I want to make the following comments on your own authority and responsibilities.

As Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission, you have full responsibility to direct and coordinate the activities and operations of all of its elements. You will exercise this mandate not only by provid-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 10, Ex FO 2. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy. The letter was initially drafted in the Department of State and forwarded to the President by Richardson under cover of a May 21 memorandum, following which the letter underwent revisions. (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May–Dec 1969) It superseded President Kennedy's letter to Ambassadors dated May 29, 1961. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, volume XXV. Members of the Johnson administration proposed sending such a letter on several occasions, but none was sent while Johnson was President. (Ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 130)

<sup>2</sup> During a telephone conversation with Halperin on August 26, Johnson stated that he had spoken the previous day with Kissinger about the letter to Ambassadors and that the only problem raised by the President "was his ability to communicate directly with ambassadors if he wanted to do so." Therefore Johnson suggested adding the word "normally" so it would read: "You will, of course, report to me through and normally receive your instructions from the Secretary of State." (Notes on Telephone Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal)

ing policy leadership and guidance, but also by assuring positive program direction to the end that all United States activities in—are relevant to current realities, are efficiently and economically administered, and are effectively interrelated so that they will make a maximum contribution to United States interests in that country as well as to our regional and international objectives.

I am concerned that the size of our representation abroad be related to a stringent appraisal of policy and program requirements and that the number of personnel of all agencies be kept at the very minimum necessary to meet our objectives. I shall expect you to maintain a continuing personal concern on this matter and to inform the Secretary of State when you believe that the staff of any agency or program is excessive.

I shall expect you to assure the highest standards of personal conduct by all United States personnel, civilian or military; you have authority to take any corrective action which in your judgment is necessary.

You have, of course, the right to be kept informed, to the extent you deem necessary, of all the information or recommendations reported by any element of the Mission. The Secretary of State and I have made it clear that we will welcome the opportunity to consider alternative policies and courses of actions before making final decisions. When you or other members of your Mission believe such alternatives merit consideration, we encourage your putting them forward along with your own recommendations.

I will reserve for myself, as Commander-in-Chief, direct authority over the military chain of command to United States military forces under the command of a United States area military commander, and over such other military activities as I elect, as Commander-in-Chief, to conduct through military channels.

However, I will expect you and the military commanders concerned to maintain close relations with each other, to keep each other currently informed on matters of mutual interest and in general to cooperate in carrying out our national policy. If differences of view not capable of resolution in the field should arise, I will expect you to keep me informed through the Secretary of State.

I deeply believe, as I said in my Inaugural Address,<sup>3</sup> that forces now are converging that may make possible the realization of many of man's deepest aspirations. If "the times are on the side of peace," I also deeply believe that you, and the dedicated personnel of the Foreign

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<sup>3</sup> For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 1–4.

Service and the other departments and agencies who comprise the staff of your Mission, will insure that we take maximum advantage of the opportunities that are so clearly before us.<sup>4</sup>

With my best wishes,  
Sincerely,

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<sup>4</sup> Under cover of a February 18, 1970, memorandum, Kissinger forwarded to the President highlights of ambassadorial replies to the December 9 letter and an outline of issues they raised. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 288, State, Ambassador's Replies to Your December 9 Letter)

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### 311. Circular Airgram From the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

CA-6693

Washington, December 17, 1969.

REF: Roger channel. For the Ambassador.

1. The President's letter of December 9, 1969,<sup>2</sup> setting out the authority and responsibilities of the American Ambassador of course applies fully to the CIA Station as it does to other elements making up the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. To make it possible for you to discharge your responsibility for direction and coordination, your Chief of Station has been instructed by his headquarters to insure that you are sufficiently informed of covert action projects and espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs to enable you to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.

2. You may expect the Chief of Station, among other things, to review with you the covert action programs, such as psychological war-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80-M00165A, State/Letters to all Ambassadors. Top Secret. Drafted by Sidney Buford (INR/DDC) on December 16, cleared by Gleysteen, Karamessines and Cline and Coerr, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Helms had informed Johnson in a May 7 memorandum, that after reviewing a draft of the Presidential letter that was eventually sent to Ambassadors on December 9, he was willing to concur in the letter on the understanding that a classified Roger Channel message would be sent as a codicil to the Presidential letter. The message was designed to make clear to Ambassadors that they were not expected to be cognizant of the sensitive details of clandestine operations and communications of CIA, while also assuring Ambassadors that Station Chiefs would continue to keep them "appropriately informed of covert action projects and clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence programs," especially those involving "high policy sensitivity." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Document 310.

fare, black and grey propaganda, political action and economic action being carried out pursuant to directives approved at the Washington level. Similarly he will present his clandestine intelligence programs in terms of their scientific, political, technical and military information objectives, carried on against approved intelligence community requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. He will also review his clandestine counter-intelligence programs to acquire knowledge of other intelligence organizations, to manipulate some members of these to U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counter-intelligence activities, as well as by espionage, about Communist parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop a higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.

3. Many of the activities of your CIA station involve sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques which the Director of Central Intelligence has a statutory responsibility to safeguard. As a general rule, you will not be expected to be cognizant of operational details (such as agent identities) and communications involved in the work of the CIA. In certain cases you may need to know these. For example, you should normally know the identity of any person with whom you have official dealings who may also have a covert or clandestine relationship with CIA. However, in some cases judgment with respect to disclosing source identities and sensitive techniques may ultimately have to be made in Washington. Your Chief of Station has been directed that if he is in serious doubt about passing on these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of State.

4. Apart from the question of sources and techniques, it is recognized that differences of view may arise as to whether an operation should be undertaken or continued. When such differences cannot be resolved locally, they should also be referred to Washington preferably by CIA channels, unless you wish to communicate your position privately to the Department in which case the Roger channel is available.

5. This message has been seen and concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence.

**Rogers**

### 312. Editorial Note

On January 14, 1970, William Macomber, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, gave an address on "Management Strategy: A Program for the Seventies" to Department of State and other foreign affairs personnel. "We are an organization which has traditionally been comfortable with policymaking and with negotiating and promoting that policy abroad," Macomber stated, but "we have tended to be intuitive in nature, weak in planning, and unenthusiastic about management." While "Presidents have continued to look to us as their principal staff arm in forging a national policy" and "have continued to expect this Department to ensure that our complex and wide-ranging governmental activities abroad are coordinated and carried out in a manner consistent with the policies they have determined," we "have not been as systematic, competent, and aggressive as we should have been in meeting these responsibilities." Macomber then proposed a series of solutions to the Department's managerial shortcomings, with an emphasis on reforming personnel policies. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 2, 1970, pages 130–141; and *Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State*, pages 587–605.

Following Macomber's address, the Department set up 13 task forces to study the Department's managerial problems and come up with recommendations for reform. Each task force was chaired by an experienced Department officer and composed of about 20 members drawn from within the Department and Foreign Service with a mixture of officers from the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and other federal agencies. The 13 task forces were assigned the following topics, respectively: 1. career management and assignment policies under function specialization; 2. performance appraisal and promotion policies; 3. personnel requirements and resources; 4. personnel training for the Department of State; 5. personnel perquisites: nonsalary compensations and allowances; 6. recruitment and employment; 7. stimulation of creativity; 8. role of the Country Director; 9. openness in the foreign affairs community; 10. reorganization of the Foreign Service Institute; 11. roles and functions of diplomatic missions; 12. management evaluation system; and 13. management tools. In a July 20 memorandum for Secretary of State Rogers, Macomber highlighted the task force effort in case Rogers might want to bring it to the President's attention. (Document 321)

The task forces drafted initial reports that were reviewed during the summer of 1970 by Department employees in Washington and diplomatic missions and consular posts abroad and then revised in light of the feedback. For examples of feedback, see Documents 322–325.

The 13 final reports containing some 500 recommendations together with a summary report were assembled in a single volume entitled *Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State*. Macomber transmitted the 610-page volume to Secretary of State Rogers on November 20, 1970; it was released to the public in December. Rogers directed that work begin immediately on carrying out the task force recommendations and approved an implementation plan. On December 8 the Department released a summary statement of action planned on the task force recommendations, which is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 28, 1970, pages 795–802. Documentation on the work of the task forces, in addition to the documents printed in this chapter, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394. See also Document 120 for excerpts concerning the NSC system from reports produced by the task force on management tools.

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**313. Memorandum From W. Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 14, 1970.

HAK:

Attached at Tab A is a copy of a speech by Bill Macomber on State's management strategy for the 1970's.<sup>2</sup> It was sent to you by Under Secretary Richardson. An acknowledgement to Richardson is at Tab B.<sup>3</sup>

I do not believe the speech is worth more than a quick skim.

The speech begins by admitting that State has failed, but must learn how to succeed, in its mission to "manage and orchestrate the overall spectrum of our Nation's activities abroad."

I frankly do not find much in the speech to indicate the radical reform I believe necessary for State to do so. In general, on the key

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 2, Chron File. No classification marking. A handwritten notation at the top of the page reads: "Action OBE". Kissinger wrote at the top of page 1: "Good paper Tony."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 312.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

difficult issues such as promotion policies and what to do about the top-heavy structure of the Service, Macomber says nothing very new and attempts to make everyone happy.

Some points worth noting:

—He emphasizes the need for greater competence and effort in trade promotion. State is apparently going to try hard to keep this away from Commerce.

—Macomber rejects the idea of a Permanent Under Secretary, but hopes there will always be an FSO in either the Under Secretary or Deputy Under Secretary position.

—Macomber states that the Under Secretaries Committee and IG's present State with "an important opportunity to strengthen through our performance the constructive leadership role we covet as, of course, does the fact that the ranking departmental executive on the National Security Council is the Secretary of State."

—Macomber believes that use of the CASP—The Country Analysis Strategy Paper prepared annually on every country in Latin America—principle can be expanded to a regional wide concept and can serve as a further management tool for establishing priorities on a region-wide basis. It will also, he notes, help State prepare its important annual posture statement.

At Tab C is a paper I wrote for Phil Heymann—Katzenbach's senior assistant—which gave some initial thoughts on how to destroy the State Department as we know and love it.<sup>4</sup> You said that you would like to see it some day when I mentioned it at Key Biscayne. The basic thrust is that we should open up the Foreign Service and try to get away from our patterned ways of doing things. Some of Macomber's points move (slowly) in this direction:

—He states that there should be a greater, constant number of people entering into the Foreign Service at the higher grades every year—but also says that this should be deferred until more Foreign Service Reserve Officers are integrated.

—He calls for less reporting and more thought by our officers abroad.

—He lists some (un-Draconian) measures to get more senior officers to retire.

But Macomber also states what I believe to be the greatest myth about the Foreign Service—that it is a "profession" in which one acquires diplomatic skills. He lists, for example, these "core" skills on page 6. But these skills are obtained in equal measure by, and necessary for the success of, many people in other fields. It is the belief that long years of service in the Foreign Service, and only that, can train

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<sup>4</sup> Not attached.



one to be an effective political counselor, DCM, or Ambassador which makes the members of the Foreign Service so resistant to, and even contemptuous of, the idea of bringing in more outsiders to serve in our posts abroad.

T.L.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

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### 314. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 16, 1970.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting with Chairman Thomas E. "Doc" Morgan, Congressman E. Ross Adair and Congressman Wayne L. Hays (House Foreign Affairs Committee), February 17, 1970, 4 p.m.

#### *I. Purpose*

To obtain support for the Administration's proposal to establish an Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; in Congressman Hays' case, the most that probably can be achieved is his agreement not to block the bill in his Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations.

#### *II. Background*

A. You are publicly committed to the Under Secretary proposal in your October 31 speech.<sup>2</sup> On December 20 the Department of State transmitted legislation to Congress which has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Frank Church (S. 3347). On December 22 your statement in support of the legislation was released to the press.<sup>3</sup> Your commitment to this proposal will be cited again in the foreign policy statement going to the Congress on Wednesday.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Ex FG 11. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 309.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 1039–1040.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the President's statement on Latin America in his first annual report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970's, February 18, 1970, see *ibid.*, pp. 133–140.

B. This meeting was requested by Congressman Hays, who during Congressional consultations prior to transmittal, indicated his adamant opposition to the proposed legislation. Chairman Morgan and Congressman Adair appear to have no strenuous objections to the Under Secretary bill.

C. Congressman Hays has long been a supporter of our European alliances and is a Member of the NATO Parliamentary Group (American section). He generally shares your views concerning the need for reorganizing and shaping-up the Department of State, a position that may strike a responsive cord with him. Concerning the Under Secretary bill, Hays has indicated his intention to "go slow" with hearings and is not at all impressed with the Rockefeller Report findings of the need for a special Under Secretary for Latin America.<sup>5</sup>

It is reported that Senator Church, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs approves of the Under Secretary bill and will schedule hearings on it.

### III. Summary

The following is a summary of Hays' position and counter-arguments prepared by Dr. Kissinger's office (Viron P. Vaky).

#### A. Congressman Hays will probably argue:

- Latins do not deserve this special treatment.
- If we do it for the Latins we ought to do it for Europeans who are staunch allies; we should not downgrade other parts of the world.
- It will probably result in proliferation of super-grades, cost more money and ruin administrative symmetry.

#### B. Points for you to emphasize:

- Proposal is an integral part of your Latin America policy.
- It is meant to make that policy more effective.
- It is meant to demonstrate sincerity of our interest in region and the special nature of our relationship.
- It will have great and favorable psychological impact on Latins; and it will enhance our ability to establish more cooperative relations.
- It will improve bureaucratic efficiency and implementation of policy.

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<sup>5</sup> In a February 17 memorandum to Timmons, Harlow commented that the legislation had "gone to Wayne Hays' sub-committee, where he was run a stiletto through its heart. Governor Rockefeller considers this one of the major recommendations to the President following his Latin American trip, and the White House has recommended this new post. State decries it, and Rogers has refused openly to support it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11) For the Rockefeller report, see footnote 3, Document 309.

—Rockefeller Report made strong case for “one window” and need for upgrading key official dealing with area.

—Latins received announcement of proposal extremely well; they will watch for follow-up.

—It was also well received in U.S.

—Proposal has not aroused criticism from other areas; no evidence that they feel downgraded.

#### *IV. Talking Points*

The following is a list of talking points recommended by Dr. Kissinger’s office (Viron P. Vaky):

A. Your proposal to reorganize and upgrade the bureaucratic structure for dealing with Inter-American affairs is an integral part of your overall policy. It is intended to make that policy more effective, and to:

1. Improve the bureaucratic implementation of policy:

a. Our Latin American policy has suffered from bureaucratic problems, particularly the diffusion of authority and proliferation of agencies dealing in foreign affairs. The result is often procrastination and confusion that sometimes delays decisions for months.

b. One of the persistent complaints found by Governor Rockefeller on his trip was that the Latins did not have one place in Washington where they could get their concerns considered. They were frustrated and sometimes humiliated by being referred from one office to another without finding anyone to make a decision.

c. The Rockefeller Report makes a strong case that reorganization was essential to make policy implementation more effective.

d. You concluded accordingly that it was necessary (1) to upgrade the authority and stature of the key position dealing with inter-American affairs, and (2) to provide one focal point for coordinating government activities in the region, speeding decision and lessening our reaction time.

e. You thus believe it important to have “one window.”

2. Demonstrate our interest in Latin America and make it easier to achieve construction relationships:

a. You considered it important to give evidence of the “special relationship” we have historically had with the region.

b. This measure will have great psychological impact on the Latin Americans and we will benefit thereby. The Latins operate very much in personal terms; therefore giving greater stature and rank to the key position in the decision-making structure that deals with Latin America is an important element in dealing with them.

c. We will thus be able to establish a greater sense of vitality, openness and effectiveness in our relations with the leaders and people of the nations of the hemisphere.

B. Your announcement in your October 31 speech that intended to propose this measure was extremely well received in Latin America, and highly praised. The proposal has considerable significance to the

Latins. They will now watch for follow-up as a test of the credibility of our policy.

C. The proposal was also well received in the United States. It was endorsed by the Council for Latin America, composed of representatives of major U.S. companies doing business in Latin America.

D. There have been no adverse reactions from other parts of the world. Generally other countries—and especially Europe—understand the special treatment and gesture we have given the Latins and why. There is no evidence that they feel downgraded. To establish similar rank positions for the other areas, of course, would be self-defeating in terms of the objective of demonstrating the “special relationship” concept for Latin America.

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**315. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations (Timmons) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 18, 1970.

I sat in on a Presidential meeting Tuesday<sup>2</sup> with House Foreign Affairs Chairman “Doc” Morgan and Representatives Wayne Hays and Ross Adair. Congressman Hays had requested the meeting and is opposed to the creation of the new post of Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

His arguments are that our friends in Europe would be insulted by the new Latin American status position; that there are only three “honest” heads of state in all Latin America, and that a new State Department bureaucracy would be created.

Hays is the subcommittee chairman handling the proposal. He is strongly pro-Europe and, in fact, is current President of the European-American Inter-parliamentarian Union. Hays inferred he would go along with the measure if there would also be an Under Secretary for Europe.

The President outlined the reasons for his recommendation, but Hays was unmoved. Morgan and Adair were not as vocal but are cool

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy. A copy was sent to Harlow.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting on February 17 lasted from 4:15 to 5 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) See Document 314 for a briefing memorandum for the meeting.

to the Under Secretary concept. The President said the Administration would take another look at the measure with the possibility of finding an appropriate title other than Under Secretary might be acceptable.

We now have three courses to follow: (1) move the bill through the Senate first and apply pressures on the House committee later; (2) propose an Under Secretary for European Affairs and make our deal with Hays; or (3) think up a new title with less status than Under Secretary. Deputy Under Secretary? Associate Under Secretary? Director of Western Hemisphere Affairs?<sup>3</sup>

Our office will be happy to move in the direction you think best.

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<sup>3</sup> In a March 13 briefing memorandum to Kissinger for his upcoming meeting with Richardson, Vaky stated “you might tell him that the President did OK a Congressional strategy concentrating on the bill in the Senate now, and then focussing on the House where Wayne Hays will be the big problem.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/Richardson Meetings, Jan 1970–March 1970) Richardson testified in favor of the bill on March 18, the first day of hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. For text of Richardson’s statement to the subcommittee, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1970, pp. 498–499. S. 3347 was not enacted.

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### 316. Memorandum From the Secretary of the 303 Committee (Jessup) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Art Hartman

At a lunch with Arthur Hartman of State on Monday, March 16 the following emerged:

1. I would describe Hartman as an entirely serious foreign service type with superior intelligence accompanied by some propensity for modesty and humility. He is Dep/Dir for Coordination for William I. Cargo’s Planning & Coordination Staff—17 strong.

2. On OPRED he stated that this was very much the President’s personal crusade, that he had a strong belief that bureaucracy must be pruned continually or it will spread like crab grass. A book which had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDO Files, Job 79–01440A, Box 8, Folder 1, US–7, State, 1970. Eyes Only.

impressed Nixon very much is Peter Drucker's *The Age of Discontinuity* which has trenchant observations on the evils of bureaucracy.

He said the President sometimes exhibited impatience as when he finally ordered by phone a 33% reduction at Clark Field in the Philippines. He stated that the President on his European visit had unfortunately gone to several large Embassies where the Ambassadors had ordered a full turn out including dependents; and this had given Nixon the idea that there were enormous numbers of Americans *everywhere*, particularly in Embassies.

Hartman said many Ambassadors were no help in the reduction business; he cited Graham Martin as a glaring example of empire building. He cited Saigon as being virtually dishonest with their figures purposely leaving out Tonsanut Airbase.

*Comment:* Hartman and some of his colleagues may find the President's bent for reduction (if indeed this allegation is accurate) an excellent vehicle for State purists to put the squeeze on agencies satelited on to State overseas.

3. Hartman acknowledged that most of his difficulties with Under Secretaries Committee papers were caused by his State colleagues who were opaque to the interests and positions of other government agencies. He stated that they still did not have an agreed statement on the Dutch request for Nuclear Subs for the President (6 months old) and Laird now wanted to dissociate the Pentagon from whatever went forward from Richardson.

[Omitted here are brief notes on several miscellaneous items.]

Peter Jessup<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**317. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

Letter from Turner Shelton

Attached is a memorandum I have received from Turner Shelton with whom you are acquainted. Shelton makes the following comments about State Department and Foreign Service personnel:

—It is impossible to convert or to re-educate members of the Foreign Service who retain strong emotional ties to former Presidents or former Administrations.

—There is a professional elitism in the Foreign Service which tends to delude its members into believing that they have a charter to dominate the conduct of foreign affairs. This is further complicated when they also harbor allegiance to previous Presidents.

—There is a general lack of responsiveness in the Department of State in implementing directives and instructions from the White House and a deficiency in personal loyalty to you.

—The State Department system rewards conformity and discourages those who have the courage to break new ground, thus resulting in a general void of originality and forcefulness.

—The Foreign Service is inbred, opposes the infusion of new blood and tends to dominate key posts to permeate its power.

Shelton recommends a measured review of key State Department posts with the objective of replacing those personnel who do not support your policies. This would offer the additional benefit of encouraging less influential Foreign Service officers who already share your views.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings, April–May 1970. Confidential; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Turner Shelton worked in USIA and the Department of State during the 1950s and 1960s. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations he served in the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs and as Counselor of the legation in Budapest and Consul General in Nassau. By 1968 he had left the Department. In October 1970 Nixon appointed him Ambassador to Nicaragua, a post he held until August 1975.

<sup>2</sup> The President wrote the following comments below: "He's right, of course. K—, 1) See if we can get Shelton assigned to a personnel post in State—Make some discreet inquiries on this point—He might know what post matters—2) Also—discuss this matter (without revealing the source) with Richardson—See if he has any ideas as to how we could shake up the place—3) Get from Shelton and others the names of F.S.O. men who *do* share my views & then have Flanigan push them *hard*." Briefing memoranda prepared by Kennedy and Haig for Kissinger's weekly meetings with Richardson on

**Attachment**

**Memorandum From Turner Shelton to the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1970.

In response to your request, I am submitting a few thoughts and comments regarding certain personnel of the Department of State. These comments include both Departmental and Foreign Service personnel.

From my discussions with ranking officials of the Department of State, I gather the impression that the philosophical approach toward a change of personnel is to believe that Departmental and Foreign Service Officers can be "converted" to the Nixon philosophy of Foreign Affairs and that employees should, therefore, be "brought along," hopefully to a new way of thinking rather than being removed or shifted.

While this may well be true in the case of those who have no particular emotional or political loyalty to former administrations, I seriously doubt that it is a valid concept in connection with a considerable number of employees who have strong emotional ties to former Presidents and former Administrations. There is evidence of disloyalty to President Nixon by some who resent both his policies as a President and as an individual. I do not believe that these particular people can be either "converted" or "brought along."

In addition to their active dislike of the President, certain individuals strongly believe that both the formulation and implementation of foreign policy should be carried out solely by a "professional elite" and since they are the "professional elite," they tend to seriously resent the role of the President and his principal personal advisors in the formulation of foreign policy. While this is obviously an attitude which can, at least to a degree, be expected among a group of professional practitioners, it becomes particularly difficult to manage when their personal loyalties lie in the direction of other administrations. What I

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May 21, May 28, and June 12 included the following item: "Ask Under Secretary Richardson what actions he would recommend be taken to place more persons in key State Department positions who share the Nixon outlook on foreign policy. Also ask him if he has any suggestions as to how we can reward those Foreign Service Officers who have the imagination and forcefulness to break new ground." Shelton's letter and the President's comments were attached. There is no indication on the memoranda as to whether Kissinger raised the issue.

<sup>3</sup> No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy.



am attempting to say is that the professional Foreign Service tends to be directed too much toward the carrying out of its own concept of "valid" foreign policy objectives and protecting its own vested interests rather than devoting its energies to implementing in a professional manner foreign policy objectives formulated by the President.

There is, in my opinion, a lack of responsiveness to the wishes of the President and a continuing effort on the part of some to delay and indeed to alter, however subtly, the directives and instructions of the White House. This negative attitude toward the President and his policy becomes more fully understandable if one considers actual examples of those who are in positions of authority. A number of the Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State have no particular political ties of any kind, however, the fact that they have reached their positions of prestige and status in the Foreign Service hierarchy under former Administrations tends to make them have a sense of nostalgic regard for these former Presidents and other officials which undoubtedly affects their general attitude. They feel that they have reached their present positions as Assistant Secretaries not as a result of the personal recognition of their abilities by President Nixon but merely as a deserved move up the ladder of the "system." Since they constitute the "system" they obviously do not feel a degree of personal loyalty to the President, which in my opinion, would be highly desirable.

There is a tendency on the part of many members of the department to tend to personalize their loyalties and obligations to former Presidents, Secretaries of State and ranking officials of the Foreign Service who have been identified over the past years with their successful rise within the "system" which they represent rather than be responsive to the present President.

One of the principal criticisms of the Department of State including the Foreign Service, is that it suffers from a lack of originality and tends to be timid. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the "system" rewards conformity and hesitates to accept those who have the courage to break new ground. While it is obvious that decision making must be approached with caution, the result of the "institutionalized" pressures of the "system" goes beyond caution and results in a Department which is too often lacking in courage and forcefulness.

Like all elite groups, the Foreign Service is in-bred and possesses a built-in opposition to those who do not belong to "the group." It should be noted that lateral entrants to the Foreign Service are viewed with a considerable degree of nonacceptance whereas the infusion of individuals with new ideas, approaches and attitudes would undoubtedly contribute greatly to an increased flexibility and improved vitality of the entire Foreign Service.

More important perhaps than even the Assistant Secretaries themselves are their Deputies and Country Directors who carry out the day-

to-day functions of the Department and who are privy to the highly sensitive information which flows into the Department of State. Some examples of these Deputy Assistant Secretaries might be useful to illustrate some of the problems of the Department. One Deputy Assistant Secretary was personally sponsored by a former well known official whose approaches to foreign policy are extremely inconsistent with those of President Nixon. Another Deputy Assistant Secretary was for years, in effect, the "hatchet man" for a high ranking departmental official who is an avowed adversary of the President. In the ambassadorial category, a present Chief of Mission to a sensitive East European post is a former departmental official, said to be an avowed liberal Democrat and very closely associated with one of the Department's former officials who openly and publicly opposed President Nixon. Another Ambassador, recently appointed to a key Near Eastern country was a well known protege and confidante of members of a former President's immediate staff. Another Ambassador, who has remained on in the Far East, was also closely allied with the same Administration and rose rapidly from a Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Information Agency to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to Deputy Chief of Mission and then to Ambassador.

These illustrations are given for the sole purpose of showing how key positions are retained by those who may find it difficult to transfer their allegiance to a President whose approach to foreign policies is very considerably different from a President or Secretary of State to whom they had a very strong emotional attachment. It is important to remember that this type of individual has undoubtedly developed a set of attitudes toward both domestic and foreign policies which are basically incompatible with those of President Nixon.

This letter is not intended to be a blanket condemnation of the Foreign Service or of Departmental officers. The Department, both in its domestic and Foreign Service possesses some very knowledgeable and indeed brilliant individuals—men and women who deeply interested in foreign affairs and dedicated to the welfare of the United States. This type of individual can be depended upon to faithfully execute the foreign policy of the President of the United States and is completely loyal to the person and office of the President.

These men and women are a significant national asset. Unfortunately, however, there are a number of persons who are emotionally involved with other political personalities and who basically and fundamentally disagree with the President in both foreign and domestic matters. It would seem advisable to reappraise the positions presently occupied by these individuals and to possibly utilize their talents elsewhere.

The necessary changes in personnel to achieve a department responsive to the President would not have to include actions which would embarrass the President with charges of "dismantling the State

Department” nor would these changes have to be carried out in a way calculated to alienate the foreign affairs structure. They can be achieved with finesse but the changes must be approached in a practical manner which demonstrates firmness and a willingness to act in the interests of the President rather than engaging in philosophical hand-wringing which recognizes the problem but which hesitates to confront the problem and deal with it expeditiously. Effective action would encourage those who support the President and his policies, tend to revitalize the foreign affairs community and will, at least to a degree, create an atmosphere which would be uncongenial to those who thrive on the “system” for the “system’s sake,” instead of devoting their time and energy to implementing the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

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**318. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Urban Affairs (Moynihan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 28, 1970.

The enclosed was drafted by a Nixon man over in the State Department who has just returned from Europe. My impression is not dissimilar, although admittedly my data base is pretty thin.

If you would like to talk about this further, I would be glad to do so.

**D**

**Attachment**

**Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, undated.

*Problem*

1. The mood of the Foreign Service officers in our Embassies abroad approaches that of semi-rebellion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1050, Staff Files, Staff Memos, Moynihan, Daniel P. No classification marking. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it.

<sup>2</sup> A typed notation on the memorandum reads: “Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Elliot Richardson.”

2. Their hostility is not directed towards the foreign policy, which they overwhelmingly support but rather of the Nixon domestic program.

3. This hostility is reflected in questions about "Southern Strategy," Carswell, Agnew civil rights, etc.

*Recommendation*

1. A White House staffer or a State Department official with White House background (or perhaps someone like Arthur Fletcher) should address at least some of the bigger embassies (i.e. London, Bonn, Moscow, Rome, Paris).

2. It should be on off the record closed session with ample time for questions and discussion. It should not be a canned presentation.

3. Particular emphasis should be given to the Nixon program for combatting poverty, i.e., income strategy, and Nixon programs such as the family assistance program and the Philadelphia plan. Facts such as the Nixon appointment of more Negroes at the policy level (i.e. confirmation by Senate) than any other Administration.

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**319. Editorial Note**

On the morning of June 6, 1970, Under Secretary of State Eliot Richardson telephoned U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to tell him he "had a rather startling piece of information—the President called me over yesterday afternoon to tell me he is bringing [Robert] Finch into the White House as Counselor and wanted me to take Finch's place as Secretary of HEW. I had to respond very promptly." Richardson's move to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was to be "announced at noon." The news left Johnson "speechless." (Notes of telephone conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal)

Richardson resigned as Under Secretary on June 23. During June and July a number of candidates were given serious consideration as his replacement. For a time President Nixon favored his assistant Peter Flanigan, and Flanigan himself liked the idea, but in mid-August the President and Secretary of State Rogers settled on John N. Irwin II. Irwin's selection was announced August 19, and he entered on duty September 21. On October 14 he assumed the Chairmanship of the Under Secretaries Committee. Irwin served as Under Secretary of State

and then Deputy Secretary of State (the position was retitled in July 1972) until February 1, 1973. Documentation on the selection of Richardson's successor is in *The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*, and in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 11.

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**320. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Assistant (Haldeman)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Turner Shelton's List of State Department Personnel

Pursuant to the President's direction<sup>2</sup> I asked Turner Shelton to prepare a list of individuals assigned to the Department of State whose loyalty to the President is questionable. Turner spent this weekend preparing the attached summary<sup>3</sup> in which he lists those key State personnel whom he considers to be disloyal to this administration and also includes some comments on specific bureaus which need overhaul. These include State Department's: Bureau of Public Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs as well as Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Shelton is very high on Bill Macomber but highlights his judgment that Macomber lacks the necessary contacts with the White House.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII, 1 Jul 70–Aug 70. Sensitive; Eyes Only. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for his signature under a covering memorandum in which Haig advised Kissinger "not to go on record for or against this report." A note on the covering memorandum indicates Kissinger asked Haig to sign the memorandum for him, which Haig did.

<sup>2</sup> In a May 14 memorandum Haldeman informed Kissinger that the President wanted him to make sure "we get Shelton's list of who our friends and opponents are in the Foreign Service." (Ibid., White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential Files, FO 2)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a 7-page memorandum, July 13, that, according to Haig's covering memorandum to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above), was an "edited version of the Shelton report." See the attachment to Document 317, which is Sheldon's original letter.

Shelton also lists those individuals who he thinks are particularly loyal to the President and enumerates a group of individuals outside the government who he believes should be considered for future foreign affairs assignments, consultation or advice.<sup>4</sup> Finally, Shelton points out that his report was confined to Department of State personnel and has volunteered to do a similar summary for Frank Shakespeare if desired. Shelton has formerly served with that agency.

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<sup>4</sup> Under cover of a July 19 memorandum, Haig forwarded to Haldeman three lists "for use in discussions with Deputy Under Secretary Macomber": 1) "people who should be removed from key positions"; 2) "people who are favorable to the Administration and should be considered for appointment to key positions"; 3) "people who are presently outside government but who would make excellent consultants or appointments." The names on each list were the same as those on each of Shelton's lists, but none of Shelton's comments were included. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3) Haig forwarded the same lists to Kissinger together with other material on personnel problems in the Department of State under cover of a November 25, 1970, memorandum in which he commented that Shelton's list "includes a full range of bad guys and good guys, with which I am not in full agreement and is provided only for your background." (ibid.)

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**321. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Task Forces

You might wish to make the following points with respect to the task force effort the next time you see the President.

1. You are convinced that one of the most significant contributions the Administration could make would be to leave a much strengthened State Department, far better equipped than it is now to meet the changing and increasingly complex foreign policy challenges this country will face in the remaining decades of this century. If the Adminis-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, July 1970. No classification marking. Drafted by Macomber. Printed from an unsigned copy.

tration can do this it will be of far more lasting significance than how we handle a great many problems the headlines focus on each day.

2. You have launched a unique effort to accomplish this. Instead of carrying out a reform and modernization effort in the usual way, i.e. by a “meat-ax” approach from the top—which is the way McNamara proceeded in the Defense Department and which is the traditional way to reform a large bureaucracy—you have decided that the best way to proceed is to turn the State Department-Foreign Service professionals loose on reforming and upgrading themselves. Your theory is that, if they will approach this with open minds, and if they will honestly look at all the real and alleged shortcomings which have been ascribed to them, they can do a better job in gearing up the Department than any group of outsiders.<sup>2</sup>

3. To the extent this effort needs to rely on the work of outside study commissions, there are already a series of excellent such reports in existence. We have never suffered from not having enough outside suggestions. Our problem has been when good suggestions have been made, the Department has been very reluctant to adopt them.

4. In order to get on with this effort you have set up thirteen task forces manned by 250 professionals, made up mostly from the State Department and the Foreign Service but also drawing on others in the foreign affairs community. They have been asked to look at all the suggestions that a change-resistant establishment had pushed side over the years, refine these or develop new proposals, and come up with an action program designed to modernize the State Department’s way of doing business.

5. The thirteen task forces have now submitted draft reports which make 468 recommendations for improvements. These run the gamut from the installation of improved substantive management tools to the improved recruiting of FSO–8s. The reports are now being reviewed for omissions and inconsistencies and are being exposed in a series of seminars in the building to those who were not on the task forces. Our Embassies abroad have also been asked to comment. When these consultations, here and abroad, are completed, the task force studies will be put in final form, an overview paper will be drafted, a listing of all the recommendations will be finalized and a schedule for implementation

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<sup>2</sup> In his book *The Angels’ Game: A Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, Macomber expressed his satisfaction with the decision to use active duty Department of State and Foreign Service personnel rather than “experts.” “Their product, while uneven, was remarkably perceptive and constructive. It also benefited from the insider’s license to be critical. They said things which needed to be said and which, coming from insiders, were far less resented than they would have otherwise been,” and “much easier to implement, than identical criticism and recommendations from outsiders.” (New York: Stein and Day, 1975, p. 200)

of these recommendations will be put into effect. A number of recommendations can be implemented promptly. Others will take longer.

6. The task forces are not recommending any new Presidential directives designed to strengthen the role and authority of the State Department. The theory is that in the long run the role of the Department can only be strengthened by improving its capabilities and performance and that a stronger leadership role for the Department should be earned rather than accorded to it by Presidential fiat.

7. Finally, many people say a great bureaucracy cannot reform itself. You think it can and, if this effort is pulled off successfully, it can well be one of the lasting ornaments of this Administration.

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**322. Letter From the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Japan (Sneider) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 12, 1970.

Dear Bill:

I am writing to you in your capacity as the representative of that corporate body which produced the Task Force recommendations on the management of foreign affairs. I have now had an opportunity to read through most of these reports and feel very strongly that the tremendous effort that has gone into preparing them deserves recognition from the field. While one could argue about some details, for my money it is the best set of recommendations on reorganization of the Service and the Department that has yet been produced and a clear demonstration that in-house reorganization plans are far more realistic and understanding of the needs of the Service than anything that can be done from the outside. The Task Force reports testify to the fact that we are still a very vital and dynamic Service with powers of self-criticism and self-analysis.

For what value they may be, I would like to add a few comments, largely in support of the recommendations in the report. One theme that runs through practically all the Task Force reports impressed me

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force Files, August 14 thru 31, 1970. Official-*Informal*; Unclassified. Commentary on the task force reports from Ambassadors and other Embassy officials in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere is *ibid*.



particularly, namely: that there is recognition throughout of the changing character of both our international responsibilities and of the personnel now entering the Foreign Service field. After being away from the field for four years, I have been constantly impressed in Tokyo by the changes during this period both in the nature of the work we must perform and the type of people we are now attracting into the Service. The younger officers are truly a very different generation and a different breed. While some of us old timers might squirm occasionally, recalling the “good old days,” it is incumbent upon us to face up to this reality. The alternative, which I have seen too often, is for these younger officers to fly the coop. The abler ones have really no difficulty in finding responsible and much better paying jobs and we just have to dig in and fight to retain these people. The key factors in holding the abler, younger officers seem to be a well-ordered personnel structure, as recommended, sufficient scope in every assignment to challenge their imagination and initiative (too much layering in an Embassy hurts), and a more democratic—freer interchange between all levels (the use of titles can be a two-way barrier in Embassies). What this adds up to is an endorsement of the basic thrust of the Task Force reports. On specifics, the new promotion and retirement systems recommended make particularly good sense to me.

On the subject of Embassy organization, my limited experience as DCM in Tokyo leads me to two primary conclusions. First, a major organizational problem remains with integrating the non-State agencies—and there are a flock of these in Tokyo. Secondly, I would heartily endorse the recommendations on defining the DCM’s responsibilities, while still leaving scope for the Ambassador’s individual tastes. The DCM position is perhaps the most amorphous and undefined role in the Embassy—ranging very greatly from post to post.

Finally, while I do not think that anyone would disagree with the need for stronger managerial tools and training, there is a danger of over-emphasis in this direction. I hope that, in recognizing that foreign affairs is big business and needs effective management, we do not lose sight of the need for men with that unusual combination of perception, courage, wisdom and diplomatic skills that make the best of our Service. Inevitably, we are faced with making judgments and policy recommendations on the basis of less than complete data, judgments that often need the wisdom of experience and instinct. Yet, all this—I must assume—can be encompassed in the management basket, if we do not get too automated.

All the very best.

Sincerely,

**Dick**  
*Minister*

**323. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Task Force Reports

As you are aware, a number of the Task Forces' recommendations relate directly to the organization and operations of the regional bureaus. I have therefore encouraged the officers of EUR to submit comments on those recommendations. A number of the more cogent of these comments I attach for your consideration and that of the Task Forces in their further work.<sup>2</sup>

While I believe that the points made represent reasonable criticisms or suggestions, I would not personally press them all with the same vigor. They are, however, worth bringing to your attention as representing the views of a group of officers in EUR who have read, given thought to, and discussed among themselves the various Task Force reports.

Having read the Task Force reports myself and having attended various discussion sessions arranged by you, I could not help but be struck by the sheer mass of the reports and the breadth of the subjects covered. At the present stage, it is difficult to come to grips with the various recommendations except in a diffuse way. The next step, which I know you have under way, must necessarily involve the development of a single comprehensible and internally consistent program which focuses on the main problems. The Task Forces have done an admirable job in pinpointing many of the problem areas which presently confront us. However, they were unfortunately too compartmentalized to develop logically consistent remedies for the problems identified. Consequently, while many of the specific recommendations would, if adopted, represent much needed improvements, others are ill-advised and should be revised or discarded.

In very broad terms, the Task Forces address themselves to two fundamental questions: (1) How can the State Department and the Foreign Service be organized to meet the needs of U.S. foreign policy? and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, August 14 thru 31, 1970. Unclassified.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

(2) What type of personnel does a modern Foreign Service require? If we can devise acceptable answers to these two questions in logical, coherent form within a comprehensive conceptual framework, we will have made a giant step forward.

If we were to try to isolate the one most characteristic feature of the Foreign Service today it would be the deep feeling of dissatisfaction with the present personnel system. This, of course, refers not only to method of assignment (which is only a small part of the picture) but also to every other aspect of personnel administration. If this feeling is well-founded, first order of business should be a thorough reform of the personnel system. Some of the elements of an improved personnel system might be the following:

(1) The establishment of a stable personnel system which would avoid the uncertainty and inequities created by the constant changes of the past two decades. Even a less than ideal system, consistently administered, would permit both individuals and personnel administrators to plan ahead rationally;

(2) Inventory of personnel and positions;

(3) Careful screening of young Foreign Service Officers;

(4) Promotions geared to grade requirements;

(5) Humanization of the selection out of time and grade provisions so that they are used to eliminate those guilty of incompetence or malfeasance and not to correct personnel imbalances created by incompetent planning;

(6) Improvement of the efficiency report system; and

(7) Assignment aimed at developing human talent.

As I pointed out at one of your discussion meetings, a consideration troubling me in trying to appraise the relevant Task Force reports is the unproved assumption that there are really enough “interesting” jobs in the Foreign Service and the Department of State to meet the requirements of a Foreign Service of some 3000-plus officers for such jobs. A mere inventory of available positions will not answer the question as to how many of these are actually of a type which will meet the need, on which young officers now seem to place so much stress, for challenging and responsible positions at all stages of a Foreign Service career.

The cone system, I know, with its introduction of varying recruitment criteria for the different cones, is supposed to take care of at least part of this problem, but I am not sure that it will entirely. I am personally confronted with a steady stream of officers at all levels who want a line job within one of the EUR country directorates, and I would imagine that the other regional assistant secretaries find themselves in the same position. The fact is that only a small percentage of officers can actually be accommodated on country desks or in functional positions, mainly economic, within the regional bureaus or the E area. What happens to the others is part of the problem of finding constructive and challenging work for all.

The foregoing remarks are not meant in criticism of the Task Force enterprise, which has certainly been one of the best things that has happened around the Department in many years. I shall look forward to the product of the group charged with pulling together the various Task Force reports into a comprehensive whole. I should then hope to have further comments on specific proposals for change which might be sponsored by this group.

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**324. Letter From the Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 24, 1970.

Dear Mr. Macomber:

In response to your invitation for "openness" and the Department-wide review and discussions on the Task Force studies, the Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies welcomes the opportunity to discuss with you on Wednesday some problems on the status of women.<sup>2</sup>

We are delighted with the appointment just made of Elizabeth J. Harper as chairman of the Department of State's Women's Program Committee. As she forms her Committee and draws up plans, we look forward to working with and through her in improving the status and employment opportunities of women in the Department.

The Ad Hoc Committee, formed in mid-July specifically to examine the Task Force reports for their implications and effect on the status of women, believes it must act independently of Miss Harper to assure your immediate consideration of our recommendations.

We present in an enclosure (A)<sup>3</sup> a review we have made of the four Task Force studies (I, II, IV, and VI) which have particular significance

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs. No classification marking. Copies were sent to State, USIA, AID, AFSA, and JFSOC.

<sup>2</sup> The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and its successor, the Women's Action Organization, and the more general issue of women in the Department of State during the early 1970s are treated in detail in Homer L. Calkin, *Women in the Department of State: Their Role in American Foreign Affairs* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 131-160.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached.

to equal employment opportunities for women and their career development.

We make several recommendations chief among them being:

1. That the reports of the Task Forces be reviewed at once from the point of view of their impact on the role of women in the foreign affairs agencies and necessary revisions made.
2. That a special Task Force be convened immediately to carry out this thorough-going review and revision.

Because the reports were made generally available only in mid-July, and because our group did not have or attempt to command the resources of the Task Forces themselves, our review is not comprehensive. We have, however, singled out certain major points which serve to illustrate the need for immediate discussion, clarification, or revision.

We are sure you will share our surprise at the marked minority position of women in the Foreign Service and the apparent inequities in their assignment and promotion as illustrated in Enclosure B. For example, men constitute 95.3 percent of the total Foreign Service Officer ranks; women, 4.7 percent. While the intake of women officers was approximately 10 percent of the total five years ago, this rate has dropped in the past two years to 7 percent. Out of 307 top positions (Ambassador, DCM, and Consul General) only two were held by women as reflected in May, 1970 statistics.

We believe that if the inequities which now appear to exist are to be redressed a conscious effort on the part of the Department must be made now while the Department-wide Task Force review is underway. We believe explicit language must be used in the Task Force studies which will embody the Department's action plan for the '70's.

In short, just as the Department believes that its course for the '70's must be set by the Task Forces and cannot be delayed, we believe equally strongly that the course for women must be set concurrently.

We look forward to our meeting with you.

Sincerely yours,

Jean Joyce  
Ruth Mosley  
Mary S. Olmsted  
Idris M. Rossell  
Eleanor W. Savage

**Enclosure B**

Washington, August 21, 1970.

SOME BASIC DATA ON WOMEN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

*I. Relative Number of Women, July 1, 1970 (O/EP data)*

<u>Total FSO Strength</u>	<u>Men</u>		<u>Women</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
3248	3,096	95.3	152	4.7

*II. Relative Number of Women in Incoming Classes (BEX data)*

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>% Women</u>
FY 1969	89	83	6	7
FY 1970	102	95	7	7

*III. Women in Top Career Assignments (May 1970 Foreign Service List)*

	<u>No. of Positions</u>	<u>Women Incumbents</u>
Ambassador	124	2
DCM	117	0
Consul-General	66	0

Further, according to the best information available to us, recent personnel shifts have resulted in only 3 women counselors at any overseas post:

- 1 woman political counselor (Athens)
- 1 woman commercial counselor (Rome)
- 1 woman economic counselor (Mexico City)

In the Department, only 1 woman FSO is holding the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and no woman is serving as Country Director (one FSR serves as an Assistant Administrator).

*IV. Relative Promotion of Men and Women FSO's—4-Year Summary 1967-70 (Computation based on O/EP data)*

<u>Class</u>	<u>Number and Percent Promoted in 4-year Period</u>			
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>% Men</u>	<u>% Women</u>
CA	—	—	—	—
CM	6	0	3.0	0.0
FSO-1	31	2	2.4	11.0

<u>Class</u>	<u>Number and Percent Promoted in 4-year Period</u>			
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
FSO-2	130	2	7.4	3.6
FSO-3	230	7	9.0	6.0
FSO-4	340	21	14.3	9.2
FSO-5	477	21	23.5	22.3
FSO-6	651	25	41.1	22.3
FSO-7	<u>288</u>	<u>34</u>	27.6	41.4
	2,153	112		

### 325. Memorandum for the Files<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 26, 1970.

#### SUBJECT

Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies

At a meeting with Mr. Macomber today the "Ad Hoc Committee to Improve the Status of Women in the Foreign Affairs Agencies" stressed the need for the Department to consider some problems on the status of women. Referring to their letter of August 24, 1970, to Mr. Macomber,<sup>2</sup> representatives of the group stressed the following principal matters:

- 1) Need to recruit more and better female officers;
- 2) Need to train a larger number of female officers;
- 3) Need to strengthen promotion, assignment, and utilization policies as they affect women to minimize discrimination; and
- 4) Need to amend the individual Task Force reports to reflect more directly the Department's efforts to strengthen personnel and management policies toward women in the foreign affairs agencies.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs. No classification marking. Drafted by Howard P. Mace, Deputy Director General of the Foreign Service.

<sup>2</sup> Document 324.

Mr. Macomber, supporting the ladies' basic thesis, made the following points:

1) The ladies should make specific, broad-gauged suggestions for changes in Task Force reports to Task Force Chairmen;<sup>3</sup>

2) Many improvements in personnel policies can readily be made to improve the utilization and development of the talents of female employees;

3) The possibilities of assigning lady officers, including senior FSSOs, to the Inspection Corps, would be explored;

4) Increasing the use of women on Selection Boards and Panels would be investigated; and

5) Miss Harper would work directly with the Ad Hoc Committee on these matters.

**HPM**

*Deputy Director General*

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<sup>3</sup> The Ad Hoc Women's Committee held a Department-wide open forum on September 2 to consider recommendations on the status of women for the Task Force Reports, and then forwarded a 16-page proposal for additions and changes to the reports under cover of a September 8 memorandum to Christopher Petrow of Macomber's office. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs)

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**326. Memorandum From Mary S. Olmsted of the Ad Hoc Women's Committee, Department of State to Chris Petrow of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Our Recommendations re Task Force Reports

Thank you for the time and trouble you went to in making our views known to the chairmen of the Task Forces about the role and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs. No classification marking.



status of women in the Department and the Foreign Service, and for your memorandum of September 30 reporting their actions.<sup>2</sup>

We were glad to see that certain of our proposals were incorporated into the reports. We were disappointed, however, that some of the Task Forces did not take up some of the basic recommendations which we believe must be adopted to assure full utilization of the resources of women over the 1970's. We were particularly disappointed that Task Force I did not accept any of our recommendations in this important area of career management and assignments. Some of the other Task Forces appear to have underestimated the problems faced by women in the Department and the Foreign Service. They also apparently underestimated the discontent now existing among women in the foreign affairs agencies as well as its possibilities for adversely affecting the efficiency and harmony of the Foreign Service. We hope that this lack of understanding can be rectified by a strong statement, in the covering report, on the future role of women in the Services.

We are making these views known to Mr. Macomber.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The second paragraph of the memorandum was included in Olmsted's October 6 letter to Macomber. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of The Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs)

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**327. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Military Representation Abroad Action Memorandum

In January 1970, at the suggestion of PM, Under Secretary Richardson asked the Interdepartmental Political Military Group (IPMG) to prepare a study for the Under Secretaries Committee on the role of the military in the overseas diplomatic missions. The study was one of a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 US. Confidential. Sent through Johnson who initialed the memorandum. Drafted by Thomas Pickering (PM).

number of on-going actions resulting from the Overseas Personnel Reductions (OPRED) ordered by the President. We have now reached a point in this study process where we should brief you and solicit your views on how best to proceed. What follows is a brief explanation of the purpose of the study, issues which have been settled, and the one outstanding issue which is unresolved.

Under Secretary Richardson, in his directive ordering the study, indicated that we should examine specifically the possibility of reorganizing the military representation in the overseas diplomatic mission as a single section, parallel to the political or economic sections, headed by a senior military officer reporting directly to the Ambassador. In the course of the IPMG study, in which DOD/ISA and JCS have played an active role, we have resolved a number of subsidiary issues including a realignment of military communications channels in the diplomatic mission, administrative support arrangements more closely integrated with the Embassy, and a means for implementing any reorganization proposals through the regional interdepartmental groups on a phased and orderly basis. The IPMG, however, has not resolved the major outstanding problem—the type of organizational arrangements to be instituted for the military.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain firmly convinced that no change is warranted in the present Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Defense Attaché Sections of our Embassies. They believe that MAAG and Attaché offices perform separate, unrelated, and unblendable functions which must, in order to carry out our military responsibilities overseas, remain as separate organizations. They believe any attempt to provide for unified control under the Ambassador of these and other overseas military bodies—mapping missions, ship repair units, medical research detachments and similar bodies would be unworkable and severely impinge upon the ability of these officers and men to do their assigned tasks.

The Department of State staff believes that a single military section would provide the Ambassador with a new tool better to perform the military aspects of his overseas mission for the President. Part of this belief is based on the need for enhanced and more simplified means of staying in touch with and exerting control over the military elements of the mission in so far as this is required to carry out the Ambassador's foreign policy mandate from the President. Another factor, is the encouragement of the military through a single section to provide broader gauge officers to carry out a more broadly conceived role for the military overseas. The Nixon Doctrine, we believe, will require more military-to-military advice and consultation with our close allies overseas. The increasing role of the military in many overseas governments requires a well-rounded U.S. military officer to improve and maintain across-the-board contacts for the Ambassador. Single military sections

have worked well in Jordan, the United Kingdom, and in other areas where attachés have handled some or all of the military assistance duties. In many other countries, military assistance officers do contribute in important ways to representational contacts with foreign military officers and to our intelligence reporting.

Meshed with the problem of the apparent impasse at the IPMG level on the organization of the military is the leftover question of the future of MAAGs in Belgium, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. The decision by the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee that these MAAGs should be abolished in countries in Europe in which we no longer have military assistance programs has brought a strong reclamation from the Secretary of Defense.<sup>2</sup> The USC decision envisaged the future settlement of the organizational problem of their disestablishment and the assumption of any necessary remaining duties within the Embassy in the on-going IPMG study discussed above.

Before moving to the Under Secretaries Committee to discuss the IPMG report on this subject, we need to have a review of the problem with you. We have at least one pending Defense Department suggestion on how to proceed further to raise with you as well as a number of interrelated problems which we believe could be best handled in a discussion session. (The Department of Defense has suggested a traveling joint State–Defense study mission visit a number of posts where there may be problems, possibly including the European Embassies mentioned above. We are reluctant to proceed along these lines until we have your own views.)

#### *Recommendation*

That you agree to meet with Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Hartman, and myself at an early convenient time for a briefing on and discussion of these issues.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Haig briefed Kissinger on this “interdepartmental brawl” in a July 31 memorandum and then expressed his own strong opposition to abolishing the four MAAGs in an August 28 memorandum to Kissinger. Both are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 225, Dept of Defense, Vol. VIII.

<sup>3</sup> Irwin approved a meeting for November 16 at 11 a.m.

328. **Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber) to the President's Assistant (Flanigan)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 29, 1970.

Peter:

Here is the "percentage chart" you asked me for the other day.

**William B. Macomber, Jr.**

**Attachment**

Washington, undated.

COMPARISON OF CHIEFS OF MISSION APPOINTMENTS

	<i>Career</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Non-Career</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Eisenhower	146	68%	68	32%
Kennedy	73	61%	47	39%
Johnson	89	60%	59	40%
Nixon	66	69%	30	31%

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Flanigan, Box 13, Ambassadors—Broad Memoranda. No classification marking. In a January 19, 1971, follow-up memorandum to Flanigan Macomber stated: "the percentage chart figures on career and non-career Chiefs of Mission in the last four Administrations reflect the total number of Ambassadors appointed during each of these Administrations. Thus, if a non-career Ambassador was replaced after brief service by another non-career person the figures would reflect two non-career appointments and a resultant distortion in the percentage figures. I think a 70%–30% split in career appointees at post is just about right, and that is where we are at the moment." (Ibid.)

### 329. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 19, 1971, 1600Z.

8959. For Chief of Mission from Deputy Under Secretary Macomber. Subject: Implementation of Task Force Recommendations on the Roles and Functions of Diplomatic Missions.

To assure systematic and timely implementation of the management reforms proposed by the Task Forces, an action program was submitted to the Secretary along with the reports of the thirteen task forces.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary has now approved the action program below and has asked me to assume responsibility for carrying it out.

Of major importance are those recommendations concerning the role, function, and structure of our diplomatic missions. Recommendations on the missions were submitted not only by Task Force XI on the role and function of diplomatic missions, but also by Task Force VII on creativity, and Task Force IX on openness.

Their recommendations are aimed at three principal objectives:

1. To strengthen the executive direction of the mission and enhance its overall organization and program management.
2. To promote creativity and openness within missions.
3. To stimulate openness and closer contact with the host country and with the visitors from the United States.

These recommendations are summarized in the following sections. Each summary concludes with a paragraph requesting specific action by the missions.<sup>3</sup>

#### Mission Organization and Management

Task Force XI (Diplomatic Missions) reemphasizes the paramount roles of the Ambassador and suggests various management reforms to give him better control over the activities of his mission and greater organizational flexibility in meeting problems. These reforms are also intended to provide better communication throughout the mission and more thorough consideration of creative and innovative views.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210, ORG 8 Task Force Recommendations. Unclassified. Drafted by Robert Foulton, Chief of the Management Staff in Macomber's office, and approved by Macomber.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 312.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding responses from the missions see Document 312; and National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, March 1971. Ambassador to Nepal Carol Laise's response is Document 332.

Task Force XI gives high priority to an improved system of Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA), resembling but going beyond the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) procedure used successfully by the Interdepartmental Group of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA/IG). PARA's basic intent is to analyze U.S. interests and policy objectives more systematically, with the aim both of (a) sharpening policy definition and guidance and (b) providing a more logical method for the allocation of resources (money and people) by all agencies.

Such a system would provide both the Department and the chief of mission with sound concepts and procedures for guiding and controlling all programs and functions at a mission. The Department is now considering how best to implement these recommendations and will keep the missions informed of its findings.

Task Force XI's remaining recommendations on organization and management of missions are related to the PARA system, but are not dependent on it. While it does not call for a dismantling of the traditional mission organization, Task Force XI does encourage chiefs of mission to cut across established jurisdictional lines by establishing either ad hoc or standing groups to meet short-term or continuing management problems. It finds the standard Country Team to be deficient as a management tool and underscores the utility of greater organizational flexibility both in solving problems and in stimulating creativity.

In urging that the executive section of missions be strengthened, Task Force XI recommends the formation of management systems (1) to deal specifically with the need for coordination of information collection and reporting and (2) to focus on policy formulation and related resource allocation problems. Illustrations of such systems are provided.<sup>4</sup>

While mindful that no precise blueprint can be applied to every mission, the Department is in fundamental agreement with the management objectives set forth by Task Force XI.

*Action Suggested:* In considering the recommendations relating to organization and management, numbers 420 through 425, and 499 on the attached list, you would be aided by a review of the rationale and conclusions given in Task Force XI's report on diplomatic missions (pages 451-459 of *Diplomacy for the 70's*). After reviewing this material and related aspects of the task force reports on creativity and openness, you are urged to consider how these principles can best be applied, taking into account the size, nature and functional requirements of your particular mission.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

By March 15, 1971, I would appreciate your report on the results of this examination, giving us your judgment of how far we might go in refining the organization of the mission to achieve the intended purposes.

#### Creativity and Openness in the Mission

Task Force VII (Creativity) concludes that the climate in many of our missions is not altogether hospitable to creative thinking. It finds that creativity is inhibited by “an almost feudal quality” in the relationship between senior officers and the lower ranks in the mission. It appeals for a “democratization” of personal relationships within the mission, adding that the principal factor in attaining it will be the personal style of the chief of mission himself. Task Force VII also believes that greater use of ad hoc task forces would stimulate freer expression of views among the diverse units and agencies of the mission and would give younger officers greater opportunity to participate and be heard.

In dealing with creativity and openness, the recommendations of Task Force XI (Diplomatic Missions) parallel and sustain those of Task Force VII. Task Force XI calls attention to the impatience of younger officers with “antiquated rules of protocol and behavior” and emphasizes the importance of creating an atmosphere in which the chief of mission and his ranking staff members open themselves to ideas from below and, in turn, encourage those they direct to look beyond the narrow confines of their job descriptions. It recommends the use of informal discussion groups in the mission, preferably self-administered so as to give participants a sense of freedom and spontaneity.

Task Force IX also sees the “hierarchical attitudes” of the Foreign Service as limiting openness and calls for measures for the promotion and transmission—in and out—of ideas, viewpoints and criticisms.” (Pages 3911–3 of *Diplomacy for the 70's*.)

We are in fundamental agreement with the task forces that more democratic working relationships within the missions can induce creativity and openness. But like the task forces, we are mindful that there are no universally applicable formulas for achieving this. Above all we recognize that, since chiefs of missions must have wide latitude in the management of their missions, the effectiveness of missions could suffer if rigid rules governing relationships among their personnel were imposed on them.

We believe that the best way of carrying out the task force recommendations lies in the preparation of specific guidelines for the chief of mission. Although these guidelines would be drawn up within the Department, they should reflect fully the views of the missions themselves.

*Action Suggested:* The missions are asked to review carefully the relevant passages of the reports of Task Forces VII, IX, and XI. We would appreciate by March 15 your reactions to task force recommenda-

tions 426 through 429 and your recommendations for the proposed guidelines.

#### Openness Outside the Mission

Task Force IX (Openness) finds that "conditions of service abroad encourage clannishness." This group decided that greater efforts were needed to expose mission personnel to sources of influence which might previously have been neglected. Among these sources would be not only representatives of a broad spectrum of the population of the country to which the employee is assigned, but also U.S. visitors who can bring to the mission a greater understanding of and sensitivity to the U.S. domestic scene.

We call particular attention to the recommendations concerning reporting. Task Force IX concludes that too much of an officer's time is devoted to the reporting of particular events at the expense of broader and more frequent contacts. Task Force XIII (Management Tools) also stresses this theme, recommending that "spot" reporting be reduced in favor of a few well developed analytical pieces. Task Force VII recommends the appointment of a special study group to "recommend measures for the paper flow." The problem of the quantity and type of field reporting is a familiar one for the Department. While we can claim some progress in our efforts to streamline and rationalize the reporting function, we are still not fully satisfied with current practices. We will be most interested in your comments on recommendation 436.

*Action Suggested:* I would be grateful if by March 15, 1971, you could report on the actions you have taken or intend to take to implement recommendations 430 through 436.

I recognize that the criticisms and suggestions that you are being asked to deal with may not, in every case, be applicable to your mission. Where you find one or more of them to be inapplicable, and believe no significant improvements are needed in the areas they deal with, please say so. But before reaching such a conclusion, I ask that in each instance you bear in mind that the criticisms and suggestions we are dealing with are not the work of "outsiders" but rather of experienced "insiders" drawn from all ranks of the Foreign Service and the Department.

Many thanks for your cooperation.

#### Action Program

The schedule of actions to implement the recommendations of the 13 Task Forces on Management Reforms listed below is divided into the following three categories:

Category I—Recommendations approved for implementation.

Category II—Recommendations requiring further study—decisions to be made within 90 days.



Category III—Recommendations requiring further study—decisions to be made within 180 days.

### Missions

420. Ambassadors should adapt their line organizations to the nature of their particular missions and the requirements laid on it. II

421. In many posts, the role of the DCM should be broadened to make him the equivalent of a corporation executive vice-president in charge of operations and coordination. The DCM would then become the operation director of a PARA system. II

422. In missions with large operational programs, it may be necessary to augment the supervisory role of the Ambassador and DCM with another officer in an executive/management capacity. This officer could be a “counselor for management” an “executive secretary” or a lower ranking officer. II

424. Except for small missions, management systems should be established to (a) improve the collection and reporting of information and (b) provide adequate analysis and policy formulation to support a PARA system. II

425. In larger missions, consideration should be given to the formation of three management coordination groups: (a) information collection and reporting group, (b) policy and budget group, and (c) operations group. II

426. It is recommended that the Department give active consideration to measures for significantly democratizing the personal relationships in the mission. III

427. Ambassadors should seek greater openness and participation through less rigid compartmentalization. II

428. In our missions abroad, the Deputy Chief of Mission should see as an integral part of his management function the promotion and transmission—in and out—of ideas, positive viewpoints and criticisms. II

429. Encourage cross-mission communication at all levels and the consideration of creative views from all levels and sections. This can only be accomplished through impetus from the top. The executive section must make clear that this effort has its continuing interest. II

430. Ambassadors should insure that greater use of U.S. visitors is made. For example, Congressional travelers and other VIP’s should be asked to participate in give-and-take exchanges with selected cross sections of a mission. II

431. Visiting Congressmen should be asked to brief a mission on domestic developments. II

432. Embassy officers should be given, on a regular basis, the opportunity to act as escort or control officer for important visitors. II

433. Sufficient funds should be made available for travel and language improvement so that local contacts will be as widespread and useful as possible. II

436. Reduce reporting in favor of fewer, more perceptive analyses. If these analyses are indeed to improve in quality they must derive from broader contacts outside the Embassy. The aim should be to assure that a minimum of one quarter of a substantive officer's time is devoted to out of the office contact and travel. III

499. Attaché reporting should be more closely coordinated with other mission intelligence through the operation of a reporting committee. III

Recommendations 423, 434, 435 have not been assigned to missions.

**Rogers**

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### **330. Editorial Note**

During 1971 women employed by the foreign affairs agencies continued to press for reforms, especially concerning the effect of marriage on their rights, opportunities, and employment conditions. At an Open Meeting on Marriage held on January 20, 1971, Department spokesmen, including Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Macomber, exchanged views with women of the foreign affairs agencies on the regulations affecting married women employees. In a January 29 follow-up letter to Macomber, Mary Olmsted, President of the Women's Action Organization, welcomed Macomber's statement that it was time to start making marriage not incompatible with a women's career. She included an 11-point summary of the organization's understanding of what was said at the meeting (printed in Calkin, *Women in the Department of State*, pages 272–273) and highlighted additional concerns not covered fully or at all at the meeting. The letter and further correspondence with Macomber is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Women's Affairs.

In airgram CA-3745, August 11, 1971, the Department of State transmitted to all diplomatic and consular posts a policy statement on the effect of marriage on the rights, opportunities, and employment conditions of women employed by the Department, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency. The airgram reported that the three agencies were "continuing to review their regulations to assure that marriage and a career are compatible for those

women who desire both, and that women with dependents will have equal opportunities for service abroad if they so desire." The airgram then specified the policies adopted by the three agencies:

"1) Recruitment literature has been rewritten to eliminate any reference to considerations based on sex or marital status.

"2) Women applicants are not being questioned regarding their marital status or intention to marry.

"3) Women with dependents are being considered for appointment and assignment in the foreign affairs agencies.

"4) A woman who was required to resign from the Foreign Service because of marriage will be given opportunities for reentry into the Foreign Service at a class commensurate with her qualifications, if there is a need for her services and if she meets current conditions of employment.

"5) Women in the foreign affairs agencies who wish to continue their careers after marriage can do so if they continue to accept all conditions of employment without reservation, including availability for world wide service. Equality in application of the regulations means that—

"(a) A Foreign Service employee marrying a national of another country will be assigned to the U.S. so that the spouse may apply for U.S. citizenship (Uniform State/AID/USIA Regulations, 3 FAM 629, *Marriage of Employees*).

"(b) If two Foreign Service employees marry and both wish to continue working, each may retain regular status if each continues to be available for world wide assignment. The foreign affairs agencies will make every effort to assign both husband and wife to the same post in positions appropriate to their class levels and qualifications. If such assignments are not feasible the husband and wife may be assigned positions at different posts, or one or the other of the couple will be granted leave without pay for the duration of one full tour of duty. The couple will be consulted on the alternatives.

"(c) The fact that a woman is married, or intends to marry will not be considered a factor in her availability for assignment overseas unless she declares that she is no longer available for assignment world wide.

"6) A woman employee who marries while in service abroad and wishes to convert from Regular to Resident status in order to continue her employment at the post may apply to do so.

"7) A woman employee who must remain in the United States after marriage may be considered for transfer to an appropriate personnel category, such as FSRU/FAS.

"8) Women employees in the foreign affairs agencies who as a result of marriage were converted from Regular to Resident appointments are being asked whether they wish to convert back to their regular status as world wide available employees.

"9) The fact that a woman is married or intends to marry, or any comment thereon, shall not be included in any part of her performance evaluation and shall in no way prejudice her eligibility for promotion.

"10) A post differential is paid to a regular employee of the Foreign Service residing with his or her spouse when both have been determined to be career employees of the United States Government. A post differential is also paid to a regular employee living with his or her spouse who is not employed by the United States Government (Subject to 031.3 Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Affairs) which appeared in TL-SR 209, April 18, 1971).

"11) A woman employee's marriage or intent to marry will not affect her consideration for a long term training program (Uniform State/USIA Regulations, 3 FAM 817, on Continued Service Agreements apply)." (Ibid., MR: Special—Women Employees/Wives)

In September the Department of State established a full-time Office of Women's Affairs and named Gadys P. Rogers as the Deputy Under Secretary of Management's Special Assistant for Women's Affairs. In a December 15 memorandum to Macomber, Rogers reported on "Where the Department Stands with Respect to Improving the Status of Women." Three weeks later, on January 4, 1972, she forwarded to Macomber a 7-page year-end report on the status of the Department's "Women's Program" and its accomplishments during 1971. Both reports and additional documentation on the status of women employed by the Department are *ibid.*

Also during 1971 calls were sounded for reforms in the treatment of Foreign Service wives, which were instituted during 1972. See Documents 338 and 341. Additional documentation on the issue is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 374, MR: Special—Policy on Role of Wives.

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**331. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Defense Sections

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 8. Confidential.

I have heard informally that Mr. Packard has passed down to the JCS and ISA for review our draft message on the establishment of Defense Sections in Embassies which you sent him under cover of your letter of February 9, 1971.<sup>2</sup>

As expected the reactions at these levels are strongly negative. Essentially the position is that things are just fine the way they are, and in any case why should the State Department meddle in what is essentially Defense business. As it was described to me, most of the "Colonels" working on the subject have very little idea of the functions of Embassies, the responsibilities of Ambassadors, or the role of the State Department in foreign relations.

Our problems in dealing with this question stem from two sources:

- (1) A deeply ingrained suspicion that the State Department is out to corral the military and ultimately to control their activities overseas; and
- (2) The military, at least at this level, have never accepted the President's letters to Ambassadors, which they regard as the product of an "end-run" by the State Department. In their view the Ambassador is a State Department functionary, and there is no reason why the military overseas should be under the Ambassador's jurisdiction.

This preliminary reading reinforces my own view that if we are to make any headway with this project it is not going to be through the normal processes of "staffing out" the proposal. It is going to have to be handled at your level with Mr. Packard, and it is at this level that we are going to have to convey the conviction that this reorganization is as much in the military interest as ours, that the present system is far from satisfactory, that an Ambassador represents the President and not just the Department of State, and that the President's letter establishing this principle is not just a passing phenomenon that will "go away." I believe it would be worthwhile sometime when you see Mr. Packard to mention again your desire to talk this project over with him before he becomes the prisoner of negative recommendations developed at the staff level in Defense.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The draft message and February 9 letter are attached but not printed. The draft message established within each mission, as soon as feasible, "a single Defense Section, in which responsibility is centralized for all functions which are usually performed by uniformed military members of Embassy or mission staff, under a single, appropriately ranked military officer. The Section Chief would be responsible for supervision and coordination of all functions normally handled by military personnel, including representation, reporting (including Defense Attaché reporting), liaison with host government military, advice to Ambassador on military affairs, liaison between Embassy and U.S. commanders in areas under Ambassador's jurisdiction, and the like. As appropriate the Defense Section would handle military sales matters, overflight clearances, military visits, and other similar subjects which are usually carried forward in military-to-military channels."

<sup>3</sup> Packard informed Johnson in a February 23 letter that "the Department of Defense continues to support retention of MAAGs and Attaché offices as organizationally separate entities with existing command and administrative relationships." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 8)

**332. Letter From the Ambassador to Nepal (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)<sup>1</sup>**

Kathmandu, March 11, 1971.

Dear Bill:

In response to your recent circular telegram (State 8959),<sup>2</sup> we have subjected ourselves to critical self-examination on the basis of the relevant Task Force recommendations and related material, and have come up with the attached comments.<sup>3</sup> The exercise was extremely worthwhile in and of itself, and opened our eyes to improvements that can be made in our own management, even though it has not produced many original recommendations of general applicability. On the whole, I honestly believe that we are committed to the kind of flexible, situation-oriented mission structure, characterized by openness and creativity, that the Task Force recommendations are trying to bring about. Of course, there are shortcomings which we continuously try to spot and correct, but our commitment and executive policy are in harmony with the Task Force objectives. Being a small mission is certainly a great advantage; complex institutional arrangements are needed in a large organization to endow it with at least some of the advantages of smallness, but when applied to a small organization which doesn't need them in the first place, they are at best redundant, more likely, positively harmful. We are staying loose and I think are effectively responsive to changing requirements.

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, I should like to reaffirm a couple of basic philosophical points in this covering letter. The first relates to the concept of low profile. I think this is a good concept as long as it is considered a *policy*, and I commend the fact that it is so described here and there in the various Task Forces. But "low profile" makes no sense at all as an *objective*, as a goal to be pursued in its own right. If we start confusing ends and means and elevate the low profile concept from a means to an end in itself, we shall almost certainly go beyond a healthy pruning of what we have done in the world in the post-war years toward the destruction or undoing of much of the good which we have achieved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Task Force File, March 1971. Unclassified; Official-Informal. Carol Laise served as Ambassador to Nepal from 1966 to 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Document 329.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

My second point relates to the chronic contradictions between what is real in the field and what is real in Washington. Our aid policies provide classic illustrations of this endemic impediment to effective foreign policies; you know better than I how the need to cater to Congressional and other demands for oversimplified formulas and box scores has repeatedly forced us to act in the field in ways that are plain foolish in the context of local conditions. Every previous reorganization of the Foreign Service and the State Department has involved at least some such straitjacketing of operations in the field. The hope this time, one which I fully share, is that we can achieve major improvements without suffering much of this kind of damage, because this reorganization is being done from within, by the professionals themselves. Even professionals, however, can mesmerize themselves with their own generalizations, particularly if they have been steeped for a while in the hothouse atmosphere of Washington; so even the present effort requires constant attention from its leaders to keep it honest and pragmatic rather than theological. In the final analysis, there are no bad missions, just bad ambassadors. No set of rules is a substitute for executive talent.

The situation we face in Nepal illustrates the necessity for utmost pragmatism in Washington if we are to be able to pursue our real interests here effectively and economically. The atmosphere is totally alien to Washington. This is an oral, familial society; institutions do exist and ostensibly they have policies, but it is the personal and familial relations that determine what happens. Economic development inputs simply don't work if they are done "by the numbers," strictly according to made-in-Washington global rules. There are other similar examples, (for example, local employee staffing patterns), that confront every element of this Mission to some degree or other. They all underscore the fact that if the U.S. Government has any interest at all in maintaining a presence in Nepal—and I am prepared to argue, in detail, the case that it does—then Washington should give its people here maximum freedom to determine how that interest should be pursued, within some reasonable total allocation of resources. This is only one aspect of the delegation of authority that is needed to stimulate and nurture creativity and innovation, a question that is considered at greater length in the attached paper.

Please forgive the hortatory tone of these remarks. I really think you and your colleagues are doing a tremendous job, and am moved to write the foregoing thoughts out of a sense of hope, not despair. At the same time, parallel developments, notably the directions AID reorganization seem to be taking, are most disturbing in the local context and in the context of the responsibilities laid on the Ambassador for insuring that our activities serve our national interest in any given country. I appreciate the way the Chiefs of Mission in the field have

been consulted regarding the Task Force reports, but there has been no comparable effort that I know of to involve us similarly in the thinking going on in the task forces reorganizing aid and weighing future institutional shapes and relationships for economic development. Is there any way of wiring us into this process, systematically, before it is too late?

Finally, I would like to express thanks for the opportunity given us to participate in this management reform process, which in itself is contributing to improved management within this Mission.

Sincerely,

**Carol**

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**333. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 29, 1971.

Dear Mel:

My attention has been drawn to a number of recent instances where senior DOD officials have engaged in conversations with foreign officials on sensitive questions which were either directly inconsistent or at least subtly at variance with current U.S. foreign policy. I am sure you are aware of the cases I have in mind, as some of our concerns have already been communicated to your staff.

My purpose in writing you is not to belabor the incidents of the recent past but to look to the future in an effort to avert situations which could further embarrass the United States in our overseas relations. With this in mind I propose that the following procedures be instituted forthwith:

1. That DOD Directive 5000.7, as most recently revised on December 10, 1970,<sup>2</sup> be scrupulously adhered to in seeking formal State Department clearance for visits to special areas by General or Flag officers and civilians of the rank of GS-16 or above. To minimize any misunderstanding, requests for the concurrence of this Department of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70-15 Apr 71. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of directives are maintained by the Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Pentagon.



visits by personnel of this rank, as provided for in DOD Directive 5000.7, should be made in writing to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. This procedure should equally apply for proposed senior level visits to those countries cited in DOD Directive 5000.7 where notification only to the Department is required.

2. That in circumstances where the senior officer will, or may be expected to, engage in substantive discussions with foreign officials or be exposed to local information media the officer in question will be briefed by this Department in advance of his departure from Washington. (If time or space problems make it infeasible to fulfill this requirement, we propose in paragraph 3 below the alternative formula of a briefing by our appropriate diplomatic posts.) Furthermore, briefing materials prepared in DOD involving foreign policy or politico-military considerations should be coordinated with the Department of State to insure that the materials in question are consistent with established policy. We will also provide any supplementary briefing materials that may be appropriate.

3. In those circumstances where a senior DOD official contemplates discussions with foreign officials where issues of U.S. foreign policy may be anticipated to arise I recommend that we leave to the discretion of our Ambassador the utility of having a member of our mission staff in attendance. In those cases where we judge it advisable, the visiting DOD official will be briefed on his arrival by our local diplomatic mission. In such instances we would so advise DOD in giving our concurrence to specific visit requests as outlined in paragraph 1 above. In proposing this procedure, let me emphasize that our Embassies are at the disposal of visiting DOD officials, and I am confident that our diplomatic missions can, and will, provide useful supplemental guidance to support your senior proposal.

In addition to the foregoing, if you considered it desirable we would be prepared to make an officer from the Department of State available to accompany senior DOD officials abroad in selective instances. I would appreciate your views on this suggestion.

I am convinced that immediate adoption of points 1–3 above will materially strengthen our objective to have our foreign policy articulated in a consistent and coordinated manner by senior officials of the Executive Branch.

With best personal regards,  
Sincerely,

**William P. Rogers**

**334. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber) to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Reorganization of 7th Floor

In response to the Task Forces' recommendation, Messrs. Irwin, Johnson, Samuels, Eliot, Pedersen, Cargo and myself have examined the current 7th Floor organization. We wish to propose to you certain changes, based on some fundamental management concepts. None of the changes are intended to alter or impede in any way your present operational style.

The two fundamental principles that we would like to emphasize are (a) the collegiate approach to management, under your and the Under Secretary's direction and control, with the Under Secretary acting on your behalf, and (b) aggressive 7th Floor leadership of the Department and of the foreign affairs community through the use of modern management techniques of planning and evaluation.

*Recommendations*

1. We (except for the Under Secretary) strongly urge that the Under Secretary be given the title of Deputy Secretary to provide clearer evidence of his responsibilities, not only as your alter ego but as your principal deputy. The new title would also symbolize your reliance on the Deputy Secretary for insuring coordination of foreign affairs activities, including guidance to the Department and to other agencies in the allocation of resources. It should be noted that the second man in the new domestic departments will have the title of Deputy Secretary. This fact has led OMB to suggest that we also request a title change for the Department's Under Secretary.

The Under Secretary dissents from this recommendation feeling that no change in name is required for him to fulfill his functions, that he is reluctant to give up the tradition associated with the present name of the office, and that a change will simply cause confusion.

Regardless of title, we do recommend that the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) be responsible to you for the management of the Department's planning, evaluation and resources allocation processes,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, 7th Floor Organization. No classification marking. Sent through U. Alexis Johnson.

and that the delegation of authority in these areas go through him to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

Approve (1) Title of Deputy Secretary<sup>2</sup>

or (2) Title of Under Secretary

Approve Recommendation

2. If you should approve the title of Deputy Secretary, then I would recommend that a new position at Level III entitled “The Permanent Under Secretary” be established in lieu of the present Under Secretary for Political Affairs. This change is recommended to reemphasize the Under Secretary for Political Affairs’ position as the number three officer in the Department and to eliminate the confusion that the present title creates. Under normal circumstances, this position would be filled by a career officer whom we would consider the senior officer of the Foreign Service.

The Under Secretary has certain reservations about this recommendation. He feels that the new title would create new confusion with the present “Under Secretary” and that it could be interpreted as continuing the present imbalance between “political affairs” and “economic affairs” a balance which Recommendation 3 below is designed to redress.

Keep present title<sup>3</sup>

Change to new title

3. To reinforce Department leadership in economic matters, we recommend that a new position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs be established, assigning to it responsibility, within the Department, for: (1) coordination of foreign economic policies and programs, (2) representing the Department in your absence on the Board of the International Development Corporation and the International Development Institute, (3) chairing the Operations Group of the Council on International Economic Policy and (4) representing the Department in that Council in your absence. We recommend that these functions be assigned to the present Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs until such time as the position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs is established.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Rogers initialed this option on May 18. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, approved July 13, 1972 (Public Law 92–352; 86 Stat. 490), created the position of Deputy Secretary of State to replace the Under Secretary of State.

<sup>3</sup> Rogers initialed this option on May 18.

<sup>4</sup> Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 created the permanent position of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the position of Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs was discontinued.

4. To give concrete support to the managerial role of the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) we recommend that the management functions (personnel, budget, evaluation and methods development), currently delegated directly to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, be delegated to him through the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary). We further recommend that the present title of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration be changed to Deputy Under Secretary for Management and Resource Allocation. This Deputy Under Secretary would exercise the Under Secretary's (Deputy Secretary's) responsibilities for allocation of the Department's resources, for evaluation of overseas programs and of the Department's domestic operations, for insuring that our new policy analysis and resource allocation system is operational and for providing management consulting services. He would also be available for other assignments as the Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) may determine.<sup>5</sup>

5. OMB has urged us to reconsider our previous decision concerning the salary level of the Coordinator for Security Assistance. Our position to date has been that the responsibilities could be adequately and appropriately discharged by an officer at the Deputy Under Secretary level (Level IV). OMB maintains that in order to provide him with adequate "clout" he should be at the Under Secretary level (Level III). They also feel that this would be clear evidence of our desire to run an effective program. OMB also points out the Executive Directors of IDI, IDC and OPIC will be at Level III. Organizationally, we could live with another Level III officer although the rank might be somewhat overinflated. Regardless of the rank, the Coordinator would have supervisory responsibility for the new Economic Supporting Assistance Administration and for PM's activities in the military assistance area. The Under Secretary (Deputy Secretary) would continue to be ultimately responsible within the Department for the general supervision of the security assistance program.

Approve Level III for Coordinator

Approve Level IV for Coordinator<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. In the margin he wrote: "Talk to me on this," which is crossed out. In returning the memorandum to Macomber, Eliot noted in his May 18 covering memorandum, which is attached, that Rogers wanted to talk to Macomber about Recommendation 4. The Department by administrative action changed the title of the position of Deputy Under Secretary for Administration to Deputy Under Secretary for Management on July 12, 1971.

<sup>6</sup> Rogers initialed this option on May 18 but drew an arrow to indicate that he meant the other option, and this is confirmed in Eliot's covering memorandum.

6. To assist in linking resource allocation to policy analysis, in strengthening our long-range planning capability, in the coordination of foreign assistance programs, in the substantive support of the Under Secretaries Committee and the Operations Group of the CIEP, and in providing substantive staff analysis on issues raised with the seventh floor principals, we recommend that a policy analysis and resource allocation capability be added to and the economic analysis capabilities be strengthened in the Planning and Coordination Staff.<sup>7</sup>

7. To improve the Department's evaluation capability, we recommend that a Management Evaluation Group be created to evaluate the implementation of policies and programs both in the Department and overseas, including programs of other agencies for which you have a coordinating responsibility. Eventually, we would hope to amalgamate this Group with the Inspector General, Foreign Operations. This Group would report directly to the Under Secretary and where appropriate to the Secretary, although the Deputy Under Secretary for Management would be responsible for its day-to-day supervision (see recommendation 4).<sup>8</sup>

If you should approve the above recommendations, we will prepare the necessary implementing documents including the appropriate legislation for the establishment of new positions and for title changes. We believe that we should, at the same time, obtain legislative approval for some of the other appointment actions we have taken administratively. We should include in our legislative proposal specific authorization for Level IV appointment authority for the Executive Secretary, the Director General, the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, the Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs and the Coordinator for Oceanic Affairs.<sup>9</sup> We are requesting a Level IV position for the Director of PM in the Security Assistance legislation.

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<sup>7</sup> Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. Rogers announced the institution of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) system on July 6; see Document 336.

<sup>8</sup> Rogers initialed his approval on May 18. Rogers announced the formation of a new Management Evaluation Group on July 6; see Document 336.

<sup>9</sup> Rogers forwarded draft legislation to Shultz under cover of a July 31 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 10) Shultz responded in an October 28 letter to Macomber that OMB concurred with the proposals with the exception of Level IV appointment authority for several positions. (Ibid., Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363, Seventh Floor Reorganization)

335. **Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Political Affairs (Peck) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 18, 1971.

Mr. Ambassador:

You may recall that you agreed to consider some thoughts on the subject of the Department's efforts to stay on top of what other agencies are doing in the field of foreign affairs. If my assumptions are correct, considerable improvement in our present situation is possible with the expenditure of relatively minimal—but relatively high level—effort.

Our coordination and control of what goes on must not be a reflection of narrow bureaucratic interests on our part. By the same token we are supposed to insure, to the extent practicable, that the actions of other agencies are equally consistent with our over-all policies. This can only be done if we know what is going on.

The Department's principal failing, it seems to me, is in the area of communication, itself the key to any effective effort to control and coordinate. We fail to remind our Embassies—and our desks—of what is expected of them, tell them how they are doing and what the problems are, and insure that they are keeping each other informed. These points are very closely inter-related, but a few examples may serve as illustrations of the general thesis.

Since the letter to the Ambassadors of December 9, 1969,<sup>2</sup> nothing has been done to refocus the attention of those concerned on the fact that it continues to be USG policy that the Ambassador is, indeed, in charge; this despite the long and growing list of transgressions (mostly by DOD; a few samples are attached). Our general policy seems to be to rely on other agencies to caution their own people, a highly questionable practice in terms of the observable results. Perhaps the most striking recent example was the *Westmoreland*/Ethiopia, *Enterprise*/Chile, homeporting/everywhere flap. The Secretary signed a letter of admonition to Mr. Laird,<sup>3</sup> urging him to set up a program designed to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Memorandums of the Executive Secretariat, 1964–1976, Box 6, S/S–S Memos, April–Sept 1971, Vol. 3. Secret. Nicholas Platt (S/S) forwarded copies of the memorandum to James Dobbins (S/PC), Leonard Warren (PM), and William Berry (INR) under cover of a June 22 memorandum in which he indicated that Peck wanted their bureaus to look over the memorandum in anticipation of discussing it with them. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Document 310.

<sup>3</sup> Document 333.

lessen the possibility of further incidents of a similar nature, but to my knowledge none of our Embassies or desks (except for those directly involved) are even aware that there has been a series of serious problems or that we have tried to do anything about it. Under these circumstances, it would not be too surprising if the same sort of thing should happen again somewhere else.

In other and fairly frequent cases, where CAS and DOD appear to be the principal perpetrators, the crime consists of taking actions with a Chief of State, or the host government, without clearing with or even informing the Ambassador until after the fact, sometimes well after. The most recent examples involved [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Incidents of this nature generally result in a bleat from the Embassy concerned, followed by silence from this end. The problem appears to be at least partly the result of a lack of understanding by the Ambassador and/or members of his mission of the responsibilities with which the former is charged. To some extent, this may be caused by the relatively rapid personnel turnover and a failure to insure that new arrivals from other agencies are carefully instructed by us before they depart and carefully read in by the Ambassador when they get there.

A third category of problems stems from the tendency of many Ambassadors to take actions based on instructions received from military commands, or through attaché channels, without insuring that the Department is aware of what they have been asked to do. On occasion, the Embassies may even become involved in a struggle with the agency over the proposal in question, still without the knowledge of the Department. From a management point of view, this is almost as great an error as an approval.

As you no doubt are aware, the CIA has made good use of the lack of assertiveness that often occurs at the desk level. The technique involves casually mentioning a subject to an Ambassador and then telling the Department he has approved it. Neither party thought it was a very good idea at all—and neither one checked the other's views.

On the basis of the above, subjects with which you are quite familiar, I would like to make the following general recommendations. If you approve in principle, I propose to discuss the matter with S/PC, PM and INR, looking to them to generate the necessary paperwork. PM is already in basic agreement with this memo.

I. A letter (or a brief letter covering a memo) should be sent to each Ambassador, calling his attention—in general but unmistakable terms—to the fact that we have had a number of problems around the world of the kind mentioned above, requiring that specific steps be taken to improve and tighten control at the Embassy, and insure that the Department is kept better informed.

The letter should be signed by one of the principals and should, at the very least, indicate that the Secretary's wishes are behind it. Preferably, the Secretary would sign.

Approve<sup>4</sup>

Disapprove

Discuss

II. At the same time, the Secretary would address one of his full staff meetings on the subject, stressing the importance of the steps he wishes taken. The Assistant Secretaries should be instructed to insure that the people in their Bureaus are carefully advised as to what is to be done.

Approve

Disapprove<sup>5</sup>

Discuss

III. A meeting of all desk officers should be called, at which the same message would be put to them by a senior official (you can guess whom I have in mind). This would be in addition to the efforts by the Assistant Secretaries and would be intended to provide an indication of seventh floor interest. (JIG does not like this idea.)

IV. A program should be established to insure that all newly assigned Ambassadors, DCMs, Country Directors and Desk Officers are carefully instructed in their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis other agencies, in particular CIA and DOD. The briefings, to be given by S/PC and DDC on a regular and continuing basis, would point out the dangers and pitfalls and would draw on incidents in other countries as specific examples. The same general procedure should be followed by us with regard to individuals from those agencies prior to departure for posts abroad, and after they arrive.

Approve<sup>6</sup>

Disapprove

Discuss

Two final points. It is recognized that many of our officers do not need to be reminded of their authority; others will not make real use of

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<sup>4</sup> Johnson initialed his approval.

<sup>5</sup> Johnson initialed his approval and wrote in the margin: "This can be done at U staff mtg."

<sup>6</sup> Johnson initialed his approval.



it despite reminders. To the extent that those who fall between these extremes are moved to action, the purpose of this exercise will have been achieved. Further, there is no intention to get involved in a major confrontation with the other agencies. I would foresee a non-contentious series of papers and actions resulting from the deliberations.

ELP

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### 336. Editorial Note

In a press release issued on July 6, 1971, Secretary of State Rogers announced "a reorganization of the Department's top echelon—the 'Seventh Floor'—involving changes in the responsibilities of the Under Secretary and other key senior officials. At the same time, the Secretary announced the introduction of a new management system on the Seventh Floor and at the level of Assistant Secretaries which makes use of Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) and other modern management concepts. The Secretary also announced further extensive changes in the system of recruitment and administration of Foreign Service personnel." That same day the Department released the text of William Macomber's 180-day progress report on management reform in the Department, which spelled out in greater detail the changes approved by Rogers in Document 334 and other reforms recommended by the Department's task forces. The report noted that the reforms, "while wide-ranging and profound in their effect, do not constitute a drastic reorganization of the Department of State. Rather they are practical measures intended not to change the structure, which is basically sound, but to change attitudes and practices to make that structure work more effectively." For text of the press release and the report, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 26, 1971, pages 103–109; copies are also in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210, ORG 10, Management Improvement, 1971. Copies of the Department's Management Reform Bulletin, which appeared regularly during 1971 to keep Department personnel informed of changes, are *ibid.*, Management Reform Bulletins. On January 26, 1972, Macomber delivered "an anniversary report" on the Department's management reform program. A copy is *ibid.*, Manpower Utilization Report, July–December 1971; the report was also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 14, 1972, pages 206–212. Documentation on implementing the task force recommendations is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394.

**337. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 20, 1971.

Dear Alex:

I agree completely with the point made in your 2 August letter to me that all U.S. Government activities and organizations abroad coming under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Mission must be responsive to the direction and supervision of the Ambassador.<sup>2</sup> I also agree that the Ambassador must be kept fully informed of all activities having policy implications. As you know, applicable DOD directives and terms of reference governing the MAAG's clearly stipulate the status of the MAAG's in the U.S. Mission and the responsibilities of the Chief of the MAAG to the Ambassador. MAAG Chiefs are, of course, also responsible to the Secretary of Defense because of the responsibilities assigned to him by the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act. They are, as well, under the military command of the Commanders of the Unified Command to which the MAAG is assigned.

While I understand your desire "to ensure that the Chief of Mission has access to all communications to or originated by subordinate DOD elements which are part of the U.S. Mission," I believe the procedures you suggest to accomplish this objective are unnecessarily restrictive.<sup>3</sup> I suggest, instead, that communications procedures be modified to require that all significant messages having policy implications to or from subordinate in-country DOD elements which are part of the U.S. Mission include the applicable U.S. Embassy as an information addressee. I am sure you will agree that routine administrative and technical traffic concerning spare parts, personnel accounting, etc., can be exempted from this requirement. This would give full effect to the President's directive that Ambassadors have "the right to be kept informed . . . of all the information or recommendations reported by an element of the Mission,"<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 1. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> In his August 2 letter, (ibid.) Johnson stated that he had "been struck over the past several months by the number of misunderstandings between individuals in the field assigned to Diplomatic Missions and Ambassadors over the position of these people in the Diplomatic Mission and their responsibilities to the Ambassador. Some of these cases involved contravention of relationships which were established by President Nixon's letter of December 9, 1969, to Chiefs of Mission" (Document 310).

<sup>3</sup> Johnson proposed dispatching a joint message that established procedures "to ensure that the Chief of Mission has access to all communications to or originated by subordinate DOD elements which are part of the U.S. Mission." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 1)

<sup>4</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

without vitiating the Secretary's statutory responsibilities for Military Assistance and Sales, or command relationships between the MAAG Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the Unified Commanders. Attached is a redraft of your proposed Joint State/Defense message which reflects these suggestions.<sup>5</sup>

We in the Department of Defense believe that the basic organizational relationships between the MAAG's, the DAO's, and our Diplomatic Missions are sound and have been working effectively for some years. I was, therefore, very concerned to learn that there have been misunderstandings between individuals assigned to Diplomatic Missions and their Ambassadors. I would appreciate it if you could send me the details of these incidents so that I can see that corrective action is taken.

Sincerely,  
**Dave**

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<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

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**338. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Secretary's Open Forum Panel, Department of State (Thomas) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Macomber)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 20, 1971.

**REFORM OF THE ROLE OF FOREIGN SERVICE WIVES**

It has become increasingly clear in the past few years that a reform is urgently needed in the treatment of Foreign Service wives. No question before the Open Forum Panel has been more controversial; none has drawn consistently greater attendance at Panel meetings. Few problems have had a more negative effect on morale. The treatment of wives is repeatedly mentioned by resignees as one cause for leaving the Foreign Service.

The Task Forces, recognizing this problem, recommended that guidelines be established for the role of Foreign Service wives, intend-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: Special—Policy on Role of Wives. No classification marking. Thomas was a Foreign Service officer who had served in several Latin American countries.

ing that the issue be given the closest scrutiny, and that a genuine reform be carried out. Management Reform Bulletin #20<sup>2</sup> is not a satisfactory response to that challenge. That document has been the cause of considerable commentary and controversy, almost all of it negative.

In fairness to the Foreign Service wives who drafted the guidelines, they never intended for them to be used as a Management Reform Bulletin. The guidelines do contain several controversial statements, and thus have served to stimulate discussion of the problem. However, as a statement of *official* State Department policy, MRB #20 is considered by a great many wives (and their husbands) to be highly objectionable. As a *reform* bulletin, it is woefully inadequate—it reforms nothing.

The modern Foreign Service wife is increasingly well educated, more inclined to have career interests of her own, and often unwilling to see her fulfillment solely in “wifely” pursuits. Conscious of her changing role in society, and of the progress her fellow women are making toward achieving equality and human dignity, she is unwilling to accept second class status or interference in her private life.

Yet while the world has changed, and while Foreign Service wives have changed, the Foreign Service too often appears wedded to 19th century attitudes towards wives. In too many cases, the Foreign Service wife is subjected to excessive demands on her time and energy; to pressure, bordering on harassment; to involvement in projects not of her own choosing; to unwarranted invasions of her private life; to unnecessary restrictions on her right to pursue her career or academic interests; to fears that the pursuit of her own interests will harm her husband’s career; and perhaps worst of all, to a caste system which grants to wives of senior officers the right to dictate to the wives of employees of lesser rank.

These things do not occur at every post, nor do they affect every wife. On the contrary, most Foreign Service wives enjoy their tours abroad and enjoy taking part in their husbands’ activities. However, the pattern of abuse is widespread enough to demand that vigorous steps be taken to bring these practices to a halt.

There will be those who argue that reforming the role of wives violates Foreign Service traditions. It is important to remember, however, that such a reform would be in keeping with a long-forgotten tradition established by Jefferson and Franklin: that the style of American diplomacy should conform to the ideals of our nation. Certainly our treatment of wives in the Foreign Service no longer conforms to our present concepts of democracy, equity and social justice. In fact, treatment of wives at some posts makes a Foreign Service career appear unattractive,

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<sup>2</sup> A copy is *ibid*.

and adversely affects our ability to recruit and hold the most talented personnel.

In the past year, a great deal has been accomplished to improve the lot of women employees of the Department. We firmly believe that at least as great an effort, involving nothing less than your strong personal intervention, is needed to redress the balance and give equal justice to the women who have married into the Foreign Service.

Several steps will be required to bring about these changes. By far the most important requirement is that a message be sent to the field which spells out the Department's new policy on wives. (A proposed airgram, drafted by Panel members and Foreign Service wives is attached.)<sup>3</sup> The message can be so cast that it supersedes MRB #20 without having to repudiate it openly. Such a message would not solve the problem—we have no such illusions. But it would be a signal to all concerned that drastic changes are called for, and that wives are free to lead their own lives without fear that their husband's careers will suffer. Such a message would be worthless, of course, without a commitment on the part of the Department to ensure that the changes are enforced.

We believe it would be a serious loss if the feelings of common effort and cooperation of our Foreign Service personnel and their wives were somehow lost. There appears little risk that the American traditions of good neighborliness, community spirit and service to their country will be undermined by this message. However, excessive caveats and amendments to a firm policy statement may be misinterpreted as loopholes which justify the continuation of undesirable practices. These practices, which you have characterized as feudal, are a greater threat to the spirit of cooperation than any message forbidding those practices could ever be.

We hope you will sign the attached airgram, and that you would be willing to "follow up" at some appropriate occasion with a few remarks, publicized in the *Newsletter*, which would emphasize the seriousness with which the Department views this question. We would also urge that changes be made in the Foreign Service regulations, efficiency reports, inspectors' reports, grievance procedures, protocol guidelines, etc., in order to bring them in line with the new policy. If you would like to discuss this further with us, we would be pleased to meet you at your convenience.

#### *Recommendation*

That you approve the attached airgram.

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<sup>3</sup> Not attached; see Document 341.

**339. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Department of State Task Force VII Committee (Petrow) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Macomber)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Findings of Task Force Chairmen

The following represents a consensus of the views of the Task Force Chairmen. It is a summary of their findings during their week-long inquiry in the Department and of their recommendations for the future.

I. Findings

A. The first and the most important thing to report is our satisfaction with the very large measure of progress which has been achieved in carrying out the recommendations of the task forces. This is a real tribute to your leadership; you can be proud of what has been accomplished to date. Ten years from now it is possible that we will look back on the establishment of the PARA and the new management evaluation organization as landmarks in the history of the Department, comparable in importance with the reorganization which resulted from the recommendations of the first Hoover Commission.

We also found that there had been major innovative accomplishments on the personnel side. The provision of more assured tenure for Classes 5 to 3, the junior threshold review procedure, the establishment of the Foreign Affairs Specialist Service (even though it is temporarily stymied in the courts), and the measures designed to bring about improved personnel management and are all important achievements. In short, this is an outstanding record, and one which we believe is inadequately understood and appreciated throughout the Service. It would probably have been even better if the budgetary stringencies resulting from the President's economic program had not intervened.

B. Our second major finding is that, although much still remains to be done in carrying out the recommendations of the task forces, the Department's ability to make further progress, particularly in the important fields of creativity and openness, is being seriously hindered

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, Management Reform—Task Force Chairman's Meeting—Report. Confidential; Eyes Only. The 13 Task Force chairmen convened in Washington December 13–17 to be briefed on implementation of the Task Force recommendations and to provide their evaluation of the progress so far and their advice on handling outstanding issues. (Memorandum from Robert Steven to Macomber, October 8; *ibid.*, MR: TF Chairmen's Meeting, December 13–17, 1971)

by a crisis of confidence among its personnel. Some of us were more alarmed about this than others, but all of us believe that it is the most serious problem facing management today. Many officers in the Department, including some occupying key positions, are experiencing agonizing doubts about the role of the Department and the Foreign Service in the management of our foreign affairs. They believe that the highest levels of administration there is a loss of faith in the discretion and discipline of the Service which has led to what appears to be a conscious decision to exclude the Department from more and more of the important work being done in the management of our foreign policy.

This loss of faith in the Department, which has been openly reported in the press, is attributed in part to the rash of press leaks, many of which the Department is suspected of being responsible for. Evidence of the Administration's decision to rely less and less on the Department is seen in such things as Ambassador David Kennedy's practice of negotiating important textile agreements with Asian countries without bringing FE or our embassies into his confidence, or the fact that Ambassador William Eberle, the President's Special Trade Representative, on at least one occasion dealt directly with foreign officials abroad without going through our Embassy. Nor surprisingly, all this has led to a defensive reaction on the part of many officers in the Department that the loss of faith in them is unjustified and that the Department has been inadequately supported and defended by its leaders.

The sense of malaise in the Department has been exacerbated by the turbulence caused by the labor management dispute and the attack against selection out which has culminated in the effort to block the confirmation of Howard Mace. The resulting decline of morale has had the effect of lessening officers' interests in and support for the reform program. People are discouraged about the future of the system and their place in it, and this has deprived them of the incentive to support further reforms. There is also some evidence that management's justifiable concern about leaks has damaged the climate for openness and creativity in the Department. Many officers feel that, because of the danger of leaks, the Department's leadership actually wishes to discourage independent thinking and discussion. If this feeling should become widespread, we believe that it could seriously damage the effectiveness of the Department. Needless to say, it would also block further progress in carrying out the task force recommendations on creativity and openness.

C. One of the principal purposes of the management reform program is to strengthen the role of the Department in the coordination of foreign policy. Our third major finding is that the ability of the Ambassador to carry out his responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government in the country to which he is assigned is being seri-

ously impaired by the constantly declining ratio of State Department personnel to personnel of other agencies abroad. The continued proliferation of representation abroad by other agencies has been accompanied by a significant reduction of State Department personnel resulting from the fact that, unlike the other agencies, the Department has been taking the BALPA and OPRED cuts across the board in the field. In some posts, the proportion of State Department personnel has fallen so low that the Ambassador finds it difficult to maintain control over the operations of other agencies. Our concern at this development was heightened by reports such as the one that the FBI was seeking to acquire an independent communications system for its representative in Beirut.

## II. Recommendations

A. Looking ahead, we concluded that, before you could reasonably hope to give the reform program a new impetus, something would have to be done to deal with the crisis of confidence from which the Department is suffering. We had no particular remedies to propose beyond a frank discussion with the Secretary at his lunch for us: the primary responsibility for dealing with this problem lies with the Secretary.

B. Assuming that the Secretary succeeds in restoring a much needed sense of confidence in the Department, we believe that a good case can be made for creating some kind of permanent institution to assist you in mobilizing support within the Service for the management reform program and for backing you up in your often lonely and beleaguered fight to keep the program going. We have in mind a kind of blue ribbon advisory panel of Department and Foreign Service officers, preferably not drawn to any significant degree from among the task force chairmen. Such a group could not only lend you visible support, it could also serve as a channel of communication between you and the rank and file. This group could also serve as a source of new ideas. The Department, like the world outside, is constantly changing, and the agenda of reform is in need of periodic renewal. A permanent advisory panel on management reform could well act as the initiator of new proposals for reform.

We concluded that it would also be helpful in restoring and maintaining the program's momentum if you had a more effective mechanism for following through on decisions implementing task force recommendations than you now have. We think it might be desirable for you to have someone on your staff working full time on the reform program. Ideally, this should be an officer with sufficient rank to command access to senior departmental officers. This is in no way a reflection on Bob Stevens, who in the time he has available for task force work has been doing a most effective job.



C. Finally, we recommend that any future cuts in State Department personnel be taken, to the maximum possible extent, in Washington rather than in the field in order to prevent the further withering away of the Department's strength relative to that of other agencies in the field.

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### 340. Editorial Note

During a conversation in the Oval Office on January 18, 1972, President Nixon and George Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, both expressed concern about and criticism of the Department of State and Secretary of State Rogers' leadership. A selection of their comments, taken from different points of the conversation, appears below. The comments were made during a discussion of Senator Warren Magnuson's Export Expansion Bill, which proposed to transfer the commercial and economic responsibilities of the Foreign Service to the Department of Commerce. For excerpts from the discussion of the Magnuson Bill, see Document 380.

Shultz began by saying "I certainly have the feeling that the State Department is in a very fragile and serious state and it needs a, it needs a strong and fresh hand in there in the second term I think, 'cause it seems to me anyway—I'm not here or the expert on this—but it seems to me that you need a State Department that's good in order to do the work, and they have lots of talented people but they're not, just not being used and it's hard to get at them and use them effectively."

President Nixon then added that "the trouble with the State Department people is they lack guts, principle and, frankly, knowledge, in the fields that really amount to anything," and argued that the problem was only exacerbated by the fact that Rogers "just constantly defends the god-damned Department, and he says nothing is wrong. Well, the Department is not always right. The Department's in a hell of a shape." He continued: "The problem that we have here is that Bill has made a fatal error in terms of his own place as Secretary of State. He has pandered so much to be liked by his colleagues at the State Department that the State Department runs him rather than his running the State Department. He has pandered so much to be liked by the press that cover the State Department that the press runs him rather than [he] them. Now the net result of all this—if you were to ask people of the State Department and the people of the press who cover the State Department, 'Do you like Bill Rogers?' he'd get about 90 percent. If, on the other hand, you were to poll the country in terms, 'Do you know Rogers the Secretary of State—who he is—or, do you consider

him a strong Secretary of State?’ you might get 30. Now, that’s a tragedy, a tragedy ‘cause the man’s so able.”

Later in the conversation, Nixon told Shultz that the “Kissinger operation, in view of my own lack of confidence in the State Department FSOs, has been indispensable to me, and of course very helpful.” But he added that the Kissinger operation has also been “very detrimental to State and detrimental many times needlessly so,” adding that “Henry says Bill is dumb—not smart. He is wrong. Bill is smart as hell. Bill is not a clown.” Nixon also pointed out that while both he and Kissinger distrusted the State Department, what distinguished his views of the Department from that of Kissinger’s was that Nixon had “much more suspicion of them and much more contempt for them than he has. He’s one of them in a sense. He has great respect for their liberal background and training.”

Schultz concluded by saying: “They don’t realize that under [Rogers’] leadership, the Department has fallen into total disrepair and that is I think, that’s the problem in the long run, and maybe it ought to be allowed to just disintegrate, but I think that if we don’t have a State Department we have to invent one.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 650–12) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

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### **341. Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts<sup>1</sup>**

A-728

Washington, January 22, 1972, 9:05 a.m.

Subject: Policy on Wives of Foreign Service Employees. The Department believes that the tradition of husband and wife teams and of wives’ participation in the representational activities of a post has been one of the major strengths of the Foreign Service. It is convinced that the great majority of married couples in the Foreign Service have welcomed this unique opportunity to work together and to contribute together towards the attainment of the objectives of the Service and of the U.S. Government.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PER 1. Joint message from State, AID, and USIA. Drafted on January 12 by the Open Forum Panel, Macomber, Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom, and Director General of the Foreign Service William Hall, concurred in by USIA and AID, and approved by Macomber. Unclassified.

If this tradition is to continue and be strengthened there must be a recognition that participation by a Foreign Service wife in the work of a post is a voluntary act of a private person, not a legal obligation which can be imposed by any Foreign Service official or his wife.

From its inception under Jefferson and Franklin, a basic principle of American diplomatic practice has been that our style of diplomacy must be representative of our way of life. In the past few years, rapid changes in American society have provided wider roles for women than were traditionally available. Women have gained increasing recognition of their right to be treated as individuals and to have personal and career interests in addition to their more traditional roles as wife or mother. If the Foreign Service is to remain representative of American society, and if its traditions are to be preserved and strengthened, the Foreign Service must adapt to these changing conditions. Recently these changes in American society have resulted in a growing attention to the role of a Foreign Service wife abroad. To some extent, this has been heightened by occasional but serious abuses in which requirements have been levied on some wives which are today considered unnecessary and demeaning.

The attached policy statement is designed to eliminate these occasional abuses which have occurred in the past, and more importantly to permit wives to choose for themselves the roles they wish to follow. It is not intended to undermine the sense of cooperation, participation and community spirit abroad or the tradition of response by Foreign Service communities to special and emergency situations which arise. On the contrary, the Department believes that emphasizing the voluntary nature of wives' contributions will strengthen and enhance the traditions of cooperation and common purpose which have characterized Foreign Service life.

It should also be emphasized that this policy statement is in no way intended to criticize the past actions of any group of employees or their dependents, nor is it designed to pass judgment on the relative merits of various roles which Foreign Service wives may wish to play. The Foreign Service can benefit when wives follow the traditional role of Foreign Service wives, but it also can benefit when wives pursue other interests, be they academic, professional, family or avocational which are not in conflict with the appropriate conduct of diplomats in a foreign country.

**Rogers**

## Attachment

### POLICY ON WIVES OF FOREIGN SERVICE EMPLOYEES

The following is U.S. Government policy regarding wives of Foreign Service employees. This policy applies as well to male spouses and other dependents of Foreign Service employees. Copies of this instruction should be made available to all employees and their dependents. Ambassadors and Principal officers are asked to insure that this policy is observed and that all concerned understand the voluntary character of wives' participation on which it rests:

1. The wife of a Foreign Service employee who has accompanied her husband to a foreign post is a private individual; she is not a Government employee. The Foreign Service, therefore, has no right to levy any duties upon her. It can only require that she comport herself in a manner which will not reflect discredit on the United States.

2. Foreign Service Officers have broadly defined representational responsibilities overseas. These are an integral part of their job, and they are expected to lead generally active social lives. An officer is not relieved of such responsibilities if his wife chooses not to assist him in carrying them out. However, the U.S. Government has no right to insist that a wife assume representational burdens. Each wife must decide the extent to which she wants to participate as a partner in this aspect of her husband's job. She is free to follow her own interests (subject only to the laws and regulations of the host country and the U.S. Government).

3. Many wives may want to engage abroad, as they do at home, in charitable activities. In doing so they not only help others less fortunate than themselves, but often contribute favorably to the image of the U.S. abroad. However, a wife's participation in charitable activities must be truly voluntary. Which particular charity, if any, and the extent of her involvement is a decision for the wife alone to make.

This applies also to wives' participation in activities such as binational organizations, clubs and "in-house" social gatherings which are often worthwhile, contribute to morale and the effective functioning of the post, and thus benefit the Foreign Service. Many wives enjoy these activities, provided they are not viewed as requirements. Some do not and are not required to engage in them.

4. Although membership in a diplomatic community and the requirements of protocol inevitably involve considerations of rank and precedence in dealing with people outside the post, this does not grant to any wife authority over, or responsibility for, the wives of other employees. The American tradition of neighborliness, personal courtesy and mutual concern is the appropriate way to be helpful and friendly without assuming a superior-subordinate relationship.

5. Mention of wives' participation or lack thereof in the types of activities discussed in this instruction may not be made in performance evaluation reports, Inspectors' efficiency reports, or training evalua-

tions. Every rating and reviewing officer has the responsibility of insuring that employees' ratings are not affected by such considerations. However, should violations of this policy occur, remedial action will be taken.<sup>2</sup>

6. The Department, USIA, and AID are instituting careful review of their regulations and guidelines to insure that they conform with these principles. Posts are instructed to review their own programs and guidelines to insure conformity with this instruction. These Agencies are confident that this policy statement will receive the support and cooperation of all concerned. If violations do occur, every effort should be made to resolve them at post. However, if after such an effort is made, they cannot be resolved in the field, they should be brought to the attention of the Director General for the Department of State, Office of Personnel and Manpower for AID, and the Assistant Director for Personnel and Training for USIA. Complaints of abuse will be handled on a confidential basis.

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<sup>2</sup> In a June 20 memorandum to Macomber's Special Assistant, Robert Stevens, Olmsted questioned a recent note by Steven stating that comments on the performance of a Foreign Service officer's wife contained in a memorandum (not in the performance evaluation report itself) could be placed in an FSO's performance dossier. Olmsted called the practice "a travesty" on the official policy. (Ibid., Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394) In a June 26 memorandum to Macomber, Steven noted that during sessions with the Open Forum it was explicitly agreed that informal memoranda and letters concerning wives could appear in the official performance folders that went before selection panels, but in hindsight he thought Olmsted was probably right. He proposed a prohibition on all references to wives' activities, informal as well as formal, in official performance files, but Macomber did not sign and send forward a memorandum implementing the new policy. (Ibid.)

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### 342. Editorial Note

During a conversation between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers in the Oval Office on March 7, 1972, the following exchange took place:

Rogers: "I think I should say too that one of the problems I have now with diplomats is that they don't really think it counts. They don't—"

President: "Well we've got to change that, got to change that."

Rogers: "So they want to come to the White House—and you can see that in all the traffic—they say this doesn't make any difference what Rogers says or the State Department, and that's important because it hurts our ability to conduct foreign affairs." National Archives,

Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Rogers, March 7, 1972, Oval Office Conversation No. 679–15. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

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### 343. Editorial Note

In March 1972, the Department of State issued *United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State*. The 621-page volume, Secretary Rogers' second annual report to the Congress, sought to provide a comprehensive record of how U.S. foreign policy was implemented during 1971. Included was a chapter on management that focused on implementation of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation system:

"The long and difficult effort to develop a system for policy analysis and review, linking U.S. interests and objectives with available resources, culminated in 1971 in the establishment of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) system. Systems of this type are not new. The Department's problem has been to adapt the tools which such a system provides to the area of foreign policy, so much of which cannot be 'quantified' and so much of which depends on judgment and incomplete information. We believe, however, that we have the beginnings of such a system in PARA.

"During the year a number of specific PARA actions were taken:

"1. Under the aegis of the Secretary, the Under Secretary and other Department principals began to conduct a cycle of annual policy reviews for major areas of the world. The objective has been to look beyond current operational problems toward the general lines of policy we should follow over the next five years and the programs and activities required for the support of these policies.

"—Some of the reviews of the past year have been concerned with U.S.-Canadian relations, U.S. policy toward the Andean countries, the implications of U.S. energy policy for U.S. foreign relations over the next decade, U.S. relations with north Africa, and U.S. policy toward certain countries in East Asia and western Europe. These reviews have permitted the leadership of the Department to consider issues which might not normally have been brought to its attention. They also enabled the Assistant Secretaries to present their views on long-range policy issues to the Department's leadership in a more systematic manner. Increasingly, Ambassadors will be invited to participate to insure that the views of the Embassies and the country teams will be fully taken into account.

“—With the pattern now set, we expect in the coming months to achieve comprehensive coverage by the PARA system, improve our analytical techniques, relate policy objectives to the various resource allocation processes, and further develop regional and subregional policy frameworks within which the individual country PARA’s will be formulated.

“2. The country PARA review system is based on an annual document prepared jointly by the Department and the Embassy’s country team. After the paper has been reviewed at staff level by an informal interagency working group, it is referred to the Department’s leadership. An ‘issues’ paper is prepared by the Secretary’s Planning and Coordination staff, which becomes the agenda for the review session chaired by the Under Secretary or another of the Department’s principals. The development of the ‘issues’ paper injects the ‘adversary’ role into the decision-making process, as recommended by the task forces on *Diplomacy for the 70’s*. After the review session, a guidance memorandum is prepared establishing the Department’s position. The PARA document is then reviewed by an assistant secretary level interdepartmental group which approves the U.S. Government position on the various issues raised. This interagency group is part of the National Security Council mechanism. If the agencies cannot reach agreement, the matter is referred to higher levels, such as the NSC Under Secretary’s committee.

“—The PARA process provides the opportunity for cyclical reviews of bilateral, regional, and global issues, and establishes systematic and cumulative policy dialogues between the country team and the Washington agencies on major policy issues.

“—During the past year, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs completed another programming cycle, involving consideration of a Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), a review of this document by the National Security Council (NSC) Interdepartmental Group for Latin America, and the adoption of policy positions and programs. The Bureau of African Affairs also completed a cycle of policy reviews and approval by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. Both the Bureaus of European Affairs and East Asian Affairs prepared documents for a selected group of countries in these regions, as an initial step toward a comprehensive 1972 cycle.

“—A new programming system for security assistance was developed, designed to coordinate the Military Assistance and Supporting Assistance Programs and to relate them to U.S. interests and objectives.

“—These new developments were, of course, in addition to the existing programming processes of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Educational and Cultural Exchange Program.

“3. In addition to the regional, functional, and country PARA process, the Department has established a formal series of special pol-

icy studies as requested by the Department's leadership. These special studies concern issues in such areas as U.S. policy in Asia, U.S. policy toward the enlarged European Community, the future scope and focus of educational and cultural policies and programs, international science and technology programs, and the prospective role and evolution of international economic organizations. After the completion of each study, a review session chaired by one of the Department's principals is held and a position is formulated on the issues raised.

"4. Each of the reviews, whether they concern bilateral, regional, or functional issues result in a decision-guidance memorandum, signed by the principal who chaired the review session. In some instances, these reviews also result in communications from the Secretary to the President, expressing his views on the examined issue.

"The specific details of the PARA process may undergo changes as the Department improves its techniques. However, the central objectives have been established and will continue to govern:

*"In Washington:*

"—To assist in the early identification of emerging issues and their orderly analysis and review.

"—To assist in linking policy and resources allocation, insuring that resource requirements are taken into consideration in decisions and that allocations are consonant with U.S. interests and their priorities.

"—To provide the supporting rationale and data base for the Department's funding and personnel requests in the budget/appropriation process.

"—To facilitate Department policy and resource allocation guidance for the overseas programs and operations of other agencies, especially in the foreign affairs area.

"—To support the Department's in-house policy planning process.

*"In the field:*

—To encourage country teams, under the Ambassador's leadership, to periodically reassess the U.S. role in the host country.

—To provide the basis for coordinated submission of foreign affairs programs and budgets by State and other agencies represented at a post, through a single integrated presentation of the proposed programs and activities, relating objectives and resource requirements." (Ibid., pages 387–390)

In connection with the implementation of PARA, Under Secretary of State Irwin established a series of policy study memoranda (PASM)s and a complementary series of decision memoranda (PADM)s. Copies of PASM 1 through PASM 16, dated October 15, 1971, through December 12, 1972, are in the Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 82 D 126, PASM)s. Copies of PADM 1 through 62, dated September 13, 1971, through March 6, 1973, are *ibid.*, PADM)s. The PADM)s consist of memoranda from Irwin summarizing the conclusions of PARA reviews



conducted either of policies toward specific countries and regions or of the performance of bureaus. Files on PARA review meetings, including agendas, issue papers, background papers, and memoranda, are *ibid.*, Lot 83 D 113. The Department also contracted with the Social Sciences Department of the Bendix Corporation to perform an evaluation of PARA. In July 1972 Bendix submitted its final report, entitled “PARA: Process, Problems and Potential.” A copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: TF XIII, PARA. In his Annual Management Report for fiscal year 1972, submitted to the Office of Management and Budget on September 19, 1972, Deputy Under Secretary for Management Macomber called PARA “perhaps the most pervasive of the changes we have made in the way we do our work.” He described the progress made in implementing the system and outlined “priority improvement projects” needed to refine and further develop PARA. (*Ibid.*, Macomber Files: Lot 73 D 421, ORG 10) In *United States Foreign Policy, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), which was presented to Congress on April 19, 1973, Rogers once again devoted a significant portion of his discussion of management to PARA, describing the results of the first PARA cycle as completed in 1972. (pages 229–233)

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#### 344. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 18, 1972.

Dear Mel:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of instructions<sup>2</sup> that I have directed be sent to all of our diplomatic posts, clarifying the question of the responsibilities of our Ambassadors for the military components of our diplomatic missions overseas.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas Pickering, Deputy Director of PM, on May 8 and redrafted by Johnson on May 15. Cleared by Springsteen, Moore, Green, Sisco, Meyer, and Nelson.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

There has been some recent misunderstanding at the working levels of the Department of Defense, and among some of the personnel of our missions, about the relationship between Military Assistance Advisory Groups, Service Attachés and our Ambassadors. The fact that President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961,<sup>3</sup> regarding Ambassadorial responsibilities explicitly mentioned these military elements as subordinate to the Ambassadors, and that President Nixon's letter of December 9, 1969,<sup>4</sup> dealt with this subject in lesser detail seems to have led to the false conclusion on the part of some that there was a deliberate, though unstated, intent to change the traditional relationships.<sup>5</sup>

Having participated in the drafting of the President's letter of December 9, 1969, I know that the intent was quite the opposite and that it was felt that it was not necessary specifically to mention Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Service Attachés, because they were so clearly not "military forces under the command of the United States area military commander."

Apart from whatever channels of communication and responsibility DOD desires to establish with MAAGs with respect to DOD responsibilities, MAAGs, and similar elements of our diplomatic missions, are obviously so closely related to the conduct of our foreign relations that they must continue to be a part of our diplomatic missions and responsible to the Chiefs of Mission. This is also required by my own statutory responsibilities for providing "continuous supervision and general direction" of military assistance programs.

I would appreciate your bringing this letter to the attention of the concerned areas of the Department of Defense.

With best personal regards,  
Sincerely,

**Bill**

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<sup>3</sup> For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, pp. 1345-1347.

<sup>4</sup> Document 310.

<sup>5</sup> In a May 9 memorandum to Rogers, Spiers stated that "while we understand informally that there is some difference of view within the Department of Defense, one apparently increasingly predominant view does contend that the MAAGs are not subject to Ambassadorial control" and that the difference arises over the interpretation of Rogers' letter of December 9, 1969. Spiers added that "the issue has arisen enough times to as to make difficult State-Defense relations on a number of points, such as who sends instructions to the field on policy questions dealing with the MAAGs, what channels of communication are to be used, and whose clearance is required." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 1)

**345. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1972.

Dear Bill:

With regard to your letter of May 18,<sup>2</sup> I feel that the overall coordination between our departments concerning the functioning of the military elements of our diplomatic missions overseas is progressing well.

I further consider that the guidance contained in the President's letter of December 9, 1969 to the Ambassadors<sup>3</sup> is clear and is fully understood within the Department of Defense. The role of the Ambassador as the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission and the relationship between him and the various elements of his mission are clearly laid out in that letter and should not be the cause of any confusion either in Washington or overseas. I am pleased to note that the first responses from the ambassadors to your circular message indicate that relationships within the country teams are both amicable and effective.

As you mentioned in your letter, I continue to require a direct channel of communication and line of responsibility with the MAAGs and similar organizations in the missions in order to carry out my statutory responsibilities. I do not feel that this requirement conflicts with the authorities and responsibilities of the Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions.

My staff will continue to coordinate closely with yours in these responsibilities of mutual concern. I would appreciate your bringing any specific problems in this regard to my attention. With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

**Melvin R. Laird**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 1. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Document 344.

<sup>3</sup> Document 310.

346. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Macomber) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Richardson)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 20, 1972.

The Management Reform Task Forces which produced *Diplomacy for the '70's*<sup>2</sup> placed a great deal of emphasis on the need to stimulate creativity in the Department and Foreign Service, and to improve the atmosphere for openness in the foreign affairs community as a whole. Certain specific recommendations were identified as Action Program Items 464 through 474. For a variety of reasons, we have not been able to make as much progress in this area as in other areas of the Task Force recommendations.

All during 1971 members of my staff worked with the Public Affairs Bureau, with the Open Forum Panel, with S/PC, and other offices in an effort to develop new regulations and guidelines in the general area of expression of individual views both "in-house" and publicly. Some of these efforts were successful, i.e., the "Dissent Channel,"<sup>3</sup> and the Policy on Wives of Foreign Service employees. But in other important areas, we simply could not move. Bill Blair will recall much of the background of this, as P was centrally involved in much of the discussion.

I am writing to ask you to take another look at this concern of the Task Forces over the state of creativity and openness in the Department and Foreign Service. My hopes have been re-stimulated by the experience of EUR with its self-initiated series of EUROPOLICY papers, which permits individual employees to present new ideas to their colleagues in a responsible, disciplined, serious channel. We have seen four of these papers so far, all classified; I would expect that eventually EUR may come up with some worthwhile effort which may not need classification. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no leaks, no frivolous demands for "publication," and no strain on our resources. It seems to me that EUR on its own has implemented at least

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Force Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: TF IX, Openness. No classification marking. Drafted by Steven, and sent through S/S. A copy was sent to EUR. Printed from a copy that indicates Macomber signed the original.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 312.

<sup>3</sup> Procedures by which officers at posts abroad could submit dissenting views on policy to the Department were specified in Management Reform Bulletin No. 9, February 23, 1971; telegram 201473, November 4, 1971; and airgram A-3559, April 8, 1972. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Management Reform Task Papers: Lot 74 D 394, MR: TF IX, Openness)

one of the Task Force recommendations which caused considerable concern last year, without provoking the dire results forecast in some quarters.

Please have the appropriate people in P get in touch with EUR's Policy Planning Staff, which is running this effort, to make an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages which might be expected if we applied the idea at the Department-wide level.<sup>4</sup> Unless there are overwhelming objections to this effort, I hope you can give me some recommendations perhaps by the end of October on where we might place responsibility for development and coordination of this and related programs suggested in Action Program items 464–474, and an idea of the resources we might need to commit in man-hours and money.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Handwritten next to this sentence is "not done 1/31/73."

<sup>5</sup> Handwritten next to this sentence is "not done 1/31/73."

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### 347. Editorial Note

On the day of his re-election as President, November 7, 1972, Nixon had a long discussion with his Assistant H.R. Haldeman about changes in administration personnel for the second term. "His feeling is that he's ambivalent—to a degree at least—about Rogers, whether he will keep him or not, although he realizes that he shouldn't," Haldeman noted in his diary entry for November 7. "Doesn't really know what he wants to do at State, if he does let Rogers go." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Two days later Haldeman had dinner with John Ehrlichman and Henry Kissinger and, according to Haldeman's diary entry for November 9, "we went through the whole question of State and Defense and foreign policy with Henry. It comes down to his general agreement that we should go ahead with [Kenneth] Rush at the State Department, because you have to get a man who basically functions according to the orders he gets, as the P's man, rather than an independent Secretary of State." (*Ibid.*) Speaking of Rush during an Oval Office meeting with Kissinger on November 13, the President said: "I am going to tell him: I am going to take the responsibility for cleaning up that State Department and I want him to be my man." Just prior to that comment Nixon had asserted that his "one legacy is to ruin the foreign service. I mean ruin it—the old foreign service—and to build a new one. I'm going to do it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes,

Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, November 13, 1972, Oval Office Conversation No. 814–3) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

In a November 14 meeting, the President told Haldeman that he wanted him to “talk to Rogers, make the point that the P is closest to him, but feels that anyone who’s been in for four years should go like [Secretary of Housing and Urban Development] Romney, [Secretary of Transportation] Volpe and [Secretary of Defense] Laird.” Haldeman was to tell Rogers that “it would be bad if you stayed and they didn’t. It’s best for you to finish in a blaze of glory with the Vietnam peace signing, and then you take the lead and move out. That we’d have problems with Romney and Volpe and we need your lead to do this.” (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Haldeman met with Rogers on November 16 and recorded in his diary that “Rogers obviously was shocked to be told that he was to leave, and he didn’t say much more than that to me, except that he thought it was a bad way to handle it.” Later that day Rogers met the President and Haldeman and “made a brief pitch about his concern on the appearance of his being fired, that it creates bad and unnecessary public opinion” and that “the P should have consulted him first and then decided.” The three men then “discussed the organization of State if Rogers were to stay, and he basically made a pitch to stay on to June 1, so that he can clean up things that he was doing and not look like K[issinger] had forced him out.”

Upon being told by Haldeman the next day, November 17, that Rogers “was going to stay on for a short time,” Kissinger responded that it was “a disaster for the P and the country and unworkable for the Administration and our foreign policy. Our problem is not the foreign service, it’s the Secretary and he operates independently of the White House, won’t carry out orders and won’t do the work, the preparation of his own materials. The Department is torn between their loyalty to the Secretary versus the White House.” On the other hand, “if we had a Secretary we could work with, we could tell him what we want and it would get done.” The President informed Haldeman later that day that he “should have a clear understanding [with Rogers] that he’s to leave on June 1, but will say nothing prior to that.” Furthermore, he should tell Rogers that “there will be a reorganization in the Department as in all others. The P will make the decisions regarding all appointments. The line of working control must be through the system.” Regarding the foreign service, “we’ll have to see what promotions we want to put through. The most important thing is loyalty” and “everybody has to work within the system.” Haldeman noted in his diary that regarding Rogers’ successor, Nixon “hasn’t decided (but it will be Rush, of course.)” (*Ibid.*)

Haldeman met with Rogers at the latter’s home on November 18 to pass along the President’s message. “We need a clear understanding that

if you stay on, first, we have to go with the new organization now without delay," Haldeman told Rogers, "second, the President will make the appointments on his decision"; and "third, the Foreign Service promotions have got to be based first on loyalty, then on competence." Rogers "argued that the Foreign Service are very loyal to the P, especially now. They agree with his policies and his approach and he can win them over if he just takes a basically reasonable attitude toward them and not cut them off. Says he gives lip service to agreeing completely to the other conditions and says he feels he can work with them, even the staffing thing for a few months, but he definitely will leave, probably by June 1, maybe even by May 1." (Ibid.)

On November 21 the President met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush to discuss his prospective appointment as Deputy Secretary of State. According to Haldeman's diary, Nixon "reviewed the State Department situation, made the point that Rush may or may not move up to Secretary, and that would remain to be seen after Rogers leaves." Referring to William J. Casey, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission who was slated to become Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the President "explained the Casey role as the guy to tear up the Department. Rush's role is to back him and handle substantive matters. He said basically there'd be two purposes for Rush: one is substantive, that he should work on preparations for the European Security Conference, SALT, Vietnam, and so on; and second, is a cover for the beginning of the reorganization." Rush replied that he "recognized very much the P's views as to the problems at State, and totally agreed with the need to move in and clean it out. He expressed his view of Rogers as being a complete captive of the Foreign Service. That the problem with the Foreign Service is that what they want is to control foreign policy, and they aren't, and that makes them unhappy. The way they react reflects that unhappiness, which is what poses the problem for the P with them. The thing that they don't recognize is that it's not the business of the Foreign Service or the State Department to control foreign policy or to make the decisions, but rather to provide the P with the input and information so that he can do that. And then to insure that his policy decisions are carried out precisely." Haldeman noted that it was clear that Rush was "very pleased to take on this role and understands that if he goes at it right, he's got a chance to move up to Secretary." (Ibid.)

Rush entered on duty as Deputy Secretary of State on February 2, 1973, a day after Casey entered on duty as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and William J. Porter succeeded U. Alexis Johnson as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Rogers served until September 3, 1973, and was succeeded by Kissinger.