

Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

The NSC System

1. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon¹

December 27, 1968.

SUBJECT

Memorandum on a New NSC System

The attached memo (Tab A) outlines my ideas for organizing the NSC and my own staff. It is based on extensive conversations with a number of people—particularly General Goodpaster, who agrees with my recommendations.²

I apologize for its length, but the decisions you make on the issues raised here will have an important effect on how we function in the field of foreign affairs in the years ahead. I thought, therefore, that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Executive FG 6–6. No classification marking. A handwritten annotation on page one of the memorandum reads: “12–27–68 (Taken by HAK to Florida for 12/30 meeting with RMN), approved by RMN 12/30/68.” In *White House Years*, pp. 41–47, Kissinger recounted the formulation of this memorandum, the subsequent debate over its merits, and Nixon’s hesitation at implementing it. Kissinger stated that Nixon approved the memorandum on December 27, before meeting with Rogers, Laird, and Kissinger to discuss it on December 28 at Key Biscayne. (Ibid., p. 44) Roger Morris, an NSC staff member from 1967 to 1970, discussed how the memorandum took shape in *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 77–90. Morris credited Morton Halperin with drafting the plan proposed in the memorandum. The Department of State drafted revisions in the memorandum which, in addition to Document 4, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1; and in the National Archives, RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, NSC.

² Four memoranda on national security organization prepared by Goodpaster and forwarded to Kissinger on December 15 are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 1, Gen Goodpaster.

it would be best for you to have as full a description as possible of what General Goodpaster and I have in mind.

We would like a chance to discuss the memo with you after you have gone over it.

At Tab B are outline summaries, plus action recommendations, covering each of the subsections of the basic paper.³

Tab A

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon

SUBJECT

Proposal for a New National Security Council System

This memorandum:

- examines current procedures for making national security decisions, and contrasts them with those of the Eisenhower Administration;
- recommends new NSC procedures to insure orderly decision making;
- makes proposals regarding my own staff;
- lists the major issues which will require early consideration by the National Security Council, and suggests the focus and timing for papers on these.

Current Practice

The Johnson Administration's key decision-making body is the so-called "Tuesday Lunch" of the President and his principal advisers.⁴ The lunch group meets without a formal agenda and without any formal followup. Decisions are conveyed orally to the Departments, with frequent uncertainty about precisely what was decided.

A National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) is sometimes issued by the President or his Special Assistant informing the bureaucracy of a Presidential decision, but the NSAM almost never provides

³ Attached but not printed. Nixon indicated his approval of each of the action recommendations, but he crossed out the listing of the DCI as member of the NSC Review Group and wrote "no" next to it. In *White House Years*, p. 44, Kissinger stated that Nixon's only change was to remove the DCI from the National Security Council. The original action recommendations with Nixon's markings and initials in blue ink are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1.

⁴ Attendance has varied, but recently the membership has included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]

any rationale for the decision. While the National Security Council meets from time to time, its principal function is an educational one, i.e., general review of a major issue. In recent years the NSC has not been used as a decision-making instrument.

The major strength of the existing system is its flexibility and the speed with which decisions can be made. The absence of formal staffing for the Tuesday lunch, for example, permits a free and frank discussion unencumbered by a large group of second-level staff, but the discussants are frequently inadequately briefed and often unfamiliar with the nuances of the issue before them. Because the principals meet without the benefit of staff or previous staff study, there is no guarantee that all the relevant alternatives are considered, or that all the interested parties within the government have a chance to state their views. Since there is no systematic follow-up, it is often unclear exactly what has been decided or why. Nor is there any formal method for assuring that decisions are adequately implemented.⁵

Eisenhower Procedures

The NSC met frequently during the Eisenhower Administration. Participants had the benefit of fully staffed papers, and a systematic effort was made to give all interested parties a hearing.

A Planning Board (chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, and with representatives from the agencies represented on the NSC) met frequently to review all papers going to the NSC. The Special Assistant for NSC Affairs prepared the agenda for the NSC meeting, summed up the positions taken by the participants, and presented a decision document to the President for approval after the meeting. Implementation of NSC based decisions was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board.

If there is any criticism to make of this system it is that its very formality tended to demand too much of the principals' time, while giving insufficient priority to issues of primary Presidential concern.

The present task is to combine the best features of the two systems; to develop a structure, using the NSC, which will provide the President and his top advisers with:

- all the realistic alternatives;
- the costs and benefits of each;
- the views and recommendations of all interested agencies.

⁵ In a conversation with three journalists on July 29, 1971, Kissinger commented that the Johnson administration "had a different style from ours. They were a raucous group: fighting, lively, quite a contrast to the order in our Administration. Their Tuesday lunches were chaos." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, President/HAK Memcons, Memcon—Henry Kissinger, Henry Grunwald, Hugh Sidney, and Jerry Schecter, Jul. 29, 1971)

The procedures outlined below will, I believe, permit us to reach these goals, while avoiding the dangers of compromise and indecision which can result from an excessively formal system.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

A. *The National Security Council.* The National Security Council should be the principal forum for issues requiring interagency coordination, especially where Presidential decisions of a middle and long-range nature are involved. It should meet regularly, and discussion should be limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—at the direction of the President and in consultation with the Secretary of State—should be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared—normally by the responsible departments. The NSC staff should assist by synthesizing and sharply defining the options, and occasionally by providing an independent staff study. To keep the meetings small, only principals should attend (with the possible exception of the Under Secretary of State).

The NSC should consider middle and long-range policy issues as well as current crises and immediate operational problems. By providing a forum for high-level discussion of planning papers, the NSC can insure that senior officials consider the long-range implications of policy choices.

NSC agenda papers should present a wide range of alternative policy options that are politically and administratively feasible, and should avoid the all-too-frequent practice of setting up extreme alternatives as straw men to the one course of action being urged.

The NSC should not be considered the sole forum for Presidential discussion in the National Security field. The President will reserve the option of constituting subcommittees for the expeditious handling of operational matters (with membership especially adapted to the particular issue).

B. *National Security Council Review Group.* An NSC Review Group would examine papers prior to their consideration by the NSC, unless the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President deem it unnecessary. Its role would be to frame the issues to be decided by the NSC, not to achieve a compromise or consensus which hides alternatives. The Group will also assign action to Regional or Ad Hoc groups, as appropriate.

Membership in the Group would vary depending on the issue, but would include:

- the Assistant to the President (Chairman);
- the senior State Department and Defense Department official below the Secretary actively concerned with NSC matters;

- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his representative;
- the Director of the CIA or his representative;
- the Directors (or their representatives) of other agencies such as AID, USIA or ACDA when appropriate.

The Review Group would examine papers prepared for the NSC to be sure that: (1) they are worthy of NSC attention; (2) all the relevant alternatives are included; (3) the facts are accurately presented.

Issues that do not require Cabinet level discussion or Presidential decision will be referred by the NSC Review Committee to the NSC Under Secretary's Committee.

C. *NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary's Committee.* This Committee would be composed of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Director of Central Intelligence (and other agencies where appropriate). It would deal with matters referred to it by the NSC Review Group, including matters on which the IRG's have not been able to agree but which do not involve issues requiring Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion.

D. *Inter-Agency Regional Groups.* The currently existing inter-agency regional groups (IRG's), chaired by the relevant Assistant Secretary of State, should be reconstituted as sub-organs of the NSC. Membership should generally include the agencies represented on the Review Group, depending on the subject being considered. The IRG's should perform three functions: (1) discussion and decision on issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; (2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC, stating alternatives, their costs, and consequences; (3) preparation of potential crises contingency papers for review by the NSC. These papers should discuss what steps can be taken to avoid the crisis, as well as actions planned during the crisis.

Note: The elaborated NSC machinery makes the continued functioning of the existing Senior Inter-Departmental Group unnecessary.

E. *Ad Hoc Working Groups.* Where the problem is not geographic—or is too important to be dealt with from a regional perspective—ad hoc working groups should be used to develop policy alternatives for consideration by the NSC. The make-up of the working group would depend on the subject being studied. In cases where implementation of policy is complicated or controversial, and inter-agency cooperation is required, ad hoc groups might be charged with coordinating operations in support of policy.

F. *Outside Consultants.* The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should establish a roster of consultants who are experts on major issues. When appropriate, these consultants should participate in groups preparing papers for NSC consideration.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE

A. *NSC Memoranda*. Two memoranda series should be established to inform the departments and agencies of Presidential actions. In order to avoid confusion, the current series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) should be abolished and replaced by:

—*National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)*. NSDMs would be used to report Presidential decisions (whether or not the result of NSC meetings) when the President wants the agencies concerned clearly to understand what he desires, and the reasons for his decisions.

—*National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs)*. This series would be used to direct that studies be undertaken of particular problems (normally for NSC consideration).

Existing NSAMs should be examined prior to January 20 and divided into three categories: (1) those which are out of date and should be rescinded; (2) those which should continue in force; (3) those which should be re-examined to determine whether they should be continued. NSAMs in the second category would be primarily annual decision documents which the President would review as a matter of course during his first year. Those in the third category should continue in effect pending completion of the review. A NSDM should be issued on January 21 indicating the status of all existing NSAMs.

B. *Annual Review of the International Situation*. The National Security Council Staff, together with the relevant agencies, should prepare for the President an annual review of the international situation similar to the annual economic message. This report, which would be submitted to the Congress, would permit a more extended discussion of the President's view of the international situation than is possible in the State of the Union Message. The Review would:

—provide a regular framework for defining U.S. security interests and programs to meet those interests;

—give the agencies an opportunity to assure high-level attention to fundamental issues within an overall framework.

The Review would focus on world events over the past year and set forth the President's view of these events and our future goals. The statement would include some of the material which over the past eight years the Secretary of Defense has presented in his Annual Posture Statement to the Congress, but it would not give the details of Defense or other foreign policy budgets. The statement should normally be issued in January.

III. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

The NSC Staff of the Assistant to the President would be divided into three categories: (1) Assistants for Programs; (2) Operations Staff;

(3) Planning Staff. The role of the Staff would be to provide a Presidential perspective in programs, planning and operations. The Staff's job would be to see that the agencies do the initial work, using existing inter-agency mechanisms. Only in exceptional circumstances would the NSC Staff prepare its own papers. The functions of each part of the NSC Staff are described below.

A. *Assistants for Programs* would be responsible for the preparation of studies on the long-range implications of major policy issues (e.g., Vietnam, Middle East settlements, and alternative NATO strategies). They would work with the appropriate Departments to provide the President and the NSC with the relevant information and policy options. After it has been decided that a problem will require one or a series of Presidential decisions, responsibility would be assigned to one of the Assistants for Programs. They would develop a strategy for getting the necessary staff work done, and for bringing the issue to the National Security Council in a timely and orderly fashion.

The Assistants for Programs would be charged with developing a five-year perspective by helping the agencies to: (1) define middle-range goals; (2) propose specific measures to achieve these goals. The responsible Assistant would work with the group considering the issue to insure that all relevant options were kept open. They would also need to work closely with the NSC Operations Staff and Planning Staff if the link between planning and operations is to be maintained.

B. *The Operations Staff* would consist of approximately five Senior Members and a small number of Staff Assistants. Each Senior Staff Member would be responsible for certain geographic regions and/or functional activities. They would follow the day-to-day business of the Departments, and would be responsible for bringing to the attention of the Assistant to the President those matters which are of Presidential concern.

C. *The Planning Staff* would prepare the NSC agenda papers, synthesizing agency papers and necessary back-up and follow-up papers. It would undertake specific studies only when inter-agency studies were unsatisfactory or undesirable. Consultants would be drawn upon to work with the Planning Staff in developing options beyond those developed in the Departments. The Planning Staff would also provide back-up expertise for the Assistants for Programs.

Members of the Planning Staff would also be available to serve as members of inter-agency study groups. Some of the members of the Staff should be experts with particular skills; others should be generalists.

The existence of this Staff and its access to consultants would enable the Assistant to the President and the President to receive preliminary studies on complicated and controversial subjects without

arousing concern within the Departments before the President had decided what options he wanted to explore seriously.

D. *The Military Assistant* would help the Assistant to the President in the development of Staff papers on the full range of military issues, and would be available to provide him with judgments on military questions. He would also assist in monitoring and assembling intelligence materials.

IV. MAJOR POLICY ISSUES

This section lists issues which will require early attention by the NSC, and suggests procedures to be used in developing alternatives.

A. *High Priority Major Policy Issues*. (These are the subjects which will require early, high-level attention and for which alternative policy papers should be available for prompt consideration by the NSC.)

1. *Vietnam*. The NSC Staff should prepare a paper (prior to January 20) listing alternative strategies, both in Vietnam and at Paris. The alternatives should include diplomatic moves and military actions which are mutually supporting. The paper should be sent to the relevant Departments for their examination within two weeks after January 20 to insure that all the relevant alternatives are listed and that the factual assertions are correct.

2. *Middle East*. An ad hoc working group should be asked to develop a paper examining alternative approaches to the Arab-Israeli problem. It should complete its report within one month.

3. *Europe*. European policy will require early consideration for several reasons:

—A number of West European heads of government are almost certain to request early meetings with the President (basic policy should not be made by preparing talking papers for such meetings);

—Negotiations with the Germans on an arrangement to offset the balance of payments costs of our troops in Germany are currently underway. A decision will have to be made at an early date on whether the talks should be continued, and, if so, on what position we should take (these decisions should be taken in the context of an overall policy toward NATO);

—The French have been dropping hints of an interest in improving relations (our reaction to these probes should also be in the context of an overall European policy).

A paper examining these and other problems of European policy should be prepared by the NSC Staff, or by an Ad Hoc Working Group.

4. *International Monetary Policy*. An Ad Hoc Working Group, chaired by the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Policy, and including the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, a representative of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the responsible Assistant for Programs, should be asked to

report to the NSC within two months on the basic issues and alternatives of international monetary reform. The Group should also be charged with overseeing on-going operational matters relating to international monetary affairs.

5. *Strategic Forces.* As discussed with Secretary-designate Laird, the NSC Staff will prepare—prior to January 20—a paper outlining issues and alternative policies regarding strategic forces. The paper should be sent to the relevant agencies for comment prior to review by the NSC.

6. *Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Security Policy.* A high-level inter-agency group should examine the entire range of U.S. security policy. (Since this issue relates intimately to our worldwide posture, it is too crucial to be handled entirely as a Defense Department matter.) The examination should consider U.S. interests, threats to those interests, and alternative security policies. The Working Group should be staffed by the NSC staff, augmented by personnel from relevant agencies. The Group should report to the NSC within six months following the inauguration.

7. *Contingency Planning.* An Ad Hoc Working Group should be established after January 20 to review existing inter-agency plans and procedures for contingency planning on possible major trouble spots (Berlin and the Middle East are especially crucial). The Group should pay particular attention to the political impact of proposed military moves, and the orchestration of political and military measures.

8. *Japan.* A number of issues in U.S.-Japanese relations will arise during the next twelve months, and the Japanese Prime Minister is likely to request a meeting in the fall. Therefore, an Ad Hoc Working Group should be set up to examine the full range of U.S.-Japanese relations (including the issue of the reversion of Okinawa, the future of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, U.S. bases in Japan, and U.S.-Japanese economic relations).

9. *AID Review.* What is needed at this time is not a major research effort,⁶ but rather a concise, hard-headed consideration of issues (particularly the relationship between economic and political development) and options. The task could be assigned to a small nongovernmental group, or to an interagency Ad Hoc Working Group.

V. PROGRAM BUDGETING

Today, decisions on U.S. economic assistance, military assistance, and U.S. troop levels in a given country are made separately—often in

⁶ A Presidential Commission, chaired by James Perkins, has just completed a report based on a year's study. [Footnote in source text. Regarding this report, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities, Documents 79 and 145.]

ignorance of what other agencies are doing in the country, and without regard to their impact on our political and diplomatic posture. This makes it impossible to relate budget choices to policy issues.

A series of program budgeting studies should be prepared on major countries where important policy differences exist and we have programs involving large resource transfers. These studies will permit the NSC to examine at one time our overall policy objectives and our budget choices as they relate to key countries or regions.

A small, permanent inter-agency staff, manned by personnel seconded from the relevant agencies but under the NSC, should be created to do these studies. The staff should have overall responsibility for their preparation and should provide technical advice on each. The studies should be performed by Ad Hoc Groups made up of program budgeting experts from the permanent staff and country specialists from the relevant agencies. The results of the studies should provide a basis for policy judgments, as well as for possible reallocation of funds within the proposed FY-70 Budget and/or requests for supplemental funds.

(A country program budget study on Korea is currently being produced by an inter-agency committee. The NSC should consider this study at an early date as a pilot project. Program budgeting studies might be requested, in addition, for Taiwan, Thailand, Greece, Brazil and Ethiopia. This will get at least one study underway in each geographic region. Other countries can be added to the list at a later date.)

Henry A. Kissinger

2. Editorial Note

In his memoir, *The Right Hand of Power*, pages 513–514, U. Alexis Johnson, who stepped down as Ambassador to Japan in mid-January 1969 to become Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Nixon, recalled meeting Henry Kissinger at the Hotel Pierre in New York City on the evening of January 5, 1969. Although the meeting lasted only about 15 minutes, “that was long enough for me to see that some rough roads lay ahead. Henry outlined his thoughts for wiping out the SIG–IRG interdepartmental system General Taylor and I had developed in 1966 that gave State broad responsibility for directing the interdepartmental work of the government in foreign affairs. Henry intended to establish a system centered on the National Security Council staff with himself as head. I had only two minutes to ex-

postulate with Henry. As I was going down the elevator to get a cab to the airport, I tried to brief Rogers and Richardson on the important bureaucratic theology involved in the SIG-IRG as far as State was concerned—an area with which, of course, they were entirely unfamiliar. I brooded about this on my flight back, and as soon as I arrived in Tokyo I sent a long back channel message to Richardson trying to explicate the issues involved and urging that he and the Secretary mount the ramparts before January 20 against the Kissinger/NSC takeover of State's interdepartmental functions." Johnson's back channel message to Richardson has not been found. The establishment of the SIG-IRG system in 1966 and its operation through the close of 1968 are documented in *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations. For Johnson's role in establishing the system, see Document 48.

3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to President-Elect Nixon¹

January 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures

The State Department has now begun to object to the NSC procedures which you approved in Florida. (Bill Rogers had agreed to the general outline in Key Biscayne, but now—in light of the objections of his Foreign Service subordinates—wants to reserve judgment. Mel Laird agrees with the memo I showed you—with one minor caveat.)

General Goodpaster and I will be discussing State's objections with you, but I thought you might want a brief summary of the arguments for a State-centered system (Tab A) and the counter-arguments which led Andy and me to recommend the system which you approved (Tab B).

A delay in establishing the new NSC structure will mean a concomitant delay in getting down to business on the many serious foreign policy issues you will have to face in the opening months of your

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1. Secret.

administration. It would not be helpful to begin the Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement—particularly since it would be over an issue you had already decided at Key Biscayne.

Tab A

The Case for a State-Centered System

The Foreign Service arguments are as follows:

—The existing SIG/IRG mechanism makes the State Department the executive agent of the President for the conduct of foreign policy. This would be destroyed by instituting an NSC system such as you approved.

—The interdepartmental machinery should be staffed by the State Department. The leadership in defining the issues, formulating them, and bringing them to the attention of the President should be taken by the State Department. The committees do not vote; the State Department decides, with other departments having the right to take disagreements to the NSC.

—There is an organization in being (the Department of State) staffed with experienced personnel, with geographical and functional structures established to cover the various areas and issues which arise in the conduct of foreign relations.

—If the Secretary is to pull together foreign policy positions, he must have authority not only over the State Department, but over other Departments as well. He, through the Under Secretary, and the other Departments through their Under Secretaries, must review papers on their way to the NSC to see that all options are adequately examined. The NSC should act primarily as an appeal board when Departments disagree.

—To the extent that there are limits to State's ability to provide a Presidential perspective, NSC staff members can participate in SIG/IRG mechanisms without prejudice to the State Department's power of decision.

—Our Ambassadors are expected to coordinate policy and operations abroad. (Indeed, there is no realistic way to create another system overseas.) Since the Ambassadors usually report directly to the State Department, it is essential that the Department be similarly organized.

—The Foreign Service does not serve the State Department, but the United States and is, in a real sense, the President's staff—avoiding the parochialism often seen elsewhere. To the degree that State is parochial, this can be overcome as Department officers are forced to work with other Departments in the SIG and IRGs.

Tab B

Counter-Arguments

I. The State Department is unable to take the lead in managing interagency affairs because:

—The staff is inadequate to the task of planning or of management.

—The Foreign Service, by training and background, is not capable of the planning you want. Their forte is in compromising differences, and avoiding a confrontation of conflicting points of view.

—Evidence of this is the Department's consistent failure to utilize its own Policy Planning Council adequately. Studies have been unrelated to real problems, have had no effect on policy, and have obfuscated rather than clarified alternatives.

—An attempt by State to dominate the other agencies would, over time, make it the direct focus of Congressional attack, thus weakening its position on the Hill.

—Senior officers within the Department must, to some degree, become the advocates of their subordinates. As they do so, they represent parochial interests.

—The parochial interests of State and the Foreign Service are not removed by simply describing themselves as the President's men.

—When the State Department has attempted to manage operations—as in Vietnam—it has not worked and has had to be changed.

II. Protecting the President's interests.

—The only way the President can ensure that all options are examined, and all the arguments fairly presented, is to have his own people—responsive to him, accustomed to his style, and with a Presidential rather than departmental perspective—oversee the preparation of papers.

—If the President wants to control policy, he must control the policy making machinery.

III. The present system permits an adequate role for the State Department.

—Issues may be raised in the interdepartmental groups, under the chairmanship of the relevant Assistant Secretary.

—State is represented on the NSC Review Group.

—Issues may be sent from the Review Group to the Under Secretary's committee (chaired by the Under Secretary of State) when they do not involve Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion.

—The proposed system gives State a larger role than it had under John Foster Dulles. It can make of the system what it wants.

Attachment²

January 6, 1969.

NSAM 341

Following are highlights of NSAM 341:³

—Reaffirms the Secretary of State's "authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas." (Military forces operating in the field are specifically excluded from such activities.)

—Creates the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), chaired by the Under Secretary of State, "to assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibility for interdepartmental matters which cannot be dealt with adequately at lower levels . . ."⁴

—Creates Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG) for each geographical region of the Department of State, under the chairmanship of the relevant Assistant Secretary of State.⁵

—The SIG and the IRGs are given "full powers of decision on all matters within their purview, unless a member who does not concur requests the referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority."

From the point of view of the Department of State, the most important aspect of NSAM 341 is its reaffirmation of the Secretary of State's position as *primus inter pares* on matters relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. The SIG/IRG system is looked upon as an important tool in carrying out this responsibility, but the delegation of responsibility itself is the essential ingredient of NSAM 341.

² No classification marking.

³ For text of NSAM No. 341, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

⁴ Membership: Under Secretary of State, Executive Chairman; Deputy Secretary of Defense; Administrator of the Agency for International Development; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of the US Information Agency; and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (Other agencies may be invited by the Chairman.) [Footnote and ellipses in the source text.]

⁵ Membership: the regional Assistant Secretary of State, Executive Chairman; and a designated representative from Defense, AID, CIA, JCS, USIA and the White House or NSC staff. (Other agencies may be invited by the Chairman.) [Footnote in the source text.]

4. Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State-Designate (Richardson)¹

Undated.

The suggested changes incorporated in the attached revisions of the Proposal for a New National Security Council System² are predicated upon the following considerations:

1. That the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the NSC perform an indispensable function on behalf of the President of the United States in assuring that those national security policy issues which require his attention and decision are identified and brought up for action;

2. That the Secretary of State is the primary adviser to the President on foreign affairs and is responsible to him for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas;

3. That there is no inherent incompatibility between the function of the Special Assistant and the NSC in policy development and control and the Secretary of State's responsibilities in the field of foreign policy;

4. That the arrangements described in the attached Proposal, which will in due course become embodied in a new restatement of NSC-State Department relationships, must be viewed against the background of a long history of efforts to define these relationships effectively; and

5. That the necessarily wide dissemination of any such restatement must therefore be considered in the context of its impact on institutional attitudes and morale as well as public comment and interpretation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. No classification marking. The paper is not typed on letterhead and includes no information about authorship other than the following handwritten note at the top of the first page by Kissinger: "Richardson—memo." The first page of the paper, which ends with paragraph 5, was typed in black ink and double-spaced, while the attachment was typed in blue ink and single-spaced. The 4 pages of the attachment are numbered 3 through 6; pages 1 and 2 in the same format have not been found but they presumably consisted of the opening sections of Kissinger's December 27 memorandum (attachment to Document 1) up to the last paragraph of "Eisenhower Procedures." For Nixon's reaction to Richardson's paper see Document 8.

² Document 1.

Attachment³

Undated.

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I. NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

A. *The National Security Council.* The National Security Council should be the principal forum for national security policy issues requiring inter-agency coordination where Presidential decisions are involved. It should meet regularly, and discussion should be limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—at the direction of the President and in consultation with the Secretary of State—should be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared—normally by the responsible departments. The NSC staff should assist by synthesizing and sharply defining the options, and occasionally by providing an independent staff study. To keep the meetings small, only principals should attend (with the possible exception of the Under Secretary of State).

The NSC should consider middle and long-range policy issues as well as aspects of current crises and immediate operational problems involving the national security. By providing a forum for high-level discussion of planning papers, the NSC can insure that senior officials consider the long-range implications of policy choices.

NSC agenda papers should present a wide range of alternative policy options that are politically and administratively feasible, and should avoid the all-too-frequent practice of setting up extreme alternatives as straw men to the one course of action being urged.

The NSC should not be considered the sole forum for Presidential discussion in the National Security field. The President will reserve the option of constituting subcommittees for the expeditious handling of operational matters (with membership especially adapted to the particular issue).

B. *Department of State.* The Secretary of State should be the principal adviser to the President in the conduct of foreign policy. The Department of State has principal responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.

³ Secret; Eyes only.

C. *National Security Council Agenda.* The Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President should, in advance of NSC meetings, discuss subjects proposed for NSC discussion to be sure that they are appropriate for NSC consideration and, if so, that they are so framed as to sharpen the issues to be decided, not to achieve a compromise or consensus which hides alternatives. In the case of an issue not regarded by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President as requiring Presidential decision, they could indicate the agency or forum appropriate for its consideration.

Papers prepared for the NSC would be reviewed by NSC staff to be sure that: (1) they are worthy of NSC attention; (2) all the relevant alternatives are included; (3) the facts are accurately presented. They should also be made available in advance of NSC meetings to agencies represented on the NSC.

D. *Under Secretary's Committee.* The Committee would be composed of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (and other agencies where appropriate). It would deal with matters on which the Interagency Regional Groups (see below) have not been able to agree but which do not require Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion as well as with matters referred to it by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President.

E. *Inter-Agency Regional Groups.* The currently existing interagency regional groups (IRG's), chaired by the relevant Assistant Secretary of State, should perform three functions: (1) discussion and decision on issues which appear capable of settlement at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; (2) preparation at the direction of the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President of policy papers for consideration by the NSC, stating alternatives, their costs, and consequences; (3) preparation, also as so directed, of potential crises contingency papers for review by the NSC. These papers should discuss what steps can be taken to avoid the crisis, as well as actions planned during the crisis.

F. *Ad Hoc Working Groups.* Where the problem is not geographic—or is too important to be dealt with from a regional perspective—ad hoc working groups should, consistently with paragraphs B and C above, be used to develop policy alternatives for consideration by the NSC. The make-up of the working group would depend on the subject being studied.

G. *Outside Consultants.* The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should establish a roster of consultants who are experts on major issues. When appropriate, these consultants should participate in groups preparing papers for NSC consideration.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE

A. *NSC Memoranda*. Two memoranda series should be established to inform the departments and agencies of Presidential actions. In order to avoid confusion, the current series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) should be abolished and replaced by:

—*National Security Decision Memoranda* (NSDMs). NSDMs would be used to report Presidential decisions (whether or not the result of NSC meetings) when the President wants the agencies concerned clearly to understand what he desires, and the reasons for his decision.

—*National Security Study Memoranda* (NSSMs). This series would be used to direct that studies be undertaken of particular problems (normally for NSC consideration).

Existing NSAMs should be examined prior to January 20 and divided into three categories: (1) those which are out of date and should be rescinded; (2) those which should continue in force; (3) those which should be re-examined to determine whether they should be continued. NSAMs in the second category would be primarily annual decision documents which the President would review as a matter of course during his first year. Those in the third category should continue in effect pending completion of the review. A NSDM should be issued as soon as possible after January 20, following review by the NSC, indicating the status of all existing NSAMs.

B. *Annual Review of the International Situation*. The National Security Council Staff, together with the relevant agencies, should prepare for the President an annual review of the international situation similar to the annual economic message. This report, which would be submitted to the Congress, would permit a more extended discussion of the President's view of the international situation than is possible in the State of the Union Message. The Review would:

—provide a regular framework for defining U.S. security interests and programs to meet those interests;

—give the agencies an opportunity to assure high-level attention to fundamental issues within an overall framework.

The Review would focus on world events over the past year and set forth the President's view of these events and our future goals. The statement would include some of the material which over the past eight years the Secretary of Defense has presented in his Annual Posture Statement to the Congress, but it would not give the details of Defense or other foreign policy budgets. The statement should normally be issued in January.

5. Memorandum From the Military Assistant-Designate (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)¹

January 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Processing of Information and Intelligence for the President-Elect

Within the limited time available and the restrictions imposed by a temporary lack of access, I have reviewed the information system currently employed to keep the President and the Special Assistant abreast of the current worldwide situation.² Summarized below are the principal impressions gained from this review:

—Information and intelligence are now fed to the Special Assistant and the President on an “as available” basis, depending on the degree of urgency of the information and the time at which it arrives at the White House Situation Room. Under the current system, the President receives his initial daily briefing in writing. At 6:30 a.m. each morning, he receives the printed CIA Daily Brief, the CIA printed update on the situation in North Viet-Nam, the printed Morning Staff Summary and the printed Joint NMCC–DIA Operational Intelligence Brief. There has been *no* formal briefing as such. The President also receives each evening the printed State Evening Summary and, when prepared, the State Department Daily Activities Report. All other informational material is furnished during the day as required and as dictated by its degree of urgency. Normally, information is provided by Mr. McCafferty to the Special Assistant with or without covering memo. The Special Assistant in turn forwards it to the President. The nature of the information provided through this system is varied and is both refined and raw. Material received in the White House Situation Room includes (a) cables from all sources (6–700 per day), (b) hard copies of Departmental messages (12–1500 per day), and (c) an average of 5 NODIS messages and 25 EXDIS messages per day. A variety of other informational data including press reports written with each memoranda and reports are also forwarded. Mr. McCafferty and his staff sort out all source material for the Special Assistant which they

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969. Confidential; Eyes Only.

² Haig recounted his hiring and first months as Kissinger's Military Assistant in his memoir, *Inner Circles*, pp. 189–202. Roger Morris, an NSC staff member at the time, discussed the same subjects at greater length in his biography, *Haig: The General's Progress* (New York: Playboy Press, 1982), pp. 97–105 and 112–117.

feel would be of interest to either the President or the Special Assistant. Where additional information is required, Mr. McCafferty's staff initiates the action to obtain this from the reporting agency. When required, covering memoranda are prepared. During crisis situations information is channeled directly to the President with copies to the Special Assistant. Specifically, the White House Situation Room and its staff function to support the Special Assistant and the President. (I have been informed that on occasion data required by substantive NSC staff officers has not been available and some refinements may be called for in this area.)

—The system employed by the President-Elect should be totally responsive to his personal requirements and tailored to his personal schedule. Due to the heavy flow of vital information, I believe the President should receive both written and, at least initially, oral information and briefings. I also believe that where possible, *all* information provided to the President should be channeled through the Assistant to the President except during non-business hours when anything provided to the President should be provided simultaneously to the Assistant to the President. (You may wish to insist that clearance be obtained from you prior to the relay of off duty emergency information to the President. This is a problem which should be discussed with the President's Military Aide and the President.) Because reading is an essential part of his informational flow, I would recommend that we retain a reading package to be made available to the President as he desires at the earliest time each morning. This should be followed later in the morning by a briefing presented by you which would be designed primarily to comment on and interpret the reports which he has received, supplemented by any other informational data which has crystallized over the period. Obviously, this briefing will be both informational and operational in the sense that you should comment on key events over the preceding period but also discuss actions which have or should be triggered by these events. In sum, your briefing will undoubtedly become a business session introduced by a summary of key events. I would anticipate preparing notes for your use at these daily meetings. Also on occasion you may wish to be accompanied by Mr. McCafferty or other experts together with illustrative material when the situation dictates.

—It is apparent that the system devised for the President-Elect should include consideration of the role that the Military Aide will play in the processing of information. Under President Johnson, Military Aides have been isolated from substantive information and emergency notification to a large extent. I do not believe that Mr. Nixon will continue with this system and will expect Colonel Hughes to be generally cognizant of the run of current information. Consequently, I would suggest that the system adopted be coordinated with the Military Aide to insure that his needs will be met at the outset so as to preclude ad

hoc adjustments which might work to our disadvantage. Hopefully, his access to certain written information will suffice.

—I would propose few changes in the White House Situation Room initially and would continue to exercise Mr. McCafferty's current system. Except as noted above, I should be included in the information distribution system prior to the time that it reaches your desk with the assurance that delays will not occur and with the assurance that in my absence, the material will go straight to your desk or in an emergency situation directly to the President. In order to make this system most effective, I should be located in the West Wing, either through the construction of a small office in the main reception room or the occupation of the room which is now occupied by Mr. Schwartz.

—Keeping the President informed will be one of the most pressing responsibilities of the Assistant to the President, and the system established initially will unquestionably be modified with experience and as the President's wishes and modus operandi become clearer. Of major concern in this area is the requirement to prevent being "scooped" by the Departments and members of the Cabinet. Timely information invariably results in substantive reactions and the Assistant to the President must be the primary point of contact with the President. Since, in this sense, information is power, the Departments will undoubtedly attempt to hold back information and intelligence from the Situation Room in an effort to strengthen the hand of their Secretary. Movement in this direction will take the form of legitimate efforts to "restore the authority of the Departments in the interest of required decentralization." These efforts cannot be tolerated and will require firm handling at the outset of this Administration. Related to this phenomena will be efforts to screen out at Departmental level so called "raw" information and intelligence. This can be expected from CIA and the intelligence community at large. It is essential that multisource reports and estimates continue to be furnished to the NSC so that you will be fully aware of divergencies in this critical area and so that you can be the President's broker when conflicting estimates exist.

A.M. Haig, Jr.³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

6. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense-Designate Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)¹

January 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Memorandum dated January 3, 1969 concerning a New NSC System²

I have read and re-read your proposal many times and have tried to relate it to the discussions we had in Key Biscayne on proposed changes in the National Security Council System.³ After much study and considerable reflection on the draft proposal, I am forced reluctantly to conclude that as Secretary of Defense-designate, I cannot fully approve the proposal in its present form.

This decision was reached for several major reasons, among which I would list the following:

First, it would institute as presently drafted, a “closed loop” in which all intelligence inputs would be channeled through a single source, the Assistant and his NSC staff. Such an arrangement in effect would or could isolate not only the President from direct access to intelligence community outputs but also the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other top-level members of the President's team.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 1, Sec. Laird. Secret. A draft of the memorandum that has extensive handwritten notations, most of them additions in Laird's hand that were incorporated in the final version, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 75 104, Secretary Laird's “Organization Papers.” Several pages of handwritten notes in an unidentified hand are *ibid.* One note states: “Two Choices: 1) Send memo to Henry outlining in detail why this is totally unacceptable. 2) No memo—instead go to Bill Rogers & explain situation—I go to Bryce [Harlow] at same time—then you & Bill & Bryce see Pres., suggest he call in Asst & tell him that NSC staff is independent, to be used & responsive to State, Def, & Asst—not solely to Asst. 2) that Asst be responsive to Pres & his Bd of Directors, not a substitute for or a buffer between them & him.”

² Kissinger sent Laird a copy, with one revision, of his December 27 memorandum to Nixon (Document 1), under cover of a January 3 memorandum in which he indicated that it had been discussed with Rogers and Goodpaster and approved by Nixon. The one revision was in the membership of the Under Secretary's Committee, adding the Assistant to the President and omitting the Director of Central Intelligence. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 75 104, Secretary Laird's “Organization Papers”) Another copy of Kissinger's December 27 memorandum with marginal notations in an unidentified hand is *ibid.*

³ See footnote 1, Document 1.

I have found in my past dealings with the intelligence community and DOD officials, for example, that it is not a good practice to interpose a third party, no matter how capable and objective, between the man responsible for intelligence information and those who must take responsibility for acting upon it. A method must be provided to correct this deficiency.

Second, it would place in the hands of the Assistant and his NSC staff the primary right of initiating studies and directing where they will be performed as well as determining which policy issues should be placed on the agenda for NSC meetings. There should be some consultation provided for with the principals in establishing the priorities of these studies. It would also give the Assistant both the power and the responsibility for implementing NSC policy as well as the right of determination of issues arising from the implementation of those policies without requiring consultation or even notification of NSC principals. This could very well result in principals going around the NSC and directly to the President as a regular practice. This would negate what I believe the President-elect is trying to accomplish.⁴ The principals who make up the National Security Council, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, should be able to place policy issues on the agenda subject only to the veto of the President.

Third, it is my desire, as I know it is yours, to strengthen and revitalize the National Security Council as a major Presidential tool in determining National Security policy. But in my view, this cannot be accomplished by aggregating to the NSC and through it to the Assistant to the President the major tools that have always been intended to be utilized equally by all of the President's top-level board of advisers in the National Security field.

These three points constitute several of the major reasons why I find it necessary to raise these serious questions about the proposed New NSC System, as outlined in your draft of January 3rd. In our conversation today and in my conversation yesterday with General Goodpaster it was made clear that the above comments were in line with your understanding of how the NSC would operate. I do feel, however, that the memo creating the new system should formally spell out these important points.

Needless to say, I look forward to a period of sustained mutual cooperation between the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the principal advisers to the President in this vital area. I am sure that in further consultations among all of the principal

⁴ Written in hand in the margin beside the previous three sentences is "How?"

advisers, we will arrive at a mutually satisfactory New NSC System. This, I think, is most important.⁵

Melvin R. Laird

⁵ Kissinger discussed Laird's memorandum in *White House Years*, pp. 44–45, commenting that while Laird threw up a smoke screen of major objections, as was his style, "it turned out that he sought no more than the participation of the CIA Director at NSC meetings and the right to propose the initiation of studies. These requests were easily accommodated."

**7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger) to
President-Elect Nixon¹**

January 10, 1969.

SUBJECT

Additional Provisions Concerning the Conduct of National Security Affairs

1. Through further discussions on organization and procedures for National Security Affairs, Secretary-designate Rogers and I have worked out the proposed provisions which follow. I believe they are consistent with your determination to restore and revitalize the NSC structure, and with the overall plan of organization and method of operating you wish to employ. I recommend that you approve them.

2. In general, the arrangements seek to provide a means by which Presidential leadership and broad perspective will be applied in the guiding, shaping, and policy direction of security affairs, while a maximum of operating responsibility for operational activities—responsive to policy and conforming to its guidelines—will be exercised at departmental and interdepartmental levels.

3. The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy adviser. He is responsible, in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy, for foreign policy decisions not requiring specific Presidential supervision, to the full extent permitted by

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 2, Memo for President-Elect. Secret. The memorandum is marked in hand at the top: "Never sent."

law, of interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas. (Military forces operating in the field are specifically excluded from such activities.)

4. The determination whether to treat a security matter as a “policy” question or an “operational” question should be made by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State in consultation, insofar as interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas are concerned.

5. The Secretary of State should have authority and responsibility to refer operational questions involving interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas, not settled through discussion and decision in the IRGs, for timely consideration by the Under Secretaries Committee.

6. The NSC Review Group will function as a planning board in the final preparation of policy papers to be considered by the NSC. The Group will receive papers directly from the IRGs, from Departments, from ad hoc groups, or, on occasion, from other sources.

8. Memorandum From President-Elect Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)¹

January 13, 1969.

I have considered the paper furnished by Elliott Richardson,² as well as the documents you have provided me at Key Biscayne and here³ to implement my plan for national security organization and operations.

I do not accept the changes proposed in the paper of Elliott Richardson, other than those reflected in the implementing documents you have submitted, which I have today approved and initialed.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1. Confidential.

² Document 4.

³ See Document 1.

⁴ Attached but not printed are NSDMs 1, 2, 3, and 4, all dated January 11 and initialed by Nixon. All four were issued on January 20 (Documents 10, 11, 12, and 13). NSDM 1 was issued with identical wording while NSDMs 2-4 were issued with revisions. The revisions made in NSDMs 2 and 3 are noted on the attached NSDMs.

Please inform all concerned that I adhere to my plan as previously provided and as set forth in the implementing documents; that this is my firm and definite decision and that I want all necessary preparatory action taken immediately to put this organization and system into effect on January 20.

9. Memorandum From Colonel Robert E. Pursley to Secretary of Defense Designate Laird¹

January 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Proposal for a New National Security Council System

I delivered a set of the papers on the New National Security Council System² to General Wheeler this morning, Monday, January 20. I indicated discussions on the papers could be held as early as Tuesday morning, January 21. If I may, I should like to offer a few observations. My notes are keyed to the outline of Mr. Kissinger's memorandum.³

Current Practice. The procedures which have been followed during the past three years (as long as I have been with the Secretary of Defense) are accurately described. I would emphasize, though, the drawbacks inherent in not being able to prepare adequately for the top-level discussions. Sometimes the Secretary of Defense was provided 3–4 hours before the Tuesday Luncheon meeting with a list of topics proposed for discussion. While that interval allowed some time for staff work and consultations inside the Department, it almost invariably allowed *too little time* for thorough staff work and frequently allowed *no time* for the Secretary to review papers or to consult his staff prior to leaving for the meeting. The impact of such procedures on the quality of discussions is obvious.

The lack of systematic follow-up to the Tuesday Luncheon meetings is also accurately described in Mr. Kissinger's paper. The hazards in this regard went beyond just keeping the various Departments and staffs informed on any single action or issue. All too frequently, actions

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 75 104, Secretary Laird's "Organization Papers." Secret; Eyes Only.

² Not further identified.

³ Document 1.

on one issue carried potential impacts on other issues. The absence of formal decision documents made it easy (or convenient) to forget earlier actions approval. Conflicting guidance or policies could—and, in my judgment, did—result.

Eisenhower Procedures. The Kissinger memorandum appropriately suggests the present task is to institute procedures which will provide the President and his top advisers with:

- all* the realistic alternatives (emphasis supplied).
- the costs and benefits of each.
- the views and recommendations of *all* interested agencies (emphasis supplied).

These goals are sound. However, as you suggest in your memorandum,⁴ the procedures Mr. Kissinger outlines, allowing his planning staff to *prepare* and *synthesize* NSC papers, seem to contradict—or potentially conflict with—the stated goals. A more “open” system allowing for inputs and review by the Cabinet staffs concerned with national security issues is desirable.

National Security Structure. The *proposed agenda* for the NSC meetings should be subject to the review of the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Secretary of State. The Secretary of Defense could, and should, incorporate the inputs from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter point may seem obvious and trivial, but it is important. It has been customary in the past for the Joint Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to have direct lines of communication on some important matters. It is preferable, in my judgment, to establish at the outset that Mr. Kissinger’s channels—and his staff’s channels to any and all DoD components—will be through the Secretary of Defense.

It is not clear to me why it would be necessary to have both (1) the *National Security Council Review Group* and (2) the *NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary’s Committee*. To preclude a “closed loop,” as you call it, under the direction of the Assistant to the President—a system which could find the White House staff directing, or working at cross-purposes with the Cabinet level staffs (State and Defense)—it might be advisable to *combine* the National Security Council Review Group and the Ad Hoc Under Secretary’s Committee into one Committee (the membership appears to be about the same, anyway). This one committee could operate under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State, much as the “Non Group” has operated in the Johnson Administration.

⁴ Document 6.

Membership on this committee could usefully include the top member of the White House, State Department, and Defense Department Public Affairs staffs. In the more formal system proposed for dealing with national security affairs, more papers will be prepared, more people will be informed (and rightly so)—but the chances of “leaks” will increase exponentially. It will be important, I believe, to have a position prepared for public presentation to forestall the potentially adverse impact of such leaks. Even aside from the “leaks” problem, there is much to be gained from having a well-developed, coordinated, and forthright public affairs posture. The alternative is the possible reinstatement of credibility gap charges. Including the key public affairs officials at the working level below the NSC could make a positive contribution in effecting policy decisions, as well as serving as insurance against the deleterious effects of wrong or slanted information.

National Security Procedure. The proposed institution of (1) *National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)* and (2) *National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs)* is sound. I would suggest the *addition* of a variation in each case, however. To insure continuity in the decision process and to avoid conflicting policy decisions, I believe a periodic Summary of NSDMs would be useful. The summaries, or inventory, could be done by functional areas. Also, I believe a periodic Status Memorandum of NSSMs, something akin to a “tickler file,” would be useful. The latter would call attention to areas in which action was lagging or in which the opportunity for new direction might be advisable.

National Security Council Staff. The organizational planning for the NSC staff infers uncertainty about (1) whether the main idea will be to use the existing State and Defense staffs to prepare studies and follow the day-to-day actions required to implement policies or (2) whether the White House staff will attempt to duplicate the Cabinet level staff work. There appears to be a tendency to the latter. I would see substantial room for confusion, suspicion, and disorder with a system of coordinate staffs along such lines. I believe the preferred system is one of a small White House staff which leaves the State and Defense staffs the detailed and substantive work.

Major Policy Issues. In addition to the Major Policy issues listed for early attention by the NSC, the following might deserve consideration:

—*Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union*—or even talks ranging beyond the strategic arms area.

—*Non-Proliferation Treaty*—whether we press for immediate U.S. ratification and what pressures, if any, we use on reluctant allies and friends to sign the treaty.

—*Latin America*—what our arms policy and role vis-à-vis insurgencies should be.

—*Selective Service Reform*—what changes should be made in the draft system now and/or after the Southeast Asia conflict is resolved.

—*Termination Day (T-Day) Planning*—what military, political, and economic plans should we be making for phasing down the Southeast Asia conflict.

A Final—and Minor—Point. In numbering NSDMs, it would seem more logical to me to have the NSDM, which establishes the NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series, numbered 1. It presently carries the number 3.

Robert E. Pursley⁵
Colonel, USAF

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

10. National Security Decision Memorandum 1¹

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series

At the direction of the President, the following two memoranda series are hereby established to inform the Departments and Agencies of Presidential action:

—*National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM)*. This series shall be used to report Presidential decisions (whether the result of NSC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 1. Confidential.

meetings or appropriate consultation with the Department head concerned).²

—*National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM)*. This series shall be used to direct that studies be undertaken (normally for NSC consideration).³

The National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) series is hereby abolished. An NSDM to be issued shortly will describe the status of existing NSAMs.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

² Copies of NSDM 1 through NSDM 264 (August 6, 1974) are *ibid.*, Boxes H-208–H-248. Copies of NSDM 1 through NSDM 348 (January 20, 1977) are *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83D305.

³ Copies of NSSM 1 through NSSM 206 (July 29, 1974) are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda. Copies of NSSM 1 through NSSM 248 (November 13, 1976) and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, are in *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83D212, and copies of NSSM 1 through NSSM 200 are also in *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-122–H-207, National Security Study Memoranda.

⁴ In NSDM 5, February 3, the President listed 30 NSAMs that would continue in force until further notice, specified a review process for 40 other NSAMs, and directed that all other NSAMs “be considered inactive as of this date.” (*Ibid.*, Box H-209)

11. National Security Decision Memorandum 2¹

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 363, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential. A January 13 memorandum from Pedersen to Rogers proposing revisions in NSDMs 2 and 3, together with typed drafts of the NSDMs with handwritten revisions, are *ibid.*, RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, NSC.

SUBJECT

Reorganization of the National Security Council System

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be reorganized as follows:

A. The National Security Council (NSC)

The functions, membership and responsibilities of the National Security Council shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The National Security Council shall be the² principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The nature of the issues to be considered may range from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning.

The Council shall meet regularly, and discussion will—except in unusual circumstances—be limited to agenda subjects.³ The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council Staff, as provided by law.

B. The National Security Council Review Group

An NSC Review Group is hereby established to examine papers prior to their submission to the NSC. These papers may be received from NSC Interdepartmental Groups,⁴ from NSC Ad Hoc Groups,⁵ or from Departments (at their discretion).

The role of the Review Group shall be to review papers to be discussed by the NSC to assure that: 1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention; 2) all realistic alternatives are presented; 3) the facts, including cost implications, and all department and agency views are fairly and adequately set out. The Review Group shall also be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.

² NSDM 2 as approved by Nixon on January 11 (see Document 8) stated that the NSC shall be “a” principal forum, not “the” principal forum.

³ The Director of Central Intelligence will brief the NSC on each agenda item prior to its consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ Discussed below. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ Discussed below. [Footnote in the source text.]

The membership of the Review Group shall include:⁶

- The Ambassador to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman);
- The representative of the Secretary of State;
- The representative of the Secretary of Defense;
- The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence;
- The representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

C. The National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee shall consider:

1. Issues which are referred to it by the NSC Review Group.
2. Matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas:

—which are of an operational nature⁷ (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question); *and*

—on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach agreement, or which are of a broader nature than is suitable to any such groups; *and*

—which do not require consideration at Presidential or NSC level; *and*

—which are then referred to it by the Secretary of State.

The results of NSC Under Secretaries Committee consideration of the matters listed in 2. above, will be submitted to the Secretary of State.

3. Other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The membership of the Under Secretaries Committee shall include:

- The Under Secretary of State (Chairman);
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- The Director of Central Intelligence;
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

⁶ NSDM 2 as approved by Nixon on January 11 (see Document 8) did not include the words “The representative of” for any members.

⁷ Determination shall be made jointly by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]

D. National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups

Existing Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the existing Political-Military Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State, are hereby reconstituted as part of the National Security Council structure. The Interdepartmental Groups shall perform the following functions: 1) discussion and decision on interdepartmental issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; 2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; 3) preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC.

The membership of the interdepartmental regional groups shall include the agencies represented on the NSC Review Group. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.⁸

E. National Security Council Ad Hoc Groups

When appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend regional boundaries.

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary over personnel from his Department serving on interdepartmental committees—including the authority to give necessary guidance to his representatives in the performance of interdepartmental group duties—is not limited by this NSDM. Nor does this NSDM limit the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State for those interdepartmental matters assigned to him by NSDM 3.⁹

Copies of reports of the interdepartmental groups shall be transmitted to the heads of Departments and Agencies simultaneously with their submission to the NSC Review Group.

NSAM 341 is hereby rescinded.¹⁰

Richard Nixon

⁸ Committee Data Sheets, prepared annually for each IG, which provide information on membership and meeting frequency, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Interagency Committee Files: Lot 76 D 185, Committee Lists.

⁹ Document 12.

¹⁰ See Document 3 and footnote 3 thereto.

12. National Security Decision Memorandum 3¹

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the US Information Agency
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas

The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy adviser. He is also responsible, in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy. I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law² for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. Such activities do not include those of the United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander, such other military activities as I elect as Commander-in-Chief to conduct through military channels, and activities which are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall US overseas program in a country or region.

In discharging this authority and responsibility, the Secretary of State will be assisted by the NSC Interdepartmental Groups and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, as constituted in NSDM 2³ and in accordance with the procedures set forth therein.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 3. Confidential.

² Including continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance and sales programs, as provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ Document 11.

Within the purview of this NSDM, the Secretary of State may delegate full powers of decision to the Under Secretary of State, as Executive Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, subject to the right of a member who does not concur to request the referral of a matter to the NSC Review Committee or to the NSC.⁴

Richard Nixon

⁴ NSDM 2 as approved by Nixon on January 11 (see Document 8) did not include this paragraph. On January 28, following a telephone conversation between Rogers and Kissinger regarding the paragraph, Pedersen sent Kissinger substitute wording which Pedersen anticipated would be issued to recipients of NSDM 3 under a covering memorandum explaining that it replaced "incorrect text" that was "inadvertently issued." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 3) Instead the substitute wording was issued, with revisions, as NSDM 7, which reads: "The authority of the Secretary of State under NSDM 3 includes the right to delegate full powers of decision to the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Groups on all matters within the purview of NSDM 3 subject to the right of a member who does not agree to request the referral of a matter to a higher level of authority." (Ibid., NSDM 7)

13. National Security Decision Memorandum 4¹

Washington, January 20, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the U.S. Information Agency
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Program Analyses

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 4. No classification marking.

The President has directed the preparation of a series of program analyses for designated countries and regions. These analyses will be used as the basis for National Security Council discussion and decision on policy and program issues and, where appropriate, will be related to existing programming activities.

These studies shall be performed under the supervision of a permanent program analysis staff under the National Security Council. The staff shall consist primarily of personnel on assignment from the relevant agencies and responsible to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It shall work in close cooperation with similar staffs within the various departments and agencies and the Bureau of the Budget.

Each study shall be performed by an ad hoc group made up of (1) personnel on temporary assignment from the relevant agencies; and (2) members of the program analysis staff. The chairman of each group shall be appointed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in consultation with the Secretary of State. Studies will be made available to the departments concerned for their information and for comment prior to National Security Council consideration.

Henry A. Kissinger

14. Editorial Note

At the first meeting of the National Security Council, held on January 21, 1969, the President directed that regular attendance at NSC meetings be limited to statutory members, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State, and, on an ad hoc basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (see Document 15). In a February 3 letter to Nixon, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information requested that U.S. Information Agency Director Frank Shakespeare be included on a regular basis at NSC meetings. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 6–6) In his February 23 reply, Nixon stated that Shakespeare would be invited to “all meetings in which matters of particular concern to USIA are under discussion” but that to use the NSC forum effectively he must limit regular attendance to statutory members. (Ibid.)

In a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell, January 23 at 2:35 p.m.:

“Mr. Mitchell noted his exclusion from NSC meetings, ‘which was wonderful for him.’ HAK said it is the President’s intention to bring

him in gradually, and wants him to be fully briefed, but reason he hasn't been at the meetings up to now is that the Pres wants to exclude some of the Cabinet members who are not statutory members, and in order to have a basis to do that, he has confined the list to statutory members. HAK will make sure Mr. Mitchell is kept informed—for example, there is some by-play in Paris which doesn't appear in reports and when it jells he will be in touch." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

On April 28, however, H.R. Haldeman notified Henry Kissinger that the President had directed that henceforth Attorney General John Mitchell be automatically included in all Council meetings. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-299, NSC System, National Security Council Vol. II, 4/1/69–5/30/69)

Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy expressed dismay over his limited participation in NSC meetings in a January 20, 1970, letter to Kissinger, and Kissinger admitted in response that at times they may have been overzealous in restricting attendance. (See Document 94 and footnote 3 thereto) A year and a half later, in National Security Decision Memorandum 123, July 27, 1971, the President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury (John Connally, who had replaced Kennedy in February 1971) as well as the Attorney General participate in all regular NSC meetings. Upon Attorney General Mitchell's resignation in February 1972, however, it was determined that his successor, Richard Kleindienst, would be not be invited to NSC meetings. (Memorandum from Davis to Haig, March 2, 1972; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-299, NSC System, National Security Council Vol. I, 1/20/69–3/31/69) On the other hand, it was decided to invite Connally's successor at Treasury, George Shultz, to NSC meetings, but Connally's proposal in May 1972, on the eve of his departure, that the Secretary of the Treasury be made a statutory NSC member was ignored. (Memorandum from Davis to Kissinger, June 4, 1972; *ibid.*, Vol. III, 6/1/69–12/31/69)

15. **Minutes of the First Meeting of the National Security Council¹**

Washington, January 21, 1969, 2 p.m.

Meeting was opened by the President and in attendance were:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, CIA
Secretary of the Treasury²
Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The inaugural meeting commenced with a 7-minute still and motion picture photography session, after which the President announced that he would discuss briefly at this inaugural meeting the staff of procedural problems which the National Security Council will be concerned with, making the following points:

Number of meetings will generally follow a scenario which calls for two meetings per week up to the 1st of March, followed by a meeting every Thursday at 10:00 a.m. which should be finished by 2:00 p.m. and which should last for another month, after which he anticipates meetings will be held bimonthly.³

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan–Mar 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) The Diary indicates that Haig also attended the meeting, and presumably he prepared the minutes. The Record of Actions prepared by Haig is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 955, Chron—Col. Haig—January 1969.

² During a telephone conversation on the morning of January 21, Secretary Kennedy told Kissinger that he thought he should attend the NSC meeting. Kissinger said he would check with Nixon and get back to him. Kennedy stated further that Nixon had told him he would be sent an agenda for every meeting and he would decide whether he wanted to attend. Kissinger said his understanding was that Kennedy would attend if there were issues such as international monetary policy on the agenda. (Note from Eagleburger to Joan McCarthy, January 21; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 1, Chronological File)

³ According to a list of NSC meetings compiled by the NSC Staff in 1974, the NSC met 36 times in 1969 (averaging four times a month from January through June and twice a month from July through December), 21 times in 1970, 11 times in 1971, and 3 times in 1972. (Records of NSC and Related Meetings, January 20, 1969–December 31, 1972; *ibid.*, Box CL 311, Listings of NSC and Related Committees' Meetings, 1969–75) See also

The President desires that members of the National Security Council appoint their most qualified planners to sit on the NSC Review Group and urged the attendees to select their best brains at the second level in their respective departments.

The President stated that he wished to have a review of the international situation and that this review should be subject to the scrutiny of the best brains available each year.

Membership of the National Security Council must be tightly limited and the President prefers to have the statutory members always in attendance, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of State. Beyond this, the Secretary of the Treasury should participate on an ad hoc basis during sessions in which budgetary or commercial considerations must be treated.

The President emphasized that the Secretary of the Treasury is the only other non-statutory Cabinet Member who will participate on a regular basis.⁴

The President discussed the role of the Director, CIA, at NSC meetings, emphasizing that he anticipates that the Director will normally give a briefing to update the membership on the intelligence aspects of the agenda items but the Director will not sit in on the substantive portions of the meetings.

The President pointed out that he wished the Director's role to be distinct in this regard and that he is basically an expert on intelligence rather than a policy formulator but that when the agenda item so dictates, he would, of course, be included in the substantive discussion.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Attorney General would not be included in council meetings at the present time. The President emphasized the importance he places upon the maintenance of security with respect to deliberations of the council, adding that President Johnson had warned him that leaks throughout government had been one of his primary concerns.

The President added that he had no personal problem such as President Johnson manifested on leaks but that the system and organization itself must be disciplined in order to prevent wholesale disclosures which have characterized the style of government recently.

The President emphasized that he wanted the deliberations of the group to be open and free and to assure each member that they should feel completely free to speak their piece.

footnote 2, Document 178. Minutes for many of the meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-109 and H-110, NSC Minutes. Folders on each meeting containing talking points, briefing memoranda, analytical summaries, and background papers are *ibid.*, Boxes 83-89.

⁴ See Document 14.

The President emphasized that he did not want detailed debriefings in the respective departments following an NSC meeting, adding that he was conscious of the struggles for power within and among agencies and that leaks to the press had become an habitual vehicle for this in-fighting. He urged each statutory member to emphasize to their respective departments that their views would be heard at the NSC level, that they will not be watered down and that there could be no excuse for bringing their frustrations to the press.

The President then emphasized the careful selection process that had gone into the formulation of the membership of the Security Council, expressing his confidence that the very best men available had been chosen and that he had the utmost confidence in this body. Discussing the style and procedural approach that would be followed, the President stated that the NSC was not a decision-making body, that he would not call for votes on a particular issue and that he did not want them to feel obliged to hammer out a consensus.

The President stated, "I will make the decisions. To do this, I will need all points of view. I will then deliberate in private and make the decision. In this process, I might talk to individuals prior to finalizing my decision."

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, and Peru.]

The President asked Mr. Kissinger to discuss with him the following day the scheduling of a worldwide intelligence briefing. He then turned the meeting over to Mr. Kissinger who outlined the following procedural points to the group:

- a. Agenda items would be furnished to the membership in writing.
- b. The NSC Review Group would meet prior to the Council, carefully consider the substantive issues, to include the costs of the various options to be presented.

The President then stated that he wanted the Director of OEP to serve on the Review Group. At this point, the Secretary of Defense asked if the President wished to have the same individuals sitting on the Review Group and the Under Secretaries' Committee. Mr. Kissinger stated that the Under Secretaries' Group should primarily be involved in operational matters, much like the old OCB while the Review Group would focus primarily on policy matters. The Under Secretary Group has much of the same character as the old OCB and would be chaired by the Under Secretary of State while the Review Group would have much of the character of the old Planning Group.

General Lincoln stated he had no planner available to participate on the Review Group and the President told him to get one as soon as possible.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Turning next to procedural matters, Mr. Kissinger stated that while some papers were prepared initially by the NSC staff, normal procedure in the future would be that these papers would be prepared by the interdepartmental groups, regional or functional, or by special ad hoc groups, that they would then be presented to the Review Group the week preceding consideration by the Security Council.

Mr. Kissinger stated that there were two issues that he would have to discuss with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, which involved (a) contingency planning and (b) studies to be conducted which involved the technical characteristics of weapons.

Mr. Kissinger stated that gaps had been left in the initial NSC agendas to provide for ad hoc problem areas which might arise from time to time. He stated that the published schedule would be revised at the President's direction to move the Middle East item to the 1st of February and slip the SIOP briefing to February 5.

Mr. Kissinger emphasized that the President wanted alternatives presented to the NSC, not a single answer waffle.

The President interjected that he felt strongly about this point and if minority views existed that he wanted to see them clearly stated.

Secretary Kennedy asked how the President wished to have the facts presented to the Council. Secretary Rogers replied that we should get people such as the Director of CIA or interdepartmental briefings to accomplish this.

The President stated that that was the system that should be used rather than through papers alone, that he would like to get the facts through briefings.

Secretary of State stated, "I don't want to read papers, I want to hear facts and be brought up to date."

The President then asked how regularly we were in contact with Ambassador Lodge, to which Secretary of State replied, "several times a day."

The President asked if we could not simplify our communication procedures with Lodge.

The President expressed his confidence in the Paris negotiating team and emphasized the importance that they moved in tandem with Washington.

As the meeting adjourned, the Vice President asked how he should handle confidential papers which he was receiving. Mr. Rogers said he would have him briefed on this problem.

Meeting was adjourned at 11:35 a.m.⁵

⁵ This time is in error. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting, which began at 2 p.m., adjourned by 3:30 p.m., when Nixon met alone with Kissinger and Wheeler. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

16. Editorial Note

In a January 22, 1969, memorandum to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird raised the issue of “communication channels between the Department of Defense (DoD) and your office. It would be exceedingly valuable to me—and I believe a useful practice for the NSC system—if all official communications between DoD and your office were to come through the Secretary of Defense. In that way I could better keep abreast of developments, both within the Department (a task which may be rigorous under the best of circumstances) and between the Department and its principal outside contacts. I shall ask the DoD elements which will be involved in NSC matters to forward their official communications through the Secretary’s office.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1347, NSC Nixon Files—1969) Laird made the same points in a January 22 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 75–89, 334 NSC Jan 1969) Kissinger responded to Laird in a January 25 memorandum that in the future “all official National Security Council communications will be routed through you” with courtesy copies provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This routing, however, was “not intended to affect the direct access between the President (and the NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor their statutory role as the principal military advisers to the President and the NSC.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1347, NSC Nixon Files—1969)

Both President Nixon (for the White House) and Laird (for the Defense Department) issued guidelines for liaison between the two agencies. Both specified that on issues involving national security or defense policy communication would be between Nixon or Kissinger on the one hand and Laird on the other. On other issues communication would be channeled through Nixon’s Military Assistant and Laird’s Special Assistant. (Memorandum from Laird to Nixon, March 15, 1971, and memorandum from Nixon to Laird, April 8, 1971; *ibid.*, Agency Files, Box 226, Dept of Defense, Vol. XI, 24 Feb 71–15 May 71 and memorandum from Laird, January 24, 1972, attached to Staff Meeting Minutes for January 24; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 7628, OSD Office Chronological Files) Laird expressed his concern over breakdowns in White House-DoD channels of communication with some frequency. For example, he raised the issue directly with President Nixon in 1971 and at a number of his own staff meetings, including those on August 24 and 31, 1970; April 12, 1971; January 10 and 24, June 5, June 19, and October 16, 1972. (Staff Meeting Minutes; *ibid.*) Following the White House’s discovery in Decem-

ber 1971 that the JCS had been receiving copies of NSC documents by illicit means (see Document 164) Laird sent copies of his two January 22, 1969, memoranda to Attorney General Mitchell under cover of a January 5, 1972, memorandum in which he stated, "As you will see, on January 22, 1969—my first day as Secretary of Defense—I counseled both the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against a private NSC-JCS channel. As you know, I have since repeated that admonition numerous times." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 330 7445, Signer's Copies, January 1972)

17. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, January 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Review Group Meeting, 23 January 1969

1. The first meeting of the NSC Review Group was held in the White House Situation Room on 23 January under the chairmanship of Henry Kissinger.² Others in attendance as regular members of the Review Group were Dick Pederson, Department of State; Paul Warnke, Department of Defense; Lt. General William Rosson, Joint Staff; and Haakon Lindjord, Office of Emergency Preparedness. In addition, Morton Halperin, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Spurgeon Keeny—all members of the White House Staff; General Andrew Goodpaster, temporary advisor to Kissinger; Hugh Ryan, U.S. Information Agency; and Samuel DePalma, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2. The first part of the meeting was devoted to a description by Kissinger of the functions of the NSC Review Group. He described it as being essentially like the NSC Planning Board of the Eisenhower

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01086A, Executive Registry, Box 7, Folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting. Secret. Drafted by Smith on January 25.

² According to the Record of Decisions at the meeting, it was decided that the Review Group would meet weekly. (Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, Chronological File) According to a list compiled by the NSC Staff in 1974, the NSC Review Group and its successor the Senior Review Group met 140 times from 1969 through 1972. (Records of NSC and Related Meetings, January 20, 1969–December 31, 1972; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 311, Listings of NSC and Related Committees' Meetings, 1969–75) Other records indicate, however, that there were additional meetings not included on the list. See also footnote 2, Document 178.

administration but with the primary task of presenting papers on major policy issues to the NSC in such form that choices could be made among feasible alternatives. He made a sharp distinction between *policy* exploration and *operational* decisions. He said the Review Group would deal only with the policy issues and leave operational decisions to the appropriate departments. The fundamental role of the Review Group is to select, on the basis of the best information and judgment available, those issues appropriate for NSC decision and to present those issues in a format which would facilitate choices among options.³

3. Kissinger placed considerable emphasis on the President's desire for secrecy regarding all NSC discussions. The President wishes to have a free give-and-take during NSC meetings and wishes not to be restrained by fear of leaks or public discussions of views expressed. He wishes to keep secret even the subjects under discussion. Regarding Review Group meetings, Kissinger at first urged that the information be handled as NoDis is now handled. In the subsequent discussion he was made aware that the various agencies could not perform their tasks without providing dissemination to IRG representatives as well as heads of key offices. At this point Kissinger invited each member to present at the next meeting his needs for communicating within his own agency the actions of the Review Group. It was also agreed that the Secretary of the Review Group, presently Morton Halperin, would distribute minutes of the meetings which could be used as a basis for briefing within the separate agencies.⁴

³ In reporting on the Review Group meeting at the DCI's morning meeting on January 24, R. Jack Smith, Deputy Director for Intelligence, emphasized that the group "will make no decisions but will identify choices and options." (Memorandum for the Record by R. J. Smith, January 24; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01086A, Executive Registry, Box 7, folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting) Kissinger reported at the Review Group's March 6 meeting that the President had told him "he likes the options format for NSC papers. He wishes, however, that obviously absurd options be removed and wants the Review Group to indicate which options appear to be the more logical or 'respectable.'" (Memorandum for the Record by R. J. Smith, March 7; *ibid.*)

⁴ According to the Record of Decisions at the January 23 meeting, no record was to be made of the group's discussions but instead the NSC staff would distribute a record of decisions that would provide the basis for de-briefings of decisions according to a procedure to be determined at the group's next meeting. (Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, Chronological File) However, beginning in June 1969 and continuing into 1973 minutes for most meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-111-H-113, SRG Meeting Minutes, Originals. Talking points, papers for discussion, and other briefing and background material for individual meetings from January 1969 to December 1976 are *ibid.*, Boxes 90-103. Briefing and background material for meetings from January 1969 to January 1977 along with minutes for many meetings are also at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 302-307. R.J. Smith's records of discussion at a number of meetings between January 1969 and June 1970, including meetings for which there are no minutes at the NSC, are in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01086A, Executive Registry, Box 7, Folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting.

4. This organizational discussion was followed by a discussion of the paper on [the] Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was a crisp substantive discussion during the course of which a number of descriptions of pros and cons underlying key issues were modified. A revised draft was to be circulated to the members on the following day for coordination. Early in the following week the paper is to be distributed to the NSC members as a basis for discussion at the next meeting.

R. J. Smith

Deputy Director for Intelligence

18. Editorial Note

The National Security Council's 303 Committee and its successor, the 40 Committee, reviewed proposals for major and/or politically sensitive covert action programs. For documentation on the 303 Committee and the 40 Committee, as well as on the NSC Intelligence Committee and the Net Assessment Group within the NSC Staff, both of which were established on November 5, 1971, see Documents 92, 182, 184, 185, 189, 195, 203, 218, 228, 239, 242-47, 250, 251, 256, 265, 266, 268, 270, 278, 279, 286, and 287.

19. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, January 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Contact Between the White House Staff and Foreign Diplomats

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 1, Miscellaneous Hold. Confidential; Literally Personal and Eyes Only.

Henry Kissinger has sent you a careful memcon of his talk with Bui Diem on January 24, which I attach simply for reference.² You will note that the last paragraph contains Henry's invitation to the Ambassador to come in any time he wants.

I have very strong feelings on this broad subject of contact between White House staff members and foreign diplomats, and I think they are based on considerations of orderliness and historical experience which go far beyond any parochial feeling—or any sense that John Burke and I have some clue on how to find out what is really on Bui Diem's mind.

In a nutshell, I think the annual practice of members of the White House staff receiving foreign ambassadors personally is an immense mistake. To my recollection, it did not exist at all under Bobby Cutler, Dillon Anderson, or Gordon Gray in the Eisenhower Administration—and if it had been attempted in the Truman Administration I venture that there would have been additions to the lines of the unemployed.

However, the strong and personal White House staff installed by President Kennedy—led by another relative of mine—produced a gradual and important change in practice which has now come to be accepted—and which Henry obviously deems himself to be following. Not only Mac and Walt Rostow, but a great many others made a practice of not only being available to foreign ambassadors or seeing them a great deal in a social way, but of actively seeking them out. Sometimes this was coordinated with the Department and the results were [a] plus, sometimes it was done on the express orders of the President and as a way of giving extra force to representations—a notable example being both Mac's and Walt's contacts with Dobrynin. It is not by any means all bad or to be ruled out—but it would be my own considered view that it should be cut to the absolute minimum and in no circumstances engaged in except on the express orders of the President or yourself, and with the understanding of *both* the President and yourself.

To state the substantive arguments briefly, the *advantages* of authorized and directed formal contact by the White House staff are (a) to convey direct messages from the President where it would be embarrassing, insecure, or excessively formal to summon the ambassador to the Oval Room; (b) to get exploratory discussion of key topics on a very relaxed basis and without the formality that some ambassadors feel about their regular points of contact in the Department. I accept the validity of (a) in rare cases. But I submit that (b) should not be the case if the Department and specifically the assistant secre-

² Not printed.

tary are doing the job you are entitled to expect of them. (I leave out of account the authorized use of CAS contacts in Washington, which again is a very rare hole card and can be occasionally put on a real "cut-out" basis to good effect and with good reason.)

On the other hand, the *disadvantages* seem to me enormous and normally overriding. You can judge for yourself whether Henry's third point goes beyond what you said to the Ambassador the other day. Obviously, in this instance, no harm has been done and the report is scrupulous. But the cases have been legion—and in numerous cases documented to us through Tom Hughes' best sources—where members of the White House staff have given a significantly different slant to a problem and to the US position on it, from the position that we in the Department were conveying on the express authority of the Secretary. Apart from questions of misinterpretation, the chances of being whipsawed are just terribly great, and I would reckon that there are many embassies in town that have now established, or are at this moment seeking to establish, dual lines of contact to the White House and to the Department on the whole range of foreign policy issues. (I might add that the danger extends to the Pentagon, but has never been in the slightest degree significant in recent years with the caliber of men that we have had in the crucial ISA positions.)

In short, my personal suggestion to you would be to develop very clear and strict ground rules on this matter in whatever way you see fit.

I might add that the question of course washes over into contacts at social gatherings. I do not sense that Henry and his men have any great appetite for such gatherings, but they will be sorely tempted by the ingenious Diplomatic Corps. Obviously, they cannot be put on a freeze, but very strict rules of discretion and an absolute requirement of reporting the significant seem to me a minimum solution.

This is a question not of executive suite politics, but of your personal and institutional position and above all of the orderly and precise conduct of our foreign affairs. I say this with the utmost respect, with nothing but healed scar tissue from the past, and with only the warmest and most admiring feelings for Henry and for all of his staff whom I know.

I am making no carbon of this memorandum, and only you and I and my secretary will ever know it was written.

WPB

20. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to Secretary of State Rogers**¹

Washington, February 1, 1969.

The President has directed that all State Department matters concerning the President's personal schedule be cleared through my office. This will also apply to all details of the President's schedule when he is on foreign trips.²

Will you please take the necessary steps to insure that all such matters arising in the State Department are referred to my office—and that I have the opportunity to review all incoming cable traffic regarding the President's schedule and all outgoing traffic before it is sent. This would include any proposed turn-downs as well as acceptances or other schedule details. No commitments, express or implicit, for the President's time should ever be made without prior approval from my office. As you well recognize, this is essential to insure proper coordination.

This procedure should not, of course, in any way affect the normal clearance procedures already established with Henry Kissinger's office except in the specific areas of the President's schedule.³

HR Haldeman

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Kissinger and Ehrlichman. A blind copy was sent to Ken Cole.

² In his diary entry for January 31, Haldeman wrote the following: "Had long session about schedule and [President] called K[issinger] and me in to meeting with General Goodpaster about K's problems with State. P refused to tackle it head-on. Started by shifting schedule and personnel responsibilities regarding State from K to me, to get K out of trivia. Especially emphasized this about trip." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

³ In a February 3 memorandum to Rogers, Haldeman indicated that the President had "somewhat revised" the procedure outlined in this memorandum: "I will continue to have responsibility for schedule planning but the responsibility for personnel appointments has been assigned to John Ehrlichman." (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers) In another February 3 memorandum to Rogers, Haldeman indicated that the President had directed him to assume responsibility for overall planning of the President's proposed European trip, and that he assumed "that steps have been taken to insure that I receive copies of all incoming cable traffic and all outgoing traffic before it is sent regarding all details and facets of the President's trip." (*Ibid.*)

21. Editorial Note

On February 6, 1969, the White House issued a press release announcing the steps that President Nixon had taken to “restore the National Security Council to the role set for it in the National Security Act of 1947.” The press release also announced that the President had “directed the reorganization and strengthening of the NSC staff.” The substantive components of the staff now consisted of: 1) an Operations Staff with seven subdivisions—for Latin America, Europe, East Asia, Near East and South Asia, Africa, International Economic Affairs, and Science, Disarmament and Atomic Energy; 2) Assistants for Programs; 3) a Planning Staff; and 4) the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. For text of the press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 24, 1969, pages 163–164.

Also on February 6 the Department of State issued *Foreign Affairs Manual Circular* No. 521 outlining the New National Security Council System as well as the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State in the new system. In a message that same day to officers and employees of the Department of State, Secretary Rogers apprised them of the new system and assured them that it was the President’s intention that the Department “play a central and dynamic role” in the system. For text, see *ibid.*, pages 164–165. The Secretary’s message was transmitted to all diplomatic and consular post in telegram 019246, February 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 1)

Earlier, in a January 25 memorandum, Secretary of Defense Laird had established procedures for Department of Defense participation in the National Security Council and its various components. He designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as the central point of contact for NSC matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as advisor to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary for NSC matters. He also specified procedures to expedite coordination between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on agenda items prior to meetings of the NSC, the NSC Review Group, and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. (Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, Box 5, NSC/RG) In a January 28 memorandum, Paul Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, established basic responsibilities in ISA for carrying out the functions assigned to him by Secretary Laird. (*Ibid.*) In a January 29 memorandum, L.K. White, Executive Director Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency, outlined the new NSC system and established institutions and procedures for providing the system with CIA support. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01086A, Box 7, Folder 220, National Security Council)

22. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 7, 1969.

I have expressed to you on several occasions my concern that the NSC staff is not properly organized and that the functions of the components of the staff, i.e., the Operators, the Planners and the Programmers have not been sufficiently delineated and formalized to insure the kind of smooth staff work that is essential. I am equally concerned that the interface between the NSC staff and your personal staff, which should be oriented primarily to support the White House and the President, is also ragged and requires some finite functional sorting.

I have no personal ambitions with respect to this problem and am honored to serve in any capacity at this level, providing I have assured myself that you are getting the kind of support which you must have. It would be a tragedy if our failure to sort out organizational problems and establish sound internal management were to detract from the kind of service that I am sure you can provide to the President and to the country.

You mentioned to me on several occasions the problem of establishing a Deputy's billet. After careful reflection, I am convinced that such a billet should be established, provided you are willing to delegate to the incumbent of that billet the authority that is needed to permit him to move promptly and decisively on organizational matters and to enable him to relieve you of the mounting inconsequential procedural details with which you are currently being plagued by various members of the NSC staff. As I suggested earlier, I think it is essential that the following things be done as soon as possible:

a. A detailed organizational charter be promulgated among the staff, outlining the specific responsibilities of each staff member which provides for a finite interface between each staff section, and includes a conceptual flow of work projects through these sections, as well as appoints senior points of contact where appropriate, i.e., within planning and programming sections. It is equally important that the interface between your urgent, one-time support requirements for the President and the long-term, more formalized development of NSC projects be carefully outlined. I would foresee this as a primary responsibility for your Deputy, who should deal directly with the staff and the pri-

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative File, National Security Council Organization (2), 2/7/69–2/11/69. Eyes Only; Private.

mary officers within the three sections of the staff to insure that the frictions of the past two weeks are promptly eliminated.

b. Establish an Administrative Secretariat in the EOB under the supervision of a non-substantive, yet highly qualified administrative officer.

c. Put Larry Eagleburger and your Deputy, or just the latter, in the office next to you and move all NSC administrative business to the EOB.

d. Continue the preparation of Daily Presidential Briefs as currently set up but with a mandatory one hour coordinating period each evening to insure that the business and intelligence details included in the brief are carefully refined by you personally or by your Deputy and also to insure that you are thoroughly prepared before your morning meeting with the President.

e. Dependent on the seniority of the Deputy that you select, the interface between Larry Eagleburger and the Deputy will require the most careful coordination. In any case, it is essential that these two individuals work together on a give and take basis, that one can fill for the other and that both are totally cognizant of each others' responsibilities and the current actions being handled by each. As I visualize it, your Deputy's principal focus would be on the flow of substantive information between the NSC staff and you and the requirement to insure that this information is provided on a timely basis and is substantively responsive to your guidance. I visualize that Larry Eagleburger will continue to provide you the broad personal attention in every area of activity in which you are involved.

While I am not volunteering to assume the Deputy's responsibilities outlined above, I would be honored to serve you in this capacity and believe I could do much to relieve the errors and confusion of our first organizational days. In any event, I think it is essential that you move promptly to establish the lines of responsibility which I have outlined so that the best energies of our staff can be channeled to support you in an efficient manner.

If you approve this action, I am prepared to move, without delay, this weekend, to sort out these details in coordination with the members of the staff and in full recognition that there will be certain bruises develop with which I am prepared to cope.²

² Haig was promoted to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in June 1970. In an April 15, 1969, letter to Laird in which he supported Haig's candidacy for promotion to Brigadier General, Kissinger praised Haig's "superb" performance. "He deals daily with a multitude of complicated and extremely sensitive subjects with an ease and maturity I have seldom seen, including supervision of much of the work my staff does for the National Security Council." Kissinger concluded, "In short, I could not operate without him. He is the finest officer I have known." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 1, Chronological File)

23. Memorandum by the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)¹

NSC-U/DM 1

Washington, February 7, 1969.

TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

The Organization and Functioning of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee

NSDM No. 2 of January 20² established the NSC Under Secretaries Committee under my chairmanship. In order to have time reserved on our calendars for meetings of the Committee, I wish to confirm that we will hold 4:00 p.m. Thursday each week. It is understood that the Committee will probably not meet each week and I will attempt to get word to you on meetings as far in advance as possible. I think it important, however, to hold this time so that operational problems can be scheduled for consideration by the Committee on fairly short notice.

I have discussed with Henry Kissinger the problem of assuring closest coordination of all phases of NSC activity. In order to make our procedures as consistent with the NSC and Review Group operations as possible, my staff will use the following designations on documents:

- NSC-U/DM (Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum)
- NSC-U/SM (Under Secretaries Committee Study Memorandum)³

In addition, the Committee will use two auxiliary series:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-270, Under Secretaries Decision Memoranda, U/DM 1. Information copies were sent to the Acting Director of AID, the Director of USIA, the Director of OEP, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury.

² Document 11.

³ Copies of NSC U/SM 1 through NSC U/SM 150 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-249 through H-269, Under Secretaries Study Memoranda and *ibid.*, RG 59 S/S-U/SM Files: Lot 81 D 309. Copies of NSC U/D 1 through NSC U/DM 126 are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-270 through H-280 and *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S-U/DM Files: Lot 83 D 276.

- NSC-U/N (Under Secretaries Committee Administrative Notices)⁴
- NSC-U/M (Under Secretaries Committee Minutes)

I hope in the next few days to be able to indicate several subjects and the date for consideration of these subjects in the Under Secretaries Committee. I also hope that you will feel free to suggest to me matters that you wish brought before this Committee. I would then discuss these suggestions with Henry Kissinger in order to assure appropriate coordination with other parts of the NSC structure.

Elliot

⁴ Copies of NSC U/N 1 through NSC U/N 149 are *ibid*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-281, U/N and *ibid*, RG 59, S/S-U/N Files: Lot 83 D 277.

24. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Organization of National Security Council Staff and White House Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

In coordination with Mr. Eagleburger, I have completed an analysis of the organizational structure of the National Security Council staff and of your White House office and am submitting herewith our recommendations for the reorganization of both.

The plan provides recommendations in three broad areas:

- a. Section I—The organization of your White House office.
- b. Section II—The organization of the National Security Staff Secretariat and,
- c. Section III—The organization of the National Security Council Staff.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969-77, Box 40, Administrative File, National Security Council Organization (2), 2/7/69-2/11/69. No classification marking.

Within each of these three areas, functional responsibilities are delineated and the interface between all three are outlined.

Section I—Organization of the Office of the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

Executive Assistant

Duties

The Executive Assistant (Larry Eagleburger) would continue to provide full range of personal staff assistance to you. He would maintain complete cognizance of your daily activities and serve as your focal point for the transmission of instructions to and from the Office of the President through the designated Assistants to the President and intergovernmentally at the Special Assistant level and above, and to the NSC staff through the Military Assistant. Normally, the Executive Assistant will delegate to the Military Assistant liaison at the Special Assistant/Military Assistant level with the Department of Defense, Director, OEP, and Central Intelligence Agency. It is emphasized that contacts with the NSC staff would be effected through the Military Assistant or in coordination with him with the view toward relieving the Executive Assistant of time consuming coordination with the NSC staff so that he can be totally responsive to the rapid pace of your daily activities, plan ahead to preclude short deadlines in your schedule and foresee potential trouble spots.

In processing the flow of business related to the NSC, the Executive Assistant will, after clearance of NSC substantive papers by the Military Assistant, present them to you with staff assistance as required and in sufficient time to insure assimilation and/or modification prior to consideration by the National Security Council and/or the Review Group.

The Executive Assistant would be located in the office adjacent to yours, with the desk against the window so that both of you would have easy access to each other through the interconnecting door, thus avoiding the risks associated with the reception room conduct of business. Entry to your office through the front door would be limited to scheduled visitors as controlled by your private secretary in coordination with you and the Executive Assistant.

Approve²

Disapprove

Other

² Kissinger checked this option.

*Military Assistant**Duties*

The Military Assistant, Colonel Haig, will maintain cognizance of the full range of activities handled by the Executive Assistant and will be specifically charged with coordination of and liaison with National Security Council staff through the Staff Secretary or designated senior geographic substantive officers and the designated senior representatives of the Planning and Programming Sections as described in Section III.

The Military Assistant will insure that NSC and Review Group papers were available to you on a timely basis and are consistent with substantive guidance which you have provided. In effect, the Military Assistant would serve as the de facto Chief of Staff for substantive NSC affairs and be the single point of contact to insure final review of NSC papers prior to presentation through the Executive Assistant to you.

Military Assistant will be responsible for setting up thru the NSC Secretary or the substantive officer concerned, staff briefings, special briefings and meetings as may be required in the conduct of NSC business.

Military Assistant would exercise monitorship of the Daily Intelligence Briefing for the President by conducting a daily coordinating meeting with the substantive geographic officers and Mr. McCafferty and an assistant to be designated as outlined below.

Military Assistant will monitor 303 Committee agendas and activities working in close coordination with Mr. Frank Chapin and insure you are briefed on this material in a timely manner and that follow-up action is accomplished in timely fashion.

Military Assistant will be located with the Executive Assistant and be the point of contact with the NSC staff and will be able, as required, to fill in for the Executive Assistant in his absence.

Approve³

Disapprove

Other

*Administrative Assistant**Duties*

The Administrative Assistant, Bob Houdek, will be the point of receipt for all material forwarded to you from the NSC Staff Secretariat

³ Kissinger checked this option.

to be relocated in EOB and described in Section III. He will sort this material into categories such as “Information,” “Action” and “Signature.” He will also receive, for initial screening, material received from the Office of the President or other members of the White House staff and all out-of-house foreign affairs related material of a non-NSC operational nature for your or Presidential action. He will insure that it is properly logged and suspended by the existing small White House office Administrative Section, dispatch it to the Staff Secretary if appropriate, or refer it to the Executive/Military Assistants. The Executive/Military Assistants will insure that priorities for your attention are established and that the paper work is substantively responsive and coordinated prior to delivery through the Executive Assistant to your desk.

Mr. Houdek would continue to participate in daily press briefings and provide liaison with the office of the Press Secretary.

The Administrative Assistant will continue to be located in the small office to the left of the guard desk in the West Basement.

Approve⁴

Disapprove

Other

Information and Intelligence Operations

Mr. Art McCafferty and one qualified designated Assistant will prepare, based on all source reports (including submissions by the substantive staff) and the daily draft intelligence summary for the President. It will be available by 1730 hours each day in time for the coordinating meeting between you, the Military Assistant and appropriate members of the NSC staff. The meeting will be held in the Situation Room and should include, as necessary, participation by the CIA briefer, Mr. [name not declassified].

(This meeting will enable NSC staff members to insure that items presented to the President in the morning brief are accurate, have been subjected to their analysis where required and contain the latest factual data available. Participation by Mr. [name not declassified] in this meeting would also permit proper coordination of material contained in the CIA Daily Brief with the basic memoranda prepared for the President. It will also go far toward improving the responsiveness of the CIA Daily Brief by highlighting special items of Presidential interest. Notwithstanding, there will be occasions when the CIA representative will be excused.)

⁴ Kissinger checked this option.

If you are not available for this meeting, it should be conducted by the Military Assistant to insure that the coordination is effected on a timely basis and that a final coordinated draft will be available for your subsequent review prior to your meeting with the President the following morning. The morning update will be conducted for you by the Military Assistant.

Approve

Disapprove

Other⁵

Organization of the White House Office Secretarial Staff

It is essential that the reception room be maintained as an orderly, non-substantive administrative area which is occupied solely by required secretarial support. The following secretarial organization is proposed:

Joan McCarthy—Personal secretary, responsible for the maintenance of your daily calendar, in coordination with the Executive Assistant (a separate analysis of your personal schedule has been prepared by Mr. Eagleburger as attached at Tab F).

Mildred Zayac—Mrs. McCarthy's Deputy, responsive to your personal requirements, with the full capability of filling in for Mrs. McCarthy so that acceptable working hours can be established for both.

Sally Dahler—Perform confidential secretarial duties for you and also fill in as required in general front office clerical work.

Secretary to be designated for the Executive Assistant.

Muriel Hartley—Secretary for the Military Assistant.

It is anticipated that the above secretarial staff would provide the full time competence required to support you, your Executive Assistant and your Military Assistant (each is capable of filling in for the other). Additional late hour assistance can be provided by Mrs. Lora Simkus to insure that the secretarial staff is not subjected to the excessive workloads of recent weeks.

Approve⁶

Disapprove

Other

⁵ Kissinger checked the "Approve" option and next to the "Other" option, wrote: "except for [name not declassified] presence."

⁶ Kissinger checked this option.

Section II—System for the Processing of Papers
Related to National Security

As soon as practicable, the point of receipt of all paper work related to the National Security Council affairs should be designated as the NSC Staff Secretariat which will be set up under the supervision of the NSC Staff Secretary, Mr. Moose, in the Executive Office Building (Mr. Bromley Smith should serve as his adviser and be located with him). It will be the function of this Staff Secretariat to receive, log and establish suspenses for all NSC related paper work. Decision will be made by the Secretariat as to the processing of this paper. Normally, it will entail immediate dispatch to the responsible substantive officer, or to the Planning or Programming Section and also provide for mandatory coordination between all affected staff members. Logging and suspenses will also be established for all correspondence referred to the NSC for action from your White House office.

Approve⁷

Disapprove

Other

When an issue is urgent and demands your immediate attention, it will be sent simultaneously to your office and to the substantive officer or officers most concerned to minimize delay. Specifically, the Secretariat itself should be organized under Mr. Moose to provide the following:

- a. Prompt servicing and central control of all NSC action papers or papers referred to the NSC staff by the White House office.
- b. A system for guaranteeing coordination between individual members and staff sections of the NSC staff.
- c. The provision of administrative support to the NSC Staff to include clerical assistance, transportation, personnel services, messenger service and space control.
- d. Maintenance of the budgetary, personnel and organization framework of the NSC staff. (Mr. Moose has already recommended that he be authorized to acquire the services of a budget specialist to prepare a revised NSC budget. We recommend approval of this action so that budgetary estimates can be promptly prepared.)
- e. Maintenance of the NSC staff communications system which will provide for the rapid distribution of cables, intelligence publications, and reports to the NSC staff.

⁷ Kissinger checked this option.

f. Maintain liaison with the departments and agencies within the national security structure at the Staff Secretariat level. As a rule, a Staff Secretary would not deal with the Assistants to the principals of the Departments and Agencies. This liaison should be effected through the Executive Assistant or the Military Assistant as previously outlined.

g. The Staff Secretary will work in close coordination with the Chief of the Planning Section and especially the Chief of the NSC Support Group, in the preparation and timely distribution of all NSC agenda related papers. The Staff Secretary will insure that all NSC related papers, including NSSMs, NSDMs, are standardized as to format and style and are properly numbered and distributed among the interested agencies on a timely basis. Based on guidance from the Chief of the Planning Section, the Staff Secretary will maintain suspense files, a master calendar of NSC and Review Group work schedules and related calendar of NSC business. It is essential that the reproduction capability of the Secretariat provide for the rapid reproduction of multiple copies of NSC documents so that timely distribution of material of substantive interest to *all* staff personnel is promptly furnished these officers for comment as required. The Staff Secretary's Administrative Assistant must be capable of insuring this action in coordination with the Chief of the Planning section who must be equally conscious of this responsibility.

h. Establish a messenger service responsive to the requirements of your White House office and the interagency requirements of the NSC staff.

i. Serve as the single point of contact between your office, for all NSC matters, as well as matters referred by your office to the NSC staff.

j. Serve as the point of contact for the clearance of cables from State, Defense, CIA or other agencies and departments as required. Normal routine would provide for receipt of the cable initially at the White House office and dispatch to the Secretariat through Mr. Houdek who will log the message. Once staff clearance has been obtained, it will be returned to Mr. Houdek for your clearance after which it will be officially cleared by the Staff Secretary who will also maintain a log and suspense on the messages.⁸ Some messages which the staff officer considers routine or totally consistent with your views should be cleared by him thru the Secretary without further reference to you. Through this system, a double suspense will insure no cable clearances are missed. This system will also enable us to restrict highly classified or personal traffic to the White House office if so determined by you or your immediate staff.

⁸ In the left margin next to this sentence, Kissinger wrote: "Within 48 hours."

k. Serve as the point of contact for the receipt of White House initiated requirements received by your White House office which should be referred to the Staff Secretariat for logging, suspense and assignment of action to the appropriate substantive officer or staff section. As with cables, a double log and suspense system would be used, first in your office and secondly, within the Staff Secretariat to insure a double check and timely receipt of the response. High priority requirements of the President or his White House staff would be brought to the attention of the Military Assistant or the Executive Assistant by Mr. Houdek prior to or simultaneously with processing through the Staff Secretariat so that you are aware of the requirement.

(Mr. Moose has recommended the acquisition of a highly qualified administrative assistant from the Department of State to assist in establishing the Administrative Section within the Staff Secretariat and it is recommended that he be provided with this assistance.)⁹

Section III—Organization of the National Security Council Staff

There is an urgent need for a prompt and finite delineation of responsibilities within the substantive NSC staff. This delineation of responsibilities will unquestionably generate personal resentment on the part of individuals who had been told or who have assumed that they would play a role which would be greater or perhaps somewhat different from what sound organization dictates.

Recognizing this, we have spoken to several of the principal officers, with the view towards getting a cross section of attitudes on organizational arrangements, especially as they pertain to the interface between the geographic officers and the Planning and the Program sections. Unfortunately, each visualizes a degree of authority and responsibility which could only be achieved at the expense of adjacent staff section or substantive officer. Thus, hard decisions must be made now which are based on the overall efficiency of the NSC staff and more importantly, which provide the kind of balance, expertise and judgment essential at this level.

—At Tab A is a proposed Organizational Chart of the NSC Staff.¹⁰

—At Tab B is a proposed draft mission statement for the Operations Section.

—At Tab C is a proposed draft mission statement for the Planning Section.

—At Tab D is a proposed draft mission statement for the Programs Section.

⁹ Beneath this paragraph (the bottom of page 8), Kissinger wrote: "OK HK."

¹⁰ Tab A is not attached. Tabs B–F are not printed.

- At Tab E is a Procedure Outline for the processing of papers for Review Group and NSC Meetings prepared primarily by Mr. Halperin.
- At Tab F is a separate analysis of your personal schedule.

Recommendation

That you approve in principle the organizational concept outlined;

That you convene a meeting of the staff and furnish them with copies of the attachments with the provision that functions are in draft only and are subject to refinement in coordination with the Military Assistant;

That, in the interim, the organization be set up as outlined effective February 13, to include execution of all physical moves by the close of business February 13.

(Mr. Dave McManis (NSA) is prepared to serve as Intelligence Assistant and can be here on February 13. He would remain on NSA payroll.)¹¹

¹¹ At the end of the text, Kissinger wrote (presumably referring to the entire memorandum), “want to discuss minor changes—Role of Halperin etc.”

25. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

Formation of an Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam

At the present time, no formal link exists between the NSC and the major policy planning group in Washington concerned with Vietnam. Policy planning on this subject has heretofore been handled by an informal interagency group under Department of State auspices. This deficiency has come into sharp focus in recent days as we attempted to get a grasp on existing contingency plans for Vietnam preparatory to your departure for Europe. The attached NSSM (Tab A)²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-136, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 21. Secret; Sensitive.

² Document 26.

would formalize this interagency group and provide for the channeling of its policy studies into the NSC Review Group and the NSC, when desirable.

Creation of this Ad Hoc Group should have an immediately beneficial impact in pulling together our politico military contingency planning for U.S. reactions to a major new Communist offensive in South Vietnam. This Ad Hoc Group can be tasked, as below, with this responsibility. It can also oversee the implementation of your decisions on reaction and should prove of particular value if the Vietnamese Communists attempt a major offensive during the period of your upcoming trip to Europe. Conversely, it will not preclude the type of planning we conducted on Tuesday with Mel Laird and General McConnell. I will talk to Mel to insure that the special types of military operations we discussed at the meeting are excluded from this interdepartmental forum.

A study memorandum is enclosed (Tab B)³ requesting the preparation of an integrated political and military scenario of possible U.S. reactions to Communist attacks on the cities of South Vietnam and to the assassination of President Thieu. Preparation of these papers has been discussed with the Department of State and work is already underway. We thus have reason to expect that the short deadline can be met.

Approved⁴

Disapproved

³ Not found attached. It can be found in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-136, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 22.

⁴ The President initialed this option.

26. National Security Study Memorandum 21¹

Washington, February 13, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Vietnam

To facilitate the orderly planning and implementation of policy on Vietnam within the framework of the National Security Council, the President has directed the formation of an interdepartmental, Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam.

This group shall be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State and shall include representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.² Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman. The Group shall perform the following functions:

1. Preparation of policy and contingency papers for consideration by the NSC Review Group and the NSC. Copies of the papers shall be transmitted to the heads of participating departments and agencies as provided in NSDM 2.³

2. Discussion of interdepartmental issues concerning Vietnam and decision on issues which can be appropriately settled by the Ad Hoc Group. This should include the planning and coordination, as appropriate, of the Government's public information policy on Vietnam.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-207, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 21. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

² In a February 17 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, Rogers designated Bundy Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group and delineated procedures Bundy should follow in submitting papers to the NSC Review Group or the National Security Council directly. (Ibid.) Following Bundy's departure in May 1969, William Sullivan became chairman of the group.

³ Document 11.

27. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 13, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Review Group Meeting on 13 February

1. The NSC Review Group met on 13 February on NSSM 10, "East-West Relations."²

2. This was a precedent-making meeting, marking the first time that there has been a full-scale confrontation between Henry Kissinger—representing the new concepts of NSC procedures—and the European Affairs Bureau of the Department of State—representing the traditional procedures of policy formulation. The paper presented to the Review Group was not a paper setting forth a range of options which would enable the NSC principals to engage fundamental and opposing issues and arrive at a new and more precise consensus. It was instead an advocacy paper designed to advance only one basic policy toward East-West relations. The paper contained some half-hearted gestures toward meeting the options format which Kissinger had requested, but these alternate options were patently straw men, lacking both internal logic and conviction.

3. During the discussion that ensued the paper was attacked by a majority of the Review Group and defended mildly by a minority. The State Department view was that whatever faults the paper had could be blamed on the overlay of "options" which had been forced on it by the NSC Staff. In reality, it was said, there is only one view which "responsible people" can hold regarding policy toward East-West relations, and that view is set forth as Option 3, "Strong Deterrent with Flexible Approach." Gradually during the course of this discussion agreement was reached that Option 3 as stated was so broad that it needed to be articulated in a series of sub-options. As Kissinger put it, "Surely there is divergence between the attitudes expressed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the one hand, and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other. Somewhere between these two outer wings are other defensible positions. The President and the NSC should be given the opportunity to discuss this range." Kissinger then

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 7, Folder 223, NSC Review Group Meeting. Secret. Drafted by Smith on February 15.

² Copies of NSSM 10, January 27, and the resulting paper are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-133, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 10.

directed the NSC Staff to prepare a new draft of the paper to be ready for consideration of the NSC at its scheduled 19 February meeting.

4. During this discussion, Henry Kissinger set forth some views regarding the much discussed "linkage" proposition which I found useful and may be illuminating to others. Linkage, he said, means to him and to the President only that *some* political progress should take place side by side with progress on arms control and related discussions. This does not mean that one expects the Soviets to give up essential positions to satisfy this linkage. One would not expect them to agree to the unification of Germany in order to facilitate arms control and discussions, but one can expect them *not* to exacerbate the Berlin problem or other such problems when it is within their power to refrain from doing so.

5. The next meeting of the Review Group is scheduled for 18 February. Presumably the revised draft on East-West relations will be the principal, if not the sole, topic.

R. J. Smith

Deputy Director for Intelligence

28. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Taylor) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Comments on National Security Decision Memorandum 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7²

I was very much interested in studying the text of the reference NSDMs and in analyzing the national security procedures set forth in them. They seem to me to describe quite clearly the procedures to be followed in security policy formulation and, if carried out in accordance with the intent of these memoranda, they should assure that the National Security Council receives well staffed documents to serve as the basis for Presidential decisions.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, NSC System, IFG (Institutional File General) 1969 through 1974. Confidential.

² Documents 10, 11, 12, and 13. For NSDM 7, see footnote 4, Document 12.

What I do not see is an assignment of responsibility for the functions which must be carried out after Presidential approval of a policy paper. The functions which I have in mind include:

- a. The assignment of tasks to subordinate departments and agencies to carry out a Presidential decision.
- b. The preparation of departmental and agency programs to discharge the assigned tasks.
- c. The coordination of these programs to assure a properly aggregated interdepartmental effort.
- d. The manner of approval of these programs prior to implementation, and
- e. The evaluation of performance during and following implementation.

The only reference which I find to these functions is in the assignment to the Secretary of State of responsibility “in accordance with approved policy, for the execution of foreign policy” and “for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas.”³ Without further clarification, I would interpret these references as giving the Secretary of State full authority to assure the proper execution of approved departmental programs in the field of national security, using either the National Security Council machinery or the resources of the Department of State to assist him.

If this reading is correct, this is a formidable responsibility and I question the ability of the Secretary of State to discharge it without a further clarification of what is expected of him. To discharge such a task, he will need a more specific statement from the President setting forth his authority over the other departments involved in national security and the way in which he is expected to use this authority. He will also need an accepted procedure by which he can obtain adequate staff support for his executive and supervisory functions. One might look to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee for such machinery to assist him but, in this case, the duties of the Under Secretaries Committee would have to be broadened substantially beyond the text of NSDM 2.

Since the implementation of national security decisions and the verification of performance of implementation have always been weak

³ I am not entirely confident of the accuracy of this interpretation because, as I have learned to use the term, “foreign policy” includes all “interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas” and something more, i.e., the limited amount of interdepartmental overseas business, whereas the language of the NSDM seems to suggest that “foreign policy” and “interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas” are two separate categories of activities to which the Secretary of State stands in two differing and separate relationships.” [Footnote in the source text.]

points in past procedures, I would suggest strongly the need for a very clear statement at the start of this Administration, setting forth the functions which must be performed in the course of implementation and the responsibility for the execution of each of these functions. I would think that the vehicle for such a clarification would be an additional NSDM added to the series which has just been issued.

M.D.T.

29. Editorial Note

Early in the Nixon administration the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger began the practice of maintaining special direct channels of communication with some foreign officials and U.S. Ambassadors, bypassing the Department of State. The Kissinger-Dobrynin channel, for example, was arranged within a few weeks of President Nixon's inauguration. In his diary entry for February 15, 1969, the President's Assistant, H.R. Haldeman, noted the following: "Big item was meeting planned for Monday with the Soviet Ambassador. Problem arose because P[resident] wanted me to call Rogers and tell him of meeting, but that Ambassador and P would be alone. I did, Rogers objected, feeling P should never meet alone with an Ambassador, urged a State Department reporter sit in. Back and forth, K[issinger] disturbed because Ambassador has something of great significance to tell P, but if done with State man there word will get out and P will lose control. Decided I should sit in, Rogers said OK, but ridiculous. Ended up State man and K will both sit in, but P will see Ambassador alone for a few minutes first, and will get the dope in written form. K determined P should get word on Soviet intentions direct so he knows he can act on it." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) The President met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on February 17.

Two weeks later, on March 3, Kissinger met with Dobrynin and reported on the meeting in a March 6 memorandum to the President: Dobrynin "said that Moscow had noted his conversation with the President as well as the lunch with me with 'much satisfaction.' Moscow was ready to engage in a 'strictly confidential exchange on delicate and important matters' with the President using the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel. The exchange will be kept very secret. Moscow 'welcomes an informal exchange.'" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969)

From March through November 1969 Kissinger met six times alone with Dobrynin and twice together with the President. Then, following a meeting on December 22, Kissinger reported the following to Nixon in a December 24 memorandum: "Dobrynin suggested that he and I meet at regular intervals, discussing a particular topic at each meeting to explore what possible solutions on various issues might look like. We could decide after the discussion of each topic was completed and after it had been discussed with you whether any action was necessary—whether instructions would be given or it should be taken to another level. If you approve, I will agree to meet with him every three weeks after our return from San Clemente on an agenda to be approved by you." Nixon gave his approval. (Ibid.) "Increasingly, the most sensitive business in US-Soviet relations came to be handled between Dobrynin and me," Kissinger wrote in *White House Years*, page 138. Documentation on the channel from February 1969 through April 1973 is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Boxes 489–96, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger. Included are lists of meetings, memoranda of conversation, notes exchanged, and Kissinger's memoranda to the President. Documentation on the channel for the period from May 1973 through August 1974 is *ibid.*, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Boxes 68–71.

Kissinger established special communication channels with other foreign officials. In October 1969, for instance, he arranged a backchannel with West German State Secretary Egon Bahr that also included West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Starting in early 1971 Kissinger and Bahr exchanged messages through a covert Navy operation. For more information, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

Kissinger communicated through backchannels that bypassed the Department of State with a number of U.S. Ambassadors at their posts abroad, among them Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph Farland, Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush, and Ambassador William Porter at the Paris peace talks. President Nixon commented at a meeting with his closest advisers on December 22, 1971, that "there have been more backchannel games played in this administration than any in history because we couldn't trust the God damned State Department." (Conversation 308–13; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes) David McManis, Director of the White House Situation Room, briefed General Brent Scowcroft on the situation in a January 4, 1973, memorandum: "'Backchannel communications' are used to provide an unusual degree of privacy to messages between HAK and selected ambassadors. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

"We have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] set up several communications links using key materials permitting access to the mes-

sage only here and at the distant end—not at any headquarters or relay point.” McManis briefly described procedures for communicating with Ambassadors Bunker and Porter and Egon Bahr and noted that “one alternative has always been the courier run.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1327, NSC Unfiled Material 1971) Later in 1973 Kissinger began having some backchannel messages specially encrypted. (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger, April 27, 1973; *ibid.* Box 1335) Copies of many backchannel communications, including those with Ambassadors Bunker and Farland, are *ibid.*, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, Boxes 410–433.

Kissinger was concerned that the Department of State not become party to his backchannel communications. In a January 12, 1971, message to Bunker he observed that during a discussion with William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Sullivan had “referred to fact that you would be returning to Washington as a result of my backchannel request to you to do so. I was surprised that Department was aware of my use of this channel since I have been proceeding under the assumption that our communication through this channel are kept exclusively between us. I would be grateful if you would reassure me in this respect.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4)

30. Memorandum From the President’s Military Assistant (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures

The attached memorandum prepared by Mort Halperin on NSC procedures has been discussed by Mort in detail with both Dick Moose and myself and we are in general agreement with its content.

¹ Source: Johnson Library, Halperin Papers, NSC/RG. No classification marking. Kissinger wrote “OK, HK” at the top of the page.

Tab C reflects some modifications with respect to follow-up action which I suggested to Mort. I believe that the scheduling proposed by Mort for NSC business matters and circulating of the agenda in the Review Group is a very sound procedure which will do much to improve the system and, hopefully, better shape NSC discussions. I believe the tab which discusses the manner by which business will be assigned to the NSC system will require a little further thought as it will hinge upon your relationships with Secretary Rogers and the role of Department of State policy. Most importantly, however, it will depend upon the President's own wishes in this matter and I think, therefore, it should be handled very gingerly in any discussion you might have with him.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff (Halperin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures

This memorandum responds to your request for my thoughts on how the system which has evolved so far can be improved so that you and the President can stay ahead of problems. I take it our goal is to identify issues far enough in advance of the time of Presidential decision so that:

- (1) the bureaucracy can be asked to prepare a paper laying out the options and providing the necessary background;
- (2) the NSC staff can enlarge upon the options if necessary;
- (3) the issue is brought to the President early enough for him to make an unhurried decision which takes account of our long run objectives as well as the tactical concerns of the moment;
- (4) there is a follow-through mechanism to insure that the President's decisions are, in fact, implemented.

Changes in the system can be thought of in three categories, discussed in the three attachments:

- (1) Improving the procedure for identifying items for NSC consideration (Tab A);
- (2) Improving NSC discussion (Tab B);
- (3) Monitoring the implementation of Presidential tasks (Tab C).

Tab A

Identifying Actions for NSC Consideration

Thus far, most of the items on the NSC agenda are broad discussions of the major foreign policy issues facing the U.S. While a few specific issues, such as Biafra and Peru, have been put on the NSC agenda, no clear pattern has yet emerged as to how the President will want to deal with a variety of specific issues which will require his attention and for which he should consider options and long run implications.

The choices appear to be:

(1) Wait until the State Department sends the issue to the President.

This will almost certainly mean that the issue arrives very close to the time that the President needs to decide and that he will be confronted with a recommendation rather than options. The NSC staff could add a cover memo stating alternatives, and the President could decide based on the written material, but this does not seem to be compatible with the President's desires.

(2) These matters could be handled on an ad hoc basis with State, and other agencies involved informally asked to give their views in writing to the President who could then convene a meeting of those directly involved. For example, rather than waiting for the Visit Briefing Book for Presidential visitors, the agencies concerned could be asked to provide their views in writing on the main issues long enough in advance to enable the NSC staff to put them together to give the President a view of the issues and raise additional alternatives. The President should then decide whether to hold a meeting of those concerned. Similar procedures could also be used on issues like the FRG offset or our position on the details of mutual withdrawal from SVN. This approach can work and will certainly have to be used for some issues.

(3) Schedule on the NSC Agenda issues for which the President should review options and alternatives and use the existing NSC machinery to develop the necessary papers. This approach has been used thus far to a remarkable degree. The specifics of our Middle East negotiating policy, the issue of Sentinel deployment and the question of Biafran relief have all been handled through the regular NSC procedures despite the temptation to handle them otherwise. (We are skipping the Review Group on the Sentinel issue, but there is no great harm in doing that when the laying out of alternatives is largely the job of a single department. If time had permitted, it would have been useful to circulate the Defense paper in advance and solicit written comments from other agencies.) To continue to use this system for the growing

number of issues that will come before the President requires two things:

(a) A willingness on the part of the President to continue to hold one, and in many cases two NSC meetings per week, and a willingness on his part to schedule several items at a single meeting (in most cases after there has been an initial NSC discussion of the basic issue). These meetings will have to dispense with the formal procedures of CIA and other briefings and focus rather sharply on the immediate issues for decision. They will require the kind of brief agenda papers suggested in the next attachment.

(b) An intensive effort on the part of the NSC staff to identify these issues far enough in advance to put the NSC machinery to work. It will have to be made clear to the operations staff members that such issues should be brought into the NSC system. The NSC planning group will have to carefully monitor forthcoming meetings, visits, matters of Presidential interest and concern, etc. and then work with the Assistants for Operations to put the machinery into motion.

On balance, Option 3 would appear to most closely conform with the President's desires. Setting the machinery into motion on a particular issue does not commit the President to holding an NSC meeting. Papers approved by the Review Group can go to the President for his information and for decisions based on the written documents. Alternatively, the President could call in a subgroup of the NSC to discuss a particular problem. Using the NSC machinery guarantees, in any case, that the President will have put before him a discussion of all of the relevant options as well as a careful analysis of the situation and the long range implications of any decision that he makes.²

Tab B

Improving NSC Discussion

NSC discussion thus far has probably suffered because of a lack of knowledge on the part of the NSC members as to what items the President wished to focus on and what policy issues he wished to have their advice on. This is particularly a problem for the kind of general papers that have on the whole been discussed thus far but it will be somewhat of a problem even for more narrowly focused issues.

The NSC discussion has also suffered from the fact that papers have been distributed only a short time before the meetings.

² In a March 10 memorandum to Kissinger, written after Kissinger approved Tab A, Halperin outlined steps to be taken to implement Tab A. (Ibid., Chronological File, January–March 1969)

The schedule is now set up so that beginning with the April 2 discussion of NATO we will have 13 days between the Review Group meeting and the NSC meeting for regularly scheduled items. (We will, of course, have to add on other items with shorter deadlines.) This more extended period between the Review Group meeting and the NSC meeting will have several advantages:

- (1) It will permit a more careful rewriting of papers when the Review Group decides that is necessary.
- (2) It will permit us to circulate papers substantially in advance of meetings—normally one week.
- (3) It will permit the preparation of an agenda paper, discussed below.
- (4) It will permit the President to receive his NSC book 48 hours or more before the meeting.

This new time schedule would permit the preparation of an agenda paper which might help to sharpen the focus for NSC discussion. This paper, which would in effect be a combination of what has previously been in the HAK talking points and in the Issues for Decision paper, would indicate to the members of the NSC what areas they should come prepared to discuss and on what specific decisions the President will want their advice.

If agenda papers are to be used, they should be prepared as indicated in the initial procedures memo approved by the President. A draft of the agenda paper would be circulated and discussed at the Review Group meeting and members of the Review Group would then be given two additional days to provide comments on the draft. It would be understood, of course, that the draft was subject to review by the President and that, in any case, he would retain his prerogative to lead the discussion in other directions if he decided to do so. Following the revision of the paper based on Review Group comments, the paper could be distributed to the agencies. Alternatively, and preferably, HAK could discuss the paper with the President eight days before the NSC meeting and secure his general approval for the paper. This would increase the probability that over time there was a reasonably close overlap between the items raised in the agenda paper and those that the President would want to discuss. This will insure that the agenda paper is taken seriously by the staffs and will mean that the NSC members are better prepared to discuss the key issues and major decisions.

Attachment to Tab B

Illustrative Cycle for NSC Meeting

1. Friday: Response to NSSM and/or other paper comes to NSC staff.

2. Tuesday PM: Pre-RG meeting.
3. Thursday: RG meeting. Reach consensus on agenda focus.
4. Monday: Revised draft agenda approved by HAK.
5. Tuesday: HAK checks agenda paper with RN.
6. Wednesday: Agenda paper and IG paper circulated to NSC one week in advance of meeting.
7. Friday: Pre-NSC meeting with HAK with RN and HAK books.
8. Monday: RN book forwarded.
9. Wednesday: NSC meeting.
10. Friday: NSDM sent out with record of decision (to appropriate extent) and assignment of implementation action.

Tab C

Implementation of Decisions

The process for implementing the Presidential decisions which take the form of general policy guidance has been less fully developed than the other parts of the NSC system.

The intention of circulating a Decision Memorandum after each NSC meeting, providing the President's decisions and the rationale for them, has been greatly limited by the President's desire to restrict decisions of NSC meetings to the principals only. Thus, most decisions have passed by debriefs from the members of the NSC to their staffs or from the NSC staff member to his agency counterparts. This process has the drawback that the President's intentions are nowhere clearly stated. It is possible to have different interpretations of his decisions passed on by different participants in the meeting. Where the dispute concerns a particular single decision—should there be a Biafra relief coordinator—the matter can if necessary be referred back to the President, but where the issue concerns style, tone and nuance—just what is our attitude toward Four Power Middle East talks—the current procedure leaves much to be desired and is susceptible to both inadvertent ignoring of Presidential decisions or deliberate distortions.

There is much to be said for trying to return to the original notion of a careful Decision Memorandum stating the President's decision and the reasons for it, while recognizing this cannot be done with some issues. The Decision Memorandum could clearly be separated from the NSC meeting. One need not refer in any way to the NSC deliberations or attempt to include all of what the President said at the NSC meeting. Rather, the Decision Memorandum would be a document carefully written to tell those who will implement the policy what they need to

know about the President's desires in order to do what he intends and to provide enough explanation of why the President has decided as he has to enable those implementing the policy to follow the spirit as well as the letter of the Presidential decision. While such Decision Memoranda would normally be written soon after an NSC meeting, in other cases they might be issued after some delay, when the President clearly came down on position.

The Decision Memoranda should, in most cases, clearly assign responsibility for implementing the decision. This assignment should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In some instances a Cabinet officer should be assigned responsibility (perhaps in consultation with other officials); in other cases responsibility could be assigned to an interdepartmental group: the Under Secretaries Committee, an IG, or an ad hoc group. In other cases responsibility could be assigned to a particular individual. In the absence of a specific delegation it is much less likely that a policy will be implemented and it is much harder to monitor compliance.

There is a related question of long run monitoring of implementation of Presidential decisions. This should be the primary responsibility of the operations officer. At some stage, we may want to consider some system of periodic reporting on the implementation of decisions—perhaps internally by the NSC staff member or formally by interagency group, where it has been assigned responsibility for action. The procedure to be adopted for follow-on will depend in large part on the choice made on how to inform the bureaucracy initially of Presidential decisions and should, therefore, be deferred until there is a longer period of experimentation on the prior question.³

³ In a March 28 memorandum to Halperin, Lake discussed procedures for implementing Presidential decisions. He commented that "the most efficient means of disseminating NSC decisions would be by NSDM, as argued in your memorandum. It appears, however, that the President has ruled this out." (Ibid., NSC/RG)

31. National Security Decision Memorandum 8¹

Washington, March 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Crisis Anticipation and Management

The President has directed that increased emphasis be placed on the anticipation of potential crisis situations that may affect the interests of the United States. The National Security Council structure provides a means for the orderly review of world situations and of our policies, the formulation of possible courses of action to deal with contingency situations and the initiation of actions, when appropriate, to remedy deteriorating situations.

The President has directed that the National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups shall prepare contingency studies on potential crisis areas for review by the NSC. The studies should include a careful orchestration of political and military actions. It is recognized that not all contingencies can be anticipated and that the specifics of a particular anticipated contingency cannot be accurately predicted. Nevertheless, there are important advantages which might accrue from contingency planning, among which are:

- a clearer assessment of U.S. interests and possible need for U.S. action in a particular situation;
- an increased likelihood that U.S. actions taken will be timely and will minimize risks or losses;
- the possible discovery of actions which might resolve or head off a crisis; and
- the familiarization of key officials with factual material and alternative courses of action in event of a crisis.

The Review Group shall issue instructions for contingency planning and review contingency studies prepared in the Interdepartmental Groups. The Review Group shall forward contingency studies to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 8. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Documentation on the implementation of NSDM 8 is *ibid.*, and in *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S–NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 8. Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 8. Confidential.

the Under Secretaries Committee. When the study is to be submitted to the National Security Council, the Under Secretaries Committee will comment in light of its responsibilities for crisis management.

The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Groups shall have coordinating authority for the management of crises in their areas when these occur, subject to additional policy and operational guidance provided by higher authority.

The Under Secretaries Committee shall determine the organization and procedures for crisis management.

Henry A. Kissinger

32. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to the Director of Communication for the Executive Branch (Klein)¹

Washington, March 24, 1969.

Per your request, I talked with the President about the possibility of having Henry Kissinger appear on shows like Meet the Press and specifically about the April 30th date.

The President does *not* want Kissinger to make public television appearances of this sort. He is perfectly willing to have Henry meet with commentators, editors, etc. on a background basis in private sessions but does not want him—or any other White House staff members—to appear as Administration spokesmen in public.

H

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, HAK/President Memoranda, 1969–1970. No classification marking. This source text is a copy sent to Kissinger and is marked “HAK” at the top of the page.

33. **Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, April 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Role of Program Analysis Office

On April 9 you signed a NSSM which directs a study of Post Vietnam Asian Policy.² The scope of this study includes every major U.S. resource program in East Asia: military grant aids and sales, economic assistance, U.S. bases and forces, and the implications on these programs for the U.S. budget and balance of payments.

I did not see this NSSM in any form until after it had been signed. Now that a formal study of all U.S. resource programs in East Asia has been directed, what does that leave for my Program Analysis Office in the region? I am immediately exposed to the reasonable argument that any study I attempt in the region "is already being done." Over the last few weeks, I have tried without success to obtain the cooperation of your staff on studies in East Asia, in particular, to get a first rate study of Thailand started. Now that I am confronted with this fait accompli, I feel I need to have a better understanding of how you view the role and purpose of my office.

Because I was not asked to comment on NSSM 38 before it went out over your signature and because it can be interpreted (and will be interpreted by the State Department) as pre-empting work which I have underway on East Asian countries, I think it sets a dangerous precedent. The NSSM says nothing about the need for in-depth analysis, and it will be undertaken by operators, yet it can and will be used to suppress the kind of analytical work which is badly needed and which I thought my office was designed to undertake.

The policy decisions that the study will bring forth will in effect dictate a wide variety of program decisions which in my judgment should not be made until we have undertaken the relevant program budgeting studies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. [Jan. 1969–Aug. 1970]. Secret; Eyes Only. Haig wrote in hand at the top of the first page: "File—Lynn says no longer necessary."

² Reference to NSSM 38, April 10. (Ibid., Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 38)

For example, decisions are contemplated with respect to "SEATO," "new regional arrangements," "military forces and deployments," "U.S. bases," "military grant aids and sales," "economic assistance," and "budget and balance of payments costs." In nearly every case program decisions are called for and I can see the results pouring concrete around our policy in, for example, Thailand in a way which precludes analysis. There is little doubt that SEATO and our bilateral ties with Thailand will be reaffirmed, base decisions will be made affecting U.S. forces in Thailand, planning decisions will be made which affect our aid and military assistance programs to Thailand, etc. All this will be accomplished without analysis of U.S. force effectiveness, of the possibilities of developing Thai forces, of the need and opportunities for economic assistance to Thailand, of the costs of alternative commitments, of the likelihood of the anticipated threats, etc.

The fact that the East Asia IG will conduct the study makes it inevitable that, as in the past, costly and possibly ineffective program commitments will be made by operating agencies. NSSM 38 can lead to a sterile product which serves up as policy recommendations the operators' preferences buttressed by nothing more than the conventional wisdom. Meanwhile the possibility that the process of program analysis will affect the thinking of the State Department or obtain the necessary cooperation in Washington or in the field seem to me to have been all but precluded.

I have put together a bright and experienced staff. We have approached our analyses in a deliberate manner, seeking to lay the foundation for an analytical approach to program issues and related policies. Since this kind of work has never been done on a broad scale in the government, careful preparation is necessary both to obtain successful studies and to protect your interests with the agencies.

I have drafted a NSDM³ which I think is necessary to place our studies in the proper relationship with the results sought by NSSM 38 and other such NSSMs. I believe you should sign it. It is required to give us the latitude necessary for our work.

Since this subject affects my "vital interests" I would like to discuss it with you.

³ Attached but not printed. The proposed NSDM was not issued.

34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Improvements in Information Support and Communications

It is critically important to be able rapidly to obtain and display in the White House information on national security matters. The facilities to do this should be designed to provide you with instant briefings in critical situations and to support any group of advisers or task force that you might assemble. The White House Situation Room and the communications facilities which link it with the outside world should be designed as an integral whole to meet this need, using the most modern techniques and facilities available.

Realization of this goal requires coordinated action in five areas:

1. design of an improved conference room
2. automation of information handling
3. more space
4. review of communications capabilities
5. development of substantive information files

Improved Conference Room

The Conference Room associated with the Situation Room should be equipped to provide you with instant briefings and also should be able to support any advisory group or task force that you might assemble in a crisis. To do this, the Conference Room should have the following features:

1. It should have rapid access to sizeable central file of facts, as well as to current messages and intelligence.
2. It should have the facilities to rapidly display selected fact sheets, messages and intelligence reports to a group of up to twenty people.
3. It should have facilities for preparing and updating large map displays without interfering with other activities in the Conference Room.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 332, Improvements in Information Support and Communication. Sent for action. No classification marking.

4. It should have telephone facilities to support up to twenty people in the Conference Room, with provisions for the Situation Room staff to screen incoming calls if desired.

5. It should be designed and outfitted to minimize the physical and psychological discomfort associated with any prolonged use of the room by a single task group.

If undertaken in conjunction with the other projects described below, the improved Conference Room can be available in 12 months, and can be paid for out of funds available to the Defense Communications Agency (discussed under *Space* below).

Automated Information Handling

The principal means we have to keep continually abreast of fast-moving developments is to read the messages addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which are routed to the White House for information, and to read the intelligence reports and summaries which are prepared for us by the intelligence community. This incoming information is now received by teletype, manually transferred to the Situation Room, and screened and routed within the White House. It is then manually transmitted to the Executive Office Building where it is further screened, routed and delivered to members of my staff. Once seen, these messages are filed in various places in accordance with a simple classification scheme. These procedures frequently involve handling delays under normal time pressures; in crisis periods such delays could have serious consequences. I would, therefore, like to automate as much of this process as possible, in order to increase the speed and reliability of both initial dissemination and subsequent retrieval of information. A modest, computer-based system, similar to systems now used by the State and Defense Departments, will permit us to do this.

The computer would:

1. display messages for screening and routing as soon as they are received, with simultaneous presentation in the Situation Room and in the NSC Secretariat. (Sensitive messages would be restricted to the White House.)

2. receive indexing and routing instructions from the analysts who screen the messages. (It may also be feasible to have the computer assign index terms and routing instructions based on the contents of the message, subject to verification by the analyst.)

3. automatically print out the required number of copies for immediate distribution.

4. automatically create files accessible by originator, subject, and date/time of receipt.

5. quickly find, display, and print out if desired, messages and other indexed material retained in current files.

It will take about two years to get a fully operational system, assuming a competitive procurement. The system will cost about \$500,000 annually for leased equipment, operation and maintenance. This will be partly offset by current communications center costs of \$300,000 per year. The White House Communications Agency is prepared to pay all of the costs of this project except for the programming costs which may be associated with the development of special files for the White House/NSC. The development of such files would be part of the Substantive Information project described below.

Space

The most immediate limiting factor in achieving any improvement is space. The present Situation Room conference area is too small for a group of any size, and cannot effectively use modern techniques such as rear projection displays. The communications center is in the bomb shelter, far removed from the Situation Room, and it has no room to install modern message handling, storage and retrieval facilities.

The necessary additional space can be obtained by underground construction immediately behind the Situation Room. The White House Communications Agency has done some preliminary planning for a new communications center there. These plans can be revised to incorporate the new conference room and automatic information handling facilities discussed above. The cost for the entire facility should not exceed \$1.5 million, and WHCA can make that amount available within its FY 1970 budget.

Planning, construction and equipment installation will require about one year. Upon completion of the new Conference Room, the existing Situation Room spaces will be reconfigured as necessary to support the new Conference Room, and any excess space will be released for other use.

General Albright (WHCA) has assured me that the noise level associated with excavation will be minimal except when jackhammers are needed to cut around existing manholes. The jackhammer work will be scheduled at times when you are not in residence.

I recommend that you (1) approve the construction of a new Conference Room and Communications Center adjacent to the present Situation Room, (2) approve the installation of improved information handling and display facilities, and (3) authorize General Albright to proceed with construction as soon as Mr. Haldeman and I have approved the detailed plans.

Approve

Disapprove

Other

Review of Communications Capabilities

While facilities in the White House are being modernized, it is important to keep in mind the support you need when you are away from the White House. Staff coordination procedures and information support which can be readily implemented in the White House are much more difficult to achieve when you and part of your staff are elsewhere, or enroute. To cope with these situations, it is important to assure that:

1. Communications facilities are as reliable and responsive as possible, and
2. the limitations of facilities are recognized and staff procedures are designed with these limitations in mind.

I feel that it is also important to review at this time your requirements for communications through the systems of the various Executive Departments, and the present ability of those systems to meet your needs in various circumstances. The results of such a review would be the development of better guidance for the agencies concerned, as well as a better understanding of the procedures which may be necessary to accommodate limitations in communications performance.

I recommend that you authorize me, in consultation with WHCA, to organize a review of the communications facilities and systems which support the National Security functions of your office.

Approve

Disapprove

Other

Substantive Information

The foregoing steps will speed the receipt, dissemination, storage, retrieval and display of information in the White House. However, to assure that accurate information is readily available when desired, it is necessary to identify the specific substantive information desired, to organize this information into accessible files, and to establish procedures for updating the information to keep it current. Information which does not change frequently can be maintained easily in a central data bank. For information which changes frequently, there is a choice which must be considered carefully between maintaining an accurate file in the White House and delegating this responsibility to an appropriate department or agency.

I proposed to have the RAND Corporation assist us in determining information needs, defining the contents of the central data

bank, identifying useful data banks elsewhere to which we should have access, and evaluating the choices between White House versus Agency maintenance of data files. The funds for this task can be provided by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense.

Approve

Disapprove

Other²

² There is no indication of approval or disapproval of any of the recommendations, but Haldeman informed Ken Cole on April 23 that the President had approved all Kissinger's recommendations and Cole informed Kissinger of that fact in an April 29 memorandum. (Ibid.)

35. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

After-Action Report on the Korean Shootdown Incident²

Now that the Korean shootdown incident has come and gone, I thought you might be interested in a brief appraisal of the manner in which it was handled within the bureaucracy, with the view toward drawing upon these experiences in the event of future contingencies.

In general, I believe the bureaucracy functioned well, especially during the initial stages of the crisis. The following steps were taken:

1. Establishment of a small working group from each of the Departments/Agencies directly concerned (State, Defense, JCS, CIA, White House).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, May 1969–1971. Secret. Sent for action.

² A U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down on April 14 by North Korean MiG aircraft. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX, Japan and Korea.

2. This method made it possible to bring about a rapid and intimate exchange of views and maximum security in the development of highly sensitive options for your consideration. It is significant that there has been no leak of the range of options you considered.

3. The result was the preparation of a master game plan which meshed the political, diplomatic and military actions under each option and which could have been executed with minimum confusion.

The exercise revealed the following shortcomings:

1. Military planning proved generally unresponsive, pedantic and slow. It took more than 72 hours for the JCS to develop a plan for an attack on a single airfield. Part of the problem was interservice rivalry: the Airforce and the Navy could never agree on whether to attack with B-52s or A-6s.

2. We disbanded the Committee too early. As a result, the windup of the operation produced some uncertainty expressed in the slow restarting of reconnaissance operations and some confusion over what force should be left behind in the Korean area. This was remedied by reassembling the Committee.

3. The incident showed the degree to which Vietnam reduces our military options. We would have had difficulty conducting major operations without drawing on our Vietnam deployment. In fairness, it must be pointed out that Vietnam enabled us to envisage a massive concentration of power that would have been unavailable otherwise.

I have asked each agency represented to prepare a critique. Their comments are attached (Tab A).³

Recommendations:

1. The emergency machinery should be institutionalized. Every participant agreed that it worked well. It should have been started earlier and kept in being longer.

³ Attached are a paper by U. Alexis Johnson, which is printed below, and three memoranda to Kissinger, which are not printed, from Nels C. Johnson, Director of the Joint Staff; Thomas Karamessines, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans; and Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

2. Military contingency planning should be tightened up. This would be accomplished by a series of Presidential directives which can be prepared for you if you agree with the basic concept.

Approve⁴

Disapprove

Other

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, April 28, 1969.

Reflections on EC-121 Incident⁵

From my viewpoint the substantive difficulty that we faced with respect to this incident was that our freedom of choice was very limited by the absence of a military capability quickly to respond. Apart from the other problems involved with retaliation, the passage of time required to generate the capability made this a less and less feasible course of action. The only flexible capability in a situation of this kind, entirely subject to our own control, and involving the minimum of political complications with third countries, is a carrier. While recognizing the importance of carrier operations to the conflict in Viet-Nam, I feel that we should balance the need in Viet-Nam against the importance of having some carrier capability available for contingency op-

⁴ The President initialed the approval option. Written below in an unidentified hand is the following: "Set up as Permanent Comm./HAK." In a May 8 telephone conversation with John Getz, Johnson's Special Assistant, Haig stated: "Just wanted to get message to Amb. Johnson concerning the 'Korean Group' that functioned during the crisis. The President has looked at all the after-action reports on this, including Amb. Johnson's & the ones from Defense, JCS, and CIA, and he told Kissinger he wants to institutionalize this outfit, for better or for worse, but in so doing he wants also to maintain at the State operational level a group dealing with the coordination of the problem at hand—in other words, this ad hoc group would be 'permanentized' for crises to deal with broader issues, and State would orchestrate the implementation—cables, dispatches, etc., which is, he thought, consistent with what Amb Johnson had in mind." (Notes of Telephone Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal)

⁵ Johnson also discussed the administration's response to the shootdown and the resulting formation of WSAG in his memoir, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 524–525.

erations in critical areas, such as Korea has been during the past year and now appears will continue to be for at least sometime to come.

Two problems inherent in any proposed military operation for which full contingency plans do not already exist are the collegial nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the inherent competition among the Services to "get in on the action." In this case, as in others, the first problem results in a delay in obtaining authoritative military views and recommendations except insofar as the Chairman of the JCS can, by the force of personality, impose his views on the other chiefs. The second problem results in a tendency to overstate capabilities and to minimize problems and difficulties. It is thus difficult to obtain entirely unprejudiced and thoroughly staff military advice, particularly in a short-time frame.

These comments in no way reflect upon the individual competence of our military leadership, but rather are inherent in the present system. Under our present executive organization there is no answer to this problem except that there be on the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense (ISA is the logical point) and in State a sufficient knowledge of military affairs blended with political competence to ask the right questions and obtain the answers. It is also only in this way that international political considerations can be fed into the process at an early enough stage to assure that military planning is blended with international political considerations in such a way as to assure the optimum blend of each, and thus assure that the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have the best possible and most realistic alternative courses of action presented to them.

My observation in this case, as well as in other crises in which I have participated, confirmed my conviction that in today's world there can be no purely military planning nor purely political planning but that the two must be integrated right from the beginning. It is my experience that only when they are integrated and examined in detail in the form of a single plan of action that the problem areas best emerge. It is also my observation that presentation in such a succinct integrated plan of action form is most useful for the decision makers as for the operators when decisions are made.

In addition to such a plan of action, it is also my observation that problem areas emerge and can best be dealt with when there is a detailed examination and consideration of what is to be said publicly. Normally this will be a statement or a speech by the President. With these two elements determined, that is the plan of action and the public statement, all other actions readily flow therefrom. I feel that this was well done in this case, and my only comment being that I think that it might have been useful to have started this part of the process somewhat earlier, preparing integrated plans and outlines of statements for various

courses of action. The NSC staff should, of course, be deeply involved in this planning process.

On the other hand, when the President has made decisions it is important that there be an exceptional interdepartmental mechanism for promptly coordinating and assuring their implementation and that this be focused at a single point within the Executive Departments responsible for their execution. This will always involve State, DOD and the JCS, and the CIA should also be involved. This can and should be done by the establishment of what has in the past been called a "Task Force" usually, and I believe logically, chaired by State with participation of the agencies concerned, including, of course, to the extent desired, the NSC staff. Such a Task Force working out of the Operations Center in State can provide to the decision makers a single point of information, a single channel for instructions and assure that decisions are carried out in a coordinated and most effective manner. (This, of course, does not preclude the President from issuing instructions to or through anyone he may desire, it simply assures that when instructions are issued they are promptly disseminated and that there is a common understanding on how they are being implemented.) Such a Task Force should be involved in and expected also to make a major contribution to the planning process.

UAJ

36. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 30, 1969.

You asked me yesterday to think about ways of "sub-contracting" some of my functions to others on the Staff because (1) my area of responsibilities was becoming increasingly active, (2) you were con-

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative File, National Security Council Organization (4), 5/3/69–6/12/69. No classification marking; Personal for Mr. Kissinger. In an attached May 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig summarized the main points of Sonnenfeldt's memorandum. Then, in a long comment, Haig added among other things: "Obviously, Hal assumes that U.S.-Soviet relationships are his exclusive responsibility and since most world-wide issues impinge on this reality, ipso facto, he is responsible

cerned that I was "killing myself" as a result, and (3) that you wanted to be sure I could give my best efforts to those issues that would remain for me to handle. You were kind enough to speak well of my work and to stress that what you were suggesting was not intended to be critical.

You did not mention it, but I take it that your statements were related to Colonel Haig's recent request to me that I give thought to how certain under-employed and consequently frustrated members of the Staff could be more fully utilized.

I will address myself principally to your comments to me since the problem mentioned by Colonel Haig is not one that I feel qualified to deal with specifically. The recommendation I shall make at the end of this memorandum is, however, germane to that problem and may be of help to you in coping with it.

I must necessarily deal with the issue you raised in a somewhat personal vein.

I begin by reminding you that I came here at your invitation to take on these responsibilities fully conscious of their variety, extent, and, in some instances, complexity. If anything is "killing me," to use your phrase, it is not the weight of the substantive problems with which I deal but the impediments placed in the way of doing so effectively. Confining myself only to matters pertinent to your comments, these stem from the overlapping, fragmentation and inadequate definition of responsibilities on this Staff in the area of my assignment. This situation undoubtedly diverts my energy and time from substantive work more than is to be expected in any bureaucratic situation.

Large and significant segments of the issues relating to my area are formally assigned to others on the staff: thus, the whole matter of economic policy toward Europe, with its vital political implications, is the concern of another officer; similarly, the important issue of East-West trade, which encompasses the bulk of our formal relationship with the Communist countries other than the USSR, is the responsibility of another officer; again, the fundamental problems of military policy, with their crucial role in the US-Soviet relationship and in NATO affairs fall outside the scope of my assignment; large portions of the

for most of the globe." He also endorsed Sonnenfeldt's "excellent point" on planning and his concern about the overextended bureaucracy involved in the NSSM process. Haig indicated that "reports I have received from throughout the bureaucracy indicate that those who do the work are increasingly hard pressed, beginning to lose enthusiasm and becoming resentful of additional requirements, especially those which are demanded on an urgent basis." He concluded that he was also concerned about staff coordination and supervision, though not so much Sonnenfeldt. In Sonnenfeldt's case, Haig wrote that "no system would be totally satisfactory."

disarmament area, a major aspect of our relations with the USSR, are assigned elsewhere; our dealings with the USSR on such issues as the Middle East, on Vietnam and Korea are principally within the purview of other members of the Staff.

I have been encouraged that improved lateral communication within the Staff has in some measure made the discharge of my own responsibilities more effective in recent weeks and the working relationships among those of us who have these overlapping and interrelated assignments have become a good deal smoother over time. In this connection, I should make special note of the highly satisfactory way in which I have been able to share with Larry Lynn the work on the preparations for the SALT talks. Yet much of the work on these subjects remains fragmented, with wholly inadequate lateral contact, insufficient exchange of information and knowledge, lack of coordination, frequent duplication and, worst of all, inadequate coherence of approach. I do not, for example, have the impression that our dealings with the Soviets on the major issues that make up the essence of our present relations with them (e.g., Middle East, Vietnam, Korea, Central Europe, arms control, trade) flow from some consistency of conception; certainly, given the situation as I outlined it above, I have no way of providing it.

I say this not, as you at one time implied, because I seek an accumulation of responsibilities now assigned to others on the staff, but because I do not feel that I can fulfill the responsibility I have (or I thought I had) and because the attempt to do so meets with almost insuperable obstacles under the conditions in which we now function.

The frustrations of overlapping but badly coordinated functions are compounded, at least for me but I think for others too (for whom I do not in any sense purport to speak), by the ill-defined and roaming assignments of certain staff members. These have resulted in separate and uncoordinated contacts with other Executive agencies, foreign embassies and the press on matters of European and Soviet policy and have on several occasions greatly complicated my ability to do my job. Moreover, the still fuzzy line between my responsibilities as the NSC representative on the European IG and Mort Halperin's responsibilities in the NSC process has led to time-consuming and debilitating jurisdictional maneuvering, to confused signals to the agencies and to unnecessary duplication of effort. It seems clear also that those among us supposedly concerned with longer-range analysis and planning find themselves, presumably for lack of a market, irresistably drawn to short-term and operational matters, complicating relations with the agencies and generating irritation.

In a nutshell, a vast amount of organized and spontaneous "sub-contracting" is already occurring in the area of my assignment which,

I strongly believe, adversely affects my ability to do an effective and professional job in serving you, and, through you, the President. I cannot in all honesty see how further fragmentation or proliferation of assignments in my area will improve this situation; more likely it will compound it.

What I do believe you should consider is a conscious effort to give substance to your earlier hope of making this staff a focus of longer-range planning in the Government. Indeed, our failure to do so so far has led to an atrophying of the Government's activities in this respect.

In brief, my recommendation is that you do the following:

(1) Revise the present NSSM system by establishing two types of NSC papers, one dealing with nearer term policy problems and the other with real long term issues, including those that overlap geographic and functional areas. The first type could be called National Security Policy Study (NSPS), the second could remain "NSSM."

(2) NSPSs would continue to come up through the IG-RG (or ad hoc group-RG) route and would be handled by the NSC members presently on IGs or other established groups; they would result in Presidential policy decisions, NSDMs and other specific measures.

(3) NSSMs would not come through IGs, which turn out by and large to be poorly suited for longer-range and more reflective studies or for papers that overlap established bureaus. Instead, NSSMs would be developed in specially constituted groups, chaired from whatever agency is principally relevant to the problem being considered. In some cases an NSC planner could be the chairman or the first drafter. Papers might or might not go to the NSC through the RG (they normally would) and would not necessarily require decisions by the President. They might give rise to a follow-up NSPS. Their basic purpose would be to identify trends, objectives, longer term strategies, and basic conceptions of interests and policy.

The virtue of this proposal is

(1) to create a government community, guided by members of the NSC staff, concerned full-time with thinking about the future;

(2) get the IGs out of a line of work in which they are not at their best (though, obviously, they will retain an interest) and put them full-time into a line of work for which they are best suited;

(3) give specified NSC staff members clear responsibility in the area of longer term planning as distinct from other members responsible for operational and short-to-medium term policy, but, obviously, with communication between them.

37. Memorandum From the Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Staff Meeting²

At the staff meeting on April 30, I discussed the following issues:

1. Requirement to think ahead on problem areas;
2. Requirement to keep close and intimate contact with what is occurring in the departments and agencies and to flag difficult problems for Mr. Kissinger at an early date;
3. Format, content and responsiveness of staff papers; and
4. Improvement of coordination among the staff.

The following items were raised by the staff:

1. Difficulty in reaching Haig and Eagleburger on the telephone due to limited lines.
2. General consensus that the bureaucracy was getting overloaded with NSC requirements.
3. Heavy press of work and short deadlines were precluding the type of reflective planning which staff members felt was essential to forecast the problem areas.
4. Complaint that response to NSSM's involved such heavy work for operations officers that deadlines set by Osgood could not be met.
5. Halperin's complaint that many of his memoranda are never answered.
6. Uniform feeling of most of substantive staff that they need more face-to-face contact with Mr. Kissinger.
7. Bob Osgood's suggestion of periodic staff meetings to discuss planning issues.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 334, Items to Discuss with the President 2/5–7/14/1969. No classification marking.

² Kissinger held his first NSC staff meeting on January 21. Talking points prepared for the meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 314, Staff Meetings. The same folder includes minutes of 44 NSC staff meetings from November 1969 to February 1971, many of them meetings of the NSC Operations staff. Minutes for three NSC staff meetings during September and October 1970 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Young Files, Chronological File, Box 1. Minutes for seven NSC staff meetings during 1971, all but one of them titled Senior Staff Meeting, are *ibid.*, NSC Files, Saunders Files, Box 1272, NSC Operations Staff Meetings, 1971.

8. Hal Sonnenfeldt's recommendation that we forward more correspondence to the Departments for preparation of replies for Presidential signature.

9. Hal Sonnenfeldt's belief that staff needs more feedback on what happens to their papers.

10. Consensus of staff that they need more access to intelligence reports and on a more timely basis.

11. Comment by several operations officers that they need more time to prepare analyses for President's Daily Report if substantive analyses are required.

38. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

National Security Council (NSC) Procedures

Under your able leadership, an excellent organizational system has been molded for considering national security matters. I am concerned, however, about the pattern being established in NSC procedures, particularly with regard to sudden changes in NSC schedules and lateness of papers to be considered by the NSC and the Review Group. In all candor, we are not being provided the time or circumstances for an orderly and studied review of the issues coming before the NSC and the Review Group.

It would seem important that the Review Group—charged as it is with insuring that realistic alternatives are presented to the NSC and that different views are fairly and adequately set out—should be able to function in a reasoned, deliberate manner. For this purpose, its members should have adequate lead time to thoroughly study papers submitted to them. A more important requirement is posed for NSC members who must weigh the pros and cons of various alternatives and recommend to the President policy positions on matters of the highest

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Nixon Files—1969, Box 1347, Nixon Files—1969. Confidential; Eyes Only.

national importance. In recent weeks, however, agenda have been uncertain, and papers have been received too late for adequate review.

I believe it would serve no useful purpose to document the full range of problems we are having with the NSC processes. Rather, I would suggest we strive for a more orderly arrangement, and particularly one that allows the Review Group and National Security Council membership more study and deliberation time before their respective meetings.

I understand the difficult position you are so ably discharging. Please accept my comments as simply a desire to see the system work *more* effectively, to our mutual benefit, to the benefit of the President, and to the benefit of the nation.²

Mel Laird

² In a May 8 follow-up memorandum to Kissinger, Moose and Davis noted that “all the other NSC participants have voiced similar complaints in various degrees. These are legitimate complaints. The late arrival of papers appears to be more serious than the schedule changes and possibly more susceptible of correction,” and “the biggest delay is in the receipt of papers by the NSC Secretariat from the Interdepartmental Groups.” (Ibid.) In his May 19 reply to Laird, Kissinger agreed completely with Laird’s concerns, indicated that “we are stretching out the schedule to allow more time between all phases of the NSC operation,” and noted that “our success, of course, depends on strict observance of the due dates for the papers on which the meeting schedules are pegged.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 1, Chronological File)

39. Memorandum From the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)¹

Washington, May 9, 1969, 10:35 a.m.

MEMORADUM FOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. De Loach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bishop

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President, called from Key Biscayne, Florida. He advised that there is a story today on the front page of the *New York Times* by William Beecher which

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking.

is extraordinarily damaging and uses secret information.² Dr. Kissinger said they wondered whether I could make a major effort to find out where that came from. I said I would. Dr. Kissinger said the article is in the lower right hand corner of the front page and to put whatever resources I need to find who did this. I told him I would take care of it right away. Dr. Kissinger said to do it discreetly, of course, but they would like to know where it came from because it is very damaging and potentially very dangerous. I commented it is this kind of thing that gives us headaches of where they come from; that if we can find the source one time and make an example it would put a stop to it. Dr. Kissinger agreed and said that is what they propose to do.³

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

² A copy of the article, headlined "Raids in Cambodia by U.S. Unprotected," is attached. The article stated that "American B-52 bombers in recent weeks have raided several Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia for the first time, according to Nixon Administration sources, but Cambodia has not made any protest."

³ Hoover wrote beneath his signature: "What do you suggest?"

40. Memorandum by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)¹

Washington, May 9, 1969, 11:05 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. De Loach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bishop

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President, called from Key Biscayne, Florida, and referred to his earlier call to me this morning² regarding an article on the front page of the *New York Times* by William Beecher. He said there were two other stories by the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking.

² See Document 39.

same man within the last ten days—one having to do with our Korean decision and one with the National Security study on strategic forces.³ He said what they would like is to tie all three together. I told him I would look up the other articles and include them in the inquiry which we have already started.

Dr. Kissinger asked that I call him as soon as we know something, but even if we don't, that I call him sometime tomorrow morning to bring him up to date because this is of most intense interest. I told him I would. I also told him I had read the article this morning and there are many facets where I see it would be embarrassing to the Administration and harmful. Dr. Kissinger said they are disastrous because it makes it hard to do this again. I said it also alerts the enemy right away as to exactly what the plans have been.

I told Dr. Kissinger I would call him in the morning. He stated this is of top priority to them. I told him I understood and have issued orders accordingly. Dr. Kissinger said it was reassuring to know I have taken a personal interest in it.

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

³ Reference is to two first-page stories in *The New York Times* by Beecher, one headlined: "Administration Gets Study Of Global Nuclear Strategy," May 1, and the other headlined "Hints of Reprisal Shield U.S. Planes," May 4.

41. Memorandum by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover)¹

Washington, May 9, 1969, 5:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. De Loach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bishop

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking. Also a typed note at the bottom of the page reads, "Original impounded by court order. See memo in 63-16062-3."

I called Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Adviser to the President, at Key Biscayne, Florida. I told him I had some information which I thought he ought to know about so as to bring him up to date.

I told him that in regards to the background of William Beecher, who wrote the article in the *New York Times* today,² he is formerly from the *St. Louis Globe Democrat* and then went to the *Wall Street Journal* and was later employed by the *New York Times*. He has been active in the U.S. Army reserve program for a period of time and is described as particularly astute as to military affairs. In 1966 at the request of Marvin Watson, Assistant to the President at that time, we conducted an investigation as to a leak of information concerning United States government policy in the anti-missile field in connection with an article by Beecher in the *New York Times* of December 27, 1966. Our investigation led to nothing very definite except the possibility that his story was primarily on informed speculation as there had been made available publicly a lot of source material from which he could draw his conclusions.

I stated that in regard to the current three articles,³ it is the conclusion of the contacts we have made that it could have come and probably did from a staff member of the National Security Council. I continued that Beecher while at undergraduate school at Harvard had a roommate who is now a staff member of the National Security Council. There is a strong possibility also that he may have gotten some of his information from the Southeast Asian Desk, Public Affairs Office of the Department of Defense, as the Public Affairs Office is constituted of employees who are pronounced anti-Nixon. I continued that Beecher frequents this office as well as the National Security Council, and the employees freely furnish him information inasmuch as they are largely Kennedy people and anti-Nixon. I said that also in the Systems Analysis Agency in the Pentagon, there are at least 110 in the 124 employees who are still McNamara people and express a very definite Kennedy philosophy.⁴

I continued that this situation has made it very easy for Beecher to obtain information; however, the source we have been working through said it should not be ruled out that a staff member of the

² See footnote 2, Document 39.

³ See Documents 39 and 40.

⁴ In a May 13 letter to Kissinger, Hoover stated: "In regard to the current three articles, it is the conclusion of the sources we have contacted that the information probably came from a staff member such as Morton H. Halperin of the National Security Council. Also, it is a strong possibility that some of the information came from the Southeast Asian Desk, Public Affairs Office of the Department of Defense, as the Public Affairs Office is constituted of anti-Administration personnel." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 88, Confirmation Hearings—Wiretaps)

National Security Council who obviously was in a position to know the information contained in all three articles could have assisted Beecher. Dr. Kissinger said he has heard this as an allegation, too, but there is no proof; that he has heard it as a speculation. I said, of course, this is speculation all the way through tying it into this man Halperin. I said that Beecher works full time at the Pentagon and was asked today as to what his source of information was, and he said it was an excellent one. He said that his source was from the Air Force, but he did not reveal any names. I continued that he stated the Air Force was particularly anxious to soften up its press in its bomber program and is endeavoring to obtain a favorable image with the press. I commented that I thought that was probably a misleading statement by Beecher to throw it into the Air Force.

I continued that there is a man named Eagleburger who attended the Central State College at Stevens Point and the University of Wisconsin and is presently a State Department Foreign Service officer on detail to the National Security Council at the White House. I said he was formerly an assistant to former Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach and is a close friend of Beecher.

I said in regards to Halperin, we conducted an applicant investigation of him in 1962 and in February 1969 and the investigation reflected Halperin and other experts in his field are of the opinion that the United States leadership erred in the Vietnam commitment as we did not possess the interest or capabilities to obtain the original objectives. I said that in 1965 his name appeared on a list of individuals who responded to a request for a public hearing on Vietnam by agreeing to sponsor a national sit-in. I said the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1965 advised that Halperin's name was on a list of Americans who had reportedly received the World Marxist Review Problems of Peace and Socialism, a communist publication.

I continued that from another source it was indicated we should not overlook the Systems Analysis Agency in the Defense Department who had an employee named Ivan Selin and another named Halperin currently employed as staff employee of the National Security Council. I said they are very close to each other and both are so-called arrogant Harvard-type Kennedy men who would not hesitate to do anything to save their jobs. I said it was stated that Halperin was particularly anxious to save Selin's job with the Systems Analysis Agency. I said both men know Beecher and consider him a part of the Harvard clique, and, of course, of the Kennedy era and we should not ignore the possibility that Halperin and/or Selin could be the source of the leak to Beecher.

I said that is as far as we have gotten so far. Dr. Kissinger said he appreciated this very much and he hoped I would follow it up as far

as we can take it and they will destroy whoever did this if we can find him, no matter where he is.

I told Dr. Kissinger I wanted him to know the developments and he said he appreciated it very much and they will certainly keep looking into it at their end. I told him we would keep after it and he said they were counting on whatever we can find out.

Very truly yours,

J.E.H.

42. Memorandum From the Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to the Assistant to the Director (DeLoach)¹

Washington, May 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Colonel Alexander M. Haig
Technical Surveillance Request

Pursuant to my conversation with the Director, Sunday, May 11, 1969, there is enclosed a memorandum for the Attorney General which the Director may want to discuss personally with the Attorney General. It involves a high-level request for technical surveillance on four individuals whose names are contained in the memorandum.²

As I told the Director, the request emanated from Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's staff. Haig came to my office Saturday to advise me the request was being made

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH. No classification marking. Typed at the top and bottom of the memorandum is "DO NOT FILE." A typed note to the right of the subject line states "Original impounded by court order. See memo in 63-16062-3." Below the subject line is written "SPECOV."

² The May 12 memorandum for Mitchell is not attached, but a copy is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box TS 1, Kissinger, Henry A., Nomination as Secty of State, Hearings. The "Approved" line at the end of the memorandum is signed by Mitchell and dated May 12. Three of the four individuals named in the memorandum were members of the NSC staff at the time. Attached to Sullivan's May 11 memorandum is a typed note on the letterhead of the Office of the Director, FBI, dated May 12, that states: "The attached was approved by the Attorney General at 5:48 PM, May 12, 1969." Written in hand below that note is the following: "6:00 p. called Mr. Sullivan and advised him. HWG[andy]."

on the highest authority and involves a matter of most grave and serious consequence to our national security. He stressed that it is so sensitive it demands handling on a need-to-know basis, with no record maintained. In fact, he said, if possible it would even be desirable to have the matter handled without going to the Department; however, I was told the Attorney General is aware in general of the main elements of this serious security problem.

Colonel Haig said it is believed these surveillances will only be necessary for a few days to resolve the issue. We, of course, can handle the matter most discreetly through our Washington Field Office. Colonel Haig said it is not desired that there be any formal dissemination of the results of our coverage to his office. Instead, he will come to my office to review the information developed, which will enable us to maintain tight control of it.

Recommendation

If approved, attached memorandum will not be filed but will be maintained in a secure, off-the-record capacity as basis for authority to proceed in response to this request.³

³ At the bottom of the memorandum Hoover wrote "OK."

43. Editorial Note

The wiretapping of National Security Council staff members, other administration officials, and journalists that began in May 1969 has been treated in a number of studies, among them the following: Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, pages 156–162; Roger Morris, *Haig: The General's Progress*, pages 147–167; Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), especially pages 83–97, 318–325; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), especially pages 212–227, 497–500; and David Wise, *The American Police State: The Government Against the People* (New York: Random House, 1976), pages 31–106. Kissinger, Haig, and President Nixon all discussed the wiretapping in their memoirs: Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, pages 386–390; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pages 252–253, and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pages 118–122, 426–429, 1114–1119; and Haig, *Inner Circles*, especially 213–223.

Documentation on the wiretapping can be found in a number of locations. Both Seymour Hersh (*Price of Power*, pages 646–647) and Walter Isaacson (*Kissinger: A Biography*, pages 789–791) include helpful information on sources. Among those sources they highlight are *Dr. Kissinger's Role in Wiretapping: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), and the depositions and other material generated by Morton Halperin's lawsuit against Kissinger, *Halperin v. Kissinger*, U.S. District Court, Washington, D.C., case 1187–73. Neither the National Security Council files in the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives nor the NSC files for the first Nixon administration held by the National Security Council contain relevant documentation. However, the records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force at the National Archives, RG 460, contain extensive documentation in a series entitled Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigations. Included are many internal Federal Bureau of Investigation memoranda, Director J. Edgar Hoover's letters and memoranda to Nixon, Kissinger, and Attorney General Mitchell, interviews with FBI agents who participated in the wiretapping, chronologies, and other material. While Henry Kissinger's papers at the Library of Congress contain very little documentation on the wiretapping that dates from the 1969–1970 period (see footnote 4, Document 41, and Document 49), his file on *Halperin v. Kissinger* in Box CL 423 includes his statements regarding wiretapping made in connection with: 1) court cases; 2) his 1973 confirmation hearings as Secretary of State; and 3) his 1974 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Also included is a compendium of those statements arranged chronologically that was prepared in 1976 by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 15, 1969.

It has come to the President's attention that some members of your staff or the National Security Council staff have been asked to meet

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 817, Haldeman, H.R. Confidential. A copy was sent to Ziegler.

with members of the press for the purpose of background interviews, etc.

The President wants it clearly understood that no one on your staff and no one on the National Security Council staff is ever to hold any meeting with an individual or group of press people either for background or attribution. He wants you to be the only spokesman for the White House and the NSC in the field of national security and foreign policy, and any time a briefing is required you are to conduct it.

Obviously, there may be specific, highly unusual situations where it will be desirable to violate this rule. If this should become the case, it should not be done without the President's specific authorization for each individual case, and you should discuss this directly with the President.

Will you please be sure that the members of your staff understand this. By carbon of this memo, I am also advising Ron Ziegler of the same situation and will ask that he make sure his staff is aware of it too.

H.

45. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 16, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Washington Special Actions Group

The President has directed that the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Korea be constituted on a permanent basis in the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, May 1969–1971. Confidential.

event of future similar crises worldwide. Henceforth, this committee will be referred to as the Washington Special Actions Group.²

The President visualizes that the Washington Special Actions Group will confine itself to consideration of the policies and plans affecting crises. Implementation of policy decisions and coordination of operations will be conducted through the interagency Crisis Task Forces prescribed by the Under Secretaries Committee under the authority of NSDM 8.³

Henry A. Kissinger

² In a June 20 memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, the President directed that WSAG "review existing military contingency plans for potential crises areas. Where existing plans appear to be inadequate, it is contemplated that the group will initiate action to have appropriate additional plans prepared." (Ibid.)

³ Document 31. Minutes for most WSAG meetings starting with the first meeting on July 2, 1969, through the meeting on July 22, 1974, are at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-114-H-117, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Files on each meeting that include talking points, briefing memoranda, background papers, summaries of conclusions, and, for many meetings, minutes are also *ibid.*, Boxes H-070-H-097.

46. Memorandum From the Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to the Director (Hoover)¹

Washington, May 20, 1969.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Following my conversation with you this morning, Dr. Henry Kissinger and Colonel Haig came into the office around 11:45. Dr. Kissinger read all the logs. On doing this, he said "it is clear that I don't have anybody in my office that I can trust except Colonel Haig here." He mentioned that he was under great pressures to adopt a soft line on foreign policy. But he said he is not going to do so. He did not mention where the pressures came from, but I got the impression that he meant the Department of State and possibly one or two others high in the administration. He indicated that President Nixon definitely wanted to maintain a hard line.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 27, Witness Statements, Sullivan—Depositions. Confidential.

Dr. Kissinger said he wanted the coverage to continue for a while longer yet on the first four names, and to which will be added two new ones I sent over to you today. He said that what he is learning as a result of this coverage is extremely helpful to him while at the same time very disturbing. He said he had not decided how to handle this problem but he did not see as he could delay it much longer. He said that Colonel Haig, as in the past, would come over to read the logs. He asked to be remembered to you.

Respectfully submitted,

Bill Sullivan

47. Memorandum From the Assistant Director (Domestic Intelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sullivan) to the Assistant to the Director (DeLoach)¹

Washington, May 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Colonel Alexander M. Haig
Technical Surveillance Request

Pursuant to the Director's request, there is enclosed with this memorandum a letter from the Director to President Nixon setting forth some extremely sensitive material on Morton H. Halperin and Daniel Ira Davidson developed yesterday through our delicate coverage.²

Colonel Alexander Haig read the material this morning and expressed his grave concern and said he would transmit the details of this to Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Because of the explosive nature of this operation, I would like to restate the original request made by Colonel Haig to me. It will be recalled he said that the instructions for the Bureau's assistance in this

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 460, Plumbers Task Force, Gray/Wiretap Investigation, Box 27, Witness Statements, Sullivan—Depositions. No classification marking. Typed at the top and bottom of the memorandum is "DO NOT FILE." A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: "Original impounded by court order. See memo in 63-16062-3."

² The letter to the President is not attached, but a copy of Hoover's letter to Kissinger of the same date, May 28, is *ibid.*, Box 8, FBI Wiretap Correspondence with WH.

matter came from the highest authority; however, to protect the highest authority he would read the materials and advise Dr. Henry Kissinger. He further stated he did not want any of the logs sent over to Dr. Kissinger's office but that he would read it here and have it kept here. In view of this, I would like to suggest that the Director consider taking this matter up personally and directly with President Nixon rather than having it carried to the President. I suggest this because of the sensitivity related above and that the only way that it could be made known to President Nixon without an intermediary would be through the Director. Additionally, President Nixon might not want anyone else in his office to know of this matter. Lastly, the Director might want to discuss this directly with Dr. Kissinger first.

Recommendations

- (1) For the information and consideration of the Director.
- (2) That this memorandum be returned to W. C. Sullivan to be retained with the rest of this extremely sensitive material.

48. Editorial Note

In its June 3, 1969, issue, *The New York Times* carried a front page story by Hedrick Smith headlined "U.S. Said to Plan an Okinawa Deal Barring A-Bombs." Henry Kissinger telephoned U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, early that morning and told him the President was "fit to be tied" by the article. (Notes of telephone conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Telcons, Personal) The President's Assistant H. R. Haldeman wrote in his diary for that day: "Big flap about Okinawa leak in *New York Times*. Rick Smith had complete and accurate story about contents of an NSC Decision memorandum. P[resident] really upset because of jeopardy to national security. Had me call Cushman, Richardson and Laird, have them get complete internal report on who had access, etc." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Haldeman telephoned Richardson and told him: "the point is that it is obvious that this seriously impairs our negotiating position; also obvious that the leak was by someone who had access to the NSC paper; and the President feels that unless we find out who it is, the entire NSC meetings are compromised." (Notes of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 104, Telcons)

In a telephone conversation between Laird and Kissinger, June 3 at 11:40 a.m.: "L said President had given him a note about his concern over the story today in the *New York Times*. K said concern is no expression—he is climbing walls. L said he is sure it is not out of his shop. K said L will get an official request by President to conduct an investigation. K said we have a pretty good idea where it came from, but in order to be fair we are going to ask every senior official to make an investigation. L said it was the worst thing that could have happened over there. K said there was one argument that it was leaked in order to get the hard-line Senators stirred up. L said he would wait for the memo. K said he would get it from Haldeman on the plane. K said frankly we do not think it comes out of L's shop. L said it is a lousy thing to come out now and K said it was disastrous." (Ibid., Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

The referenced memo, if it was prepared, has not been found.

The next morning *The New York Times* carried a front-page article by Hedrick Smith headlined "Nixon-Thieu Talk May Bring Accord on U.S. Troop Cut." In a conversation between Secretary Rogers and Kissinger at 10:30 a.m. that day: "R again said he was concerned about Okinawa thing—we have to be sure that deliberations made by NSC are secure. K asked if R had any idea as to where leak came from. R said no reason why anyone at State would do it—it is quite contrary to our best interests. K said only one on his staff involved was State Dept man, close associate of Alex Johnson's and has the same views." (Ibid.)

In a 2 p.m. conversation with Kissinger on June 3: "The President wanted to know if HAK had any more ideas on where the story came from. HAK felt there was a pattern that is emerging by people trying to get out ahead to steal the thunder. Richardson is really shaken and realizes that the President just won't discuss anything with them if this continues and the President agreed. Only one person in his office was aware of this HAK said. The President's opinion was that it was coming from State. HAK said someone called his attention to the fact that Beecher had not written a byline since these stories started coming from Smith. The President wasn't as concerned about this as he was the Okinawa story. He wanted to make sure HAK had told Rogers he had changed his mind and HAK confirmed that he had discussed this. They agreed to go along the three guidelines and to reaffirm just that." (Ibid.)

Haldeman entered the following in his diary for June 4: "New security flap about troop withdrawal leak. [The President] had me call all Departments again, this time to say we know someone gave a backgrounder, wants report on who. Of course all denied it. Then wanted more detailed push on NSC Okinawa investigation. By evening was really mad. Kept calling me from San Clemente house with new or-

ders to investigate." Haldeman's informal, handwritten notes for June 4 included the following entries: "skip NSC Weds—P. has decided to skeleton them. cut NSC to one every 2 wks—or once a month. less papers[.] more brought privately to P. for his decision w/K. go right fm subcomm to P—not to NSC"; and later in his notes, "decided because of leaks—no NSC mtg on SALT talks[;] none from now on until further notice[;] no paper on any of this." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Haldeman Notes, Box 40) In his diary for June 4, Haldeman wrote that the President "decided no more NSC meetings. Result of leak. Can't trust to papers. Will make decisions privately, with K."

Haldeman conveyed the same information in telephone conversation with Kissinger on June 4 at 5:25 p.m. In reply, "K said he agrees with much of this but we have to go thru the NSC on next two sessions on strategic arms talks. K said we have to have a meeting on the 13th and one on the 18th—after that we can put into effect what the Pres wants. K said NSC is President's one way of keeping control of the Govt. K said we need to cancel the Wednesday meeting, but it should be held some other time during the week because we do not want Pres accused of holding up talks. It was agreed to tentatively block out 3:30 on Friday, June 13, for two hours." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files)

In a June 9 memorandum, Alexander Haig, Kissinger's deputy, advised Kissinger "to discuss [with Nixon] procedures associated with future NSC meetings in the light of the President's reaction to recent leaks. Termination of formal NSC meetings would adequately constitute an unacceptable modification in the announced policy formulation process and would open the Administration to serious charges, which we would have difficulty answering in the face of the justifications promulgated earlier." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 957, Haig Chron—June 1969). The National Security Council met on June 13 and again on June 18 and 25.

The Okinawa leak also spurred further discussion about phone taps. Haldeman noted in his diary for June 3 that he had a "long talk with K[issinger] about his leaks. E[hrlichman] and I had breakfast with him and advised him to move out the suspect people. He later told P that this is what he's doing. Set up detailed plan for tapping all suspects, not carried out." According to Haldeman's informal, handwritten notes for June 3, Ehrlichman made the following proposal: "full list of all who have access to NSC papers[;] tap all exc. K. Haig & members of NSC[,] all sub cab & others—tap on."

49. **Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, June 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Meeting with J. Edgar Hoover, Wednesday, June 4 at 9:30 a.m.

1. Express your appreciation to Mr. Hoover and Mr. Sullivan for their outstanding support in recent weeks in uncovering security problems within the NSC staff. Inform Mr. Hoover that you have discussed these problems in detail with the President (and with Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlichman).

2. Tell Mr. Hoover of the action to be taken with respect to Davidson.²

3. Ask Mr. Hoover for his views on how we should proceed with Halperin, who had been involved in indiscretions and who obviously has a reputation for liberal views but who has yet to be firmly linked with a security breach. I think it best that you seek Mr. Hoover's advice in this instance while avoiding any specific comments pro or con and especially avoiding any opinions on this matter.

4. Request Mr. Hoover's advice on how to proceed with Sonnenfeldt.

5. Ask Mr. Hoover if he has any additional information or guidance which he feels would be helpful in this very difficult situation. Specifically you might inquire about the requirement for prolonging the taps, making it clear that the President wishes to terminate them as soon as possible. (I think in the case of Halperin and Sonnenfeldt that they should be kept on for at least another two weeks so that a pattern of innocence can be firmly established.)³

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 88, Confirmation Hearings—Wiretaps. Top Secret; Sensitive. Points 1, 3, and 5 of the memorandum are quoted in full in Morris, *Haig: The General's Progress*, pp. 159–160.

² Reference is to Daniel Davidson of the NSC staff, who resigned on May 29.

³ According to informal notes kept by Haldeman, Ehrlichman made the following comments at a meeting with the President on June 16: "re taps—impt. for K. to get the files out of his office[;] thru E & Mitchell find someone to read taps[;] maybe use Huston etc. for this[;] work out a scheme—minimize what done thru Hoover[;] esp. newsmen—shld be done by outsider. K. shldn't be reading these—" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Haldeman Notes, Box 40)

50. Editorial Note

Sometime in the afternoon of June 18, 1969, in a telephone conversation with Attorney General Mitchell: "K[issinger] said he has another State Dept problem with which he wanted to acquaint AG and on which he might need AG's help. Starting this week, State is not sending cables over for clearance before they go out—in any area especially on VN. AG asked including Paris and K said right—they sent Walsh into see Sovt Ambs without clearance from the White House . . . K said Soviets must think we have lost our minds on the basis of what K showed AG on Dobrynin. WH clearance for eight years has been standard. AG asked who signed Cable and K said all cables are signed by Rogers. K said he knows this is direct order from him. AG said he definitely agrees this cannot be. AG asked how K got cable and K said it comes over automatically. AG said he thought K should take up with Pres and K said he would like to say that he had discussed it with AG. AG said by all means—could not be stronger about anything he has run into down here. K said he feels the President has to have control on foreign policy and if K is not doing job well enough, he should get someone else. AG said he agreed that control had to be at WH—they will murder him if he does not have this. AG said K should be as strong as he needs to be and if he needs AG's backup to let him know." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Later that day in a draft memorandum to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger noted two recent instances in which the State Department "had failed to clear highly important communications on Vietnam with the White House" and emphasized how essential it was for the President "to exercise control over important communications of Presidential concern." Kissinger proposed sending a memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers that spelled out the categories of messages that the State Department should refer to the National Security Council for clearance prior to transmission. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1) Kissinger decided instead, however, to forward to Nixon the next day a much briefer memorandum for Rogers that stated: "I have noticed that clearance of some important cables with the White House was recently overlooked by the State Department. I would like to reaffirm my wish that departmental telegrams be cleared with the White House to insure that I am kept fully abreast of communications on important policy and operational matters of Presidential interest." Nixon signed the memorandum, and it was delivered to the Department of State on June 20. (Ibid.)

Rogers drafted a response, making a number of handwritten revisions, in which he stated that it was his understanding "that cables

involving policy matters should be cleared with your staff but I did not understand, nor do I think it wise, that I should clear all cables dealing with operations with your staff. If this is required then my role as Secretary of State would be a mere conduit." Rogers concluded, "Unless you want personally to clear all operational cables then I would think that the discretion as to whether they should be brought to your attention should rest with me." (Ibid., RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 3, Personal Papers of William P. Rogers)

In a telephone conversation with Kissinger on June 20 at 6:30 p.m., Rogers said that he "was a little upset by the memo the President sent him on these cables. He had an answer he was going to send to the President but wanted to discuss it with HAK first. It was not his understanding that HAK's staff would clear operational cables.

"HAK said he thought we should keep matters where they are. It is certainly satisfactory for everyone's point of view. There was one cable that the President noticed in the regular reading material that HAK gives the President on all Paris negotiations that was in question. This cable had not been cleared but added that we couldn't clear all of Roger's cables. The system that now exists will be no problem—concerning policy cables was the only thing he had in mind. Rogers said if he really wants to see everything we send over. Rogers also express concern over the fact that when he clears a cable then Walsh has to call Sneider and Sneider has to clear it. HAK didn't think this was right and said the Secretary should have the last word.

"Rogers said he would talk to the President about this and HAK agreed that he should. He said he has a general line they follow and that the day to day negotiations really should be done at State. He said it doesn't make any difference what we say in the public sessions but a change in direction he would certainly clear with WH.

"HAK assured him that this was the procedure that had been followed in previous administrations even back to Eisenhower. Rogers wasn't sure it went back that far." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

In a June 21 memorandum to Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Kissinger's Military Assistant, noted that Nixon's memorandum on cable clearances had "generated a sharp reaction from Rogers and that Rogers indicated he would call the President about this subject. You should point out to the President that it would be most difficult to protect him if, as Rogers insists, clearances be cut down to include only telegrams which involve policy changes. This is ridiculous in terms of past policy and would mean that all operational cables and negotiating traffic, even in times of crises, could legalistically be excluded by the Secretary of State. Past experience has indicated that it is not diffi-

cult to assess a subject on its own merits and to seek White House clearance in cases where the President's interest is evident. This would apply to most Vietnam negotiating traffic and until quite recently all of these messages have been cleared by the White House. You should inform the President that this is an important issue and one in which there could be no compromise if you are to serve him in your present capacity." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 957, Haig Chron-June 1969)

On June 26 President Nixon sent Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird a memorandum (Document 53) that spelled out the categories of messages to be cleared with the NSC using the language that Kissinger had first considered forwarding to the President on June 18.

51. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Working Groups on Viet-Nam

Recommendation

That you establish a policy-level US/Vietnamese working group to be presided over by yourself and to include Mel Laird, Henry Kissinger, General Wheeler and myself; that the first session of this group take place early next week; and that subsequent meetings be held weekly, preferably on Tuesdays.²

Discussion

During my conversation with you on the morning of June 24³ I reported that President Thieu had proposed the establishment of US/Vietnamese working groups in both Saigon and Washington in order to assure a common strategy as we move forward. President Thieu

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Country Files, Vietnam, Vol. XIII. Secret.

² Nixon neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Rogers and Nixon met at the White House from 10:18 to 11:10 a.m on June 24. No record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

regards such a suggestion as a logical outcome of the conversations which he had with you in Midway on this subject.

This memorandum contains my recommendations for the form in which I believe we should organize ourselves in Washington to meet this request. It does not address the matter of organization in Saigon, which I believe is best left to Thieu and Bunker to determine.

My first recommendation would be that we form a compact group at the policy level over which you would preside and on which Mel Laird, Henry Kissinger, General Wheeler and I would sit. You might wish to expand this unit to include one or two others, such as Dick Helms.

It would be my suggestion that this group meet once a week, preferably on Tuesdays, so that it can have a timely impact on the Thursday negotiating sessions in Paris. The group would also be available to be convoked in emergency situations if circumstances warrant.

Ancillary to this group would be the ad hoc committee on Vietnam which Bill Sullivan currently chairs. That group has representation from the White House, State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and CIA. An AID representative participates when his presence is needed. They currently meet three times a week or more often if necessary.

On the Vietnamese side, Ambassador Bui Diem is the principal representative here in Washington. I have already informed him that he should meet with Sullivan as often as is necessary. Their first meeting is scheduled for June 25. He has indicated his desire to discuss President Thieu's proposed statement on a political settlement as well as tactics and timing for the Paris negotiations. I have assured him that representatives of the various US Departments and Agencies are available to him through Sullivan's committee and that I myself or other Cabinet-level officials would see him if the situation warrants it.

If these recommendations conform to the views which you expressed in our conversation, I will arrange with Henry Kissinger to have this organization activated. I would suggest that the first session of the policy group take place early next week because I feel that we are pressed for time, particularly with respect to the statement to be issued by President Thieu.

WPM

52. **Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, June 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday, June 25

1. Although you are not scheduled to see the President this morning it is probably essential that you do so, in which case you should discuss Secretary Rogers' proposal for an informal working group on Vietnam.²

—I discussed this with Dick Sneider last night and was told that this was an effort by the Secretary of State to avoid a showdown with you and to pose a compromise solution to his long-standing problems on Vietnam. Sneider said that the President had been aware of the proposal and had approved it, and that it had been formulated in the last day or so after receipt of the President's memorandum on cables.³ Then, as a result of a little plumbing on my part, he stated that the problem had been in the hopper for some time and that the memorandum from the President merely added salt to the wound. Sneider concluded his comments to me with a statement to the effect that you had better accept this one rather than lose the whole ball game. I can only conclude from that that Sneider has been well versed on the evolution of this proposal as well as on many of our other problems with State.

—One additional point that Dick Sneider made when I asked him whether or not the proposal was visualized as being in the framework of the NSC—Dick stated, "of course not. The NSC system is dead, Henry killed it long ago."

—Despite the foregoing, I cannot help but feel that there is some blackmail being exercised by State in an effort to kill the NSC system, to reassert the vicarship of the Secretary and to defuse your power while at the same time avoiding a direct confrontation with the President, which Rogers may not be sure he can win. This has all the earmarks of a State Department ploy to achieve maximum benefits with minimum risks. I do not believe you should roll over on this one.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President's Daily Briefs, Box 8, June 17–30, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² Document 51.

³ See Document 50. A transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with Sneider on June 24 at 7:20 p.m., is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.

—Consequently, I recommend you discuss the Rogers' memo with the President, informing him:

(a) of how it was delivered to you and state that the proposed organization might ensure some concentrated attention to the Vietnam situation which is in dire need of thoughtful attention;

(b) you have assumed that the organization would be within the framework of the NSC system, which were it to be otherwise it would emasculate the system and could not but lead to its downfall;

(c) if it is the President's intention to let the system fall of its own weight then you will, of course, accede to the proposal. If not, then you should recommend that the President only adopt this organization within the framework of the NSC system.

2. As I look back over the main failures of the NSC system, in fact they be failures, the only area with which we have failed to achieve our objectives is that of security. I am personally convinced that the President's confidence has been shaken in the entire system because of inexcusable pattern of leaks which have emanated from State and Defense and perhaps your own staff. The solution that Rogers has proposed is to return to a breakfast group pattern in which a handful of advisers move on policy deliberations which affect the entire country and which will only increase the risk of a lack of bureaucracy consensus for courses of action which might be undertaken. I am personally strongly opposed to this type of government, which cannot but have dire effects for the Nation. If we are afraid to bite the bullet and establish the kind of bureaucratic discipline so essential to the conduct of NSC affairs, then the bypassing of the structure and the designation of a handful of individuals to deal with our policy issues will only enable the Secretaries of State and Defense to overlook a basic deficiency in their organizations (and perhaps you in our own), which will arise again in the future to scuttle the President's programs in another form.

3. On balance, I am convinced that the President should think very hard about discarding the NSC system after such a brief period. A circumventing of the bureaucracy will not solve the basic ills which the shortcomings in the NSC system have uncovered. These ills are a lack of discipline and loyalty to the President himself and a failure on the part of key principals in the Administration to adhere to the policy guidance which I feel he has clearly enunciated on issue after issue. The list of breakdowns is long and frightening and rests primarily on the shoulders of the Secretary of State, whose department, in my view, has frequently⁴ been the source of disloyalty to policy guidance enunciated by the President. As examples, I cite:

⁴ "Frequently" is handwritten above "invariably," which was crossed out.

- The President's guidance on SALT.
- The President's guidance on the broad relationship of all ongoing areas of interest to the Soviets as they affect Soviet actions which might lead toward progress in Vietnam.
- Spanish negotiations.
- Recognition of Mongolia, etc.

4. In my view, the time has come for some tough talk and some meaningful action with respect to loyalty to the President's programs. Bureaucratic in-fighting can no longer be tolerated. Unless the President recognizes⁵ these issues,⁶ ad hoc kitchen cabinets, breakfast groups or any other organizational gimmick will sooner or later suffer the same fate. You may wish to draw upon the above rationale in discussing this issue with the President. If despite your objections, he desires to try the Rogers' proposal I recommend that you agree to do your best to make them work and then sit down with Secretary Rogers face-to-face and set about establishing the procedures for doing so.

⁵ "recognizes" is handwritten above "views," which was crossed out.

⁶ The words "and finds a solution to them" were typed after the word "issues" but then crossed out.

53. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, June 26, 1969.

I believe you will agree that I am best served when there is full coordination between our respective staffs, and when I am fully apprised of current national security operational and policy questions. To ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to my policy in this area, I thought it would be useful to review the categories of messages which should regularly be referred here prior to transmission. These are:

—Policy cables—those laying out or interpreting general policy for the guidance of officials abroad as well as instructions regarding

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 280, Department of State, Vol. III, 6/1/69. Confidential. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for the President's signature on June 26. (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, June 26; *ibid.*, President's Daily Briefs, Box 8, June 17–30, 1969) For background on the memorandum, see Document 50.

approaches to foreign governments or positions to be taken by representatives abroad.

—Operational instructions involving policy questions, current negotiations, or the handling of critical situations.

—Foreign visitors, either scheduled or prospective in whom there is a real or potential Presidential interest.

—Any communication which involves or mentions the President or the White House.

—Any telegram relating to a matter currently under consideration or scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council or its related bodies.

—Matters in which there is a known Presidential interest, particularly items which the President has, or may be expected to have, before him for decision.

54. Editorial Note

During a meeting with his Assistant H.R. Haldeman on June 26, 1969, President Nixon made the following comments in connection with the “K[issinger] plan,” according to Haldeman’s notes: “re staff talking—in dom. policy wld hope use good jdgmt. Absolute rule—eff. today[:] *nobody* to talk or say anything re foreign policy—on or off record—w/o K. approval esp. Safire, Klein. don’t interpret, defend, attack, explain—involved in *very* sophisticated business. certain developments—next 3 mos. absolute curtain. includes *everybody*—just refer to what P. has said. don’t re-state, define, etc. still get K. in to explain to them re analysis. P. staff relation w/press[:] staffer has *no* views of his own. have to have central control. whole & *only* job here is to build up presidency & that’s not hard to do. can’t build up self—all goodies are the P’s. hold to absolute rule on *Times-Post*. Kilpatrick OK to except on routine.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Haldeman Notes, Box 40)

55. Memorandum From the Director of the Secretariat Staff of the Department of State (Gleysteen) to the Deputy Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Ruser)¹

Washington, June 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Under Secretaries' Committee Action Assignments

We have gone through our NSC files and have compiled a list of NSC Under Secretaries' Committee action responsibilities. The result is as follows:

—NSDMs 2 and 3—The Under Secretaries' Committee was assigned certain general responsibilities.²

—NSDM 8—The Under Secretaries' Committee was assigned certain responsibilities in connection with crisis anticipation and management.³

—NSDM 12—The Under Secretaries' Committee was directed to examine REDCOSTE proposals and to coordinate and monitor U.S. preparations for offset negotiations.⁴

—NSDM 13—The Under Secretaries' Committee was to supervise the preparation of a strategy paper on Okinawa negotiations.⁵

—NSDM 17—The Under Secretaries' Committee was directed to supervise the preparation of certain documents relating to this NSDM.⁶

—NSDM 18—The Under Secretaries' Committee has been assigned the task of reviewing the annual underground nuclear test program and requests for authorization of specific tests.⁷

—NSSM 43—In this document the Under Secretaries' Committee was directed to submit a series of recommendations to implement the President's proposals to the NATO Ministerial Meeting in April.⁸

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC/USC Memos. Secret.

² Documents 11 and 12.

³ Document 31.

⁴ NSDM 12, "NATO," April 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 12.)

⁵ NSDM 13, "Policy Toward Japan," May 28. (Ibid., Box H-210)

⁶ NSDM 17, "Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China," June 26. (Ibid.)

⁷ NSDM 18, "Review of Underground Nuclear Tests," June 27. (Ibid.)

⁸ NSSM 43, "Implementation of President's Proposals to NATO Ministerial Meeting," April 15. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S-NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212)

—NSSM 25—The Under Secretaries’ Committee became involved in a study of the relationship of Plowshare to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.⁹ Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of May 19 called for further study of this subject.¹⁰

—The Under Secretaries’ Committee has been seized with the problem of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory.

—The Under Secretaries Committee has studied the question of the Brazilian DE construction program.

—The Under Secretary was involved in the Working Group called for by NSSM 4 to review US foreign aid policy.¹¹

—The Under Secretaries’ Committee has studied US aid to the Japanese space program (memorandum of May 19).¹²

—The Under Secretaries’ Committee is studying the question of the Dutch interest in U.S. assistance in the development of nuclear submarines (memo of May 20).¹³

DG

⁹ NSSM 25, “Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and Limited Test Ban Treaty,” February 20. (Ibid.)

¹⁰ Memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State. (National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 15, NSC/USC Memos)

¹¹ NSSM 4, “U.S. Foreign Aid Policy,” January 21. (Ibid., S/S–NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212)

¹² NSC–U/SM 16, May 19. (Ibid., Lot 81 D 309)

¹³ NSC–U/SM 17, May 20. (Ibid.)

56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers’ Proposal for the Establishment of Working Groups on Vietnam

At Tab A is a memorandum from Bill Rogers² forwarding the proposal he mentioned to you on June 24, which would establish a policy

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Vol. VIII, 7/1/69–7/31/69. Secret.

² Document 51.

level US/Vietnamese working group presided over by yourself and including Bill Rogers, Mel Laird, General Wheeler and myself.

While I agree with Bill's proposal to establish a compact Cabinet level policy group, I fear the organizational lines he proposes would have the practical effect of placing control over both Vietnam policy and operational matters in the hands of the Secretary of State by (a) establishing a Cabinet level working group under your titular chairmanship outside of the National Security Council framework and, (b) by placing the current Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam chaired by Bill Sullivan under this group as staff support.

In practice it is not likely that you would have the time nor the inclination to meet weekly on operational matters associated with Vietnam. Thus, State would, at the departmental level, assume a predominant role in the conduct of Vietnam affairs. Further, on the occasions when the Cabinet level committee did meet to determine important policy issues, agendas, working papers and interdepartmental coordination would be prepared by a committee chaired by State and divorced entirely from the NSC machinery, which now gives equal weight to the views of all the departments concerned. Also, in the conduct of day-to-day affairs, it is probable that White House clearances could then be effectively circumvented because of the special role assigned to the interdepartmental ad hoc committee. The overall impact of this special arrangement would greatly diminish your control over the conduct of Vietnam affairs now afforded by the NSC system. In other words, the proposal is, in effect, the SIG system which State tried so hard to implement last January and which you rejected.

I am sure Mel Laird and General Wheeler would be equally disturbed at the prospect of giving State predominant control over the conduct of Vietnam business. General Goodpaster shares these views. John Mitchell also feels that it would be a grave mistake to take this road.

It therefore seems to me that if there is to be a working group, it should (a) be part of the NSC system, (b) be ad hoc so that your schedule is protected, (c) be served by the NSC staff, and (d) meet only at your request. The action would be completely consistent with the charter of the National Security Council as approved by you in January and would enable you to assemble a more manageable Cabinet level group under your chairmanship to consider issues related to Vietnam. This may prove especially timely during the coming weeks when so many sensitive Vietnam-related issues must be addressed. The Cabinet level working group would receive its support as does the full NSC—by the NSC staff—thereby ensuring the same kind of Presidential control as is currently exercised.

Recommendation

I recommend you sign the memorandum at Tab B to Bill which approves the establishment of a Cabinet level working group on Vietnam but which modifies his proposal by keeping the group within the NSC framework.³

³ See Document 57.

57. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Working Groups on Vietnam

I have given considerable thought to your memorandum of June 24,² proposing the formulation of a group on Vietnam, chaired by me and composed of yourself, Laird, Wheeler, and Kissinger. I welcome the opportunity for periodic meetings of this group. However, given the demands on my time, I do not want to commit myself to another fixed meeting. Instead, I propose to convene such a group as the need arises in lieu of the full NSC and as part of the NSC process. I have instructed Henry Kissinger to staff it along these lines.³

RN

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, Vol. VIII, 7/1/69–7/31/69. Secret.

² Document 56.

³ Below his initials, the President wrote: "I would also like to have John Mitchell as a member of this group—The first meeting should be early next week—"

58. **Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, July 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, July 2, 1969, 10:00 a.m.

Introduction

Introduce the meeting by outlining for group the purpose of the exercise which should include:

1. An overall review of existing military contingency plans by the policy level group in order to:

a. bring the group up to date on the menu of existing contingency plans in the event of emergencies similar to the EC-121 shootdown.

b. enable this policy group to consider whether or not existing military plans are responsive to the most probable crisis situations that can develop over the short range.

c. test these plans carefully in terms of their own technical suitability, i.e., levels of force, response time, impact on ability to react to concurrent crises elsewhere, impact on Vietnam conflict, etc.

d. enable group to direct the development of additional military contingency plans where gaps appear as a result of the review.

e. prepare an integrated game plan blending military and political actions to permit immediate response from a policy perspective in the event contingencies occur.

2. Emphasize that the operation of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) should not conflict with ongoing politico-military contingency planning done at the Interdepartmental level nor should it conflict in time of crisis with the operational implementation of the policy decisions which will emanate through the WSAG to the Department of State for implementation and interdepartmental coordination.

3. Elicit discussion from the group on the objectives and charter of the WSAG.

[Omitted here is discussion of contingency planning for Korea.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, May 1969-1971, Korea, 7/2/69. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Printed from an unsigned copy. The July 2 meeting was the WSAG's first meeting.

59. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, July 2, 1969, 11:42 a.m.–12:28 p.m.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP (WSAG) MEETING

SUBJECT

Military Contingency Planning for Korea

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman	NSC Staff
State—U. Alexis Johnson	Col. Alexander M. Haig
Defense—G. Warren Nutter	Col. Robert M. Behr
CIA—Cord Meyer	
JCS—Vice Adm. Nels C. Johnson	

Summary of Decisions

1. The WSAG will review the NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea² instead of the NSC Review Group.

2. The NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea will be the agenda item for the next WSAG meeting on July 11, 1969.

3. The areas of immediate concern to the WSAG are Korea, Berlin and the Middle East. Following WSAG review of relevant interdepartmental and military contingency plans for these areas, further requirements will be met by task forces functioning as working groups under the WSAG. The existing Berlin and Korean Task Forces will be employed, and action initiated to form a similar element for the Middle East.

4. The contingency of actual Sino-Soviet hostilities will be an additional concern of the WSAG.

Kissinger opened the meeting stating that its purpose was primarily organizational although some time would be devoted to the “Red Books” (covering military plans for Korean contingencies) provided the Committee Members by the Joint Staff. He reviewed the President’s thoughts on the need for updated and effective procedures for contingency planning, having in mind documents which would be useful for incidents similar to the EC-121 “shoot down.” Kissinger said he envi-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Behr, who forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under cover of a July 3 memorandum. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

² NSSM 34, March 21, 1969, and the Contingency Study are *ibid.*

sioned the WSAG to have policy responsibility for the content of contingency plans but that the implementation of these plans would clearly rest with organizations such as those within the State Department that have already been structured to accept these responsibilities. Moreover he wished it to be clearly understood that actual operations during contingencies would not be run from the White House Situation Room. What has to be done now is to develop ways of interfacing military and political considerations and to answer the question "who does what"? He noted that military plans for contingencies are highly sensitive and that, for WSAG actions, only the principals should have access to the documents. They would not be reproduced and would be returned to the Joint Staff after having been worked in the WSAG. Ultimately, what will be required are contingency folders, approved by the WSAG, then kept on file in the White House Situation Room for use in possible emergencies. He then asked the group members for their comments.

Secretary Johnson immediately called to mind the comparison between the Berlin Task Force and the Korean Task Force under Ambassador Brown, which has prepared a plan for Korean contingencies in response to NSSM 34. He commended this plan to Kissinger saying that it covers much of the same ground as the "Red Books" sent to the Group by the Joint Staff. He remarked on the effectiveness of the "Live Oak" plans done by the Berlin Task Force. This is an on-going operation which has produced plans in great detail and with an underlying concept that the planning group would also be deeply involved in the emergency actions incident to Berlin contingencies. He stated that with respect to the Korean Task Force, much valuable work has already been done. What should now be done is to refine the work under the direction of the WSAG serving as a "Watch Dog" committee. Kissinger remarked that the President was not telling the WSAG how to organize, but that he desires the group to provide plans which will give him the same kind of assurance that he had during the EC-121 incident.

Secretary Johnson stated that the Korean Task Force work is now ready to be looked at by the NSC Review Group. Kissinger rejoined that the plan should not be handled by the Review Group but by the WSAG. He did not believe the Review Group could address the problems with the same precision that the President needs for decision making in contingency situations. Admiral Johnson concurred, stating that the military aspects of the contingency plans are highly sensitive and that the security aspects of these plans are of paramount importance.³ Kissinger

³ In NSDM 19, issued July 3 and signed by Kissinger, the President directed that "henceforth political-military contingency plans prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups in accordance with NSDM 8 should be forwarded to the NSC Washington Special Actions Group." (Ibid.)

added that whether the plan would eventually appear on the NSC Agenda was a decision the President would have to make at a later date.

Turning to Admiral Johnson, Kissinger asked whether the military participated in the Korean contingency plan. Admiral Johnson said that they had but he was not sure to what extent. He thought the document reflected military planning in outline form but not in the detail contained in the “Red Books” before the members. He then reported an exercise internal to the Joint Staff which resulted in a “Crisis Data Book.” This effort visualized hypothetical contingency situations, how they could develop, predicted the reactions of other affected countries, then postulated reasonable US actions and their consequences.

Kissinger returned to the President’s objectives with respect to contingency plans. The President wants, he said, no generalized statements, but instead courses of action which would be useful in specific situations. For example, if he wants three B-52s to strike a designated objective, what else would he have to do. He is interested in knowing the possible reactions of affected people and governments. What exactly is likely to happen in a political/military sense? He wants a check list of what he has to do—not esoteric speculation about events that could lead to a crisis. Additionally, follow-on factors have to be considered such as how to deal with reinforcement levels. Secretary Johnson opined there was a need to amplify the contingency scenarios. Kissinger reflected on his own thought processes during the EC-121 incident and remarked that his initial reactions were probably naive. The main lesson he learned from the incident was that the trick in any action taken would be to preclude a counter blow. He reported some after-thoughts the President had on the EC-121 incident to the effect that if such an occasion arose in the future and a B-52 strike was believed necessary, the price you pay really isn’t much greater for a strike with twenty-five aircraft than with three. The need is to look determined and, if the object is to prevent counter-responses, the action taken should be powerful blow. If a similar situation were to arise today, he (the President) would probably either do nothing or select an option toward the extreme of the range of possibilities. Admiral Johnson said that he agreed with the President’s ideas as do the Joint Chiefs. For example, if you attack an airfield but don’t take out the enemy’s air order of battle, you are in deep trouble.

Nutter suggested a parallel between the President’s philosophy and Golda Meir’s “A Seven-fold Retaliation” policy. Secretary Johnson said that the military aspects had to be balanced by an understanding of their political implications. For example, when would we expect the Soviet Union to become involved? We had the *Pueblo*⁴ and the E-121

⁴ Documentation on the *Pueblo* incident can be found in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Documents 212–331.

incidents but the next time it might be the political assassination of a US Ambassador or the President of South Korea, or it might be the destruction of a vital industrial facility such as an oil refinery.

Kissinger thought that if any of the contingencies mentioned by Secretary Johnson were to occur today the President would probably take positive action.

Kissinger then returned the attention of the group to the "Red Books" containing representative military contingency plans for Korea. He expressed an opinion that it would be non-productive for the group to review each of the 25 plans in the book. There was basically a great similarity among the plans, and that probably what should be done would be to group them within categories of response. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Admiral Johnson then displayed a graphic prepared by the Joint Staff—a map on which was marked the objectives of the 25 plans contained in the "Red Book." [*4½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Secretary Johnson then asked how the group proposed to work the problem at hand? He suggested that the Korean Task Force work be referred to WSAG and not to the Review Group. Additionally, he thought it advisable that members of WSAG look carefully at the Korean Task Force plan in preparation for the next morning. Kissinger agreed with the two courses of action but suggested that the Joint Staff also work on the "Red Books" to group the contingencies by challenges and responses. He inquired whether the work could be done within a week? Admiral Johnson thought this was possible. Secretary Johnson remarked that the "Red Books" contained no treatment of the political aspects of the various courses of actions suggested in them. Admiral Johnson agreed and said it was not their purpose to address the political issues. All members agreed there was a need for expanded scenarios to include their political ramifications.

Secretary Johnson thought there was an additional requirement to examine the steps, from a political-military standpoint, that could be taken to confine the actions to a low level. Admiral Johnson remarked that a CIA assessment of possible enemy reactions would be needed. Secretary Johnson said he wanted Ambassador Brown in on the act. (It was not clear whether he meant representation on the WSAG or whether he meant in Brown's capacity as head of the Korean Task Force.) The group agreed that, with the work in front of them, frequent meetings would be required.

Secretary Johnson stated that, of all possible contingencies, Berlin problems had been dealt with more extensively than any of the others. Admiral Johnson remarked that no plan, however detailed, is any good if it is static. All contingency plans must undergo periodic review. Secretary Johnson agreed and recommended a standing Task Force

working continuously, but not necessarily on a day-to-day basis, within each of the contingency areas. Meyer asked about the membership of the Korean Task Force? Secretary Johnson then gave a rundown of the task force membership under Ambassador Brown. Kissinger said he has no objection to the task force concept provided they have access to the kind of material necessary to work the problems effectively. Under any circumstances, he considered the WSAG as the proper reviewing authority for the type of planning being considered by the group. Admiral Johnson said it would be possible for the military to provide detailed briefings, giving the necessary background information, but omitting unnecessary operational detail.

Kissinger then inquired about the level of activity of the Berlin Task Force. Secretary Johnson said that its structure and mechanics were still in existence but that its recent activities have been limited. Kissinger stated his belief that, because of the pressure of other duties, the WSAG cannot function as a planning group but only as a reviewing agency.

Secretary Johnson then said the Korean Task Force plan was on its way but he was not really certain of its status within the NSC reporting process.

Kissinger said that for the next meeting the Joint Staff should attempt to group the plans in the "Red Books" and that the WSAG should be prepared to discuss what kinds of provocations would lead to what kinds of responses.

Secretary Johnson then outlined the six general contingency areas set forth in the NSSM 34 study.

Kissinger remarked that, if the work of the Korean Task Force fits the objectives defined by the WSAG, the work should be used and people should not have to do it over again. After the WSAG looks over the Korean Task Force plan, the Korean Task Force could then be used as a Working Group for the WSAG to make whatever revisions will be required. Similarly, when Berlin contingencies are considered in the very near future the Berlin Task Force can assume responsibility for follow-on work. Moreover, because contingency planning is underway for the Middle East there is a need for a similar Task Force to handle those problems. He noted that the military contingency plans which deal with a confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East are somewhat unrelated to politics and seem to be deficient in the logistic arrangements that are called for. Admiral Johnson replied that the military plans for the Middle East are undergoing revision at the present time and that part of the problem in making sense out of logistic requirements is the lack of military bases in the area.

Kissinger then asked whether the next WSAG meeting could be held on the 11th of July. The agenda would be the Korean Task Force

plan. Nutter remarked that the members should also consider that plans other than those for the Middle East, Berlin, and Korea would probably be required. Secretary Johnson agreed, but said that further NSC directives were unnecessary because the current general instructions for contingency planning are sufficiently comprehensive. Nutter stated that there are grave problems associated with Berlin planning because of the tripartite and quadripartite character of those plans. There are very difficult security problems and almost insurmountable military problems. Secretary Johnson agreed that the Berlin plans were immensely complicated and represented years of work.

Kissinger recalled his participation in a 1961 Berlin War Game. The results of that game were comforting because they indicated we could not lose. Now the situation is somewhat different. He further questioned what we would do in the event of actual hostilities between the Soviet Union and Communist China. He noted that the President had inquired about this problem earlier in the morning. Early answers to this question are needed.

Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson to see what could be done bureaucratically to set up a Middle East planning element. Secretary Johnson replied that he would look into what has been done in Middle East planning in the recent past and under the former administration. He will report his findings to the Group at their next meeting. All agreed that, subject to the President's schedule, the next meeting will be held on Friday, July 11th at 1400 hours.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:28 P.M.

60. Memorandum From the Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff (Halperin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting, July 11, 1969

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, 7/11/69 Korea. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Colonel Robert Behr. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 76, WSAG, July-Aug. 1969)

I. Procedures

Before considering the substance of the contingency plan for Korea I believe that it would be useful to spend a few minutes at the WSAG meeting clarifying the procedures which the WSAG will use. The issues which you might wish to raise are:

1. *What should be the end-product of WSAG deliberation?*

What I believe is needed is a relatively short contingency plan which:

- a. States the likely contingencies which might arise.
- b. Summarizes the available courses of military action and their pros and cons.
- c. Provide a real time scenario of military and diplomatic moves to implement some or all of the courses of action.

This paper would be kept on file in the Situation Room and periodically updated. Neither the political/military plans as they emerge from the IG or the military plans from the Pentagon will fit this bill. Both plans are needed: the military plan for obvious reasons and the IG plan to guide the task force in the State Department in supporting the WSAG during a crisis. These papers should be consistent with the WSAG Contingency Plans.

The WSAG should be asked to agree on format for this paper as indicated above.

2. *How should these WSAG Contingency Plans be prepared?*

I do not believe that the IGs or Task Forces should be charged with preparing the WSAG Contingency Plans. This is true for several reasons: (1) the IG chairman simply will not give priority to this task, (2) JCS will be unwilling to release the operations plans to these groups, (3) there is great value in having the same individuals prepare each of these Contingency Plans, (4) the review of the IG paper should not be done by those who draft it.

This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that a special ad hoc working group should be created to draft the WSAG Contingency Plans. This group should be chaired by the NSC Staff. It could be either at the Senior Staff or working level. I believe that the latter has great advantages and suggest that Col. Behr chair the group.

If you accept this approach the procedure might work as follows:

- (1) IGs submit contingency papers to the WSAG.
- (2) The WSAG Working Group examines the plan and reaches a preliminary judgment as to whether the contingency merits a WSAG Contingency Plan.
- (3) These recommendations go to the WSAG.
- (4) If the WSAG determines that a Plan is needed the Working Group examines the IG paper and the military operations plan and provides the WSAG with a means of possible contingencies and military responses.

(5) The WSAG discusses this menu and directs the Working Group to prepare a Contingency Plan.

(6) The Working Group drafts the Plan working in the Situation Room.

(7) The WSAG approves the Plan.

(8) The IG paper and the military planning is then altered to conform with the WSAG Contingency Plan.

(9) The Working Group periodically examines the Plan and updates as necessary calling major changes to the attention of the WSAG.

II. Korea

If this approach is to be followed the WSAG at this meeting should discuss which contingencies and which possible military responses should be covered in the Contingency Plan. A menu based on the IG paper and the military operations plan should be distributed at the meeting for discussion.

61. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Reactivation of the Committee of Principals

Recommendation

That you speak to the President and Henry Kissinger about making use of the Committee of Principals, within the NSC framework, to backstop on-going disarmament negotiations.²

Discussion

I believe it would be highly desirable to reactivate the Committee of Principals as the principal mechanism below the Presidential level for backstopping the various on-going disarmament negotiations. The

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18. Secret; Limdis. Smith forwarded the memorandum to Richardson under cover of a July 10 memorandum stating that he wanted very much to talk with Richardson regarding the draft proposal. (Ibid.)

² There is no indication of approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

Committee of Principals (COP) which has been in existence since 1958, and has been chaired by the Secretary of State, has in the past been the principal forum for either decision making or for formulation of issues for the President in the disarmament field and the COP and the COP Deputies have backstopped negotiations. The NSC framework established this year does not give any specific place to the COP, though such a place is not precluded.

The new NSC structure with its pre-scheduled agenda, Review Group, and ad hoc steering committees established to prepare studies for various specific items to be presented to the President, is a useful mechanism for the establishment of basic national policies, and particularly during the initial review of foreign policy by the new Administration. However, I believe that the experience with the present NSC setup and the likely requirements of on-going disarmament negotiations suggest the desirability of having a more flexible, and at the same time more clearly established, procedure for high level backstopping of negotiations in the disarmament field. This is particularly true for the forthcoming SALT negotiations but also applies to the negotiations in the ENDC at Geneva and to subsequent discussions in the fall at the UN General Assembly.

We cannot expect to have the pace of the ENDC and SALT negotiations fit predetermined schedules of the NSC, which of necessity are not very flexible, involving as they must the President. For many ENDC and UN matters, I believe it is not desirable to involve the President in the relatively less important matters of substance that are bound to arise and require higher level interagency discussion. This would not of course preclude raising matters with the President in the NSC when they cannot be resolved in the COP or by their deputies. Moreover, it is desirable that we have one fixed body below the Presidential level consider the various disarmament matters. At present we have different steering committees (some of the same composition) considering CW/BW, seabeds, etc.

With respect to SALT, I am sure the President will wish to oversee the negotiations in a rather intimate way. However, there will be day-to-day instructions involving tactical issues that the COP or deputies should be authorized to backstop.

Moreover, the Committee of Principals would be a highly useful mechanism for the preparations on short notice of issues arising during the SALT or ENDC negotiations for presentation to the President.

One further thought which I believe is of importance. It is essential that, within the Administration, facts and issues be clearly brought into focus for consideration by the President. My experience in past Administrations, and during the current one, is that in consideration of issues in the disarmament field there is a reticence among high of-

ficials to engage, in a meeting before the President, in the sharp examination of assertions by one or another Principal that leads to questionable premises being challenged. I believe it would be very healthy for preliminary discussion of some issues in an on-going negotiation to take place at the Principals level prior to their discussion with the President.

Attached for your information at Tab A is a brief résumé of the history of the Committee of Principals.³

I urge that you raise this matter with the President and Henry Kissinger and if you wish, I would be very happy to participate in this discussion.⁴

Gerard Smith⁵

³ Not printed.

⁴ Richardson responded in a July 15 memorandum that he thought the proposal was a good one and that Smith should take it up with Rogers, but he advised Smith to make clear that "we are not attempting to bypass the NSC" and warned that "we would have to be very careful in discussing this with the President or Henry Kissinger." He pointed out that the arguments in the third to last paragraph "seem to question the whole NSC system." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18)

⁵ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

62. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, July 11, 1969, 2:13-2:50 p.m.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP (WSAG) MEETING

SUBJECT

Military Contingency Planning for Korea

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Behr, who forwarded the minutes to Kissinger under cover of a July 11 memorandum. (Ibid.) The meeting was the WSAG's second and was held in the White House Situation Room.

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman

State—

U. Alexis Johnson

Winthrop Brown

Defense—G. Warren Nutter

CIA—Cord Meyer

JCS—Vice Adm. Nels C. Johnson

NSC Staff—

Col. Alexander M. Haig

John H. Holdridge

Col. Robert M. Behr

Summary of Decisions

1. A Working Group under Ambassador Brown, responsive to the WSAG, will produce three sets of contingency plans for Korea. These plans will be structured in the form of sequences of events and will cover low, intermediate and high levels of military involvement.

2. A similar Working Group will be formed for Middle East plans.

3. The WSAG meeting time will be standardized at 2:00 P.M. on Fridays.

The meeting began at 2:13 P.M. Secretary Johnson suggested to the Chairman that he be permitted to report to the Group the results of a “rump meeting” between the two Johnsons which took place on July 10th. Kissinger yielded to Secretary Johnson who then discussed the State-Defense meeting of the previous day. Its purpose was to review the work done by the Joint Staff in grouping the various military plans into categories of response (called for at the last WSAG meeting), and to map a course of action which would distill from the NSSM 34 Study² and the DOD plans a paper having greater utility for decision-makers. Because much of the work on the probable nature of NK provocation has been done in the NSSM 34 Study, the follow-on effort should concentrate on building scenarios for various levels of military response without too much regard for how the particular contingency would arise. This work could be done by a Working Group under Ambassador Brown, with representation appointed by the WSAG principals.

Kissinger remarked that what the “rump session” had concluded was coincident with his own thoughts. He would not, therefore, have to take the time of the Group by critiquing the NSSM 34 Study (which he regards as an excellent foundation document) in order to express the same conclusions with respect to an approach to the problem of providing the President with useful options in the event of another Korean emergency.

² NSSM 34, March 21, 1969, and the NSSM 34 Study are *ibid.*, Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, 7/11/69 Korea.

Admiral Johnson clarified what he sees to be the working arrangement—a small ad hoc group responsible to the WSAG as opposed to a NSC/IG effort. All agreed.

Kissinger stated that the Working Group should not concern itself with recommendations about when and why a particular plan should be implemented. All that is called for is a set of options including at the one extreme “surgical strikes,” heavy military involvement at the other extreme, with in-between options such as attack against several airfields. Admiral Johnson noted that diplomatic maneuverings were, of course, related but a thing apart and not germane to the task at hand. Secretary Johnson remarked that the work on the scenarios would be eased by the nature of the problem itself. When a specific course of action is selected for development, that course then logically dictates what must be done to carry it out. He visualized the end-product as a sequence of events similar to that produced during the EC-121 incident.

Kissinger cautioned that a philosophical attachment to one class of response—be it minimum, intermediate, or maximum violence—often tends to cloud contingency plans. What we need are scenarios for the decision-makers. They will have to exercise their responsibility to choose the appropriate level of response from among a group of options. Returning to the plan of action, Secretary Johnson suggested a “plan a week” approach—for example, the next WSAG meeting should look at the “surgical” strike category, with the other options following at weekly intervals. Kissinger agreed and standardized future meeting times—Fridays at 2:00 P.M. There were no dissents.

Kissinger conjectured that if the President had, today, to select a response to a provocation similar to those of recent history, he would probably pick an intermediate option—say, [8 lines of source text not declassified] Admiral Johnson thought the attacks should be regarded as punitive, and that they would not result in permanent damage.

Kissinger inquired how an attack against the [4½ lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Johnson inquired about other “nerve-center” targets. Kissinger asked Cord Meyer to identify a number of these targets and to report them to the WSAG by 15 July. Meyer agreed to do so. Nutter brought up a point relating to international law, citing a body of opinion which holds that the target must somehow be related to the “crime.” In other words, if you get hit *from* an airfield, you have to attack an airfield in response. At this point Secretary Johnson asked what one is really after in striking [9 lines of source text not declassified]

Admiral Johnson raised the question of format, noting that the work his staff had done for him this past week was perhaps too detailed. The consensus of the Group was that the EC-121 sequence of events is a good model.

Admiral Johnson returned to Kissinger's earlier evaluation of the NSSM 34 Study. He concurred in the evident merit of the work and hoped that the Korean Task Force would keep it up to date. All agreed that the NSSM 34 Study—and all other IG plans—should be periodically reviewed and made current.

Brown departed at this point after being informed that his WSAG Working Group would include Bill Nelson (CIA), Colonel Boylan (OSD), John Holdridge (NSC), with a Joint Staff member to be reported later.

Kissinger then asked about Middle East plans. Secretary Johnson reported that these plans are not in the same good state as the Korean study. He has told Roger Davies to get with other agency representatives and move! As he (Johnson) sees it the Middle East problem should be developed by starting from the circumstance of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities, what we can do to deter Soviet involvement, and then try to decide what to do if they do become involved. With regard to how the problem should be managed, he suggested another small ad hoc group working under Davies and responsive to WSAG direction. Admiral Johnson said that the Joint Staff is presently engaged in a Middle East study. The work already done will be relevant and useful. Meyer noted the variety of ways in which the Soviets could become actively involved. Admiral Johnson agreed this was a problem and mentioned, additionally, the situation in which the Israelis threaten the UAR with missiles. Kissinger said that another group was dealing with the missile problem, primarily with its diplomatic aspects.

Secretary Johnson then mentioned some vexing operational problems that come to mind when one considers US military responses in the Middle East. Among these are overflight rights (Spain and Turkey) and the lack of bases available to the US. Admiral Johnson suggested this was a problem for State to solve. He then recounted our successful use of Athens International Airport during the June 67 war. (US aircraft staged out of Athens on "mercy missions"—parachute delivery of water into the Sinai.) Nutter questioned whether Ethiopia could be used, but all agreed its location was not sufficiently proximate to the probable area of operations.

Secretary Johnson said that Davies would present a progress report on Middle East studies at the next WSAG meeting. He stated further that he had instructed Mr. Springsteen to be prepared to brief on Berlin. All agreed, however, that Berlin could be put off until later. Secretary Johnson said work on Berlin would nevertheless proceed concentrating on specific military options. Kissinger broke in with a caution that the basic plans must be appraised. Do we really mean them? There followed a brief discussion among the Group on the implications of Gromyko's recent statements on the willingness of the USSR to talk

about Berlin. Careful analysis of his remarks is in order. Kissinger offered the suggestion that the Soviets may have rejected a Berlin confrontation as a direct implement, regarding the option as a tool to gain their objectives should a crisis develop in another area—such as the Cuban incident.

There was no further discussion. The meeting adjourned at 2:50 P.M.

63. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with the Attorney General, 2:30 p.m., Saturday, July 12, 1969

Introduction

—Advise Mr. Mitchell that you have requested meeting to discuss with him what you consider to be a most serious situation with respect to the President's relationships with the Secretary of State and your role in serving the President as his foreign policy adviser.²

—Point out that you have asked Colonel Haig to join the discussion because as a professional officer with considerable high level experience, he will be able to comment on the problem as an unbiased observer of the Washington scene over the past 8 years. You have asked Colonel Haig to interject his personal comments at any time if he feels that your presentation of the facts are either inaccurate or a distortion of the critical issues.

Discussion

—State that at the outset of the Administration the President had certain assets available to him which had to be carefully nurtured and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Ehrlichman Files, Box 26, State Department–White House Relations, 1969. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote “ACDA cable” in the upper right hand corner of the first page. The tabs are attached but not printed.

² No record of Kissinger's meeting with Mitchell has been found.

intelligently and systematically integrated into an overall Game Plan for achieving U.S. objectives in both the short and the long term.

—On a short term basis, these assets were of critical importance for the achievement of an acceptable solution to the Vietnam conflict and on a longer term basis, these assets had to provide the means by which the President's long term objectives could be achieved.

—For this reason, at the outset of the Administration the general outlines of U.S. short term and long term policies were reviewed in a National Security Council and the President promulgated an overall conceptual framework for proceeding, giving major emphasis to efforts designed to achieve a settlement to the Vietnam conflict. In its broadest context, this framework called for:

(1) A new appreciation for the role of the Soviet Union's support for Hanoi with accompanying U.S. tactical and strategic approaches.

(2) A recognition that Soviet interests and anxieties should be manipulated to work for the U.S. Government, with the view toward influencing the Soviets to exert maximum pressure on Hanoi to achieve an acceptable solution to the conflict. Pressure points included: (a) recognition of Soviet concern for growing tension with Communist China, (b) the actual or apparent concern of the Soviets to arrive at early understandings which might crystallize parity with the U.S. in the area of strategic forces, (c) a recognition that Soviet interests in the Middle East might be jeopardized by the uncontrolled and volatile forces in the area which could prematurely trigger an Arab-Israeli conflict at a time and under circumstances not acceptable to the Soviets, (d) an appreciation for the Soviet's overall concern in retaining discipline within the Communist camp, especially as it pertained to the separatists' movements in Eastern Europe, and (e) a recognition of internal economic and bureaucratic divergencies within the Soviet Union itself.

—Inter alia, the above Soviet concerns constituted what could be considered U.S. assets in seeking our short term and long term objectives. As a result, the President approved in concept a short term approach which would involve a somewhat harder attitude toward the Soviet Union; which would involve a patient and reserved attitude toward movement in those areas of Soviet interest until the Soviets had, in turn, indicated a willingness to reciprocate in areas of prime concern to the U.S. Government. This involved:

(1) A carefully measured U.S. approach to SALT negotiations being urged by the Soviets.

(2) A carefully measured and flexible demeanor toward the Middle East crisis.

(3) A slowdown of bridge building actions set in train by the previous Administration, especially in the area of trade.

(4) Carefully worked out U.S. initiatives to increase Soviet concern that the U.S. and Communist China were moving closer together against the Soviet Union and,

(5) A carefully developed Game Plan for a solution to the Vietnam conflict which would seek to retain the viability of the Saigon regime, at least to the degree that Saigon would have an opportunity to compete for survival in the post-settlement political competition in South Vietnam.

—The above factors constitute the Presidentially approved framework upon which U.S. policy in the short term would be pursued. Despite the fact that Secretary of State was provided a detailed guidance on countless occasions, including formal NSC meetings, a personal letter from the President to the Secretary of State and countless detailed specific instructions, he has consistently worked along lines contrary to this conceptual approach and systematically dissipated those assets available to the President.

—We have discussed State efforts to steamroller early SALT negotiations.

—You have also recounted for the Attorney General, State efforts to inject the U.S. into the Middle East situation in such a way that our flexibility would be seriously jeopardized.

—With respect to stated Presidential policy on trade with the Soviet Bloc and specifically the “Most Favored Nation Clause,” State has, in recent weeks, repeatedly attempted to circumvent the President’s stated policy.

—With respect to Vietnam, Secretary Rogers has systematically diverged from Presidential guidance with respect to:

- (1) The pace of Vietnamization.
- (2) The level of pressure applied to the Saigon regime to broaden its base.
- (3) Tactical approaches in Paris, specifically as they pertain to the conduct of private talks both in timing and substance.
- (4) Approach to the issue of ceasefire.
- (5) Approach to the issue of de-escalation.

The above difficulties have not been the result of a coherently articulated disagreement by Secretary Rogers with the overall framework of U.S. policy but rather manifest themselves in countless variations from approved Presidential policy in patterns which are primarily tactical but which have had the overall effect of seriously denuding all of the President’s foreign policy assets. In recent weeks, the pace and style of Rogers’ freewheeling has increased in tempo. Recent divergencies include:

- (1) An apparent decision on the part of the Secretary to bypass the White House in major policy areas.
- (2) A situation which finds countless carefully worked out policy issues being leaked to the press, with increasing regularity.
- (3) Unwillingness in those instances where White House clearances are requested, to accept substantive realignment of cables with-

out escalating the issue to the Secretary's level, placing the Assistant to the President in a position of accepting State language or forcing an undesirable Presidential confrontation with the Secretary.³

Cite Most Recent Specific Examples

1. Undue pressure on Thieu to give forthcoming political statement. Show cable Tab A.⁴
2. Undue pressure on Thieu with respect to the substance of his talk. Show cable Tab B.⁵ (The Thieu speech is at Tab C.)⁶
3. Discuss problems in the development of the President's statement in support of Thieu's speech. (President's statement is at Tab D. Secretary Rogers' statement commenting on the Gromyko speech is at Tab E.)⁷ Make the point that Rogers' statement was released within two hours of the President's statement supporting Thieu; that it was done without any coordination with the White House and prior to the Secretary's having read the full text of Gromyko's statement. Procedurally, it tended to detract from the impact of the President's statement but more seriously, it again diverged from foreign policy guidance with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations and was counter to our recent efforts to recoup additional assets on the Soviet-China issue. (Romania visit.)
4. Discuss Secretary's blatant attempt to circumvent the President's written directive to convene another private meeting in Paris. President's directive at Tab F.⁸ Draft cable forwarded last evening at Tab G.⁹

Conclusions

While any of the individual incidents outlined above might be passed over as isolated though serious breaches of discipline by the Secretary, in sum, they represent a fundamental disloyalty to Presidential policy which has the most serious implications for the U.S. national interest. They have stripped the President of a large measure of his ability to conduct foreign policy in a coherent and effective way and, based on these facts, you believe that it is essential that the President move swiftly and decisively before it is too late.

³ Kissinger marked this paragraph with a check in the right hand margin.

⁴ Telegram 13543 from Saigon, July 5.

⁵ Telegram 13723 from Saigon, July 8.

⁶ Telegram 13916 from Saigon, July 10.

⁷ Both statements are dated July 11, 1969.

⁸ Dated July 9.

⁹ Draft telegram to Paris dated July 11.

—Courses of action which are open vary from:

(1) a direct ultimatum by the President to the Secretary demanding adherence to the established policy and requiring coordination with the White House on policy matters or resignation.

(2) If the above is not acceptable to the President, you would be willing to step down or even to assume an essentially non-substantive role, which would give the Secretary of State the kind of leeway which he apparently has assumed to be his prerogative.

—In either event, the situation is now intolerable since the national interest will no longer permit the type of freewheeling, undisciplined and at times disloyal style followed by Secretary Rogers. The situation has progressed to the point that members of the State staff have brought this to your attention and you are soliciting the Attorney General's assistance in bringing this to the attention of the President without delay.

64. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

First Meeting of Verification Committee²

Following is an outline of the procedures you can follow in conducting the first meeting of the Verification Committee.

What Can the Verification Committee Accomplish?

The committee can put the verification issue in the proper perspective by addressing the following questions:

—What exactly are present and projected U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor various arms control agreements?

—In the light of the criteria for strategic sufficiency in NSDM 16,³ are unilateral U.S. intelligence capabilities under the various agreements adequate to insure that U.S. strategic sufficiency can be maintained?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-004, Verification Panel Meeting—Review of Capabilities 7/22/69. Top Secret; Umbra.

² The first meeting was held on July 22; see Document 65.

³ Dated June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305)

(On this question, each agency should state its views and supporting rationale. If any agency's views are based on criteria or objectives other than those in NSDM 16, this should be made clear.)

—If we detect violations of an agreement, in what circumstances can we let this fact be known without compromising our intelligence capabilities?

How Should the Work of the Verification Panel be Carried Out?

A draft memorandum to the principals setting up the first meeting is at Tab A.⁴ Before a final copy is typed, you should indicate who you want to attend.

Initial Meeting of Principals.

I recommended that the principals meet to accomplish the following:

- review the issues that give rise to the need for a new verification study,
- approve general terms of reference for the preparation of a committee report,
- agree to set up a working group, with a designated chairman, to prepare the committee report,
- establish a deadline for completion of the report (August 15 or 30, for example).

Working Group Procedures.

I suggest the working group function in the following way:

—In Phase 1, the necessary factual information on present and projected U.S. monitoring capabilities and on the extent to which detected violations can be revealed without compromising intelligence capabilities should be developed.

—In Phase 2, the results of Phase 1 should be provided to Defense, JCS, State and ACDA, who would be responsible for preparing agency positions on the adequacy of our capabilities.

—Based on the Phase 1 analysis and agency positions, a final report would be drafted by the working group director and presented to the Committee's principals for approval.

Terms of Reference.

In my judgment, terms of reference should be provided for Phase 1. I have drafted a suggested set which is at Tab B. You could discuss this paper at the first meeting of the principals or leave the matter to the chairman of the working group.

⁴ None of the tabs are printed.

Detailed terms of reference will not be needed for Phase 2.

Chairmanship of Working Group.

You approved the alternative of designating me as chairman of the working group of experts. You should indicate this to the principals.

Membership of Working Group.

I believe CIA, DIA, and INR should be represented. I strongly recommend that the National Security Agency also be represented. NSA after all has the experts on the raw data, and we should draw directly on their expertise. DDR&E should probably also be included. Finally, another member of your staff should participate. (Bill Hyland or John Court)

Summary.

If this general approach is satisfactory, you could use the talking points at Tab C in your first meeting with the principals.

65. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 21, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Attorney General
Under Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Verification Capabilities

The President has directed that a review of U.S. capabilities to monitor arms control agreements be undertaken on a priority basis.

He has asked me to convene a committee consisting of the addresses to carry out this review. Accordingly, I would like to have a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-004, Verification Panel Meeting—Review of Capabilities 7/22/69. Top Secret; Nodis.

meeting of the committee at 10:00 a.m., July 22, 1969 in the White House Situation Room to:

- review the issues that give rise to the need for a review of U.S. verification capability,
- approve general terms of reference for the preparation of the committee report,
- agree to procedures for establishing a working group to conduct the review,
- establish a deadline for completion of the report.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² According to the minutes, Kissinger opened the meeting by stating: “[Gerard] Smith suggested panel. Need systematic review, statement of disagreements, statement of capabilities and limitations. This group would review MIRV Panel report, but charter would be broader.” (Ibid., Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals—1969-3/8/72) Minutes for Verification Panel meetings from July 22, 1969, through June 4, 1974, are *ibid.* Folders containing briefing and background material for each meeting from July 22, 1969, through June 4, 1974, are *ibid.*, Boxes H-004-H-018. For Smith’s recollections of the Verification Panel and the NSC system, see his memoirs, *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I*, especially pp. 108–113; and *Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator*, especially p. 158. Source documentation on the proposal for the Verification Panel and the revivification of the Committee of Principals (see Document 61) is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA/D Files: FRC 383 98 89, Notes for the Files.

66. Paper Prepared by the Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff (Halperin)¹

Washington, undated.

THE NSC AND NEW INITIATIVES

This memorandum responds to your request for my views on possible NSC work schedule over the next several months with particular reference to the possibility of “bold initiatives.” This memorandum: (1) describes some of the current shortcomings of the NSC system; (2) considers items currently on the NSC Agenda and what initiatives may result from them; (3) considers possible new initiatives.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 817, Name Files, Halperin, Morton H. Secret. Halperin forwarded this paper, together with two other papers, to Kissinger under cover of an August 5 memorandum in which he noted that Winston Lord did “most of the drafting of these papers.” (Ibid.) The papers were forwarded to Kissinger by Haig under an August 15 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

I. Current Status of the NSC System

I think that the new NSC system has functioned far better during its first six months than we had any right to expect. The process has actually been used and has resulted in Presidential decisions on a number of issues. More important, the bureaucracy has begun to think in terms of options and alternatives rather than a single course of action. The system has also resulted in the President and his principal advisors coming to grips with major issues, such as Okinawa reversion and German offset, in a systematic way, taking account of long-range considerations and without the pressure of immediate deadlines.

However, there are beginning to be danger signals which suggest that the system is running into serious trouble. The main concerns are:

1. *Major issues are moving outside the NSC system.* Three of the most important issues—perhaps the most important—facing the government, are now being dealt with largely outside the NSC system, while they were initially within the system. For differing reasons, Vietnam, SALT, and the Middle East are now effectively outside the NSC procedures. I recognize that there were valid reasons for treating each of these items as we have, but the result is to begin to move toward the Eisenhower Syndrome of using the NSC for low priority issues and dealing with important matters in other ways. Unless the line is drawn and these issues are moved back into the system there will be increasing pressure to deal with other major issues on an ad hoc basis.

The memorandum in which the President made his decisions regarding China also had unfortunate implications. After the bureaucracy had labored long and hard to produce a reasonable paper on China policy, without warning and without explanation to the bureaucracy, and prior to NSC consideration of that paper, the President announced decisions on many issues contained in that document.² While I think I can guess at the reasons for the President's action, it tended to undercut the belief that the President would not make major decisions unless the issues were fully argued out in the NSC system. This can only lead to attempts to have the process short-circuited on other issues, arguing the pressure of time or security.

2. *Deadlines are beginning to slip badly.* A number of responses to NSSMs have been delayed repeatedly, even in cases such as India-Pakistan military policy and SVN internal security where the request for the study came personally from the President. Initially the delays resulted in part from the overloading of the system but this is no longer the case. Delays now result in part from the fact that people have discovered

² NSSM 14, "U.S. China Policy," February 5, 1969, and related papers are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-134, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 14.

that it is relatively easy to get a delay. They also result from the fact that some studies submitted on time (frequently because of weekends and long nights of work) have been cancelled out of the Review Group, often at the last minute and without explanation. This has produced a good deal of cynicism in the bureaucracy. For example, we have just been asked whether we really want the Sino-Soviet paper when we say we want it and whether we can give assurance that the schedule will be adhered to. The paper can be done on time only by long hours during the summer and there is reluctance to do so if the study will lie on the shelf when it is completed. (We have given these assurances.)

Delays are also resulting from the failure of some of the operators on the NSC staff to emphasize the importance of deadlines and to give priority to their own participation in these projects. This results in part from the fact that they are overworked, and in part from the fact that some of them do not really accept the system.

The failure to meet deadlines and the accompanying failure in some cases to take the project seriously leads to inferior papers and also to delays in making necessary policy decisions. For example, the Indian, Pakistani, and Greek governments have all been told for some months that our military assistance policies are under review in the NSC system but we still do not even have papers completed. I suspect that Sisco believes in the end that he will get decisions by some informal means. If he is proven to be correct, the system will be further undermined. In any case, the long delays tend to make the papers less relevant and to lead people to believe the system cannot be used where relatively quick decisions are needed.³

3. *Implementation of NSC decisions is unsatisfactory.* We have not done very well at all in devising procedures to implement NSC decisions and to monitor that implementation. As you pointed out many times, one of the main failures of the Johnson Administration was that the bureaucracy was never informed as to why the President was making the decisions he was making. I believe that we are almost equally guilty of that charge. Moreover, in many cases, no decisions have been reported at all or only to a very limited circle and there is no procedure for NSC staff follow-up. Aside from implementation problems, this lack of concrete results from NSC meetings undercuts the morale of the bureaucracy which labors to produce the papers and prepare for the meetings. This poses the danger that the NSC will be considered more and more as a high level seminar rather than a decision-producing body.

[Omitted here is Part II, NSC Agenda Items (pages 3–11 of the paper).]

³ Kissinger wrote in the left margin next to this paragraph, "Let's force that issue & get specific deadlines."

67. **Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, August 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Analysis For Vietnam

On several occasions we have discussed the need for analysis on Vietnam. Looking back on our experience over the last few years, it is remarkable how frequently we have let our preconceptions about Vietnam lead us astray even though readily available facts would have told us differently had we analyzed them and made the analysis available to top decision-makers. The examples are legend:

—the shortcomings of the Strategic Hamlet Program were obvious to any discerning observer of the rural political and economic situation in Vietnam, but we promoted the program without recognizing that it was often counter-productive;

—U.S. force deployments in 1965 were predicted on intelligence estimates of enemy strength that underestimated it by half;

—our overly optimistic expectations for the bombing campaign against North Vietnam were attributable to our failure to appreciate the minor influence of manpower and logistic constraints on the North Vietnamese effort in South Vietnam;

—our mistaken optimism in 1966 that the North Vietnamese could no longer sustain heavy casualties in the South were in complete contradiction with the facts of North Vietnamese demography; nevertheless, we persisted in our beliefs, which would not have stood up to a few simple manpower calculations;

—our excessive expectations for the various “revolutionary-development” type cadre programs can be traced to our mis-reading of the basis for Viet Cong appeal in the villages—mature, highly organized, ideologically motivated, and grievance-responsive political leadership;

—the shock of the Tet offensive was in part attributable to our failure to analyze available intelligence accurately;

—our tolerance of GVN inaction on crucial issues like land reform has been due to the paucity of the most basic type of political analysis on the Viet Cong movement in the early 1960s. Such analysis would have shown that a large measure of their success can be attributed to their exploitation of tenure-related social and economic grievances;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-001, Vietnam Special Study Group (VSSG) Meetings, VSSG Meeting 10-20-69. Secret; No Dissem. Sent for action.

—we have persistently misled ourselves as to the capability of the South Vietnamese forces, refusing to recognize that all the critical indicators—night patrols, small unit actions, desertion rates, etc.—suggest a lesser capability.

I cite these examples because of my concern that there is less analysis of Vietnam matters going on in the government today and such analysis is more infrequently weighed by top decision-makers than at anytime since the 1965–66 period. This paucity of analysis at a time when major changes are taking place in our policy could be extremely costly if we cannot anticipate or understand developments in Vietnam.

I contrast the current situation with our position at the time of the NSSM 1 effort earlier in the year.²

In our compilation of the NSSM 1 responses on pacification, bombing, the Phoenix program, and Vietnamese army performance, we were quite surprised at how far we had progressed by early 1969 toward agreement or at least clarified disagreement, on these subjects. I attribute the progress which took place in 1967–68, which we capitalized on in NSSM 1, to the role of analysis in improving the quality of interagency discussion and program understanding.

For example, in the case of the Phoenix program, every NSSM 1 respondent including MACV and CIA (the program sponsors) agreed on what we could and could not expect from anti-infrastructure activities in 1970. Analysis of the pacification program clarified the category “C” hamlet dispute, which is central to any conclusion on the situation in rural Vietnam. On Vietnamese force effectiveness, we were beginning to understand the reasons for poor leadership (small numbers of NCOs and junior officers in combat and inadequate incentives for combat performance) and high desertion rates (an army lacking in political legitimacy in the estimate of the rural populace, from which it takes most of its recruits).

What was significant about NSSM 1 was that much of the analysis had never before been considered at the White House level, and never before had much effort gone into the resolution of the inconsistencies in the analyses of the departments and agencies. But no new analysis was produced for NSSM 1; it had all been done before.

I am concerned that after a good start with NSSM 1 we have not followed through. We are now getting only a trickle of analysis on Vietnam issues at the NSC level. Therefore, we may be missing an important opportunity to enlighten ourselves on matters of great concern.

² NSSM 1, “Situation in Vietnam,” January 21, and the Summary of Interagency Responses, March 22, are both printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970. See Documents 4 and 44.

I think we should give careful consideration to whether we have marshaled and analyzed all the available evidence on:

- the progress of Vietnamese force modernization and the current performance capability of Vietnamese forces;

- the effect on Viet Cong political activities and the rebuilding potential for Viet Cong local force and guerilla units pursuant to U.S. troop withdrawals from the Delta; (This is probably the major unanswered question in Vietnam today.)

- the real progress, if any, of the GVN toward the implementation of the recently proposed land reform program for which we have allocated \$40M;

- the extent to which some of our more successful economic assistance programs might allow us to quicken what has been the quite remarkable eroding effect that our economic assistance has had on Viet Cong political fortunes in the countryside;

- the nature of the recently registered gains in pacification effort and their vulnerability to a decline in GVN-U.S. military capability.

The NSSM procedure cannot provide for continuous attention to a particular subject like analysis for Vietnam. What is needed is a special mechanism of a semi-permanent nature to provide continuity to the analysis and serve as a touchstone for those in Washington and elsewhere who can make analytical contributions. This mechanism should give direction to the analysis and serve as a forum for the resolution of analytical questions. It should also focus non-government analytical talent on the problems of greatest concern to us.

One way to accomplish this task would be to establish a Vietnam Program Analysis Group under the aegis of the NSC staff. The group should perhaps be co-chaired by a representative from the State Department or the Defense Department and it should include representatives from OSD, JCS, CIA, OST, and BOB. Such a group could sponsor analytical efforts and provide for the circulation of the analytical work within the government. When appropriate these studies could be forwarded through the NSC framework to the NSC Review Group.

I would recommend that the agenda for the Vietnam program analysis group be determined by you after discussion with State and Defense. The group should not have operational responsibilities. It should fill requests arising from:

- the need for analysis on program issues ancillary to pending decisions by the President or members of the National Security Council;

- the requirement to have a better analytic understanding of the accomplishments of major U.S. programs in Vietnam (e.g. the pacification, Phoenix, Vietnamization, bombing, land reform, and stabilization programs) as the accomplishments of these programs or our expectations about them become matters of high-level interest;

- the requirement to have an assessment of the internal developments following major U.S. program changes in Vietnam, for example,

the response of GVN and Viet Cong programs in the delta pursuant to the withdrawal of the 9th U.S. Division.

Recommendation

My views as expressed herein do not reflect any attempt on my part to solicit more work, far from it. I bring these views to your attention as a matter of principle. I think careful scrutiny of the record will show that had we coolly and persistently expended more effort on analysis, our course in Vietnam would have been less perilous.

I recommend that you explore these issues with Richardson and Packard and suggest some sort of program analysis arrangement to accomplish the objectives outlined above. If you wish, I can explore the possibilities at the staff level and give you recommendations on organizations, people and possible roles and agenda.³

³ Kissinger initialed the approval option. Below it he wrote, "Do quietly. Let me surface pro" but then crossed it out and wrote below that: "Do memo for Pres. & let us set it up *before* we negotiate it. Talk to me." Kissinger's September 5 memorandum to the President, drafted by Lynn, is printed *ibid.*, Document 115.

68. Notes of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, August 26, 1969.

Secy Rogers calling from Walter Reed (there for a check-up). Re Thailand, Secy said we should all keep quiet about it now. Amb J said Tanat is very very happy. Secy said to tell everyone to keep quiet—we have nothing else to say. Amb agreed with this line.

Secy said he had couple of run-ins with Henry Kissinger yesterday Secy said first he and Newsom² were working on Nigeria when he got a roundabout message from Lake saying that President didn't want anything done until he returned from Calif. When Secy asked Lake who told him to call, he said Henry. Secy then called Kissinger to find out what was going on—Henry said that it was a mistake, Lake

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 696, Telcons, Personal. No classification marking.

² David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

should not have called. Then later in day Secy was working on Thai message to Fon Min when Marshall Green's³ office rec'd message from the White House saying that the President wanted to send the message. Secy called Henry again asked what the devil was going on—Henry had earlier told Secy that such incidents would not take place again. Kissinger again said it was mistake that Ted Eliot should have been informed of this. Secy told Kissinger that President should not be sending messages to FonMins—Kissinger agreed. Secy told Kissinger in no uncertain terms that he wanted this business of Kissinger's subordinates sending him messages stopped—said Kissinger's messages were "not worth a damn" and that he had no intention of following them!

Secy asked Amb to get out message for his signature to Kissinger along following lines: "To make certain that we get directions clearly and readily understood and be sure directed to appropriate people who handle them, has been agreed with White House staff that directions from President will come directly to me or to the Secretariat." Secy said he wanted something that sounded friendly, not like having a feud.

Amb J asked Secy when he would be coming back. Secy said he would be in tomorrow. Amb said he had several things to discuss and that he would be going back to San Clemente for a meeting on Sept. 4th. Secy said he would be going back around the same time. Amb said he would report conversation he had with boss when he sees Secy tomorrow.

³ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

69. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

San Clemente, California, August 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Program Analysis Studies

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 4. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Both the President and Kissinger were at the Western White House in San Clemente. A copy of the memorandum is marked, "Hand carried to Pres., 8-30-69." (Ibid.)

At the August 14 meeting of the NSC, you were briefed on the results of a program analysis of Korea completed under NSSM 27.²

You indicated your desire to have a comprehensive five-year program plan for Korea developed to serve as a guide for agency planning. I am taking the necessary steps to see that this is accomplished for your review.

The Korea study is the first in a series of such country/regional studies being carried out under NSDM-4 (Tab A).³ The next ones to be completed will be for Brazil and Thailand. Their overall purposes are:

—To pull together in one place information on all U.S. activities in the area and categorize them by the policy objectives they serve.

—Based on careful analysis, to develop alternative U.S. objectives, policies and programs for the ensuing five years so that rational choices can be made.

—To formulate the issues in such a way that the President can provide clear and consistent policy and program guidance to the relevant agencies, as opposed to letting each agency determine its priorities and programs based on its own interpretation of national policy.

—To provide a basis for translating Presidential guidance into a comprehensive five-year program plan that can be used by each agency for planning purposes and can be reviewed and revised periodically as necessary.

Now that we have a better understanding of the great potential of program analysis studies, as well as a better idea of how to go about it than we had on January 20, and in consonance with your expressed interest in developing programs on a long-term basis, I believe we should revise NSDM-4 to:

—clarify the purpose and organization of these study efforts,
—specify the procedures for management of these studies and for implementation of NSC decisions resulting from them, and
—emphasize the importance of preparing five-year programs as a planning guide to all agencies.

I have enclosed at Tab B a revised version of NSDM-4.⁴ The revisions are in line with procedures I have agreed to with Elliot Richardson. If you approve, I will issue it.⁵

² NSSM 27, "Interagency Planning Programming Budgeting Study for Korea," February 22, 1969. (Ibid., Boxes H-138-139, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 27)

³ Document 13.

⁴ Document 71.

⁵ The President initialed his approval on September 2.

70. **Telegram From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹**

Colorado Springs, Colorado, September 1, 1969, 2255Z.

CSWH 90020. I have been disturbed in recent days by the lack of teamwork in the conduct of national security affairs.² Consequently, I am reaffirming my policies with respect to this matter.

1. Public statements and press releases: Prior to release, all public communications on matters of known or potential Presidential interest must be carefully cleared by the White House (Assistant to the President for National Security) for consistency with Presidential policy and for coordination with the Departments and agencies who share overlapping interests and responsibilities. Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or inter-departmental interest, it will be resolved in favor of clearance.

2. Official communications: All official communications with policy implications must be cleared by the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. This procedure requires close and confidential staff relationships at all levels between the White House and your Department as well as among Departments.³

Richard Nixon

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The President flew to Colorado Springs, Colorado, from San Clemente on September 1 to attend the National Governors Conference.

² In an undated memorandum to Mitchell that was prepared at San Clemente in August and sent forward about September 2, Kissinger detailed "a series of incidents in which the bureaucracy [including DOD and CIA as well as State] was either unresponsive to the President's desires or displayed an extraordinary inability to coordinate matters within itself. These problems have too often been due to a failure to clear public statements and policy cables with the White House." In addition, Kissinger continued, "we must now face the question of the Secretary of State's working relationship with me. If not, what seems to be an increasingly serious sort of bureaucratic guerrilla war may have very serious consequences for the management of our foreign affairs." (Ibid.)

³ Helms responded in a September 2 telegram: "You may rest assured of total compliance in the Central Intelligence Agency. I shall be in touch with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on this matter." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 207, CIA, Vol. I)

71. National Security Decision Memorandum 4 (Revised)¹

Washington, September 4, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of U.S. Information Agency
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

Program Analysis Studies

The President has directed the preparation of a series of program analyses for designated countries and regions. These analyses will develop alternative statements of U.S. interests, objectives, policy options and their associated program and budget implications for consideration and decision by the National Security Council. On the basis of NSC guidance/decisions, five-year country/regional program plans will be developed to be used by all agencies for planning purposes.

The following procedures will be followed in performing and implementing program analysis studies:

1. The studies will be performed under the supervision of the Program Analysis staff of the National Security Council. This staff should cooperate closely with similar staffs within the various departments and agencies and the Bureau of the Budget.
2. The countries and regions to be studied and the scope of each study will be designated in National Security Study Memoranda.
3. The analyses will be performed by Ad Hoc groups composed principally of personnel from agencies directly concerned. Where appropriate a steering committee composed of senior officers in the agencies will provide guidance and focus for the efforts of the Ad Hoc group.
4. The Ad Hoc groups shall work in close consultation with each agency, with their regional bureaus and country desks, and with the U.S. Mission in the country.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1–50. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. NSDM 4 was first issued on January 20; see Document 13.

5. Upon completion, the analyses will be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He will then obtain the comments of the relevant Interdepartmental Group and forward the study along with these comments to the NSC Review Group prior to NSC consultations.

6. On the basis of NSC guidance and decisions, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will direct the preparation of a five-year program memorandum to serve as a basis for agency planning in the country or region concerned.

7. The five-year plans will be reviewed and revised periodically as necessary to keep them up to date.

Henry A. Kissinger

72. Memorandum From the Staff Secretary, National Security Council (Watts) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Revised NSC Staff Arrangements

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (5), 8/19/69–12/1/69. Confidential. This memorandum is Tab B to a September 14 covering memorandum from Watts to Kissinger, which discusses some personnel actions. Tab A, suggested talking points for Kissinger's use at the September 15 staff meeting, refers to the departure of Morton Halperin from the NSC Staff. In an August 15 memorandum to Kissinger in which he discussed two alternative approaches to planning in the NSC system, Halperin commented on his possible departure: "I must tell you frankly, the question of whether it makes sense for me to remain on the staff is related not only to the issue of the problems involved in my dealings with Defense and the question of my relations with the Assistants for Operations, but also to the question of whether, given your own style of operation, any job on the NSC staff involves enough responsibility and opportunity for independent initiative." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Name Files, Box 817, Halperin, Morton H.) In an August 22 letter to Kissinger, Halperin wrote: "I am prepared to stay on for a two-month trial period provided we can reach a clear understanding on my functions and provided that you communicate this understanding at a staff meeting as soon as you return from California." Halperin attached a job description for himself as Chief, NSC Planning Group, and talking points Kissinger could use on the NSC system at a staff meeting. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (5), 8/19/69–12/1/69) Halperin's proposals apparently failed to prevent his departure. A draft of this memorandum, dated September 12, is *ibid.* A September 13 draft is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, Staff Meetings.

At your direction, a revised National Security Council staff pattern follows:

I. The Planning Group

This group will have four broad areas of activity.

A. Identification of Problem Areas

Focused effort must be directed to the isolation and identification of potential problems in the near and middle-range future, as well as over the long haul. What kinds of questions need to be answered? What is the range of choices facing the USG? What actions can we begin to take in the immediate future to ward off or ameliorate these problems?

The operations staff rarely has the time to concentrate on such considerations. This must, accordingly, be a prime function of the planning group.

In many instances, problem areas which the planners identify will lead to operational requirements. In these cases the planners and operators will work together, with coordination by the Staff Secretary.

The operators, of course, will maintain contact with their counterparts in other agencies. At the same time, the planners will also develop ties with their logical counterparts, particularly in the new Office of Planning and Coordination in State.

B. Assessments and Choices

In order to provide Dr. Kissinger with constant intellectual stimulation over and above what is contained in the standard operational paper flow, the planners will be charged with developing think-pieces, policy options and alternative approaches on the entire range of National Security Affairs issues.

Clearly, such efforts may also have operational consequences. Again, it will fall upon the Staff Secretary to coordinate this with the operations staff.

C. NSC Planning

The NSC system needs constant idea regeneration if it is to maintain momentum. To this end, the planners must be concerned with planning questions to be channeled into the formal NSC system, just as the operators will be concerned with operational questions. The planners and the operators will work together in development of NSC papers, with primary responsibility dependent upon the topic at hand. The Staff Secretary will be responsible for coordination.

D. Crisis Management

The planning group can broaden staff strength at times of emergent and actual crises. The planners can provide support to the operators, as they form ad hoc emergency groups under the direction of Dr. Kissinger.

The planning group will include:

1. Osgood—Director
2. Kennedy—Deputy Director
3. Morris (plus Africa)
4. Lord (plus UN)
5. Rodman

II. Operations Staff

This remains largely unchanged. Close cooperation between operators and planners, as discussed above, will be critical.

Assignments would be:

Latin America—Vaky/Nachmanoff
Europe—Sonnenfeldt/Hyland/Lesh (Lesh will be replaced shortly by Arthur Downey from the Office of the Legal Adviser in State)
East Asia—Holdridge/Moor/Grant
Near East and South Asia—Saunders/Foster (Foster will be replaced shortly by Hoskinson)
Africa—Morris
United Nations—Lord
International Economic Affairs—Bergsten/Johnston/Hormats
Scientific Affairs (space cooperation, science and technology, CBW, disarmaments and Seabeds)—Behr. This area has much in common with Sonnenfeldt's interests in SALT and NATO, so they need to work closely together. Behr will also have a special relationship with WSAG.

III. The Secretariat

The distribution and filing activities of Information Liaison (IL) will continue as is.

The same applies to the entire handling of day-to-day paper flow relating to operational actions. This includes screening of incoming messages, assignment of action, logging through of activities from start to finish, and keeping other agencies informed of decisions made. Overall immediate supervision of the logging and status function will be performed (under Mrs. Davis' guidance) by John Murphy who will shortly join the staff. The regular and official channel for action, guidances and directives will be via the NSC Secretariat to the State Secretariat.

The most critical function is handling from beginning to end of NSC paper work. This includes scheduling, assuring that requisite papers for each meeting are on hand on time, preparation of books for each meeting (books for NSC and other meetings must be in Dr. Kissinger's hands 48 hours in advance), note-taking, record-keeping and follow-up. These activities must be formally centralized in the Secretariat to provide continuity and a single voice and point of contact.

Notes at National Security Council meeting will be taken by Watts. Note-taking and record-keeping at all other meetings (Review Group,

pre-NSC and pre-RG meetings, etc.) will be handled by Mrs. Davis.

The informal channels which exist between operators, planners and the program analysis staff, on the one hand and their counterparts in other agencies on the other must, of course, continue open and active. Only in this way, and through a constant monitoring of the entire system, will it be possible to get the kind of supervision and performance record that is required.

The Secretariat, working closely in each case with the appropriate concerned staff men, will establish and maintain a system of monitoring the status of action, including implementation of decisions, on all items that have been brought into the NSC system. The framework is now being worked out by Mrs. Davis and Guthrie, who has just joined the staff. In order to complete this operation as quickly as possible, Rodman will help out for the next few weeks. Once established, the system will be actively maintained by Davis and Guthrie, under the direction of Watts. Rodman will then move to his regular assignment on the Planning Staff.

The Secretariat will maintain close contact with various special groups, such as the Verification Panel, the Defense Program Review Committee and WSAG.

IV. Program Analysis Staff

This staff and its functions remain essentially unchanged. More emphasis needs to be placed on program budgeting, as Larry Lynn desires, and greater activity in this area is anticipated.

73. National Security Decision Memorandum 23¹

Washington, September 16, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Vietnam Special Studies Group

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-211, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 23. Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to more systematically assess the facts upon which Vietnam policy decisions should be based, the President has directed the formation of a Vietnam Special Studies Group.²

This group will:

- sponsor and direct on a continuous basis systematic analyses of U.S. programs and activities in Vietnam,
- undertake special analytical studies on a priority basis as required to support broad policy and related program decisions,
- provide a forum for and encourage systematic interagency analysis of U.S. programs and activities in Vietnam.

The Group will meet as necessary to initiate and review studies and to supervise the preparations of issues papers for consideration by the President and the National Security Council. The Group will conduct its affairs without prejudice to the existing interdepartmental framework concerned with day-to-day operational matters on Vietnam.

The membership of the Vietnam Special Studies Group shall include:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Chairman)

- The Under Secretary of State
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

Henry A. Kissinger

² Kissinger proposed establishing the group in a September 5 memorandum to the President in which he cited six examples from 1962–1968 of “how frequently officials have let their preconceptions about Vietnam lead them astray even though a careful and objective analysis of readily available facts would have told them differently.” He then listed six issues that needed “careful consideration [as] to whether we have marshaled and analyzed all the available evidence,” and proposed that the Vietnam Special Studies Group “give continuous direction to the analyses.” For text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 115.

74. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, September 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

Defense Program and Budget Review Committee

Your remarks at the NSC meeting on the U.S. military posture,² strongly underscored your view that resolution of major defense strategy and program issues must no longer be the result of "treaties" negotiated between DOD and BOB or compromises struck among the military services.

As a result of the NSC meeting, I recommend that we move to establish an interagency Defense Program Review Committee. Such a committee could be chaired by me as your representative with Dave Packard, Elliot Richardson, Dick Helms, Bob Mayo and General Wheeler as permanent members.

The Defense Program Review Committee will satisfy your objectives by evaluating the diplomatic, military and political consequences of:

- changes in the defense budget and programs,
- changes in U.S. overseas force deployments and in committed forces based in the U.S.,
- changes in tactical nuclear weapons deployment,³
- major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.

The Committee can meet as necessary and prepare issues papers for you and the NSC to consider. For example, once a five year force and program plan for DOD has been established, the Committee can review significant changes to this plan proposed by DOD or BOB or initiated by Congress.

Recommendation: Because of the importance of this decision, I recommend that you sign the enclosed NSDM to establish this Commit-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Haig Chronological File, Box 958, Haig Chron—September 1969. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.

² The meeting was held on September 10. Handwritten notes of the discussion are at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

³ This reference to tactical nuclear weapons deployment was omitted from the implementing NSDM (see Document 79). According to a September 20 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, Kissinger had "expressed concern about the nuclear issue," which was conveyed to Laird. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969) For other changes made in Kissinger's proposal, see Document 76.

tee.⁴ The Committee itself can establish appropriate organizational arrangements.⁵

⁴ Nixon signed attached NSDM but, in response to Laird's September 22 letter (Document 75), it was revised before it was issued (see Document 79). In a September 10 memorandum to Kissinger forwarding the draft NSDM, Lynn warned that "this plan, or for that matter, any plan which carries out the President's directive, may create real problems with Mel Laird, who stands to lose a great deal of his potential power as Secretary of Defense." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 337, HAK/Richardson Meetings, May 1969–December 1969)

⁵ The President initialed his approval.

75. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 22, 1969.

Dear Henry:

Following our conversations, I have reviewed NSDM-23² again and believe that you should know about some of the things we are doing over here along these lines.

On 17 June, I directed Warren Nutter to form an OSD task group to study and supervise the Vietnamization effort in order to ensure that Vietnamization continues in an orderly, equitable, efficient, and explainable way. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Comptroller, Installations and Logistics, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Public Affairs, and Systems Analysis are represented in the task group. The group is chaired by Warren's deputy for East Asia, Dennis Doolin, and meets on a daily basis. A copy of the group's current task list is appended.³ Every morning, Warren, Doolin, and Admiral Bill Lemos meet with me on Vietnam and Vietnam related matters. We are presently expanding the staff in Warren's office and adding full-time analysts to the task group to study redeployment planning, concepts and strategy, leadership, and Vietnamese force improvements.

You are also aware of the Vietnam Ad Hoc Group,⁴ chaired by Bill Sullivan at State. This group meets every Tuesday and Friday, and has

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-211, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 23.

² Document 73.

³ Not printed.

⁴ See Documents 25 and 26.

representatives from State, Defense (OSD and Joint Staff), AID, CIA, and your own staff.

Although NSDM–23 does not so state, I understand that the creation of a permanent working group is being considered to carry out the tasks outlined in your memo. Is such a group necessary in view of ongoing efforts? If so, would it not be more advisable and effective to place this group under the already established WSAG, rather than under a new special study group at the Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary level? I will be happy to discuss this with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Mel

76. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Military Assistant (Pursley) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

Secretary Laird recently discussed with you the proposal for a Defense Program Review Committee.² Mr. Laird indicated to you his agreement with the general nature of the proposed Committee and the direction its work would provide on national security deliberations and on programs.

The Secretary still agrees with the general thrust of your proposal. However, since the last discussion with you, three modifications in the draft National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) have occurred to him. He has asked me to outline the modifications for your consideration:

a. What the Committee Will Do.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-211, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 26. Secret.

² See Document 74 for Kissinger's proposal.

The present draft NSDM says "This Committee will review the diplomatic, military and political consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination"

Mr. Laird suggests the charter be broadened to read: "This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political, *and economic* consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination"

In reality, the U.S. will probably be confronted on a continuing basis with the call for more national security commitments from the various diplomatic, military, and political claimants than we shall have resources to fulfill. In effect, then, two of the key jobs confronting the Defense Program Review Committee would be the delineation of:

—Sound U.S. *diplomatic, military, and economic goals*, at least as they look to those involved in national security matters.

—*Alternative national security strategies*, i.e., the ways in which resources can be allocated to meet, or at a minimum to avoid violating, the prescribed goals.

b. Committee Membership.

To fulfill the broader charter recommended above, Mr. Laird suggests: *adding the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the membership*. The counsel of a professional economist will be needed to insure that economic goals are clearly recognized and that the economic impact of alternative national security strategies is considered and evaluated in the Committee's deliberations. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, while an important member of the Committee, cannot be expected to fill such a role.

c. The Specific Committee Charter.

Currently, the draft NSDM indicates the Committee, inter alia, will review issues requiring Presidential determination that *result from*

—changes in defense strategy, programs and budgets, and
 —changes in U.S. overseas force deployments and in committed forces based in the U.S.

Secretary Laird believes the Committee would be more useful if it were to consider, and make recommendations on proposals affecting strategy, programs, budgets, etc., *before* changes went into effect. Mr. Laird suggests recasting the NSDM, therefore, as follows:

This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political, and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from

—*proposals to change* defense strategy, programs and budgets,
 —*proposals to change* overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S., and

—major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.³

Robert E. Pursley
Colonel, USAF

³ Under cover of an October 9 memorandum to the President, Kissinger forwarded a “slightly revised” version of the NSDM setting up the Defense Program Review Committee. The revisions incorporated the changes proposed by Laird. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 67, Defense Program Review Committee)

**77. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Staff,
National Security Council (Osgood) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, September 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Role, Functions, and Requirements of NSC Planning Staff

The purpose of this memorandum is to make as precise as possible, at this experimental stage, the responsibilities of the Planning Staff. It outlines a role that we regard as substantively necessary and organizationally workable. We present it for your approval or modification in the form of an Action Memorandum because of the importance of defining relationships between the planning and operational members of the NSC Staff in a way that will elicit your support and their cooperation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1319, NSC Unfiled Material 1969. Confidential. Sent for action. In forwarding the memorandum to Kissinger, Haig stated that it was “replete with generalities but does codify much of what you have outlined as the role of the Planning Staff.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, September 26; *ibid.*) In an October 1 memorandum to the President, Kissinger commented that the Planning Staff was “being strengthened under Osgood’s direction to do medium and long-range planning and to consider policy and program alternatives in some key areas,” with a greater emphasis “placed on trying to isolate some critical issues which do not get the kind of advance attention they deserve. I expect this to assume an increasingly important role in generating new thinking and alternatives for Council consideration.” (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 6–6)

I. Role

The principal role of the Planning Staff is to assure that (a) U.S. policies and policy studies reflect systematic foresight in light of significant considerations in a period of from one to five years ahead, and that (b) they are coordinated with one another according to a coherent concept of American interests. This foresight and coordination should be applied to three kinds of issues:

- (1) Issues which arise with respect to decisions or NSSMs that are up for consideration in the near future.
- (2) Issues that are anticipated to arise from international trends and developments but which are not being dealt with by decisions or NSSMs in the near future.
- (3) Issues raised by possible crises that one may anticipate.

II. Functions

Broadly speaking, the Planning Staff can play this role in two ways:

- (1) providing education and enlightenment to those with operational responsibilities, including the President and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs;
- (2) participating more directly in the formulation and consideration of policies and policy options.

The first function should be the primary responsibility of the Planning Staff, but it also needs to perform the second function to a degree in order to keep informed and remain relevant.

The first function can be performed through think-pieces, conferences, memoranda, consultants, and other intellectual media. The principal instruments of the latter are the NSSM process and the operational staff in their dealings with the departments.

The second function is difficult because it requires being familiar with operational matters and participating in the policy process to an extent that may not be easy to reconcile with the intellectual or organizational requirements of good planning. And it is largely this latter function that raises delicate problems of the relationship between the operational and planning staff.

III. Responsibilities

To carry out these functions properly I recommend the following guidelines concerning the responsibilities of the Planning Staff and its relationship to the Operators.

- (1) Planners should develop their own papers, particularly on issues of mid-range or longer-range significance which are not adequately dealt with in NSSMs elsewhere. Operators should suggest papers and studies for the Planning Staff and advise the staff in preparing them.
- (2) The Operators are responsible for managing NSSMs. They should represent you at meetings and prepare you and the President

for Review Group and NSC meetings. The Planners should not deal with Department personnel on matters concerning the content of NSSMs under the management of Operators.

(3) Planners should make suggestions to Operators concerning the longer-range implications of policy positions in NSSMs as they are being drafted.

(4) The Planning Staff should be free to present to you occasionally comments and alternative positions reflecting longer-range perspectives on NSSMs as they come to the Review Group and the NSC.

(5) The Planners should, from time to time, give you analyses of developments in international politics with significant bearing upon U.S. policies in the longer run.

(6) On a few particularly important longer range issues with which the NSSMs do not adequately deal, the Planning Staff should initiate Planning NSSMs that would be conducted by Departmental personnel and draw on other Planning Staffs. We would manage these as the Operators manage regular NSSMs. We would, of course, check with Operators in order to guard against duplication of effort and would work closely with them while the NSSM studies were being prepared.

(7) The Planning Staff would be responsible for an Annual Review of American Foreign Policy, stating concisely the interests and policies of the U.S. in relation to the international environment.

IV. Requirements

In order to fulfill its responsibilities the Planning Staff will need certain kinds of authorization and assistance.

(1) NSC system documents put out by the Secretariat (schedules, memoranda, NSSMs, NSDMs, etc.), EXDIS and NODIS cables, sensitive intelligence reports, and other material necessary to keep the Staff abreast of ongoing actions and alert to problems needing planning attention.

(2) Draft copies of NSSMs as they become available to the Operators.

(3) Authorization to initiate and manage a select few Planning NSSMs, while keeping the Operators fully informed.

(4) Access to a reasonable portion of funds available to utilizing consultants, calling conferences, commissioning outside studies, etc.

(5) Permission for a Planning Staff representative to sit in on Pre-NSC Review Group meetings and, occasionally, Review Group, Pre-NSC, and NSC meetings, when they have an important bearing on subjects in which the Planning Staff is particularly interested.

Recommendation

That you consider the proposals and views in this memorandum as the basis for a memorandum from you to the NSC Staff as a whole.²

² There is no indication of approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

78. National Security Study Memorandum 77¹

Washington, October 8, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Director of the U.S. Information Agency
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
President of the Export-Import Bank

SUBJECT

Program Budgets

The President has directed that program budgets will be prepared for selected countries where the United States has major overseas diplomatic, military, economic assistance, intelligence, and information programs. Where appropriate, these program budgets will be used as the basis for U.S. program decisions.

To implement this directive, the addressee agencies will designate individuals, by country, by October 10, 1969 to be available for a period of 90 days to develop program budgets for the following countries:

Thailand	India	Brazil
Korea	Pakistan	Chile
Philippines	Turkey	Colombia
Indonesia	Greece	
Taiwan		
Vietnam		

These program budget groups will work under the supervision of the Program Analysis staff of the National Security Council which will cooperate closely with the staff of the Bureau of the Budget. The completed program budgets will be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by December 15, 1969.

Where appropriate the AID and PL 480 program budgets will be used as the basis for the FY 70 country program memoranda submitted to the President pursuant to NSDM 10.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-163, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 77. Confidential.

² NSDM 10, "AID and PL-480 Commitments," April 11, 1969 (Ibid., Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 10)

In the case of the three Latin American countries on the above list (Brazil, Chile and Colombia), the program budgeting studies directed by this memorandum should be related to the extent possible to existing programming activities under the CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper) system.

Henry A. Kissinger

79. National Security Decision Memorandum 26¹

Washington, October 11, 1969.

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the formation of the Defense Program Review Committee.²

This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from

- proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
- proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.,
- major defense policy and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 235, DPRC & DEF Budget—Vol. I—1970. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Records of DPRC meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098–H-106. Included are minutes for many meetings as well as talking points, other briefing material, and background memoranda and papers, 1969–1973.

The Committee will meet as necessary and supervise the preparation of issues papers for consideration by the National Security Council. Issues will be brought to the attention of this group at the initiation of the addressee agencies or of the Chairman. Studies of defense policy and program issues undertaken in response to National Security Study Memorandums will be submitted to the Defense Program Review Committee prior to NSC consideration rather than to the NSC Review Group.

The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee shall include:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Chairman)

The Under Secretary of State

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

Richard Nixon

80. Editorial Note

The President's Assistant, H.R. Haldeman, included the following entry in his diary for October 15, 1969: "Had Rogers and Laird in after NSC to try to get them in line about Vietnam and November 3 speech. Apparently this uncovered all their problems with K[issinger], because P[resident] called me in to discuss it. Says he'll have to bring Mitchell in more because K can't deal with Rogers and Laird, has problem of communicating with them, and has become an issue. Wants me to make all this clear to K, hard to do. Problem is his insistence on perfection and total adherence to the line in every detail. Also injects himself too much into everything, between P and Cabinet officers, and they just won't buy it, so he becomes ineffective even at getting them to do what they already were ready to do." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

Twelve days later, for October 27, the following entry appears in Haldeman's diary: "The K problem came to a head today. P had me in early to review some items, then got into problem of K vs. State, and

especially Rogers which we had discussed last week and which K had churned up some more over the weekend, in phone calls with P. As we were talking, K and Ziegler came in for morning briefing. K got going on State, this time saying he had decided not to force Sisco to cancel appointment with Dobrynin, because that would be worse than keeping it, but then went on and on about what a terrible mistake it was. Then got into Lebanon problem, Israel jets, etc. Finally P said ‘well that’s all for today, have to get to work’ and got up and walked out into little office. K then said he wanted me in the noon meeting because he had to get into the Rogers problem with P. I took him into my office and tried to point out the fallacy of his technique, regardless of merits of case. I think he saw it a little, at least. P called me in to restate his concern with this as latest example. Feels K is impairing his usefulness, and is obsessed beyond reason with this problem. Later P called Mitchell and me in to discuss further, and asked Mitchell to have a talk with K. Tough one, because there is some real merit to K’s concern about Rogers’ loyalty.” (Ibid.)

81. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

The Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) will meet in the situation room tomorrow at 10:00 a.m.² At this meeting, I believe you should:

—*provide general guidelines on the types of issues the DPRC should address as a matter of routine;*

—*indicate a tentative approach to the FY 71 DOD budget so that issues with policy implications requiring Presidential determination are identified early:*

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 234, DPRC & DEF Budget 1969. Secret; Sensitive.

² The meeting, the DRPC’s first, was held on October 22.

—initiate interagency (*State and Budget*) involvement in setting up the *Defense Five Year Force and Program Plan* (FYFPP) by asking all the DPRC members to assist in defining the FYFPP format. The idea is that this document will serve as a basic reference and control document for the President and the DPRC.

At the next meeting of the DPRC you could then begin the process of reviewing the FY 71 DOD budget in terms of its policy implications.

All these topics are discussed in more detail below—issues are identified and some proposals for proceeding are suggested.

Defense Program Review Committee—Issues

The charter for the DPRC as established by NSDM 26³ is to “review the diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from:

- proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets;
- proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.;
- major defense policy and program issues and program issues raised by studies prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.”

These issues are of the following types:

1. *Strategic Guidelines.* These guidelines, based on Presidential and NSC decisions, will set the framework of purposes, objectives, and goals, which the Defense Five Year Force and Program Plan will serve. There are several defense-related NSSMs now underway which will assist in expanding and clarifying these guidelines:

- studies on the role of nuclear weapons in Europe (NSSM 65) and Asia (NSSM 69);⁴
- a study on strategic requirements to deter less than all-out nuclear attacks on the U.S. (NSSM 64);
- an upcoming NSSM on U.S. strategies and forces for NATO.

2. *Budgetary Guidelines.* The budget level guidelines, drawn from Presidential decisions, set the overall limits for the Defense budget. Pressures for changing these budget guidelines may arise through the year resulting from:

- changes in the *budgetary planning assumptions* concerning the level of U.S. activity in Vietnam: higher (or lower) deployments, ammunition consumption, etc;

³ Document 79.

⁴ Copies of NSSMs and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-122 through H-207, National Security Study Memoranda.

—*changes in U.S. Government revenue projections* which might constrain further the availability of funds for defense;

—*new national priorities* which could require reallocating government funds away from defense toward domestic programs or vice versa.

3. *Force and Program Guidance.* NSDM 27⁵ specified the general level of military capability the U.S. will maintain to support its international objectives and commitments. As we modify existing forces so they are consistent with the NSDM 27 decision, diplomatic and political reactions could develop which raises major policy issues for the President and the NSC;

—How do we explain diplomatically the relative roles of Korea and Southeast Asia in determining the forces we will maintain in the Pacific after the war in Vietnam?

—What obstacles will domestic political pressure groups present when we consider ways to redesign the Army Reserve force structure so that the Reserves support the worldwide strategy?

—What weapon system procurement plans will become major Congressional issues—shipbuilding (under study in NSSMs 50 and 54), advanced strategic weapon systems (ABM and ULMs, etc.)?

4. *Overseas Deployments.* When we told NATO what forces we would commit during 1970, we had some difficulties in coordinating our diplomatic scenario with our military plans. Other similar issues may arise requiring Presidential determinations:

—The Korea Program Analysis (NSSM 27), includes alternatives with different deployments to Korea.

—Elliot Richardson, in his report on the Defense Program Questionnaire (DPQ 69) for NATO, indicated that further changes in our forces committed to NATO may be necessary.

—Our deployments to Thailand are becoming a symbolic and political issue in Congress which may eventually require Presidential determination. (NSSM 51 will address the Thailand issue.)

As a general rule major issues of these types should be reviewed by the DPRC. After examining each issue, the DPRC should decide whether it should be forwarded for NSC or direct Presidential consideration.

The FY 71 Budget and the Five Year Defense Force and Program Plan.

In addressing the Committee's responsibilities in reviewing the FY 71 DOD budget, I believe you should involve the members of the Committee immediately by:

—asking State to begin identifying the defense program implications of NSDM 27 which will raise diplomatic policy issues;

⁵ NSDM 27, "U.S. Military Posture," October 11, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda Nos. 1-50)

- asking BOB to identify the major procurement issues which may raise policy issues in Congress (FDL, C5A, F14);
- asking BOB and Defense to identify areas where costs might so exceed projections that either budgetary guidelines or the force level must be adjusted.

I believe it is important for agencies to begin addressing these issues now so that when Defense submits its budget, no time will be lost in identifying issues for NSC or Presidential attention.

The Five Year Force and Program Plan—Setting It Up

NSDM 27 calls for the submission to the DPRC by the Secretary of Defense of his proposed Five Year Force and Program Plan by next January 15, together with an explanation and rationale for the forces in each major force category.

This plan, when completed, will be in effect a *basic reference-control document* which the DPRC can use to track defense decisions. Whenever DOD or any agency proposes to change elements of this plan, that would automatically create a potential issue for the DPRC, which it could take up or not depending on the policy implications and the diplomatic consequences of the proposal.

The non-defense members of the Committee can be involved in designing the format for the plan. If the plan is designed correctly, it will include enough detail so that the non-defense agencies can become aware early in the process of defense program change proposals with policy implications.

With respect to the specific procedures that might be followed in developing the FYFPP format, I believe you should consider either:

- asking Dave Packard to form a small working group, chaired by a Defense representative and including representatives of each DPRC member, to define the format; or
- providing a “straw man” format to serve as preliminary guidance for DOD and to provide other DPRC members a framework in which to place their own suggested additions. (An outline and several illustrative tables are attached (tab A);⁶ however, more work should be done before you could distribute the document informally.)

I believe you can go either way. Clearly, there are bureaucratic reasons for giving Dave Packard a major role in designing the proper format. On the other hand, since the primary orientation of the DPRC is toward the broader policy implications of defense program changes, with particular emphasis on all the dimensions of a problem, I believe you should retain the dominant role in indicating the level of detail and the basic categories in the FYFPP.

⁶ The tabs are not printed.

I have prepared talking points along the lines just described for the first DPRC meeting (tab B).⁷

⁷ According to the minutes, Kissinger opened the October 22 meeting as follows: “Originally, President found himself arbitrating defense issues on a line-by-line basis. He didn’t like being put into this position. We’re concerned with political doctrinal implications of long-term force projections. You’ve seen NSDM 26. Implications of force postures, in relation to five year projection, and in relation to NSSMs. In this context, the Group performs same function NSC Review Group performs. Other contexts are five-year plan due by Jan 15 and next year’s DOD budget. We can’t reopen budget line-by-line. We can review implication, e.g., NATO implication, doctrinal implications, it’s this problem we are here to deal with. Defense strategy, overseas deployments and policies and programs.” Richardson then commented that “As a Group we should be concerned with regular mechanism between State and Defense, see that political implications are taken into account.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-099, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DRPC Meeting 10–22–69)

82. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Mayo, Ehrlichman on FY 71 Budget

I understand you will be meeting this afternoon with Bob Mayo and John Ehrlichman on the FY 71 budget.

From what I can tell, Bob Mayo will probably have two issues to discuss:

—The extremely tight financial situation, which he may believe requires a further reduction in projected FY 71 defense outlays of about \$2 billion (from around \$75 billion, including pay raises, which is what DOD is shooting for now, to about \$73 billion).

—Procedures whereby the FY 71 defense budget will be reviewed by the President, including the role of the DPRC.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DRPC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

*Discussion**Financial Situation.*

I have always been concerned about the quality of the Government's financial projections and about the procedures whereby BOB decides how overall budget cuts are to be allocated among agencies.

The BOB's power to fix the revenue and spending targets and to decide which agency gets what gives BOB enormous leverage over the President's program and particularly over new programs. I believe Mayo's analysis should be carefully reviewed by responsible policy officials *before* Mayo takes action, but this may be a larger issue than you want to take on.

At the least, however, I think *Mayo should be required to take his case for further cuts in DOD's budget to the DPRC for a full policy review.* This is what the DPRC is for.

Further, I believe *such a review should take place as soon as possible.* From what I can tell, Mayo's final ideas on DOD's budget probably wouldn't be given to DOD until early December as things stand now.

General Procedures for Reviewing DOD's Budget.

BOB "Model." BOB people are under the impression that the President wants them to treat DOD like any other agency as far as the budget review is concerned. This means that something like the following would take place:

—In early December, BOB would give DOD its final budget "mark."

—Laird would respond with a memorandum for the President containing his recommendations on those issues which he and the Budget Director differ.

—Mayo would then prepare a memorandum for the President laying out Laird's views and giving BOB's recommendations on how the issues should be resolved.

—A meeting would take place in mid-December with the President, you, Laird, the JCS and possibly Mayo to reach final decisions.

The specific issues would probably be centered mainly on specific weapons programs, although many BOB staffers feel they must now analyze their issues in a broad strategic context related to NSDM 27.² In any event, the President's staff work would be done by BOB.

² NSDM 27, "U.S. Military Posture," October 11, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda Nos. 1-50)

DPRC "Model." My understanding is that the President wants to put an end to these eleventh hour confrontations and to broaden the review process and the way issues are framed.

This could be done by using the DPRC as the forum for reviewing issues and laying them out for the President. This would mean that:

—Mayo would take his proposals on the DOD Budget and on program issues to the DPRC for full review. Laird's positions on these questions would also be debated in this forum.

—Based on DPRC review, you, as Chairman, would forward a memorandum to the President outlining his choices and the basic judgments he must make in resolving them.

—The staffing would be a joint enterprise of the DPRC so that BOB's view of the world would not be the primary view the President sees.

—Mayo could still meet privately with the President to present his views if that's what the President wanted, but at least a balanced DPRC evaluation would be available to the President.

In this model, the *DPRC would be the central focus for reviewing DOD's budget* and related issues.

Since *Mayo's independence and freedom of action would be materially reduced*, you can expect him to resist the idea that his role be compromised by having him work through the DPRC.³

(My personal view is that there should be a domestic equivalent to the DPRC. The dominant role of the Budget Director has got to be changed in favor of a more substantive process.)

³ In a March 23, 1970, memorandum to Kissinger, Mayo indicated he had been expecting implementation of the changes agreed upon at the October 24 meeting, in particular his withdrawal as a designated member of the DPRC "in light of BOB's responsibilities covering the entire range of the Government's programs" whereas the DPRC made budget recommendations to the President "on a partial as opposed to an overall basis." Moreover, Mayo stated, since "by its very nature, the DPRC can provide nothing more than a partial judgment," overall tradeoffs between defense and non-defense functions "must be considered in a wider forum than that represented by the DPRC." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 206, Bureau of the Budget)

83. Editorial Note

In an October 27, 1969, memorandum, President's Assistant John Ehrlichman informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger that President Nixon had suggested moving ahead with removing the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning from the National Security Council. Kissinger jotted on the memoran-

dum: "John—Let's talk. I don't think he is the worst villain." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 267, Office of Emergency Preparedness—through 11/69, Vol. I) Kissinger responded formally to Ehrlichman in a November 12 memorandum in which he stated that he saw no national security objection to removing OEP from statutory membership in the NSC but deferred to Ehrlichman with respect to domestic and Congressional aspects of the issue. Under cover of his memorandum, Kissinger forwarded a brief study which discussed some of the issues involved in removing OEP from the NSC. (Ibid.)

Kenneth BeLieu, President's Deputy Assistant for Senate Relations, discussed the issue in late December with Senator Henry Jackson (D-Washington) and Bryce Harlow, Counselor to the President. BeLieu reported in a December 29 memorandum to Egil Krogh, the President's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs, that Jackson felt the issue should not be taken up at that time "because it will give some in Congress an opportunity to 'open up' on NSC matters far beyond the intended action. That during an election year with many critical matters under NSC consideration foes of the Administration could seize the opportunity to hold expanded hearings and perhaps embarrass us." Harlow also felt "it may not be to our advantage to expose NSC procedures to Congress next session." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-299, NSC System, National Security Council Vol. III, 6/1/69-12/31/69) In a January 20, 1970, memorandum to Ehrlichman, Krogh recommended deferring removal "until more propitious political times arrive." (Ibid.) Ehrlichman advised the President in a January 22 memorandum that a reorganization plan removing OEP from the NSC be prepared but held "in abeyance until such time as it is politically easier to enact in Congress." Nixon approved. (Ibid.)

On December 14, 1970, at 4:47 p.m. Arnold Weber of the Office of Management and Budget and Kissinger had the following telephone conversation:

"W: I was asked to call you to inform you that the President has apparently indicated we should go ahead with plans for abolishing OEP, which is one of the members of the NSC or certainly in your area of interest. The purpose of this call is to inform you, and if you or your staff have any comments . . . This recommendation was made by the Ash Council.

"K: That's one way to get a man off the NSC.

"W: I believe it's in the interest of economy.

"K: I have no immediate view. I will see if any of my colleagues do.

"W: This is confidential—General Lincoln is not aware of it. Knowing how these things work, we can't say with assurance whether this will happen, but we thought you should be aware of it.

“K: All right.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 366, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

OEP’s Director remained a statutory member of the National Security Council, however, until the agency was abolished by Reorganization Plan 1 of 1973.

84. Memorandum by Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, October 28, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of the Defense Agencies

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee

National Security Decision Memorandum 26² established the Defense Program Review Committee to assist the President in carrying out his responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs. The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee is:

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Chairman)

The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Additionally, other agencies may be represented at the discretion of the Chairman depending upon the issue under consideration.

This Committee was established by the President at my request to review *major* Defense issues requiring Presidential determination.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Accession 74–0045, Signer’s Copies October 1969. Secret. Marked “Revised by Col RE Pursley 25 Oct 69.”

² Document 79.

Major defense issues should be interpreted to include only those select and broad national policy matters in which the highest level military, political, and economic considerations are involved.

The Committee was not established to monitor Department of Defense on-going internal operations, programs, or budgeting processes. The basic Department of Defense program proposals and decisions will continue to be developed through established Defense procedures, and the operations of the Department will continue to be administered through established command channels.

Mel Laird³

³ Printed from a copy with this stamped signature.

85. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Continuing Problems with State Department

General

In recent weeks, the momentum of deteriorating relationships with the Department of State has continued to grow. From the outset of the Administration, our problems have been characterized by a failure of the Department of State, and in particular the Secretary, to cooperate with this office, to adhere to broad policy lines approved by the President and to abide by established ground rules for minimum coordination of policy matters across a broad spectrum of foreign policy issues:

SALT

—The history of our relationships with State and, in turn, U.S. Government's relationships with the Soviet Union on Strategic Arms

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John Ehrlichman, Box 26, State Department—White House Relations, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is an updated version of Haig's October 27 memorandum to Kissinger on the same subject. (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 1)

Limitation negotiations is replete with examples of the consistent failure of the Secretary of State, the Department of State and ACDA to adhere to the minimum policy guidelines promulgated by the President or Assistant to the President in the President's behalf.

—At enclosure 1 is a detailed chronology of the earlier problems experienced with State in the evolution of the SALT issue.² Subsequent to that chronology, in recent weeks, the following problems have arisen:

(1) In contrast to the President's desire to maintain a cool and aloof relationship with the Soviets, at least until his November 3d speech, State moved with excessive eagerness to accept the long overdue Soviet response on SALT talks.

(2) Despite a firm Presidential directive to the effect that the talks should not be held in Helsinki, Secretary Rogers in effect agreed to this site in his discussions with Dobrynin in New York and subsequently after having been instructed to the contrary, continued to acquiesce in Helsinki as the location, for preliminary talks.

(3) Despite obvious desire on the part of the White House to achieve maximum credit for the President on the SALT issue, it appears that State moved, through press contacts, to insure that the Secretary of State received maximum credit for the favorable Soviet response.

(4) On October 24, the Secretary of State sent a memorandum to the President, designed to give State and ACDA almost autonomous control of SALT negotiations, despite the existence of White House memoranda designed to retain control here.

(5) State has not yet responded to a request for copies of memcons covering the Rogers–Dobrynin conversations on Wednesday, October 22, 1969.

(6) Despite an urgent requirement suggested from the White House that careful coordination be effected with our European Allies on the SALT announcement, the State Department did not execute such coordination until late Friday afternoon, just a few hours before the announcement was to be made and well after serious leaks were already reflected in the press. (Except for the fact that we utilized White House channels to notify the Big Three confidentially on Thursday, October 23, this could have been a serious affront to our Allies.)

(7) Despite the full realization in the Department of State of the President's interest in any contacts with the Soviets, State, without consulting with or notifying the White House, arranged a meeting between

² The attached April 30 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon is not printed.

Gerard Smith and Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss the "mechanics" of the forthcoming SALT talks for October 29. Concurrently, a new flurry of speculative press articles apparently emanating from ACDA sources have started to appear in the media, the most significant being today's Marquis Child's article indicating that Gerard Smith will move rapidly to initiate talks on the MIRV ban with the Soviets once the talks start.³

(8) In sum, State's handling of the Soviet SALT reply was contrary to the tactics desired by the President. It clearly damaged the atmosphere that we were attempting to maintain vis-à-vis the Soviets. It is apparent that unless the Department of State and its subordinate agency, ACDA, are immediately brought under firm control that the freewheeling, undisciplined and frequently disloyal style of operating which has characterized the SALT issue will continue unabated. These discrepancies can continue only at the greatest risk to the national security now that substantive talks are about to get underway.

Colorado Springs Directive

—On 1 September (enclosure 2), the President sent a directive to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of CIA,⁴ reiterating his desire that all communications with policy implications be cleared with the White House, adding that in cases of doubt the rule would be to seek clearance. It is obvious that this directive has not been disseminated to the appropriate bureaus in the Department of State. In fact, contrary to this directive, we have received several indications that guidance has been issued to at least some bureaus and members of the State Department staff that they should strictly limit coordination and collaboration with members of the NSC staff.

—For example, our African staff man was informed by the Chief of the African Bureau that the African Bureau has received a directive from the 7th Floor that it is not to coordinate its actions with him.

—As a further manifestation of this problem, State dispatched a cable to Bonn dealing with the future of the Berlin issue, containing strong policy implications, without obtaining necessary clearance from the White House.⁵ Despite continued efforts by the NSC staff, State adamantly refused to accept White House guidance until the issue was finally resolved between Dr. Kissinger and the Under Secretary of State.

³ Marquis Childs, "SALT Talks Offer Chance to Curb Spiraling Arms Race," *The Washington Post*, October 29, 1969, p. A25.

⁴ Document 70.

⁵ Telegram 174682 to Bonn, October 15. For text see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972.

—One of the most serious breaches of the President's directive occurred on October 8 when the Department of State, unilaterally and without White House approval, passed to a French Embassy officer for relay to the North Vietnamese, U.S. medical journals containing articles on the treatment of hemorrhagic fever, reportedly rampant in North Vietnam. This is an incredible act which may have been motivated by humanitarian concerns but which represented a fundamental policy decision which was not even cleared with Ambassador Lodge, who registered a strong complaint upon learning that it was done. Background material at enclosure 3.⁶

—On October 8, Department of State dispatched a message to Moscow, Paris and Saigon, without White House clearance, which reported a meeting between Ambassador Sullivan and the Soviet Minister Tcherniakov which established a totally unauthorized new communication link between Sullivan and the Soviets and Habib and the Soviet representative Oberemko in Paris, designed to deal actively with the Vietnam problem. (Cable at enclosure 4).⁷ It took energetic action by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with the President himself to rectify this situation.

Middle East

—On October 25, we received notification by information memorandum from the Secretary of State that he intended to launch a major Middle East initiative on Wednesday, October 29.⁸ The memorandum indicated that Joe Sisco would launch talks with the Soviets in an effort to seek Soviet agreement with a proposal that would have the Israelis return to their pre-war borders, with some exceptions, in return for guarantees for the future of Israel. When State was informed that such an initiative at this time would be contrary to the U.S.-Soviet atmospherics sought in conjunction with the Vietnam speech, we were informed that Secretary Rogers had already made a commitment to Dobrynin on October 22 to launch these talks and that it would be embarrassing, if not impossible, to draw back now. The White House had not been informed of this commitment. In view of the President's pre-occupation with his weekend speeches, the Assistant to the President acceded to the State initiative rather than bother the President whose personal intercession would be required to modify what was presented to the White House as a course of action approved by the Secretary of State.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

⁷ Telegram 170777 to Moscow, October 8; attached but not printed.

⁸ Not found.

Latin America

—After a copy of the President's draft speech on Latin America was provided to State, we noted indications that it was immediately taken over by the Secretary, who initiated a series of coordinating actions which would risk the security of its contents—but which could then gain maximum credit for State for whatever initiative the President would ultimately include.

—The President had approved and directed the upgrading of the State bureau responsible for Latin American Affairs, from Assistant Secretary to Under Secretary level, to be included as one of the initiatives reported in the October 31 speech.⁹ Rather than accepting this directive, Secretary Rogers called Dr. Kissinger and insisted that if he were to so reorganize State it would be necessary for Dr. Kissinger similarly to reorganize the NSC staff, upgrading his Latin American specialist. Dr. Kissinger agreed, despite the meaningless nature of such an exercise. (NSC staff members do not have clearly defined titles in any case.)

—Immediately after the draft of the President's speech was furnished to the Department of State, press speculation began to build concerning its contents. The most flagrant of these was an article in today's *New York Times* by Tad Szulc, obviously leaked by State, which intimated that the President's speech would be in large measure a recitation of Governor Rockefeller's recommendations for Latin America.¹⁰

—Although each of the most recent drafts have been furnished to State, they have initiated a process of nitpicking, seeking both substantive and stylistic changes, despite the fact that the broad outlines of the proposals contained in the speech were approved by the President and promulgated as Presidential directives, following NSC consideration of our Latin American policies. Furthermore, the Secretary called the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on Tuesday, October 28, and informed him that he intended to take over the substance of the speech on Thursday and Friday of this week and insure that it was consistent with his views.

Africa

—On October 16, State slipped a new option into the discussion of Southern Africa at the Review Group meeting on that subject without prior consultation with the NSC staff, in a clear effort to circumvent the usual channels of preparation for Review Group meetings.

⁹ See Document 80.

¹⁰ Tad Szulc, "Rockefeller Seeks Latin-Policy Shift," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1969, p. 1.

—More serious was the testimony of State’s Assistant Secretary for African Affairs before the House Subcommittee on Africa. His confidential testimony revealed State’s recommendations on closing our Consulate in Southern Rhodesia and on importing Rhodesian chrome, issues under NSC consideration. Both of these recommendations were (as State knew) consistent with the views of the Subcommittee Chairman, Congressman Diggs. The effect of this can only be that, if the President chooses a different course from that recommended by State, Congressman Diggs and his colleagues will know that their friends in State fought the good fight against the “wrong-headed” White House.

State under-cut the President’s position in this manner, despite specific instructions from BOB that its testimony before Congressman Diggs should avoid all statements implying what our policy is or should be. Commerce and Treasury received similar instructions and followed them in their testimony.

Summary

In sum, it has become increasingly apparent that State-White House relationships have deteriorated to the point that the most serious damage to the national interest cannot but result. The situation today differs only in degree from the problems that have been experienced since January 21st. At enclosure 5 is a summary of major problems up to July 12, included in a memorandum prepared by the Assistant to the President by Colonel Haig.¹¹ At enclosure 6 is a memorandum which was prepared in August at San Clemente, summarizing the problems that had occurred over the summer weeks.¹² The impression gained from review of the history of our problems with State suggest that their continuation can no longer be tolerated.

¹¹ Document 63.

¹² See footnote 2, Document 70.

86. **Memorandum From W. Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, November 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relations with the State Department

As you requested, I am putting down on paper some of my thoughts about the present state of our relations with the State Department. I have done this in the form of separate papers on: the problem and its consequences; the reasons which I believe lie behind the problem; and some possible remedial measures.²

In discussing only the problem, there is the danger that the picture can be painted in overly bleak tones. I do not mention the many areas of close and friendly collaboration with State—e.g., with Ted Eliot.

The memorandum incorporates the comments of the senior staff operators. I discovered that Bill Watts was independently writing a similar memo. Many of the comments in my memo are taken from Bill's (with his blessings).³

Attachment A

Washington, undated.

The Problem and Its Consequences

Almost without exception, the staff members agreed with my view that working relations between the NSC staff and the State Department are at their lowest ebb in years. This is most obvious in the extraordinary failures of the State Department to coordinate its activities with this staff in a number of important ways. (Some of the specific incidents of which you are aware come as a particular shock to me when I recall the meticulous way in which my former bosses at State checked

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 2. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis.

² All three papers are attached but only the first two, attachments A and B, are printed.

³ Attachment D; printed below.

almost everything of importance with the White House, and were sincerely embarrassed when there was some slip-up.)

Most of the operators also said that the State Department sees the NSC now in an adversary role in a way that it has not before. There seems to be less effort than before to resolve problems by compromise. This is an atypical attitude for the State Department, which has not been noted in the past for the overt ferocity of its bureaucratic methods.

I will not recount the many cases of State failure to clear statements and instructions, or to carry out Presidential directives, etc. There are a number of categories of operational problems, however, which can usefully be listed.

—Almost daily, policy statements and positions are taken through speeches or cable directives which were not sent to the White House for prior clearance.

—Implicit and explicit directives have been sent from the 7th floor to certain bureaus telling them not to deal with their NSC counterparts.

—As the information flow has thus diminished or stopped, NSC staff members have been unaware of issues on which a White House view could usefully be given.

—Papers are sent over from State (sometimes probably deliberately) late before meetings, so as to make meaningful comment almost impossible by the NSC staff.

—The 7th floor is signing off on a greater number of cables than in the past. The Bureaus are increasingly preparing messages without White House clearance and obtaining 7th floor approval before they come to us for clearance. This pattern allows the Bureaus to avoid confrontation with our staff and has the particularly pernicious effect of involving the 7th floor and you in disagreements which should have been resolved at lower levels.

—Papers are frequently produced which simply do not produce realistic alternatives for the President to consider, but rather put the entire weight on the favored State position.

—Specific Presidential orders and policy guidelines have been ignored. This has, of course, happened in past Administrations—but never in recent history to such a degree, particularly with regard to press statements.

—In addition to disregard of Presidential policy directives, bureaucratic directives from the President have been suppressed and ignored. For example, the Colorado Springs directive⁴ was never given any distribution within the State Department.

⁴ See Document 70.

These problems vary greatly, of course, among the Regional Bureaus.

Consequences

The major consequences of these problems have been obvious to you: the serious inconsistencies we have displayed to foreigners with regard to critically important substantive issues and the impression of indiscipline and lack of coherence we have displayed to the press. The gravity of these consequences, particularly the former, cannot be overstated.

Another consequence has been less important substantively, but also concerns me. It is the amount of time and physical and psychic energy which goes into our bureaucratic struggles. This has, I believe, seriously affected the efficiency and performance of our operation—and of the Government as a whole.

Attachment B

Washington, undated.

The Reasons

Most of the problem revolves around the Secretary's relationship with the President and you, as noted in Bill's memo. Substantive disagreements with the White House also play a strong part. In addition, there are a number of bureaucratic reasons for the problem. They are basically atmospheric:

—Relations vary from geographic area to geographic area, depending largely on the personalities involved. Psychological interactions involved here include a feeling by some Assistant Secretaries that they have been bulldozed by more competent NSC staff officers and resultant fears that continued close contact will damage their own positions in the bureaucracy, as well as occasional resentment at the bureaucratic as well as personal power of the NSC staff.

—The whole 7th floor has (I believe properly) encouraged the Bureaus to show more initiative in developing new policies, etc., to show that the State Department *can* play a more positive role in our foreign affairs establishment. This has been interpreted by some Bureaus to mean that they should circumvent the NSC staff.

—Many in the State Department lack confidence in the present NSC system. There is reportedly a widespread belief that it was designed from its inception to constrain the State Department. Many State officers therefore do not believe that they will gain anything by submitting differences with the NSC staff to the NSC structure.

—There is also reportedly an unfortunate belief in some Bureaus that you are anti-State Department in outlook. I gather, without knowing specifics, that some comments attributed to you denigrating the State Department have been given fairly wide circulation in some Bureaus.

—Some Bureaus reportedly believe that some of the President's directives, as put out in NSSM's, NSDM's, and other memoranda over your signature, reflected your desires more than the President's, and even on occasion that they were put out without the President's knowledge. These rumors have debased the effectiveness of these directives.

—As you saw in the Green memorandum, some State officers have the impression that the White House does a great deal of back channel manipulation of the field.

All of these factors have contributed to a vicious circle of reactions and counter-reactions between the staff and the State Department, which has contributed to an increasing loss of confidence in each other.

Attachment D⁵

Memorandum From William Watts, Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

On Dealing with State

I. Background

In the last analysis, the whole question of relationships between the National Security Council and the Department of State turns on your relations with Secretary Rogers. With the mistrust and suspicion that now exist, it is inevitable that he will seek to circumvent and undermine your efforts. The result is that the working relationships between the Department of State and your staff will have not only the

⁵ Roger Morris, who was a member of Kissinger's NSC staff from January 1969 to April 1970, later wrote in his book, *Haig: The General Progress*, p. 129, that "when Watts, the staff secretary, sent Kissinger an unusual memo early in 1970. 'On Dealing with State,' urging an end to the venom and harsher habits of rivalry, Haig openly ridiculed Watts with Kissinger and other officers."

chronic abrasions of an unwielding bureaucracy, but may suffer an outright break-down. Simply put, this jeopardizes the very basis of the national policy process.

Institutional corrections are probably possible and worth trying, but ultimately it all will hang on the Kissinger/Rogers axis.

This basic fact is complicated by an additional reality which must be as galling to Secretary Rogers as it is obvious to the President. To wit, the whole NSC operation, from you on down, stands head and shoulders above the Department of State in terms of quality of product and degree of initiative. The President obviously meant it when he said at the staff meeting in the Cabinet Room that State hadn't turned out a new idea in 20 years. He clearly looks to you for his most sophisticated advice and counsel, and this is now sufficiently obvious to everyone that it is bound to exacerbate the entire State/NSC relationship.

II. The Problem

All of this gets translated into reality in increasingly obvious and crude forms:

—policy statements and positions are taken through speeches or cable directives, which are not sent to the White House for clearance.

—specific Presidential orders are frequently ignored, or not enforced.

—papers are produced which simply do not present realistic alternatives for the President to consider, but rather put the entire weight on the favorite State program.

—papers are sent over from State deliberately late before meeting dates or other deadlines, so as to make meaningful comment here almost impossible.

—implicit and explicit directives have been circulated within the State Department telling staff men not to deal with their NSC counterparts.

—And so forth.

It would not be fair, however, to suggest the problem is all one way. Many at State are deeply concerned that the White House is undertaking clandestine policy initiatives without even clueing State in. In addition, there is concern that communications from the Secretary to the President, or at other levels, either do not get through to the President or are presented in a way which does not give full force to the State position.

III. What to do?

In point of fact, the cards are stacked heavily in your favor. You have an overwhelming dual advantage: your own very special relationship with the President, and the superior quality of NSC staff work.

This is a situation which the 7th floor at State certainly recognizes. *But in its insecurity and rancor, State is just not going to put out its hand first.*

Under these circumstances, only an initiative on your part can bring a genuine improvement in White House/State relations.

You hold the high ground. You can clearly afford to offer State a greater role, in the full confidence that, if State is unable or unwilling to respond, it can only blame itself.

The need for such an initiative grows day by day. It is simply a monumental waste of your time to have to spend so much energy on smoking out and preventing end runs. It is debilitating to the staff to be constantly in the same position, when in fact what they should be doing is working in close harmony with their State counterparts and thereby serving you in a far more creative capacity. What is going on now approximates a slow war of attrition, in which State regularly tries to limit your capacity for action, and looks upon the NSC as its main adversary on the Washington landscape.

As I said at the outset, this all revolves around your relations with the Secretary of State. If there is to be genuine relief of tension and improvement of working relations, the process must start with you and Secretary Rogers.

Such an initiative could be followed up by a range of additional actions, the purpose of which would be to try and make better use of the resources available at State (they are not inconsiderable), and to engender the kind of active inter-relationship which is so badly needed.

A number of specific steps follow:

1. A private meeting between yourself and the Secretary, in which you would stress your own desire to see nothing but the closest relations between the members of your staff and their counterparts at State. This kind of forthcoming opening on your part could at least lay the groundwork for a bit of relaxation from the Secretary's side, and prepare the way for a subsequent session with the important working-level people at State—primarily the Assistant Secretaries.

2. A meeting of you with Elliot Richardson and the IG Chairman (with the Secretary invited, although he might not want to be there), as a follow-up to your overture to the Secretary. You would lay out in some detail just what kind of product the IG papers really should be, and what the President needs. Some of my discussions lead me to believe that there is genuine confusion on this score. Some straight talk from you, stressing the importance of these papers and showing just how basic they could be if done properly might result in a vastly improved product. Your message would be that the NSC staff wants to work with—and not against—the IG process.

3. You should continue to encourage NSC staff members to consult more actively with their State Department counterparts *throughout* policy deliberations over at State. This is a subject that would be well worth discussing with Secretary Rogers; he could (hopefully) be made to see that it is in his interest that such close consultations do go forward. As it is now, conflict all too often emerges in the very last stages, and this is just one more factor which escalates issues for decision to a show-down of sorts between you and the Secretary.

4. The role of the Under Secretaries Committee should be strengthened, putting an increased responsibility on State's shoulders. State must be *challenged* to do a better job and the way to do that best is to *give them* responsibility, not take it away. A number of NSSMs already in process could be directed straight to the Under Secretaries Committee in the first instance, and this line of approach should be more actively followed in the future. This can be handled in part by the very way the NSSMs are drafted.

5. Every effort must be made to move papers through the White House system as quickly as possible. Admittedly, State is notoriously delinquent in the way it sends papers over late for clearance, with horrendous last minute deadlines. This is something for which we constantly jump on them for and we will continue to do so. But to the extent that our own hands are clean, and decision papers do not languish here, the onus for delay is on State.

6. There will always be very private White House initiatives. This is required both by Presidential style and the concern over possible leaks. Nonetheless, this is also a formula which needs to be used with utmost discrimination, only where absolutely necessary.

In sum, there is a major problem. No one else in this government—who is in a position to deal with it—will. You *can*. To lift the current malaise, to everyone's advantage, you *should*. I believe—and I say this in the full knowledge that I am drawing heavily on my credit balance with you—you *must*.

It is in your interest, in the President's interest, and—ultimately—in the national interest.

87. **Memorandum From William Watts, Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, December 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Staff: Comments and Recommendations

At the end of my first interview with you last summer about joining your staff, you said, "No matter how many difficulties and problems I have described to you, it is in my interest to make this system work."

I left the Governor and came to work for you because I believed (and continue to believe) that I could serve you in your interest. What follows has that fully in mind, and is set forth in the spirit of candor which must underpin my usefulness to you.

As you have made clear on a number of occasions, there is a real justification for the NSC system as it now exists only if the NSC staff effort is clearly superior to that produced anywhere else in the government. On the basis of experience to date, the President has come to expect from you work of the highest caliber (so much so, I would venture, that he has clearly carried the pattern you established in organizing a domestic staff counterpart under John Ehrlichman). This is a key element in your strength and ability to intercede in the foreign policy process. To the degree that you are not served to full capacity by your staff, further refinements are required.

Overall quality of staff work is going to depend in large measure on three internal factors:

- (1) Personnel
- (2) Bureaucratic efficiency
- (3) Morale

Let me treat these separately.

Personnel—Your staff is widely recognized as the most competent and skilled group in Washington. So it should be. There are, however, some specific weaknesses, and these need to be dealt with.

We have already touched on this subject briefly in recent conversations. I recommend that you, Al Haig, Tony Lake and I get together

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (5), 8/19/69–12/1/69. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only.

in the near future to settle on some specific steps. It does no good to know that certain members of the staff are not up to snuff, and yet not take steps to find replacements. But in order to move on this, we need your guidance and authorization.

Bureaucratic Efficiency—Your staff has grown in size far beyond its final counterpart under Walt Rostow. The flow of paper is staggering, as are the numbers of individual action assignments.

This has required the development of internal bureaucratic machinery which has taken time to shape and tune. Where shortcomings remain—as they obviously do—I am trying to work them out.

We are just now getting into action a far more institutionalized review procedure, which should enable us to almost automatically see that deadlines don't slip, due dates are met, and all members of the staff are kept up to the mark in terms of their assignment responsibilities. I do not pretend that by automating status reports and upgrading our review capability we can guarantee absolute quality. That relates closely, after all, to the personnel question. But real improvement (particularly if some personnel changes are made) should be inevitable.

Morale—Your best men are not looking for special status or prestige. They know that the very nature of their assignment, their location close to the center of power in this power-oriented city, gives them all this and more.

I know you feel you should not have to worry about the morale of your staff. But it is an objective reality, I believe, that performance and morale are directly and irrevocably linked. If this is so, then it follows that it is *very much* in your interest to promote the morale of your good men.

I am concerned that you do not fully accept just how deeply committed your best men are to your position and what you are doing. One of the chief criticisms, in fact, of the NSC staff in the bureaucracy is that they are loyal to your positions and concepts almost to the point of inflexibility. They have gained a reputation of defending your views (as those of the President's) to a point where they are sometimes seen as unyielding.

I also hope you realize that your best men are willing to follow your lead and work the very long hours they do—weekends and holidays included, of course—not because they necessarily want to, but because they know what you are doing holds the entire national security and foreign affairs system in this government together. It is your preeminence, your ability to contribute what is unique and creative in this Administration's foreign policy, that makes these men go. They are, in this sense, very concerned indeed with *your* morale; they strive to give you the best, to help let you be the best.

I am satisfied that the good men on your staff are not trying to sabotage you. If they wanted to, after all, it would be simple enough to do, and would be quickly apparent.

I am also satisfied, however, that their product could be improved. In fact, I can visualize a joint staff effort working with you and on your behalf which could hum in a fashion capable of meeting even your most exacting standards.

Those of us responsible for doing so, consistently work with the staff to get their product more fully in tune with what you want. In some instances, as I have indicated above, this is a futile exercise. In those cases, changes must be made; and the machinery needs continuing improvement.

But there will continue to be, even under the best of circumstances, another side of the equation. In turning to this, I must speak bluntly. If I can't, then I shouldn't be here.

There are several specific points I wish to raise.

1. *Imprecise instructions*—None of us, no matter how hard we try, can read your mind. You have said on more than one occasion that you know what you want when you see it. Fair enough, but it means that as the staff man is trying to get what you want, he frequently works without a very clear understanding of what he is supposed to be driving at. I am sure you can appreciate that this puts him at a disadvantage.

To the degree, then, that you can *make your own instructions* as to what you want or what you need as *precise and focused* as possible, your best men will be able to satisfy you quickly and painlessly. Everybody stands to benefit.

2. *Contradictory instructions*—From time to time, staff men get from you—directly and indirectly—different sets of instructions which are clearly at odds with each other.

Let me be specific. In the case of the CBW exercise, I think it is fair to say that everyone involved with the product was at one point or another substantially confused. I recognize that this effort was not managed well, and I hold myself primarily responsible. A game plan should have been drawn up immediately after the NSC meeting so that everyone involved would have known what they should be doing. (This will be done in the future.) Nonetheless, I stand on the judgment that instructions and directives were being changed so rapidly that it was extraordinarily difficult to proceed coherently and cohesively.

I realize that the President frequently changes his mind, putting you in an equally tenuous position. Just as that makes your task the more difficult, so is the task of those who genuinely want to get you what you need vastly complicated when they work under colliding instructions.

3. *Public Reprimands and Downgrading of Your Staff*—If anything can break the spirit of the men working for you (whether in your own White House basement office, or in the EOB), it is drilling them for inadequate performance or downgrading them in front of their peers. Your best men find this hard to understand and accept, and it hardly motivates them to produce the highest quality of which they are capable. The downgrading also seriously undermines their own effectiveness as they deal with their counterparts in the bureaucracy.

When you feel a reprimand is in order, I recommend you do this *in private*, and in a way that lets the man know *what* he is being *rapped for*.

The reverse, of course, holds as well. A few *words of encouragement* after a particularly exacting effort mean a great deal.

4. *Absence of debriefing on decisions and agreements you make privately*. You do a lot of important work in private meetings with key Administration officials, at which no other member of the NSC staff is present. This kind of personal forum enables you to move quickly and informally on a wide range of issues. It also, I assume, permits a degree of candor which would be lacking if other people were around.

I have in mind primarily your breakfast or luncheon meetings with Richardson; but this also applies to similar meetings with Packard, Mayo, Ehrlichman and others, where items of direct interest to your staff members are discussed.

What subsequently happens all too frequently, I fear, is that your staff men hear about specific decisions or guidance—which they need to know—only indirectly, through the staff subordinates of the other principals. Richardson and Packard et al, do debrief, in extenso, following their meetings with you. This puts your staff members in the difficult and embarrassing position of finding out what you have agreed to, recommended, or decided, through overtures to their counterparts around Washington. Furthermore, what your men get may well be warped and flavored in a way which favors the other principal's position when it differs from yours.

I urge you to *give readouts* after such key private policy and decision-making meetings. In order to conserve your time, this can, of course, be done through one channel—Al Haig/Tony Lake. It would help me if I could sit in, but I make no particular brief for that. I do make a strong brief that the readouts be given.

As I said at the outset, I have put these thoughts in writing in what I honestly believe to be your best interests. If I can usefully develop any of this more fully, either orally or in writing, let me know.

88. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Problems with the Program Analysis Operation

You should be aware that Larry Lynn is becoming increasingly discouraged from the attitude displayed by the Department of Defense toward his various projects. While there are many minor problems, I believe the most serious involves the role of the DPRC and the fact that Secretary Laird has put out some extremely prohibitive guidance to the Department of Defense which is now being translated into a stonewall position against Lynn in most of the areas with which he is dealing and which involve the DPRC, as well as some of the non-associated NSSMs such as the NATO Tactical Nuclear issue.

I believe that it is essential that you meet with Larry early this week to discuss the specifics of his problem. Following that meeting, you should ask for a meeting between Mel Laird, Dave Packard, Larry and yourself, together with whomever Mr. Laird might want to include to sort out the many problems. If you do not do so, I am convinced that the following situation will develop.

1. Larry will resign his position within a matter of weeks.
2. The entire DPRC system will remain stillborn.
3. All other Defense related relationships involving the NSC will suffer accordingly.

As you know, you do not have a Richardson counterpart in Defense. Also, as you probably know, Mr. Packard is being systematically isolated by Secretary Laird from Defense policy issues so that, in effect, any agreements arrived at between our office and Mr. Packard are meaningless. There is also an indication that many of the staff sections in the Defense Department are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the NSC system which they consider as a drilling formation, a bottleneck for actions which they believe they have worked diligently to prepare only to find them stalemated for weeks at a time, at the NSC level.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

All of the above convinces me that unless prompt remedial action is taken and that unless a constructive dialogue is developed between you and the Department, we are headed for a complete collapse of our relationships with the Department of Defense. I do not believe we can or should permit this to happen, especially in view of the growing problems with State. To me, all that is necessary is a rational, high-level discussion of the issues and, if necessary, some give on our part. This is not a matter that we can procrastinate on any longer, nor can we keep Larry at arm's length, pouting over his frustrations and harboring strong resentments toward you for lack of support or toward the Department of Defense for its lack of cooperation.

89. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 1, 1969.

Attached is the letter from Bob Mayo, providing his views to me on the pending completion of the FY 1971 budget preparation and the initial stages of the FY 1972 planning cycle.² I concur in his views that (a) an issue identification process for the Department of Defense, as outlined in the Budget Bureau Bulletin 68-9, is appropriate, and (b) it is premature to deal with the FY 1972 cycle.

Much of Bob's letter bothers me, however. The tone of the letter is strongly aimed at further Defense cuts. The basis for such a predilection is not well-founded, in my judgment. It may be that for any number of reasons such a course will be prudent. But if we do choose that course, it should be on the basis of sound and reasoned analysis, not on the rudimentary analyses which have typified budget and national security resource availability in the past. I believe we have an opportunity to make a quantum jump in our decision-making process at the national level in striving for an optimum resource allocation among our national goals. Pursuing Bob Mayo's course would miss that opportunity.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense—01 Dec-31 Jan 70, Vol. V. Secret.

² Dated November 19; not printed.

Bob highlights, for example, “. . . the worsening fiscal picture for 1971. . . .” He concludes, without providing the analysis, that we cannot meet our fiscal goals (unspecified) without a lower Defense target. It is not clear that if employment levels and national production rates slacken, thereby impinging on the revenue flow, the best—much less the only—course is to cut federal outlays. Economic analysis might show that employment levels, production rates, and therefore federal revenues would be enhanced by continuing, or even increased, federal outlays. I do not know. I am simply suggesting the case is not clear based on Bob’s statements.

For projecting security outlays in 1972, Bob suggests we wait until the middle of next year to have our discussions, i.e., until *Bureau of the Budget* has had the opportunity to reexamine economic projections, the revenue picture, the Administration’s other critical programs, and our progress in Vietnam. I agree on the timing. But it would be far better in my judgment to have a broader look than the Bureau of the Budget can provide by itself. To do the analytical job properly, we need to study:

—*The overall economic picture*, including the GNP projections; the resources which will likely be available for federal programs; the impact of various spending levels on national goals such as defense, full employment, economic growth, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium.

—*The sensitivity* of higher and lower federal spending increments on our key national goals, i.e., what price do we pay in inflation, if any, for more national security.

—*The allocation of the resources within the Federal sector for optimum distribution.*

—*The relation between the supply side of the national security equation and the demand side, i.e., our basic national security commitments.*

We now have an institutional arrangement in the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) to consider such issues. We should use the DPRC for just these purposes. To do so will in my judgment constitute a major accomplishment for this Administration.

At the same time, if we use the DPRC for lesser tasks, such as assessing the program of individual weapons systems or alternative regional force levels, we shall risk the loss in utility of the Review Committee. Maybe at some later time the DPRC can assimilate such important, but lesser, tasks. But at the start—or at least for the ensuing budget cycles—we should reserve to the DPRC *only* those major aggregate resource allocation issues ancillary to our top-most national goals.

Mel Laird

90. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

Deteriorating Relationships with DOD

Our official relationships with DOD continue to deteriorate, at least as far as my activities are concerned. Since I last discussed this problem with you, we have received new and disturbing evidence of DOD's unwillingness to cooperate with NSC activities.

I realize that you cannot do battle with the bureaucracy on every incident. However, we are faced with a series of incidents, any one of which could be tolerated but which, taken together, create a serious problem.

My immediate problem is that it is extremely difficult to get the other agencies to cooperate with us if DOD can consistently withhold its cooperation and get away with it.

My general concern is that this refusal to cooperate, even when the President himself has directed it, coupled with the serious lack of leadership and competence in OSD, may eventually cost the President heavily in bad policies and programs, missed opportunities, and problems with Congress.

The history of the last two decades demonstrates that when things don't go well in the Pentagon, the country as well as the party in power pay a stiff price.

The specific problems are as follows.

Program Budgets

On 8 October you signed NSSM 77² directing that program budgets be prepared for 13 countries and asking the agencies to designate individuals to work on the project.

Every agency but DOD responded by designating representatives. After overcoming the reluctance of the State Department and the Budget Bureau and reaching some statesman-like compromises on schedule and procedures, a phased work program was developed.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense—01 Dec–31 Jan 70, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

² Document 78. Copies of NSSMs and follow-up studies, organized by NSSM number, are in *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-122 through H-207, National Security Study Memoranda.

Dave Packard's reply was received on December 3, two months late (See Tab A).³

After lecturing us on how busy they are and on how difficult it is to develop program budgets, he says,

—he will support the program analysis efforts for the four countries for which separate NSSMs have already been issued (though their cooperation on Korea and Turkey has been minimal at best),

—he will not cooperate with developing a program budget for Vietnam,

—two to four of the remaining eight countries could be undertaken as a matter of second priority if people are available and after the others are done and evaluated.

I consider the reply insulting and the assertions about the difficulty of the task wrong. If we accept the DOD reply, NSSM 77 will in effect have been rescinded.

I can live with this situation. The strategy would be to wait until the NSC has reviewed the Korea and Thailand program analyses and then attempt to reissue the NSSM with stronger Presidential support.

What I object to is the principle of the matter and the fact that the other agencies will draw inferences about who has the upper hand.

NSSM 50, A Review of U.S. Naval Forces

As you recall, DOD submitted an extremely poor study on U.S. Naval Forces in response to NSSM 50. On November 21, you sent a memorandum to DOD pointing out that the President was personally interested in the study, that the study was deficient, and that a series of specific questions should be answered before you reported to the President.

On December 2, Packard replied (See Tab B),⁴ noting that,

—many of the questions were valid and that answers would be forwarded by 21 January 1970,

—you cannot consider the capabilities of a single service apart from the capabilities of the entire Department of Defense,

—DOD's views on naval forces will be transmitted in September 1970, as called for by NSDM 27 (U.S. Military Posture). "Only at that time will we be able to provide the President with a meaningful presentation on U.S. naval forces." The NSSM 50 report is a Navy study with no DOD endorsement. (We asked for a DOD study, not a Navy study.)

What we will get in September 1970, of course, is a coordinated DOD view on naval force requirements for the next five years, not an

³ Not printed.

⁴ Not printed.

imaginative study on how and for what purposes the Navy of the future might be designed and what the major problems are. Thus DOD is saying that it is not going to take any responsibility for NSSM 50, period.

There is nothing we can or should do until the answers to the questions come in on January 21. I would like to note, however, that:

—today, the Navy is quite beyond civilian control. Unlike the other two services, the Navy has no intention of subordinating itself to Secretary of Defense leadership and will use every trick in the book to get its way. Relatively speaking, they escaped scott free during the current budget review.

—the Navy is a museum, not a fully effective fighting force. For years they have sacrificed the basic elements of real effectiveness—trained crews, sonobuoys, support ships, spare parts—to keep the maximum number of combatant ships afloat and the maximum number of aircraft in the inventory. (I remember that two years after a new support aircraft had been introduced into the inventory, only 30 percent were operationally ready; they had simply not bought spare parts. At the time they were insisting in the strongest terms that they needed to buy more of these aircraft. The FY 71 budget review has, according to my informants, dramatically compounded such problems.)

—the Navy is increasingly becoming a relic. It is run largely by 57 year old Admirals who haven't had a new idea since their battleships were sunk from under them; they won't have their next new idea until their carriers are sunk from under them. The whole concept of the Navy should be thoughtfully reviewed, but there isn't a prayer of this happening under present DOD leadership.

DPRC

On December 1, September Laird wrote you on the proper role of the DPRC. (See Tab C)⁵

In Secretary Laird's view, the DPRC should,

- analyze the overall economic picture,
- evaluate the sensitivity of our key national goals to higher and lower national spending levels,
- study the optimum allocation of total Federal resources,
- evaluate our basic national security commitments.

The DPRC should *not*:

- assess the programs of individual weapons systems (Safeguard? AMSA? CVAs?)

⁵ Document 89. In a December 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Lynn wrote: "My view is that he [Laird] is trying to get the DPRC off his back and divert you to fighting with Mayo, Treasury, and the Council of Economic Advisers over national priorities and the size of the defense budget. ('Let's you and them fight.')" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 234, DPRC & DEF Budget 1969)

—assess alternative regional force levels (NATO? Korea?) The clear implication is that the DPRC should not review the Defense policy and program NSSM's.

In summary Secretary Laird believes “we should reserve to the DPRC *only* those major aggregate resource allocation issues ancillary to our top-most goals.”

His views are preposterous. If you were to do what he suggests, the columnists would be writing that Henry Kissinger is not only Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense but President as well.

More than that, he is proposing a flat rejection of both the spirit and the letter of the NSDM that established the DPRC. (It is interesting to note that only 5 of about 35 NSDMs have been signed by the President himself; the NSDM on the DPRC was one of them; a copy of the NSDM is at Tab D.⁶ Not only that, at one NSC meeting the President went on at some length about wanting to put a stop to the bilateral bargaining between BOB and DOD and to the inter-service log rolling.

There are a number of ways to handle the situation:

—You could ignore Laird; as the defense NSSMs, such as the ones on Korea, Thailand, nuclear forces, etc. come up, schedule them for the DPRC, perhaps with a call from you to Laird in each case.

This approach puts Packard in an exposed position. He has already exceeded Laird's guidelines in laying issues before the DPRC. We could regard this as Packard's problem, not ours.

Yes

No

—Call Laird and explain the President's wishes.

Yes

No

—Forward Laird's memo to the President, explain the problem to him, and get a renewed charter from the President which you could transmit to Laird.

Yes

No⁷

Format for DOD's Five Year Force and Program Plan

On October 31 you asked *Packard* to comment on a draft format for DOD's submission of a Five Year Force and Program Plan called for by NSDM 27.

⁶ Document 79.

⁷ None of the options is checked.

You also asked for DOD suggestions on a format for showing overseas deployments and military assistance programs and DOD recommendations as to the number and content of the detailed program status tables.

The purposes of the exercise were to give guidance to DOD and to get an interagency discussion of the kinds of information on the Defense program that should be available to senior officials.

Laird replied on 25 November (See Tab E).⁸ He said that he wasn't going to comply with the request and to wait and see what he submits in January. This was a simple request. I understand that a somewhat more forthcoming response was proposed for his signature but that it was toughened up in his office. (He says he will use NSDM 27 as a guide, but NSDM is not specific enough to be a guide.)

Here, too, if this were the only problem, we wouldn't have to go to the mat on it. In the context of the other problems, however, non-compliance is significant.

Recommendation

I don't see how you can let this string of rebuffs go unanswered. I recommend that you meet with *Laird* to resolve the problem or to decide what disagreements should be referred to the President.⁹

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ See Document 91.

91. Editorial Note

On December 11, 1969, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense *Laird* met for breakfast to discuss the Defense Department's role in the National Security Council process and, in particular, the function of the Defense Program Review Committee. No record of their discussion has been found.

Asked by Kissinger to provide talking points, Laurence Lynn, Director of the NSC's Office of Program Analysis, provided notes for discussion that highlighted some of the problems he had discussed in his December 8 memorandum to Kissinger (Document 90). Among his points were the following: 1) "Many in DOD (mainly in Systems Analysis and ISA) appear to attach a low priority to compliance with NSSMs and to cooperation with the interagency groups such as the DPRC and the VSSG. More and more I hear the question, 'Is the President really

interested, or just you?" 2) "Deputy Assistant Secretary Wu has told me Laird does not intend to have the defense policy and program NSSMs submitted to the DPRC, that this is not his understanding of the DPRC's function. (Wu said to me, 'after all, Laird created the DPRC.')

3) "The problem, simply, is that OSD is not putting its best efforts—or even at times any effort at all—into responding to the interagency, NSC instigated or led study and analysis efforts. I attribute this to Mel Laird's indifference or outright opposition, to Packard's impatience with interagency studies staffed by 'clerks,' to poor relationships between Packard and Laird, and to incompetence in ISA." (Undated memorandum; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr.)

A set of talking points for Kissinger's breakfast meeting, prepared by an unidentified member of the NSC staff, reads in part:

"1. Main issue is role of DPRC. Key points are:

"—Though the analysis of national priorities and the allocation of total Federal resources should receive top level attention, as Laird suggests, this task is too ambitious for the DPRC; a special staff and much wider agency participation would be required.

"—On the other hand, Laird is quite right in believing that DPRC shouldn't be another 'project manager' for DOD programs. It shouldn't consider which tactical aircraft to buy or how to equip a division.

"—The President's intent was to have an interagency forum to consider those issues with major doctrinal, diplomatic, or economic implications. The President wants State, CIA, BOB, and CEA views considered in the process of reviewing such issues.

"—The DPRC seems to be the most logical forum to review the defense policy and program NSSMs. [Laird has opposed this rather strongly.] The NSSMs typically address issues of Presidential interest with broad implications." (Ibid., Agency Files, Box 223, Department of Defense—01 Dec–31 Jan 70, Vol. V. Brackets in the source text)

92. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 9, 1970.

Dear Henry:

I am writing about the new Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Laos which was launched by your memorandum of December 6, 1969.²

Jonathan Moore, who chairs the Group, and I have both felt that there was a need for some mechanism for improving interagency coordination of our actions and programs in Laos. Otherwise there is danger of our examining and making decisions in fragmentary fashion without relating the various pieces which make up the whole in a way that will provide continuing cohesive control over our actions in Laos.

Our earlier practice of examining CIA-related proposals in a private session between State and Agency representatives can be improved upon, particularly by bringing in Defense representation and by enabling more coordinated analytical staff work. I appreciate that the Agency is reluctant to have some of its activities exposed too much, but the Defense Department is considerably more upset to be virtually excluded from deliberations which can affect them in a very material manner. The concept of the new Laos Interagency Group is welcomed by Defense representatives even though it does not go as far as they were proposing, and the Agency representatives on the Group are quite satisfied with its workings thus far. I am convinced that the Group can function in a discreet and controlled fashion.

The more recent guidance we have received from you raises in relevant fashion the relationship of the Ad Hoc Group to higher-level interagency bodies. I have two quick observations on it. First, in order to function effectively, the new Lao Group does require clarification on its relationship to other mechanisms such as the 303 Committee. Second, for the same reason, it needs to have some responsibility for

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Far East, Laos, Vol. III, 11 Oct 69–31 Jan 70. Secret; Sensitive.

² In the memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, the President directed that the group was "to be similar to the Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam in both composition and function" and should perform the following functions: "1. Coordination and assessment of military planning and operations in Laos. 2. Discussion of interdepartmental issues concerning operational developments in Laos and decision on issues which could appropriately be settled by the Ad Hoc Group, with referral to Principals on those which cannot," and determination of a public posture on military developments if required. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 LAOS)

preliminary screening, staffing, and drawing up recommendations. It is obvious that the new group should not try to do the job by itself, but unless it plays a meaningful staffing role it cannot be really useful to higher-level policy bodies, the memberships of which are not in continuous contact with developments and considerations relating to U.S. policy in Laos. Our current feeling is that the new Lao Group should be the core mechanism, monitoring comprehensively Laos developments and being competent to analyze proposals and develop positions on them for forwarding to the most appropriate higher policy body in the given instance.

The current practice of the members of the new Lao Group of keeping their respective principals fully informed and seeking guidance from them is a necessary one which insures better coordination and control. Given this, we feel the group should have the continuing responsibility of determining which matters to refer to higher authority and which parent mechanism is the most appropriate in a given instance. The nature of the decision being examined must be known before we can know which higher-level body is the most appropriate for referral. The WSAG, the 303 Committee, and units of the NSC system itself all have relevance, but being somewhat specialized, none has sole responsibility for formulating policy for Laos and none, it seems to me, can undertake the functions of the new Lao Group as I have described them herein. The 303 Committee, for instance, examines CIA operations, but on a broad conceptual basis rather than an operational one and it carries no strictly military representation.

There may be matters of ultra-sensitivity requiring special handling. Such matters will not be referred to the Group unless you or other higher authorities so direct. If such a matter first comes to the attention of the Chairman of the Group, he, recognizing its sensitivity, will take the initiative to consult you or other higher authority as to the best channel for handling.

I am taking the liberty of making these preliminary comments in this channel because you have been generous enough to invite it and because it has been so useful previously, and in the hope that they will be helpful to you in considering this matter. Perhaps you and I and Jonathan can chat about this when you find time now that you are back in Washington.³

Sincerely,

Marshall

³ Kissinger responded in a January 14 letter: "I agree fully with the general procedures outlined and especially the view that only major *intelligence* issues be referred to 303." (Ibid.)

93. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Defense Program Review Committee¹

Washington, January 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Defense Program Review Committee Working Group

Based on our prior discussions and the presentation to us at our last meeting² of the draft Fiscal Guidance for the Defense Department, the agenda for the Defense Program Review Committee for the coming months should include:

General issues:

- Analysis of Forces, Threats, and Strategies in Relation to U.S. Overseas Commitments and Policies;
- Analysis of Resources Required for Defense and Relation of Defense Budgets to Civilian Programs and the Economy;
- Review of U.S. General Purposes Forces Postures;
- Review of U.S. Strategic Posture.

Specific issues:

- Future Strategic Role of Manned Bombers;
- Requirements for Aircraft Carriers;
- Continental Air Defense.

These issues, together with any other issues suggested by members of the Committee, will be considered by the DPRC during the period prior to the submission by the Defense Department in September of their Five Year Force and Program Plan for FY 72–76.

It is essential that the Committee have a regular procedure for organizing and preparing for its consideration of these issues. To that end, the President has directed that the Defense Program Review Committee establish a Working Group to assist it in its work.

This Working Group will be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and will include a representative of each regular member of the Committee.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Secret; Sensitive.

² January 15.

The responsibility of the Working Group will be the preparation, prior to DPRC consideration of an issue, of a paper which will:

- set forth and analyze the issue or problem;
- state with precision any difference of views within the Government and the reasons therefor;
- present the options available to the President, indicating in summary form their advantages and disadvantages.

The Working Group will be responsible for organizing and supervising whatever studies and analyses are required for the preparation of the DPRC papers, drawing on the participating agencies for staff support.

Please let me have the name of your representative on the Working Group by January 23, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

94. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 20, 1970.

Dear Henry:

You will recall discussions with you, as well as discussions with the President, at which you were present, relating to the participation by the Treasury in national security matters. The President clearly stated that I should participate whenever financial and economic matters are involved. It was pointed out that this was true in most cases—not controlling, of course, but frequently of great importance. Examples of where the Treasury would not participate and I would not be expected to take time, would be those cases where technical discussions of weapon systems or internal operations were concerned.

A year now has passed and Treasury participation has been negligible. It seems to me it has been on a “hit and miss” basis. Occasion-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Confidential. Kissinger wrote at the top of the first page: “Draft reply. This shouldn’t sit for a month. Make some excuse for delay.” See Document 14.

ally, I have been invited. Usually it has been at the last minute and with briefing papers furnished just prior to the meeting and frequently without previous participation by Treasury staff. In fact, in some cases Treasury staff has been excluded completely or until positions have been finalized. Yet in a number of cases I could cite, Treasury participation has made a real contribution to the ultimate decision.

Let me give you a few glaring examples that have come to my attention in recent days of where Treasury has been by-passed in the national security process and where we have responsibility and could make a contribution to effective policy.

a. *NSSM 26—U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia*. Clearly, Treasury has responsibility in the Aid program including military assistance. In this paper, however, the omission of Treasury at the Review Committee level was even more obvious since the paper was completely rewritten as a result of Treasury recommendations. At the IG level the basic paper was discussed and the corrections which were largely incorporated in the final draft were a direct result of Treasury participation. Yet Treasury was omitted from the Review Committee Meeting as well as the NSC Meeting itself.

b. *NSSM 51—Policy Toward Thailand (Program Analysis)*. Again, a major thrust of this paper was the Aid and military assistance program which Treasury participated in prior to the paper and has subsequently been asked to participate in the subject area. During the course of the NSC procedure we were not asked to take part.

c. *NSSM 60—U.S. Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France*. During the early drafts of the NSC paper, Treasury made direct contributions. At the Review Committee level and also at the NSC Meeting Treasury was not invited.

d. Treasury has recently been asked to participate in a triumvirate task force (State, DOD, and Treasury) on Viet Nam's economic and fiscal policy in which we certainly do have a responsibility. You are well aware of the serious economic and fiscal situation in Viet Nam and its implications upon our policy. Again, however, the various papers dealing with the subject have not included Treasury at any level in the NSC process.

e. *NSSM 46—Spain*. Considerable effort has been expended on this most important paper by Treasury. We have had to clarify our own thinking and position in Treasury which has taken some time but in the process we have helped both State and Defense with their views. Even with this background we were not invited to the NSC Review Committee Meeting and the indications are that we will not be invited to the NSC Meeting itself.

The above are merely current examples and a recent review of the titles of your NSC papers by one of my staff suggests that there are

many policies in which Treasury has a responsibility that are being developed without Treasury participation.

I believe it is time to review the operating procedure of the NSC with respect to Treasury participation. Hopefully, a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out between you and me. If not, I feel that I must see the President on this important problem.²

With kind regards,

David M. Kennedy

² Following his rejection of a draft reply that was “much too abject,” Kissinger responded to Kennedy in a March 12 letter in which he agreed that the record of Treasury’s participation in national security affairs provided by Kennedy “leaves much to be desired. While it was not intended to be on a ‘hit or miss’ basis, it is apparent that at times we have been overzealous in our efforts to comply with the President’s desire that NSC meetings be held to the absolute minimum of participants.” Kissinger stated further that he had instructed his staff “to carefully review each item on the NSC and Review Groups agendas to ensure that Treasury participation is provided for whenever its interests are involved.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974)

95. **Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy by President Nixon¹**

Washington, February 18, 1970.

PART I: THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

If we were to establish a new foreign policy for the era to come, we had to begin with a basic restructuring of the process by which policy is made.

Our fresh purposes demanded new methods of planning and a more rigorous and systematic process of policymaking. We required a

¹ Source: Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace; A Report to the Congress* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 17–23. Also printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 122–126. Nixon’s 2nd and 3rd reports to the Congress, dated February 25, 1971, and February 9, 1972, respectively, also included

system which would summon and gather the best ideas, the best analyses and the best information available to the government and the nation.

Efficient procedure does not insure wisdom in the substance of policy. But given the complexity of contemporary choices, adequate procedures are an indispensable component of the act of judgment. I have long believed that the most pressing issues are not necessarily the most fundamental ones; we know that an effective American policy requires clarity of purpose for the future as well as a procedure for dealing with the present. We do not want to exhaust ourselves managing crises; our basic goal is to shape the future.

At the outset, therefore, I directed that the National Security Council be reestablished as the principal forum for Presidential consideration of foreign policy issues. The revitalized Council—composed by statute of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness—and its new system of supporting groups are designed to respond to the requirements of leadership in the 1970's:

—Our policy must be *creative*: foreign policy must mean more than reacting to emergencies; we must fashion a new and positive vision of a peaceful world, and design new policies to achieve it.

—Our policymaking must be *systematic*: our actions must be the products of thorough analysis, forward planning, and deliberate decision. We must master problems before they master us.

—We must know the *facts*: intelligent discussions in the National Security Council and wise decisions require the most reliable information available. Disputes in the government have been caused too often by an incomplete awareness or understanding of the facts.

—We must know the *alternatives*: we must know what our real options are and not simply what compromise has found bureaucratic acceptance. Every view and every alternative must have a fair hearing. Presidential leadership is not the same as ratifying bureaucratic consensus.

—We must be prepared if *crises* occur: we must anticipate crises where possible. If they cannot be prevented, we must plan for dealing with them. All the elements of emergency action, political as well as military, must be related to each other.

sections on the NSC system: *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building the Peace* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 226–232; and *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 208–212. Also printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 341–344; and *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 341–345.

—Finally, we must have effective *implementation*: it does little good to plan intelligently and imaginatively if our decisions are not well carried out.

Creativity: Above all, a foreign policy for the 1970's demands imaginative thought. In a world of onrushing change, we can no longer rest content with familiar ideas or assume that the future will be a projection of the present. If we are to meet both the peril and the opportunity of change, we require a clear and positive vision of the world we seek—and of America's contribution to bringing it about.

As modern bureaucracy has grown, the understanding of change and the formulation of new purposes have become more difficult. Like men, governments find old ways hard to change and new paths difficult to discover.

The mandate I have given to the National Security Council system, and the overriding objective of every policy review undertaken, is to clarify our view of where we want to be in the next three to five years. Only then can we ask, and answer, the question of how to proceed.

In central areas of policy, we have arranged our procedure of policymaking so as to address the broader questions of long-term objectives first; we define our purposes, and then address the specific operational issues. In this manner, for example, the NSC first addressed the basic questions of the rationale and doctrine of our strategic posture, and then considered—in the light of new criteria of strategic sufficiency—our specific weapons programs and our specific policy for the negotiations on strategic arms limitation. We determined that our relationship with Japan for the 1970's and beyond had to be founded on our mutual and increasingly collaborative concern for peace and security in the Far East; we then addressed the issue of Okinawa's status in the light of this fundamental objective.

Systematic Planning: American foreign policy must not be merely the result of a series of piecemeal tactical decisions forced by the pressures of events. If our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the products of rational and deliberate choice. We need a system which forces consideration of problems before they become emergencies, which enables us to make our basic determinations of purpose before being pressed by events, and to mesh policies.

The National Security Council itself met 37 times in 1969, and considered over a score of different major problems of national security. Each Council meeting was the culmination of an interagency process of systematic and comprehensive review.

This is how the process works: I assign an issue to an Interdepartmental Group—chaired by an Assistant Secretary of State—for in-

tensive study, asking it to formulate the policy choices and to analyze the pros and cons of the different courses of action. This group's report is examined by an interagency Review Group of senior officials—chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—to insure that the issues, options, and views are presented fully and fairly. The paper is then presented to me and the full National Security Council.

Some topics requiring specialized knowledge are handled through different channels before reaching the National Security Council. But the purpose is the same—systematic review and analysis, bringing together all the agencies concerned:

—The major issues of defense policy are treated in systematic and integrated fashion by the NSC Defense Program Review Committee. This group reviews at the Under Secretary level the major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic, and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities.

—Through other NSC interagency groups, the United States Government has undertaken its first substantial effort to review all its resource programs within certain countries on a systematic and integrated basis, instead of haphazardly and piecemeal.

Determination of the Facts: Intelligent discussions and decisions at the highest level demand the fullest possible information. Too often in the past, the process of policymaking has been impaired or distorted by incomplete information and by disputes in the government which resulted from the lack of a common appreciation of the facts. It is an essential function of the NSC system, therefore, to bring together all the agencies of the government concerned with foreign affairs to elicit, assess, and present to me and the Council all the pertinent knowledge available.

Normally, NSC Interdepartmental Groups are assigned this task. But other interagency groups perform this function for certain special topics. For example:

—The Verification Panel was formed to gather the essential facts relating to a number of important issues of strategic arms limitation, such as Soviet strategic capabilities, and our potential means of verifying compliance with various possible agreements. This Panel was designed not to induce agreement on policy views, but to establish as firmly as possible the *data* on which to base policy discussions. It helped to resolve many major policy differences which might otherwise have been intractable. As the section on Arms Control in this report explains in detail, the Panel played a central part in making our preparation for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union the most thorough in which the U.S. Government has ever engaged.

—The Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) gathers and presents to the highest levels of the United States Government the fullest

and most up-to-date information on trends and conditions in the countryside in Vietnam. This group is of key assistance in our major and sustained effort to understand the factors which will determine the course of Vietnamization.

Full Range of Options: I do not believe that Presidential leadership consists merely in ratifying a consensus reached among departments and agencies. The President bears the Constitutional responsibility of making the judgments and decisions that form our policy.

The new NSC system is designed to make certain that clear policy choices reach the top, so that the various positions can be fully debated in the meeting of the Council. Differences of view are identified and defended, rather than muted or buried. I refuse to be confronted with a bureaucratic consensus that leaves me no options but acceptance or rejection, and that gives me no way of knowing what alternatives exist.

The NSC system also insures that all agencies and departments receive a fair hearing before I make my decisions. All departments concerned with a problem participate on the groups that draft and review the policy papers. They know that their positions and arguments will reach the Council without dilution, along with the other alternatives. Council meetings are not rubber-stamp sessions. And as my decisions are reached they are circulated in writing, so that all departments concerned are fully informed of our policy, and so that implementation can be monitored.

Crisis Planning: Some events in the world over which we have little control may produce crises that we cannot prevent, even though our systematized study forewarns us of their possibility. But we can be the masters of events when crises occur, to the extent that we are able to prepare ourselves in advance.

For this purpose, we created within the NSC system a special senior panel known as the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG). This group drafts contingency plans for possible crises, integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action. The action responsibilities of the departments of the Government are planned in detail, and specific responsibilities assigned in an agreed time sequence in advance. While no one can anticipate exactly the timing and course of a possible crisis, the WSAG's planning helps insure that we have asked the right questions in advance, and thought through the implications of various responses.

Policy Implementation: The variety and complexity of foreign policy issues in today's world places an enormous premium on the effective implementation of policy. Just as our policies are shaped and our programs formed through a constant process of interagency discussion and debate within the NSC framework, so the implementation of our major policies needs review and coordination on a continuing basis.

This is done by an interdepartmental committee at the Under Secretary level chaired by the Under Secretary of State.

Conclusions

There is no textbook prescription for organizing the machinery of policymaking, and no procedural formula for making wise decisions. The policies of this Administration will be judged on their results, not on how methodically they were made.

The NSC system is meant to help us address the fundamental issues, clarify our basic purposes, examine all alternatives, and plan intelligent actions. It is meant to promote the thoroughness and deliberation which are essential for an effective American foreign policy. It gives us the means to bring to bear the best foresight and insight of which the nation is capable.

96. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 21, 1970.

Henry:

Per your instructions, I have prepared a memorandum for you including talking points for your use in your meeting with the President tomorrow.² I have pondered this most difficult of problems at great length this weekend and have concluded that you should not raise this issue in either the terms I have outlined or in any other terms unless you have in your own mind definitely decided to leave Government without any qualms or reservations. In my view, there is no way to pose a set of alternatives to the President along the lines outlined which will not ultimately result in your departure. As I told you earlier, I believe the President will pay any price to keep you happy and on board, but only at the expense of a bill which he will collect on later and probably to your disadvantage.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3. Secret; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig wrote in hand at the top of the first page: "my file only; get all other copies Laura has."

² The attached memorandum is printed but not the talking points.

I am confident that the President has been completely aware of your problems with Rogers, perhaps to a greater degree than you realize. If you are to hit him with the hard alternative now, it should not be with the view toward achieving a temporary victory which will ultimately deteriorate, but rather with the view toward providing him with notice that you intend to leave as soon as it can be conveniently managed.

I recognize the risks that your continuation in this job will pose for you personally and even for the country in the long run; however, I also believe that the overriding consideration is our country's current need for the kind of counsel and advice that only you have been able to provide in the present structure of things. Thus, after careful thought, I am against your taking this course of action now.

AI

Attachment

Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Discussion with the President on Relationships with Secretary Rogers and the Department of State

General

Attached is a brief talking paper which represents my best judgment on the tack and rationale you should employ in your discussion with the President on Sunday, February 22, dealing with your relationships with Secretary Rogers. As you know, I do not believe that you will want to permit the discussion to deteriorate into a bleeding litany of the almost incredible record of poor cooperation, intentional violations of Presidential instructions and, on occasion, deliberate deceit. Nor do I think you will wish to press too strongly on the difficulties you have experienced because of what appears to be a direct confrontation between you and Secretary Rogers with the parallel and increasing efforts by the Secretary and his staff to manipulate an anti-Kissinger press campaign. Rather, I believe you will wish to present to the President a calm, deliberate but unshakeable decision on your part to leave the Administration if the President, for whatever reasons, is unwilling to provide you with the kind of direct support essential to a clear-cut and effective working relationship between you, the Secretary of State and his Department.

Particulars

The history of Secretary Rogers' uncooperative attitude with respect to the office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is lengthy and tragic and includes documented accounts of poor faith in the following major areas:

a. State's uncoordinated and unauthorized policy actions with regard to SALT talks and the preparations therefor.

b. State's abrogations of the Colorado Springs directive of September 1, 1969.³

c. State's unresponsive and frequently hostile performance with regard to such major policy issues as the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.

d. State's systematic efforts to erode Presidential policy decisions on the concept of linkage and, in the early days, Presidential efforts to hold the line on Vietnam issues.

e. The recent imbroglios with State involving the visit of Prime Minister Palme, the handling of the Symington Subcommittee Hearings (which, incidentally, can best be attested to by John Ehrlichman who was the President's principal staff agent and who witnessed firsthand Secretary Rogers' direct refusal to comply with instructions from the White House), the policy study on France, the issue of Nigerian relief, and finally and perhaps most importantly, the near fiasco resulting from State's lack of coordination in the preparation of the President's Annual Review of U.S. Foreign Policy.⁴

Discussion

The bill of particulars concerning our problems with the Department of State in general, and Secretary Rogers in particular, is awesome, detailed and thoroughly documented by you. It would be naive to believe that the President is not thoroughly familiar with the problems you have been having with Secretary Rogers and, while I believe he has been uniformly in your corner, there have been continuing manifestations of an unwillingness on his part to draw the line in a direct and unequivocal fashion with the Secretary himself. The result of this has only contributed to Rogers' inclination and perhaps growing determination to do you in with a jugular fight. His disappointment over the public setback associated with the Annual Review cannot but, in my opinion, add to this determination and raise the risks of even more serious confrontations in the near future. For this reason, I believe it is essential that you measuredly lay the situation before the President while avoiding the bill of particulars which is available to him at any time if he feels it necessary to review it, and that you do so in a fashion which would leave absolutely no uncertainty in the President's

³ Document 70.

⁴ See Document 95.

mind as to your determination to leave Government rather than to continue with a situation which cannot but pose the most serious risks to the national interest, if not to the future effectiveness of the President's authority within the bureaucracy.

Recommendation

That you draw from the attached talking points in a discussion with the President on your relationships with the Secretary of State, the discussion to be held prior to the return of the Secretary on February 23.⁵

⁵ According to the President's Daily Diary, Kissinger had lunch and met with Nixon at Camp David from noon to 3:15 p.m. on Sunday, February 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Haldeman recorded in his diary entry for February 23: "K back from his journey Saturday night. Reported to P Sunday at Camp David. Is pretty pleased, feels made a start towards some real progress. Long talks and he was (he says) very tough." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

97. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 26, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director, Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee Working Group Procedures

I have designated Dr. Laurence E. Lynn as my representative to, and chairman of, the Working Group.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 235, DPRC & DEF Budget—1970—Vol. I. Secret.

These procedures will govern the functions of the Working Group:

—The DPRC, normally after receiving a proposal or presentation from the Defense Department will identify issues requiring further consideration and will refer them to the Working Group.

—The Working Group will assign the agency most concerned, usually the Department of Defense, or, if appropriate, an interagency team, the task of preparing an initial paper. For example, the Defense Department Representative would normally prepare papers on issues involving force levels or weapons systems, analyzing the issue and setting forth the DOD position, or the alternatives among which it recommends that choice be made.

—The Working Group will then review the paper for completeness, adequate presentation of differing views, and inclusion of an adequate range of alternatives.

—After necessary revisions, the paper will be forwarded to the DPRC for discussion.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² The first meeting of the DPRC Working Group took place on March 4. Lynn's March 3 briefing memorandum for DPRC members is at the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-101, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC Working Group Meetings. A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Laird on March 12, 1970, at 10:25 a.m. begins as follows:

"K: The DPRC went very well. I want to make one thing clear to you Mel. I am not going to get involved in the individual weapons systems. I am not going to get into your business on this.

"L: I understand. I just wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding.

"K: And the way Dave [Packard] handled it was just what we had in mind.

"L: Good." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcon), Box 1, Chronological File.)

98. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, March 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC)

I believe that we should carefully reconsider the role of the DPRC. Your memoranda of January 19 and February 26, 1970² indicate that we do not share the same views on this subject. I hope we can fully agree on this issue, because I believe that the DPRC should, and can, fulfill a critical function which is not being, and which has never been, performed.

The primary concern of the DPRC should be the allocation of resources within our economy. The studies would include the allocations between the public and private sectors, within the public sector, and between defense and other Federal programs.

In considering this problem of overall resource allocation, the DPRC should examine the following types of questions:

1. *The resources available for defense.* This would include studying the total level of overall resources, the availability of resources to the public sector, and allocations within the public sector between defense and other needs.
2. *Our national security objectives and strategy.* We need a better understanding of the implications of our current strategy in terms of the broad tasks to be accomplished.
3. *The relationships among goals, resource availability and policy.* To meet national security goals, while striving for other public sector objectives, may require fiscal, monetary, and debt policies—even to include controls—that constitute diminution of other national goals. We should consider the trade-offs, for example, among national security, price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and the absence of controls.
4. *The foreign policy implications of defense actions.* If we cannot meet all obligations within reasonable terms, a variable in our studies should be reformulation of US interests and commitments.

As you note in your memoranda, DOD will normally be the agency most concerned with the issues before the DPRC. Under your proposed

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Confidential.

² Documents 93 and 97.

procedure, the Working Group would thus usually be referring its work to DOD. Given this situation, I believe it is essential that a DPRC Working Group be chaired by someone within DOD, that is, if the Working Group is to be maintained. I would designate my Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Dr. Gardiner Tucker, to direct such DPRC Staff work.

Melvin R. Laird³

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Laird signed the original.

99. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) Working Group Procedures

As I am indicating in a separate memorandum to you,² I am concerned about the role and utilization of the DPRC. It appears the DPRC may not be addressing the major and critical task for which it was established. Rather, the DPRC appears to be addressing other issues—of importance, to be sure—but for which other institutional arrangements for resolution already exist.

We agree, presumably, there is inadequate analysis of the distribution of resources within the public sector. The following outline illustrates, using Defense as an example, the chain of allocation decisions which must be made:

Sector and Optimization Level

1. Overall US Economy—Consumer vs. Business vs. Gvt Uses
2. Within Government Sector—Federal vs. State vs. Local
3. Among Federal Govt Uses—Defense vs. HEW vs. Trnsp, etc.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Confidential.

² Document 98.

4. Within Defense—Strategic vs. GenPurp vs. R&D, etc.
5. Within a Given Def Use—ICBMs vs. SLBMs vs. Bombers
6. Within a Given System—MinMan vs. Titan, vs. Other
7. Within a Particular Weapon—Warhead vs. Guidance vs. Pen Aids, etc.

The DPRC should, in my judgment, address the optimizations at the first three levels, as outlined above. We have existing and appropriate arrangements for considering the lower-level optimizations. (I will soon forward to you a proposed DPRC agenda for the next six months.) Given those fundamentals, I believe it is desirable to reassess the role and mechanics of a DPRC Working Group. It is not clear a Working Group, in a formal sense, would be needed.

As you note in your memoranda, DOD will normally be the agency most concerned with the issues before the DPRC. Under your proposed procedure, the Working Group would thus usually be referring its work to DOD. Given this situation, I believe it is essential that a DPRC Working Group be chaired by someone within DOD, that is, if the Working Group is to be maintained. I would designate my Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Dr. Gardiner Tucker, to direct such DPRC Staff work.

Melvin R. Laird

100. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 14, 1970.

Henry:

Attached on the right flap is Lynn's comprehensive analysis of the future work of the DPRC.² On the left flap are two memoranda just received from Secretary Laird³ which in my view constitute a major assault on the approach we are currently using for DPRC work. Laird in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Secret; Sensitive.

² Memorandum from Lynn to Kissinger, March 13; not printed.

³ Documents 98 and 99.

effect is stating keep out of force structure and force program decisions and focus your attention on the allocation of national resources for defense and competing enterprises, sort out major doctrinal and strategic issues and I will worry about individual programs.

As I told you earlier, I think Laird is more right than we are, and that in a gut fight it will be difficult to muster support for the individual program approach. What has to be done is to clearly enunciate the cut-off point by a detailed discussion of how individual programs and force structure dictates the larger questions and therefore why there must be some minimum investigation of costly programs and force structure as preliminary work before addressing the larger questions.

I am convinced that Secretary Laird would not have written these two memoranda, the language of which has been very carefully chosen, if he did not intend to go to the mat with you on this issue. I know that although this may be distasteful to you, you want my best judgment. Personally, I think you are on very weak ground for two reasons. One is in principle Laird is more correct than we are. The second reason is because we have apparently failed to communicate with him on the entire issue. By this, I mean he does not understand because we have failed to convince him that certain costly programs must be investigated by the DPRC as the building blocks to the more important discussions on resource allocation at the highest level. I would suggest that you meet with Secretary Laird at the first opportunity and arrive at a more acceptable solution rather than to continue to add to the kind of tensions which must have spawned these two memoranda. As I told you earlier, I am also concerned that we have not looked at the very questions that Laird is asking us to solve nor have we given him a sympathetic reception when he has raised them. For better or worse, I believe that our domestic spending has been totally out of balance with our security spending and that this is the responsibility of your office to rectify it. If the President were to overrule that judgment, then his actions should be based on consideration of all the facts none of which have been brought to his attention to the best of my knowledge.

101. Editorial Note

On March 26, 1970, Laurence Lynn, Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council, drafted a memorandum to the President from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry

Kissinger explaining Kissinger's disagreement with Secretary of Defense Laird concerning the role of the Defense Program Review Committee. The memorandum reads in part as follows:

"The Issues

"Secretary Laird and I are in complete agreement on four issues:

"—We both believe that systematic analysis of the proper size and allocation of the Federal budget is badly needed and would be of great assistance to you in your budget planning.

"—We (and Budget Bureau officials as well) agree that the process whereby major domestic program decisions are made throughout the year, whereas the DOD budget is reviewed only near the end of the budget cycle, may put DOD at a distinct disadvantage: if new domestic program initiatives taken during the year cause your spending commitments to exceed projected revenue by the time DOD's budget comes to your attention, DOD may be forced to take disproportionate cuts in its budget to bring total spending and revenues into balance.

"—We agree that the DPRC should analyze alternative DOD budget levels in the light of their impact on spending for domestic programs, on our ability to fulfill our obligations and commitments, and on the overall capabilities of our military posture. Studies to accomplish these objectives are already underway.

"—We agree that the DPRC should not become involved in detailed program management or weapons design issues.

"Our disagreements are as follows:

"—I do not believe that the DPRC—the primary function of which, as I understand it, is to insure balanced and comprehensive analysis of major Defense policy and program issues—should concern itself with analyzing the size and scope of government activities, the proper level of Federal spending and the allocation of the Federal budget among DOD and other agencies. The DPRC is not constituted for these tasks, as it lacks non-defense agency representation, and I question whether it would be appropriate for me to oversee this work.

"However, at such time as your Domestic Policy Council is in a position to undertake an analytical presentation of domestic program 'strategies' and their costs, we could join forces with them and discuss the larger questions Secretary Laird raises with the entire Cabinet. I see no intellectual obstacles to achieving this within six months.

"—I believe that, in addition to analyzing our national security objectives, strategies and overall budgets the DPRC must analyze major DOD policy and program issues well in advance of the final budget review.

"We cannot analyze the size of the DOD budget in the abstract. It must be done in the context of specific threats to our security and our

interests, capabilities required to meet these threats at various levels of risk, and the implications for defense and non-defense spending of implementing any particular alternative.

"For example, in my January 19, 1969 [1970], memorandum [Document 93] to which Secretary Laird is responding, I suggested a work program as follows:

"—Analysis of forces, threats and strategies in relation to U.S. overseas commitments and policies,

"—Analysis of resources required for defense and relation of defense budgets to civilian programs and the economy.

"(Secretary Laird and I are in agreement on the need for these first two studies, and they are underway.)

"—review of U.S. general purpose forces posture;

"—review of U.S. strategic posture;

"—future strategic role of manned bombers;

"—requirements for aircraft carriers;

"—continental air defense.

"In addition, the State Department has proposed a study of our overall base structure in East Asia.

"In my judgment, if such analyses could be completed and reviewed by you during the next three or four months, you could indicate your decisions and priorities to both DOD and the Budget Bureau well in advance of the final budget review and foreclose the necessity of making most major decisions at the last minute without knowledge of their implications.

"Moreover, Secretary Laird would no longer be at the 'end of the line' when the final budget review took place.

"Equally important, you would have a much better opportunity to shape our defense posture in accordance with your thinking rather than having the posture reflect compromises struck among three competing Military Services." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970.)

Lynn forwarded the draft memorandum to Kissinger together with a draft memorandum from the President to the Chairman of the DPRC (Kissinger) stating Kissinger's view of the DPRC's role and directing that a series of studies be done. Kissinger decided not to send the former to the President but forwarded the latter to him under cover of a March 30 memorandum. The President signed it on April 2 (Document 102).

102. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Chairman of the Defense Program Review Committee (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 2, 1970.

This year, I would like to review major defense policy and program issues when the Defense program is still in its formative stages, well in advance of the final review of the Defense Department's budget in December.

I would like the Defense Program Review Committee to assist me in this review by undertaking immediately a series of studies on our military posture and forwarding the results to me over the next six months.

I would like this review to cover the following subjects:

—a definition and analysis of our overall strategy for general purpose and theater nuclear forces in relation to the threats we face and to our interests and commitments;

—the availability of funds for defense and non-defense programs over the next five years and potential trade-offs between defense and non-defense expenditures;

—an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs of our general purpose forces in relation to specific military threats, in particular Army and Marine Corps land forces, carrier-based and land-based tactical air forces, and anti-submarine warfare forces;

—an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs of our strategic nuclear forces in relation to the Soviet and Chinese threats and to our criteria for strategic sufficiency, including analysis of U.S. requirements for a manned bomber and for continental air defense forces;

—an analysis of our overall concept and programs for military research and development in relation to projected requirements for new weapon systems.

Would you please have the Defense Program Review Committee prepare terms of reference and a schedule of completion for these studies and forward them to me for my review by April 10, 1970.

Richard Nixon

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-098, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC General 1969–Feb. 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lynn and forwarded to the President for his signature by Kissinger on March 30. (Ibid.)

103. **Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff and William Watts, Staff Secretary, National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, April 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

The NSC System

You asked for recommendations on how the system can be strengthened and made to work more effectively. The following recommendations, none of which involves *major* changes, in our judgment would in the aggregate move in the direction you want.

The NSC Structure and Agency Relationships

The Review Group would be strengthened if it were clearly understood that more of the papers will be referred directly from the Review Group by memorandum to the President for decision. This is the way the process has been working to an increasing extent.

The system is suffering an overload. Many of the papers neither warrant nor need a full NSC meeting as a prelude to Presidential decision. Given the number of *major* issues which will require full NSC consideration and the President's wish to limit the number of such meetings, more of the burden must fall on the Review Group.

But the Review Group was not constituted originally to consider the substantive merits of options presented, or to reach a decision on which option should be pursued. At several recent meetings, State, Defense and JCS representatives have made it clear that they are not empowered to state the positions of their agencies. Their role has been to assure that a full range of options is presented and that each is argued fairly and completely.

To stimulate the discussion and advocacy you seek from the Review Group, the members could be asked to present agency viewpoints on the issues and options. The Review Group's charter requires it to assure that "all department and agency views are fairly and adequately

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Offices Files, 1969-77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (6), 3/3/70-4/27/71. No classification marking. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Watts and Jeanne Davis. An attached handwritten note from DRY [David Young] to Haig asks: "Do you want me to keep this for Tue & Thur mtg?" Haig wrote on the note, "Yes."

set out.” In this context the Review Group members could be asked either:

—to present the views of their respective agencies at the meeting when the paper is discussed, *or*

—as you have required on a number of occasions, to present a formal statement of Agency views and recommendations when the paper is returned after redrafting in accordance with Review Group instructions.

We recommend the first course. If this course is to be followed, it need only be announced at a Review Group meeting that this procedure will be observed.

—Discussion will be stimulated and issues clearly exposed if each agency representative is required at the meeting to give his agency’s recommendation as to whether the subject and the paper need be brought before the full NSC and, if not, to state his agency’s viewpoint on the substantive issues and options.

—The Review Group members will have to seek agreement from their principals in detail. The flexibility of the Review Group members consequently will be limited, but the issues will be exposed and addressed substantively.

The two courses are not mutually exclusive. If discussion focuses issues more clearly, a redraft of the paper may be needed. Agency views then can be included with the resubmission.

The Use of the IGs

You have rightly observed that in most instances IG papers have been considerably less than first class. The IGs, however, have much to offer in the way of expertise. They also, in the final analysis, will shape the specifics of day-to-day implementation of decisions. For these reasons they should be brought more directly into the process rather than being progressively excluded.

There is another important reason for enhancing the IG-Review Group mechanism and making it work. Participation by the principal agencies in the actual formulation and drafting of issues and options is an essential ingredient of the system.

—Without this participation, the Department of State will dominate the process of issue formulation subject only to the check-rein of the NSC staff. Increasingly, the NSC staff will be forced into open opposition to State to maintain the integrity of the policy formulation process. The NSC staff will have to play devil’s advocate for other interested agencies as well as to play its role of objective evaluation.

—Over-reliance on ad hoc arrangements, in which one or another agency does not fully participate, will generate growing resistance to the system and increasing isolation of the NSC staff. It will make man-

agement of implementation of decisions more and more difficult and we will face an increasing problem of clearing cables as a means of policy control. As a practical matter, some papers, ostensibly prepared by ad hoc groups chaired by State, actually are prepared in the IG framework.

—The following steps should be taken to improve the quality of IG papers:

1. *Participation by the NSC Staff.* Each IG includes a senior NSC Staff member. He knows both the quality and manner of presentation which is wanted and he should carry the burden of guiding the drafting group to bring forth the desired product.

—The NSC Planner should assist him during the draft phase with comments and recommendations both as to substance and manner of presentation.

—The Policy and Coordination Staff of the Department of State (Cargo) oversees the work of the IG Chairmen and also should be in a position to influence significantly the quality of the paper. The NSC Planner should maintain a close working relationship with State Planning and Coordination Staff to this end.

2. *Return Unsatisfactory Papers.* An IG paper which does not meet acceptable substance and presentation standards should be returned for redraft before the Review Group is asked to consider it. The Review Group should not be forced to address papers which are grossly inadequate. If this were done with a rigidly enforced tight deadline, the departmental coordination staffs and the IGs themselves would respond.

The Management and Discipline of the System

The emphasis, of course, must be on the intellectual approach to the substantive issues at hand. But this can be helped or hindered by the management and administration of the system itself. The agencies for the most part have overcome the administrative headaches which they experienced in the first few months—they are prepared to respond.

—*Scheduling* has become a major problem. Adjustments will be required but they can and should be held to a minimum. The NSC Planner, Staff Secretary and the Director of the Secretariat should work closely with the operators to coordinate the order of presentation and consideration of papers and to assure that related subjects have been arrayed and scheduled in the most meaningful way. Events external to the NSC system which affect the timing of the decision-making process must be taken into account. Schedules when set should be adhered to as closely as possible. You should meet bi-weekly with the NSC Planner, the Staff Secretary and the Director of the Secretariat to discuss scheduling.

—*Due dates* for papers to be submitted to the Review Group should take into account (1) timing of the need for decision, (2) the length of

time reasonably required for preparation of a quality paper, and (3) the scheduled date for consideration of the paper by the Review Group (the submission date should be at least two weeks before the scheduled Review Group meeting on the paper).

—Once set, due dates and schedule should be adhered to—the agencies should know what is required of them and when it is required. The Director of the Secretariat should stay in close touch with the IG Staff Directors and Cargo's Policy and Coordination Staff on these matters.

—NSSMs should be carefully reviewed before they are issued to assure that the right questions are being asked of the right people.

—The Staff Secretary/Director of Secretariat should assure that before submission for approval, every NSSM has been reviewed by the NSC operators concerned and the NSC Planner to be certain that (1) the subject for study has been so delineated that the basic issues will be surfaced and addressed, (2) the relationship of the NSSM with all others on related subjects is clear, and (3) the due date proposed for submission is realistic in terms of the complexity of the problem, the timing of decision and the schedule for consideration. The *need* for a NSSM should be clearly demonstrated in a memorandum requesting its approval.

—The substance of the proposed NSSM should be discussed informally with the IG members representing the agencies principally concerned and with State's Planning and Coordination Staff before being submitted for final approval. The participants in the study (1) will have something to contribute to sharpen and focus the study request and (2) will understand more clearly at the outset what is needed.

—*Follow-Up Actions*

—*Review Group Follow-up*

—Review Group consideration of a paper invariably requires some redrafting either for matters of substance or manner of presentation. Immediately following the Review Group meeting, the NSC operator, the NSC Planner, Director of Secretariat and the representative of the Department charged with the redraft (usually State) should meet to clearly identify the redrafting instructions and the date for submission. This should be followed by a memorandum from the Director of Secretariat to the Review Group members confirming the Review Group requirements.

—*NSC Meeting Follow Up* (Applicable also to Presidential Decision based on Memorandum submission).

—A draft NSDM should be prepared before the NSC meeting based upon the recommendations contained in your Memorandum for the President and the Issues for Decision paper. If the paper is to be submitted for decision by memorandum, the draft NSDM should accompany the recommendations for the President's consideration.

—Immediately following the NSC meeting, the Staff Secretary, operators concerned, the NSC Planner, and Director of Secretariat should meet for a debrief of the meeting and assignment of tasks resulting from it. The draft NSDM should be reviewed in light of the discussion at the NSC meeting.

—The draft NSDM revised as necessary should be prepared for submission to the President for approval and issuance.

—Every NSDM should require a report by the *Under Secretaries' Committee* of the actions taken to implement the decision—date for submission of the USC report will be determined by the nature of the implementing actions or programs required.

The Under Secretaries' Committee

Senior NSC Staff Members frequently attend meetings of the USC representing you. They should be armed with your guidance. A memorandum should be submitted prior to the meeting stating the issues to be discussed and recommended positions to be taken by the NSC Staff Member as a means of obtaining that guidance.

104. Memorandum From the President's Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Items to Discuss with Elliot Richardson at Luncheon Meeting, Wednesday, April 15, 1970

1. Raise the issue posed by the joint State–Defense message (Enclosure #1, Tab A)² on European Security which we received late yesterday afternoon for clearance after approval by Secretary Rogers. This action constitutes a most serious challenge to the President's established

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 339, HAK/Richardson Meetings April–May 1970. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. In the right-hand margin near the top of the first page: Kissinger wrote: "1. Development of a Reduction plan for IRBM. 2. Elaboration of on-site inspection proposal. 3. Limits on size of mobile IRBM's."

² At Tab A is an April 14 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger which asserts that "State has sent for clearance a massive cable giving the coordinated State, Defense, ACDA views on several major questions: our approach to an ESC [European Security Conference]; how to handle MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], and the question of East-West cooperation. The cable effectively preempts most of the questions and decisions contained in the NSSM 83 study which the Review Group is to consider on Thursday and the NSC on April 29." (Ibid.) NSSM 83, "U.S. Approach to European Security Issues," November 21, 1969, and follow-up studies are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-166, National Security Study Memoranda.

system for handling policy issues within the National Security Council system. The fact that two Cabinet officers would join in imposing the White House with a locked policy paper of this type is absolutely unacceptable. In this instance it is especially bad because State was completely aware of ongoing actions within the NSC system designed to address the issues explicitly covered in the message. We had, in fact, even gone so far as to move the date of the Review Group consideration of these problems forward to assist State's time problem. An additional and perhaps more troublesome feature is that State has gotten Defense to go along with them on fundamental policy issues which have not been considered appropriately within the NSC framework and which may be completely at odds with what the President wants. In effect, dispatch of this message would cause us to scrap NSSM 83. I recommend that you ask Elliot to speak with the Secretary in order to have this message considered in the Review Group on Thursday.³ Hal Sonnenfeldt assures me that this would provide adequate time to meet Ellsworth's requirements. An additional nettling fact about this operation is the extensive interdepartmental coordination that was done without the responsible authors at State having had the courtesy of notifying our staff that the exercise was under way.⁴ These are the kinds of action which shatter what have been up to now improving State-NSC relationships. I believe you should pull no punches in informing Elliot of this problem.⁵

I have discussed this with Mr. Richardson:

Yes

No

Comments:⁶

[Omitted here are items #2–#12.]

³ April 16.

⁴ In the left margin next to this and the following sentence, Kissinger wrote: "similarly State Defense on ME."

⁵ No record of the Kissinger–Richardson luncheon discussion has been found.

⁶ Neither option is marked and nothing is written after "Comments."

105. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Treasury's Special Assistant (Jurich) to the President's Counselor (Harlow)¹

Washington, April 16, 1970.

Just a thought for you to consider. In order to help the national security situation here in the White House, would it be possible to strengthen the Vice President's position.

At this time he does not have any staff members that participate in the process, as I understand it. He does attend the NSC meetings but is not sufficiently briefed to make significant contributions.

I also understand that he does not have a representative on the domestic council. This, too, could be strengthened.

Perhaps an addition to the Vice President's staff is not feasible, or you may feel it would not be a place to make a major contribution. I'll let you be the judge.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG 6-6. No classification marking. Anthony J. Jurich was Secretary Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The memorandum is written on paper with no letterhead. On April 24 Harlow wrote the following note at the top of the memorandum: "Stan Blair—Please call me re this—Brice Harlow"

106. Draft Letter From W. Anthony Lake and Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

Dear Henry:

With this letter we submit our resignations from the NSC staff effective _____. We do so with regret and upon long reflection.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Lake Chron, Box 1047, Tony Lake Chron File [Jun. 1969–May 1970] Personal; Eyes Only. The letter is unsigned and was not sent. In a much briefer version of the resignation letter, sent to Kissinger on April 29, Lake and Morris spoke of their "grave reservations about the value of using U.S. troops in Cambodia" and their "increasing alienation" from the administration that predated and went beyond the Cambodian problem, but they did not explain their disaffection in any greater detail. (Ibid.)

In view of the closeness and apparent mutual respect of our working relations in the past, we naturally want to be completely honest in describing the reasons for our resignations. They involve some very strong feelings about this Administration. As we have said before, we sympathize with your difficult position and the pressures you are under, and do not intend this letter as an attack on you personally. But the strength of our feelings requires our writing this.

We are leaving the staff in order to take positions at _____² in which we hope to make a contribution in an area of need. Yet we leave at this time only after judging that this is possible without seriously embarrassing you or placing an undue burden of work on other members of the staff.

As we told you in February, we find ourselves increasing alienated by the domestic and many of the foreign policies of this Administration. Because of our continuing personal loyalty to you and what you are trying to do, however, we have no desire for our resignations to become even a minor public issue.

We do indeed believe, as the Annual Review suggests, that a new era requires a new quality of leadership. It demands above all an understanding of urgent needs in America and abroad and a commitment to meet them. We have found neither. We have often heard courage equated with standing up to criticism. But it is not enough to dismiss the critics for their motives or manliness, nor to ridicule them with the catch phrases of the Right.

We think real courage means recognizing the validity of the problems, however they are raised, and leading an effort to resolve them. We think Presidential politics should be the means to that end and not, as we see it practiced now, an end in itself through obsession with public relations.

From past discussions you are aware of the nature of our specific disagreement with a number of the Administration's foreign policies, particularly with regard to Southeast Asia. We must also say that we are appalled by the attitudes of leaders in this Administration on racial issues, and their cynical approach to other domestic problems which demand immediate redress rather than political maneuver.

Moreover, we are deeply disturbed by the process of policy making as well as the policies themselves. While we continue to have the highest respect for your intellect and what you are trying to accomplish in forging a rational and disciplined means of making foreign policy, it is equally clear to us that you have not and will not be able to accomplish this goal single-handedly. Under the best of circum-

² Omission in the source text.

stances, this would have been an enormous job in this Administration. In any case, it would have required a genuine joint effort by you and a closely-knit staff acting for you, with and in your full confidence. But we think they can only act effectively for you if you share with them what it is that you are trying to accomplish and the information you hold, trusting them and giving them support.

Finally, our disagreement with the Administration's approach to foreign and domestic problems is compounded by its working atmosphere. Relations among the highest officials establish the atmosphere for the whole government. We have both worked for senior officials in the Johnson Administration. Whatever that Administration's faults, we were left unprepared for the atmosphere of suspicion, manipulation and malice which we have seen over the past year. Working this near the center of power should be, we believe, an exciting and, in some measure, gratifying experience. Instead, we have been increasingly depressed by it.

During our time on the staff, we have always made an honest effort to act in your interests, even when they may have been costly either in terms of our relations elsewhere in the government or through conflict with our own personal or intellectual preferences. We hope you will accept this letter for what it is: the candor which you would expect and which our personal regard for you required.

Sincerely,³

³ Following the departures of Lake and Morris from the NSC (Halperin also resigned as an NSC consultant in May), Kissinger opened the NSC staff meeting on June 15 with the following comments on the NSC system:

"Dr. Kissinger noted the departure from the norm of the last few weeks, acknowledged the extra burdens which had been placed on some staff members, and said we should now return to the regular pattern. He stressed the necessity of cranking up the NSC system and said he would discuss this with Col. Kennedy. He also noted there would be new staff members. He emphasized that NSC staff members cannot be spokesmen of the bureaucracy—they are spokesmen only of the President and must carry out both the letter and the spirit of the President's intentions. The President must have available to him every significant point of view, but once his decision has been made, the staff must see to it that it is carried out. The staff must stay conceptually ahead of the bureaucracy, must ask the questions that no one else is asking. We cannot be ratifiers of the bureaucratic process. He thought in the areas where we had taken the lead, such as SALT, we had been successful and had served the President well." (Memorandum for the Record by Jeanne W. Davis, June 16; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, National Security Council, 1969-77, Meetings, Staff, 1969-71)

107. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Production Activities of the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG)

1. Ever since its inception in September 1969, I have followed the activities of the VSSG and its associated Working Group with close personal interest. This continuing interest in the activities of the Working Group and its panels is a direct reflection of the importance I attach to providing the President with the best intelligence possible on the status of Vietnamization and other topics pertinent to his continuing concern for matters bearing on Vietnam policy decisions.

2. The intelligence product submitted to the VSSG so far reflects an impressive amount of innovative analysis and hard work on the part of all concerned. The subjects analyzed—security in the countryside and the enemy's manpower capabilities—include some of the fundamental factors that will greatly affect the eventual outcome of the struggle and will shape the climate within which decisions must be made. As you are well aware, these papers presented some highly usable and frank evaluations of the situation in Vietnam. They will be of great value over the next few months and, in concert with other papers to be produced for the VSSG, will provide the policymakers of this Government with very useful background material.

3. I therefore believe that the members of the VSSG can take a lot of satisfaction in the progress made to date. At the same time, I am sure that we are all properly concerned at the extent to which key analytical talent of all the agencies involved has been tied up on these projects. The priority attached to these special projects has certainly warranted these intensive but somewhat disruptive efforts. With the issuance of NSDM 52² and its attendant requirement for a regular production cycle of quarterly reports, I think we should take a fresh look at the process through which Working Group support is provided to the VSSG. I am, therefore, suggesting for your consideration a few ideas that could meet the President's requirements and at the same time

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-002, Vietnam Special Studies Group, VSSG Meeting 5-20-70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

² NSDM 52, "Quarterly Report on the State of the War and Vietnamization," April 10, 1970. (Ibid., Box H-215, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 52)

lessen the disruption of normal intelligence support activities for which VSSG member agencies retain a continuing responsibility. My suggestions should also lighten the load of Dr. Lynn and his staff who must carry out other continuing and special responsibilities for you.

4. In order to effect a more equitable spread in the responsibility for overseeing the production of periodic VSSG reports, I suggest that primary responsibility for each of the main topics on which NSDM 52 calls for quarterly reports be assigned to separate designated project officers in the appropriate agencies and departments represented in the VSSG. For each report, once terms of reference had been approved by the VSSG Working Group and principals, the project officer would be charged with full responsibility for the production and coordination of the draft of the report assigned to him. Members of all VSSG components would participate in the preparation of every report and, when completed, each project officer's draft would be submitted to the Working Group for review and referral to the VSSG principals for their final endorsement.

5. This manner of proceeding seems to have a number of basic advantages and should avoid a lot of the costly, though necessary, expenditure of time and resources that went into our first series of reports. As an illustration of a possible division of assignments, CIA could undertake primary responsibility for preparing the quarterly study of Enemy Capabilities, Strategy and Intentions called for in NSDM 52. I have not discussed these matters with the other principals of the VSSG, but, if they are agreeable, it would seem in order for the Department of Defense to undertake primary responsibility for the quarterly studies on the Main Force War. If this general approach strikes you as having merits, you might raise it at the next VSSG meeting and there decide the best allocation of primary responsibility for each of the three quarterly studies called for in NSDM 52.

Dick

108. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Director Helms' Memorandum on VSSG Activities²

CIA Director Helms has written you a lengthy memorandum on the activities of the VSSG, in particular the Quarterly Report (QR) on the War (NSDM 52). You should be familiar with his views in case he raises them at Wednesday's VSSG meeting.

Helms is generous in his praise for the VSSG's "innovative analysis and hard work" thus far. However, his main point seems to be that the NSDM 52 should signal an end to his "intensive but somewhat disruptive efforts" to support the VSSG as well as "lighten the load on Dr. Lynn and his staff."

He believes the responsibility for preparing the QR can be divided among State, DOD, and CIA with each taking primary responsibility for that part closest to its traditional interest. Each agency's working group would include members from other agencies and receive guidance from the VSSG working group in the preparation of its report.

At close inspection Helms' proposal, if accepted, would subvert the process that has produced the only innovative and objective analysis we have had on Vietnam for several years.

Our approach has been to draw on the best talent in the government to prepare the countryside and manpower papers. This has resulted in high-quality contribution from low-level talent in all agencies. Most of the creative analysis was done or directly stimulated by my staff. We obtained good analysis because:

—we disrupted the cozy accommodation between George Carver and his friends around town,

—we by-passed tired philosophers like Carver and Lou Sarris to tap those with analytical talent and an intimate knowledge of Vietnam,

—we were able to provide firm direction from the NSC for the analysis and obtain a non-bureaucratic response.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-002, Vietnam Special Studies Group, VSSG Meeting 5-20-70. Secret.

² Document 107.

Helms' recommendation would wreck these arrangements. If implemented it would mean:

—On enemy strategy, we will get a CIA rendition of the latest COSVN directive and their assessments of recent changes in Hanoi's pecking order rather than an analysis of the enemy's activities by-type, his manpower and force structure, and his logistic efforts in terms of what they imply for alternative enemy strategies. Issues such as the use of Phnom Penh as a supply conduit will not get aired.

—On the main force war, we will get DOD's officially blessed view backed by whatever off-the-shelf analysis supports it.

—I am not sure what we will get from the State Department, but State's failure to do anything on the political analysis of the countryside—for which they were assigned *primary responsibility* at the last VSSG meeting—is no basis for confidence that Helms' approach will result in a State contribution.

Helms' proposal can be handled by reminding him of the logic of the VSSG process:

—to obtain a high-quality product, we need to draw the best talent from *all* agencies to work on a subject,

—after the basic intellectual capital is built up by the VSSG, it can be drawn on by the reporting process, for example the QR. We are at this point with the countryside and manpower analyses. The community, with the exception of INR, has accepted the techniques used—although CIA and DOD strongly opposed them at first—and I plan to ask DOD to assume primary responsibility for the countryside portion of the QR.

The VSSG's main force, enemy strategy, and political analyses are not yet developed to the point that we can turn them over to the community. If we assign primary responsibility for these studies to the agencies, the NSC will lose direction of the best talent in the government, which will continue to be stifled as it has been thus far.

I met with the VSSG Working Group on Monday and went over these points. They seemed to accept the idea that:

—the first innovative phase of the analysis is carried out under close supervision of the VSSG Working Group,

—after we have obtained an agreed framework for analysis, the most capable agency will be responsible for preparing that portion of the QR under the direction of the VSSG Working Group with continued interagency participation.

If this subject comes up at Wednesday's meeting, I suggest you make these same points.

Another approach you might use to respond to Helms' views would be to say that you believe the VSSG process has worked successfully thus far and that you are not inclined to change it. You might note that you prefer to leave the exact allocation of work to the VSSG Working Group, and that you understand the Working Group intends

to “spin-off” responsibility for the direction of analysis as soon as the basic and innovative work is done.

Finally, this talk about my staff being over-worked is rubbish. Everytime the VSSG analysis has bogged down it has been because of a lack of support from the agencies, particularly DOD. My staff has always been further ahead in their portion of the analysis, and done a greater share of the total work than CIA.

109. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Samuels) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)¹

Washington, June 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Under Secretaries Committee

The Under Secretaries Committee has achieved an extremely important role in the decision-making process in the Government and the chairmanship of this committee has enabled the State Department to play a very important role in the formulation of policy decisions. It is important that nothing be done to detract from State’s role.

For example, a draft paper is in circulation by Kissinger’s office, remitting to the Under Secretaries Committee a watching brief over the EC enlargement negotiations and the U.S. Government’s relations with the European Community. I am told by one of the members of the NSC staff that the question has already been raised by one agency as to whether this watching brief ought not now to be placed elsewhere.

Considering the importance of the Under Secretaries Committee and State’s role in it, I suggest that if a new Under Secretary is not designated prior to Elliot’s confirmation,² it might be desirable upon his confirmation to designate Alex Johnson as Chairman of the Committee, at least pro tem, and so advise all other agencies.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 2, Administrative, Vol. 1. No classification marking.

² Richardson stepped down as Under Secretary of State on June 23 to become Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. In a June 12 memorandum, NSC-U/N 23, Richardson notified members of the Under Secretaries Committee that he had asked Johnson to become acting chairman pending the arrival of a successor. (Ibid., S/S-NSC-U/N Files: Lot 83 D 277) John Irwin entered on duty as Under Secretary of State on September 21 and assumed chairmanship of the Under Secretaries Committee on October 14. (Ibid.)

110. Talking Points Prepared by the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn)¹

Washington, undated.

Meeting with Shultz, Ehrlichman on DPRC, Defense Budget

I. Background of DPRC

Two major factors contributed to establishment of DPRC:

—*National Security Study Memorandum 3, Review of the U.S. Military Posture*;

—Initiated on January 20, 1969;

—Produced a substantive review of alternative strategies for strategic and general purpose forces;

—For the first time showed the trade-offs between defense and non-defense spending within the framework of our overall economic and fiscal policy for a five year period; [The NSSM 3 Report on General Purpose Forces is at Tab A; see the table on page 29.]²

—Though analysis was admittedly crude, *it enabled the President to decide on a world-wide defense strategy in the light of its implications for both defense and non-defense spending.* [NSDM 27 recording that decision is at Tab B.]³

—President was quite impressed with the value of this work in helping him shape our defense posture.

—Last summer, in anticipation of a \$3 billion reduction in the Administration's defense budget by Congress, *the Administration decided to formulate its own program for reducing the defense posture.*

This exercise produced a classic confrontation between the Budget Bureau and the Defense Department on the scope and nature of the reductions. *The President was forced into a position of having to referee disputes over specific line items and dollar amounts without any idea of the implications of his decisions.* Further, he first learned of some DOD plans, e.g., reducing our NATO naval forces, in the newspapers.

Based on these experiences, the President decided to establish an Under Secretary-level group to insure balanced and objective analysis of major DOD policy and program issues, along the general lines of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 235, DPRC & DEF Budget, 1970, Vol. I. Secret. Lynn drafted the talking points for Kissinger's meeting with Shultz and Ehrlichman scheduled for June 24. (Ibid.)

² All brackets are in the source text. Tab A is not printed.

³ Tab B is not printed.

the NSSM 3 work, on a continuing basis. At the final NSC meeting on NSSM 3, he underscored two points:

—*He wanted to stop the bilateral bargaining between BOB and DOD, which failed to shed any light on the major defense issues and which puts him in the position of having to arbitrate disputes on literally dozens of line items, usually at the last minute when all parties are set in concrete and there is no time for thoughtful analysis;*

—*He wanted to prevent a situation in which inter-service logrolling and compromising among the chiefs was the basis for the defense posture.*

Accordingly, the DPRC was formed on October 11, 1969. [NSDM 26 on the DPRC is at Tab C.]⁴ Its major purpose is to consider the political, economic, diplomatic and military consequences of issues requiring Presidential determination that result from:

- proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
- proposals to change U.S. overseas force deployments and committed forces based in the U.S.,
- major defense policy and program issues raised by studies.

In all candor, it must be admitted that the DPRC has been a controversial institution since its inception:

—The Director of the Budget Bureau has been concerned that the DPRC might interfere with his prerogatives as the President's budget adviser and with the role of the BOB staff. [On October 24, 1969 I analyzed Director Mayo's position and the issues it raised in a memorandum to you which is at Tab D.]⁵

Moreover, Director Mayo's concept for the FY 72 budget review really doesn't contemplate a fundamental role for the DPRC; it envisions BOB's traditional role in the budget review process with some modifications. [My April 8, 1970 analysis of Director Mayo's views are at Tab F.]⁶

—Secretary Laird has wanted the DPRC to focus on the broad questions of defense versus non-defense spending and avoid concern with the Defense program. [On March 26, 1970 I sent you a memorandum analyzing Secretary Laird's views. See Tab E.]⁷

Nevertheless, *the DPRC has been active.*

—In a series of meetings last fall, the DPRC reviewed the Defense budget and major unresolved issues. [At Tab G are talking points you used last fall to brief Ehrlichman and the President on the DPRC re-

⁴ Document 79.

⁵ Document 82.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ See Document 101.

view.]⁸ The major focus was on the ABM program, on which about 4 meetings were held.

In the end, the DPRC played no real role except on the ABM. However, as a result of this process, the President indicated that he wanted a variety of substantive issues reviewed by the DPRC prior to next year's budget review.

—To insure more orderly staff work for the DPRC in preparing papers, the President established the DPRC Working Group on January 19, 1970. [See Tab H]⁹ The same directive outlined the studies that were to be undertaken by the DPRC, under the general supervision of the Working Group.

—However, Secretary Laird sent you two memorandums on March 14, 1970 questioning the DPRC's role.¹⁰ Because of the controversy, including the question of who should chair the Working Group, no progress was made on the studies.

—On March 23, 1970, you held a meeting of the DPRC to review where we stood. [Your papers for that meeting are at Tab I.]¹¹ The main result of this meeting was that Packard initiated an exercise within DOD to cut \$3 billion from the FY 72 DOD fiscal guidance, \$1 billion from each Service.

—To break the impasse over the DPRC's role, the President directed a series of studies on April 2, 1970 designed to flush out the basic issues in shaping the Defense posture for 1972 and beyond. [The Directive is at Tab J.]¹² At Secretary Laird's request, you agreed to have Gardiner Tucker, ASD(SA), chair most of the studies under the general supervision of the Working Group. The DPRC met on April 24, 1970, at which time you provided guidance to the DPRC Working Group on how the studies should be carried out, with Tucker's role spelled out.

—On the weekend of May 30–31, Secretary Laird gave the President a three page memorandum which indicated that we faced an \$18 billion budget deficit in FY 72. Thus, he proposed that "unless I hear from you to the contrary," he would revise the DOD fiscal guidance downward by \$6 billion in FY 72. He said, "We will keep you informed of necessary changes in our strategy and commitments as our planning proceeds." [Tab K]¹³

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Document 93.

¹⁰ Documents 98 and 99.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Document 102.

¹³ Tabs K, L, M, and N are not printed.

Note that the DPRC was informed on March 23, 1970, that the deficit projected for FY 72 was \$3 billion using standard projections and almost \$7 billion using pessimistic assumptions. Two months later, Secretary Laird, with BOB's concurrence, was talking of a deficit of \$18 billion, a staggering deterioration. I understand the story will get even worse, perhaps by \$3–4 billion.

The President reacted on June 2, 1970 by directing the DPRC "to consider urgently the full implications" of Secretary Laird's memorandum in time for NSC consideration on July 15, 1970. [Tab L] On June 13, 1970 you directed the DPRC Working Group to prepare the analysis. [Tab M] This work is now underway.

II. The Present Situation

In the face of an admittedly bleak fiscal outlook, DOD and BOB have already reached agreement that \$6 billion must be cut from DOD's fiscal guidance. [Recent BOB tables showing fiscal projections are at Tab N.]

This serious fiscal situation has implications for critically important issues:

—NATO force deployments (including the delicate question of timing our decisions with respect to the NATO posture review and possible BFR discussions),

—SALT (DOD's view on the timing and the substance of our SALT discussions is now dominated by budgetary considerations),

—ABM,

—the U.S. naval posture in the Mediterranean and its implications for the military balance in the Middle East,

—our whole Vietnam posture: withdrawal schedules, air activity levels and effectiveness, etc.

—troop levels in Korea,

—the combat readiness of our entire military posture.

Of course, vitally important issues on the domestic side are affected as well.

The question is, how can the President be given the opportunity to make key policy decisions in a timely manner, in the light of a rational and objective evaluation of their implications?

—The DPRC was set up by the President to provide the support he needs on the national security side. The President clearly wants it to function effectively. For this to happen, the agencies involved must cooperate.

Moreover, the DPRC's activities must be meshed with the agencies' internal decision making processes.

—But there must be order on the domestic side as well. Secretary Laird complains that the President's domestic advisers persuade (or allow) the President to make incremental commitments to domestic programs out of political necessity without alerting him to their implica-

tions for the fiscal outlook or explaining how he may be mortgaging the future; when the inevitable fiscal crisis comes, DOD, because its spending is controllable, absorbs a disproportionate share of the punishment.

On this point, Secretary Laird is right. There has been no domestic NSSM 3, there is no domestic DPRC, and there is no widespread recognition of the need to examine systematically and in advance the total problem and the issues that must be resolved in setting priorities and allocating funds. To date, the domestic agencies don't even have fiscal targets for FY 72 and haven't begun to face up to their fiscal problems.

There are three key questions at this point:

—What decisions should the President make in the cause of putting together the budget?

—What facts and analyses are needed to inform the President's decisions, and how should they be prepared?

—How and when should the President make these decisions?

*Shultz, Ehrlichman and Kissinger should address these questions as a matter of priority and set up an orderly process to insure Presidential control over the formation of his budget and program.*¹⁴

¹⁴ No record of the discussion at their June 24 meeting has been found.

111. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

Organization on the Indochina Problem

1. I am the first to recognize that I have already discussed with you and with Alexis Johnson the problem of how the Government

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 208, CIA, Vol. III, 1 Jul–31 Dec 70. Secret; Eyes Only. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a July 18 covering memorandum in which he stated: "This paper makes some telling points. Perhaps we should have study done—by Holdrige—Nutter & Green." Kissinger wrote in response on Haig's note: "No—We should implement it. Helms is right. Let's implement it. Put [William] Smyser in charge & have him act as traffic cop to other groups."

should organize to fight the political and military war in Indochina. Therefore, this memorandum may strike you as redundant or unrealistic in light of the complexities inherent in the “bureaucracy.” Nevertheless, I risk your ire, because I genuinely believe that the issue involved is one of great importance. I am much persuaded that Hanoi regards the battle for Vietnam as a single struggle involving Laos and Cambodia as well. If one accepts this belief as valid, a corollary is that to combat the North Vietnamese effectively and efficiently, the United States should also view Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as component elements of a single struggle and conduct its affairs accordingly.

2. When one looks today at how this Government conducts its affairs in the Indochina area, one comes across the following: A plethora of working level and policy level groups and committees, with much overlapping membership, are grappling with various component parts of the total Indochina problem but in a way that almost precludes effective, efficient address to the total problem. We have, for example, an NSC Vietnam ad hoc subcommittee² which specifically avoids considering Laos or Cambodia, a Laos ad hoc committee³ which does not look at Vietnam (and whose activities have waned as those of WSAG have waxed), a Vietnam Special Studies Group⁴ which is different from both, and various subgroups of all three—some of which work on overlapping problems (e.g., cease fire, where there has long been a subgroup working on cease fire under Mr. Sullivan’s NSC Vietnam subcommittee and there is also a VSSG Working Group cease-fire panel, under a different chairman, with overlapping but different membership). One special ad hoc group drafts the response to NSSM-94, another drafts the response to NSSM-95,⁵ while the VSSG Working Group, in an organizationally separate exercise (but using some of the same people), drafts a different paper that materially bears on the conclusions of both. Meanwhile, the WSAG, or its working group, ploughs the same, or adjacent, terrain in separate fashion though, again, with some overlapping membership. This whole arrangement virtually guarantees duplicate efforts, confusion, wasted energy, missed opportunities, and poor staff work to support decision-making echelons of the government, including the President and yourself.

3. It would seem to me that a drastic rationalization and consolidation of this staff support and coordination effort would be of great

² See Document 26.

³ See Document 92 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁴ See Document 73.

⁵ NSSM 94, “Diplomatic Initiatives in Indo-China,” May 25, 1970, and NSSM 95, “U.S. Policy Objectives in Indo-China,” June 6, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-172, National Security Study Memoranda.

benefit to the United States Government and those who determine its policies, particularly since the latter have every right to expect that the government's full resources will be efficiently marshalled to support and implement their decisions.

4. I am certainly no organization expert, but I recognize that when one is critical of a condition, one should not stop at carping. One should at least have a suggestion. I would, therefore, recommend that there be appointed within the NSC staff a single senior officer who would serve full-time as, in effect, your Indochina manager. This officer should relieve you of detailed concern on Indochina matters, and should have a small staff assisting him on a full-time basis. He should chair an interagency committee whose members from appropriate agencies should be of at least two- or three-star rank or at a civilian equivalent. This group would replace the present VSSG Working Group, the Vietnam ad hoc group, the Laos ad hoc group, and all similar bodies. Its members would have direct access to their respective principals and be empowered to vote their agency's stock on routine matters. It is not envisaged that this Indochina Committee would attempt on its own to do substantive analysis or detailed operational planning. Instead it should levy such tasks on the component of government most directly responsible, asking that component to prepare a draft with the participation and in consultation with other government components. The Chairman of the Indochina Committee would confine himself to setting terms of reference for commissioned projects, reviewing the drafts, directing revisions, assembling completed packages for policy review, and insuring that policy decisions are in fact carried out. The Committee would, of course, report to you and to whatever higher authorities you deemed appropriate or desirable.

Dick

112. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for July 15, 1970, President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman recorded that "K[issinger] is building up a new head of steam about Rogers. Bill has made some startling statements about Cambodia as a non-success, encouragement of Chinese, harm done to his Middle East efforts by White House comments, etc. K still feels this is all part of a plan to do him in and to take over foreign policy by State from White House. Talked to me several times." Haldeman agreed to "get Haig in with P to discuss the whole problem." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

The next day, according to his diary entry, Haldeman had a long talk with President Nixon about Secretary Rogers and Henry Kissinger. "P was willing to listen to my version of K and Haig's story. He only bought part of it. He knows what the Rogers problem is, but he feels K is too self-concerned and inclined to overdramatize, which is true. Solution lies in better understanding both ways, but it's not likely because neither Rogers nor K will really admit the other might be right. P also feel K is overly concerned about anything that affects Israel. Had me call Haig for reaction to Rogers press conference [on July 15]. Al felt he had backtracked very well but that still doesn't solve real problem, which is the clear impression of a major wedge between State and WH on basic major foreign policy positions. Hard to cover that up now that it's out, and the weasels will use it to the hilt. P doesn't fully buy Haig's view, but understands it." (Ibid.)

113. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

Planning for Southeast Asia

I understand that following their recent trip to Southeast Asia, Members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board expressed to you the need for more planning on our future political, military and economic involvement in Southeast Asia.

As indicated in the enclosed summary,² the Administration has in fact done a great deal of planning for Asia—both within and outside of the NSSM series—and a very substantial portion of this has been done in the Department of State. Rather than observing a dearth, I am concerned as to what might be done to bring more order and greater consistency to these many efforts going forward in a multiplicity of contexts and forums.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974. Secret. Forwarded to the President by Kissinger under an August 3 covering memorandum (Document 114).

² The attachment, "Southeast Asia Planning," is not printed.

Looking over the record, and taking into account my talks with our Ambassadors at the recent Chiefs of Mission meeting in Tokyo, I believe our work on Asia can be improved in two respects:

—A senior group, short of the NSC, should provide a forum for substantive review and discussion of plans and programs for Asia—to the extent such planning efforts cannot be scheduled for, or do not warrant, NSC review. Many of these studies—even, in some cases, when commissioned in the NSSM series—do not now get a full and proper hearing—assuring that the best thinking of our planners be brought to bear on day-to-day operations.

—Even more urgent, these various plans and programs must be knit together in a multi-year strategy for the implementation of the Nixon doctrine. This was one of the principal points unanimously made by our Ambassadors at the Tokyo meeting. It should be one of the first tasks of the senior planning group.

A Planning Mandate for the Under Secretaries Committee

I believe that this planning function should be assigned to the Under Secretaries Committee, which would be restricted to its permanent membership for this purpose.

The Committee should schedule meetings from time to time to discuss our longer-term interests and objectives in Asia beyond the present emergency and to appraise current political and program issues—including negotiations, the security situation in Southeast Asia, U.S. and Asian forces posture objectives, aid and trade problems, relations with mainland China—as they bear on these longer-term concerns. As the occasion arises, the Committee should discuss and review planning documents prepared anywhere in the Government—although it should not, of course, preempt other NSC bodies and reviews.

These meetings would be informal but the Committee should, as it wishes, submit its thoughts to you in personal reports individually from its members or jointly through its Chairman.

To do its work properly, the Committee will require some staff support. A few months ago, I constituted a small in-house study group, under Ambassador Green's chairmanship, which began to examine our options in Cambodia in the perspective of alternative outcomes in Southeast Asia, great power relations, and U.S. long-term objectives. This group, whose existence is classified, has done very useful work. A similar staff group, under Ambassador Green's chairmanship, should support the deliberations of the senior group.

A Five-Year Strategic Plan for Asia

As one of its first tasks, the Committee should undertake the preparation of a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Nixon doctrine, taking into account the severe constraints imposed by ever-growing Congressional limitations and shrinking budgetary resources.

Such a planning effort, which should involve senior levels of the Government on a continuing basis, is needed:

- to provide multi-year planning guidance for all the agencies of the U.S. Government;
- to provide concrete and specific guidance from which our Ambassadors can speak to our Asian friends and allies about our long-term intentions;
- to clarify for the Congress and, as appropriate, the American public the Administration's specific long-term intentions and purposes in Asia.

Accordingly, the plan should relate U.S. forces posture planning, military and economic assistance, Asian and U.S. diplomatic and political programs and initiatives, and our continuing bilateral and multilateral commitments. If possible, it should be supported by a comprehensive inter-agency program budget in line with NSDM 4,³ which would provide multi-year program guidance.

This plan will not be easy to prepare during the present period of rapid change in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, within the context of the Nixon doctrine, I believe an effort should now be made to define more precisely our long-term political, security and economic goals beyond the present emergency and relate current diplomatic and program decisions more closely to these objectives.

Recommendations

If you agree with the foregoing, I recommend that you authorize the issue of a NSDM or other appropriate directive, which would provide:

1. *That the permanent members of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) assume responsibility as a senior planning group for Asia.*
2. *That the Under Secretaries Committee be supported by a small inter-departmental staff group, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Green, for this purpose.*
3. *That you direct the Under Secretaries Committee to prepare a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Nixon doctrine, which would undertake a more precise definition of U.S. objectives in Asia, beyond Vietnamization, and encompass a political, security and development strategy for the area.⁴*

William P. Rogers

³ Document 13. The revised version of NSDM is Document 71.

⁴ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of these recommendations.

114. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from the Secretary of State

Secretary Rogers has forwarded to you a memorandum which deals with the criticism made by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning the lack of an overall military, economic and political plan for Southeast Asia (Tab B).² The Secretary quite rightly emphasizes that the Administration has in fact done a great deal of planning for Asia both within and outside of the NSSM series. At the same time he correctly makes the point that an additional mechanism is required to pull together the proliferation of contexts and forums currently involved in Southeast Asian planning.

To solve this problem, the Secretary has recommended that the Under Secretaries Committee (chaired by State), supported by a small interdepartmental group chaired by Ambassador Green, be given responsibility for planning for Southeast Asia and that they be charged with the preparation of a five-year strategic plan for the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. This is an attempt to undo the NSC system set up in January 1969 by, in effect, reinstating the previous Administration's Senior Interdepartmental Group which headed a State-dominated system for national security policy. I therefore would like to put the issue before you in some detail.

Studies Underway

As I informed you by memorandum of July 20, our planning efforts for Southeast Asia have been extensive and include:³

- NSSM 37, Vietnam Negotiating Plans
- NSSM 38, Post-Vietnam Asian Policy
- NSSM 94, Diplomatic Initiatives in Indo-China (considered in July 21 NSC Meeting)
- NSSM 95, Alternative Courses in Cambodia
- Study of Various Vietnam Ceasefire Proposals (also considered at NSC Meeting)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII, 1 Jul 70–Aug 70. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² Document 113.

³ For text of the July 20 memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 347. Copies of NSSMs cited below and the resulting papers are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Boxes 122–207, National Security Study Memoranda.

—NSSMs on Thailand Program Analysis, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore

—NSSM 69 on Asian Nuclear Policy

—Strategy for Southeast Asia (being prepared by the JCS at the request of the Secretary of Defense and the White House)

—Vietnam Studies on Vietnamization, Pacification, and Economic Problems

Discussion

We have followed our usual “building bloc” approach that we applied to SALT. This gives us an opportunity:

- a. to isolate the issues;
- b. keeps the bureaucracy from log-rolling;
- c. forces a sharp statement of the issues; and
- d. makes bureaucratic sabotage harder.

The principal forum for the conduct of the foregoing planning effort has been the National Security Council structure and, more specifically, the Washington Special Actions Group which met daily throughout the Cambodian crisis and has met at least weekly since. We have also utilized the Vietnam Special Studies Group with a subsidiary working group to investigate a host of more technical problems including ceasefire, pacification and air sortie levels. Both of these forums are constituted at the Under Secretary level under my Chairmanship. Where needed, preliminary work has been done through interdepartmental working groups chaired as appropriate by State or Defense, or from within the NSC staff.

However, having now drawn together the essential facts associated with our day-to-day operations and long-term interests in Southeast Asia we need to pull pieces of the puzzle together with the view towards developing a comprehensive political, military and economic strategy for the long haul. I have already had an informal working group looking at this strategic perspective.

The basic question raised in the Secretary’s memorandum is who will control the policy planning process. Thus far you have consistently insisted that policy formulation belongs within the NSC system where all agencies have a fair opportunity to present their views. Within this framework you have rejected the concept of a vicarship role for any agency, including the Department of State, which would be strongly resented by both Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this system State nevertheless plays a central role reflecting its prime interest, including Chairmanship of Interdepartmental Groups at the Assistant Secretary level and of the Under Secretaries Committee which is primarily charged with operational questions and policy implementation.

The approach recommended by Secretary Rogers for the crucial area of Southeast Asian planning would seriously undermine the NSC frame-

work. His proposal to place the most important current U.S. policy planning effort under State Chairmanship simply constitutes another of the frequent challenges to the system which has worked so effectively in such complex policy issues as SALT negotiations, Japanese base negotiations, the Korean drawdown, and chemical and biological warfare. It would reopen the issues that were debated vigorously back in 1969 when the NSC system was established and would result in the following consequences:

- (1) Would put machinery under State.
- (2) Give State an opportunity to block recommendations.
- (3) Destroy the impact of my office and the NSC staff.

We already have experienced some problems in implementing your policies in the existing framework—the Secretary’s proposal would compound these problems by giving State control of staffing arrangements and chairmanship of working groups for Southeast Asian planning. (In addition, the Under Secretaries Committee was specifically established as an operating body and not as a planning group).

For these reasons I would be strongly opposed to the implementation of Secretary Rogers’ recommendation which could in the long run constitute a death blow to the National Security Council system itself and could represent a fundamental shift back to the previous Administration’s system which delegated to the Secretary of State the vicarship role for national security policy formulation.

I strongly recommend instead that you take the approach outlined in the proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.⁴ This memorandum agrees with his stated need to establish a framework for the synthesization of the various ongoing planning efforts involving Southeast Asia. It states, however, that you wish to do so in a framework analogous to the other policy planning groups, such as that for the Middle East, which have been convened at the Under Secretary level under the chairmanship of your Assistant for National Security Affairs, and points out that subsidiary working groups will be established and chaired by the Department of State where political considerations are paramount.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.

⁴ Not printed. The August 5 memorandum, which Nixon signed after adding a sentence, advised Rogers that the planning framework for Southeast Asia should be analogous to other special groups, such as the Special Review Group for the Middle East, with Kissinger as chairman. This would allow for equal participation by Defense and other agencies where they have a major interest. Nixon also informed Rogers about the establishment of the Special Review Group for Southeast Asia (see Document 117). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII, 1 Jul 70–Aug 70)

115. Editorial Note

In an August 3, 1970, memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Frank Shakespeare, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, requested that effective immediately the USIA Director attend all meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group dealing with Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia. Kissinger wrote "nonsense" at the top of the memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 294, USIA, Vol. II, 1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970]) In a November 5 memorandum to Alexander Haig, USIA Deputy Director Loomis noted that of 89 National Security Decision Memorandums mentioned in a recent report, USIA had received only 9. "While we recognize that some of these NSDMs deal with subjects of marginal concern to this Agency, there are others that USIA needs if it is to do its job. For only if we know what U.S. policy is on a specific subject can we make sure that our media are accurately portraying and effectively supporting it." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974.) Jeanne Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, wrote Haig on November 12: "As you know, more than a year ago we cut back on the amount of information we were giving USIA about NSC activities at Mr. Kissinger's request. Then, when the Review Group (which Frank Shakespeare attended) was abolished in favor of the SRG (which he does not attend) their isolation was almost complete. Our rationale has been, of course, that USIA receives its policy guidance from the State Department. But, given the history of 'interpretations' of Presidential decisions, it may be wise to provide, or at least supplement, this guidance more directly from here." (Ibid.) On November 16 Haig sent Loomis copies of 24 NSDMs. (Ibid.)

About the same time Shakespeare asked for a meeting with the President. "We can probably pinpoint two points on Shakespeare's mind from a series of recent memos," Harold Saunders of the NSC staff conjectured in a November 18 memorandum to Haig: "(1) Soviet duplicity in the Mid-East and (2) the importance of keeping USIA informed on the foreign policy line we want projected." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 294, USIA, Vol. II, 1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970]) Shakespeare met with the President on November 25 and, according to Haldeman, had a long session "about his concern about Rogers and lack of loyalty at State, Rogers' lack of conformity to P's Soviet policy, State effort to 'get' him, etc." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Haldeman informed Kissinger that at the meeting the President had "agreed that, from time to time, Frank should be in on certain NSC meetings to give him some

background on the subjects covered. You should look for opportunities for Frank to sit in on such meetings." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974.)

On January 3, 1972, Shakespeare met with Haldeman to discuss his resignation, which he had submitted to the President on December 15, 1970. According to Haldeman, Shakespeare "said his reasons for resigning were, first, that he wanted to get back to the business world. That he couldn't stay beyond this year anyway, but second, and undoubtedly far more important, was his disagreement with our basic foreign policy in terms of our failure to accept the Soviet threat as such. His third reason was exclusion from knowledge and participation which makes it impossible for him to function, especially since his views run counter to those of the establishment, although parallel to those of the P[resident]. He said our problem is that we've got to make a basic decision. Either we do or don't want an independent USIA. The State Department, of course, wants to take it over and keep it locked up under its wing. If we do want an independent USIA that represents the P and his policy, then we've got to have the right director first, and second, the director must know why we are doing things in foreign policy. He has to be present at all NSC, Cabinet and WSAG meetings, both so he'll be informed, and so that the bureaucracy will know that he's part of the internal establishment. It's essential that he be fully informed on policy and the reasons for it." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

On March 29, 1971, Shakespeare met with Kissinger and reached an understanding that he outlined in an April 15 letter to Kissinger asking for confirmation; he would not be a formal member of the NSC or the Cabinet but would be invited to all Cabinet and NSC meetings as well as all WSAG and Senior Review Group meetings; the arrangement was personal and would not be extended to another USIA officer in his absence or to his successor in the event of his departure. On that basis Shakespeare indicated he would withdraw his resignation. He remained Director of USIA until February 7, 1973. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 295, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [Jan-Oct 1972])

116. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

National Security Council System (U)

1. The Department of Defense has been exploring ways to make the operation of the National Security Council (NSC) system more productive, more efficient, and less costly in time and effort.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with me that, in general, the NSC system is working well. The following observations support this view:

a. Current procedures insure that the views of all interested agencies are available for consideration during planning and deliberations at all levels within the NSC structure.

b. The NSC system provides for exchanges of views between the departments and agencies directly concerned.

c. Dissent and appeal procedures permit the inclusion of the views of all agencies concerned.

d. The President is presented with realistic alternatives as a basis for decision.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are also in agreement that the system could be improved by incorporating the following recommendations:

a. *More Care in the Selection of, and the Assignment of Priorities to, Study Topics.* Review of the subjects now being studied under NSC auspices indicates that, generally, they are appropriate and should be completed. However, more care in selecting study topics would be beneficial, particularly with respect to their relationship to ongoing studies, so as to avoid duplication. Additionally, there is a requirement for continual review of ongoing studies to insure that appropriate emphasis is placed on the most critical topics throughout the year. Therefore, I propose to submit quarterly recommendations to the NSC suggesting priorities for ongoing studies and new subjects for consideration.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-299, NSC System, New NSC System. Confidential. Kissinger wrote at the top of the first page: "When will I get analysis." On June 10 Haig forwarded to Kissinger an "under-the-table" draft of the memorandum, prepared by the JCS in response to a request made by Laird at a March 9 meeting. (JCSM-259-70, May 28; *ibid.*) In his covering memorandum Haig commented that "a number of the criticisms are valid and most of the recommendations worthy of consideration. I believe it is time for a major streamlining and tightening of procedures. This process may help give a needed shot-in-the-arm to the system." (*Ibid.*)

The following ongoing studies should be addressed on a priority basis:

- The various studies bearing on US nuclear policy.
- The various studies bearing on NATO.
- Studies affecting fiscal guidance which should be completed prior to the time that the Five-Year Defense Plan and fiscal issues are considered by the NSC.
- US policy on current Sino-Soviet differences.

The following subjects should be considered for future study on a priority basis:

- Problems inherent in changes to overseas force deployments to include an assessment of the relationship of base structure to strategy.
- Economic impact of reductions in defense manpower and procurement and the requirement to provide standby facilities to reinitiate or expand defense production.
- Future US policy toward the Middle East.
- Policy on the use of Reserve component forces.
- An annual study of resource allocation to and among Federal programs for the forthcoming five years.

b. *More Care in Initiating Studies to Insure that the Nature of the Requirements is Clear.* The problem of imparting top-level guidance early enough in the NSC processes to be effective appears to be a function of the clarity with which the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) and subsequent terms of reference are drawn and the appropriateness of the deadlines prescribed. Study requirements established by NSSMs are not in all cases, clear and complete, and the deadlines established are not always realistic. Also, more consideration should be given to determining the agency of primary responsibility for NSSMs. Some studies of primary concern to the Department of Defense are being developed under the aegis of interdepartmental groups or the NSC staff rather than the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, the response to NSSM 59 (US Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents)² should have been prepared by the Department of Defense. A means for improvement would be the coordination of the NSSM with the cognizant agencies prior to its being issued. In addition, the organization tasked with the responsibility for the preparation of a report in response to a NSSM should be required to prepare a study directive and to coordinate that directive with the interested departments and agencies. This directive should state explicitly the terms of reference (i.e., the problem, objectives, limits, scope, assumptions, and essential elements of analysis),

² A copy of NSSM 59, May 28, 1969, and the response are *ibid.*, Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 59.

should establish the study schedule, and should provide for in-process review. The NSC Review Group would appear to be the appropriate element to approve such a directive. While such a requirement might be more time consuming in the initial stages, it should sharpen and speed the study by allowing the principals the opportunity to guide the direction of the effort by focusing on agreed requirements.

c. *More Consistent use of the US Intelligence Board to Support the NSC System Requirements.* The US Intelligence Board (USIB) has not always been used to the best advantage within the NSC structure. Special committees or working groups addressing NSSMs should function from a common intelligence base resulting from proper coordination of intelligence content with the USIB during preparation of the NSSM. Agreed national intelligence should provide the basis for all NSSMs. Whenever there are intelligence judgments in a study which are in major disagreement with the intelligence assessments of the USIB, these disagreements should be stated clearly in the study, and the reasons for the disagreements should be indicated.

d. *Reserving National Security Decision Memorandums for Promulgation of Presidential Decisions on National Security Policy Matters.* The National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDMs) were designed initially to be reserved for Presidential decisions on national security matters. However, some of the NSDMs have been used to announce administrative and study requirements rather than policy decisions. It would be useful to have requirements of an administrative nature announced through a separate series of memorandums with a wider distribution and have study requirements announced through NSSMs.

e. *Strengthening the NSC Administrative System.* Administrative shortcomings, such as unannounced schedule changes, papers arriving too late for adequate review, and the lack of feedback from meetings at various levels, indicate a requirement for improved administrative procedures. It is recommended that the NSC staff:

—Insure that all study requirements, including those for the Defense Program Review Committee, are promulgated in NSSMs.

—Record and distribute minutes of meetings.

—Maintain and promulgate the status of all papers within the NSC system.

—Maintain and promulgate schedules for meetings of the NSC groups.

—Maintain a quarterly publication, updated monthly, providing a priority listing of pending subjects for NSC consideration. This publication should be coordinated with the Review Group prior to issuance.

—Have the NSC staff member on interagency groups monitor the progress of the study being conducted to insure that divergent views are included in papers and that agencies have sufficient time to review all papers adequately.

f. *Expanding Review Group Responsibilities.* It would be useful to modify Review Group meeting procedures to include addressal of:

- Proposals for studies.
- The terms of reference of NSSMs.
- Proposed priorities and schedules.

g. *Minimizing the Proliferation of High-Level Ad Hoc Groups.* I believe that the present structure of the NSC system should be used and that proliferation of high-level ad hoc groups should be discouraged.

4. I believe that more attention should be paid to the functioning of the WSAG. The primary purpose of the WSAG is to provide a group prepared to assume the important task of advising the NSC and the President on the handling of time-urgent crises. Because of its small size and tightly controlled representation it is well suited for dealing with planning for contingencies of this type and should continue to do so. However, either because of the sensitivity of some of the plans or because of the proliferation of groups within the NSC system charged with such planning, the WSAG planning effort has not always been properly coordinated with other planning done within the NSC system. Such coordination is mandatory and should be accomplished by submission of WSAG plans to the Under Secretaries Committee or the NSC, as appropriate. Also of great importance and concern is the occasional extension of WSAG interest and action into matters of an ongoing operational nature. These matters should be presented to the President through well-established operational channels rather than through the WSAG.

Mel Laird

117. National Security Decision Memorandum 79¹

Washington, August 13, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 51–96. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Special Review Group for Southeast Asia

The President has directed the establishment of a Special Review Group for South East Asia comprising the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The Special Review Group for South East Asia is responsible within the National Security Council framework for coordination of planning for the area and for the development of a comprehensive long-range political, military and economic policy document for the area.

In carrying out its responsibilities the Special Review Group will establish such interdepartmental working groups as may be required. Existing interdepartmental working groups, ad hoc groups and committees charged with specific responsibilities pertaining to the area may be called upon to assist the Special Review Group or may be consolidated or reconstituted as required by the Special Review Group. Studies being performed by such groups will be coordinated by the Special Review Group for South East Asia.

Henry A. Kissinger

118. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Senior Review Group

It has become increasingly clear that the NSC Review Group should be a senior group comprising agency representatives at the Under Secretary level. When you issued NSDM-2² establishing the NSC structure, the level of agency representation for the Review Group was

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 85. Secret. Sent for action.

² Document 11.

not specified. Subsequently the group was formed comprising representatives at the Assistant Secretary level.

The Review Group's function of examining NSC papers prior to their consideration by the NSC is a vital one. It is to assure that the issues are sharply defined and that Agency views are presented clearly and argued effectively. In the case of both the Departments of State and Defense, intra-agency differences often are strong—e.g., the viewpoint of State's economic bureau and that of a regional bureau on a given issue may differ widely. The Under Secretary level can resolve these intra-agency disputes but it is far less certain that a representative at the Assistant Secretary level can. The tendency of the agency representatives to the present Review Group therefore has been to address papers editorially and procedurally rather than to focus substantively on the issues.

We are moving to strengthen the system at the same time that we are bringing into it for consideration issues of increasingly broad and long-range significance—e.g., Southeast Asia strategy, long-range European policy. We have increasingly relied upon the senior level ad hoc or Special Groups to perform the Review Group function in respect to issues central to our security policy in order to assure full exposition of fundamental policy questions and viewpoints.

I believe the system will be strengthened and the probing analysis of the issues on which we must insist will be better assured if we regularize consideration of these papers at the Under Secretary level. A Review Group at this level also would conform to the pattern which has been established for dealing with operational questions through the NSC Under Secretaries' Committee and contingency planning through the Senior Washington Special Actions Group.

A proposed NSDM which would establish a Senior Review Group at the Under Secretary level is at Tab A.

Recommendation: That you sign the NSDM at Tab A which establishes the Senior Review Group in the NSC structure.³

³ Nixon initialed his approval on September 4 and signed the attached NSDM, which was designated NSDM 83 and dated September 4 but then withheld for further consideration at Kissinger's order. Kissinger penned a note to Haig, on a September 4 memorandum from Lord, stating, "Let me speak to you about the Senior Review Gp. On 2nd thought I don't like the idea." Documentation on the decision to withhold the NSDM is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. On September 14 after Kissinger had read Kennedy's September 8 memorandum (Document 120), the NSDM was issued without any changes as NSDM 85 (Document 121).

**119. Memorandum From Peter Rodman of the Planning Group,
National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, September 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Improving the Efficiency of the Department of State

Attached are two reports produced in the Department of State on the subject of reform and reorganization of the Department.² Rogers brought them to the President's attention; he wrote a brief note to you on the front page of each, suggesting that we might want to look them over to see if they contain anything useful.

The documents are:

—(Tab B) A report on "Management Tools," by a Task Force chaired by Robert A. Hurwitch. [The President wrote on it: "Maybe there are some goods ideas here."]³

—(Tab C) A paper by Robert Dickson Crane entitled "The New State Department: Harnessing Research and Resources to Policymaking." [The President called Crane "a bright (erratic) guy," and suggested "perhaps we should look this over".]

I have done brief summaries, which follow at Tab I (in the form of a memorandum to the President, which you might want to send him in view of the interest he expressed).⁴

The papers are mediocre and cluttered with jargon. The Hurwitch Task Force report does, however, contain some concrete recommendations. Of particular interest are its critical comments on the NSC system, which I have extracted for you (but not for the President) at Tab II.⁵ (I have given them to Dick Kennedy as well.)

I see no need for further action. Since both papers are State products, the Department is presumably in a position to benefit from what-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. IX. No classification marking. Sent for action.

² See Document 31 for information on the task force project that produced the two reports. Neither report is attached. Copies are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. IX, attached to a September 23 memorandum from Kissinger to the President that Kissinger signed but that apparently did not go forward.

³ All brackets in the source text.

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ Printed below. The pages of the report from which the excerpts were taken are noted at the end of each excerpt. The portion of text in the parentheses added by hand.

ever wisdom they contain. This is not the occasion for a White House *démarche* to State on State's reorganization.

Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I if you think his expression of interest warrants a reply.

Attachment

Comments on the NSC System From Report of Task Force XIII

I. State's Role in the NSC System

The Task Force found that while there are some concerns in the Department that the re-invigorated NSC machinery has usurped certain State Department functions and responsibilities, on balance, this machinery, if properly used, provides excellent opportunities for the Department to exercise leadership in the foreign affairs community. The principal advantage of the NSC machinery is that it provides the Department with a Presidential enabling authority for exercising leadership in reaching and enforcing policy decisions in an interdepartmental context at all levels of the NSC system.

Both in the Department and elsewhere in the foreign affairs community, we found a growing appreciation that the number of U.S. agencies involved in foreign affairs and the complexity of foreign affairs problems required some inter-agency system such as the NSC mechanism to ensure full and orderly examination of the issues. However, procedures that prescribed a channel from the Bureau Assistant Secretaries' (Inter-departmental Groups—IG's) to the NSC Review Group without Seventh Floor involvement were found to be unrealistic in practice and potentially disruptive of the Department of State as an integral institution. A further weakness in the NSC system is the absence of an explicit direct relationship between IG's and the Under Secretaries' Committee. For example, in the process of formulating annual AID programs, the interaction between political considerations and economic development considerations takes place at the Bureau level. But there is no entity on the Seventh Floor that is adequately staffed to vet the total AID package or military and intelligence programs against world-wide political and foreign economic policy considerations. The 7th Floor is obliged to play a relatively passive role in reviewing these programs and other similar matters. This type of situation, resulting largely from inadequate Seventh Floor staff, was found to be one of the major reasons why many entities in the foreign affairs community either no longer looked to the Department of State for leadership or found it inadequate when they sought it. (p. 35)

1. The Task Force recommends that Seventh Floor principals deliberately promote wider use of regional and functional IG's to forge

policies by referring to them issues that involve more than one agency of the foreign affairs community. The IG's should also act as the vehicle through which regional components of the planning process outlined in part A of this chapter ("Decision-Making") would be determined and integrated into the various planning and program budgeting cycles of the other agencies.

2. The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) be empowered to consider policy issues of a broad functional nature and/or involving more than one region that are beyond the scope of a regional or functional IG and do not need to go directly to the NSC. Also it would act as the next court of appeal for issues that could not be resolved at a lower echelon. This recommendation will involve modification of the USC Charter as set forth in NSDM 2.⁶

Adoption of this recommendation would result in a series of hierarchically dependent decision centers, proceeding from the IG's to the USC, finally to the NSC (through the Review Group) and ultimately to the President. Such a system would be analogous to the practice of jurisprudence which has appropriately layered courts and the built-in provision for appeal to higher authority.

The value of a hierarchical appeals system is that it will expedite decision making by inducing decisions to be made at the lowest possible level so that higher levels can concentrate on broader issues. This appeals system would not prevent issues from being introduced at other points in the NSC mechanism as required by the nature of the issue. (p. 46)

2. Identifying Issues

In the foreign affairs community as a whole the principal formal tools which now exist for issue identification are the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) issued by the NSC and the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASPs) used in the Latin American area. The NSSMs reflect issues of concern to the President and NSC staff and have generated some longer-range planning on an inter-agency basis. This process, which is almost always in response to an initiative from outside the Department, now encompasses the bulk of the Department's longer-range issue identification. But it is not a systematic method of identifying long-range issues, and several officials we interviewed felt that issues were often poorly posed in the NSSMs. (p. 22)

3. Implementation

Specific decisions are generally communicated promptly and clearly to the implementing units. On occasion, however, the implementing unit is not specified precisely, and the system suffers. More

⁶ Document 11.

often, the specific decision is transmitted without reference to the broader objectives which should guide the action office in carrying it out. Action offices thus must rely on rather rough and ready guidance of their own making, extrapolating from the specific decision and the very broad-brush generalizations contained in public pronouncements by the President and the Secretary. The result can be either inconsistency in implementation or excessive caution. One reason for this lack of guidance is that Departmental inputs to NSSMs are often not framed in such a way as to produce it. Also the Department usually does not participate in the drafting of National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) which it is required to implement.

Problems in the NSC machinery compound this difficulty. There was almost universal agreement among those interviewed that the NSC mechanism is not as effective in downward communication of its decisions as in the upward flow of decision-making. If, as frequently happens, the mechanism operates slowly, conditions to which the decision was originally applicable may have changed. Over-classification often means that not all the action areas affected by a decision are fully aware of it. (pp. 25–26)

**120. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group,
National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, September 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Senior Review Group

In a recent report² a task force studying the workings of the Department of State (under the direction of Mr. Macomber) the following recommendation was included:

The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) be empowered to consider policy issues of a broad functional nature and/or involving more than one region that are beyond the scope of a regional or functional IG and do not need to go directly to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 85. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kennedy and Rush.

² See the attachment to Document 119.

the NSC. Also it would act as the next court of appeal for issues that could not be resolved [at a lower echelon. This recommendation will involve] modification of the USC Charter as set forth in NSDM 2.

If this recommendation is pressed, it will tend to preempt the role you earlier visualized for the Senior Review Group (at the Under Secretaries level).

It would tend to put an increasing share of the policy review function in the Under Secretaries Committee chaired by the Under Secretary of State. The role of the Review Groups (as presently constituted) chaired by you would be further diminished.

If you want to go ahead with the Senior Review Group, the possibility that a recommendation from the Secretary of State for an enhanced role for the Under Secretaries Committee in the policy review area may be forthcoming I believe argues for an early issuance of an NSDM. Otherwise, the Senior Review Group NSDM might be seen as a negative reply to a recommendation from the Secretary.³

³ Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "OK—Establish Senior group. HK." The date "Sep 12 1970" is stamped just below. NSDM 85 was issued September 14 (Document 121).

121. National Security Decision Memorandum 85¹

Washington, September 14, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT

The National Security Council Senior Review Group

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the establishment of the Na-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 85. Secret.

tional Security Council Senior Review Group which shall assume the functions of the present Review Group constituted by NSDM 2.² This Senior Review Group will comprise the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who will act as Chairman. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

The Senior Review Group shall review papers prior to their submission to the National Security Council for consideration or to me for decision. These papers may be received from NSC Interdepartmental Groups, from NSC Ad Hoc Groups, or from Departments (at their discretion). The Senior Review Group shall be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.

The role of the Senior Review Group shall be to assure that the issues have been sharply defined, all relevant factors considered, realistic alternatives with their costs and consequences clearly set out, and the views of all interested departments and agencies fairly and adequately presented. The Senior Review Group shall recommend whether a paper, after review by it, should be referred for consideration by the National Security Council, forwarded directly to me for decision or returned to the originating body for revision before further consideration by the Senior Review Group.

The Senior Review Group shall assume the responsibilities assigned by NSDM 79 to the Special Review Group for South East Asia³ and by memorandum of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of January 2, 1970 to the Ad Hoc Group for the Middle East.

This memorandum supersedes Section B of NSDM 2.

Richard Nixon

² Document 11.

³ Document 117.

122. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

The National Security Council System

Thank you for your thoughtful memorandum of August 4 on the NSC system.² I am glad you think the system is working well generally, and welcome your suggestions for improvement.

Many of your observations closely parallel my own thoughts. In particular, I agree on the desirability of establishing priorities among issues to be discussed, the necessity for clarity and precision in the preparation of the NSSM's, and the monitoring of studies by NSC staff members to ensure that divergent views are reflected in the papers. National Intelligence Estimates and other USIB studies have provided the basic intelligence background for most studies within the NSC system and we will continue to reflect them in the studies.

Continuing emphasis is placed on the setting of priorities for consideration of issues within the system. Your suggestions were helpful and in large part coincided with our planning. The series of discussions in the DPRC and NSC on Defense budget issues, the on-going series of meetings on European issues, and the series of Special Review Group and NSC meetings on the Middle East are examples. Other issues which you have suggested will be considered at an early date.

I recognize the difficulties created by the unavoidable schedule changes and hope you will agree we have been doing better in this regard recently. A monthly report on the status of all papers within the NSC system is being circulated to NSC members as you have suggested. The inconvenience of some of the tight deadlines arises, as I know you are aware, from the degree of importance and urgency which the President attaches to certain issues as well as the time sensitivity of the issues themselves.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, NSC System, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Confidential. Drafted by Kennedy and Davis and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an August 25 memorandum in which they stated that many of Laird's suggestions were "good ones and in line with things we are now trying to do to make the system more effective. Others are not-too-well disguised attempts to remove major issues from the NSC and the interdepartmental arena and get them back into the hands of the 'agency of primary responsibility.'" (Ibid.)

² Document 116.

I believe that the establishment of the Senior Review Group at the Under Secretary level, which the President has just directed, will serve to meet two of your recommendations—expanding Review Group responsibilities, and minimizing the proliferation of high-level ad hoc groups.³

The WSAG has functioned effectively within the framework of the NSC system. It has coordinated the preparation of a variety of political-military contingency plans which stand ready for consideration by the NSC and the President should the occasion require. Moreover, it has provided, within the NSC framework, a senior body able to promptly and effectively consider policies and plans incident to crisis situations and to effect essential interagency coordination in the process of their development.

I will review carefully all of your suggestions and will continue to take all possible steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the NSC system in line with the President's wishes.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ Kissinger's response to Laird's August 25 memorandum was delayed pending a final decision on the establishment of the Senior Review Group, about which Kissinger had second thoughts (see footnote 3, Document 118).

123. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 25, 1970, 7:15 p.m.

R: I just heard about the press conference.² Did the President tell you to say all those things. You know you talked about the peace

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3. No classification marking. Drafted by W.G. Hall of the NSC staff. A handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "File or destroy?"

² Kissinger held a press backgrounder on September 25 from 2:30 to 3:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76, Record of Schedule) A transcript of the briefing is *ibid.*, Box 426, Briefings, Background. Kissinger responded to questions concerning, among other things, the President's upcoming visit to Yugoslavia, the components of a Middle East settlement, his own trip to Paris, the status of the Paris peace negotiations, Madame Binh's proposals, the U.S. role in the Middle East, Soviet activities in the Middle East, U.S. relations with Jordan, the reasons for the President's trip, the timing of the trip, and the possible establishment of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba.

initiative in Paris, the Middle East. Didn't realize the whole thing, the President wanted you to do.

K: Can't say exactly every last word of it.

R: God dammit, you said you would let me know.

K: I did.

R: Come on now, I talked to you about lunch and you didn't mention it.

K: I reject this tone. You always talk. . . . I got you at the Dutch Embassy.

R: You never mentioned anything like this.

K: Told Ted Eliot.

R: You told him about the backgrounder and then talked about all these other things.

K: Related to the trip³ almost every one of them.

R: If that is the way it is going to be played, the Hell with it!

K: About what?

R: About everything. First you talk about Chile and got us in a hell of a jam. Had no idea you were going to _____.⁴ Now I'm hearing all about the peace initiative that you are sponsoring.

K: I said exactly the opposite. No peace initiative. Why don't you read what I said before you start popping off. I said if the Soviets continue it would be of the utmost seriousness. Referred to the Kennedy statement Alex Johnson raised here yesterday and was supposed to be put out by State.

R: If it comes from the White House, it is a different matter.

K: I knew you would use the opportunity to do that. I am sick and tired of it.

R: Don't think you have a corner on being sick and tired of it. That we are having serious confrontation, is that what he wants? If the President is giving signals I don't know about I don't understand. Why didn't Ziegler handle it?

K: All of them being based on the previous Defense Department releases. The only thing that was changed was that I changed "utmost concern" to "the utmost seriousness." Literally the only thing that was changed.

³ Kissinger departed that evening for Paris for the Vietnam peace talks, and to meet with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. The President departed September 27 to visit five European countries and the Vatican, accompanied by Rogers for all but the Vatican visit.

⁴ Omission in source text.

R: What I don't understand is if the President wants to play that way, fine I will do it that way. I am a good team player, I can help build up a crisis too if he wants it.

K: That is the last thing he wants. There would be no controversy if Defense hadn't blown every day.

R: Ziegler from all circumstances to stay away from this thing.

K: Ziegler spent a full 1/2 hour trying to stay away from it. The story broke and we found ourselves in this position. Result was we were confronted with this [series]⁵ of questions.

R: Prior backgrounder _____.⁶

K: Perhaps I didn't use the exact precise language but I have no interest in having a crisis on this issue. This job just isn't worth doing if this constant harassment from you . . .

R: Don't think you have a monopoly on this thing. There was no reason to have a backgrounder under these circumstances.

K: I informed Ted Eliot.

R: He didn't know you were going to talk about this thing.

K: If this thing hadn't blown out of Defense, there would have been no possibility of my saying anything like this. I _____⁷ you on this. Haig and I went over so we _____.⁸

R: If anything _____.⁹

K: No, exactly the opposite.

R: You talked about the Paris thing, that you are going to Paris on a new peace initiative.

K: _____.¹⁰

R: I understand that but why was it necessary to have a background meeting.

K: Getting into a hell of a jam because of the State Department.

R: A jam because of the State Department, I haven't said a thing.

K: Not today. I said exactly the opposite, no initiative, no announcement, nothing coming out of this meeting or the Islander meeting. Read the backgrounder, see if it could have been said in a more explicit fashion than it has been said.

R: I will talk to the President. If we have this each time. . . .

⁵ All brackets are in the source text.

⁶ Omission in source text.

⁷ Omission in source text.

⁸ Omission in source text.

⁹ Omission in source text.

¹⁰ Omission in source text.

K: I know who started all this about expel.¹¹

R: Hell, I wasn't even in the country. I understand and think you . . .

K: Do not have the slightest interest in continuing. Three years from now they won't know who was up and who was down. I got you out of the Dutch Embassy.

R: You didn't mention a word about this.

K: I had informed your Executive Secretary.

R: When I was out of my office.

K: At a time when I didn't know you were out of the office. When I tried to reach you, I was so preoccupied with this disaster. Wish that the backgrounder had been delayed until after the Ziegler announcement. I will send you the text immediately and urge you to look at the actual language of what I said.

R: You commented on Madame Binh and what she said. If the President wants you to announce foreign policy [Okay, but it is either you or me].

K: Don't want to be in a position that we did nothing. Couldn't [just say it was on a trip] say this is a backgrounder on the trip, has nothing to do with Madame Binh's trip, completely disassociate myself from Madame Binh.

R: I will think about what you have said.

K: Okay

R: Fine, I will see you in the morning.

¹¹ A reference to Kissinger's statement at a July editors' briefing in San Clemente that it might be necessary to "expel" Russian technicians and pilots from Egypt. Marquis Childs reported in a July 20 column in *The Washington Post* that "this did not contribute to the peace initiative and Kissinger sent Rogers a telegram apologizing for his slip." Kissinger assured the President in a memorandum the same day that the report of an apology for using the word expel was "absolutely incorrect." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 282, Dept of State, Vol. VIII 1 Jul 70–Aug 70)

124. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for September 25, 1970, President's Assistant H. R. Haldeman wrote the following: "K[issinger] called at home tonight to say Rogers had called him in a blind rage, yelling at him, about the briefing [see Document 123]. Said K tricked P[resident] into

hard line about Cuba. Also claims K indicated there'd be a new peace initiative and that's why K going to Paris tonight (not true). Said 'One of us has got to go' and is going to P. K then felt he had to stay here to protect himself. Haig and I talked him into going." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

The next day, September 26, Haldeman told the President about Kissinger's call the previous evening. "P then had Haig in and went over the whole thing with both of us. Made it clear he felt K had erred in briefing yesterday, Haig said K knew it. P gave Haig his whole theory about how to handle crisis, said we couldn't let K-Rogers battles get in way of dealing with substance. Recognizes both were tired and strained, but that will always be the case in a major crisis. Simply have to get them both to quit acting like little children, trying to nail the other and prove him wrong. Since P sees exactly what they're doing, it's obvious neither will get away with it. I told P I had agreed with K that maybe he should think of leaving, he felt it was good to shake him a little. Said if K does go, he'd put Haig in the spot. But would really be a major loss, and then State and Rogers would run rampant which would be very bad." (Ibid.)

The President brought up the "K-Rogers battle" again on September 27, according to Haldeman's diary. President "wants me to get into it and try to work it out. Real problem is ego of both and determination of both to justify themselves, instead of selling the P and his program. In any event, have to find a way to avoid these wrangles in future. Asked if I felt time had come that one had to go. I said no, but we did have to resolve the problem. He indicated that if one did go it would have to be K, and he's obviously still thinking of Haig as replacement." (Ibid.)

125. Memorandum From Jeanne Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Your Luncheon with Under Secretary Irwin, Thursday, October 15

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 340, HAK/Irwin Meetings. Secret.

This is the first of your planned weekly luncheons with Under Secretary Irwin,² continuance of your regular sessions with Elliot Richardson. We have canvassed the staff for items you may wish to raise, with the following results:

[Omitted here are items concerning Jordanian relief activities and the Middle East.]

State's Role in Interagency Coordination

State is still resisting the basic interagency concept of the NSC mechanism: specifically, papers prepared for the NSC or its subordinate bodies by the Interdepartmental Groups, the Under Secretaries Committee, or other groups chaired by State are, in many cases, being "approved" by the Secretary or an Under Secretary before they are sent here. Papers have often been seriously delayed, or even blocked, by this device. Wayne Smith's recent experience with the "provocative attacks" paper is an example. In addition, State has taken the position that these papers, once blessed by the Secretary, are no longer open to interagency dissent.

This is unfair to the other agencies who, in effect, are being subjected to the veto power of the Secretary of State. It is not consistent with the basic concept which is designed to assure that all agency views can and should be put forward. The Secretary of State, of course, is free to submit his views separately if he wishes.

You may wish to remind Mr. Irwin of the direct responsibility of the IG Chairman (and the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee) to the NSC, and the necessity for providing other agencies full opportunity to make their views known.³

[Omitted here is an item concerning security at the United Nations.]

² Richardson stepped down as Under Secretary of State on June 23, 1970, to become Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. John Irwin entered on duty as Under Secretary of State on September 21, 1970.

³ According to his record of schedule, Kissinger and Irwin met from 1:35 to 2:32 p.m. on October 15, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976)

126. **Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State (Cargo) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)**¹

Washington, October 27, 1970.

SUBJECT

NSC Procedures—Your Lunch with Henry Kissinger

There are three related problems that I believe can usefully be discussed at your Wednesday lunch.

[Omitted here is discussion of the first problem, "FY 1971 Supplemental."]

2. Presentation of Issues to the President

In recent months and increasingly with the advent of the SRG, there has been confusion on the specifics and timing of the presentation of issues to the President. NSSM 99 on Cambodia² is a good example. After two meetings of the SRG, Alex Johnson circulated a draft cable which summed up the preliminary conclusions of the group (DOD and AID concurred) and suggested the next steps necessary in the process of consulting with the governments in the area.

Instead of getting approval of that message the President was asked by NSC staff to approve a NSDM, subsequently issued as NSDM 89 (Tab D).³ The NSC staff then redrafted our message to include the text of the NSDM which gives the President's specific endorsement of Strategy 3 variant 3. Both we and Defense had not felt that such an approval, conveyed to the field, would help guide our missions. Instead we had conveyed the general purposes of our approach and specific guidelines for their discussions.

The issue here is not what goes in a cable but rather what goes to the President for decision and when. Without seeing what went to the President, it is difficult for us to know if indeed the President was approving all the analysis and conclusions of NSSM 99. Secretaries Rogers and Laird do not have the opportunity to comment in a timely and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger-Irwin Meetings. Secret. Drafted by Hartman. Sent through U. Alexis Johnson and Eliot.

² NSSM 99, "U.S. Strategy for Southeast Asia," August 17, 1970. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-173, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 99)

³ NSDM 89, "Cambodia Strategy," October 26, 1970. (Ibid., Box H-219, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 89)

meaningful way to the President. They can clear a cable; they cannot be expected to approve a paper more than 100 pages long.

The principle to be guarded is that the Secretary have an opportunity to see the form in which an issue is being presented to the President, and based on this to make his recommendation. An NSC meeting offers the Secretary the opportunity to do this. The present procedures wherein issues frequently go directly from the SRG, Verification Panel or similar NSC bodies to the President for decision does not. Our recommendation therefore is that if a decision by the President is required after meetings of the SRG, Verification Panel or similar bodies, that recommendation be set forth in a memo from the group to the President. Then both Secretaries Rogers and Laird will have an opportunity to comment or add their own formal or informal advice.

(This same point arises in connection with the presentation to the President for decision of the options on handling the “provocative attack” issue discussed today by the Verification Panel. It is important, as you have already noted, for the Department and the Secretary to know exactly what is being presented to the President.)⁴

3. Timing of Meetings

As an aid to all concerned, and while recognizing Henry Kissinger’s scheduling problems, I recommend that you put to Henry the suggestion that two or three specific times be set aside on the SRG members’ schedules to be kept for possible meetings. This will, except in rare and unavoidable cases, obviate the necessity of changing meeting times constantly.

⁴ The Department of State’s record of the Kissinger–Irwin luncheon on October 28 indicates that Irwin expressed State’s concern over the system to be followed in presenting issues to the President with the advent of the SRG. Irwin noted that Kissinger had presented NSSM 99 to the President for a decision following the SRG meeting without holding an NSC meeting or informing the agency principals in attendance at the SRG that he would go directly to the President. The “basic question,” Irwin stated, is: “At what point does the Secretary of State personally participate in the decision-making process under these circumstances?” According to the record, “the discussion was inconclusive and probably can be considered as the beginning of a continuing dialogue as required.” (Veliotes, Record of Irwin/Kissinger Lunch of October 29, November 3; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings) Veliotes incorrectly gives October 29 as the date of the lunch. Irwin and Kissinger met on October 28 at 12:10 p.m., but not on October 29. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

127. **Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)**¹

Washington, October 28, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Luncheon Today with Henry Kissinger

Two of the regional Assistant Secretaries (Marshall Green and Joe Sisco) have raised with me the difficulties caused them by virtue of the fact that when the President meets with foreign leaders, State Department representatives are usually not included in the meetings. The normal practice is for Henry Kissinger to be the only American present besides the President and, if necessary, an interpreter.

Henry usually takes some time to prepare and distribute a record of the meeting. Our Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors in the field are therefore left in the dark as to what has happened on matters which often are in a state of flux. For example, we do not yet have records of any of the President's meetings with foreign leaders this past weekend.

I suggest that you raise this problem with Henry and urge him to persuade the President to include an appropriate State Department official whenever he meets with foreign leaders except on a tête-à-tête basis. You could tell Henry that we would of course not distribute records of Presidential conversations without White House concurrence. But this new procedure would enable us quickly to prepare action and information telegrams on matters of importance that are discussed in these meetings.²

TLE

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger-Irwin Meetings. Confidential.

² At the top of page 1 is written, "next HK/JNI meeting." The issue was not raised at the October 28 lunch. (Veliotes, Record of Irwin/Kissinger Lunch of October 29, November 3; *ibid.*)

**128. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to All Assistant Secretaries of
State and Bureau Heads¹**

Washington, November 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

White House Clearances of Policy Telegrams

The Executive Secretariat has had many questions recently about White House clearances and the procedures involved in obtaining such clearances. I hope that the following comments will be of assistance to you and your Country Directors and Desk Officers.

1. In general, when a Bureau is following policy already established by the NSC system, the highest clearance needed on an outgoing telegram is that of an Assistant Secretary or his Deputy or a Country Director. (Procedurally, both Exdis and Nodis cables receive an S/S clearance for administrative reasons.)

2. In cases where a telegram has major policy implications or involves the interest or special competence of one of the principal officers (the Secretary, the Under Secretaries, the Deputy Under Secretaries or the Counselor) a clearance from the appropriate Principal should be obtained.

3. If a Bureau believes that, because of policy changes or innovations, a White House clearance may be required on a telegram, the telegram should be drafted for the approval of a Principal, and S/S should be advised of the possible need for White House clearance. S/S will seek the Principal's judgment as to whether a White House clearance is necessary.

4. When need for White House clearance is established, S/S is charged with responsibility for obtaining the appropriate clearance in coordination with the NSC Secretariat.

5. Please ask your staffs to bear in mind in considering requests from other offices to be included "on clearance," *the need for clearance* as contrasted with *the need to be informed* (which can be covered with a copy of the outgoing cable). As you are aware most substantive telegrams are routinely distributed to the NSC.

6. Procedures for obtaining White House clearance on non-policy telegrams (e.g., those involving the schedules of the President or mem-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Memoranda Files: Lot 72 D 370, Memos, November 1970, Vol. 2. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Veljotes and Williams (U); Getz and Monjo (J); Suchman (D); and McHenry (C).

bers of the White House staff, non-substantive Presidential messages to foreign leaders) are the same as the foregoing except that approval by a Principal is not necessary.

Don't hesitate to call on me or one of my Deputies (Mr. Brewster or Mr. Curran) if you have any general or specific questions on this matter.²

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

²The Executive Secretary provided the same guidance in a memorandum distributed on April 21, 1971. (Ibid., S/S Memos, April 1971, Vol. 4)

129. Editorial Note

On November 28, 1970, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig forwarded to the President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman five items that he considered "indicative of the problems we are having with the Department of State." One item, for example, was a Jack Anderson column stating that "diplomats are saying Richard Nixon may go down in history as the President who lost Latin America." In his covering memorandum, Haig contended that the "lack of discipline" was "largely attributable to known or imagined differences between the White House and State Department. Secretary Rogers is a major factor," but "even on issues where the Secretary may not be directly involved Department personnel know they can exploit the existence of a divergence between Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger as they pursue their own policy conceptions whether or not they coincide with approved Presidential policies. I cannot overemphasize the concern with which I view this problem area within security terms and in terms of the problems which it will pose for the President as '72 approaches." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3)

On both December 3 and 4, the President discussed the problem of State Department leaking with Haldeman. On December 4, according to Haldeman's diary entry, Nixon told him that he should definitely "go ahead on the talk with Rogers, making the point that there are two different fights involved here. One is with K[issinger] and Rogers, and that the P[resident], of course, has to side with Rogers on. But the second one is much more important: that's the foreign service vs. the P. There it's unforgivable, and the P is going to have heads

rolling. Since Cambodia, they've been taking on the P, leaking, etc. These things don't just happen, and from now on, it's us or them. State can't be told anything, and that's the way it is." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

At the same time the President asked for a record of press leaks attributable to State which undercut Presidential policy. On December 7 Haig sent the President a 23-page detailed description of more than 70 press leaks concerning, among other topics, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, and SALT. In his covering memorandum Haig stated the leaks were "clearly and probably attributable to State" and indicated a "a consistent pattern of dissent." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 3)

**130. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Eliot) to the Under Secretary of State
(Irwin)¹**

Washington, December 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Diplomacy by the NSC Staff

One aspect of the operations of the NSC staff is particularly troublesome: direct dealings on official foreign policy matters with foreign officials without the participation or knowledge of the State Department.

Three recent examples are:

—John Thomson's visit to discuss the Indian Ocean (telegram at Tab A).²

—Henry's discussion with the Pakistan Ambassador on a special U.S. delegation to East Pakistan (telegram at Tab B).³

—About 10 days ago, Mr. Nachmanoff informed the Brazilian Ambassador that the Administration would not give a commitment at this time that it would tax Brazilian soluble coffee. We learned this when

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger–Irwin Meetings. Confidential; Eyes Only.

² Not attached.

³ Not attached.

we were provided the language at Tab C to be added to a telegram we were sending on recent Ways and Means Committee action on the International Coffee Agreement.⁴

We have no way of knowing of other such actions about which we have not been told.

I think the point to be made to Henry is that unless the President specifically requests that the Secretary of State not be consulted or advised of direct diplomacy by the NSC staff, we expect to be consulted and advised.

Furthermore, we regard all three of the above examples as "operational" and of the kind the State Department, in charge of foreign operations, should have had action on. For the NSC staff to undercut the Department in these ways harms the ability of the Department to carry out the functions the President has assigned to it.

I believe that this matter is so serious and important that you should convey the thought to Henry by implication that if this sort of problem recurs, the Secretary may raise it with the President.⁵

TLE

⁴ Attached but not printed. Arnold Nachmanoff was a member of the NSC's Operations Staff for Latin America.

⁵ The State Department's record of Irwin's luncheon with Kissinger on December 10 states that Irwin raised the issue of NSC diplomacy "in general terms as well as the specifics of the three cases in point. HK agreed that the White House NSC staff should not be conducting diplomatic business directly with foreign governments." (Nicholas Veliotos, Memorandum for the Files, December 10; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Summaries of the Under Secretary's Meetings with the National Security Advisor)

131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, January 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

Coordination of Official Contacts with the USSR

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSC Matters Files, Lot 73 D 288, Senior Review Group Memos. Secret.

The President wishes to achieve more adequate coordination of our numerous official contacts with the USSR. He wants to ensure that he and members of the NSC can at all times be fully informed of the status of these contacts and that our activities with respect to the USSR are integrated to the fullest extent feasible.

The President has selected the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, reporting to the Senior Review Group, as the vehicle for serving this function. Accordingly, the IG/EUR, including representatives of department and agency heads concerned with one or another aspect of our relations with the USSR, should in the first instance devise effective means whereby our several contacts with the USSR will be carried out in a coherent and coordinated manner. These means should take due account of the need for prompt action when this is operationally required. When fully functioning on this matter, the IG/EUR should act as the coordinating body for our activities (other than covert) with respect to the USSR. It will also be the responsibility of the IG/EUR to maintain an up-to-date record of the status of all ongoing diplomatic and other official contacts with the USSR; it will further maintain an up-to-date projection of likely future contacts and activities.

This directive does not affect existing mechanisms dealing with certain aspects of our relations with the USSR, such as the SALT Backstopping Committee, the Berlin Task Force and committees already functioning within the NSC system. The IG/EUR will, however, be responsible for ensuring that heads of these existing groups are aware of ongoing and projected activities with respect to the USSR. Heads of existing groups, in turn, should keep the chairman of the IG/EUR as fully informed as possible of their decisions and the actions deriving therefrom.

The Chairman of the IG/EUR is requested to prepare a report to the Senior Review Group on the effectiveness of this operation after approximately three months, together with recommendations resulting from this initial experience.

Henry A. Kissinger

132. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Programming

The Problem

In my judgment, some major programming problems have arisen that need resolution if we are to have a comprehensive picture of the government's programming activities in selected countries and ensure adequate White House control over the government's activities.

—(1) The full harmonization of our policies and programs in key countries and regions requires that our efforts be viewed in their totality and systematically analyzed. You commented on this requirement in your memorandum to the President on Secretary Laird's "Strategy of Realistic Deterrence."²

"My view of a national security strategy encompasses a different set of issues than Secretary Laird's. A true national security strategy should include our diplomatic posture, our economic assistance and trade policies, and our cultural and educational programs as well as our military posture.

"If all of these instruments are brought to bear in an integrated fashion, we will establish a broader and more lasting basis for national security than that obtainable by forces alone. There must be an overall design. Then the policies of our allies and friends will enhance our interests, and the options open to our potential enemies will be minimized."

—(2) Program management and administration, already diffuse, are becoming even further fragmented. The NSC system is designed to strengthen attention given to our various programs and policies in order to broaden the range of choice for the President and other high-level decision makers. The NSC system is also intended to facilitate the integration of our entire program effort in key countries and regions.

Yet, in fact, the JCS, OSD, and State operate almost as independently as before, and none exercises overall control. Further fragmentation of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 4. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Laird's paper on "The National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence" and Kissinger's memorandum are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 236, DPRC & DEF Budget.

our programs is clearly visible. The “new approach to foreign assistance” will divide AID into three separate entities: one for developing lending, one for most technical assistance, and one for supporting assistance. However, this particular fragmentation could *help* our effort. AID is responsible for country programming of *some* of our programs now, but does them inadequately and does not have a sufficiently broad scope. By destroying a responsible but inadequate present mechanism, we are creating a new vacuum which we could exploit.

OMB has little control over these diverse programs, no inclination to adopt a country programming approach, a strong budgetary bias on all program issues, and a proclivity to view their function as being technicians. I was shocked at the recent FY 1972 OMB budget review of assistance programs at the lack of analysis. Alternative country assistance levels were bandied about without any substantive basis for evaluation. Decisions were made on the most arbitrary basis. Basic information such as a country-by-country presentation of our lending through international institutions was not available.

The point is that if our programs are to serve foreign policy goals, program decisions must be made in a foreign policy context. While this is being done on an ad hoc basis through the SRG, DPRC, and WSAG, it is not being done in a systematic way for all programs in key countries and regions.

—(3) There are gross inefficiencies in the allocation of our resources in selected countries and regions. International lending is a case in point. We do not always know how it serves our interests. In Vietnam we spend over half our resources for air activities while ground forces are only sparsely supported. Commenting recently on the capability of ARVN to deploy into Cambodia and at the same time continue operations against base areas within South Vietnam, the Chief of the JGS Combat Operations Division said:

“Additional [ground]³ units are needed and an expansion of the army is necessary, but there are not enough funds to support any more units. The JGS is seriously concerned about the problems and conditions of the soldiers it already has on its payroll.”

We recently expanded military assistance to Jordan without looking at the requirement for additional economic assistance to allow the economy to sustain higher force levels.

We have made a decision on force levels and economic support for Cambodia (NSSM 99/NSDM 89)⁴ but there is no forum for insur-

³ Brackets in the source text.

⁴ See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 126.

ing that the force levels and pay rates the GKR has opted for and our economic and military assistance plans are consistent. We have no way of knowing whether CINCPAC and the Mission even are adhering to NSDM 89's guidelines. State has voiced concern over the absence of coordination of these programs.

I believe the trade-offs between development assistance, supporting assistance, and military assistance and the relation of all three to our overall political goals lie at the heart of the Nixon Doctrine. Yet, our decision-making apparatus still reflects the naive belief that when we give hardware support to a country, e.g., Indonesia, Cambodia, or Thailand, we get military capability. We treat force levels and military pay on the one hand and supporting assistance on the other as if they were two separate factors, when, in fact, they are intimately connected. We place development on a pedestal above other goals, when, in fact, it is closely linked to military and economic strength and involves basic questions of political commitment to undertake reforms. These, in turn, as has been demonstrated in Korea and Taiwan and in a different way by Brazil, are related to foreign policies of the U.S. and the country in question.

The lesson of these examples is not that we need a comprehensive country mechanism for all countries. Rather, it is that in key countries such as Jordan, Vietnam, Cambodia, we need to insure that our program efforts are not counter-productive and that they make the most efficient use possible of the total resources we have.

—(4) Another difficulty is bureaucratic. State and Defense are already moving to pre-empt White House control of country programming. They can see a vacuum as well as we can. Motivated in particular by the security assistance review both agencies have recognized the need for country programming which by itself is desirable—but it needs to be integrated with our other programs as well. The Under Secretaries Committee's report⁵ (Fred Bergsten is providing you with a separate memo on this) cited as common to all of its organizational options the requirement that "a single policy document covering all aspects of security assistance be prepared annually to guide program development."

State is considering letting a research contract to a team of systems analysts to help them devise such a country programming system. In

⁵ A copy of the draft report dated December 5, 1970, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, Security Assistance, 1970–1971. A copy of the final report dated February 5, 1971, is *ibid.*, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 210, Security Assistance—Key Papers.

his report to you on the outcome of the security assistance deliberations, Under Secretary Irwin noted that:

“The Committee concludes that the present respective statutory responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense for direction, supervision and administration of these programs should be maintained. However, there must be improved coordination and liaison between the two Departments to ensure that these programs are integrated in as effective a manner as possible with U.S. defense plans and programs and U.S. foreign policy. The two Departments are now reviewing their internal organizations to determine what changes should be made toward this end.”

This is fine, but past history shows that “improved coordination and liaison between the two Departments” usually means a negotiated compromise not alternatives based on analysis.

Your Alternatives

Any solution to this problem must overcome two obstacles. The first obstacle to a country programming approach has been the lack of agreed analytical techniques for integrated analysis and planning. The second is the requirement that the responsibility for country programming reside at a level that is close enough to the White House to (a) insure adequate White House control and (b) provide the leverage necessary to force State, DOD, and CIA to take integrated country programming seriously.

OMB and NSC are the likely candidates for this latter task. My reservations on having OMB do it are stated above. The key consideration, however, is the program budget.

The methodological arguments used by AID at the SRG meeting on Brazil notwithstanding, I believe we have developed the capability to do good country programming on a limited number of countries. This capability has been demonstrated in the following studies:⁶

- Cambodia (NSSM 99 Phase I—NSDM 89)
- Korea (NSSM 27—NSDM 48)
- Vietnam (NSSM 77, NSSM 99)
- Thailand (NSSM 51)

We now have a firm analytical foundation for these countries. They also are countries for which annual budget decisions inevitably involve major policy issues, a point amply demonstrated this year by OMB’s attempt to arbitrarily cut supporting assistance for Vietnam.

Other countries—for example, Jordan, Indonesia, and India—could be added. The determinants of how many countries would be addressed in a country programming exercise would depend on (a) the

⁶ NSSMs and follow up studies, organized by NSSM number are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Boxes H-163, H-138, H-173, and H-149–H-150; NSDMs and supporting material are *ibid.*; Boxes H-219, H-215, and H-222.

number of countries for which major program decisions have an important impact on our overall policy, and (b) the number of individuals on the NSC staff you would want to devote to this project, and (c) the support we receive from the agencies.

How Country Programming Would Work

If we were to formalize what has to date been an ad hoc country programming effort, it should be designed to accomplish the following objectives:

- (1) Influence the development of program issues and alternatives before final budget decisions are made.
- (2) Provide a substantive basis for final budget deliberations either between you and George Shultz or by the SRG, and final decision by the President if necessary.
- (3) Provide for at least some monitoring of the execution of White House decisions before and during the fiscal year.

For example, country programming might proceed as follows for FY 1973:

—In January or February, in cooperation with OMB, guidance would be issued to the agencies and the field for the development of program issues and analysis for FY 1973. This would be followed by an interagency meeting at my level. The meeting would initiate the development of a Country Program Memorandum (CPM) that would be the final decision-making document for the FY 1973 budget.

—In the late summer of 1971 we would hold an initial program review at the working level to consider draft FY 1973 CPM's. The NSC staff would devise a format for the CPM's and provide technical direction for their development. Primary responsibility for drafting each CPM would be assigned to selected agencies (most likely those which have major programs in the country) or to the NSC or OMB staff. For example, India might be handled by AID, Korea by DOD, Jordan by State, Thailand by OMB and Vietnam by NSC. While one agency would be assigned primary responsibility, the final CPM would be an inter-agency document.

—The CPM's would then be forwarded to you as Chairman of the SRG and to OMB Director Shultz by mid-October. You could decide to hold a meeting on one or several of them, to consider the issues raised in a meeting with Shultz, and/or forward them to the President.

Setting Up the CPM System

Two current NSDM's relate to the procedure I have outlined above. NSDM 4, as revised September 4, 1969, (at Tab B)⁷ is the charter for detailed country studies that are undertaken on an ad hoc basis. I

⁷ Document 71.

believe NSDM 4 should remain in effect. We need to retain the option of exploring at great depth selected problem areas without being locked into the budget cycle.

NSDM 10 (at Tab C)⁸ is the other decision document that bears on country programming. It directs the Secretary of State to submit annually “a country memorandum setting forth the total economic assistance program, including AID and PL 480, for major countries.” The AID Administrator initiates the memoranda.

I have reviewed the NSDM 10 submissions. They have three serious drawbacks:

—all U.S. country programs are not included. The NSDM 10 requirement covers only PL 480 and AID programs, not military assistance, U.S. multi-lateral lending, direct U.S. involvement, trade, etc.

—in most cases no alternatives are presented. Instead the agency view is forwarded for Presidential endorsement. In the few cases where alternatives are presented they are of the “high,” “intermediate,” and “low,” variety with the middle option inevitably being selected.

—very little analysis is provided. How are our interests served by what is proposed? What trade-offs are possible and what alternatives do they suggest (e.g., indigenous forces for U.S. forces, indigenous ground forces versus air forces, economic versus military support). On what issues does one’s choice of the options turn? These questions are simply not addressed. Moreover, there is no program budget or other basis for analysis.

The Drawbacks

There are drawbacks to embarking on an integrated country programming effort under NSC direction:

—OMB’s support would be mandatory. Shultz would have to be willing to expose his budget arguments to substantive scrutiny by the SRG or by you. I believe Shultz is committed to decision-making based on analysis and thus would be receptive to a country programming approach.

—You would have to obtain firm Presidential backing in order to convince the agencies that NSC direction is a workable solution to our country programming problems. State and DOD see a role for themselves. While the approach outlined above gives them a major role in the preparation of the CPM’s, it would be clear that overall direction would be an NSC responsibility. I have no firm basis for predicting State, DOD or CIA’s reaction to a country programming NSDM. It is possible that if the groundwork were carefully laid, we could pull the

⁸ Dated April 11, 1969. Attached but not printed.

whole thing off with little pain. But a major bureaucratic battle cannot be ruled out.

—A new factor is the pending creation of the International Economic Policy Council. Its policy making and coordinating mandate on all foreign economic policy will certainly include trade, but also—within the general policy guidance of the NSC—may include foreign aid (presumably only of the economic variety). Trade should not be much of a problem, because we can't really include it very meaningfully into country programs anyway. Aid would seem to be the main potential source of difficulty. Even here, the new Council should restrict itself to broad policy issues and not try to get into individual country situations—and it probably will not if the present plan to keep it without its own staff survives. However, this development does raise one more issue which you may have to iron out with Shultz.

—Additional NSC manpower would be required to guarantee the necessary bureaucratic and quality control of the CPM effort. For example, if my office were given this additional responsibility, I estimate that at least 1 and probably 2 more people would be needed. And I think this would be true for other offices (e.g., Bergsten's) which you might want to give this responsibility.

Recommendation

I strongly believe that the advantages of a country programming effort far out-weigh its bureaucratic drawbacks, that it represents an area where we can add greatly to our existing intellectual capital stock and that the Administration should embark on a country programming effort of limited scope for FY 1973. Seven countries—South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, India, Jordan, and Indonesia—are prime candidates to be covered in the first year.

I have prepared a memorandum for the President (at Tab A) to obtain his approval of the country programming effort and an implementing NSDM (attached to his memorandum).

I recommend that you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A,⁹ and upon receipt of his approval, sign the attached NSDM.

Fred Bergsten concurs in this memorandum.

⁹ Not printed. Kissinger did not sign the memorandum. Instead, he wrote on page 1 of Smith's memorandum: "Arrange a meeting with Schultz [sic] & then let's do a jt. [joint] memo." Beneath his note the date "Jan 20 1971" is stamped. In a March 27 memorandum to Kissinger, Smith reported that he had met with Shultz, who strongly supported Smith's proposal but suggested two modifications in the proposed NSDM, which Smith incorporated. Smith drafted a joint memorandum to the President which Shultz signed and Smith forwarded for Kissinger's signature under cover of his March 27 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-290, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112.) See Documents 149 and 150.

133. Editorial Note

On January 18, 1971, *The New York Times* carried an article entitled “Foreign Policy: Decision Power Ebbing at the State Department,” the first in a series of seven articles in the *Times* on the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. The opening paragraph stated: “The Department of State, once the proud and undisputed steward of foreign policy, has finally acknowledged what others have long been saying: that it is no longer in charge of the United States’ foreign affairs and that it cannot reasonably expect to be so again.” President’s Assistant H.R. Haldeman noted in his diary entry for January 18 that the article generated a “big flap” and “had Rogers quite upset; and he succeeded in getting the P[resident] into the same frame of mind. The P’s reaction was to put out a statement from him blasting the article; but a careful reading of it convinced me that it’s got enough basis in fact and accuracy that such a statement wouldn’t be a good thing to do.” (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

Following remarks critical of Secretary of State William Rogers by Senator George Aiken (R–Vermont) that were carried by one of the wire services, the President assured Aiken in a February 9 letter that “Rogers takes part in every step of the planning and discussion associated with foreign policy” and “he has my complete confidence.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Subject Files, Confidential File, FG 11) Aiken responded in a February 11 letter to Nixon that his letter was “most welcome” since “there was, indeed, a growing feeling on the Hill that Bill Rogers was not carrying the weight in formulating foreign policy to which the Secretary of State would naturally be entitled.” (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files, Subject Files, EX FG)

On March 2 Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri) gave an address on the Senate floor that was released to the press under the title “Further Concentration of Power, Executive Privilege, and the ‘Kissinger Syndrome.’” Symington made note of *The New York Times* articles and proceeded “to examine both the nature and the scope of Dr. Kissinger’s present authority.” Among other things, he reviewed the “complex structure of six committees” that Kissinger had established under the National Security Council, noting pointedly that Kissinger was chairman of all six. And he emphasized that, unlike the Secretary of State, Kissinger wielded his far-reaching authority “without any accountability of any kind whatever to the Congress.” (*Ibid.*, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5) In response Kissinger prepared a memorandum for President Nixon, undated, calling Symington’s address “a fundamental misunderstanding of how the NSC system actually works. He does not recognize that the function of the National Security Council system is to advise the President and support him in his decision making role. The NSC does not

as an entity itself make decisions—only you do.” Kissinger then highlighted ten additional examples of “factual errors and misconceptions” in Symington’s statement. (Ibid.)

134. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)¹

Washington, January 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

Coordination of Official Contacts with the USSR

Upon reading Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of January 7 on the above subject,² the Secretary asked me to inform you that the procedures outlined in the memorandum should not alter our internal procedures for clearances of substantive cables with the White House. This means that such cables will only be cleared with the White House if the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or the Under Secretary for Political Affairs deem it necessary.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Memoranda Files: Lots 72 D 371, Memos, 1971, Vol. 3. Secret. Copies were sent to Rogers, Irwin, Johnson, Pedersen, Stevenson, the heads of 10 bureaus, and the Director of ACDA.

² Document 131.

³ Printed from a copy that indicates Eliot signed the original.

135. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for January 20, 1971, President’s Assistant H.R. Haldeman wrote the following: “We had a long meeting this afternoon with E[hrlichman], Shultz, Mitchell, and K[issinger], at Henry’s request to discuss in detail his problems with the State Department. He walked into the meeting with huge thick folders for each of us with all kinds of papers documenting his case on the terrible things State has been doing in the public press, and how they’ve been undercutting him in

internal operations, and how they've disobeyed Presidential orders, cable traffic and all sorts of stuff. He did an extremely good job, for a change, of presenting his case quite unemotionally and very rationally; this made it far more effective than it usually is when he gets going. He really wrapped it up by saying he wasn't going to discuss with the P[resident], but was hoping we would find a way to approach it, and that problem had to be resolved. He would not continue this method of operation. If it couldn't be resolved, he would leave; if it could be, he'd be perfectly willing to work within a new approach, as long as NSC has complete control and Rogers is, as he puts it, 'brought to heel.'" (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

136. Draft Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, January 20, 1971.

WHITE HOUSE–STATE RELATIONSHIPS

1. All contacts with the White House by the Secretary of State which deal with national security affairs and foreign policy must, as a general rule, be channeled through the NSC office. Direct telephone calls from the Secretary to the President should normally be handled this way. Exceptions should be brought immediately to Dr. Kissinger's attention so that he is fully apprised of the contents of the Secretary's exchange with the President.

2. The President's directive from Colorado Springs of September 1, 1969² and from Washington on December 21, 1970, are in full force.³ They require that all cables and contacts involving policy matters and especially those with the Soviet Union, including Ambassadorial contacts, will be cleared by the President through the NSC office. Cases of doubt will be resolved in favor of clearance. Following such a contact, the President, through Dr. Kissinger, will be immediately informed in writing of the full context of the exchange.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Typed 4:15 p.m." The paper was presumably prepared in connection with Kissinger's meeting on January 20 with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Shultz, and Mitchell that is described in Document 135.

² Document 70.

³ A copy is in the National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1970, Directive #154.

3. Henceforth, the Middle East situation will be managed within the broad framework of the National Security Council system as with any national security matter. Existing White House clearance procedures will be applicable. (Dr. Kissinger agrees that if the President so directs, he will defer to the Secretary of State on policy issues involving the Middle East situation but this arrangement must be applied within the established NSC system.)

4. Just as press leaks emanating from the White House which are derogatory to the Department of State are unacceptable to the national security, similarly attacks on White House policies emanating from State sources constitute attacks on the Presidency and are no longer acceptable. Immediate remedial steps should be taken to insure greater discipline in their respect.

5. Dr. Kissinger will agree to notify the Secretary of State prior to any contacts involving policy matters between him and the representatives of foreign governments. Notification of the fact of contact will be made beforehand and a memorandum of conversation will be furnished in writing on an exclusive basis, following the contact.

137. Memorandum From Seymour Weiss of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State to the Staff Director (Cargo)¹

Washington, January 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSSM Process

In response to your request, the following three examples illustrate in varying ways how the NSSM process might be adjusted to secure a better result:

1) *NSSM 69—US Nuclear Policy in Asia*. The NSSM sought an analysis of a sensible nuclear strategy for the United States in Asia.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Subject Files: Lot 73 D 363, Review of NSSM Process. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to Hartman. Weiss' memorandum responded to a January 22 request from Cargo. In response to the same request, five other staff members also prepared memoranda reviewing the NSSM process, which are *ibid*.

However its terms of reference largely ignored the fact that a major, if not the major, determinant in such a strategy is the political context within which one might realistically anticipate that nuclear weapons might be used to secure US objectives. This failure, together with the assignment of the responsibility for Chairmanship to DOD, resulted in a study which, though launched in July of 1969, has yet to be completed! Draft, after draft, after draft, was produced each advancing no more forward than its predecessor in effectively analyzing the problem and the range of issues bearing on it. Eventually an ad hoc accommodation was worked out among State, OSD, JCS and the NSC staff, resulting in a study being produced. The resultant study still lacked cohesiveness and an integrated approach and was typified, quite literally, by agency footnotes to footnotes. Some discussion of the terms of reference before they were issued might just possibly have resulted in a better end product.

2. *NSSM 84—US Strategies and Forces for NATO*. Responsibility for chairing this study was again delegated to the Department of Defense, despite the fact that in this case the NSSM did recognize a number of the political variables which required analysis. The terms of reference and the subsequent procedures were deficient in the following respects: (a) not all or even necessarily the most important political implications were identified for analysis; (b) placing the chairmanship in Defense implied that the overriding concern and the ultimate focus of the study should appropriately be militarily rather than politically oriented; and (c) the nature of the studies themselves were extremely unrealistic. To amplify the last point, extensive war gaming type of analysis were included for the purpose of establishing a statistical measure of what was required for appropriate military strategy for NATO. These efforts were voluminous, time consuming, repetitious and in some measure duplicatory of work done in previous years, and in the end not productive of new insights. The single most important action on which a decision was needed dealt with the maintenance of US forces committed to NATO, and this decision emerged not from the NSSM 84 study but as a result of a memorandum from the Secretary to the President!

3. *NSSM 100—Military Cooperation with France*. This study, currently in process, was assigned to State, in this case appropriately recognizing the overriding political implications of the subject. Moreover such a study was needed and in all candor would probably not have been initiated by the Department. So far so good. The problem lay in interpreting what was desired. Literal reading of the terms of reference suggested a rather narrow focus on certain specific areas of cooperation, such as in R&D. In fact the study was accompanied by an oral interpretation suggesting that a broader approach was desired. Because of the room for confusion, State insisted that an NSC representative ac-

tually participate in the development of the study, a somewhat unusual procedure. This in fact resulted in three different NSC staff members participating at differing periods, each advancing a different interpretation of what was desired. Had there been an opportunity for a preliminary State–Defense–NSC staff discussion before the terms of reference were issued, some of the ensuing confusion might have been obviated.

138. Memorandum From John Negroponte of the National Security Council Planning Group to the Director of the Planning Group (Kennedy)¹

Washington, February 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Under Secretaries Committee

Introduction

In its 2 year existence, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee has put out some 91 U/SMs (analogous to our NSSMs). Topics covered have varied greatly. About 60 percent of them have been in what one might call the political/military category. Scientific and technical issues represent about 20 percent and economic ones the remaining 20 percent.

Following the terms of its original charter in NSDM 2,² the Committee's work has flowed mostly from matters referred to it by the NSC Review Group (now supplanted by the Senior Review Group) and matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger. The Secretary of State also has the authority to refer matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities overseas to the Committee, although he uses it sparingly.

Almost by definition, the Committee does not handle matters of major policy which require NSC or Presidential consideration. Thus while Dr. Kissinger is a standing member, he rarely attends its meetings. He is normally represented by a member of his staff.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential.

² Document 11.

NSC Staffing of the Under Secretaries Committee

Once a topic has been assigned, the Under Secretaries Committee staffs it by drawing on the resources of interdepartmental or ad hoc groups. NSC staff participation in the process is determined by functional specialization. Thus Behr will be responsible when science and technology is involved, Bergsten for economic matters, etcetera. The usual practice seems to be that staff members will follow the progress of a project using their own judgment as to when—if at all—Dr. Kissinger should be informed of how issues are developing.

Where guidance is required, it is usually requested in a memorandum analysing the problem and suggesting what is considered to be the appropriate guidance. When a meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee itself is in question there is sometimes a recommendation as to whether Dr. Kissinger himself should attend the meeting. My impression is that the recommendation cannot help but be influenced by the knowledge that Dr. Kissinger normally prefers not to attend.

Problem Areas

There appear to be no dramatic difficulties with respect to the Under Secretaries Committee. Some problem areas are worth signalling:

1. Substance of the Committee's Work

There are occasional complaints that the kind of work assigned to the Committee is not important enough and that it is simply a sort of catch-all for problems other elements of the NSC system do not want to deal with.

Despite these occasional grumblings, my impression from talking to Art Hartman was that this is not a serious bone of contention at this time. The Committee accepts its role and the kind of work it is doing. And if it has any concrete proposals for altering the substance of its work in any way, Hartman did not mention or infer them to me.

As far as the NSC is concerned, I can see no compelling reason for any change in the kind of work delegated to the Committee.

2. Duplication of Effort

In a way there is a built-in check against duplication of effort since much of the staff work done by the Under Secretaries Committee is accomplished by the same people who staff other constituent parts of the NSC. There are, however, occasional instances where a new NSSM will appear to duplicate efforts planned or underway in the Committee. NSSM 112³ on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in future

³ NSSM 112, "U.S. Post-Vietnam Policy on Use of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War," January 15, 1971. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-179, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 112.)

wars is one such example. This NSSM was issued at just the same time as the Under Secretaries Committee was about to recommend a similar study. (There is a background to this and the issuance of the NSSM may have been inevitable.)

What the NSSM 112 experience does suggest is that before a NSSM is issued we be doubly sure that it does not cross wires with projects planned or under way and which might adequately be handled elsewhere. Any decision to cross wires like this should at least be made consciously and not inadvertently.

One way to handle this would be to require that in submitting draft NSSMs, staff officers attach a listing of similar high-level studies being conducted elsewhere in the government and, where it seems appropriate, an explanation why these studies would not serve the purposes of the contemplated NSSM.

3. Systematic Staffing

The present NSC staffing of the Under Secretaries Committee appears to have no major shortcomings. Principal problems would appear to relate to the demands on Dr. Kissinger's own time. Since he cannot attend as many meetings as some would like, it is important that he at least have time to focus on the relevant papers and be properly represented at the meetings.

It is perhaps not wise to set out too elaborate or rigid a mechanism for staffing the Committee. The present informal system appears to be working fairly well and any excessively formalized procedures might end up being honored in the breach.

However, it might be worth considering establishment of a few ground rules which, if approved, could be circulated to the staff in the form of a memorandum. Among the points we would want to make would be the following.

1. Dr. Kissinger is interested in being kept informed of important developments in the work of the Under Secretaries Committee.

2. Staff officers should continue their practice of summarizing issues to be discussed at Committee meetings and, where appropriate, recommend what position we should take on them. There should also be a recommendation as to whether or not he should attend the meeting. Briefing papers of this kind should reach Dr. Kissinger's office a week before the scheduled meeting.

3. In the event Dr. Kissinger does not attend a scheduled Under Secretaries Committee meeting, representation from the NSC should be at the Senior Staff level.

4. The Council on International Economic Policy

Though not directly germane to this discussion, Art Hartman mentioned that the creation of this new council would involve a period of adjustment as we sort out which issues are handled where. This is something that will have to be worked out as time goes by, and will probably affect the work of the Under Secretaries Committee only slightly.

139. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, February 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

State–White House Clearance Procedures

In recent weeks a number of outgoing State cables, which have not been coordinated with the White House, in my view needed clearance in order to comply with the President's directives on clearance procedures. As you know, the President described his wishes concerning White House clearance in his Colorado Springs memorandum of September 1, 1969,² and reaffirmed them in his memorandum of December 21, 1970, Subject: "Disclosures of Classified Information and Coordination and Clearance of Official Statements."³ In both directives the President stated that, "Should there be any uncertainty as to Presidential or interdepartmental interests, it will be resolved in favor of clearance."

The following cables are examples of cables which appear to have violated the spirit of the President's instructions: State 209304 (Dec. 24); State 005063 (Jan. 12); State 005520 (Jan. 13); State 006930 (Jan. 14);⁴ State 007936 (Jan. 15); State 007497 (Jan. 15); State 007861 (Jan. 15); State 008169 (Jan. 17); State 016543 (Jan. 30) and State 016548 (Jan. 30). Many of these messages, undoubtedly, were dispatched without your being made aware of the clearance process followed. I noted, for example, that in the case of State 016543 you had only cleared the message in substance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the top of page 1 reads: "Dispatched by hand to Ted Eliot, 2-5-71."

² Document 70.

³ A copy is in the National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1970, Directive #154.

⁴ In a January 16 memorandum to Rogers which is attached to a January 16 cover note stating "Do not send! Hold per Gen Haig," Kissinger called Rogers' attention to the Presidential directives on White House clearance in light of telegram 006930 to Cairo: According to Kissinger, "a message to the Egyptian Foreign Minister repeated to six Ambassadors abroad as well as our Ambassador to the United Nations and authorizing the latter to show it to Ambassador Jarring by definition involves national policy and requires White House clearance under the provisions of the President's directives." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4)

I know that you share my interest in insuring adherence to the clearance and coordination procedures established by the President. In the future, if there is doubt as to White House interest or insufficient time for following formal procedures, I would welcome a phone call on outgoing cables dealing with policy issues.

Henry A. Kissinger

140. National Security Decision Memorandum 98¹

Washington, February 9, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Coordination of Foreign Affairs Research Sponsored by the Federal Government

The President has reviewed the report of the Ad Hoc Committee set up under the authority of the memorandum of May 28, 1969, to review present procedures for coordinating foreign affairs research sponsored by the Federal Government.² He considers that the report underscores the necessity for closer coordination of foreign affairs research to avoid duplication of effort and to enhance the quality and utility of the research project.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-222, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 98. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, and the Treasury; the Directors NSF, NASA, OEP, and OST; the Chairmen of AEC and the JCS; and the Administrator of AID.

² The May 28, 1969, memorandum and the Ad Hoc Committee report, forwarded to Kissinger by Cline under cover of an August 14, 1970, memorandum, are *ibid.* The committee recommended establishment of a new Interdepartmental Group for Foreign Affairs Research. In a 4-page memorandum to Kissinger, December 1, 1970, Smith and Kennedy summarized and evaluated the report, including DOD and ACDA dissent, and recommended that the President assign responsibility for interagency coordination of foreign affairs research to the Under Secretaries Committee, not a new IG. (*Ibid.*)

The President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee assume the responsibility for assuring interagency coordination of the external foreign affairs research sponsored by the departments and agencies in receipt of this Memorandum.³ In this connection, the Under Secretaries Committee is charged with coordinating the preparation of an annual foreign affairs consolidated research plan to be submitted for approval by the President. This plan should state group-wide and individual agency research goals and priorities, present a multi-year plan for regional and functional areas indicating agency responsibilities, and suggest joint funding of particular activities. It should be designed to avoid duplication and assure maximum interagency utility of the end product in terms of both content and availability. The Under Secretaries Committee also should make recommendations on related matters, including the state of in-house research programs and capabilities.

The Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee may establish an interagency subcommittee or working group, including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum as appropriate, to assist the Under Secretaries Committee in the discharge of this responsibility.

Those parts of the terms of reference proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the purpose, scope, membership, and functions of a coordinating body should be drawn upon by the Under Secretaries Committee as appropriate in carrying out its responsibilities.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ In response to a comment by Kissinger on their December 1 memorandum, Smith and Kennedy added the latter part of this sentence to the NSDM "to make clear that NSC-sponsored research in not included within the Under Secretaries Committee's scope of authority." (Memorandum from Smith and Kennedy to Kissinger, February 5; *ibid.*)

141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 10, 1971.

I have reviewed the cables referred to in your memorandum of February 5.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5. Secret; Eyes Only.

² Document 139.

The applicable part of the President's two directives to which you refer is that governing official communications, which states: "All official communications with policy implications must be cleared with the White House. When in doubt, the rule is that messages will be so cleared. . . ." ³

Early in the Administration I established procedures within the Department concerning clearances with the White House. These procedures fully accord with the President's memoranda of September 1, 1969⁴ and December 21, 1970.⁵ All of the cables mentioned in your memorandum were handled in accordance with these procedures. They do not in my view depart from policy established by the President, and I therefore do not consider that the question of policy implication arises.

William P. Rogers

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

⁴ Document 70.

⁵ A copy is in the National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1970, Directive #154.

142. Editorial Note

President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman and Secretary of State Rogers met for lunch in the 8th floor dining room of the Department of State on February 22, 1971, from 1:05 to 4:24 p.m. They were joined during the lunch by U. Alexis Johnson. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books)

In his diary entry for that day, Haldeman wrote the following: "I had a three hour lunch with Rogers, ostensibly for the purpose of discussing State Department personnel, which we did go into in considerable detail. It was clear, however, that Rogers' principal concern was to try to work out the Henry K problem, and he specifically asked for ways that he could direct communications to the P[resident] directly, rather than via Henry. Also wanted some help on trying to undo some of the operation of the NSSMs which have him concerned, as well as Mel Laird. Basically he is sincerely trying to do what he thinks is best for the P and, of course, so is Henry; but the two of them just stay on a collision course, and somehow we've got to figure out how to work it out. Henry caught me later and made it clear that his dissatisfaction is again reaching a peak also, so we have a lot to do." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

143. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 26, 1971.

We have now had over two years' experience with the NSSM system.

On the whole, I believe this system has served the President well. It has frequently presented him with opportunities to make key decisions based on a full range of opinions and facts. Moreover, I think the efficiency of the system has improved with experience.

I believe that the system could be further improved if there were consultation between us on the objectives, scope, timing, and action assignment of NSSMs before they are issued. I have in mind the desirability of precluding—or holding to the minimum—instances in which the preparation of studies might be delayed or made unnecessarily difficult by lack of a common appreciation of the purposes to be served and of the study approaches which might most effectively be employed. I also have in mind the usefulness of ensuring that the Under Secretaries Committee, within the limits of its responsibilities, shares fully in the total workload of the system.

I believe that the most practical means of consultation would be for you and me or Jack Irwin to discuss possible NSSMs and to agree beforehand on their central elements.

Such a procedure would be helpful in making the NSSM system even more useful to the President than it now is. Please let me have your reaction.²

William P. Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, Vol. X, 1 Dec 70–15 Apr 71. Confidential. Haig initialed the memorandum. Kennedy wrote at the top: "Rogers gangs up with Laird."

² Kennedy drafted a memorandum in response on March 1, revised it on March 5, and revised it again on March 9 after Kissinger commented: "Do it as a letter—as if it is something I don't have to do. I'll dictate." The final draft stated: "From time to time, once the President has decided on the topics which he wishes studied, I would hope to be able to discuss with you or Jack Irwin the specific requirements which certain NSSM's would lay out." The letter was apparently "OBE" (overtaken by events) and not sent, but an agreement was presumably reached (see, Document 155). Documentation on the response to Rogers' February 26 memorandum is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5; and *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974.

144. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)¹

Washington, March 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

DPRC

The DPRC has proven to be an important and worthwhile step in institutionalizing the role of State in the Defense budget process and in focusing the attention of senior officials on major Defense planning issues with fiscal or foreign policy implications. However, the performance of the DPRC has not matched our original expectations in many respects. I am particularly concerned that the working procedures within the DPRC are not contributing to the overall effectiveness of that organization and, in turn, limiting its usefulness to the President.

Among the positive contributions that the DPRC offers in the formulation of Defense policy are the following:

- Acts as a sounding board for top level ideas.
- Facilitates the exchange of information between Departments.
- Provides a vehicle for integrating, not just coordinating, various Defense programs.
- Helps to highlight crucial Defense problem areas for the President and informs him of various Department's views (ABM).
- Elicits concrete guidance from the President.

While the DPRC has provided a desirable forum for the exchange of ideas among the top echelons of the various USG agencies, its specific accomplishments have been limited. In analyzing the purpose and history of the DPRC the following problem areas are noted:

1. DOD drafts most of the papers considered by the DPRC with minimum consultation or opportunity for study by other members prior to meetings.
2. The DPRC Working Group is not used effectively. It meets infrequently and does not get involved in preparing papers for DPRC consideration.
3. The DPRC, itself, meets sporadically, and with an agenda that is put together on an ad hoc basis. This provides little opportunity for research of complex issues at lower levels prior to meetings.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Kissinger-Irwin Meetings. Secret with Top Secret attachment. Drafted by Robert Ainsworth of PM/ISP on March 2 and cleared by Leon Sloss (PM/ISP) and Weiss (S/PC).

4. There is no apparent follow-up on many of the issues raised. There is no pressure to get projects out and reported back to DPRC.

5. The organization is not used to review NSSMs as originally intended.

6. Normally, there is no conclusion reached or even substantive agreement on issues discussed. (Except ABM.)

7. While we have taken the initiative on several occasions to bring problems and proposals before the Committee for discussion, there might be a better, more structured way of focusing on key issues. At present, there is no prescribed way of getting issues before the DPRC, and no apparent agreement on what types of issues should be raised and who should be responsible for introducing these issues to the DPRC.

8. DOD appears reluctant to use the DPRC to review such considerations as force size and deployments. This is perhaps the most critical of all the problems facing the DPRC. Unless DOD opposition to the full and candid use of the DPRC in resolving the more difficult Defense questions can be overcome, no amount of improvement in the working procedures of the DPRC will help to make the organization an effective management tool for assisting the President.

I recognize that a number of practical problems contribute to this state of affairs, but I believe we can and should improve upon the present system in order to make it more responsive to the needs of the President and his advisors. The following suggestions are offered:

a. We should propose more interagency drafting of DPRC papers.
b. We should urge that drafts be discussed at the staff level before senior-level review in DOD.

c. We should urge more meetings of the DPRC Working Group.
d. We should recommend a regular schedule of recurring discussion topics over a given Fiscal Year to facilitate advanced planning and study (i.e., 5-Year Force and Program Plan).

e. We should obtain agreement as to types and the scope of issues to be raised at the DPRC and a set procedure for bringing these issues before the Committee for review. We feel the ideal would be to have DOD prepare the basic paper and turn it over to the Working Group who, in turn, would review the paper for the purpose of highlighting and focusing attention on the key issues prior to submission to the DPRC.

f. We should encourage the monthly dissemination of a DPRC Working Group Status Report which would provide a description of the issue under study, the individual(s) responsible for the study, the expected completion date for presentation to the DPRC, and scheduled meeting date(s) of the Working Group for the coming month.

Recommendation

I suggest that you discuss our concern about the DPRC and the above suggestions informally with Dr. Kissinger at one of your up-

coming luncheons.² We have reason to believe that he and his staff share many of the views noted above. If you wish, we would be happy to discuss these matters with you prior to such a meeting.

A brief review and analysis of the DPRC to date is attached.³

² Veliotis forwarded Spiers' memorandum to Irwin under cover of a March 15 memorandum in which he touched on the DPRC and three other topics for Irwin's March 16 lunch with Kissinger. Irwin returned the memorandum to Veliotis with a note next to the DPRC item stating: "not discussed. Give me back for next luncheon." (Ibid.) Kissinger and Irwin met for lunch on March 16 from 1:21 to 2:20 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76, Record of Schedule) No record of the discussion at the next luncheon has been found.

³ Attached but not printed. There is no indication of approval of the recommendation. To the right is written: "Ron agrees no discussion required."

145. Memorandum by the Assistant to the President (Haldeman)¹

Washington, April 16, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Legislative Coordination in National Security Affairs

The President has reestablished the White House Working Group and directed that this Group be responsible for supervision of Administration policy on legislative matters involving national security affairs.

The White House Working Group will carry out its responsibilities through the establishment of a Legislative Interdepartmental Group composed of representatives of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Counselor to the President for Congressional Relations.

¹ Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1971, Directive #89. No classification marking.

The LIG will meet fortnightly or more often as required.

Please designate your representative for the first meeting of the LIG by Tuesday, April 20. A meeting will be scheduled in the very near future.²

H.

² Minutes or summaries of conclusions for 10 LIG meetings during 1971 and 8 meetings during 1972 are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 301–302, Legislative Interdepartmental Group.

146. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 26, 1971.

Henry—

Attached are the NSSM's and projects under NSC auspices which include economic facets.² The first group has a specific economic component and the second group marginal economic facets. Each of the studies listed cannot be fragmented into its economic component without severely complicating the nature of the study and its overall processing. For this reason, I think it would be foolish to permit Peterson to have a free shot at this kind of essentially political and broadly based product.

I understand that Peterson's real problem is in developing specific agenda items for the Economic Council and in preparing his own NSSM's. In my view, we should invite his participation at the IG and working group level in the preparation of our studies, elicit his participation in the Review Group Meetings but under no circumstances jury-rig a special economic overview under his aegis which could seriously distort the development of broadly based policy studies.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (6), 3/30/70–4/21/71. Secret; Sensitive.

² Attached but not printed.

The development of appropriate study requirements for the Economic Council and for Peterson's shop does not appear to be an insurmountable one to me. There are a host of purely or primarily economic issues which might well be considered within Peterson's framework. These include the day-to-day actions of the type so frequently dealt with by Fred Bergsten—shoe imports, meat quotas, petroleum issues, etc. Our best bet here would be to join with Peterson, utilizing either Fred Bergsten or his successor to come up with an agreed target list of economic issues which should be considered by Peterson and the Economic Council. He should also develop a list of recommendations from the trade-oriented departments such as Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture. I think the quicker Peterson gets inundated in these kinds of issues, the more likely he is to avoid involvement in foreign policy-laden studies. If you agree, I will have Fred and Dick Kennedy meet with a member of Peterson's staff to:

1. Review our ongoing studies from the attached paper, making it clear that a breakout of the economic issues is not feasible but inviting their participation and comment on the studies, dependent on their current state of production.³

2. Assure Peterson that his participation in the Review Group Meeting is welcome.⁴

3. Assist Peterson's staff in developing a list of primarily economic issues for consideration within the Peterson framework.⁵

4. Suggest that Peterson solicit recommendations from Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture for future study limited to subject areas which are primarily economic in nature.⁶

5. Establish a formal system for regular coordination of NSC and economic related study efforts between Kennedy and Bergsten/his replacement and a designated member of Peterson's staff. (This should be done without your involvement until knotty issues arise.) Kennedy and Bergsten are preparing a memorandum for you on this subject which will flesh out the details of the problem.⁷

In addition to the foregoing problems which, regardless of the efficiency of our coordination and liaison with Peterson, will pose us with difficult jurisdictional questions, there is a fundamental issue which needs sorting out not only between the NSC and Peterson's staff but also within the NSC staff. I am speaking of responsibility for security assistance functions. The recently completed paper on Indonesia was done

³ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

⁴ Kissinger initialed his approval.

⁵ Kissinger initialed his disapproval and wrote: "That's his problem."

⁶ Kissinger initialed his approval.

⁷ Kissinger initialed his approval.

by Wayne Smith. In my view, it should have been done by John Holdridge, with assistance from Wayne's staff. Wayne has interpreted his principal role on the Indonesian paper as a charter for staff supremacy on all future internal security issues. I believe this has built-in frictions which cannot but work to your disadvantage and result in the alienation of the substantive officers who have specific geographic responsibility. I have thought about this long and hard and, as you know, have discussed ongoing frictions with both Wayne and Dick Kennedy. It is clear to me that with a charter that includes internal security, Wayne's staff will have primary responsibility for the large majority of policy issues which come to our attention. As you know, Wayne now carries the heaviest load on SALT, a large portion of the load on Vietnam and full shots at any issue which is primarily Defense-oriented. I know you are not interested in morale problems nor am I. However, I see no reason for carrying this one to the extreme by salting all the wounds among the operations staff. It seems to me in special cases you can use Wayne to do a job but as a full-time charter this is self-defeating. For this reason, I would recommend you let me promulgate to the staff that security assistance issues will normally be handled by the operators, that they will coordinate actions and obtain staff support from Wayne and that in special cases directed by you the Program Analysis staff will have primary responsibility for such action.⁸

⁸ Kissinger initialed his approval.

**147. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group,
National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, April 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

NSC Staff and CIEP Staff Responsibilities

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, Reorganization of the NSC System. Secret. Concurred in by Bergsten. Haig wrote a note to Kennedy at the top of page 1, "where do we stand." The memorandum is unsigned. An initialed copy is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77, Box 40, Administrative Files, National Security Council Organization (6), 3/30/70–4/21/71.

A review of the terms of reference of the CIEP and its subsidiary bodies (including the Operations Group)² evidences a clear overlap with the responsibilities of the NSC Staff and the NSC subsidiary bodies (including the Under Secretaries Committee). Specifically:

—The CIEP is to “Provide a clear top-level focus for the full range of international economic policy issues; deal with international economic policies—including trade, investment, balance of payments, finance—as a coherent whole; and consider the international economic aspects of essentially foreign policy issues, such as foreign aid and defense, under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council.”

—The Operations Group is responsible for follow up of decisions reached, coordination where necessary of government actions, and review of problems arising from actions of other governments or outstanding economic developments. The Operations Group “insofar as international economic policy is concerned” replaces the work of the Under Secretaries Committee.

The Problem

Clearly it will be difficult in many instances to separate those issues which are specifically the responsibility of the CIEP and those which have implications of concern within the NSC structure. Many issues, which on their face would seem to be primarily “international economic policy” questions, will have a high political or strategic interest. And many will have to be sorted out on an “Ad Hoc” basis.

It should not be too difficult, however, to distinguish from the outset between those issues which have a *broad policy character* and thus are essentially NSC issues and those which are *more narrowly focused* on trade and investment policies with an important but not overriding political content and thus are essentially CIEP issues. *But* there are a variety of economic issues, particularly those involving (1) cases in which the economic issue provides leverage in our relations with a country in respect to other issues, and (2) foreign aid and defense matters, which will be less easy to resolve unless there is a clear understanding from the beginning.

The Current Situation

Mr. Peterson has assumed responsibility for a broad range of issues clearly falling within the CIEP terms of reference. Even here, however, there are questionable areas which need to be examined:

—Specific commodity areas including textiles, shoes, sugar (and possibly the movie industry).

—International monetary problems.

—Trade and legislative strategy.

—Foreign investment policy (both by the U.S. abroad and by others in the U.S.).

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 49.

None of the foregoing would seem to be of primary interest to the NSC though obviously each has a foreign policy content and impact.

—Preferences—this one obviously has a high foreign policy impact as to our relations with Latin America and our relationships with the Europeans vis-à-vis their arrangements with third countries (e.g. Spain, the French, and others with North Africa, etc.).

—East-West Trade—the question here could be as much political as economic and within the government a strong strategic argument will be raised inevitably by Defense and probably CIA.

—Balance of Payments—this issue may be one of the most knotty we will have to face in the next couple of years. Clearly it transcends military and purely foreign policy issues *but* it cannot help but involve to a major extent foreign aid (both military and economic), offset arrangements, and the costs of military deployments overseas. Moreover, the whole question of military sales (already raised by Mr. Laird with you) will impact heavily in this area. There is a highly important security content to this issue.

—Plans for major international initiatives (in international economic policy)—until one sees the nature of the initiatives the relationship with NSC actions cannot be defined.

There are a number of ongoing studies within the NSC structure which have economic content of varying degrees (Tab A).³ None of these, however, is *primarily* an economic study. Most fall within the range of broad policy studies in which there is an important economic element. Only three would *seem* suitable for transfer to the primary concern of the CIEP:

—USC Study of Caribbean Bauxite (this study was initiated primarily because of Defense's interests in the strategic implications of nationalization of assets in the area).

—USC Study of the Pan American Highway (this one is of direct interest to the President, has some security interest, and has a high political content).

—USC Study of the Ecuador–Chile–Peru Fisheries problem (this study is completed and is of course directly related to the entire Law of Sea and Oceans Policy question).

Thus none of the ongoing studies would seem appropriate for “turnover to the CIEP.” We should initiate coordination, however, to assure that the CIEP staff's interests are appropriately reflected (as has been done in the case of NSSM 122—Japan Study).

The Options

The choices for dealing with the basic issues seem to boil down to:

³ Attached but not printed. With the exception of one added item, the list is the same as that referenced in footnote 2, Document 146.

For Broad Policy Studies

—Make the CIEP responsible for all economic issues to be dealt with in separate papers and merged at the White House level, or

—Continue to have these studies done through the NSC-IG process with discussion of economic issues prepared with Mr. Peterson's participation.

—The *first* option would put the CIEP staff in on the ground floor in a controlling way on economic issues. (Presumably Mr. Peterson would not wish to become involved himself at the working level.) *But* it would have the serious disadvantage that (as in the case of the Japan study) a rational look at the political and security questions can hardly be taken in isolation from the economic issues. Moreover, even if a way could be found to reasonably separate these interrelated matters in the study, the task of integrating the study at the White House level would be far more complicated (and thus unsatisfactory) than would a joint review performed by the NSC staff and the CIEP staff of a single coherent paper. The *second* option would keep control within the NSC framework but would involve Mr. Peterson in three ways:

—He would be represented in the development of the paper as to the economic issues, and

—The economic section would be developed primarily by the State Economic Bureau which provides the support now for the CIEP Operations Group (the CIEP Operations Group chairman is Nat Samuels; Phil Trezise acts for him in his absence.)

—Mr. Peterson could participate in the SRG meeting on the subject.

—The *second* option seems clearly preferable.

For AID and Defense Matters

—Here the issue is more complicated. We need now a clear understanding as to the extent to which the CIEP will involve itself in AID (both military and economic) and Defense matters.

—Economic aid is more complicated because of the formation of the two corporations. One of their prime objectives will be to complement the multilateralizing of most of our programs for development assistance. The difficulty will be in getting consideration of important foreign policy aspects.

—Security assistance has both economic and military components. Both certainly must continue to be primarily the responsibility of the NSC structure.

—MASF, and military programs involving major balance of payments questions (e.g. forces in Europe, offset, overseas bases), all clearly should continue to be the responsibility of the NSC structure but the CIEP charter gives them a major interest.

The *choices* are:

1. Retain primary responsibility for *all* aid (both development and security assistance) and defense issues with the NSC, coordinating appropriately at the White House level with the CIEP staff.

2. Retain the security assistance programs including both the economic and military components (and possibly also the humanitarian assistance program because it includes disaster relief) as the responsibility of the NSC structure, and make the development assistance program the responsibility of the CIEP.

3. Retain the security assistance program and all major country development programs (at least where these also involve security assistance as well) in the NSC structure, and make development *policy* the responsibility of the CIEP.

There is no simple and wholly satisfactory way to deal with this problem. The *third* option, however, seems to make the most reasonable division. Each of the options would require the closest of cooperation at the White House level but the third retains for the NSC structure the essentially security oriented issues and most of those with a high foreign policy content. It also would retain for you the flexibility to develop country program budgets in some selected cases if you later wish to do so (Option 2 also would do this *but* only in cases where both security and development assistance were involved—India would not be included, for example). Mr. Peterson would be responsible for broad development policy but *not* for specific country programs.

In any case there will have to be CIEP representation during the program formulation process within the NSC structure and this should be manageable. A close liaison must be established between the CIEP staff and your regional operators in order that foreign policy guidance will be fed in on each issue. On aid matters this will be important in the case of either Option 3, and especially so in the case of Option 2.

148. H.R. Haldeman Diary Entry¹

Washington, May 19, 1971.

This was about a 99 percent SALT day, as we set the notification process in motion.² Henry met with Gerry Smith for breakfast at 8:30.

¹ Source: *The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*. “P” is the President and “K” is Kissinger.

² In anticipation of making a public announcement on May 20, Nixon and Kissinger notified Rogers and Gerard Smith, Director of ACDA, on May 19 that a breakthrough had been reached on SALT with the Soviets through a negotiating channel between

The P had Rogers in at 9:00, and they informed both of them. The P called me in at 10:20, also Henry was in, and reported on Rogers' reaction. The P had the feeling that there was very much of a problem, that Rogers' reaction was really almost no reaction at all, but he clearly had the feeling of wondering what was going on. While we were in talking about this and starting to lay plans for timing for tomorrow, Rogers asked me to be called out of the meeting with the P and asked me to come over to see him. I went back into the Oval Office; the P told me to go ahead and do it, to make the point to him that this wasn't a State Department matter, that it cuts across Departmental lines and is clearly the P's responsibility, and that it was not in the interests of anybody to inform anyone. In January, when he initiated the first letter, he expected nothing; when Dobrynin came back from the Party Congress, Rogers was gone and then it gelled fast. The P told me to be frank on the whole relationship with Rogers and to be tough. If Rogers got to a point of a very stiff objection, I should tell him to take whatever action he felt he had to take. He said to make the point that it was important that no one get any credit for this except the P. That K will background because it cuts across Departmental lines, but there will be no claim of credit; that's the mutual arrangement we've made with the Russians, and it has to be kept that way.

I then went over to the State Department, had about a hour with Rogers. He was clearly very upset. His basic point was "Why didn't you tell me that you were doing this? There's no need for me to be involved, but I do have to be informed." He made the point that both K and the P had promised him that they would not have any other further meetings with any Ambassadors, and particularly Dobrynin, without letting him know. He said he would bet a large amount that all the magazines would have a full report on the number of meetings K had with Dobrynin, etc. This would make him a laughingstock again; it destroys his effectiveness and credibility. For instance, at NATO everybody will know that he's not in on what's going on. He also made it clear that he's hurt and raised the question of whether the P's sending him a signal; if so, he'll go. I didn't really respond to that. He said he just didn't know what to do. He did want the P to know his feelings.

Washington and Moscow that was completely independent of the official diplomatic talks and unknown either to Rogers or Smith. Kissinger commented in *White House Years*, p. 819, that the successful backchannel negotiations "gave Nixon considerable anguish, for he would now have to tell his Secretary of State that negotiations had been going on for months without his knowledge and were on the verge of being consummated by a formal announcement."

He then interjected that he thinks it's a great development and he's all for it, but then he went on to say how can he explain it to Congress. He was particularly disturbed because the P told him that he was going to inform Smith this afternoon, but as soon as Rogers got back to the State Department, Smith came in and Rogers learned that he had breakfast with Henry and was told before Rogers was. Smith said to Bill that he was sorry about the whole thing and that he wanted Bill to know he didn't have anything to do with it. Bill said if there's any leak on any of this it will be from the White House, because no one at State knows anything about it. He returned the secret letters, so that he could say he didn't have them. He made the point that if the P doesn't trust him, he can't do his work. He was very clearly upset. He didn't buy my explanation regarding the cutting across Party lines, and so forth. He didn't buy my point that Dulles and Eisenhower dealt this way, that Eisenhower dealt directly with the Soviets because he said Dulles always knew what Eisenhower was doing. He very clearly resents K; he asked how many meetings Henry had with Dobrynin and whether there were memos of conversation. He claims he's fully posted Henry on everything that he's done, but is not being posted by Henry. This is in direct opposition to what Henry says, and I raised that and Bill got quite distressed.

To sum it up: it was clear he was very worried about the short-term impact on his own image and hadn't yet figured out the long-term implications.

When I got back to the office he called, saying he had been thinking about it, and it was clear that we should develop a Party line as to how this all transpired. He wanted to know what the P wants to say regarding who was involved, and so forth. I then went back into the P's office and reported all of this to him, after which he had Henry come in and we discussed it some more, particularly the point of establishing the line. The P said that first I should remind Rogers about the fact that in January the P had told him that he was going to send a letter. He told Rogers he doesn't trust Gerry Smith or the SALT group, and therefore in order to break the deadlock, he might send a message or write a letter to see if he could get something going; he would do this on his own. He said that I should make the point strongly that our line is that this is a Presidential initiative, that we will not discuss the details of how it was accomplished; we won't let anyone describe the process. We don't want any puffing, because it was a mutual thing with the Russians. The point is the P broke the deadlock, and then it was implemented at the appropriate levels in the government. It's not in our interests to indicate what the negotiations were. He told me to point out to Bill that as a matter of fact, Rogers was the only one to know anything about this ahead of time, and therefore, he's being oversensitive. He said that after his letter early

this year, nothing gelled except garbage until the Monday after Rogers had left for Europe, when Dobrynin came back from the Party Congress and took exactly the line the P had offered in January and that the Russians had earlier refused. If Bill's asked whether he was involved, he should say we won't disclose any details of the negotiation, but he can say he was informed. Also he can make the point that the position was, of course, well worked out with the NSC and all concerned ahead of time, and the P stated his position in a press conference.

The P then had me go out and call Rogers and give him that line. In the meantime, Rogers had put a call in to the P; so I called Bill, filled him in on this, and then the P returned his call and had a pretty good chat with him. Made the point that he wanted Bill to call Mansfield and tell him, before the vote, that this was coming up, not in specific terms but an important development, but that the P was holding off on notifying anyone or calling a leaders meeting until after the vote, because he didn't want to appear to be trying to affect the vote. Right after he hung up from that call, Ziegler came in, and the P, as he hung up, heaved a deep sigh, looked out the window and said it would be goddamn easy to run this office if you didn't have to deal with people.

Later this afternoon, he had Ziegler in for discussion with K on how to handle the basic line and the announcement. They went over some wording on how to open the P's announcement. That was at 4:00, and at 4:40, he had Ziegler, Scali, K and me in to review the line Henry's going to use in his briefings. It was really pretty funny because he kept telling Henry to go ahead and tell him what he was going to say, and then every time Henry would start a sentence, the P would interrupt him to tell him what he should say. He made the point that Henry must not discuss at all how it happened, not one word in any of his sessions. He should describe the nature of the breakthrough, that the negotiations were stalemated because the Soviets had limited it only to defensive weapons, and that we've insisted that it include offensive weapons, as the P had pointed out in several press conferences. He then should say that as a result of negotiations involving the highest levels of both governments, there has been a break and that we are now able to move ahead with simultaneous negotiations in offensive and defensive weapons. There is already a lot of substantive work done, and this is a chance to give a pat to the SALT team, etc.

We got into considerable discussions on timing of the various briefing meetings and locale for the P's announcement. We ended up doing it in the press room as originally planned, with a Cabinet meeting at 9:00 and a leaders meeting at 10:00.

The other big thing for today was the Mansfield vote,³ which started in the afternoon with a resounding defeat for the Nelson Amendment, which was the first one up and was the compromise that they'd all agreed to back, but it lost very heavily. Then as the afternoon went on, they got into debate and then started moving into the other amendments, which went on into the night, all of them losing by substantial margins, which of course, pleased the P greatly. At one point after the Mathias Amendment, which was supposed to be the crucial one but which lost 73–24, the P was going to call Cooper—because he and Rogers had been working on Cooper—to thank him. I suggested he not do it until we get the final vote on Mansfield, which he agreed to, and that was a lucky thing because it turned out after we got the tally that Cooper had voted with Mathias; so it would have been singularly inappropriate to have called and thanked him at that particular point. The final vote on the Mansfield Amendment came through at 10:30, and we won it 61–36, which was a much stronger vote than we expected. So we came out extremely well.

³ A reference to the Mansfield amendment calling for a reduction in U.S. troops in Europe, which was rejected by the Senate on May 19 in a 36–61 roll-call vote.

149. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 24, 1971.

Henry:

Wayne Smith continues to raise the country programming issue. You signed the memorandum to the President² but had reservations about it due to inter-departmental sensitivity, and wanted to think about it before forwarding it to the President. There was no good opportunity to discuss it last week due to your schedule. I have been

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Reference is to the joint memorandum to the President from Shultz and Kissinger drafted by Smith. See footnote 9, Document 132.

holding the memorandum, as you directed, pending a careful analysis of where we were going.

There will be considerable resistance to this NSDM from State, Defense and probably AID. As you know, George Shultz has already signed the memorandum which can be dated today and forwarded to the President tomorrow, if you so determine. My main concern is that our substantive officers and the departments may feel somewhat usurped by the action. It would also put Smith's staff into the guts of the operators' cabbage patch. This does not bother me in the least but will generate some friction. The main benefit of the exercise which appears to me to be overriding is that you will have a systems analyst's approach focused on selected countries. This cannot hurt and should only help our overall appreciation of the needs of the countries and the extent of our efforts in each.

The one key problem at hand is that Rogers may resent your not coordinating the decision memorandum with him. He will know that it was cooked up between your office and Shultz and may claim foul. The only option would be to have Kennedy or Smith discuss it beforehand with Rogers, or you may wish to raise it with him during your meeting tomorrow.

Decision

Send directly to the President³

Send to the President after I discuss with Rogers tomorrow

Send to the President after having Kennedy/Smith coordinate with State

Hold up on the issue

AH

³ Kissinger initialed this option. Haig wrote in the left-hand margin: "date today & send." The memorandum is Document 150.

150. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Shultz) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Programming

Problem

A critical determinant of the success of our national security and foreign policies is the effectiveness with which we integrate the policies and programs in key countries such as South Vietnam, Jordan, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and Cambodia. These are the countries where the Nixon Doctrine will succeed or fail. They play pivotal roles in the balance of power in their regions.

These countries have the fullest U.S. involvement, encompassing in most cases a U.S. force presence, a large military assistance program, and economic development and supporting assistance programs, in addition to the usual U.S. trade, educational, cultural, and information efforts.

Despite the importance of these countries to our foreign policy objectives:

—*We lack an overview of all of our programs in these countries.* Our programs are often not consistent with our primary policy goals. In Thailand, for instance, a recent country programming effort found that, despite the Nixon Doctrine, as U.S. forces withdraw, our total assistance to the Thai was scheduled to decline. No one (except the Thai) had added up the total of our effort.

—*Our programs are fragmented and often contradictory.* We found recently that our PL 480 rice sales to Indonesia to stabilize its economy had all but pre-empted Thailand's traditional export market. Thus, while we had an economic development program in Thailand, it was more than offset by the effect of low rice prices (caused in part by our rice exports to Indonesia) on Thai rural incomes.

—*There is little attempt to make program trade-offs.* It takes major bureaucratic surgery to obtain \$10 million a year for three Thai special guerrilla units, yet a 10% cutback in U.S. fast-moving jet sorties for one month would save \$10 million. It is always easier to spend money on our own forces than on someone else's. The key aspect of the Nixon Doctrine is how best to develop local capabilities to substitute for U.S. capabilities, but our options are rarely presented in such trade-off terms.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

Country Programming

We have worked on these problems on an ad hoc basis from the beginning of your Administration. For example, the Korea study was a path-breaking effort to develop explicit options on possible trade-offs between U.S. forces and local forces assisted by military and economic assistance.

From our programming experience with Korea, Cambodia, Thailand and aspects of our effort in Vietnam, we have developed a *country* programming approach to the problems cited above. Country programming:

—pulls together in one presentation all major U.S. and U.S.-supported programs related to a particular country allowing one to view both the totality of our effort and its major thrusts in relation to our objectives;

—permits analysis of key program trade-offs, for example, between U.S. and local forces;

—facilitates the development of options on central issues such as: (a) assistance for economic growth versus assistance for stabilization (Indonesia), (b) ground versus air interdiction in South Laos, and (c) balanced local air/ground/navy forces versus local force specialization (e.g., in ground forces) complemented by U.S. (air and naval) forces.

We are recommending that you approve the implementation of a country programming effort limited to a short list of key countries. Such an effort would enable the highest levels of this Administration to give attention to the problems identified above in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, India, Indonesia, and Jordan. (These are the obvious candidates, although the list could be modified at the initiative of State, Defense or CIA.)

For these countries, before FY 1973 budget decisions are made, a Country Programming Memorandum (CPM) would be completed and submitted to the Senior Review Group and, if necessary, to you for final decision.

The CPM would be prepared under the technical direction of the NSC and OMB staffs. It would be developed by an inter-agency committee chaired by the agency with major program responsibility in the particular country. This set up would insure that State and DOD have the fullest opportunity to exercise leadership of these studies within the NSC system.

At Tab A is a proposed NSDM to implement the country programming effort we have outlined.²

² Attached but not printed.

We believe that the country programming effort just described will play a vital role in the strengthening the basis for decisions on national security affairs and that it should be undertaken as soon as possible.

Recommendation

That you authorize the issuance of the NSDM at Tab A.³

Henry A. Kissinger
George P. Shultz

³ The President initialed his approval. The memorandum is attached to a note card on which Kissinger wrote: "We ought to make clear who gets the chairmanship of the first countries in directive to ease gas pains. Perhaps separate directive." In a June 7 memorandum to Kissinger, Smith submitted a revised NSDM for Kissinger's signature and a "supplementary memorandum" which, according to Smith, "attempts to avoid ill-feeling in State by stressing State's responsibilities while placing the exercise fully in the NSC system" and "reduces agency resistance by stressing that the CPMs will deal with a few policy issues and not with the details of individual programs." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112) Kissinger signed both documents (see Document 151).

151. National Security Decision Memorandum 112¹

Washington, June 10, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs

SUBJECT

Country Programming

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. NSDM 112 was reissued on August 24 with revisions noted in footnotes 2 and 3 below. (Ibid.) Agreement between NSC and State on the revisions was finally reached on August 19 following two months of discussions within and among State, NSC, and DOD that are documented in Documents 152, 155–157, and 160–162.

The President has directed the preparation annually of Country Programming Memoranda (CPMs) encompassing all U.S. and U.S.-related programs in selected countries.

These CPMs will be prepared for the Senior Review Group and serve as the basis for: (a) decisions on the key program issues including trade-offs among programs, (b) final budget decisions for the upcoming fiscal year, and (c) periodic country program reviews as dictated by developments throughout the budget year.

The focus of the CPMs will be on key program alternatives and policy issues attendant to the choice and mix of programs, particularly alternatives for the upcoming fiscal year. Analysis of the effects of alternatives will be summarized. The CPMs will include summaries of each major program category with analysis of past and current programs using a program budget. Agency and Mission views and preferred programs will be indicated. Sensitive programs will be examined in a separate annex.

Overall direction of the development of the CPMs and the analysis therein will be the responsibility of the CPM Working Group, chaired by the NSC Director for Program Analysis and including the senior program officer of each addressee.

The development of individual CPMs and the analysis therein will be the responsibility of interagency CPM committees for each country chaired by the Department of State, or the Department of Defense where its programs are exceptionally important.²

Completed CPMs will be submitted to the Chairman of the SRG with a copy to the Director of OMB.

After final review by the SRG and decision by the President, major and significant departures from the CPM plan, either as a result of actions by the Administration and the Congress or as a result of negotiation and the implementation of the program, will be submitted by the responsible agency as an amendment to the CPM for review by the SRG and approval by the President as necessary.

² The final 11 words in this paragraph were omitted from the revised NSDM 112 issued on August 24. Kissinger's accompanying memorandum (see footnote 3, Document 150) was also revised. His June 10 memorandum stated that "the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of Defense, should select a single individual chairman of each of the CPM inter-agency committees dealing with a specific country. Where indicated by the importance of Defense programs in the country, the nature of issues involved, and the availability of personnel, the chairman should be from the Department of Defense." Kissinger's August 24 memorandum accompanying the revised NSDM 112 omitted the second sentence. Both memoranda and the revised NSDM 112 are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112.

OMB and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs will be members of the SRG when it considers CPMs or CPM amendments.

The countries tentatively selected for full FY 1973 CPM preparation are: South Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, India, Jordan, Indonesia, and Cambodia.³

For FY 1972 new program initiatives or significant program changes in already planned and approved programs for the CPM countries will be submitted to the Chairman of the SRG for possible consideration in accordance with the procedures of this NSDM.

For non-CPM countries, substantive and budget issues for decision pertaining to economic assistance and PL 480 will be handled in accordance with existing procedures as outlined in NSDM 10. Other issues for decision in the case of these non-CPM countries including those involving security assistance will be handled in accordance with existing interagency procedures.

NSDM 4 (revised September 4, 1969) and NSSM 77 (October 8, 1969)⁴ are hereby rescinded.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ In the revised NSDM 112 this and the following paragraphs were restated as follows: "The countries tentatively selected for full FY 1974 CPM preparation are: Thailand and Cambodia. Additional countries may be selected for country programming studies for FY 1974 and succeeding years. The FY 1974 Country Program studies will be completed by June 30, 1972, and after approval of the CPM will constitute guidance for development of the Security Assistance Program and other U.S. programs for the countries concerned." (Ibid.)

⁴ Documents 71 and 78.

152. Editorial Note

The following exchanges between President Nixon and his assistant H.R. Haldeman took place in the Oval Office on June 12, 1971, sometime between 11:19 and 11:50 a.m.

"Haldeman (reporting on Attorney General John Mitchell's views on dealing with Israel): He says the problem is that there's no one in the White House, nobody looking at it for the President. He thinks you've got to get someone to monitor it for you, not let Rogers make foreign policy in this area, which is what in effect—

“President: He doesn’t make foreign policy in any area, does he?”

“Haldeman: Basically no. And then John would argue that. He says Rogers should not. You know—the President should not allow foreign policy in any area.

“President: Well, foreign policy, the Secretary of State, Bob, does make foreign policy in other administrations. That’s the problem.”

And then shortly thereafter:

“Haldeman: What you’ve go to look at is that with you as President—this is different with other Presidents—with you as President—

“President: Nobody else can run the foreign policy.

“Haldeman: The Secretary of State should be a man who, a staff man to the President on foreign policy, not the competitor.

“President: Basically the difficulty is [Dean] Rusk was not the right kind of a foreign secretary for Johnson—

“Haldeman: He’s superb for you.

“President: Because he didn’t tell Johnson. He let Johnson be off and state his own view. Rusk would be perfect for me because he’d do what the hell I said. He’d argue but then he’d go out and do it, loyally.

“Haldeman: So would Eliot Richardson.

“President: Oh, Eliot Richardson is great.

“Haldeman: Because he can function as a staff man to you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, June 12, 1971, 11:19–11:50 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 518–6)

153. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 12, 1971.

Attached are the NSDM (Tab A)² and Henry’s explanatory memo (Tab B)³ on “country programming” which I mentioned to you on the phone.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2. Confidential; Eyes Only.

² Document 151.

³ Attached at Tab B but not printed is the country programming memorandum, dated June 10; see footnote 3, Document 150, and footnote 2, Document 151.

There was no advance consultation with anyone in the Department on these instructions. I have confirmed that fact with Jack Irwin, Alex Johnson, Ron Spiers and Bill Cargo.

All of us are agreed that this instruction cuts across what we are doing, at the President's direction, to establish and obtain legislative authority for a coordinator for Security Assistance at the Under Secretary level in the Department.⁴ In fact the system outlined in Henry's memo would appear to have the Coordinator report to one of Henry's staff.

We all also have doubts that the NSC staff will be able to cope with this system. It was unable to cope with a similar, less ambitious effort last year.

The new system also appears to be an attempt to give DOD greater authority than it received when the President decided in favor of the security assistance coordinator (Tab C).⁵ For example, DOD would chair coordinating program committees for certain key countries.

The real issue, it seems to me, is whether the Secretary of State or the NSC staff will coordinate resource allocations and ultimately foreign assistance operations.

Jack Irwin thinks you may want to sound out Secretary Laird to determine whether he favors (or stimulated) Henry's memos or would join with you in first trying to make the new Presidentially approved system at Tab C work.

Both Jack and I believe also that this can be sorted out only by you with the President. In the meantime, as you requested, I am telling Haig that we regret we were not consulted on the new memos, that we have serious substantive and legislative problems with them and that at your instructions I am taking no action on them pending further consultations.

Talking points for you are at Tab D.⁶

TE

⁴ Based on a study of security assistance prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee, Irwin proposed to Rogers in a January 21 memorandum that a coordinator for security assistance be established within the Department "who would be responsible for day-to-day policy guidance and review, planning, program development and Congressional presentation of security assistance programs." Rogers approved moving ahead with the proposal on February 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, Management Subject Files: Lot 76 D 235, Stevenson-Macomber Letter—Org of Security Assistance Programs).

⁵ Attached at Tab C but not printed is Kissinger's March 25 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Irwin.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

154. Editorial Note

On June 13, 1971, *The New York Times* began publishing a series of articles based on the "Pentagon Papers," the Department of Defense's top secret history of U.S. policy-making in Vietnam from World War II to 1968. The study, most of which Daniel Ellsberg leaked to the *Times*, included several thousand pages of Department of Defense, Department of State, White House, and Central Intelligence Agency documents. The following exchange took place during a telephone conversation on June 13 in which Alexander Haig, the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, briefed President Nixon on the "Pentagon Papers":

"H[aig]: It's the most incredible thing. All of the White House papers; Rostow papers; communications with the ambassadors; JCS studies.

"P[resident]: We have been more careful, haven't we? We have kept a lot from State, I know, and enough from Defense.

"H: Your White House papers are in very good shape.

"P: That's why we don't tell them anything." (Transcript of telephone conversation; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Haig Chronological File, Box 998, Haig Telcons—1971)

155. Memorandum From the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 21, 1971.

You will recall that on June 10 Mr. Kissinger issued NSDM 112 regarding country programming (Tab A)² and an explanatory memorandum of the NSDM (Tab B).³ Ted established that this had been issued without any advance consultation with us, and even though it was a NSDM instead of a NSSM, felt that the instruction cut across what we were doing here, at the President's direction, to establish a

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 2. Confidential; Eyes Only. Rogers wrote at the top of the memorandum: "Bob—Where do we stand on this?"

² Document 151.

³ Attached but not printed.

coordinator for security assistance at the Under Secretary level. On June 12 Ted spoke to General Haig and said that he regretted we were not consulted, that we had serious substantive and legislative problems with this, and that we were taking no further action pending further consultation. General Haig subsequently called Ted back and said that Mr. Kissinger agreed that this inter-agency consultation should be done and that all addressees would be informed not to implement NSDM 112 until after this consultation had been completed.

This morning, at Mr. Irwin's suggestion, I informed Colonel Kennedy (who is sitting in for General Haig) that you regarded NSDM 112 as covered by your agreement with Mr. Kissinger⁴ and that the Department would take no further action on it unless they wished to discuss the matter with you. Colonel Kennedy called me this afternoon to say that Dr. Kissinger understood his agreement to refer to Interdepartmental Groups and such matters and not this specific matter (which is a NSDM rather than a NSSM). I reiterated that Henry should call you.

I assume Mr. Kissinger may be calling you on this, and have included at Tab C⁵ the main reasons why NSDM 112 as it now stands is objectionable to us.

RCB

⁴ See Document 143.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

156. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 23, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Program Memoranda (NSDM-112)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 112. Confidential. Sent for information.

Secretary Laird has responded enthusiastically to the Country Programming NSDM (112)² and your accompanying memo. His memorandum (at Tab A)³ makes the following points:

—CPMs can be a “most significant step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.”

—CPMs options offer an opportunity to mesh U.S. force planning and aid budget decisions.

—DOD has a major contribution to make to all seven proposed CPMs except India, and DOD would like to chair the CPM committees on Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Korea where U.S. support of increased local defensive strength will directly impact on planning of U.S. force levels, overseas deployment and DOD budget requirements.

Comment: While DOD’s enthusiasm for what it may see as the opportunity to win back from State some measure of control over security assistance planning is the other side of the coin of State’s disinterest, DOD interest in country programming is genuine (although of recent origin with Secretary Laird), and DOD has demonstrated a greater capacity (in OSD/SA and JCS) to do country programming than State has shown.

In the meantime, the longer State continues to oppose implementation of NSDM-112 the more difficult it will be to do seven major CPMs by the budget deadline.

My understanding is that Colonel Kennedy is trying to work out an arrangement that will accommodate State’s objections within the general framework established in the NSDM. If a compromise can’t be worked out, I have no doubts that the analysis will not be done and that the country will be the real loser in this fight over bureaucratic prerogatives. You will want to assess this situation by July 1st and possibly consider other alternatives. A formal reply to Laird’s memo can await that assessment.

² Document 151.

³ Laird’s June 21 memorandum is attached but not printed.

157. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)¹

I-8821/71

Washington, June 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Country Program Memoranda (CPMs)—NSDM 112

In a 21 June memorandum to Mr. Kissinger (Tab A),² the Secretary strongly endorsed the President's decision (NSDM 112, Tab B)³ to establish a new system for comprehensive review of US policies and programs in key foreign countries. On 17 June the NSDM was withdrawn pending its revision, apparently at State's insistence. We understand State's objection is based on the position that the Coordinator for Security Assistance, rather than the NSC Director for Program Analysis should head any CPM mechanism that is established. (However, State may be split, with some elements arguing that since the CPMs are intended to deal with the spectrum of US relations with and programs in various countries, the geographic bureaus in State should take the lead, through the IGs, in preparing the CPMs for senior level consideration.)

NSDM 112, in our view, would:

- provide for thorough analysis of long-term US objectives as well as current and future programs in selected countries in the new context of the President's national security strategy and our defense strategy of realistic deterrence;
- provide for systematic channeling of basic policy issues regarding these countries through the SRG to the President for decision;
- provide DOD substantial assurance that US defense interests were given appropriate weight in options on US security and other aid to key friends and allies;
- by channeling key country foreign aid options to the President through the SRG, probably lead to overall Security Assistance Program options following the same route in the November–December budget review, as opposed to their being framed by the new State Department Coordinator for Security Assistance.

I anticipate that Mr. Kissinger will discuss the NSDM with State this week. In view of the importance to DOD of the issues at stake here,

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330 OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 74 040, NSC June 1971. Confidential.

² See Document 156.

³ Document 151.

I recommend that you phone Mr. Kissinger early in the week, refer to the Secretary's 21 June memorandum and underline DOD's concerns on the following points:

—The interagency CPM approach to reviewing US policies toward critical foreign countries is a sound one and the NSC machinery—particularly the SRG—is well suited to the task of coordinating the country reviews.

—The schedule for completion of the CPMs should be adhered to in order to permit careful review and policy decisions prior to the FY 73 budget decisions. This will require expeditious reissuance of the NSDM.

—Particularly as a consequence of actions in train to implement the concept of total force planning in the FY 73–77 Defense PPB cycle, we would expect to make a major contribution to the CPMs for six of the seven countries selected for review.

—As Secretary Laird stated in his 21 June memorandum, we believe DOD should chair at least the CPM committees for South Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Korea.

G. Warren Nutter

158. Memorandum by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 20, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

The President has directed that Departments and Agencies concerned refrain from commenting on the implications of his July 15, 1971 announcement concerning the People's Republic of China.² This directive applies to both on the record and background statements as

¹ Source: National Security Council, Secretariat, Directives, 1971, Directive #89. Confidential. A copy was sent to Moorer.

² For text of the President's remarks to the nation announcing acceptance of an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820. Nixon visited the People's Public of China February 21–28, 1972.

well as to inquiries within official and diplomatic channels. In those instances where it is considered that substantive statements must be made, he has asked that such statements be cleared with him through the office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Henry A. Kissinger³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

159. Editorial Note

According to a study prepared in 1991 by the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970 to June 1974, “concluded that the Nixon–Kissinger approach was to ‘divide and conquer’ the bureaucracy by selectively withholding information. To overcome it, Zumwalt related years later, he resorted to (1) occasional private lunches with Dr. Kissinger, (2) assigning carefully chosen lieutenants to serve as Kissinger’s aides, and (3) frequent meetings with Admiral Welander and his predecessor [in the JCS liaison office at the National Security Council], Rear Admiral Rembrandt Robinson. General Alexander M. Haig, who was Dr. Kissinger’s Deputy, performed a similar service for General Westmoreland.” The quoted passage is footnoted as follows: “Written comment by ADM Zumwalt on draft manuscript, 12 Apr 90.” (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume X: 1969–1972*, page 9)

**160. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Under Secretaries
Committee (Irwin)¹**

NSC-U/DM 71

Washington, August 5, 1971.

TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary of Treasury
The Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Establishment of Security Assistance Program Review Committee

In order to advise and assist the Secretary of State in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities for the Security Assistance Program, I believe we should establish an interagency group to be designated the Security Assistance Program Review Committee. Under existing delegations of authority from the Secretary of State, I will serve as Executive Chairman of the Committee until passage of the pending legislation and the formal appointment of the Coordinator for Security Assistance in the Department of State.

The Committee will operate under the following terms of reference in advising and assisting the Chairman:

—to review FY 1973 country² program plans and make recommendations for approval or changes.

—to make recommendations on all outstanding policy issues involving Security Assistance goals and objectives, resource allocation and proposed budgetary levels.

—to provide guidance for such post-FY 1973 planning efforts as may be required to insure effective cooperation and coordination among participating agencies.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 112. Confidential. The memorandum was rescinded and a revised memorandum issued on August 20. (Ibid.) The revisions, proposed to Rogers by Haig in an August 16 memorandum (ibid.) and agreed to on August 19 (see Document 162), are noted in footnotes 2 and 3.

² In the revised memorandum the words "security assistance" were added after "country."

—to prepare a recommended FY 1973 and subsequent fiscal years budgetary submissions to the Office of Management and Budget.³

Representatives of the following Agencies and Departments are being asked to participate in the Committee's work: State, Defense, JCS, AID, the NSC Staff, ACDA, CIA, OMB, Treasury and Commerce. We hope each of you will serve but will also designate an alternate. Until the Coordinator is appointed, Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State will serve as my alternate. Please communicate the name of your alternate to Mr. Spiers.

John N. Irwin II

³ In the revised memorandum a new paragraph was inserted following this term of reference: "In cases of countries for which Country Program Memoranda have been approved in accordance with the procedures of NSDM 112, the Country Program Memoranda will serve as the basic guidance for preparation of the Security Assistance Program." (National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 112)

161. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, August 18, 1971.

COUNTRY PROGRAMMING AND SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PLANNING

We owe General Haig an answer to his note of August 16 to Alex Johnson transmitting a revision of our Security Assistance Program Review memorandum and a revised version of NSDM 112 (attached).²

Since the Secretary forcefully objected to the original version of 112, I believe this matter must be taken up with him before replying to General Haig. However, I believe our recommendation to him should be that NSDM 112 in its revised form is no more acceptable than before and that we should reaffirm our intention to proceed with the Se-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSDM Files: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 112. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Spiers.

² Attached but not printed.

curity Assistance Program Review Committee as outlined in our original memorandum.

I believe that the major points which need to be made are as follows:

(1) NSDM 112 usurps the responsibility of the Department of State for foreign policy planning. We find particularly objectionable the concept of asking Defense to chair interagency country programming committees where "its programs are exceptionally important." We do not conceive of any instances where Defense interests would be more important than all other foreign policy interests.

(2) In the case of many countries, the country programming concept would inevitably overlap the security assistance planning function which has, upon Presidential decision, been vested in the Department of State. In the specific countries listed in the memorandum (i.e. Jordan, Thailand and Cambodia), our Security Assistance Programs, including MASF in the case of Thailand, would be the major focus of our planning effort.

(3) In other cases (e.g. Japan) where Security Assistance Programs are minimal or non-existent, CPM's would either overlap present NSSM studies or would create unnecessary duplications of present NSC procedures.

(4) The NSC Program Analysis Staff is heavily defense oriented and badly overextended (it also staffs the VP, DPRC, and VSSG where its efforts are more germane). Its record in bringing major country studies (undertaken under NSDM 4)³ before the NSC system for decision has not been good (one—Korea—out of four). In addition, Administration decisions have largely ignored these studies (e.g. Korea).

(5) The SRG could not make major budget decisions. Under existing procedures major program and budget issues are already submitted to the President for decision and are, of course, reviewed by the NSC or CIEP staffs.

Although we see some virtue in the comprehensive tabulation and analysis of all U.S. programs in a given country across agency lines and by major purpose, we believe this objective can be achieved through the regular NSC process, which should concentrate, initially, on selected countries which would not duplicate the work of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee.

As regards the Security Assistance Program Review Committee, we note that the NSC staff does not have any objection to its establishment provided that it works within the "basic guidance" provided by Country Program Memoranda. Since we will need to prepare guidance for the field for the 1974 Security Assistance Program by December of this year, the deadline set forth in the revised NSDM 112 (mid-1972) would be too late and the Security Assistance Coordinator could not rely on the Country Program Memorandum for such guidance.

³ Documents 13 and 71.

In sum, we believe that NSDM 112 should remain a dead letter. Specific country programming studies can be undertaken in regular SRG channels, with the Department of State, in consonance with its responsibility for relations with foreign countries, taking the lead in the interdepartmental work on these studies. In the case of predominantly security assistance countries, the work should proceed under the aegis of the Security Assistance Program Review Committee.

If the Secretary accepts this recommendation, Alex Johnson should convey these points orally to General Haig.⁴

⁴ See Document 162.

162. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant (Getz) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot)¹

Washington, August 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

Security Assistance and NSDM 112

Alex Johnson talked to Al Haig this afternoon and reached agreement with him on the NSDM 112 and the Under Secretary's memorandum on the Security Assistance Program Review Committee:

1. We accept the NSDM with two amendments:²

a. That the sentence at the top of page 2 will end following "the Department of State," and the remainder of the sentence shall be deleted (i.e., "or the Department of Defense where its programs are exceptionally important").

b. In the list of countries selected for FY74, Jordan will be deleted, Thailand and Cambodia remain.

2. Regarding the Under Secretary's memorandum on the establishment of a Security Assistance Program Review Committee, this will be reissued including the amendments proposed by General Haig

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1–1 US. Limited Official Use.

² See Document 151 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

under cover of his note to Ambassador Johnson of August 16.³ The memorandum, however, in its revised form will be issued as a State Department document over the Under Secretary's signature rather than a memorandum from the Chairman of the Under Secretaries' Committee.⁴

³ See Document 160 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.

⁴ The memorandum was issued, however, over Irwin's signature as Chairman of the Under Secretaries' Committee rather than Under Secretary of State.

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 7, 1971.

SUBJECT

USC Activities

PARTICIPANTS

State: David Biltchik²

NSC: T.C. Pinckney

In pursuing our intent to get a closer follow-up of USC affairs, I called Dave Biltchik and requested current lists of USC study memos, decisions, and continuing actions.

Dave seemed happy to comply and promised to send them over right away. He went on to suggest that we in the NSC should assign more actions to the USC and illustrated his point by referring to a need for a presidential mandate on monitoring U.S. personnel abroad and to the absence of response to Under Secretary Irwin's recent suggestion that the USC supervise policy for nuclear tests.

I assured Dave that I would look into both these matters, though not necessarily report anything to him. I also suggested that he call me if he had further thoughts on possible assignments for the USC. I promised to drop by and get acquainted when visiting the Department.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-209, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas Pinckney.

² Biltchik was a member of the Department of State Planning and Coordination Staff. Pinckney was a member of the NSC Planning Group.

Because (1) NSDM 2³ states, “The NSC Under Secretaries Committee shall consider . . . matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas . . . which are of an operational nature (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question) . . .”⁴ and (2) the USC seems anxious to do more, perhaps we should keep in mind suggesting more frequently to Dr. Kissinger that they be assigned operational items. A spin-off benefit might be that if kept busy, they might not be as inclined to delve into policy matters.

³ Document 11.

⁴ Ellipses in the source text.

164. Editorial Note

At 6:07 p.m. on December 21, 1971, 10 minutes after arriving at the White House by helicopter, President Nixon met in the Oval Office with Attorney General John Mitchell and Presidential Assistants H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Mitchell and Ehrlichman insisted on the meeting, Haldeman noted in his diary, because in their investigation of leaks in recent Jack Anderson columns in *The Washington Post*, “they had uncovered the fact that a yeoman in the NSC shop, assigned to liaison with the Joint Chiefs, was the almost certain source of not only the leaks, but also the absconding of information from Henry’s and Haig’s and other people’s briefcases, which were turned over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The P was quite shocked, naturally, by the whole situation and agreed that very strong action had to be taken, but very carefully, since we don’t want to blow up the whole relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*) Mitchell warned the President during the meeting “as to what this would lead to if you pursued it by way of prosecution or even a public confrontation. You would have the Joint Chiefs allied on that side directly against you. What has been done has been done and I think the important thing is to paper this thing over. First of all, get that liaison office the hell out of the NSC and put it back in the Pentagon.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, Oval Office, Conversation No. 639–30)

Investigations of the episode revealed that Navy yeoman Charles Radford, assigned since September 1970 to the JCS liaison office at the

National Security Council, had purloined a huge quantity of documents which were passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the liaison office heads: Rear Admirals Rembrant Robinston and his successor, Robert O. Welander. Radford illicitly duplicated documents at the NSC and stole them while accompanying Kissinger and Haig on trips. During one trip, Kissinger noted in his memoir, Radford "used the occasion to make himself generally useful, in the process—as he later testified—going through my briefcase, reading or duplicating whatever papers he could get his hands on, and sometimes retaining discarded carbon copies of sensitive documents that were intended to be disposed of in the 'burn bag.'" (*Years of Upheaval*, pages 806–807)

The textual files in the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives contain very little material on the JCS spy operation and the White House handling of it. Included in the White House tapes, however, are audio recordings of the series of Presidential meetings commencing on December 21 at which the President and his aides discussed the accumulating evidence and deliberated how they should deal with the problem—in particular with the JCS officials directly involved and with JCS Chairman Moorer. At a December 23 meeting with Nixon, for instance, Haldeman recounted an earlier meeting at which Haldeman and Ehrlichman told Henry Kissinger about the spying. According to Haldeman, Kissinger asked "what do you do, what do you do on that, and John [Ehrlichman] said, well, that's most of the question now. It's in the hands of the Attorney General and he's got to determine what we do obviously. He said Admiral Welander thinks we should put the yeoman in jail. Admiral Moorer thinks we should put Welander in jail." Kissinger "said I think Moorer should be in jail. John and I both laughed; he said as you go up the ladder everybody's going to crucify the guy under him and nobody will take the blame himself." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, Executive Office, Conversation No. 310–19) At a meeting the next day, December 24, Ehrlichman told Nixon that Alexander Haig and Kissinger "both agree in very strong terms that Moorer should go. They're both now satisfied that Moorer is heavily implicated. They're doubly concerned because they've been using Moorer's back-channels for all kinds of communications and they're afraid that they've been compromised." Nixon commented that "Moorer's too good a man" and "I don't feel that way at all." (*Ibid.*, Conversation 309–1) The President's telephone conversation with Haig later that day is Document 166.

The Radford episode is treated briefly in Nixon's and Kissinger's memoirs (Nixon, *RN*, pages 531–532; Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, pages 806–809) and at greater length by Ehrlichman in *Witness to Power*, pages

302–310. Discussions in secondary works include Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pages 380–385; Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pages 465–479; and John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), pages 315–317.

165. Editorial Note

Following a discussion in the Oval Office on December 22, 1971 of the Charles Radford-Joint Chiefs of Staff pipeline, the following exchange took place between President Nixon and his Assistant H.R. Haldeman:

“Haldeman: The worst thing about it is you start, which we’ve managed to avoid, maybe too much, you start getting paranoid. You start wondering about everything, and everybody, and—

“President: I know. Well, don’t be too damned sure of anybody. Don’t get too sure of anybody.

“Haldeman: You can’t be.

“President: I’m never sure of anybody. The reason I am so close-mouthed is, did you notice I haven’t [unintelligible] that—let me put it [unintelligible]. Do you not now see why I don’t have staff meetings?

“Haldeman: Damn right.

“President: You agree?

“Haldeman: Oh yea.

“President: Do you think I’m right?

“Haldeman: I sure as hell do.

“President: I don’t have staff meetings. I’d rather—I know it would charge up the staff for me to sit around and talk to them direct, but who knows. First, without evil intentions some would leak.

“Haldeman: That’s right.

“President: Beyond that there might be somebody in there, like a little guy like this, that’ll get it all. But the end thing, I tell you whenever there’s anything important you don’t tell anybody. You know, it’s really tough. It’s tough. We don’t tell Rogers, Laird, anybody. We just don’t tell any son-of-a-bitch at all.

“Haldeman: It’s a horrible way to have to work, but it’s essential.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, December 22, 1971, Oval Office, Conversation No. 640–3)

166. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹**

Washington, December 24, 1971, 5:01–5:08 p.m.

[Omitted here are opening comments and brief discussion of Henry Kissinger and the India-Pakistan conflict.]

President: On the other thing, incidentally, on the Moorer thing,² you just couldn't even dream of having Moorer out of that thing. I mean, he's part of a system, and the damn thing I'm sure started before he was there. I think it goes back over years, and it probably went further than he ever expected it was going to go. That's my guess.

Haig: [unclear] I think that—

President: And we got to remember that basically he's our ally in terms of what we believe in, and the worse thing we could do now is to hurt the military. I tried to get that through what Henry said, but that's what, that's the line we're playing on the thing. Don't you agree? We just gotta do that. In June, of course we could take a look, but not now.

Haig: [unclear]

President: Well, after all, Moorer's a good man, and he's with us. This thing, of course, is pretty bad, it's a, understand, not sending the information over but going through briefcases, that goes too far.

Haig: [Inaudible comment]

President: It just develops. The guy thought he was, you know, doing his job. And then we got a guy that starts to leak. That of course is the worst, but that's the Ellsberg syndrome.

[Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger, his conflict with Secretary of State Rogers, the India-Pakistan war, and Vietnam.]

President: I told him [Kissinger] to forget this thing about the Moorer thing. Just forget it. Leave it to Mitchell to work out. I've already decided we're going to cool this thing. We're gonna, and I'm gonna, I told Ehrlichman we ought to keep that yeoman right here in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haig, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 17–28. No classification marking. Haig's voice on the tape is extremely faint. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² See Document 164.

Washington. Sign him over to the Pentagon where we can watch him, 24 hours a day and then that's it.³

[Omitted here is further discussion of Yeoman Radford and closing comments.]

³ The President telephoned John Mitchell at 5:33 p.m. on December 24 and conveyed a similar message: "I think the main thing is to keep it under as close control as we can. But I—We cannot move to do anything to discredit the uniform. That's what I'm convinced of." "Our best interests are served by not, you know, raising holy hell." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Mitchell, December 24, 1971, 5:33 p.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 17–37) Yeoman Radford was transferred to the Northwest.

167. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant (Haldeman)¹

Washington, January 10, 1972.

In the Sunday, January 9, *New York Times* there is an article by Benjamin Wells on India–Pakistan. I want you to clip the article and without discussing it with Henry and stirring him up have a quiet talk with Bill Rogers. The problem is that somebody in State, with no justification whatever, is trying to continue a running battle with the White House on this issue. Of course, an idea as to how the State people feel is the disrespectful tone of the quote, "Nixon is mad at India, etc.," rather than that the President is opposed to aiding India. You will also note that the high State Department official who gave the story to Wells made a big point of the fact that 104 million dollars in letters of credit were not cut off and that 30 million dollars or so in development loans were not cut off.

The difficulty with this kind of article is that it appears that the State Department bureaucracy is (one) disrespectful toward the President; (two) deliberately failed to follow his directions with regard to cutting off aid during the period of the war and thereafter; and (three) are trying to move back toward India at a time that we are for other reasons trying to play it cool.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, President's Personal Files, Box 3, Memoranda from the President, 1969–1974, Memos—January 1972. Confidential.

My attitude toward India, as Bill knows, is that in the long run we must continue to aid them, but I think we gain nothing whatever by running to them so fast and particularly in this manner which would lead Mrs. Gandhi to believe that the State Department was totally on her side, the President was the only one who was against her.

Bill has handled the questions in fine shape. What is needed is to have the government speak with one voice on this and not give an indication that policy enunciated by the President and Secretary of State is being undercut by career diplomats.

168. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, January 14, 1972.

The President has directed that henceforth meetings with representatives of the Soviet Embassy in Washington on any topic and with representatives of foreign governments on the Middle East situation be cleared with him.

In conjunction with these clearances, the President wishes to have a memorandum outlining the objective of the meeting and the manner in which it will be conducted. Following the meeting, the President wishes to have a written memorandum for the record covering the contents of the discussion.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL US-USSR. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Haldeman and Mitchell. Written by hand at the top of the memorandum is: "At the Secretary's request, this was shown only to him." Stamped beneath is: "Retained in S/S-I due to extreme or continued sensitivity. No Distribution without S/S concurrence on a need-to-know."

169. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for January 16, 1972, President's Assistant H.R. Haldeman noted that Secretary of State Rogers called him that afternoon and "said I have a preemptory memo from Henry [Document

168] and I won't take it. I have orders from the P[resident] and I'm following those. I thought we had an understanding here that this was a two way thing. The theory is that the P has announced his policy, the State Department's carrying it out. He doesn't mind checking with Henry if Henry agrees to check with him too, and now he wants to talk to the P about it. He thinks it's hurting the whole situation. I raised the question of why the NSC wasn't in the meetings with the Israelis and he said they're not there because they're not supposed to be in operations, especially about the Middle East. He says we've been doing this for three years, and it's worked well. Why should we change it now." Moreover, Rogers stated, "the P knows all about the Israel stuff, that he has memos from the P about what he should do. That the policy in the Middle East has been good, and he will not have Henry second guessing him all the time. He's happy to keep the P fully advised. Says the meetings he's had with Rabin were pursuant to a directive from the P. He doesn't want the thing to end up as if State is withholding things. The main thing is that K doesn't keep Rogers advised at all on what he's doing. For instance he knows nothing about the Russia and China trips except what Al [Haig] told him the other day. Therefore, he will disregard the instructions from K, he's not working for K." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

During an Oval Office meeting with the President the next day, January 17, Haldeman recounted in detail his telephone conversation with Rogers. Haldeman then commented, "One basic fallacy in this is the principles that Rogers operates on, which is—he goes back to when we first came into office—is that the NSC has nothing to do with operations—that it's supposed to be a policy body but not an operating body. Now, there was some mumbling of that theory in the early days but it rapidly changed after about an hour after we got into office, and it's ludicrous to pretend that." Haldeman continued, "we've got to put it to Bill to a certain degree. I think we've got to make the point to Bill that he does have to keep you posted and that he keep you posted through Henry. It's ridiculous to argue otherwise." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, January 17, 1972, Oval Office, Conversation No. 648–4)

Haldeman made the following entry in his diary for January 18: "Then met with the Attorney General, about the K–Rogers problem. Brought him up to date on a flap from over the weekend as a result of Henry's directive to Bill. We agreed that we have to change Rogers' view that the NSC is for policy only and not for operations. And that we have to deal with the point that Al Haig raises of Rogers' fundamental misconception that if some matter is in the NSC and the SRG then it's K's responsibility, otherwise everything else is State's, and therefore, they cut out State's reserve, and they misconstrue the whole purpose of the NSC system. We had Henry and Haig join us to lay

down the rules to them after Mitchell and I agreed that the only way to solve this was a memorandum from the P to both Rogers and K [Document 170], that would both repeat the K directive, at least the contents of it, but in better form and would instruct K (that would go to and then instruct K) to keep Rogers filled in at the P's direction." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

170. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 19, 1972.

Confirming the discussions you have had recently with the Attorney General and Bob Haldeman, it is essential that we all have a clear agreement as to our basic operating procedure with regard to all matters relating to China, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Cuba and Chile.

Because of the sensitive nature of our relationships in these areas, I must be kept fully informed at all times of any contacts made and action taken. Also I must have the opportunity to review any proposed contacts or actions *before* they are undertaken—with sufficient advance time so that I can provide additional instructions or guidance if necessary.

I am asking, therefore, that each of you assume the responsibility of seeing that I am so informed regarding any such actions or contacts by yourself or any member of your department.

Without limiting the general sense of this request—I want to be particularly sure that all meetings on any topic with representatives of the Soviet Union, PRC, Israel, the Arab States or Chile are cleared in advance with me. I would appreciate an outline of the proposed objective of the meeting and the specific talking points to be covered. I will, of course, also need a complete memorandum of conversation following the meeting.

I am fully aware that there are some problems involved in carrying out these instructions, and I know they have been discussed at length. I'm sure, however, that you will both understand the importance during this critical year of making sure we find a way to handle this and I will appreciate your cooperation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 25, WPR—President Nixon. Secret; Eyes Only; Personal.

171. Editorial Note

The Defense Program Review Committee met on February 10, 1972. In a February 3 briefing memorandum for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Philip Odeen, Director of the National Security Council's Program Analysis Staff, emphasized that the meeting marked "an important first for the DPRC in two respects: It will be the first time DOD has presented its five-year program to the DPRC as directed by NSDM 27. Also for the first time since 1969, OMB will provide a five-year look at Federal revenues and spending. In the past OMB has refused to provide this important information, which bears directly on our defense effort. *This meeting is a critical first step in our efforts to get better control over the Defense program.* Laird will be putting out his Strategy and Fiscal Guidance in late February which will provide guidance for detailed service preparation of the FY 74 program and our force posture for the rest of the 1970s. *If we don't get our oar in now, it will be much harder to influence the Defense program later in the planning cycle since most of the decisions will already have been made.*" (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-104, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC Meeting DOD Five Year Program 2-10-72)

Secretary of Defense Laird discussed the February 10 meeting of the DPRC at a meeting with his staff (the Armed Forces Policy Council) on February 14, according to minutes prepared by the Staff Secretary. Following a summary of the committee's deliberations by the three staff members who attended on February 10, Laird said "we need to get the DPRC talking about over-all budget and economic posture of the country. Unless the DPRC goes the route of over-all national planning, it will fall." Laird noted that at a breakfast meeting that morning with Kissinger he had expressed his disappointment over the outcome of the DPRC discussions as reported to him. Laird felt, he told his staff, "we are headed toward arbitrary budget decisions in November rather than having the President present over-all options in all areas of federal budgeting." "We do not want the DPRC to provide fiscal guidance to the Department of Defense at this stage of the game. We want such guidance and decisions to be made from the President." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Accession 76-0028, OSD Office Chronological Files, Box 14)

172. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)¹

Washington, February 28, 1972.

Defense Planning Issues

Following the last DPRC meeting, you raised the question of how we might work most effectively with the Pentagon as they develop their Five-Year Force Program and Budget to assure that Defense programs are consistent with foreign policy. We had hoped that the DPRC would provide a vehicle for more effective interagency participation in the major policy issues arising from the Defense planning and budget process. While we still believe it in our interest to support, and where possible strengthen, the DPRC we need not look to that forum as the sole mechanism for engaging DOD on defense budgetary issues. This seems to be particularly important in view of the infrequency of the meetings and the resistance of the Pentagon to bringing many major policy issues into the DPRC. This makes it unclear what the ultimate value of that forum will be.

At the present, the State Department staff maintains a continuous liaison with the Services and various elements of OSD which enables us to identify major program and budget issues at a fairly early stage. What is lacking is a mechanism for effectively influencing these key decisions. We recognize that your intention is to secure a frank exchange of views on common problems, rather than necessarily insisting on changes by DOD to accommodate the diplomatic issues, as we see them. Nevertheless, if DOD is to take seriously our concerns it will require your personal participation and, from time to time, that of the Secretary. Thus, we very much welcome your interest and would encourage you to meet regularly with Mr. Rush, Admiral Moorer and others, as appropriate to discuss specific policy issues as we can identify them and call them to your attention.

To begin this process, we have prepared the attached set of papers to illustrate the budget process in DOD and the kinds of issues that arise. At Tab A is the DOD schedule for the review of Five-Year Programs and the Budget during the coming year. Tab B describes six fairly immediate program issues that have come to our attention through our

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 1. Secret. Drafted by Leon Sloss (PM/ISP) on February 24 and concurred in by EUR, EA, and S/PC. The tabs are not printed.

review of the FY 73 Presidential Budget Submission and the FY 74–78 Defense Planning briefing given by OSD to the DPRC on Thursday, February 10. Each of these issues affects our foreign policy planning. We believe a discussion by you with DOD representatives at an early date might help us to find mutually acceptable solutions to these problems. At Tab C are examples of some longer-range issues that could be the subject of future meetings.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to set up a meeting with Mr. Rush at an early date for two purposes: (a) To discuss the DOD budget/program cycle and at what points in that cycle and in what form State Department inputs could be useful and appropriate; (b) To discuss the specific issues noted at Tab B. We will, in conjunction with other appropriate Bureaus, provide you with talking points prior to the meeting.²

² Irwin initialed his approval on March 14.

173. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the President's Assistant (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

President's Visit to the Soviet Union

As we intensify preparations for the President's visit to the Soviet Union,² I plan to take personal charge of State Department coordinating efforts with the various relevant departments of the Government. I shall be having a series of meetings this week within the Department of State to review the current situation, after which I intend to call in Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss the various bilateral negotiations presently or potentially under way which might have a bearing on the Summit conference. We may also be meeting with representatives of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5. Confidential. A copy was sent to Kissinger.

² President Nixon visited the Soviet Union May 22–30 for the Moscow Summit at which the SALT I and ABM treaties were signed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXII, SALT I.

other agencies who are, or will be conducting discussions with the Soviets during the pre-Summit period, with a view to insuring that their efforts fit into the general framework both as to timing and possible use in connection with the Presidential visit. Marty Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, will be working closely with me on the substantive side pursuant to Presidential decisions.

As far as planning the physical arrangements for the trip are concerned, our principal representative will be John Thomas. I will appreciate it if as you proceed to make plans for the visit that Mr. Thomas can attend meetings and be kept fully posted.

William P. Rogers

³ In a March 15 memorandum to Haldeman, Kissinger stated that "a personal coordinating role by the Secretary could, obviously, pose serious problems with respect to the preparation of substantive matters which have already been set in motion" and thus he believed it essential that Haldeman "remind the Secretary that whatever coordinating role he visualizes for himself should be within the framework of the provisions of the NSC directives which have already been promulgated." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 5) Kissinger attached a draft memorandum from Haldeman to Rogers which, with revisions, Haldeman dispatched on March 16 (Document 174).

174. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Haldeman) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, March 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

The President's Visit to the Soviet Union

I have reviewed with the President your memorandum to me of March 14.² He is, of course, pleased that you are giving personal attention to the State Department preparations for his visit to the Soviet Union.

However, because of the myriad of departmental interests in the substantive issues, it is important that there be no misunderstanding

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Office Files of William P. Rogers: Lot 73 D 443, Box 22, WPR—White House Correspondence. Secret. Drafted by Kissinger.

² Document 173.

about the coordinating mechanism which should be followed. As has been fully covered in previous memoranda, the NSC Senior Review Group and the CIEP must be the focal points for preparation and coordination of substantive bilateral matters pertaining to the Soviet Summit. All meetings and discussions which you have should be conducted within this framework and consistent with the President's memorandum to you of January 19, 1972.³

With respect to the physical arrangements, the President has designated Dwight Chapin as the point of contact with whomever Ambassador Dobrynin might designate from the Soviet side. You may be sure that Mr. Chapin will include John Thomas in the preparatory meetings which are held for implementing the physical arrangements for the trip.⁴

HR Haldeman

³ Document 170.

⁴ At the bottom of the memorandum Rogers wrote: "I discussed this on the phone. The matter has been straightened out to my satisfaction. WPR"

**175. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group,
National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

The NSC System—An Appraisal

You asked for my appraisal of the System. Accordingly, I have set down here my personal views.

The system after 3-1/2 years remains the most effective way of assuring that decisions are based upon consideration of the relevant facts, a clean definition of the issues, and all reasonable options. If used effectively, it also provides the best means of harnessing and controlling the bureaucracy in policy formulation and execution.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Personal and Confidential. Sent for information. Typed at the top of page 1 is: "[Outside the System]"

The system was strengthened by the elevation of the Review Group to the Deputy Secretary level and by the creation of the WSAG. For 2-1/2 years rigorous discipline paid off in better and more timely papers, increasingly effective discussion of them, and a tight framework for policy implementation.

But the system now is showing signs of malaise—not necessarily fatal but requiring urgent and strong action if it is to continue to serve what is an unquestioned need for you and the President.

My appraisal of the elements of the system follows:

—*The NSC* does not meet often enough. The past year has been atypical, and we should reinstate the procedure of meeting on all major decisions and even occasionally for a briefing/update on major issues.

—*The IG/SRG Structure*

—The IG's are not functioning. State had been disciplined into line and brought to understand that other elements of this government have a valid and vital role to play in the conduct of foreign policy. But it is again slipping back into its traditional way of thinking that it sets the line and everyone else hues to it.

—State's Program and Resource Allocation (PARA) system is being pushed too far into a policy-determining mechanism. (The PARA is a worthwhile management tool which State has long needed to translate the generalities of country policy into realistic action programs with resource support. But the Bureaus are attempting to squeeze out new policy directions through this mechanism. We are watching every one of the documents closely to prevent this. The NSSM process is the most effective counter in the major countries, e.g., Korea.)

—The IG's have responded well and quickly to NSSM requirements. But, in all too many cases, the paper called for with a short deadline to meet a stated need has languished here because we were unable to consider it. The failure to consider completed papers within a reasonable time tends to break down the discipline of the system—the writers see no incentive to put forth their best efforts and the product suffers. In some cases we have moved the papers by memo, but often this is an unsatisfactory substitute for a face-to-face airing of issues and points of view among the principals.

—*The WSAG*. This has worked well through a variety of situations extending well beyond its original conception.

—But it has *not* performed the principal function for which it was originally created—advance contingency planning. I have given you a separate memorandum² which would correct this structural deficiency by the creation of a Working Group to draft contingency plans and keep them under review under WSAG direction.

² Not found.

—*The Verification Panel* has worked well and, with its working group and backstopping committee, is keeping control of the complex issues in SALT and MBFR.

—*The DPRC*. This body should be one of the most influential in the entire system. But a review of its activity against its charter suggests that it simply is not working. Secretary Laird, of course, has been recalcitrant, but I believe the problem is deeper than that.

—We are dealing here with issues and decisions on strategy, weapons, forces and resources, all of which go to the heart of the Secretary of Defense's responsibilities.

—The Secretary and his subordinates, I believe, would be more comfortable and willing to play this vital game if *they* were tasked to prepare the basic papers without being directly "supervised" by your staff during their preparation. [Your staff, after all, has final review in preparing those papers for consideration by you and the DPRC.]³

—Careful definition of the issues to be considered can frame the response in a way that will pin-point the key decisions needed and the considerations which will underlie the decision.

—Raising too many specific issues individually rather than in the context of the broader strategic and force decisions can only lead to a charge of "nitpicking" interference and thus generate basic resistance.

—*The NSCIC*. This is a vital need but one which has not lived up to its promise. Again I believe the problem is in approach.

—Too much involvement of a directive character at the outset of a study (net assessment or other) is likely to hamper, not help, get the product that is needed.

—Your staff can and should provide the impartial analytical overview of work done by the elements of the bureaucracy under specific NSSM requests.

—*The Under Secretaries Committee (USC)* has simply not functioned effectively. It started out to do so but there is an inherent conflict of interest.

—We purposely increased the number and range of actions assigned to it to following up on the implementation of policy decisions (this in response to anguished pleas). But it works at this task languidly and seldom meets.

—Even then it acts often by asserting the Executive Chairmanship prerogative and thereby diminishes further its effectiveness as other Departments immediately seek to overturn the "decision" by appeal to the President. The "decision" should never have been made in the first place if there was a major difference of view.

—The reasons for its ineffectiveness are simple—State's obsession with asserting its prerogatives and its desire to preempt for the USC a

³ Brackets in the source text.

significant policy-making role (a la the SIG whose role is now that of the SRG).

—To correct the situation will require a reorientation of State's thinking toward performance instead of prerogatives. Insistence on regular meetings of the USC and regular attendance by you or your designated representative would help to move and discipline it.

—*The 40 Committee* meets far too infrequently. We have instituted a procedure to deal with many of the simple matters by memo but have had to use this procedure even on major matters which would have benefited from a thorough vetting at the table. It should meet at least once every two months and whenever a major matter is before it.

All of the ills described above can be corrected by a dose of hard-headed realism and bureaucratic savvy. This adds up to:

—A memorandum from the President to the members of the National Security Council reaffirming his insistence that the IG structure be used as set forth in NSDM 2⁴ and that it be responsive to him (and you), and only secondarily to the Secretary of State.

—Reinstituting the successful pattern of regular meetings of the groups you chair to consider papers within a reasonable time after they have been submitted. Meetings need not and should not be lengthy. The quality of your preparation, consistently much superior to that of any of the other principals, guarantees this.

—A clear definition in study directives (in all cases, but particularly for the DPRC) of what is required and who is to do it, and then assurance of a minimum of meddling (as contrasted with helpful participation and contribution) while it is being done.

None of these ideas is new. I conveyed much the same thoughts to you three years ago. For two years we followed these principles, for the most part with considerable success. It is imperative, I believe, that we reaffirm them now both to your own staff and to the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy cannot be beaten into submission but it can be brought and kept under control through the proper use of the System.

I will provide a separate memorandum outlining a work/study program of major issues for your consideration.

⁴ See Document 11.

176. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Odeen) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

The Future Role of the DPRC

You asked for a paper on the future role of the DPRC. The past year Secretary Laird's intransigence has essentially prevented the DPRC from performing its planned functions. My earlier memo listing uncompleted work and ignored study directives is at Tab A.

The fundamental purpose of the DPRC is to ensure the DOD program is supportive of the President's strategy and foreign policy objectives. To this end, it should go beyond arms control planning (SAL[T] and MBFR) and get into broad strategy questions as well as DOD programs and budgets.

Conceptually, the *strategy decisions* made by the President are separable from the *force planning* prerogatives of DOD. The President's *strategic* objectives should provide a broad framework for force planning while DOD develops the detailed force postures to support the President's strategy.

This neat conceptual separation, however, does not work in practice. Without the White House becoming involved in DOD force planning, it is clear that the President's strategy will not be supported.

—Strategic objectives have been changed with very little effect on force postures (e.g., NATO and Air Defense).

—DOD budget requests have been out of line with the President's economic goals and NSC has ended up as a broker mediating between the demands of OMB (which emphasize economic considerations) and Laird who wants to maximize the DOD budget.

—DOD procurement and force planning policies have strategic implications all their own which can't be ignored.

Future DPRC Functions

There are four broad functions which the DPRC could perform:

—*Setting the strategic objectives* which govern our *force planning* and ensuring these objectives are coordinated with the President's overall

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 237, DPRC & Defense Budget, Aug–Dec 1972. Secret. Sent for urgent action. The tabs are not printed. Haig initialed the memorandum and wrote "thru Scowcroft" at the top of page 1. Kissinger wrote on page 1: "Dick—Here is another stupid Laird."

foreign policy goals. Possibilities for the future include establishing strategic doctrines to govern our naval force planning and to guide Asian planning in the future.

—*Ensuring the availability of adequate funds to cover DOD's long term spending plans* by projecting total long term revenues and spending to check the consistency between the President's economic, fiscal, and strategic planning.

—*Examining the adequacy of planned forces* to support the President's strategic objectives by considering reinforcement capabilities, deployment plans and the near term diplomatic impact of our force planning. A review of our capability to implement the NATO strategy with its emphasis on providing an initial ground defense and improved anti-tank capability is an appropriate new initiative in this area.

—*Reviewing the suitability and efficiency of specific weapons systems* for their role in carrying out our strategy. Is the B-1 the type of manned bomber we need for the future? Are we building carriers suited to the needs of the future?

Some degree of NSC involvement is, in my view, essential in all four areas. The key question is which areas should be addressed by the DPRC, with its full interagency membership, and which should be addressed through other bilateral channels. *To a major extent the answer to this depends on the understanding you and the President reach with Elliot Richardson.* Without his cooperation, the DPRC will not function effectively.

Broad resource allocation and strategy issues as well as the adequacy of DOD programs to carry out strategy have direct broad interagency policy implications and definitely fall under the DPRC. Specific weapons systems design and development decisions are primarily DOD's responsibility even though State, ACDA, OMB, etc., have a burning interest.

The weapons issues of interest to the President should be handled on a *bilateral* basis with DOD. This White House involvement could be helpful to the incoming Secretary of Defense. For example, the drive towards complex and costly new weapons systems is very powerful and White House pressure can be of value in containing the R&D advocates.

How to Proceed

There are many important and timely issues to be addressed in each of the functional areas listed above. A partial list of these issues is at Tab B.

In view of the slow down of the DPRC mechanism over the past six months, it is imperative that we take a strong initiative to get work moving ahead when the new administration takes office. The key problem is to assign priorities and develop a rational schedule to ensure that over the next year or so we make meaningful progress in developing the President's strategy and ensuring the forces will support it.

First priority should go to bringing to decision those studies which have largely been completed. The prime examples are the NSSM 69 Asian force and deployments study and the Strategic Objectives Study.² Both could be ready for the DPRC and NSC some time early next year.

At the same time, we need to get work underway on new strategy studies which the President will want to review over the coming year. Primary candidates are studies of the strategic rationale for our Navy and tactical nuclear forces and planning. Both areas represent real gaps in our strategic planning. These studies will take months to complete and we should start now in order to have something by next summer.

Regarding DOD long term budget planning, the important thing is to ensure rough consistency between the five year plan and the President's intention not to increase taxes. Rather than redoing NSSM 3, I propose:

—Issuing five year budgetary guidance to DOD which holds spending levels about constant in real terms. This guidance should be issued in late January or February in order to influence next year's DOD planning cycle.

—Directing DOD to present in the summer an analysis of the strategic implications of a five to ten percent increase or decrease in spending. This would be the basis for firm fiscal guidance for FY 75–79 period.

Finally, I believe we should aim towards studying several special weapons systems with work done on a *bilateral* NSC/DOD basis. Examples include the suitability of the B-1 manned bomber, the need for the FY 78 Trident IOC, and large air defense modernization programs and close air support needs. (Army, Air Force, and Marines are all developing aircraft for this mission.)

It may also be wise to ask the new Secretary of Defense to review the currently planned modernization effort to see what could be done to slow the move toward even more costly and complex weapons and equipment. This idea will be treated in my memo on steps to rationalize the Defense program.³

² Copies are *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S–NSSM Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 65 and NSSM 69.

³ Kissinger indicated his approval by writing “in principle” and below that “See me” next to the agree option.

177. Memorandum From the Director of the Planning Group,
National Security Council (Kennedy) to the President's
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, November 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

Organization and Staffing

At Staff Meeting you asked for thoughts on organization and staffing. This paper is more lengthy than planned, but I believe accurately reflects some of our principal problems. None is major, but in the aggregate they make the organization less effective than it might be.

1. *The Senior Staff's Role*

—The Senior Staff can and should be extensions of Henry Kissinger.

- They want to be and are capable of it.
- If the bureaucracy knows without question they are speaking for him, regard for our staff and in turn for HAK will grow.
- And the work will get done and the problems of assuring adherence to the policy line will be reduced (to the extent there are any problems—I think there are fewer than HAK imagines, and can produce a long list of constant follow-ups to demonstrate this).

—*The only way* that this can be accomplished is for these men to *know* what Henry Kissinger thinks and wants.

- Staff meetings could help, but we both know that he is uncomfortable with them and they have not long survived each reincarnation.
- You have been helpful to them (and in a more limited way I have tried to be) for one reason—we knew what Henry Kissinger said to a Cabinet officer, an Assistant Secretary, to us in his office, etc.
- There is nothing more demoralizing and demeaning (to HAK's loss) for one of the senior staff than to be told by a colleague from a Department what HAK has said on a subject on which the colleague had been debriefed by his principal and our man was not.
- HAK's new ideas may be helpful but the process will be greatly furthered if (a) they can read *relevant* telecons (they could be protected), and (b) if there is a reading file of staff papers on the EOB side which the *Seniors* could leaf through each day to get the flavor of his thinking on issues and his reactions.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, Reorganization of the NSC System. Personal; Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum is not signed. A 2-page attachment, January 29, that discusses alternative ways of structuring the NSC staff, is not printed. Typed at the top of page 1 is: "[Outside the System]"

2. *Systems Analysis*

—The Systems Analysis function should be pared down and focused on strategic and defense issues.

—Moreover, it will be far more effective if it stops directing and starts participating and contributing.

- It has improved but there are still some vestiges of the past, and we suffer the after-effects of earlier excesses.

- The writing of papers in this staff and then trying to sell them or ram them down the throats of the bureaucracy is hardly calculated to get what the system is supposed to produce—"all relevant facts, the views of all involved agencies, and a fair presentation of all reasonable options." Experience has shown amply that (1) this is seen as simple arrogance, and (2) this generates the strongest and most effective kind of bureaucratic resistance to implementation of a decision.

—If it is to do an analytical work concerning a country, region or issue which is the responsibility of one of the senior staff (either functional or regional), then it should do that work *for him* and not totally independently (e.g., the country programming exercise on which more later, and some economic issues, etc.). This takes people whose satisfaction is in their work and contribution, not in names on papers.

- In the last analysis, it does not serve HAK well to have radically different viewpoints expressed, neither of which has taken into account the valid aspects of the other. It is just bad staff work.

- This in no way implies that differing viewpoints should not be put forward—they should. But if they are to be useful they ought to be integrated in a way which shows their relevance one to the other and that is what the regional staff officer is for.

3. *The HAK personal staff* has become a buffer—unfortunately in the poorer sense of the word.

—There are too many (though the quality is superb); and because they are there, Henry simply turns to them.

—If he cannot trust people on the EOB side, then he should replace them, not fence them out. When HAK has said: "I want you to work on this yourself and I do not want anyone else to know," that is precisely the way it has been. If that is what the situation calls for, it is precisely what HAK should get. But that does not mean that he needs to establish a completely separate staff which he refers to as "his staff" as distinct from the others.

4. *The NSCIC*

—The NSCIC fills a vital need but for it to *do* net assessment is, in my judgment a non-starter. A year's experience lends some credence to this view.

—There should be a net assessment group established directly under the Director of Central Intelligence which reports to the

NSCIC and is tasked by it (and HAK) through the Director of Central Intelligence.

- The NSC staff element's role should be to (1) *participate* in that group, and (2) provide for HAK the independent analysis of the work done by the Net Assessment Group.
- Let the DCI (who has functions prescribed by law) fight the battle with the Secretary of Defense rather than engaging HAK in a direct confrontation. HAK can step in when he wants to do so on ground of his choosing rather than be continually engaged in energy sapping and useless bureaucratic fights started by others.

5. *The Staff and the System*

—If the NSC System is to function effectively, the NSC Staff has to play the game. It cannot denigrate the efforts of the bureaucracy; it must encourage them and help to improve them. We have come some distance along this road but we show signs of falling back.

- It should stimulate IG meetings, not decry their lack.
- It should help the Group charged with preparing a paper to produce a responsive and respectable product. It should not sit back and complain about the product or write a superior one independently to crow about.

6. *Consultants*

—The use of consultants should be brought under control.

—I find it incredible that we could have a consultant on board to do a study which had not yet been approved; and when it was, was directed by HAK to be performed by an IG. But that is exactly what happened in a recent case.

—Consultants, as a celebrated case made amply clear, can lead to real disaster.

—Their usefulness is unquestioned but common sense dictates tight control over their employment and terms of reference. This should be exercised by HAK. If the question must be put to him, my guess is that it might not even be asked in some instances.

7. *Staff Needs*

—I do not need four people on a continuing basis, though the present fourth man—the White House Fellow—has helped greatly to lighten the load over the last three months, much of which I have spent in HAK's office during your absence. Three is about right. Most of what we do is as a service and to be of help to the senior operators, but we also handle Security Assistance and (increasingly) other aid matters, and a variety of cats and dogs which need to be done.

—We need to get a senior man for *Africa and UN* matters and he should have a junior assistant.

—We need a senior man for *Scientific Affairs* and relationships with OST.

—We need a *Security Officer* who will handle not only the personnel security matters but equally as important, physical and document security matters.

—We need a *Senior Economics man* (Hormats is superb but the task is going to be enormous). When we gave way on the CIEP, we created a monster which is just now beginning to get itself involved in a way that complicates the foreign policy-making process and HAK must get a hold of this.

8. *Country Programming*

—HAK expended major capital 18 months ago vis-à-vis Rogers and Laird to get out NSDM 112 calling for Country Program studies,² but absolutely nothing has emerged. It was a major confrontation which we had to unscramble as you recall (and it was the *third* issuance of essentially the same directive since January 1969). The exercise was supposed to provide a base for Security Assistance and Economic Aid estimates for FY 73 and FY 74, but no papers were completed. Even before joining the staff, the futility of this exercise (and the cost to the prestige of the System) was evident to me. The bureaucracy had dug its heels in and, though it cooperated, it was convinced universally that nothing useful would emerge. (The Korea and Brazil examples bore them out—however excellent the academic exercises were, the conclusions could not stand the test of the real world.)

—The principle is sound. But the way to get it done is to task the bureaucracy to do it, not hire a staff here to direct it.

—This non-starter (three times) should be wiped off the slate and we can then move to get the desired product in an effective way. (The System Analysts won't like this because it is a bread-and-butter fall-back to rekindle whenever you run out of other work.)

9. *Morale*

—I know you have heard more on this than you really care to. But it would be unfair and less than candid if I failed to tell you that the prevailing mood is not helped by the lack of decent recognition of this superb staff which serves the President faithfully and well and (except for a very few notable examples) facelessly.

—As a simple and oft-repeated example, when half of the Domestic Staff can eat in the Mess, the fact that the Senior NSC Staff—a

² See Document 151 and footnotes 1–3 thereto.

handful in number—cannot, is simply a reflection on their stature *and* on HAK's.

—The fact that this staff has worked as devotedly as it has, being treated as it has, is testimony to its selflessness and its greatness. Few Commanders would expect such a result.

178. Memorandum From Donald Stukel of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the National Security Council Planning Group (Kennedy)¹

Washington, December 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

The NSC System

At Tab A is a summary of meetings held by the various groups of the NSC system during the past four years.² This summary indicates some trends which need to be thought about, especially if we are to have a chapter in the Annual Review on the NSC system. The way we have described the operation of the system in the past and the way it actually operates seem to diverge more each year. Over and above what goes in the Annual Review, we need to reexamine the system to see if changes would make it more effective.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-300, Institutional File General 1969 through 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Major Stukel was a White House Fellow on temporary assignment to the NSC.

² The figures in the text of this memorandum and in the attached summary should be considered approximate rather than exact. They vary, for example, from the figures for meetings of the same groups during the same period that NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis reported to Kissinger on January 18, 1974. Davis listed 71 (versus Stukel's 76) NSC meetings (but agreed on 3 for 1972), 140 (versus 160) Review Group and Senior Review Group meetings, 153 (versus 148) WSAG meetings, 23 (versus 30) DPRC meetings, 45 (versus 38) Verification Panel meetings, and 1 Intelligence Committee meeting. (Records of NSC and Related Meetings, January 20, 1969–December 31, 1972; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 311, Listings of NSC and Related Committees' Meetings, 1969–75)

The purpose of this memo is to raise questions with the hope of stimulating our thinking on what we should say about the system and what we can do to make it more effective.

National Security Council

The number of NSC meetings per year has shown a steady decline (37, 23, 13, 3). This year there have been three NSC meetings—two on Vietnam and one on SALT. The last NSC meeting was on May 8, 1972.

Questions:

- What accounts for the decline in the number of NSC meetings?
- Is the decline in the number of NSC meetings typical for an Administration?
- Is the NSC going to play a significant role in the next four years?
- In our writings do we want to start downplaying the role of the NSC in the NSC system?

Senior Review Group

The SRG was established on September 13, 1970. It assumed the functions of the Review Group. The role of the SRG is to assure that the issues have been sharply defined, all relevant factors considered, realistic alternatives with their costs and consequences clearly set out, and the views of all interested departments and agencies fairly and adequately presented. The number of SRG meetings dropped from about 50 each of the last two years to 16 this year. Ten of the 16 meetings were on Vietnam, South Asia, and CSCE/MBFR.

Questions:

- What accounts for the decrease in the use of the SRG?
- Is there a more efficient and acceptable means of handling NSSM studies than by a meeting of the SRG?

Defense Program Review Committee

The DPRC was established on October 11, 1969. The DPRC was to analyze the choices inherent in defense budget decisions, relating alternative levels of defense expenditure to other national priorities, both domestic and foreign. It has a very broad charter but has been a real disappointment because of its inability to come to grips with significant issues.

Questions:

- Does the DPRC serve a useful purpose?
- Does OMB perform the functions given to the DPRC?
- Does OMB give sufficient emphasis to NSC interests?
- Can the DPRC be restructured to be more effective by reducing its membership?
- What is the proper forum for examining long-term implications and strategic aspects of different defense postures?

Washington Special Actions Group

According to the directive (May 16, 1969)³ which established the WSAG, it was to confine itself to consideration of the policies and plans affecting crises. The WSAG was later (June 20, 1969)⁴ given the task of reviewing existing military plans for potential crisis areas. During the last three years the WSAG has met almost exclusively on South East Asia, South Asia, or Middle East matters. 52 of the 55 WSAG meetings this year were on South East Asia matters.

Questions:

—Do we need a group that is responsible for anticipating future crises?

—Do we need a group which concentrates on matters related to contingency planning?

—As used today, does the WSAG duplicate the SRG?

—Since the membership of the WSAG is essentially the same as the SRG, is there a need for two separate groups?

Verification Panel

The Verification Panel is charged with the technical analysis of arms control issues. This year the VP met 10 times on SALT. In the past, the VP met 6 times on MBFR, but this year MBFR was handled by the SRG (4 meetings).

Questions:

—Could the arms control issues be handled as well by the SRG?

Intelligence Committee

The IC is charged with advising the President on the quality, scope, and timeliness of the intelligence input to Presidential decision and on the steps to improve it. The IC has met once since it was established in November 1971.

Questions:

—Is it necessary to have a separate group (made up of essentially the same people as the other groups) to perform this function?

—Is the IC going to be used in the future?

Overall

There is an almost total overlap in the membership of the various groups in the NSC system below the NSC. The Big 5 (Kissinger, Irwin, Rush, Moorer, and Helms) are the principal players on the SRG, DPRC,

³ Document 45.

⁴ See footnote 2, *ibid.*

WSAG, IC, and VP. The charters of some of these groups have become blurred to the point that they are insignificant. All groups or committees (except the WSAG) have met less this year. In part this is due to the pressures of Vietnam and maybe the election. It would be a mistake to attribute the total decline to Vietnam and the peace talks.

Questions:

- Is it necessary to have all the various committees and groups?
- Do the charters of these groups need to be redefined or refined?
- Do we want to change our presentation of the working of the NSC system?

Tab A

	<i>1969</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1972</i>	<i>Total</i>
NSC Meetings	37	23	13	3	76
SRG Meetings	41	53	50	16	160
DPRC Meetings	4	11	11	4	30
WSAG Meetings	12	39	42	55	148
VP Meetings	1	10	17	10	38
IC Meetings	—	—	—1	—0	1
Total	95	136	134	88	