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Iraq 1969-1971

-244. Telegram 321 From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, January 27, 1969, 1552Z [ PDF version   ] 

To preclude Israeli retaliation, the Embassy recommended that the Department strongly condemn the recent public hanging of Iraqi Jews.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 29 IRAQ. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Immediate to London and to Rome, Beirut, Amman, Jerusalem, and USUN.

The Embassy expressed hope that Secretary Rogers' statement of condemnation would mollify somewhat Israeli indignation over the Iraqi hangings.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 29 IRAQ. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, London, Rome, and USUN.

The Department submitted a copy of Rogers' statement against the execution of the 14 Iraqi Jews to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 29 IRAQ. Unclassified. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Brussels, Amman, London, and Jerusalem. Drafted by Betty Jane Jones (IO/UNP). Cleared by Davies, Atherton, C. Morgan Holmes (EUR/FBS); Robert G. Neumann, L/NEA, Seelye, George T. Walsh (S/S); and approved by Sisco.

In the Evening Report, Richardson notified the President of attempts through third parties to achieve the release of Americans imprisoned in Iraq.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President's Daily Briefing, Box 1, February 1-8, 1969. Secret. This memorandum was for the President's Evening Reading.

Sisco recommended that the Secretary seek Presidential authority to influence the Government of Iraq to permit its Jewish population to emigrate.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, SOC 14 IRAQ. Secret; Exdis. Tabs A, B, C and D to the memorandum from Sisco and Handley to Rogers, January 31, were attached, but are not published.

With his own endorsement, Rogers passed along the suggestion of Justice Arthur Goldberg that Washington attempt to persuade Baghdad to let Iraqi Jews emigrate to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 14 IRAQ. Secret; Exdis. A handwritten note on the document reads "Approved by President according to Sec. Rogers 2/10/69 JPW. Asst. Sec. Sisco informed 2/10/69."

Leddy recommended that an expression of appreciation be sent to Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel for the work Belgium had done in representing U.S. interests in Iraq since 1967.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Baas. The attachment is not published. A message of thanks was sent on February 10.

The report, entitled "Iraq: Internal Stresses and the Search for the Bogeyman," analyzed the recent arrests and executions in Iraq within the framework of the insecurities of the Ba'ath government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

The report discussed the recent efforts of the Iraq National Oil Company to exploit the disputed North Rumaila oilfield.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PET 6 IRAQ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.

The Embassy alerted the Department that Baghdad might demand that the United States sell its Embassy property in Baghdad in exchange for the exit visas of the recently-released American hostages.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Beirut, London, and Tehran. In telegram 33546 to Brussels, March 7, the Department rejected the notion of paying the Iraqis ransom for the former U.S. hostages. (Ibid.)

Baas briefed Davies on topics likely to arise in the latter's upcoming meeting with the Belgian Ambassador to Iraq, Marcel Dupret, who represented U.S. interests in Baghdad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq Affairs, Lot File 72D4, Box 6, POL 7, Visits and Meetings, Misc., 1969. Confidential. The meeting was held on March 20 (see Document 256).

As requested, Handley provided Sisco with a review of U.S. Government actions in the face of the crisis of Iraqi Jews.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/ARN Files, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq Affairs, Lot 72D4, Box 6, POL 13-3, Ethnic and National Minorities, Jews, 1969.

Marcel Dupret, the Belgian Ambassador to Iraq, told an Embassy official and Rodger Davies that the Baghdad Government sought the U.S. Embassy property for security reasons.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential. The conversation took place in Brussels, Belgium.

Macomber wrote that the House resolutions for a special UN Security Council Meeting on the executions of Iraqi Jews were inadvisable from a practical standpoint.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, SOC 14 IRAQ. No classification marking. Drafted by Thomas H. Shugart, IO/UNP; cleared by Elizabeth A. Brown, IO/UNP; John T. Abernethy (S/R), and Baas. This letter is an unsigned copy. House Resolutions 226 and 227 were attached, but are not printed.

Assyrian representatives reported to U.S. officials that Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani was under pressure to attack the Kirkuk oil facilities, and continued to hope for U.S. support.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PET IRAQ. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Baas. The conversation took place at the Department of State.

An official emissary of Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Barzani arrived to deliver an appeal for assistance in the struggle with the Iraqi government from the Kurdish leader to Secretary of State Rogers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 IRAQ. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Baas. The conversation took place at the Department of State. According to a memorandum of conversation, another delegation led by Sam Andrews returned to the Department on January 30 to plead the Kurdish-Assyrian case. Rodger Davies responded that "while the US does not have a significant national interest in the situation in Iraq, the Iranian and Israeli governments apparently do. We are not suggesting in any way that the Assyrians turn to them for help, but it would be surprising if their apparent interest would not encourage them to provide the support that is desired." (Ibid., POL 23-9 IRAQ.)

An Iraqi businessman inquired as to whether a new government in Baghdad could expect American support if it were moderate, rightist, and pro-West.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq Affairs, Lot 72D4, Box 5, POL 2, General Reports and Statistics, Iraq, 1969.

The Embassy reported the widespread rumor that the exiled former head of SAVAK, Teymour Bakhtiar, was in Baghdad organizing an anti-Shah movement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IRAN-IRAQ. Limited Official Use. Drafted by J. Thomas McAndrew; approved by Curtis F. Jones.

An Iraqi émigré informed Country Director Talcott Seelye of how an Iranian-funded coup in Iraq had foundered.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 2 NEAR EAST. Secret; Limdis. On November 7, J. Thomas McAndrew, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Lebanon, wrote to Seelye, "Your October 15 memcon of a talk with Lutfi Obeidi came across my desk just after my conversation with Sa'd Jabr. (see Document 260) Though Sa'd did not mention Lutfi's name, I do not for a moment doubt that the two are in league. Sa'd spoke with great conviction and feeling that time is running out for the United States if it does not either 1) substantially alter its policy toward the Arabs or 2) encourage the few remaining moderate elements in the Middle East. In this latter category he would place, in addition to his 'group,' the Kurds under Mullah Mustafa, the Druze of Syria, the Bedouins of Jordan, the Lebanese, and some elements in the Yemen….It seems to me…that no group seeking to overthrow an established regime will have much chance of success unless it can obtain support from an important component of the indigenous military establishment." (Ibid., NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq Affairs, Lot 72D4, Box 6, POL 23-9, Rebellions, Coups, (Embassy Attaché), 1969)

The Embassy reported that an Iraqi émigré, hoping to overthrow the Baghdad government, was asking for a U.S. commitment to aid his proposed new regime.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tehran. J. Thomas McAndrew was the Political Officer in the Embassy in Lebanon.

The Department insisted that the US government was unable to become involved in plots against the current Iraq regime, but would be prepared to consider resumption of relations with a new, moderate government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Baas. Approved by Sisco.

The Embassy relayed news about the abortive Iranian-backed coup attempt in Iraq.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Beirut, Tehran, Amman, Ankara, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Dhahran, Kuwait, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.

Deputy Foreign Minister Khalatbari described the current state of Iran-Iraq relations in the wake of the coup attempt.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-IRAQ. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Dhahran, Jidda, London, Tel Aviv, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.

Israeli Government officials, meeting with Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Barzani's representatives in Tehran, pledged assistance if hostilities were resumed.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran and Iraq, TDCS DC-315/01044-70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only.

The Department offered reassurances to Iran of the likely instability of the current Iraqi-Kurdish rapprochement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970-73, POL IRAQ-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William H. Hallman, NEA/IRN. Cleared by Seelye; William K. Anderson, EUR/SOV; and Dirk Gleysteen, S/S. Approved by Davies. In telegram 928 from Tehran, March 12, MacArthur had sent word that the Shah believed his worst fears of Soviet influence on Iraq had been confirmed with the formation of an autonomous Iraq-Kurdish province. (Ibid.)

The Department conveyed the Israeli Foreign Minister's opinion that the Soviets had been critical to the recent Iraqi-Kurdish settlement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL NEAR E--USSR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, and Cairo. Drafted by Theodore H. Wahl (NEA/IAI); cleared by Seelye, H. H. Stackhouse (NEA/IAI), William H. Gleysteen, Jr.(S/S), Emory C. Swank (EUR), and G. Norman Anderson (EUR/SOV); approved by Davies. In telegram 1491 from Tehran, April 15, the Embassy reported that the Iranian Government concurred that Soviet influence on Iraq was strong and increasing. (Ibid.) In telegram 2909 from London, April 16, the Embassy wrote that the Foreign Office thought Soviet influence had been important, but not necessarily decisive. (Ibid.)

A report on "Iraq-Persian Gulf: Iraq Looks at the Gulf" examined Iraq's expanded regional role.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAQ-NEAR E. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by John F. Lilley. Approved by Dayton S. Mak, INR/NEA. Attached but not published is a map of the Middle East.

The Department speculated about the purpose behind the current Iraqi trip to Moscow.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow. Drafted by Thomas J. Scotes (NEA/ARN); cleared by Martha Mautner (INR/RSE/FP), Beigel; and approved by Seelye.

The cable reported that the Kurds anticipated a showdown with the Iraqi Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, TDCS 314/08439-70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

The Embassy summarized the content of the new joint Soviet-Iraq communiqué.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Algiers, Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN.

A European diplomat indicated that the Soviets were disappointed with the Iraqi Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, TDCS DC-315/04352-70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Kissinger initialed the cable.

The cable disclosed that a plot was underway by Shi'a Muslims to overthrow the Iraq government in September.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, TDCS-314/08944-70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

The Embassy passed along a report by the Belgian Foreign Office on the gradually improving conditions for Iraqi Jews.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 14 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Tehran, Beirut, London, and Tel Aviv.

The Embassy reported on the recent turmoil in Iraq's Ba'ath party, which had resulted in the dismissal of Hardan Tikriti at the instigation of Saddam Hussein and others in the Revolutionary Command Council.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Kuwait, Tehran, Jidda, Brussels, Ankara, Tel Aviv, London, Moscow, and Paris. Although identified as the Iraqi Vice President, Tikriti was in fact the Minister of Defense. In telegram 361, March 31, 1971, the Embassy in Kuwait reported that Tikriti had been assassinated in the city of Kuwait, and that the government and public "assumes that murder was planned in Baghdad and executed by Iraqi govt assassins." (Ibid.)

The Embassy alerted the Department to recent Soviet naval visits to the Persian Gulf, including the most recent one to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr where the Soviets were building facilities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 IRAQ-USSR. Secret. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, CINCSTRIKE, and MIDEASTFOR.

The Department instructed the Embassy to request that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees inquire about recent reports of arrests of Iraqi Jews in Baghdad.

Source: Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 29 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Dacca, Mission Geneva for RMRC, Brussels, and USUN. Drafted by Killgore; cleared by Albert P. Burleigh (NEA/INC), Frank G. Trinka (EUR/AIS), Laurence A. Dawson (S/R-ORM), Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF), J. Theodore Papendorp (EUR/FBX), Clement J. Sobotka, S/R; Seelye; and Orson W. Trueworthy, S/R-ORM; approved by Atherton.

The Embassy reported the comments on the situation in Iraq by a Lebanese politician recently returned from a visit there.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970-73, POL IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, and Tehran. Drafted by J. Thomas McAndrew; cleared by Nicholas M. Murphy; approved by Curtis F. Jones.

With arrests of Iraqi Jews increasing, the Department pressed for information on the scheduled visit of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to Baghdad, and suggested asking the Belgian Government to make an appeal on behalf of the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 29 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to the Hague, Mission Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Thomas J. Scotes; cleared by Seelye, Papandorp, Trinka, and Trueworthy; approved by Atherton.

The mission relayed the outcome of the UN High Commissioner's Baghdad discussions with Iraqi authorities about the arrests of Iraqi Jews.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 14 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Kathmandu, Brussels, Dacca, and USUN.

The Department instructed the Embassies to request their host governments to make representations to the Baghdad government on behalf of Iraqi Jews.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 14 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, US Mission Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Scotes; cleared by Seelye, Frederick Smith, Jr., (SCA), Trueworthy, Greene (IO/UNP), Papendorp, Long (EUR/FBX), Johnson (EUR/AIS), Jack M. Smith (EUR/SPP), Joel E. Marsh (EUR/AIS); approved by Atherton.

The Department notified the embassies that Iraq had demanded a greater rise in prices on oil piped from Eastern Mediterranean terminals than the oil companies had offered.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Warren E. Clark Jr. (E/ORF/FSE); cleared by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN), Brooks Wrampelmeir (NEA/ARP); approved by Akins.

The Department forwarded the substance of talks on internal Iraqi developments between Assistant Secretary Sisco and the Belgian Ambassador to Iraq.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 2 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Seelye; approved by Sisco.

The Department advised the posts of the Iraqi government's threat to unilaterally legislate an agreement or nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company if the oil companies did not meet its demands.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAQ. Secret; Limdis; Priority. Repeated to Kuwait, Jidda, Tehran, Tripoli, Dhahran, and Brussels. Drafted by Clark. Cleared by Scotes and Wrampelmeier. Approved by Akins.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees conveyed his annoyance over the leak of information concerning his intervention in Baghdad, which had resulted in the release of imprisoned Jews.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 29 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to US Mission Geneva.

Seelye concurred with the UN High Commissioner's dismay over the leaked information, which undermined U.S. efforts with Iraq.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 14 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Scotes. Sent through Atherton. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicated that "JTA [Jewish Telegraph Agency] report (attached) says Javits released the letter. It could be, of course, that it was released or otherwise let out by Javits' office without the Senator's OK. ASA" The letter to Senator Javits is an unsigned copy. The JTA report was attached but is not published.

Eliot informed Kissinger that the US Embassy property in Baghdad had been seized by the Iraqi Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Scotes; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Seelye, Leamon R. Hunt (NEA/EX), and Joseph F. Donelan, Jr. (O/A).

The Department forwarded a message from the Belgian Ambassador to Iraq, in which he cautioned Washington against retaliation for the seizure of the U.S. Embassy property.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Scotes. Cleared by Papendorp; approved by Seelye.

A close associate of Barzani contacted the Embassy in Beirut to request talks with the U.S. Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-3 IRAQ. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Jidda, London, Tehran, and USUN. Drafted and approved by Curtis F. Jones; cleared by Thomas J. Carolan, Jr.

In a meeting with Embassy officers in Beirut, a Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Barzani representative again requested U.S. assistance for the Kurds' anti-Baghdad movement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files1970-73, POL 12 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Tehran. In telegram 206473 to Beirut, November 12, the Department confirmed the Embassy's feeling that a meeting between Barzani and U.S. officials would only nurture false hopes of U.S. assistance. (Ibid.)

The Department critically analyzed the rosy assessment of internal Iraqi affairs recently published by a Lebanese journalist.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN-IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Brussels, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. Drafted by Edward G. Abington (NEA/ARN); cleared by Albert A. Vacarro (INR/RNA), Joseph A. Presel (EUR/SOV), Miklos, Seelye; and approved by Atherton.