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Iran 1971

-109. Telegram 218 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, January 14, 1971, 1445Z [ PDF version   ] 

MacArthur warned that the Shah, indignant over the consortium's delay in meeting with OPEC Persian Gulf producers, was threatening unilateral OPEC cutbacks.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Beirut, to Tripoli, London, Paris, the Hague, Caracas, OECD Brussels, OECD Paris, NATO, Jidda, Kuwait, Dhahran, Tokyo, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, and Algiers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Iran. No classification marking. Drafted at the Department of State on January 15 by Nicholas Veliotes (U). Identical letters were sent to the King of Saudi Arabia and the Emir of Kuwait.

Under Secretary Irwin reported back to President Nixon and Secretary Rogers on his meeting with the Shah, in which the Shah lobbied for a separate Persian Gulf oil agreement rather than the OPEC-wide deal that the companies sought.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Iran. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, Dhahran, Tripoli, London, The Hague, OECD Paris, and EC Brussels. In a telegram dated January 18, following his discussion with Amouzegar, Under Secretary Irwin recommended to the President and Secretary Rogers that the oil companies negotiate a regional oil agreement for the Persian Gulf. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC). Further documentation on the Irwin Mission is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVI: Energy Crisis, 1969-1974.

Ambassador MacArthur summarized his briefing with the consortium negotiators, in which he recommended concessions on the scope of the oil agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London, Kuwait, EC Brussels, Dhahran, The Hague, Jidda, OECD Paris, Paris, and Tripoli. In Telegram 302 from Tehran, January 19, the Embassy reported a consortium representative's remark that Amouzegar had been convinced by his talks with Irwin that Washington agreed that Gulf oil negotiations should proceed before consortium talks with Mediterranean producers began, a view which MacArthur himself seemed to share. MacArthur protested, "I gave company reps Iranian viewpoint firmly held by Shah and Amouzegar, that negotiations should proceed first with Gulf group… For them now to imply to their principals that this position (consistently held by Shah) is result of Under Secretary's talks here yesterday and my own views today seems self serving and rather devious." (Ibid.)

Ambassador MacArthur defended the credibility of Iranian assurances on oil, contradicting company claims that Finance Minister Amouzegar had raised new conditions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to London and to Tripoli. In Telegram 16444 to Tehran, January 30, the Department advised MacArthur to approach Amouzegar regarding the oil companies' concern that Iranian promises against "whipsaw" in oil pricing had been weakened.

Ambassador MacArthur and his British counterpart rejected the oil companies' request for a formal démarche to Iran to resolve remaining disputes with OPEC. The U.S. ambassador favored a message from the President to the Shah to help cement the final deal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to London. In Telegram 476 from Jidda, February 14, Ambassador Thacher wrote, "we should avoid any action tending to endorse the arbitrary short deadlines and coercive legal measures by which U.S. corporations were forced on very short notice commit themselves to payments of billions of dollars over the next few years." (Ibid.) (declass.) In Telegram 28309 to Tehran, February 19, Rogers informed Zahedi that "The settlement just reached with the companies is of great importance … in assuring stable market arrangements during the five-year period of the agreement. Of particular importance to the negotiations and us were the assurances given in this respect at the time of Mr. Irwin's visit." (Ibid.)

The report summarized the terms of the final oil agreement between OPEC's Persian Gulf members and the international oil companies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Drafted by Harvey T. Clew (INR/Economic). Released by Leonard Weiss (INR).

The report examined the attitudes of Iranian youth and the implications of these attitudes for US foreign policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-2 IRAN. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Embassy Youth Committee. Cleared by Arnold L. Raphel. Approved by Donald R. Toussaint. In a comment to Jack Miklos, May 4, Timothy Childs agreed that the attitudes of the activist youth were widespread, but that their beliefs would be tempered by time. Of the suggestion that the U.S. government attempt to draw nearer to the activists, Childs wrote “the only way to do that would be for the United States to urge, and be seen to be urging, further steps towards liberalization upon the Shah. For a variety of reasons I am sure we would be most hesitant to do this. Therefore I conclude that we should not worry too much about the ill-informed views of activist youths. By the time they reach positions of influence it should be apparent to them that the United States has a lot to offer Iran.” (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, POL 13-2, Students, Youth Groups, Iran 1971.) (declass.)

The memorandum judged that despite the considerable increase in income as a result of the oil deal, Iran was likely to continue deficit spending.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 79T00935A, Box 55, CIA/ER IM 71-43, Project 45.6028. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Economic Research and Coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

Prior to broaching the question of the Gulf islands and the proposed Gulf federation with the British, the Department solicited views on what role the U.S. Government might usefully play.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Joseph W. Twinam (NEA/ARP); cleared by Murphy (NEA/ARP), Miklos (NEA/IRN), Burns (EUR/BMI), Sisco (NEA), Davies (NEA), Robert T. Curran (S/S). In Telegram 1068 from Tehran, March 6, the Ambassador discouraged the Department's proposal in paragraph 3C: "Given GOI's adamant insistence upon validity of its claim to islands, we do not rpt not believe Iran would agree to any such 'reexamination' as GOI would fear such action would be construed as meaning Iran itself did not believe it had entirely valid claim." MacArthur also added, "We see virtually no prospect of US and UK (or both) having success in encouraging Iranian support of even truncated federation without assurance of agreement between Iran and UK permitting Iranian presence on islands before UK withdrawal." (Ibid.)

Ambassador MacArthur informally proposed to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home the introduction of an Iranian civilian presence on the disputed Gulf islands prior to the British withdrawal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tehran, Kuwait, Jidda, and Dharan. In Telegram 376 from Dhahran, March 27, Dinsmore reported that Murphy when in the Gulf Sheikdoms had heard repeatedly that Iranian seizure of the islands would present an opportunity for dissidents to rise up against the rule of the sheiks and that the "United States would be tarred with same brush because area's people aware of close U.S.-Iranian ties and there is assumption that what Iran does is in line with US desires…" Under normal circumstances, after the UK's withdrawal, "at least Sharja's and Dubai's rulers would probably turn to Iran for help in time of trouble. Seizure of islands would render this kind of relationship with Iran out of question … Iran is setting course toward seriously weakening its ties with Arabs." (Ibid.) (declass.)

Iranian Ambassador Afshar, reminding Under Secretary Irwin and Country Director Miklos of the Iranian role in the Gulf region, expressed the hope that Iran would be able to secure additional military equipment from the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Miklos. Approved in U.

Kissinger advised Nixon to discuss a proposed visit to Iran during his upcoming meeting with Ambassador MacArthur.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 602, Country Files, Middle East Files, Iran, Vol. III, 1/1/71-8/31/71. Confidential. Sent for information. A note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

Discussing a presidential visit to Iran, Nixon and MacArthur analyzed that country's role in the Gulf, and its significance as an ally.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 475-23. Secret. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Meeting with representatives from the departments of Defense and State, Ambassador MacArthur stressed Iran's importance as the lone strong U.S. asset between Europe and Japan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN).

At the behest of the UAR Government, the Shah urged President Nixon to pressure Israel to accept an Arab-Israeli peace settlement based on UNSC Resolution 242, Secretary Roger's peace plan, and Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's proposals.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. No classification marking.

Ambassador MacArthur alerted the Department that the Shah hoped to bridge the gap between the recent Persian Gulf oil settlement and the more favorable terms that Libya had just secured.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tripoli.

The Embassy reported on the recent outbreak of student strikes on Iranian university campuses and the crackdown which had followed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-2 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Charles W. McCaskill; and approved by L. Douglas Heck. Major General Zia Farsioo, the Chief of the Judge Advocates Office, was responsible for executing thirteen student dissidents from an anti-Shah, allegedly pro-Beijing group known variously as Siah Kal, Lahijan, and the Iranian Liberation Organization. He was assassinated by the group on April 7, 1971. (Attachment to Donald Toussaint to Jack Miklos, February 11, 1972, NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D410, Box 7, INT, Intelligence, General Iran, 1972.)

Ambassador MacArthur notified the Department that instances of "externally directed and supported" anti-government subversion in Iran had increased in recent months.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Moscow.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. Secret. A stamp on the document reads "The President has seen." Tab A is published as Document 129. Tab B is not published. Tab C is published as Document 124.

Nixon replied to the Shah that a peace settlement must be the work primarily of the Arabs and the Israelis, although the United States was working with both sides within the Jarring mission framework.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, Iran, M.R. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran Correspondence. No classification marking. In Telegram 1885 from Tehran, April 13, Ambassador MacArthur discussed with Zahedi the Shah's first letter, countering that although Washington was making great efforts, the United States was not in a position to impose a solution on Israel, which would only harden Tel Aviv's stance. When MacArthur added that Israel had strong domestic opposition to placate, Zahedi responded that the United States also had domestic political concerns to consider in the matter. (Ibid., Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 1/1/71-5/31/71.)

The Ambassador wrote that a former leftist Iranian student, Bahram Daryani, had publicly charged U.S. organizations, including the FBI, with facilitating anti-Iranian activities in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-2 IRAN. Confidential.

In meetings with minister of Agriculture Zahedi and Minister of Court Alam, Ambassador MacArthur voiced dismay about the Daryani charges, to which Alam replied that Iranians felt that the U.S. Government should do more to restrain Iranian students in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-2 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis. In June 1970, for example, when the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, visited San Francisco, 40 Iranian students, who raided the Iranian Consulate General in protest, were arrested. However, the U.S. Government declined the request of Iranian officials that the detainees be deported. (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 76D470, Box 9, Chronological Memoranda of Conversation, Iran 1970.) The Embassy reported other possible explanations, including the idea that SAVAK, following its disclosures of communist activities in Iran, wanted to demonstrate independence of western influence, or that the Shah was putting Washington on the defensive at a time when he was contemplating relations with Communist China. (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, POL 13-2, Students, Youth Groups, Iran 1971.)

Ambassador MacArthur questioned Minister of Court Alam as to whether underlying Iranian grievances against the United States had motivated the Daryani affair.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-2 IRAN. Secret; Nodis.

Kissinger recommended that the President sign a waiver to allow Iran to continue to receive grant military assistance despite its reclassification the previous year as a "developed" country.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military, 1/1/71-12/31/71. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum from OMB Director George Shultz, June 9, is not published. The President signed the attached waiver, Presidential Determination No. 71-18, on June 24, 1971.

The Department of State notified the Embassy of the credit terms authorized by the Export-Import Bank for Iran's FY 1972 military purchases.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by John Lentz; cleared by Glenn McLaughlin, Don Bostwick (XMB), and Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN); and approved by Paul H. Boeker (E/IFD/ODF).

Ambassador MacArthur conveyed to the Department his support for the Shah's interest in employing Major General Hamilton Twitchell as a consultant to the Iranian Armed Forces following Twitchell's retirement as Chief of the U.S. Army Mission in Iran/Military Assistance Advisory Group (ARMISH/MAAG).

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis.

In response to a White House request, the CIA prepared a paper weighing the merits of asking the Shah to ban future poppy cultivation in Iran.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, Job 80T01315A, Box 24, S-3686-S3716. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

Ambassador MacArthur reported to the Department on the terms of the consortium's agreement with Iran for additional revenue outside the terms of the five-year settlement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Repeated to London, Vienna, Jidda, Kuwait, and Dhahran.

Helms discussed Ambassador MacArthur's concern that the insecurity of Iranian communications allowed the Soviets access to details of U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Executive Registry Subject Files, I-13, Iran. Secret. The letter is a copy with an indication that Helms signed the original.

Ambassador MacArthur noted that since Iran strongly advocated producing country interest in all aspects of the oil industry, it was likely to play an "active but moderating role" in formulating OPEC participation policy at the next meeting

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 3 OPEC. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Lagos, Jidda, Dhahran, Kuwait, Tripoli, Algiers, Djakarta, Caracas, London, Paris, The Hague, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, and Vienna.

The Embassy recommended that the United States accept the Shah's proposal that all Iran's major military purchases be procured through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to CSAF and CINCSTRIKE.

Ambassador MacArthur disagreed with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General William C. Westmoreland, who opposed General Twitchell's employment by the Government of Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis.

Ambassador MacArthur reported that the upcoming UK withdrawal from the Gulf and the Iranian 25th Centenary celebrations had inspired subversive groups trained and infiltrated from outside to launch small-scale attacks in Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 IRAN. Confidential. The lavish 2500th celebrations, held October 1971 at Persepolis, commemorated the anniversary of Cyrus the Great's founding of the Achaemenian Empire. On November 19, David Abshire replied to a letter of concern, forwarded by Senator Lloyd Bentsen, that the Shah had pre-emptively rounded up 39 dissidents on August 23, and sentenced most to death. Abshire wrote that "The Iranian government has acted energetically to round up the terrorist groups, as would any government in similar circumstances. In our opinion these dissident elements in Iran … are in no way representative of the views of the great majority of the Iranians, who support the Shah and his government." (NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D351, Box 6, POL 23, Internal Security, Counter Insurgency, Iran 1971.) On December 21, the Embassy expressed the view that a campaign against the death sentences was communist-organized. (Donald Toussaint to Jack Miklos, NEA/ARN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 29, Political Prisoners, Iran 1972.)

Sisco advised Rogers on the status of British-Iranian negotiations over the Gulf islands, in which the United Kingdom and Iran had reached agreement in principle but had yet to obtain the consent of the sheikhs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-3 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Joseph W. Twinam (NEA/ARP); cleared by Davies (NEA), Burns (EUR/BMI), Dowell (NEA/IRN), and Murphy (NEA/ARP). The proposed letter, Tab A, is published as Document 144. Tabs B and C are not published. The substance of this message was included in the material submitted to Kissinger on September 8 for the President's Thursday Briefing. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, 6/1/71-12/31/71.)

Rogers encouraged Douglas-Home to urge the sheikhs to accept the tentative islands agreement, which represented the maximum that the Shah could offer.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Twinam; and cleared by Davies, Burns, Dowell, and Murphy. In Telegram 167813 to London, September 9, Sisco requested that the Ambassador ask Douglas-Home to consult with the United States prior to the Iranians if the sheikhs' reaction to the plan should be negative, so that Washington itself could approach the disputing parties if need be. (Ibid.) In telegram 175137 to Dhahran, London, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tehran, September 21, the Department transmitted Douglas-Home's reply, in which he said that "Increasingly he [the Shah] may have anxieties about having his bluff called since he cannot want to use force if he can avoid it, thus jeopardising his relations both with the Gulf States and the whole Arab world… He is, of course, as we all know, a very accomplished brinkman." (Ibid.)

Nutter laid out the Department of Defense's arguments against the employment of General Twitchell by the Iranian Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-9 US-IRAN. No classification marking.

Ambassador MacArthur alerted the Department that the Shah was requesting with increasing urgency an electronic counter measures capability, particularly Shrike missiles.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 IRAN. Secret; Exdis.

Johnson summarized the dispute between State and Defense over whether General Twitchell should be allowed to accept employment with the Government of Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. In an October 20 memorandum, Eliot notified Sisco that Laird had asked his General Counsel to devise a system in which Twitchell could work for the Stanford Research Institute on whichever Iranian contracts the Counsel deemed appropriate, and advise the Shah in this capacity. (Ibid.)

Kissinger advised Agnew on how to discuss South Asia, Taiwanese representation in the United Nations, and the Gulf islands dispute during his attendance at the 25th Centenary Celebrations in Iran.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 6/1/71-12/31/71. Secret.

Vice President Agnew recapitulated his talks with the Shah, which focused primarily on Iran's military requirements.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1268, Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 6/1/71-12/31/71. Secret; Exdis. The President was briefed on Agnew's meeting with the Shah in the Monday Briefing of October 16. (Ibid.)

The Department reported that a bombing at the Iranian Consulate General in San Francisco had left no casualties, and that a suspect had been immediately apprehended.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 IRAN-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Immediate to Tehran. Drafted by Timothy W. Childs (NEA/IRN); cleared by Davies, Michael J. Tretola (SY), Robert T. Curran (S/S), Charles D. Maguire (A/OPR), and Hampton Davis (S/CPR); and approved by Miklos. As indicated by its round-up of dissidents, the Iranian Government had anticipated terrorist acts during the celebrations, which had been broadly condemned by many Iranians as "expensive, unnecessary and tasteless." (Stanley T. Escudero to Michael G. Michaud, Ibid., NEA/IRN, Office of Iran Affairs, Lot File 75D365, Box 7, POL 1, General Policy and Background, Iran 1972)

Nutter requested that a team be assembled to brief the Shah and the Imperial Iranian Air Force on acquiring a defense capability against surface-to-air-missiles.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330-74-083, Iran 452.1, 1971, 74-083. Secret. The memorandum bears Nutter's typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.

Irwin supported the recommendation that the U.S. Air Force Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) to Iran be continued to July 1974, at a level reduced from 80 to 43, to ensure effective operation of the two additional squadrons of Iranian F-4 aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-9 US-IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Miklos; and cleared by Sisco, Davies, and Chapman.

Rogers updated Nixon on the resolution of the dispute between the sheikhs and Iran over the Gulf islands, and the subsequent Arab reaction to the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Twinam; concurred in by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Robert H. Pelletreau (AF/N), and Miklos. On November 30, the Iraqi Government condemned the Iranian and British Governments in equal measure for what it termed "an open aggression on the people of the Arab Gulf [that] threatens the peace and safety of the area…" (NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Iraq Affairs, Records Relating to Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, 1968-72, Lot 75D16, Box 11, POL 1, Iraq Political Relations, Iraq-Arab States, 1971)

The Shah described to the Ambassador MacArthur the new strategic situation developing in his region, and the long-term defense forces build-up with which he planned to meet the challenge.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6-3 IRAN. Secret. Repeated CINCEUR and Defense.

The Shah outlined the extensive changes he would demand in his government's relationship with the oil consortium once the current concessions expired in 1979.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Algiers, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tripoli.

Kissinger advised the President that Ambassador MacArthur and Secretary Rogers both urged Nixon to make his long-awaited trip to Iran, both to assuage the Shah's pride and to ease the Shah's concerns over long-range Soviet objectives in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, Presidential Trip Files, Iran Visit, [Cherokee] (Part 1). Confidential. Nixon wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "H + K--I agree [that a visit to Iran is a serious proposition.] Right after Democratic Convention?"