NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 324. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 3, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Brown on December 2. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that on December 3 the original signed memorandum was given to Rusk and a copy was sent to Smith at the White House. SUBJECT The Problem The North Koreans have continued to insist that we sign their document admitting espionage and repeated intrusions, apologizing for these "crimes," and promising not to intrude again. They have denounced us for proposing an "overwrite" solution in which General Woodward would add in his own hand a phrase acknowledging receipt of the crew. They have not categorically rejected our proposal; rather they have refused to accept it, they have attacked us for putting it forward, and they have shown no sign of moderating their demand. Recent Developments The meetings in September made it clear to us that the North Koreans are willing to give us back the crew at the moment (or almost the moment) we sign their document. There would still be some procedural problems but they seem manageable. The meetings in October made clear to the North Koreans what they may not have understood: that we are not prepared to sign their document but only to acknowledge receipt on it. We have not explained to them in so many words that we intend, after the release, to denounce the document, hanging our repudiation on this distinction between "signing" and "acknowledging receipt on," and saying that we had signed only what Woodward had himself written. But there is no doubt that they now understand this intent. They have denounced our proposal as a "petty stratagem" designed to "evade your responsibilities," and at present they appear determined not to leave this loophole open. We called the last meeting (October 31) very quickly on the heels of the preceding one in order to appear firm in our stand. They hesitated for three days before agreeing to meet, but their position at the meeting was unyielding and they may merely have been taken a bit off balance by the unusual speed of our move. It is now their turn to call and they have made no move since October 31 to convene a session. Our Choices We can (1) stand on the overwrite proposal, perhaps with minor variations; or (2) sign their document, prefacing our signature with an explanatory statement and repudiating the document as soon as the crew are free./2/ /2/In a memorandum to Rusk, drafted on December 9, Katzenbach detailed these and a third option--reformulating a "conditional apology" that met North Korean demands but contained no untrue statements, thus basing an apology on the crew's confessions and similar statements--in a draft instructional telegram to Seoul for the next Senior Members meeting. (Ibid.) The options were discussed at a lunch meeting with the President on Tuesday, December 10. The first two options were approved, but the third was not. (Notes of Lunch Meeting; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, July to December 1968 [1]) Time for a Squeeze Play The fact that Christmas is approaching and that the Administration will soon change offers us an opportunity to give the North Koreans an ultimatum without grave risk of breaking off the talks. We can call a meeting, give them a package of proposals, and say: "Take your choice; these offers are good only if you accept one of them in time to get the men home for Christmas. This Administration will then withdraw them and will make no further proposals." If this ploy failed, the new Administration would be free to resume the negotiations on whatever lines it chose. Variations on Standing Pat We can simply offer to the North Koreans our present overwrite proposal, giving them the Christmas deadline to take it or leave it. We can also revive the alternative of a conditional apology ("if we intruded, we are sorry") which we made last Spring and which was bluntly rejected then. We would dress it up in new language so that it might on the surface seem a new element but we would not include the unacceptable North Korean demands: the flat admission of "espionage" and of repeated intrusions. If the North Koreans are minded to settle the issue, this might satisfy their need for a piece of paper with General Woodward's name at the bottom. A Repudiated Apology It is reasonably clear that if we simply sign their document we will promptly get the men back. The pros and cons of this course make an intricate argument which is summarized at Tab A. We do not recommend an outright apology, since it would be costly in foreign policy terms, but we recognize that the argument for an apology appeals to many reasonable men. We could mitigate some, though not all, of the evil in an outright apology by coupling our signature with a simultaneous or perhaps even prior repudiation of the content of the North Korean document. We could, for example, have General Woodward say into the cameras and tape recorders just before he signs that, as has been made clear in the negotiations, the United States Government does not believe the Pueblo committed espionage or intruded, and that he is signing for the purely humanitarian reasons of getting the crew back. We are far from certain that the North Koreans would accept this procedure if warned about it in advance, and if not warned, they might at the last minute refuse to transfer the crew. And even such a "repudiated apology" would have demeaning elements from our viewpoint. Nevertheless, some variation on this ploy deserves serious consideration for inclusion in our take-it-or-leave-it package. We would tell the North Koreans that we are now prepared to sign their document but will have to make a statement, before we actually sign, that their document contains statements which we consider false, and that our signature does not alter these facts. Release of the crew and publication of the signed North Korean document would follow. Our repudiation would be released to the press simultaneously with their document. We would have settled the problem through mutual acceptance of two wholly inconsistent statements. We doubt that the North Koreans would accept this alternative, but they might. If they did, we would have paid a substantial but not exorbitant price to close out the problem. The most dangerous aspect of such a proposal is that it places on the negotiating record an offer by us to sign their document. The North Koreans are certain to regard this as an indication that we are gradually knuckling under and they will simply press us to remove our attached condition--the repudiation. The "squeeze play" described above does much to meet this danger, but perhaps not enough. The North Koreans may well feel that if they disregard our ultimatum we will come back after Christmas or after January 20 with an unconditional offer to apologize. We believe that this additional offer of a "repudiated apology" has a better chance of success than the others, but the costs to us in foreign policy terms would still be serious. We therefore are inclined to adopt the following more limited package, despite its relatively small chance of success, i.e., to say to the North Koreans that we are prepared to accept either of the following alternatives provided that it will result in the release of the crew before Christmas. If neither of these offers is accepted, they will both be withdrawn after Christmas and the North Koreans will then have to deal with the new Administration. The proposals would be: a. Our present overwrite proposal. You may wish to discuss this problem with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Katzenbach signed the original.
Tab A SHOULD WE APOLOGIZE? Nature of the Case The arguments in favor of signing the North Korean document come down to two propositions: a. It is the only humane thing to do since it is clear that unless we sign the North Koreans will not release the crew--certainly not for a long time. b. It is disadvantageous politically for us to let the affair drag on. The argument against signing comes down to the single proposition that this Government should not solemnly place its authorized signature on a document it knows to be false, particularly if acting under blackmail and duress. Apart from these, there are many secondary arguments--about the credibility gap, about the effects in South Korea and on our commitments in general, etc. In our judgment, these arguments tend to balance each other off or to fall in the category "an apology wouldn't really be so bad because . . ." They thus should not be decisive in determining whether we apologize or not. The Argument for Apologizing Only when we sign their document will we get the crew back. If only because the North Korean charges are lies, they will insist on a piece of paper from us validating their lies. They have been and will remain wholly inflexible on this point. We have no means of pressure which look promising. All reasonable people know the North Korean charges are false and that we would be signing purely from humanitarian considerations. We would not be seriously damaged by a signature and we owe it to the crew and their families to pay this price for their release. Moreover, there are political problems in allowing the matter to stagnate. It reminds people of our impotence and generates pressure for unwise actions, such as seizing North Korean ships. Better to cut the knot, even at some cost. Assessing the case. It is probably true that the North Koreans will not soon accept any compromise, such as our overwrite proposal. And we do not seem to have any effective pressures against them. The humanitarian argument is the most valid argument for signature. We do not believe the political argument is valid. If we resolve neither to apologize nor to do anything that might risk war or violate our basic principles, the political pressures can be contained. The Argument Against Apologizing The evil effects of signing a false document under pressure would be widespread, insidious, and long-lasting. Most foreign governments and even many Americans are puzzled by our reluctance to utter untruths but they respect us for this eccentricity. The Communist doctrine that truth is relative and can legitimately be manipulated is a major difference between them and us. If we sign we will have seriously damaged our good name. Assessing the case. Many reasonable people find this argument vague and idealistic. We find it profoundly true. If we were to apologize, the price paid for freeing the men would be substantial, though hard to define. It would not be costly in the short run since the general relief and gratification that they were free would combine with their own revelations to override the negative elements. Nor would it impair faith in our security commitments which are on quite another level of solemnity and gravity. But over the long run the fact that in this case we had bent our principles for tactical, even though humanitarian, considerations would have to be counted, a serious cost. Whether we owe it to the men to pay this price, or should look on them as on other prisoners of war, is a question to which individual consciences and political philosophies will give varying answers. The price in international political terms would be considerable.
325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, December 11, 1968, 2008Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Also sent to Moscow and repeated to Tokyo and USUN. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Steadman, Toon, Meeker, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach. 285426. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-Sixth Meeting. 1. Approach of Christmas, combined with change of Administration here shortly thereafter, offers us opportunity to press North Koreans for release of Pueblo crew without serious risk of formal break in negotiations if they reject our offer. We plan to present them two proposals with warning that unless one is accepted promptly so that men can be home by Christmas, these proposals will be withdrawn and this Administration will make no further offers. Republican Administration would then have free hand for any subsequent dealings. 2. Our hope is that North Koreans will calculate that they are not likely to get more from President-elect Nixon than from President Johnson and will accept one of choices offered. We hope also that recent visit of CVA Hancock will have reminded them that winding-down of Viet-Nam war could liberate resources to improve US-ROK military posture and that they would be well advised to reduce sources of tension, both by releasing Pueblo crew and by desisting from infiltration attempts such as Ulchin. 3. For Seoul. Charge should convey to Prime Minister our intentions as outlined above, describing in general terms contents of package to be offered North Koreans./2/ Since we are quite willing to have NK intelligence pick up gist of foregoing, you may also brief MOFA, warning sternly against press leaks, and not describing to MOFA the alternative to the overwrite. /2/The Prime Minister was briefed on December 13. He expected a few days of public and media reaction to the outcome, but believed the act would be supported. (Telegram 11770 from Seoul, December 13; ibid.) 4. For Moscow. We are calling in Soviet Charge to convey fact that final offer from this Administration is about to be delivered at Panmunjom./3/ You may as you judge appropriate raise matter in any contacts with Soviet leaders. If you can stimulate reflections among Soviets along lines of para 2 above, so much the better. At minimum, any reference by them to carrier Hancock should be countered with strong denunciation of Ulchin landings. If Soviets were to conclude (wrongly) that Hancock operations somehow related to Ulchin landings, we would not mind. If such landings are continued and expanded as we fear is Pyongyang's intent, we may face situation as serious as that created by Blue House and Pueblo incidents. /3/The Soviet Charge was informed orally by Toon on December 14 and was given a text of his remarks, which outlined the two options to be presented to the North Koreans at the next closed meeting. (Telegram 287260 to Moscow, December 14; ibid.) 5. Negotiating instructions for Seoul are contained in following paras. 6. Although protocol calls for Pak to speak first, we assume he will make only brief pro forma statement and turn floor over to General Woodward. If he delivers long denunciation of past US positions, Woodward should probably brush it aside with brief comment and go directly into presentation of our proposals. Of course, if Pak opens with something new or shows interest in overwrite, Woodward will have to decide on spot whether to explore possible opening or proceed with offers below. Following guidance is based on assumption Pak says nothing really new. 7. Woodward should draw attention to fact that Christmas, a national holiday of great significance to Americans, is only X days off and that USG very much wants to have Pueblo crewmen reunited with their families by that date. 8. Woodward should then point out that present Administration will end on January 20 and USG will from that point have a new President, Mr. Nixon, and new Secretaries of State and Defense. If Pueblo matter not settled by then, the new Administration will have to decide what measures it considers appropriate to deal with the problem. 9. This Administration intends, however, to make one last effort to solve the matter. Woodward should say that he is authorized to state that President Johnson personally and the other leaders of this Administration are prepared to go very far indeed in order to realize the humanitarian objective of reuniting the crew with their families at Christmas. They are prepared to offer General Pak and his authorities their choice of either of the following ways of handling the matter. A. We are willing to make their draft Document of Apology and Assurance the basis for a solution, and General Woodward is authorized to agree to sign his name on that document, provided that he writes in above his name the phrase "I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew". B. If General Pak's authorities prefer to avoid the use of this additional phrase, General Woodward is authorized simply to sign his name on the place provided, but under one specific condition. This condition relates to the fact that, as Pak is aware from the long discussions which have taken place in these negotiations, (1) the USG does not consider that the Pueblo was engaged in illegal activities, (2) the USG has not seen convincing evidence that the ship intruded into the waters claimed by Pak's authorities, and (3) the USG cannot apologize for an action unless that action actually took place. If General Woodward were to sign Pak's document without first adding the overwrite phrase above, he would have to make a formal statement just before signing to clarify those three points. The only reason the USG has considered instructing Woodward to sign is for humanitarian reasons in order to obtain the freedom of these hostages who are being held against this sort of ransom. Only if this fact is made absolutely clear in conjunction with signature, can Woodward be authorized to sign Pak's document. Woodward should also make clear to Pak that, if Pak's authorities announce prior to signature that the USG is admitting its crimes and apologizing, or otherwise divulge publicly the contents of the document to be signed, we would at that point be required to release our statement explaining what we consider to be the meaning of the signature. 10. After presenting above choices, Woodward should suggest Pak study them and offer to respond to any questions he may have. He should remind Pak that Christmas deadline, though it may seem sentimental to others, has great meaning for Americans which thus gives it political significance. These offers will all be withdrawn December 23 and a rapid decision by Pak's authorities is essential. 11. Faced with our deadline, Pak will probably avoid closing any doors with further denunciation of A. He may, however, be puzzled by B and may wish to explore how it differs from repudiation after signature and release, which he presumably has always expected from us. If he comes back with questions, Woodward should state that formal statement referred to in our proposal B would be a clarification by us of the nature of that document and the reason we were signing it. Our clarification would contain the three points noted in para 9.B. above and would explain that we were signing a document which was in contradiction with those points in order to obtain the release of the crew. A text of such a clarification is contained in the following para and Woodward may offer it to Pak if he wishes. 12. Statement by General Woodward. "The position of the United States Government with regard to the Pueblo, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew." 13. For General Woodward's information, we contemplate his reading statement in para 12 into tape recorders just before he signs. Text would be available for distribution to press along with NK document./4/ /4/In reply to procedural questions raised by the Embassy, the Department of State addressed the two most important issues in case an overwrite agreement was reached: (1) the type of announcement to be made once an agreement was made and the length of time between acceptance on and (2) the signing and release of the crew. Regarding the first, the Department preferred that each side announce the agreement and the time of the release, but would repudiate any North Korean attempts to claim the U.S. would "acknowledge and apologize for crimes." Concerning the second, the Department preferred no more than a 24-hour delay, but was willing to accept a maximum of 48 hours, if necessary. Most other details had been previously discussed or left to Woodward's discretion. (Telegram 11729 from Seoul, December 12, and telegram 286601 to Seoul, December 13; both ibid.) Rusk
326. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 17, 1968, 0816Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 11824. Subject: Summary of 26th Closed Meeting at Panmunjom. Ref: Seoul 11816./2/ /2/Telegram 11816 from Seoul, December 17, informed the Department that Pak accepted proposal B. (Ibid.) 1. Meeting opened at 1100 hours local Dec 17 and concluded at 1342 local./3/ /3/Telegram 11830 from Seoul, December 17, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (Ibid.) 2. Gen Pak opened meeting by stating there was no alternative to signing NK document if crew to be released. Gen Woodward then made proposals (A) and (B) State 285426,/4/ saying that if proposal (B) preferred we would have to make statement on signing, Gen Pak then proposed recess which lasted fifty minutes. /4/Document 325. 3. Following recess, Pak indicated NK acceptance proposal (B). Gen Woodward agreed to sign to right of signature block in accordance with Korean custom. 4. General Pak then said that agreement in principle had been reached on signing and questions of procedure could be considered. Gen Woodward read statement he would make on signing in accordance with proposal (B). Pak made no comment. 5. Gen Pak asked if we accepted the proposal on procedures which he had made previously. Gen Woodward in reply gave Pak our counter proposals (State 255214, State 268226)./5/ Pak did not comment. He seemed untroubled by our counter proposals with the exception our desire avoid two-hour time gap between actual signing and release of crew. /5/See footnote 4, Document 320. 6. General Woodward outlined administrative questions on which agreement would be needed such as handling of coffin and removal of NK road barrier in JSA. Gen Pak said he would comment on our counter proposals and on administrative questions at next meeting. 7. General Woodward strongly urged that next meeting be held Dec 18. Pak did not agree and said he would let us know when he was ready. He appeared to understand urgency as well as need for secrecy which Gen Woodward emphasized. 8. Charge will brief Prime Minister in strictest confidence as soon as possible on developments in view possibility NK side may not maintain secrecy. We do not propose to brief Foreign Ministry at this point and will refuse to comment in response to any other inquiries. 9. Assume Dept will continue to refuse to indicate whether progress made or breakthrough near. If any other line contemplated please advise us immediately. Lathram
327. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, December 17, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT State of Play At the 26th meeting last night (Washington time), the North Koreans accepted "in principle" our latest proposal, a "pre-repudiated apology". General Woodward passed to General Pak the text of the statement (Tab A) which Woodward will read into the record just before signing the North Korean document (Tab B)./2/ General Pak, who had just accepted the concept of such a repudiatory statement, did not raise any objections to this text. Prime Minister Chung had been briefed on our proposal and raised no objection. /2/Tabs A and B attached but not printed. The text of Tab A is the same as paragraph 12, Document 325. Tab B is the same as paragraph 3, Document 306. Procedural details remain to be settled. There will have to be at least one more meeting (probably Wednesday evening) and perhaps several. The possibility of some hang-up remains. The North Koreans may press us to modify our statement, for example. But it looks as though the men will be free before Christmas. Next Steps The scenario is fairly well fixed up to the point when the crew is released. Our important problems will be to explain what has happened to the American public and the world. At the time of release we will publish both the North Korean document and our statement repudiating its contents. We will be prepared to elaborate to the press why we agreed to resolve the matter through these two obviously incompatible documents and what the North Korean acceptance of our statement implies about the truth of their allegations. A brief statement should probably be issued at this point on behalf of the President welcoming the release but not going into the details of the arrangement. As quickly as possible, we will seek confirmation from Captain Bucher and the crew that there was no intrusion and that their confessions were extorted. If possible, Captain Bucher will immediately make a brief statement to this effect to the press in Korea. We will then brief the press here in detail on the numerous inconsistencies in the North Korean "evidence", explaining how we have been so confident they were forgeries. (If Captain Bucher says the ship did intrude, we will have to consider what public statement to make, taking into account evidence from other officers, etc.) We will then have to decide, in the light of information received from the crew, what portion of the draft White Paper should be made available to the press. We may wish to publish excerpts from the actual negotiating record, or we may prefer to give priority to comments by crew members on their experience. As soon as medical checks have been made the crew will be flown to San Diego for reunion with their families and for detailed debriefings.
328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, December 17, 1968, 2354Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard, cleared by Brown and Walsh, and approved by Katzenbach. 288724. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-seventh Meeting. 1. We believe current instructions cover most problems likely to arise at next meeting and there is little we can do until Pak delivers his responses to presentation made at Twenty-sixth meeting. 2. One worrisome question is how to respond if Pak tries to whittle away formal statement Woodward is to make. Particularly in view of time element, we prefer to react strongly, saying it is not negotiable and that any effort to obtain alterations in it will simply lead to collapse of entire deal now agreed in principle. We have not tried to modify their draft and they will be wasting time trying to modify our factual statement of considered US position./2/ If Woodward prefers he could simply say that he is not authorized to make any changes in our statement. /2/Woodward agreed and intended to tell Pak "the statement is part of package and is not negotiable." The Embassy also noted that Pak seemed unbothered by the statement at the last meeting and seemingly knew of it in advance from information passed by the Soviets. (Telegram 11850 from Seoul, December 18; ibid.) Rusk
329. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 19, 1968, 1100Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 11877. Subject: Summary of 26th [27th] Closed Meeting at Panmunjom. Ref: State 285426./2/ /2/Document 325. 1. Meeting commenced at 1100 local Dec 19 and terminated at 1553 hours./3/ Because of complexity of discussion on wide variety procedural and administrative questions we are dividing this message into two parts. The first deals with questions on which there was no substantial dispute. Second deals with disputed questions. /3/Telegram 11878 from Seoul, December 19, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. Non-Disputed Items. A. Health of Crew--In response to Gen Woodward's question, Gen Pak said crew in "normal condition". General Woodward interprets this to mean that crew is in good health. B. Order of Release Across Bridge--Commander Bucher will cross first with body of Seaman Hodges and will identify body. Remainder of crew will cross in order of roster provided by NK side; that is, lowest ranking personnel first. C. Press--Our proposal that there be no more than 25 civilian press members from each side was accepted. D. Other Personnel in Area--Agreement reached. E. Statement at Time of Signing--NKs agreed to statement by General Woodward of our position but said that they would also make statement at same time. F. Document To Be Signed--NK will provide document in both English and Korean. Signature on Korean version to be at right of signature block. Signature on English version to be above signature block. 3. Disputed Items. A. Two-hour Interval Between Signing and Release--General Pak held out for interval of two hours between signing and release. He insisted this was necessary to comply with NK law and for administrative reasons. B. Publicity--NK side offered Gen Woodward choice between no publicity until signature and arrangement which would leave each side free, once agreement reached, to respond to whatever other side said. During 30 minute recess Gen Woodward conferred with Embassy on this point. We reached conclusion it preferable leave each side free as we could not prevent premature leaks once Breeches Buoy plan implemented. Our understanding of agreement is that NK will not issue official release until time of signature if our side does not issue official release. Gen Pak seemed unconcerned with prospect of press speculation. C. Final Date and Time of Release--Pak insisted he did not have authority agree to date and time of release at 26th meeting. He said he would call another meeting in three or four days to confirm final agreement. Gen Woodward pressed him hard on this point, pointing out that if crew was to be home by Xmas with families final release no later than Dec 21 essential. Pak would not and obviously could not retreat but did say "We will do our best to realize your wish. If we cannot meet your wish it will be because of unavoidable administrative reasons." It was agreed that final agreement would be reached at next meeting. Gen Pak also agreed to Gen Woodward's proposal that signature take place at 0900 hours day following final agreement with release at 1100 hours same day. 4. Gen Woodward comments as follows: There is agreement on our proposal (B) and complete agreement on all procedural matters except for establishing date of final agreement. I considered it unusual for Pak to say he would do his best to meet my wishes for speedy next meeting. Lathram
330. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 22, 1968, 0625Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 11916. Subj: Summary 28th Meeting at Panmunjom December 22./2/ /2/Telegram 11917 from Seoul, December 22, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (Ibid.) 1. General Woodward sent following: 1. 28th meeting ended at 1229 local time. Final agreement reached. Signing will occur at 0900 hours tomorrow, 23rd December with the release of the crew at 1100 hours same day. 2. Major item covered was sequence of events at 0900 signing. 3. First, I will make my statement and then sign documents. Pak will examine documents, make his statement and then give me written assurance of crew return. Porter
331. Editorial Note On December 23, 1968, at 9 a.m. Korean time, General Woodward and General Pak met for the last time. General Woodward opened the meeting, which lasted for 47 minutes, by making a brief statement and signing the documents as prearranged. The text of the document signed by General Woodward on December 23 is in Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1969, pages 2-3. After General Pak accepted and examined the signed documents, he accused the United States of having violated the agreement, charging that the Department of State had publicly announced the time of the release of the Pueblo crew. Because of that announcement, General Pak stated that the time of the release of the crew must be renegotiated. General Woodward disputed his claim, prompting General Pak to announce a delayed release time of 11:30 a.m., to which both sides agreed. The verbatim text of the meeting was transmitted in airgram A-890 from Seoul, December 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. At 11:30 a.m. on December 23, with two crew members carrying the body of the one sailor who died during attack on the ship, the 82 members of the Pueblo crew walked in single file across the Bridge of No Return at Panmunjom into the southern section of the Demilitarized Zone, where they boarded buses and were taken to a nearby U.S. Army camp. Statements issued by President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk confirming the release are in Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1969, pages 1-2. At the U.S. Army camp Commander Bucher and other members of the crew held a brief press conference and met with Ambassador Porter and several South Korean officials. (Telegram 11967 from Seoul, December 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) At the press conference Commander Bucher stated that at no time had the Pueblo entered North Korean territorial waters and described beatings and abuse suffered by the men in captivity. (The New York Times, December 23, 1968) After a brief stay at the Army camp, the crew was flown by helicopter to the 121st Evacuation Hospital on a U.S. Army base near Seoul for medical examination. The following day the hospital's commanding officer announced to the media that, although the examination revealed the aftereffects of beatings the men endured while in captivity and signs of malnutrition, the crew evinced no psychological damage requiring immediate treatment. The men were then released for return to the United States. (Telegram 1958 from Seoul, December 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) From Seoul the crew flew to the Miramar Naval Air Station in San Diego, California, arriving on December 24. After being reunited with their families for the Christmas holidays, the men were given extensive medical and psychological examinations. From talks with members of the crew the Navy gathered additional information and documented details of the physical abuse and mistreatment inflicted on the Pueblo crew by the North Koreans. (Memorandum from Moorer to Clifford, December 24; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 383.6; and memorandum from Blouin to the Chief of Naval Operations, December 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Filed by the LBJ Library) The Navy concluded that the maltreatment of the crew members was officially sanctioned, physical and psychological abuse was conducted systematically and during specific periods of the crew's captivity, the crew adjusted to the level of abuse they experienced, and the degree of physical violence inflicted on the men was deliberately controlled to prevent death and permanent injury to the captives. (Memorandum from Colonel Robert E. Pursely to Secretary Clifford, January 6, 1969; ibid., Papers of Clark Clifford, Pueblo, March 16 to January 20, 1969) On December 26 in-depth intelligence debriefing of the crew members by teams composed of personnel from the National Security Agency and the Naval Security Group began and continued through January 10, 1969, although Commander Bucher's interviews extended somewhat beyond that date. Tape recordings, transcripts, summaries, and similar information in preparation for or derived from the debriefings of the crew are in NSA/CSS Archives, Pueblo Collection, Accession No. 24103, Boxes CBOJ11 to CBOJ33; ibid., Accession No. 24107, Box CBOJ43; ibid., Accession No. 30072, Box CBOJ55; ibid., Accession No. 31236, Box CBOJ55; NSA, Historical Files, Box 1, Pueblo, Summaries and Tapes; and ibid., carton marked Return and Debriefing of Crew (Breeches Buoy); Pueblo: Administrative and Debriefing Procedures. After the debriefings were completed, a Naval Court of Inquiry convened on January 20, 1969, at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, California, to investigate all circumstances surrounding the seizure and loss of the USS Pueblo and to determine culpability, if warranted. According to the Navy, the Court of Inquiry was merely a fact-finding body, similar to a civilian grand jury, with authority to call witnesses, take sworn testimony in both open and closed sessions, and gather diverse forms of information. Testimony given during open sessions received extensive coverage in The New York Times, among other sources. The Court adjourned on March 13 and issued its findings on May 5. The Court recommended bringing charges against Commander Bucher and Lieutenant Stephen Harris, the commanding officer of the Naval Security Group detachment on board the Pueblo, and that both be tried by court martial. Commander Bucher faced charges of failing to protect and defend his ship, following North Korean orders to sail to their port, failing to properly train his crew to destroy classified material, failing to destroy that material upon capture, and permitting classified material to fall into enemy hands. Lieutenant Harris would be charged with failing to train his crew in emergency destruction procedures and failing to destroy classified material as ordered. The Court also recommended reprimanding the Pueblo's executive officer, Edward R. Murphy, for dereliction of duty and bringing charges against the Commander of Naval Forces, Japan, Rear Admiral Frank Johnson, and against the Director of the Naval Security Group, Pacific, Captain Everett Gladding, for failing to support and protect the ship adequately. Ultimately, the Secretary of the Navy, John Chaffee, overruled any further action against the officers, stating that the members of the Pueblo crew had already endured enough suffering while held captive and warranted no further punishment and that charges against their supe- riors would also be dropped, since they were not solely responsible for failing to anticipate an attack on and the seizure of the ship. With that decision all further action by the Navy in the Pueblo matter came to a close. (National Security Agency, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and its Effect on SIGINT Operations, pages 164-165) In addition to the Naval Court of Inquiry, a Joint Intelligence Team, composed of representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence branches of the Navy, Air Force, and Army, assessed the impact on intelligence operations and programs resulting from the loss of the extensive number of messages--between 7 to 8,000 were analyzed--received by the Pueblo prior to its capture. Its report determined that the loss of those documents gave the Communist world undue insight into United States intelligence-collection capabilities and represented a major compromise of intelligence-gathering sources and methods in Southeast Asia. ("Damage Assessment of the Compromise of Operational Intelligence Broadcast Messages on Board USS Pueblo [AGER-2]," March 17, 1969; NSA, Historical Files, Box #6, Pueblo, Review (GOPI) Damage Assessment) The National Security Agency also conducted an extensive review and analysis of the intelligence losses resulting from the seizure of the Pueblo and the detention of its crew. The resulting report was based first and foremost on the information gathered during the in-depth debriefing of the crew concerning the information and equipment on board the Pueblo and captured by the North Koreans as well as information imparted by crew members when interrogated during captivity. Analysts learned from the debriefing of the enormous number of documents and the full extent of the equipment that fell into North Korean hands intact or with minimal damage and of the intelligence information imparted by some of the crew members. The conclusions contained in the final report assessed the compromise to "the Cryptologic Community collection, processing and reporting operations/techniques on a worldwide basis is without precedence in U.S. cryptologic history." The report also observed that cryptographic communications remained secure because of the continued inability of the North Koreans or others to decrypt messages "without cryptographic keys used in conjunction with the equipment." ("Cryptologic/Cryptographic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, AGER 2, 23 January-23 December 1968," March 1969, page 17; ibid., Carton VIII, Pueblo Files, Charts, Maps, Draft History, etc.) A full realization of intelligence losses resulting from the Pueblo seizure emerged only in mid-1985 when the Walker spy ring, operated within the U.S. Navy by John Walker, his son Michael, and others, was discovered and found to have passed to the Soviet Union over an 18-year period a variety of information, including the keys to coded communications, allowing the Soviets to decrypt and read highly classified documents and transmissions. (National Security Agency, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and its Effect on SIGINT Operations, pages 157-159) Congressional hearings into the Pueblo seizure, expanded to include the downing of a Naval reconnaissance plane by North Korean jets on April 16, 1969, were held in March and April by a special subcommittee chaired by Representative Otis G. Pike. (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the USS Pueblo, Hearings on the Inquiry into the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents. 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, Committee Print 91-10) Documentation pertaining to testimony given by high-level Navy officers as well as key figures in the intelligence community, such as National Security Agency Director Carter and Director of Central Intelligence Helms, are in National Security Agency, Historical Files, Box VIII, Pueblo, Post-Incident Reviews, House and Senate Hearings; ibid., Box 1A, Pueblo, VIII Post-Incident Review, Chronological File, January-February 1969; and ibid., Box 1B, Pueblo, VIII Post-Incident Review, Pueblo Chronological File, March 1969. In mid-April the House of Representatives, with the concurrence of the Senate, passed a resolution stating that "no manned ship or plane of the Armed Forces of the United States should be sent into danger areas on an intelligence gathering mission without adequate protection against attack or capture by foreign armed forces." (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, House Concurrent Resolution 204, April 17, 1969, 91st Congress, 1st Session) In the immediate aftermath of the incident, the examination of events surrounding the capture of the Pueblo and its crew led to an overall evaluation of the intelligence-gathering program as a whole and resulted in a suspension of all intelligence operations using ships of that type. By late 1969 the program came to an end with the deactivation of the last vessels. (National Security Agency, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and its Effect on SIGINT Operations, pages 174-175) In the closing days of the Johnson administration the Departments of State and Defense discussed alternatives to induce the North Koreans to return the Pueblo. Consideration was given to taking action against fishing vessels being constructed for North Korea in Rotterdam, but that course was rejected as potentially jeopardizing the principle of freedom of the seas. (Memorandum from Brown to Secretary Rusk, December 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) The ship was never recovered from the North Koreans. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXIX Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |