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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 317. Action Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to an October 5 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson that indicates that the President saw it. Another copy is attached to an October 5 memorandum from Katzenbach to Rostow in which the former states: "This is a very important decision and I would very much appreciate it if the President would read the memorandum in its entirety." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) SUBJECT The Problem: The fundamental issue at Panmunjom has been that the North Koreans have insisted on our signing an admission of espionage and intrusion into their territorial waters, apologies for both, and a promise of no further intrusion. We have refused to admit espionage or to apologize for acts we do not believe were committed. Various forms of conditional apology (e.g., we regret any intrusion that may have occurred) have been rejected. The "Overwrite" Solution: To break this impasse, we have, with your authorization on May 18, been exploring the possibility of General Woodward writing the following sentence on the "document of apology and assurance" presented on May 8 by the North Koreans: "There have been turned over to me today at Panmunjom 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Duane D. Hodges." He would sign this inscription. If the North Koreans accepted this they would presumably claim that we had signed their piece of paper. We would say that we had signed only what Woodward had written. Recent Progress: For the last four months we have been pressing for a firm commitment by the North Koreans that if we were to "acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to them" they would simultaneously release the whole crew. At the 21st meeting (September 17) the North Koreans for the first time said unambiguously that if we would sign their document, they would return the crew. At the 22nd meeting (September 30), they were even more explicit, saying that the entire crew would be released simultaneous with our signing their document. The "Overwrite" Not a Deception: In the negotiations since May we have on a number of occasions noted that the North Korean document of May 8 does not correspond to what we believe are the facts. Moreover, we have been scrupulous in using the words "acknowledge receipt on" in describing what we might be prepared to do, and when Pak has interpreted this to mean that we were "willing to sign" General Woodward has replied, "You are using words I did not use." Our Korean language experts tell us the difference between "sign" and "acknowledge receipt on" is even clearer in Korean than in English. Moreover, we have sent a message to the North Koreans through an Australian contact in Tokyo spelling out in more detail what we had in mind. We are not absolutely sure that this message got through to Pyongyang, but our Australian contact and his Korean friend are confident that it did. Moreover, at the last (22nd) meeting, General Pak presented a slightly modified draft of his paper of May 8 with this additional paragraph at the bottom: "Simultaneously with the signing of this document the under- signed acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse." (The entire document is at Tab A.)/2/ /2/Tabs A, B, and C are attached but not printed. This added paragraph tends to undercut our overwrite and confirms our feeling that Pak knows what we have in mind. If in the end he accepts the overwrite, we will not have misled or duped the North Koreans; rather they will have accepted an ambiguous act as meeting their requirements. They have been as consistent as we: they never speak of acknowledging receipt, only of "signing our document". We are not at all sure that they will in fact accept the overwrite ploy. The following courses of action appear open: Track A: Attempt to negotiate a satisfactory receipt. We do not believe that the North Koreans would accept any draft which did not contain an admission of espionage and intrusion and an apology for both. Yet a negotiation which reduced but did not eliminate these unacceptable elements would have succeeded only in making the draft our own as well as theirs and therefore more difficult to repudiate. The more extreme the document the easier the repudiation. Track B: Sign, with an explanatory statement. At the last Closed Meeting before the signing we could make a further statement for the record that it contains many assertions which we believe to be false, that we do not admit any crime, that the seizure was wholly illegal, and that we are signing the document only for humanitarian reasons to get back the crew. Our public statement at the time of signature and release would probably have to be limited to making clear that our signature was based entirely on the North Korean "evidence" as anything stronger might result in refusal to deliver the crew. Repudiation would follow, of course, immediately upon the crew's coming into our possession. (A draft of such a statement of repudiation is attached as Tab C.) Track C: Try a last-minute overwrite. We would move ahead to negotiate with Pak the technical arrangements for the release, leaving unresolved the ambiguity between "sign" and "acknowledge receipt on". We would then attempt the overwrite at the time of the actual delivery of the crew. This might work, but if Pak rejected it we would be in a difficult position. He will probably insist on the press being present for the signature and release. For us to attempt to overwrite without a clear understanding and acceptance in advance might seem to the world to be sharp practice, and to stand firm on it would seem to many a heartless legalism. Rather than see the crew return to North Korea, Woodward would have to sign their form of receipt. And we could hardly argue that he had signed without instructions when faced by an unforeseen situation. If we proceed along this track we must be prepared to end up on Track B--signature, with a statement for the record that takes some of the bite out of the document. Track D: Clarify the overwrite. We would firm up the detailed arrangements for a release and tell Pak precisely what we plan to do in the overwrite. Pak will probably reject this, at least for a meeting or two, perhaps finally. But he may accept it if convinced that this is as far as we are prepared to go. If he does agree, we have an impeccable record of disclosure and there is no legitimate basis for any accusations of sharp practice. If he finally does not agree, Track B is not foreclosed. Recommendation. I prefer alternative D. Track A is a dead end which will lose time without taking us anywhere. Track C is probably only a round-about way of getting to B--the outright signature. Though a public statement at the time of signing would help, the arguments against Track B are still strong. It would be demeaning to the United States to sign under blackmail imposed by an illegal act an apology for something we did not do and an admission that perfectly legal actions are illegal. We would not, for example, sign an admission that our actions in Viet-Nam constituted aggression and apologize for them even if this would insure release of 82 captured pilots. The repudiation of our signature would also be demeaning and could not wholly erase the stigma of the signature. The apology would confirm the belief of many in the United States and elsewhere that despite our denials and repudiation we were in fact engaged in improper acts, thus further tarnishing our reputation at home and abroad. Our men are dying and being captured in Viet-Nam and are risking their lives along the DMZ in Korea. The Pueblo crew are no different. Finally, there is no need to consider alternative B unless it becomes quite clear that the overwrite (Track D) will not work. I recommend that we proceed with alternative D. If it works it would result in the release of the crew on a basis with which we can live and if it should fail would not foreclose other alternatives, should we later ever wish to use them. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford concur./3/ /3/Rostow's memorandum to the President identified in footnote 1 above bears a handwritten notation indicating that Rostow notified Katzenbach on October 7 that the President approved alternative D. In addition to a copy of the North Korean document (Tab A), I attach at Tab B a draft statement such as might be used if we succeed with the overwrite and at Tab C a draft statement such as might be used if we signed the North Korean document under protest. Nicholas deB Katzenbach
318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, October 8, 1968, 1421Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Meeker, Steadman, Ambassador Brown, Brown (S/S), and in draft by Armstrong (EA/P); and approved by Katzenbach. 251495. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-third Meeting. 1. Although Pak's unambiguous acceptance of simultaneity and willingness release entire crew are heartening factors, para which he added to May 8 document may make overwrite play more difficult to execute. (Other differences seem trivial.) As you noted, added para is clever combination of signature and receipt which turns our demand for simultaneity against us. Woodward clearly has worthy opponent. 2. Problem seems to us to lie in clarifying overwrite ploy sufficiently but not too much. We must make quite clear to Pak what we intend to do and satisfy ourselves that he accepts it. If at moment of signature overwrite were rejected it would be most embarrassing for us and if Woodward for humanitarian reasons were compelled to sign on their dotted line, we could not plausibly argue that this had been unforeseen contingency for which Woodward had not had instructions. Next meeting should therefore above all pin down Pak's acquiescence in overwrite--if he can give it. 3. On other hand we recognize Pak probably cannot go beyond direct agreement to specific procedures. His authorities will plan to present overwrite as USG ratification of body of document and we cannot expect explicit language from Pak which would undercut that plan. On our side, we should try to place on negotiating record language as helpful to our case as we can without killing deal. We recognize Woodward will have to decide as he goes along how far beyond minimum he can risk going. 4. Woodward should also be aware that although our present intent is to press hard with overwrite and he should not say anything to encourage Pak to hope for more, we do not flatly exclude possibility of eventually meeting their demand if overwrite does not work. 5. You should call next meeting without delay and have Woodward open along following lines: "A. I am pleased to note that at our last meeting you agreed very clearly to the principle that the entire crew will be released at the same time that I acknowledge on your document that I am receiving them. B. With this agreement on your part I believe that we can now proceed to discuss the practical details of the release. C. I assume that you will want to transfer the crew to my custody here at Panmunjom. Is this correct? D. The other important aspect of the release is the time. I indicated at our last meeting that I assumed 24 hours would be adequate time from the moment when we have settled all aspects of the problem to the moment of release. Am I correct? If you need more than 24 hours, how much more and why?" 6. Pak may respond directly to above queries, but more likely will preface by noting his "understanding" Woodward willing to sign document passed at last meeting and may give no more information in absence of confirmation. We will find useful whatever info on time and place Woodward can extract without confirming Pak's "understanding", but such info not essential at this stage and Woodward should give priority to avoiding confirmation that he will "sign" by reiterating "acknowledge receipt" each time Pak says "sign" and eventually using paras 9-11 below. 7. If info forthcoming, Woodward should then probe on other aspect of transfer. He should indicate he will wish first to verify that all 82 men present, then have them pass to UNC side while he is actually acknowledging receipt. He should say we want no press present. Pak will presumably insist on them and after arguing hardship for crew who have already suffered enough for carrying out orders, Woodward should agree to report Pak's demand. 8. Woodward should give strong warning at appropriate moment, perhaps in above context, against any breach of privacy of talks. He should point out we have been scrupulous in observing secrecy and NK record not bad but note period immediately before release most delicate. Any breach at that time and in particular any assertion by NK sources that US on verge of apology would be most harmful and could result in breakdown of arrangements. FYI. This problem is of course very real and Woodward's tone and presentation should be designed impress Pak with seriousness of warning. If no appropriate occasion has arisen, this warning should be given at conclusion of meeting. End FYI. 9. After Pak has said all he will (perhaps nothing) on practical arrangements, Woodward should turn to real problem: form of document to be used. After referring, if appropriate, to Pak's statement of what he expects, Woodward should say as much of following as he feels he can: "A. I want to make perfectly clear exactly what I am prepared to do to solve the problem we have been discussing in these meetings. I do not want there to be any doubt in your mind or mine about what the other intends to do. B. On May 8 you presented a draft of what you would consider a suitable 'document of apology and assurance.' I subsequently pointed out to you the problem raised by the divergences between your draft and the facts. We have told you and I repeat now that the mission of the Pueblo was not 'espionage,' it was intelligence, that we can not accept the confessions and the 'evidence' you have shown us as 'proof' that the Pueblo intruded into the territorial waters claimed by you, and that we can not apologize for actions which we do not believe took place. You may confirm our statements on these points in the record of the Seventh, Fourteenth and Seventeenth Closed Meetings and elsewhere. We have also told you and I repeat now that we are prepared to assure you that our naval vessels will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from your coast. You may confirm our statements on this point on the record of the Seventh Closed Meeting and subsequently. C. Despite these statements you have continued to demand that I accept and sign your document and you have held the crew hostage to obtain my signature. I continue to object most strongly to this unprincipled blackmail." 10. An alternate, and for Pak, less troublesome formulation of these points, would be: "A. Unchanged from 9.A. B. On May 8 you presented a draft of what you would consider a suitable 'document of apology and assurance.' I subsequently pointed out to you the problems raised by the divergences between your draft and what we believe to be the facts. With regard to your assertions that the mission of the Pueblo was espionage', that you had provided us with evidence' which proved that the Pueblo intruded into your territorial waters, and that we should apologize for these acts, our position has been clearly placed on the record of these meetings. That position has not altered. We have also told you and I repeat now that we are prepared to assure you that our naval vessels will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from your coast. C. First sentence only from 9.C." 11. Para 10 is minimum we believe should be gotten on record before proceeding to deliver following. Woodward should of course feel free to select any variations bracketed by foregoing poles. He should then continue: "Nevertheless, in order to reach a solution of this problem, in order to reduce tensions in the area, and in order to permit these 82 innocent men to return to their families, I am prepared to use the draft you presented me at the September 30 meeting as a basis for solving the problem by acknowledging on it that I am receiving the custody of the crew. I will write on the draft the words: I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew' and I will sign my name and title. Do you have any objection to these arrangements?" 12. If Pak objects that sentence to be written is superfluous in view of para added Sept 30 to May 8 document, Woodward may suggest para added be removed. FYI: We actually see more advantage to retention of added para since redundancy of overwrite following added para buttresses argument that overwrite is all Woodward is signing. We can, however, accept it either way so long as concept of overwrite in Woodward's hand is retained. End FYI./2/ /2/The Embassy noted that Woodward's instructions failed to mention where he should put his signature. Although the North Korean document included a signature block, the Embassy assumed and the Department of State confirmed that Woodward should sign under it. The Department of State also noted that "best of all would be to write diagonally across face of NK document." (Telegrams 10316 from Seoul and 252348 to Seoul, both October 9; both ibid.) 13. If Pak seems in genuine doubt about some aspects of above procedure, Woodward should try to clarify. If he insists in usual fashion on interpreting Woodward's statements as acceptance of signature of document, Woodward should repeat "You are not using my language" and refer him to statement in para 11 above. 14. If Pak had earlier refused to be drawn into discussion of place and time of release and other details, Woodward should make further attempt when foregoing discussion of overwrite has been concluded. 15. When and if it becomes clear that Pak fully understands and accepts proposal in para 11, and assuming other details seem generally in hand, Woodward should ask Pak to fix date on which crew will be released. If Pak does so, Woodward should propose meeting 24 hours before to confirm all arrangements. If Pak does not fix date, Woodward should suggest Pak call next meeting when he has firm date to propose. Katzenbach
319. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, October 10, 1968, 0955Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis, Cactus. Rostow forwarded this document to President Johnson under an October 10 covering memorandum stating, "The North Koreans herewith pretend not to have understood the 'over-write' ploy on the Pueblo crew--or, in fact, did not understand it. The issue remains in the air." The memorandum indicates the President saw the documents. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIb, Cactus Seoul Cables, March 1, 1968 to October 31, 1968) 10338. Subject: 23rd Senior MAC Members Closed Meeting at Panmunjom October 10, 1968. Reference: State 251495./2/ /2/Document 318. 1. Meeting began at 1100 hours October 10 local time and ended 1418 hours./3/ /3/Telegram 10340, October 10, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. General Woodward opened meeting by suggesting that discussion of practical details of release of crew be held. He asked if his assumption was correct that 24 hours would be adequate time from the moment all aspects of the problem had been settled to the moment of release. 3. General Pak did not reply to 24-hour question but handed Gen Woodward detailed paper giving NK proposal for release of crew (text included in transcript of meeting which follows) and roster of crew with proposed order of release (being pouched). Paper made clear NK desire for maximum publicity at time of release and NK intention to publicize agreement to sign as soon as agreement reached. Paper made no mention of time interval between agreement to sign and actual release but did specify two-hour interval between actual signing and time of release. 4. Department will note from transcript of meeting that arrangements for release proposed by NK side differ considerably from Breeches Buoy concept/4/ and are designed to provide maximum NK advantage (e.g. by use of bridge of no return rather than JSA as release point). NK sketch of area of release being pouched. /4/Breeches Buoy was the name given to the operational plan for the recovery, return, and intelligence debriefing of the crew members. 5. General Woodward pushed hard for exclusion of press at time of signing. Pak took line that NK wanted to have three photographers present at signing and had no objection if US made similar arrangement. As noted above, NKs obviously arranging for big propaganda show at time of actual release of crew. 6. General Woodward then took up need to maintain secrecy at this stage of negotiations. General Pak did not reply to this point, presumably because NK proposals for arrangements concerning release openly state NK intention to publicize US agreement to sign as soon as agreement given. 7. Final matter raised by Gen Woodward was statement for record contained in para 9 reftel and explanation our concept of acknowledgement of receipt contained para 11 reftel. There was 33 minute pause while NK considered response. Pak eventually replied that General Woodward's statement meant that US was not willing to see early solution of the question of the Pueblo crew and it could not be understood otherwise. US side would never get crew back unless it made the apology and guarantee suggested by NK side. 8. General Pak's reply to Gen. Woodward's statement on acknowledgement of receipt did not directly reject this concept. Pak stated inter alia "Your side agreed to the matter of principle for the solution of the question of the Pueblo crew but has now taken an insincere and arrogant attitude for frustrating the agreement. Whom are you fooling?" General Woodward considers it possible that our definition of acknowledgement of receipt came as a surprise to Pak and he had no instructions to cover this matter. 9. If NK side genuinely believes we were on point of agreeing to sign and considers overwrite ploy a "trick," it is possible they will now seek to increase pressure on US through stepped-up propaganda campaign. One obvious avenue of approach would be to reiterate threat to try crew. Other would be to announce that NK had made specific offer to release crew and US had not seen fit to accept it. 10. Summarizing recent meetings we now know: 1. Details of NK proposals concerning actual arrangements for
release. 11. Prior to recess General Woodward agreed to consider detailed arrangements presented by NK side and to comment at next meeting. Porter
320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, October 12, 1968, 2130Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Steadman, Salans, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach. 254615. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-fourth Meeting--Part 1. 1. We are of course somewhat disheartened by Pak's apparent surprise when acknowledgement of receipt defined in precise terms. We had been reasonably confident that Pak had at least suspected our intentions, since para added to their document at 22nd meeting was clearly designed to undercut it. Pak's strong reaction may thus be explained partly in terms of hope, now dashed, that we would allow ambiguity to persist until moment of transfer. Whether he planned to confront Woodward with last minute demand for naked signature or planned to present overwrite to his superiors as trivial detail or had genuinely not foreseen overwrite we will probably never know. Wisdom of clarifying our intent seems, however, quite evident since last minute breakdown would be most painful. 2. Whether Pak's surprise was genuine or feigned and how serious his objections will prove to be will only come out in next meeting or two. It is clear NKs thought they were close to resolution of matter and were more than willing to liquidate it on their terms. We will have to wait and see whether this has generated momentum favorable to overwrite compromise. Meanwhile we will activate whatever additional pressures might move them to a favorable decision, e.g., threatening noises toward ships being built in Netherlands./2/ /2/Four fish-factory ships for North Korea were being built in the Netherlands for completion between October 1968 and July 1969. Some consideration had been given to ways they might be used to pressure the North Koreans. (Memoranda from Jenkins to Rostow and from Rostow to the President, September 10; Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security History, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Vol. 8, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 16) 3. Our general line for next meeting or two should therefore be stonewalling on main point combined with indications of flexibility on side issues. 4. If Pak has made no move to call meeting by October 18, General Woodward should indicate through JDO that he is ready any time. 5. Pak will presumably open with expanded version of closing statement last meeting and with renewed demand that Woodward state willingness "sign the document of apology and assurance." He will probably elaborate on charge Woodward is going back on "agreement in principle." 6. Woodward should reply on following lines: "A. At the last meeting I made a clear, specific proposal for settling this matter. You have responded with a general attack on my position. I deny that I have in any way gone back on an agreement in principle.' B. I refer again to my specific proposal at the last meeting that we solve this problem by using your draft document presented on September 30. I will write on that document the words I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew' and I will sign my name and title. Do you have any specific objection to these arrangements?" 7. If Pak's opening statement contains no general attack but simply avoids either concurring with or objecting to overwrite, Woodward should use only point B above. 8. Pak may respond to para 6 above with flat negative or specific attack on overwrite phrase, or may again deliver general attack. In any case, Woodward should reply making following points: A. He should note Pak's statement. B. He should regret, if appropriate, Pak's belligerent tone after businesslike atmosphere which had characterized recent meetings. C. He should then say May 8 document most repugnant to us. We would much prefer to have nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, to secure release of captives, we have consistently indicated since Seventeenth Meeting that we might find it possible to move to a solution based on that document. D. We have consistently proposed since May using their draft and acknowledging on it that crew was simultaneously being released. We have consistently said, "I will acknowledge receipt on a document satisfactory to you." Pak can verify from record that we have not deviated. In fact, at conclusion of last meeting in attacking our position he accurately quoted it. (Woodward may wish to read back first two sentences of para 15 Seoul 10340.)/3/ Concept of simultaneous release was eventually accepted by Pak. Our offer to acknowledge it on NK document was repeatedly misinterpreted by Pak but these misinterpretations have been regularly and carefully corrected. We are surprised Pak should now reopen problem which we had believed was closed. Pak must study record carefully. He will see there is no inconsistency in our position. /3/That portion of telegram 10340 from Seoul, October 10, quotes Pak as having said: "At the last meeting your side suggested to discuss the specific procedural matters, asking us 'If I agree to acknowledge receipt of the crew on the particular document which you have just presented can you release them to me against my signature?' and at today's meeting too you have confirmed it and suggested to discuss the specific procedural matters, the next subject. Thus, at today's meeting the specific procedural matters are being discussed on the basis of such an agreement." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) E. NK side may not be completely satisfied with procedure we have proposed. Nevertheless they have interest in accepting this proposal and resolving issue. Dragging matter out is obviously undesirable for us since crew being made to suffer as hostages. But prolongation also not desirable from NK point of view. Their relations with other countries--both political and economic--cannot fail to suffer from their contemptuous disregard of international law and morality. It will be to their benefit to begin to conform to these international standards and it will only harm them more and more seriously if they do not. F. Pak should bring these considerations to attention of his authorities. 9. If Pak persists in flat rejection of overwrite proposal, Woodward should express surprise and regret, say he had thought we had found a solution, urge Pak to reconsider, and suggest adjournment. 10. If at opening or in response to any of foregoing statements Pak indicates acceptance of our proposal, Woodward should say he is prepared to comment on Pak's suggestions for handling press and other procedural matters. He should not do so in absence of clear acquiescence to overwrite, since we wish to present stiff front to maximize pressure for NKs to accept compromise. If it would at any point be helpful, however, Woodward may in his discretion indicate that he sees no insuperable obstacles in technical procedures outlines by Pak. 11. Septel will give instructions on procedural matters which are still under discussion here./4/ /4/Telegram 255214 to Seoul, October 14, covered instructions on procedural matters, specifically, publicity for the agreement, presence of the press and photographers, the actual transfer of crew members, and an acceptable time delay between signing and transfer. (Ibid.) The Embassy raised some potential problems about those procedures, suggesting they needed to be addressed to preserve the integrity of operational plans. (Telegram 10725 from Seoul, October 29; ibid.) In telegram 268226 to Seoul, November 7, the Department of State sent modified procedural instructions to Woodward. (Ibid.) Rusk
321. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, October 23, 1968, 1100Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Rostow transmitted a copy of this telegram to President Johnson under an October 23 covering memorandum stating that the "North Koreans clarify the 'over-write' ploy on the Pueblo; and they reject it, for the time being." Rostow's memorandum indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIb, Cactus Seoul Cables, March 1, 1968 to October 31, 1968) 10633. Subj: 24th Closed Meeting. 1. Meeting began at 1101 hours and concluded at 1418 local time October 23./2/ General Woodward believes NK intentions were to probe US thinking on overwrite proposal rather than reject it outright while giving impression that NK side was unyielding on obtaining complete US acceptance of its proposal. Tone of meeting was not as harsh as transcript might indicate and only in last formal statement did Pak speak with vigor. /2/Telegram 10634 from Seoul, October 23, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. Pak opened with a review of NK version of Pueblo incident and negotiations. He stated that NK side had submitted a document with correct title and name and that crew could be returned if we signed document. He accused US of making absurd assertions that we wanted to add unnecessary things to document and to "sign it on your behalf instead of signing it as it is." Called this "petty stratagem." 3. General Woodward repeated the exact words he intended to write on the NK document and asked if NK side had specific objections. 4. Pak said proposal ridiculed meeting and that document they proposed included even terms of receipt we wanted, again asked if US prepared to sign. 5. Woodward pointed out consistency of US position noting he had never used any other words than "I will acknowledge on a document satisfactory to you" and that he had corrected Pak when he had misquoted him. He then made points in paras C and D of State 254615./3/ /3/Document 320. 6. There was a pause of over 30 minutes while Pak apparently sent for instructions on how to proceed. He then said US had agreed in principle to sign document and on this basis discussion at last meeting had gone to procedures for release of crew. In middle of this US had upset discussions by proposing "some sort of compromise". 7. Woodward denied going back on any agreement in principle and said he was surprised at rejection of US proposal and urged its reconsideration. He said if Pak had nothing more to say he proposed the meeting adjourn. 8. Pak again asked whether US was ready to sign the document and General Woodward repeated his willingness to acknowledge receipt on a document at time Pueblo crew simultaneously released. 9. Pak then held out a copy of the document and said that Woodward's name and title were clearly written on it together with the terms of acknowledging of the crew. He then asked "does this mean you will sign here under your name?" Woodward said he would write the receipt on the face of the document and sign his name and title. When asked where, he indicated diagonally across face of document. Reaction from NK side was visibly negative. He then suggested writing and signing on clear space at bottom of document. Again reaction was visibly negative. Woodward then indicated there were other ways the document might be signed. General Woodward believes negative reactions of NK side was deliberate and was intended to draw as much specific information on signing as possible from US side. 10. Pak then in prepared statement said US could not get crew back without signing document as it was. He said NK patience had its limits and he had said all there was to say. He said he was not interested in continuing empty talks, called the US proposal "shameless games" and said US side should come back when it was prepared to sign. He then accepted Woodward's proposal to adjourn. 11. Woodward believes that we must wait at least until the next meeting to determine whether Pyongyang is prepared to make any concessions on overwrite proposal. Porter
322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, October 24, 1968, 2118Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Salans, Steadman, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach. 261040. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-fifth Meeting. 1. Best way to convey to North Koreans that we are not considering straightforward signature of their document would seem to be to call next meeting quickly and simply ask if they are now ready accept our proposal. If Pak objects to early meeting we should not press since they may really be debating overwrite now that its details perfectly clear, and if brought to meeting before debate concluded would temporize with attacks which might dig them in deeper. Best solution might be note through JDO on lines, "I am ready, if you are," rather than proposing particular date. 2. General Woodward's opening statement should be quite direct and brief. Following points should be made: A. Since May we have consistently proposed solution which should be acceptable to NK. It is based on their document and on our principle of simultaneous release. B. Pak's allegations we have "upset agreements in principle" are not true. As pointed out last meeting, we have stated our position very carefully, checking both English and Korean versions, and have corrected Pak's misstatements of it. C. If Pak somehow failed to understand, his confusion certainly cleared up by very detailed explanations at October 10 and October 23 meetings. D. We now await his response. Does he have specific objections to specific procedures outlined by us? 3. If Pak again denounces our position in general terms but avoids closing door on any overwrite, Woodward should note that he has already repeatedly responded to these general comments and propose adjournment, adding suggestion that Pak call next meeting when he is ready to take up our concrete proposal for solving this problem. 4. If Pak opens up business of where Woodward's signature would be located, Woodward should ask if this is only major problem obstructing solution of matter, indicating that such a problem can certainly be solved. Should Pak respond it definitely is critical problem and that signature must be on line provided, Woodward may say that he can agree to add sentence acknowledging receipt in his own handwriting above that line, then place his signature on it, provided it seems likely that his assent to this procedure will lead to the simultaneous release of the crew. 5. If Pak responds that no overwrite acceptable and Woodward must sign on dotted line, Woodward should say he will report his regrettable position to his authorities, and he hopes Pak's authorities will have further thoughts. He should note it will be Pak's turn to call next meeting and propose adjournment. 6. If Pak should accept overwrite, State 255214/2/ continues to provide appropriate guidance. /2/See footnote 4, Document 320. Rusk
323. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, October 31, 1968, 0610Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 10793. Subject: 25th Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom Oct 31, 1968. Ref: State 261040./2/ /2/Document 322. 1. 25th Meeting commenced 1100 hours local October 31 and ended 1120 hours./3/ /3/Telegram 10796 from Seoul, October 31, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. Gen Woodward made opening statement along lines para 2 reftel. Since Pak responded with prepared statement denouncing our position in general terms, Gen. Woodward proposed adjourning in accordance instructions para 3 reftel. Gen Pak closed with short statement indicating that settlement question depended on US side signing document presented by NK side on September 30. 3. General Woodward believes we are in a period where NKs are waiting to see if we prepared to give. They may believe that US position will alter following elections and expected arrival of new US senior member. We anticipate NK side will wait some little time before calling next meeting./4/ /4/The Department of State agreed with this assessment and thought it unlikely another meeting would be held until at least mid-November. The Department indicated it would in the interim reexamine the situation "and perhaps suggest a review at highest levels." In the event Pak did call a meeting, Woodward was instructed to accept. If Pak proposed nothing new, Woodward should "propose adjournment, urging Pak to indicate when his authorities have empowered him to pursue meaningful negotiations." (Telegram 265604 to Seoul, November 1; ibid.) Porter [Continue with the next documents]
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