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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 130. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 14.2-67 Washington, September 21, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 14.2-67. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and of the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on September 21 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH Conclusions A. We believe that the recent, more vigorous activities of North Korea against the South have several motivations: to create new pressures on the Pak government; to tie down large ROK forces; to strengthen the Communist clandestine apparatus in the South; and to be in a position to exploit any new and major disruption in the ROK. The timing of these tactics has been strongly influenced by the Vietnamese War, for example by such factors as the absence of 50,000 ROK troops in South Vietnam. B. The North Koreans will almost certainly continue their campaign of military harassment in the DMZ, at current or even increased levels. We believe that North Korea undertook its program of violence of its own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow or Peking, and that this program does not indicate a present Communist intention to invade South Korea. Pyongyang is conscious of the risks inherent in such an action and would be reluctant to accept them. Similarly, there is probably no intention of escalating the DMZ attacks to a point at which open warfare might result. The North might miscalculate, however, and raise the ante along the DMZ until the ROK resolves to strike back in force. A series of actions and reactions might ensue which could lead to open hostilities. C. North Korea will also continue attempts to infiltrate guerrilla-type teams into rear areas of South Korea. Communist chances of establishing viable bases for guerrilla operations are probably poor, but some teams will be able to carry out short-term terrorist and sabotage missions./2/ /2/As a result of North Korea's "current activities" and "its incipient campaign of terror and sabotage in rear areas of South Korea," on October 25 the USIB agreed that intelligence efforts concerning the political, economic, and military situation in North Korea should be increased. (Memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board, October 25, with attachment; ibid.) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
131. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) Washington, undated. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Meeting 61, October 27, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
132. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/ Saigon, October 31, 1967, 1630Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 10112. VIPTO 51. Subj: Vice President's Meeting with Prime Minister of Korea./2/ /2/The Vice President and the Prime Minister were in Saigon to attend inauguration ceremonies for the newly elected Thieu-Ky government. Bundy arranged the meeting at Porter's request after being advised that Bonesteel had received information indicating that the ROK planned further actions against North Korea. Porter recommended that since Humphrey "enjoys great prestige in Korea" he could caution the Koreans against such actions and demonstrate that the "matter has come to attention of highest levels of USG." (Telegram 2119 from Seoul, October 27, and telegram 61160 to Seoul, October 27; both ibid.) 1. After an exchange of greetings, the Prime Minister stated that during his recent visit to Washington President Johnson had voiced concern about North Korean infiltration into South Korea. At that time the Prime Minister understood that a bill authorizing three destroyers for Korea had passed the House of Representatives, and been forwarded to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He has recently learned that the request for two of these destroyers was cancelled by the Armed Services Committee of the Senate. This will have unfortunate political repercussions in Korea as these three destroyers are badly needed to patrol their 600-mile coastal area. In view of the relationship of Korean public opinion to the Vietnamese war, the loss of the two destroyers is actually less important than the decline in the morale of the Korean people. If the Korean Government should in the future attempt to increase its troop strength in Vietnam, the opposition can effectively use this destroyer issue to criticize the government and weaken its position. 2. The Vice President stated that he would check into this matter of destroyers carefully. The U.S. has received a number of requests for destroyers and for modern jet airplanes recently, including requests from a number of South American countries. There has been a general reaction in the Congress against excessive military assistance in the past, and this has resulted in a tendency to refuse all requests. The Vice President counseled patience and stated that he believed the matter could be worked out./3/ /3/The Korean press reported that "Humphrey had agreed in principle that the US will provide two destroyers." Bundy labeled the statement a "mischaracterization" that was "tantamount to an attempt to blackmail us" and one that could jeopardize Congressional reconsideration of the matter. (Telegram 64926 to Seoul, November 4; ibid.) Noting he would bring the matter to the attention of the Prime Minister as soon as possible, Porter also explained that the "use of press by [Korean] government is most trying aspect of doing business here," since high-level officials "endeavor to make themselves look good in press by representing statements of Americans and others in manner bearing little resemblance to facts, and designed, as you say, to blackmail us." (Telegram 2256 from Seoul, November 6; ibid.) 3. The Prime Minister stated that he hoped so as this had become a matter of great urgency in Korea during the past year. 450 South Koreans had been killed during the past year. The Korean Government is incapable of countering espionage activities along the sea coast because when they detect North Korean attempts, they cannot catch them because they do not have the fast boats required. They anticipate that North Korea will accelerate its attempts to disrupt the internal security, the political stability and economic growth of South Korea in the next several years. Whereas the North Koreans trained 900 guerrillas this year, they are planning to train 2,500 next year for the purpose of sabotage in South Korea. 4. The Prime Minister confirmed that Korea had received the communications equipment and radar requested earlier. General Westmoreland assured the Vice President that Korean forces in South Vietnam received the same equipment as American forces. The Vice President asked the Prime Minister directly if the U.S. is failing to provide anything the Koreans expected. Is the U.S. keeping up with shipments of equipment to the regular forces in Korea? 5. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea, and expressed the hope that deliveries on the equipment promised--such as trucks and jeeps could be speeded [up]. 6. As of this date only 30 percent of the total commitment has been fulfilled. Also the Korean troops are using outmoded weapons and hope to be able to obtain modern weapons soon. In response to the Vice President's question he stated that he was talking about M16 rifles. The Vice President said that although we have had a supply line problem on rifles, we intend to keep our word on this. In response to the Prime Minister's specific expression of their interest in helicopters, the Vice President said that we would review this but that the Prime Minister should understand that General Westmoreland has first priority on helicopters. The Prime Minister said he hoped that Korea would have second priority. He stated that he would be happy to pass the word to President Park that Vice President Humphrey "would take care of this matter." The Vice President said it would be more accurate to say that "he would look into it." 6. [sic] The Vice President expressed the gratitude of American Government and the American people for the Korean participation in the Vietnam war. He is aware that Ambassador Porter has been talking to President Park about the possibility of additional troops for Vietnam. He knows of the political problems that this might cause and has not been sent by President Johnson to make any request for additional troops. But Korea is among the few close and trusted allies the U.S. has in Asia, and Korea is among those countries that will benefit from the increased commitment which the U.S. has made to Asia. We have no desire to tell Asians how to run their lives, but we both need each other. In such a situation there is no doubt that we will need more help in Vietnam. The details of this subject can be discussed in Seoul. When the world knows that we all stand together in Asia, the Communist forces will draw the appropriate conclusion. The Prime Minister should know that President Johnson stands by his friends and helps those who help us. 7. The Prime Minister stated that Korea is not afraid of any sacrifices that are required. Korea will stay with the U.S. till the final victory in Vietnam and this is important not only for Vietnam but for Korea and the United States. 8. The Prime Minister referring to the recent demonstrations in Washington against the war, stated that we might want to send those demonstrators to Korea and have them brainwashed there. Perhaps at the next Seven Nation Conference it would be well to mobilize 200,000 people in all the nations in support of the war to offset the demonstrations against the war. 9. The Vice President stated that the U.S. is aware of the great problem presented by the infiltration from North Korea. But South Korea must not respond unilaterally, must not act without consultations with General Bonesteel or if necessary Ambassador Porter. On this matter, as on all others, we must think and act in concert. We are aware of the pressures to respond to these provocations, but unilateral action can only lead to misunderstanding. He asked the Prime Minister to pass on this message to President Park. The Prime Minister made no response to the Vice President's remarks on this subject. 10. The Prime Minister expressed concern about the possibility of restrictions on the importation of Korean goods into the U.S. For the past 18 years, U.S. officials have encouraged Korea to increase its exports. Korea has succeeded in doing this and now its exports total $350 million. They hope to continue increasing their trade so they can eventually end their reliance on U.S. economic assistance. But to be self-sustaining they must have the possibility of increased trade. 11. The Vice President stated that there is increasing protectionist sentiment in the Congress, from industries such as steel, textiles, glass and others. We have to take a look at our textile situation and possibly we might want to consider discussing extending the present long term agreement on textiles, to permit both nations to share in the growth of the market for man-made fibers. There are strong pressures here, but the U.S. will not act precipitously in this matter. 12. The Prime Minister also asked why the U.S. is so strict about its Buy America policy. Korea expected to benefit considerably from off-shore procurement but has in fact realized very little. In 1966, offshore procurement for Vietnam amounted to $30 million while for 1967 it has fallen off to $6.5 million. 13. The Vice President encouraged the Prime Minister to think in terms of competitive trading. The Koreans should have trade missions and not rely wholly on the American market. We hope to maintain the American market as an open market, but nevertheless the Koreans might do well to find new outlets for their production. The Koreans should also use their special position with the U.S. public to explain their problem to the U.S. Congress and Senators. As one who worked hard for the success of the Kennedy Round, the Vice President stated he would do all he could to resist protectionists' pressures in the U.S. but this would not be easy. 14. Addressing General Westmoreland, the Prime Minister asked if it might be possible for the American logistics command in Vietnam to hire Koreans for maintenance positions from the groups of Koreans who have completed their military service in South Vietnam. This has now become a problem for Korean veterans returning from Vietnam who do not always have suitable opportunities for employment in Korea. 15. The Prime Minister stated that he had been told that the U.S. is agreeable but that the GVN is opposed to this. He had discussed this with Prime Minister Ky in Feb. and although he agreed in principle, nothing has happened. This has been discussed many times during the past year but with no results. General Westmoreland responded that he had recently instructed his staff to look into this matter. With a new government coming into power, and a new draft law which would absorb 65,000 more men, he believes that the situation is now more hopeful. He has the matter under detailed study and believes it possible that something can be worked out in the near future. 16. In conclusion, Westmoreland expressed to the Prime Minister his great admiration for the performance of Korean soldiers in Vietnam and for their leaders. He specifically praised General Chae and presented the Prime Minister with a highly favorable report on the Korean forces which had been prepared by his staff. Bunker
133. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 13, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck and approved in S on November 17. The memorandum is Part III of VII. Memoranda of the remaining parts of the Rusk-Choe conversations are: Part I, "Korean Question in the United Nations" (ibid., POL 32-4 KOR/UN); Part II, "ROK Assistance Program in Africa" (ibid., AID(KOR S) 8 AFR); Part IV, "ROK Internal Developments" (ibid., AID(US) 15-9 KOR S); Part V, "ROK-Japan Relations" (ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S); Part VI, "Summit Conference" (ibid., POL 27 KOR); and Part VII, "ROK Retaliation Against North Korea" (ibid., POL KOR N-KOR S). During his visit Choe also met with Bundy on November 13 and with McNamara on November 16. Memoranda of those conversations are ibid., POL 7 KOR S, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 2468, KOREA 091.112, respectively. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Korean Foreign Minister Choe Kyu-ha The Secretary North Korean Harassment The Foreign Minister stated that North Korean harassment of the ROK and UN troops along the DMZ was taking place on a large scale and that infiltration of the ROK further south by North Korean agents was a serious problem. When asked by the Secretary to explain North Korean motives, Choe replied that he thought the North Koreans were attempting to accomplish two objectives. The first was to slow down the rate of economic progress in the ROK and the second was to stimulate tension within the country. The Secretary asked whether any changes had been noticed in the deployment of the North Korean armed forces. Choe replied that new airfields were being built in the North and that the North Korean forces were being equipped with new Soviet equipment./2/ /2/As recorded in Part VII, Rusk suggested to Choe that other governments in the UN Command should be discreetly apprised of the situation. Cautioning that the ROK should respond to North Korean actions with considerable restraint, Rusk reminded Choe of the consequences of any significant North-South conflict and stated that "if any such clash occurred the ROKG should appear to be the victim of aggression" since the ROK "needs the support and sympathy of many foreign governments" and, therefore, should keep its record clean. Rusk also instructed Kohler to discuss North Korean harassment of South Korea with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and to suggest to him that the USSR counsel restraint on the part of the North Koreans. (Memorandum of conversation, December 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) Modernization of ROK Forces In view of the North Korean activities which he had just described, the Foreign Minister urged greater effort in improving the capability of the ROK forces to counter the North Korean activities which he had just described. He urged that the equipment of the ROK armed forces be modernized and referred specifically to the need for fast patrol boats. Mr. Berger pointed out that the fast patrol boats referred to were in the process of being delivered to Korea. Ambassador Kim countered by stating the ROK possessed only one destroyer and needed more. The Foreign Minister emphasized that in view of the establishment of small-scale guerrilla forces by the North Koreans, there was need for anti-infiltration equipment. Mr. Berger pointed out that a great deal of such equipment had already been provided to the ROK Government and that more was on the way. Joint Working Group The Foreign Minister then referred to the establishment of the joint US-ROK working group in Seoul, with military and economic sub-committees, to explore the extent to which the commitments made in Ambassador Brown's letter of March 4, 1966, had been carried out. He reported that the military sub-committee had worked out a project for providing additional equipment and he hoped that the working group's report, including this project, would soon be ready for submission. ROK Participation in Viet-Nam The Foreign Minister pointed out that the working group was also considering the problem of increasing ROK participation in programs in Viet-Nam. He said that although ROK exports in general were rising, his government wished to increase its exports to Viet-Nam. Participation was also desired in the pacification program in Viet-Nam. Mr. Berger pointed out that ROK receipts from Viet-Nam, including remittances, for the first half of 1967 totaled $60 million, which was equal to the total receipts from the same sources for all of 1966. The Foreign Minister did not deny the accuracy of these figures but said that his government keenly desired to increase exports to Viet-Nam. It also wished to participate in the pacification program and it had proposed a Korean Logistic Service Corps designed to relieve for combat duty troops now serving in rear areas. The Secretary asked if the KLSC was intended to be a military unit. The Foreign Minister replied that the intention was to have it comprise civilian reservists who would act as guards, drivers, etc., in the rear areas. The Foreign Minister then referred to his government's desire that Korean firms be given a chance to participate in bidding on contracts for delivery of goods and services in Viet-Nam. He alleged that Korean troops in Viet-Nam were wearing underwear manufactured in the United States and that Korean textile-makers should be given the opportunity to bid on such items. Mr. Berger reminded the Foreign Minister that certain actions had been taken above and beyond the commitments of the March 4 letter. He cited specifically the provision of Korean combat rations to the Korean troops in Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister said that the present situation in Viet-Nam was that large bids went to U.S. firms and small bids to Vietnamese firms. If the Koreans tried to compete on the small bids, it might cause difficulties with the Vietnamese. Therefore, they desired to share some of the contracts which now went to U.S. bidders. He said the National Assembly had set a deadline of mid-November, after which it had threatened to begin interpellations of the government on these subjects. He hoped, therefore, that the joint working group's report would be finished by that deadline. Mr. Berger commented that he was certain that the working group's report would show that the U.S. Government had performed very well in living up to its commitments.
134. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, November 25, 1967, 0528Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2576. For Secretary and Bundy from Ambassador. Subject: Additional ROK Troop Contribution to Vietnam./2/ /2/The contents of this telegram were summarized in a November 28 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson as background to the Tuesday lunch meeting on that date. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5D(3) Allies: Troop Commitments, Other Aid, 1967 to 1968) 1. Recent developments indicate ROK domestic political situation may soon be restored to something approaching normalcy. This raises question of when and how we approach Pak on additional troop dispatch for Vietnam. We have been deferring any real pressure on him in recognition of his domestic political problem. However, time is approaching when this should no longer be overriding consideration. Before proceeding with Pak, believe we should reevaluate prospects for and consequences of additional troop dispatch in light of recent developments and present conditions. 2. Situation with respect to further ROK contributions is not the same as it was for earlier dispatches or even last spring and summer. Since Vice President's visit and Clifford/Taylor mission, the picture here has changed sufficiently to warrant examining the desirability of a further ROK contribution, particularly in light future disadvantages and difficulties it may create for US in our total relationships with ROK. A. Recent statements by US officials on better prospects in Vietnam, including prospects for troop withdrawal and lessening need for additional US troops have been noted here and may lead Pak and his advisers, and Korean public as well, to question need for additional dispatch in light of pressures along Korean DMZ and perhaps other areas of country next spring. General Beach's talk with Pak this week, for example, clearly reflected optimistic view on military outlook in Vietnam which Beach had received in Saigon. B. Increased NK activity during past year along DMZ and interior has disturbed ROK Govt and the Korean people. They now anticipate greater North Korean efforts at infiltration, subversion and sabotage next year and are exhibiting considerable concern over security in ROK. In past, ROKG was prepared send troops to Vietnam if this did not impair ability handle threat from the North. In light of anticipated increase NK activity, important sectors of opinion are already saying that troops cannot be spared and any dispatch would spur North to increase pressure against ROK. C. ROKs not likely to be in position to act on any new troop dispatch until early next year since National Assembly action would be required nor could troops be deployed until well into year due to planning and implementation lead time required. In meantime, announcements of increase by Thailand, New Zealand and Australia will have become past history and if you decide that I should maintain pressure, it may look as though ROK alone is being subjected to pressure from US. D. There has been growing feeling in ROKG and Korean public that ROK troop dispatch to Vietnam has strengthened "special relationship" between US and ROK which justifies having their desires, whether in political, economic or defense area, being given special and unique consideration by USG. They display considerable assuredness in presenting this theme and complete insensitivity to problems that granting special treatment would create for US domestically and internationally. They are uninhibited in expressing their demands or their disappointment when they do not meet with specific encouragement. In short, they see the 50,000 ROK troops in Vietnam as their "Alladin's Lamp" to make all their dreams come true. E. Pak will have domestic political problems particularly in the National Assembly if he seeks to send additional troops. Though he and other government spokesmen have carefully hedged their statements on dispatch of troops, they continue to give opposition and public grounds to believe ROKG has strongly implied if not pledged that it will not send additional troops. Opposition will seek to take issue with any troop dispatch proposal in effort to embarrass Pak and ROKG. Opposition will find greater public acceptance of their arguments because of pressures mentioned above. F. On size of any possible dispatch, we are not as optimistic now as when we were considering matter earlier. We are inclined to believe that Pak is currently thinking more in terms of another brigade and supporting elements. These likely to be combined with Marine brigade to form composite division in Vietnam, permitting Korea to claim that it has three divisions in Vietnam. Before more troops are committed, however, Pak's problems will undoubtedly cause him to raise ante considerably. His requirements will be expensive, varied and complicated in line with what he judges necessary to overcome opposition to dispatch./3/ /3/In telegram 2660 from Seoul, November 30, although he had received no further information from Pak or other officials, Porter outlined the proposals Korea was likely to present in exchange for additional troops based on public and private statements made by Korean officials over the past months. Porter submitted a substantial list of proposed items and expected that the Korean "package" would not contain all of the recommendations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S) 3. We are not in position here to judge real need for additional ROK troops in Vietnam nor to assess political impact, at home or internationally, of an additional ROK contribution. In this connection, we have in mind fact that the impact of large scale ROK participation has long since been made and further participation will undoubtedly involve us in an exercise with rapidly diminishing returns./4/ /4/In his reply Bundy stated that the United States still wanted "maximum additional ROK troop contribution," while avoiding "the `diminishing returns' and `Aladdin's Lamp' pitfalls" Porter discussed. (Telegram 76010 to Seoul, November 29; ibid.) 4. On balance, we still believe troops can be obtained and would be ready to begin process as soon as substantial numbers of opposition move into Assembly. At least we would expect to ascertain price and commence bargaining process in line with your views as to required size of contingent, need and resources available. 5. Bonesteel has seen this message. I suggest you talk it over with him before giving me your comments. He is also aware of my feeling that until Pak makes clear to us his intentions with respect to additional troop dispatch, we should continue along our present line of support for ROK programs, including those submitted or being developed to support ROK civilian and military effort in counter-infiltration area, without making additional adjustments in their favor, either in matters of principle (i.e., force levels) or material support. They are being generously treated, I believe, for their current contribution and I would not expect to recommend approval of KLSC or other items without substantial augmentation of ROK effort. Porter
135. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, November 29, 1967, 0400Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S. Secret. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC for POLAD. 2621. Subj: ROK Internal Security. 1. In recent weeks there have been a number of developments relating to ROK preparations in internal security field for next spring's anticipated intensified NK infiltration effort. A. President Pak has disapproved Korean National Police plans to double size of combat police forces from 23 companies to 46 companies and to improve coastal watch organization. Police plan submitted to Pak would have required a won 1.1 billion supplemental budget as well as about $5 million in equipment (commo, transport, patrol boats, helicopters etc.) to be furnished by U.S. B. President Pak has approved for planning purposes strengthening of ROK Army for counter-infiltration activities by 8 new counter-infiltration battalions in each of 8 reserve divisions under second ROK Army. MND plan presented to Pak points out that this would require by contrast with police plan a supplemental budget of won 317 million and that equipment for battalions is on hand in reserve divisional stocks. C. MND Kim on Nov 22 sent letter to COMUS/K advising him of plan to organize 8 battalions, stated that personnel strength of these battalions will be temporary augmentation of present authorized strength of ROK Army. MND has not requested COMUS/K concurrence of this augmentation but requested concurrence for use of equipment from ROK Army stocks for new battalions. D. At briefing given to senior U.S. personnel by ROK MND on military counter-infiltration plans, as tentatively approved by President Pak, MND said ROK military would assume control of CI operations in those areas and situations where experience shows that police lack capability to cope with infiltration situation. 2. Understand President Pak disapproved increase in police and approved additional ROK Army battalions because use of military was budgetarily much cheaper. On basis information available to him Pak believes North Korean infiltration threat south of the DMZ will be of magnitude that will require the use of military forces and even augmented police will be unable cope with this level NK activity. Pak concerned by NK sabotage efforts aimed at ROK industrial base and at govt organization, including use of NK military "suicide squads" for this purpose. 3. ROK military now submitting requests to COMUS/K for assist- ance on variety of projects to improve capability. To assure coordinated U.S. efforts in dealing with requests from the ROK military and civilian agencies and to assure that the ROKG develops the soundest possible plan for dealing with the intensified infiltration next spring, Country Team has established a special committee chaired by DCM to include USFK Chief of Staff, Chief, PROVMAAG/K, Deputy USOM Director [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. 4. Comment: We see problem of dealing with internal security matters to be responsibilities of ROKG with USG providing such assistance as it can. We also continue believe that ROK civilian agencies, primarily augmented KNP, are best instrument for dealing initially with various aspects of NK activity in ROK outside of forward areas under ROK military control and that ROK military effort should be focused along DMZ, coast and offshore as collateral activity to their regular military missions and providing spot assistance to civilian authorities when requested. We believe present concept reportedly accepted by Pak that military forces be applied if dimension of threat such that civil agencies cannot handle is sound. Pak of course will decide when and if to bring military power to bear on problem, but for reasons connected with population, training problems, and eventual expense arising from military participation, we hope his judgment will be measured in this matter. Porter
136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, November 30, 1967, 2356Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret. Also sent to Saigon and Tokyo. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Meehan (S/S), and McNamara; and approved by Rusk. 77501. Seoul Eyes Only for Porter. Saigon Eyes Only for Bunker and Locke./2/ Tokyo Eyes Only for Johnson. /2/Ellsworth Bunker was Ambassador and Eugene M. Locke was Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam. 1. Highest levels now wish to pursue additional ROK troop contribution with maximum urgency. Since Ambassador Locke is returning to US for consultation on December 7 in any event, our proposal is that he go via Seoul for short visit, possibly bearing Presidential message to Park. 2. Purpose of visit would not be to nail down all details, but to convey sense of urgency felt at highest levels here and to carry forward from Clifford/Taylor mission. At same time, we wish his message to be as specific as possible in terms of type and scale of additional forces, and we would hope that Seoul can provide us best judgment on what kind of "package" ROK might ask in return, so that we can provide Locke with instructions and put him in position either to respond under some headings or at any rate to undertake to get rapid answers on his return here. 3. To minimize visit appearing wholly as solicitation of additional contribution, we would in any event wish to depict it as normal US/ROK consultation on Viet-Nam situation. Depending on Tokyo's judgment, we might also schedule short visit in Japan, recalling that GOJ has expressed interest in reports on Viet-Nam situation. Possible schedule might take Locke to Tokyo on December 4 and 5, with visit to Seoul on December 6 and departure from Seoul during day December 7. 4. Request urgent Seoul and Tokyo comment on this schedule and basic outline. You should not approach host governments until we have final exchanges. Your comment should cover receptivity of host government, date problems, and whether you see additional elements that could be used effectively to further the general picture of routine consultation on a regularly scheduled consultation return to the US. For example, would it be useful or the reverse to depict Tokyo visit as related to non-military areas in which GOJ already helping and in which such additional projects as educational television are pending? Replies should be Nodis with copies to other posts concerned. 5. Seoul already has our Exdis request (State 76010, Notal)/3/ for best judgment on ROK views both as to type and scale of forces and as to "package" they might seek./4/ Your reply on this subject should be sent at once on Exdis basis separate from traffic dealing with possibility of Locke visit. Please copy your response to Saigon for Locke's preliminary information. /3/See footnote 4, Document 134. /4/See footnote 3, Document 134. Rusk
137. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 6, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, December 7, which indicates that the President saw it. The source text is the retyped copy given to the President. Text of Cable from Ambassador Porter (Seoul, 2769) The result of a two-and-one-half-hour conversation today between President Park, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense and the Foreign Minister on one hand, and Locke and Porter on the other, was that the South Korean Government has agreed to make available one "light division" to augment allied forces in South Vietnam. The timing of the availability of these additional troops is to await South Korean Government assessment of Assembly willingness to pass enabling legislation. In the meantime, Porter and the Minister of National Defense may open conversations to determine "arrangements" which will permit activation of such a light division. Park, who clearly maintained control of the essentials of the conversation for the Koreans, said that when the Minister of Defense turned in a report indicating he was unable to recommend the dispatch of more troops because of Korean security problems, the President had returned the report to the Minister, telling the latter to find a way to meet the obvious needs of the Vietnam situation. He also made clear to the Minister he wished to help President Johnson. Locke went through the points cited in a State Department telegram,/2/ putting special stress on the current coming U.S. troop contribution, the need to increase pressure on the enemy at this point when his problems are severe, the excellent effect additional Korean contribution would have on the situation, and on public and Congress in the U.S. /2/Not found. President Park revealed that the Defense Minister had replied to his request for re-study of the possibilities by indicating that if rear and logistical elements now supporting Korean troops in Vietnam could be replaced by civilians, enough combat troops would be gained to form a "reinforced regimental combat team." Additionally, Park continued, this regiment could be found in Korea which would bring the total new contribution to the level of a "light division." The Prime Minister and the Defense Minister then spoke in turn. Both opposed sending more troops. The former said his opposition resulted from the assurances given by the Americans that the previous troop dispatch was the last which would be requested and because such assurances had been passed to the Assembly and the public. He qualified his resistance to a new dispatch, however, by stating that something must be found which would enable his President to face opponents of the new dispatch, adding that he had been disappointed by the American refusal thus far to "take initiative" in that sense. Locke replied that we, too, had exceeded what Congress expected in way of troops for Vietnam because no one could predict requirements, but that President Johnson had faced up to leadership problems in the matter. The Defense Minister said that in addition to his opposition on grounds of security, he had been very disappointed by the American performance on March 4, 1966 undertakings, that whereas the Koreans had sent every man they had agreed to send, the Americans had not kept their promises./3/ Porter replied to this rather characteristic pitch in low key, (knowing Park fully aware of performance figures), and said we would endeavor to phrase future commitments in more precise terms. Locke assured the President that the U.S. is greatly concerned with maintenance of Korean security and economic welfare. He related our intentions re the Military Assistance Program in the coming year, support fund level, and the $10 million program loan. /3/Reference is to Brown's March 4, 1966, letter detailing the military and economic assistance extended to the Koreans in exchange for troops for Vietnam; for a draft, see Document 76. Regarding the letter as sent, see footnote 9, Document 76. The Embassy issued periodic progress reports on the extent to which the United States had met its commitments relative to the 1966 ROK troop deployment. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19 KOR S-US, DEF 19 US-KOR S, and DEF 19-3 US-KOR S) The Foreign Minister then made a statement which related to his own success in turning off Assembly inquiry into the matter of implementation of the March 4, 1966, agreement. He also referred, as did the Defense Minister, to the "anti-infiltration measures commitment of $35 million" which, he said, Secretary McNamara indicated he had not received from CINCPAC and would consider when he did. Rather than get into a bargaining session then and there, we indicated that this was a matter we could discuss later and perhaps General Bonesteel would have some comments on it when he returns. The Ministers' performance may have been intended to permit Park to assume a constructive role. If so, it was well designed for its purpose. Before the discussion ended, Locke asked Park if we could set a date for discussion of the "arrangements" to support the "light division" he had mentioned. Park replied that Porter and the Minister of Defense could arrange for a mutually convenient time to open conversations. I recommend very careful handling of this matter. Park's problems will be greatly increased if the Assembly or the press learn of the foregoing, which they would surely interpret, Korean aid, as a commitment. This is a matter of real concern to me in view of local predilection for press leaks. I will seek an appointment with the Defense Minister immediately after Ambassador Locke has an opportunity to discuss the matter in Washington and I have your comments. Our arrangement with the President's staff about the press is that the meeting will be described as a general review of the Vietnam situation.
138. Memorandum From the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Foster) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, December 7, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Korea 370.64. Secret. The memorandum indicates that McNamara saw it. SUBJECT General Bonesteel visited me yesterday and provided a complete rundown on the situation in Korea. There is definite information that Kim Il Sung has embarked on a course of drastically increased conflict along lines proposed by Che Guevara. Based on the theory that the United States cannot support more than one "Vietnam" at a time, he hopes to create a situation that will prevent the ROK from sending more troops to Vietnam, cripple the ROK economy, cause the United States to withdraw, and eventually communize the country. A force of special agents, commandos, and guerrillas specialized for various locations in the ROK, already averaging about 25,000 strong, is being trained and is already operating into ROK. Action has occurred throughout the country, at the DMZ and in mountainous regions in the Northeast and Southwest of ROK. The latter two are supported by sea infiltration, which constitutes over 60 percent of the total. To date there have been vastly increased attempted penetrations, firefight incidents, and UNC casualties, all up about tenfold from last year. Later plans of Kim Il Sung include severe disruption of our LOC, cowing the population by terror, and placing U.S. installations under siege. He then might open the option of conventional air strike and ground attack a la Israel, assuming we would not use nuclear weapons. This is expected to heat up considerably by next summer. To counter this threat, General Bonesteel has organized a mixed line and mobile defense in depth along the DMZ and around the coasts. Although his resources are meager, he is strengthening anti-infiltration defenses at sea, along and behind the DMZ,/2/ and throwing the burden of interior defense, with increased training and support by the U.S., on the ROK forces. The United States still retains responsibility for defense of our air bases, depots, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. /2/Additional information concerning the barrier system along the DMZ is in airgram A-297 from Seoul, December 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32 KOR N-KOR S) He has submitted, through CINCPAC to JCS, a plan for modest inputs of added defensive equipment (cost, $40M) to augment his strength. This is designed not to detract from the Vietnam effort. He is confident he can turn back the attack, but believes he has barely enough resources to do so. We are skeptical that $40 million is enough even as a starter, but he is trying to keep his requirements minimal. We discussed with him, and are examining, the various ways in which R&D might help. A counterinfiltration system design effort is already underway in ARPA and the Services. John Foster, Jr.
139. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State/1/ Canberra, December 21, 1967, 3:05 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KOR S-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2337. Literally eyes only for Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara from Walt Rostow. At lunch, just completed, between President Park and President Johnson,/2/ President Johnson committed himself to: the most forthcoming response possible to Park's equipment requests, to be in Park's hands at the latest on January 1; and the most accelerated possible delivery dates for equipment. /2/Both were in Canberra to attend the funeral of former Prime Minister Holt; see Document 140. The President wishes not only staff work completed but the greatest possible imagination in finding ways of accelerating equipment delivery; for example, even the possibility of switching a destroyer from U.S. to Korean command might be examined. In return, President Park said that he would do his utmost to get troops to Vietnam by March 1, his original earliest date being April. At the close of a very good and frank session, Park said wryly, sometimes when we decide to do something, we can do it quicker than you. President Johnson accepted the challenge. Park's problem is, as you know, that he must get promise from his Assembly; and, in the face of expected increased pressures at the 38th parallel in the spring, he must demonstrate to the Assembly that he will gain as much short run security in equipment as he is losing by sending the unit to South Vietnam. Clark
140. Notes on Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak/1/ Canberra, December 21, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KOR S-US. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow on December 26. The President began by putting a series of questions to President Park about the morale of his troops; whether the Vietnamese were improving; and the quality of American support and leadership for the Korean forces. Park said his own troops were in good spirits; felt that progress was being made; judged that the South Vietnamese were in fact improving; and felt that U.S. support and leadership for his forces were admirable. The President then turned to the critical issue; namely, his judgment that we need more men quickly in South Vietnam. He described the movement of 10,000 U.S. forces and 600 tons of equipment in 17 days, ending Dec. 18. He said that Westmoreland would have 102 of his 106 maneuver battalions by Christmas. We know that parts of 2 divisions are moving south. The President observed that he was glad Park was here today for the service for Harold Holt. Holt looked at things the way President Park and President Johnson did. There are now fewer of us and we must stick closer together. Park thanked the President for sending extra food to help overcome the drought in South Korea. President said he was glad to do so and asked about the kimchi. The bureaucracy in Washington gave him more hell about the kimchi than it did about the war in Vietnam, but he managed to get it. Park said he was gratified the kimchi would arrive starting at the beginning of 1968. It would certainly lift the morale. Mr. William Bundy explained that the problem of canning the kimchi had delayed arrival. It was being sent as fast as possible and the VC would never be able to hold the Koreans once it arrived. President Park then asked President Johnson if he had received a report of Amb. Porter's talks about troops on the working level./2/ /2/Not further identified. The President said that he had read the report with great pleasure; but he had expected Korea to respond to the need for additional forces. It had been the staunchest and most forthcoming of the allies. President Park understood that if the U.S. were to get out of Asia, the Asian countries could not stand alone and would then wish they had fought side by side with the U.S. If President Park hadn't done what he had in Vietnam, his job would have been unbearable. President Park then explained his domestic situation with respect to the additional forces. Amb. Porter was working with his counterpart. He needed additional U.S. equipment because the pressure by the North Koreans had somewhat changed the attitude of South Koreans with respect to sending forces to South Vietnam. He had to be able to demonstrate to his Assembly that in sending additional forces to South Vietnam he was, simultaneously, getting equipment which would represent at least equivalent protection against North Korea. That is why the requests were focused on anti-infiltration and anti-espionage equipment. President Park repeated that he had to base his sending of additional forces to South Vietnam on the grounds that this would not detract and might increase South Korean security against North Korea. The President said we were working on Korean request now. Our AID program has been cut by a third in the Congress. Korea, Australia, and other allies must understand that if they don't put enough now into South Vietnam, the President may not be able to hold the line and then they will face a much more serious situation. President went on to say he would give urgent attention with view to favorable action on the Korean request. But he wanted Gen. Westmoreland to have the troops soon; and Park should start moving them on faith in the U.S. response. He said that Porter's cable of his talks in Seoul/3/ had come in just as he was leaving. He hoped for a full additional division from Korea. He would instruct that we get one destroyer to Korea to help as soon as possible. He would have his staff look into the possibility of a second destroyer. We would get the counter-infiltration equipment request by Gen. Bonesteel there as fast as possible. Although MAP has been cut from $620 million to $400 million, President Johnson has ordered that the Korean level be maintained and cuts be taken elsewhere. /3/See Document 137. President Johnson repeated that he would look next week into Korean requirements and let Park know as soon as possible. In the meanwhile, Park should bear in mind that in the movement of the troops, speed is of the essence. President Park said he shared wholeheartedly President Johnson's purpose, but, unlike President Johnson, he must get an explicit authorization from his National Assembly before he can move his forces. At the moment, the National Assembly is filibustering on the budget. He could deal with the National Assembly easier if the U.S. commitment was firm. President then asked what information does Korea need on U.S. aid? Park said that he needed the equipment to strengthen his security against North Korea before probes along the 38th parallel were revived next spring when the snow was off the ground. He will send Korean forces, if possible, next March--in any case, before May, if the requested material is in Korea. President Johnson said that by January 1 Park will know the amounts and delivery dates of the equipment we can supply; but he wanted President Park to get his men there on March 1. President Park agreed to that deal. President then went down the list: one destroyer in 10 months, but we shall try to do better than that. We shall also look into the matter of a second destroyer. Although MAP funds have been cut 30% there will be no cut in MAP. Counter-infiltration equipment will be sent. Park will have a response after the JCS review of his request in Seoul by January 1. But President Park will target March 1 as the date for putting in his additional forces. Park said he would ask his Defense Minister how soon he could get his forces in and he replied April was the earliest possible. President Johnson then said: That's why you've got Presidents: to make Defense Ministers work harder. It is a President's job to do the impossible. The possible is easy. It is the impossible that Presidents must deal with. President Johnson recalled various examples of actions which were initially opposed by his ministers; for example, the kimchi; sending of patrol boats to Korea; and certain bombing operations in the North which he and President Park had discussed at Manila. President Johnson said he would daresay that if President Park had listened to his Ministers, there would not now be Korean troops in South Vietnam. Park said, finally, if I have a reply by January 1 I shall see what we can do. President Johnson repeated that we have got to get additional 100,000 forces to Gen. Westmoreland from U.S., Korea, Thailand, and South Vietnam. And he promised that Amb. Porter would deliver our response by January 1. President Park then said he would do his utmost to speed up the arrival of the troops. He said that sometimes Korea could move faster than the U.S. when it made up its mind; and he would try his utmost to meet the target date. [Continue with the next documents]
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