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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 111. Editorial Note On the morning of March 15, 1967, Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon met with Secretary of State Rusk in the Secretary's Conference Room and discussed Korean economic relations with Vietnam and with the United States, Korean relations with Indonesia, fulfillment of the agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States arising from Korea's 1966 decision to dispatch additional troops to Vietnam, and the pacification program in Vietnam. Memoranda of their conversations, background materials, briefing papers, and similar information relevant to this visit are in National Archives and Records Administra- tion, RG 59, S/S Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, October 1966 to May 1967. That afternoon Minister of Defense Kim Sung-eun met with Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Pentagon and discussed the equipment needs of the major branches of the Republic of Korea's armed forces as well as Korean forces in Vietnam. A memorandum of their conversation is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Korea 091.112.
112. Letter From President Johnson to President Pak/1/ Washington, March 23, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Korea, November 1, 1966 to March 31, 1967. Secret. Dear Mr. President: All of us here were delighted to have the Prime Minister here for a visit, and to talk with him and his colleagues on a variety of subjects in which we have a common interest. We now have a better understanding of your main concerns and problems, and I think the Prime Minister and his party left with a better understanding of ours. The various departments are now examining the matters which were raised and we shall be in touch with your government when we have finished these studies. As I told the Prime Minister, we cannot help in all respects, but I assure you that we shall do what we can. In your letter of March 8,/2/ you spoke of your desire to do more in the civilian area in Viet Nam and to help in the pacification program. The 120 Korean medical people working in the provinces on health programs are doing excellent work, as are the several thousand Koreans on various contract projects. Specific new projects in which a Korean effort would be both practical and beneficial are under study, and our people will soon be discussing these with your officials and the Vietnamese government. There are certain problems: the South Vietnamese capacity to absorb additional ventures, the inflationary impact of these projects, the shortage of housing, the dollar and piastre resources available to support these projects, et cetera. Still I believe we can work something out. /2/See footnote 3, Document 110. I fully understand the desire of your men in the field to enjoy familiar rations. That is the way it has always been with soldiers throughout history. Therefore, I have asked Secretary McNamara to work out with your officials a way to meet your request that the Korean forces be supplied with "kimchi."/3/ /3/After studying the matter McNamara approved a program whereby Korean soldiers in Vietnam would be provided kimchi and peppers once each day. The Department of Defense estimated the program would cost approximately $2 million per year. (Telegram 201874 to Seoul, May 25; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-VIET S; memorandum from McNaughton to McNamara, May 20; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 430 Korea) We have already taken steps to meet your desire to have your forces in Viet Nam supplied with more modern equipment. A Korean-manned helicopter company will be operating in South Viet Nam by this summer. Distribution of the new rifle to your combat maneuver elements has been authorized and will be completed within the next few months. Secretary McNamara is looking into the other suggestions made to him by your Minister of Defense. As you know, we have just returned from Guam. The primary purpose of the meeting was to permit our new diplomatic team to become acquainted with those whom they will succeed; for all of us to take stock of the situation, as we periodically do every six months or so; and thus to assure a smooth transition. We informed the Government of Viet Nam that we would be there and told them they would be welcome, if it were convenient, although we would understand if their current pre-occupations made it impossible for them to come. They chose to join us and used the occasion to accelerate the work in the Constituent Assembly and in the Directorate on the constitution. Prime Minister Ky was, therefore, able to present us with a copy of the new constitution. All of us committed to the defense of South Viet Nam should, I believe, feel a real sense of satisfaction at the evolution of constitutional politics in South Viet Nam. I am told that the constitution reflects elements from the constitution of South Korea; and, even more important, I am sure the leadership in South Viet Nam is inspired by the success of South Korea in moving towards constitutional government since 1961. It will be a very great achievement, indeed, if our friends in South Viet Nam can carry through successfully the election schedule of the next six months. As you know, military operations are proceeding with steady success. There is much evidence of pressure on both the main forces and the guerrilla infrastructure. But none of us can state with confidence when the enemy effort will collapse. We remain ready to respond to any effort that might lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict which safeguards the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam. We have wide support in Asia and elsewhere in what you and we and our allies are doing. Meanwhile, we must continue to maintain the pressure, and we may need to step it up with additional forces. We will all have a chance to review these matters together and take stock at the meeting of the troop contributing countries in Washington, April 20-21./4/ /4/The conference, which was renamed the Seven Nation Meeting on Vietnam, continued the consultative process established at Manila the previous year. Documents pertaining to Korean participation in the conference are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US. The meeting is documented more fully in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume V. But I would take this occasion to say that your contribution has been a mighty one, for which we are all grateful. You and I know what resolution and courage are needed to make these hard decisions. But we are trying to prevent a third world war. We are trying to create conditions for a durable peace in Asia. We are trying to help the Asian nations and Asian people get for themselves a chance to live in peace and freedom. These are great aims, and they will require a great and sustained effort. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
113. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 23, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, 1967. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
114. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 21, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Confidential. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT You asked to be kept informed of developments in the Korean election. This is a brief situation report. President Pak made his first formal campaign appearance on April 17 at a rally in Taejon. Good turnout (about 100,000). Speech well received. Opposition candidate Yun Po-sun is concentrating on larger cities (Pusan, Taegu) after an early start in the provinces. Pak's main lines have been: --shallowness of opposition's promises; --determination to move against corruption; --remarkable economic progress of Korea under his administration; --pledge to continue vigorously Korea's economic growth and modernization. Press coverage has been balanced thus far. No troop movements related to politics have been reported. There are reports one or two splinter candidates may pull out of the race in favor of the opposition candidate. Embassy prediction that Pak will be re-elected by a majority stands unchanged./2/ /2/In telegram 5984 from Seoul, May 6, the Embassy reported that Pak won the May 3 election, having received over 5.6 million votes or 51.4 percent of the total ballots cast. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 KOR S) Walt
115. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 1, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Confidential. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT AID (Administrator Gaud) asks your approval to make two development loans to South Korea./2/ They would finance the foreign exchange costs in improvements of the country's electric power system. The total of the two loans is $34.7 million: /2/Reference is to an April 15 memorandum from Gaud to President Johnson. (Ibid.) --$22 million to finance a new thermal power plant in southeast Korea, the nation's fastest-growing industrial area; --$12.7 million for improvements in Korea's electric transmission [cl12]and distribution system. You will recall that in May 1965, a commitment was made to President Park that we would provide Korea with $150 million in assistance this year. With the two proposed loans, we will have fulfilled that commitment up to $142 million. AID is considering additional loans of $8 million and expects to fulfill the commitment to Park completely by this summer. Under our urging, the Koreans have boosted electricity rates by 24 per cent. The new loans will carry the requirement for another 10 per cent raise. Other requirements are aimed at enabling the Korean power company to meet its own future needs for capital investment. Korea's need for additional power resources is urgent if the country is to maintain its encouraging high rate of growth. Demand has increased 19 per cent a year since 1964. The loans would be used solely to finance purchase of United States equipment and services. Secretary Fowler agrees they will have a minimum adverse impact on our balance of payments. The Budget Bureau (Director Schultze) supports AID's proposal./3/ /3/Reference is to an April 21 memorandum from Schultze to President Johnson. (Ibid.) I recommend that you approve these loans. Embassy Seoul has strongly urged that announcement of the loans be held until after the presidential election (May 3). Their judgment is that announcement just in advance would do President Park more harm than good. Announcement after will strengthen his party in the up-coming legislative elections. Walt Loans approved/4/ /4/The President checked this option.
116. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Seoul, May 2, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, May 8, in which Rostow noted that the campaign showed "much progress between 1963 and 1967 in a working democracy." The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Dear Bill: With the presidential election due to take place on Wednesday,/2/ I thought I would pass on to you some election eve thoughts about the presidential campaign, its significance and its meaning for the democratic process in Korea. Our forecasts and predictions about the outcome of the election you will have received in our daily reporting and you will know the results by the time you receive this letter./3/ /2/May 3. /3/Analysis of the campaign and its results were transmitted in telegram 6166 from Seoul, May 16, and airgram A-546 from Seoul, May 31. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 KOR S) I believe that time will show that political scientists will view the 1967 campaign as a landmark in the developing political process of this country. It has not been an inspired or very exciting campaign. In fact in many ways it has been rather dull. This is part of its significance. It has been a struggle between the presidential candidates of two parties who by and large have gone before the people of the country, to state their case in terms of the issues of the day. The campaign has been a policy contest, for the most part, with both sides stating their position, with each candidate strongly criticizing the views of his opponent, with people in a position to hear and evaluate the promises of the candidates. Pak has chosen to rest his case on his past performance and to seek a mandate to continue along these lines. His theme has been modernization of the country and the prestige and position of Korea. Yun on the other hand has argued that the Pak administration's economic policies have benefited only a few of the chosen and has proposed alternative economic policies which he claims will benefit the masses, particularly the farmers. Another major theme of the opposition has been to call for a peaceful transfer of power to demonstrate to the world that Korea is a democracy. Salting all the opposition campaign speeches have been the traditional charges of corruption, military dictatorial rule, police and intelligence agency politics, privileged power and sell-out to foreigners diplomacy. The campaign was hardly under way when the NDP was loudly voicing its charges of illegal campaigning by the DRP, and the DRP lost no time in responding in kind. To its charges, the NDP soon added its fear and concerns that election rigging and other illegal election activity would occur. These fears and concerns were rapidly replaced with more positive statements that they knew of DRP/Pak administration plans to engage in such nefarious deeds. During the campaign Yun Po-sun, Yu Chin-o and others of the NDP went at their tasks in a most strenuous manner with the aged Yun and other NDP stumping teams covering the countryside and the cities in a highly effective manner. Considering the newness of their organization and their comparatively limited funds, the NDP conducted quite an intensive campaign. The crowds they gathered, particularly in the cities, were of respectable size and reflected the deep election interest of the people, though most observers reported the crowds as being relatively quiet and unresponsive. The opposition coalition was not as solid as it looked. A number of old respected figures stayed out of the campaign or made only a perfunctory effort on behalf of Yun. George Paek took a trip to Geneva and was away during most of the campaign. Madam Pak entered the fray in the closing days and made only a few speeches. Others such as Yi Pom-sok and Yu Chin-san could never be accused of undue exertion on behalf of Yun. Nevertheless the NDP kept its cohesion and campaigned without any overt rifts. The DRP followed a different strategy in its campaigning, a strategy in part shaped by their analysis of American election campaigns. The brunt of the battle in the first half of the campaign was carried by KCP aided by selected party faithful. Their efforts were mainly concentrated in the rural areas and the small towns where the significance of the size of the crowds they drew is hard to determine. The big gun was unlimbered in the last two weeks of the campaign when President Pak officially began his electioneering. (Prior to then his public appearances were claimed to be part of his normal ceremonial duties as President, though I suspect Pak's rate of ribbon cutting hit an all-time weekly high over the past months.) Pak concentrated his efforts in the urban areas and, even by conservative estimates, he attracted (or the DRP arranged for) rather massive attendance. He clearly outdrew Yun whenever the two spoke in the same city. The opposition, of course, claimed that Pak's huge crowds were mobilized by illegal activities of the DRP and Government, and this belief is probably shared by most Koreans. There is ample evidence that the DRP machine with its substantial resources did help considerably to increase the crowd sizes, but the predisposition to attend, sheer curiosity about or interest in the President was probably present in the first instance. The DRP crowds were generally cheerful and well behaved, and showed little overt evidence of regimentation. There is no evidence that coercive measures were used to create crowds for Pak. In addressing his audience, Pak had no better luck than Yun in developing any responsiveness or a real fervor for the cause. Many observers attribute this to his style and to his speeches which were coldly logical, factual and full of dull statistics. Both parties and the press have paid tremendous attention--perhaps too much--to the size of the crowd a stumping team would gather. The size of the gatherings was used by both sides as a barometer for election success and a sign of public support. Because of this, the charges and countercharges relating to efforts to mobilize attendance at rallies have been numerous and vehement. Both sides, needless to say, have been guilty with the DRP excesses outnumbering the NDP efforts. This is not because the NDP by nature is purer in soul than the DRP, but is simply a reflection of the fact that DRP organizational capabilities, funds and other resources were far greater than those of the NDP. Nevertheless in the public exchange, the NDP probably did succeed in leaving the impression with most Korean voters that the DRP used illegal means to gather huge crowds to its rallies. The press had great fun and games in estimating crowd sizes, as did the parties. The formulas used by various reporters and other estimators became the subject of considerable examination and discussion. The officials of both parties believed press figures consistently underestimated their rally gatherings and the NDP charged that the Government forced the papers to underestimate their crowd size. Most impartial observers felt both sides overestimated the numbers at the rallies, as did the police and [K]CIA in their reporting. Nevertheless the general feeling is that the crowds exceeded those of 1963 and that Pak did outdraw Yun in the urban areas where they both spoke. Pak's margin, however, cannot be accounted for solely on the basis of superior DRP legal and illegal efforts at crowd gathering. The role of the splinter parties in the campaign was interesting, in that it simply was not a factor. None of the five made any serious effort to campaign and when they did they drew little public attention. Only random mention was made of their activities in the press and the general impression was that they would have little effect on the outcome. The withdrawal of So Min-ho, the candidate of one of the more significant splinter parties, from the presidential race is, of course, a good indication of the little influence the splinter parties expect to have on the outcome. So's withdrawal probably will add votes to Yun's total and he doubtlessly was able to extract a price for his action. It is interesting to note how with the passage of time the number of splinter parties involved in Korean elections have decreased. While a few of these parties revolve around particular individuals who expound a specific political philosophy, most of them are organized around political opportunists. These latter groups are centered around individuals who have usually been frustrated in their efforts to gain position and prominence in one or the other of the major parties. They then organize a splinter party because they see an opportunity for personal financial gain by securing political funds from one of the major parties who provide the funds in the belief that divide and conquer is a good tactic, or because they feel that there is a chance for political blackmail, at a crucial time a deal can be made with a major party to give the splinter group a piece of the political trade. The first group of splinter parties will no doubt continue to be present in the Korean political scene permanently, just as we have our Prohibition Party and others. The second group is beginning to disappear from the scene as the political party system has matured and become more institutionalized, a process which I feel is well under way and is being given a strong push by this Presidential election. This process is being helped along by time as well, as it takes its toll of the various aged political personalities who have dominated the political scene in this country since 1948 and who gathered followers on the basis of personal allegiances rather than fellow political believers. Another interesting aspect of the campaign has been the role of the press and government influence over it. The NDP has been most outspoken on this point and, as always, where there is smoke there is some fire. Rather foolishly, the government through the [K]CIA did seek to intensify its influence on the press. This is not new, for even in non-election time the [K]CIA has special teams that cover the newspaper offices leaving word what to print and what not to print. The tempo, however, has been stepped up in the sense that [K]CIA agents make their visits more often and for longer periods of time. Nevertheless, setting aside the several outspokenly pro-government and pro-opposition papers, the press treatment of DRP and NDP activities was balanced, arithmetically so well balanced in terms of inches of news space as to make some of us feel that the press had been instructed to hit this balance. Our reading of the press did not lead us to conclude that there was any real substance to the NDP charges. Certainly the press coverage we have observed does not justify the appellation of "controlled press" being applied here. In many ways, it was a mature and responsible coverage. Possibly the fact that the press did not automatically side with the NDP, picking up and expanding on its many unsubstantial accusations, so frustrated and disappointed the NDP that they could only conclude the government was controlling and suppressing the press. The DRP and the Government supporters did many things such as buying up advertising space, more favorable placing of stories about the Pak and the DRP on the front page and other foolish stunts, that warrant a charge of "dirty pool" but hardly can be considered to involve an effort to suborn the freedom of expression. At any rate it is hard to see this type of political gimmickry really affecting voter attitudes. The press played an unusual role in the early part of the campaign that had far reaching effect. Both parties had started off on a tactic of heavy personal abuse of the opposition candidate. The audiences and the press reacted negatively, with the press particularly criticizing both parties for resorting to the personal abuse theme and strongly urging that campaign speakers stick to the issues. Thereafter personal attacks diminished considerably and substantive issues were the heart of most speeches. The press did give its readers in roughly equal proportion the basic facts on what the candidates were saying. It did not grossly or irresponsibly distort the arguments or claims of either side. It did give the readers the papers criticism and commentary on the issues and the pledges of the candidates. The restrictions and inhibitions on the press caused by the Government were in large measure foolish, consequently damaging to its cause, and reminiscent of an era which the country has outgrown but is simply experiencing a cultural lag. The major campaign issues were those relating to the economy. Domestic political issues of corruption, maladministration, civil service wage scales, length of military service were not lively ones and such foreign policy subjects as the Vietnam troop dispatch or the Japanese normalization treaty in terms of public interest hardly qualified as election issues. Both sides presented their views on the economic issues extensively. There were not only speeches but numerous newspaper articles, radio and TV programs where DRP and NDP spokesmen were provided an opportunity to present their case on a particular subject. An interested voter had available to him many ways to determine party views on specific issues of interest to him. Agricultural policy was probably the most important substantive issue and very likely the most significant when it came to swaying votes. Yun and the NDP went at this issue heavily, playing to the predominant rural voter and promising him high rice prices and low fertilizer costs. The "rich get richer and the poor get poorer" theme was for the farmers' benefit. Contrasts were drawn between the plight of the farmer and the gains of the urban population. To this was added the promise of lower taxes and the dangers of continuing present government policies which were bringing higher prices and saddling the nation with foreign loans that would keep the nation in debt to foreigners for many years to come. Pak and the DRP sought to counter these arguments by pointing to the progress of the past, promising a faster rate of economic progress in the future and logically analyzing the opposition claims and promises to demonstrate their lack of realism, irrationality and weakness. They sought to make their case on the need for a balanced development between agriculture and industry--a rather sophisticated economic argument to make stick in a country with a predominantly rural/farming voting population. The DRP is worried about the psychological effect on the rural voters of the NDP campaign promises. The other issues in the campaign are not likely to have much effect on the voter. Corruption as an issue has become standard in Korean electioneering and does not seem to have had any impact on the voters. To be meaningful it needed a hot, specific scandal at this time to stir up emotions. The Samsong scandal was six months too soon. Furthermore Pak admitted the existence of some corruption in his administration and promised to continue his efforts to eradicate it if elected. Lastly, the Korean voter has always lived with corruption and only gets excited about it if it exceeds the bounds of his standards of propriety. This has not been the case. Probably one of the most fascinating features of the past weeks has been that of the charges and countercharges of illegal activities. First, let me say that under Korean election laws, it is virtually impossible to run a modern election campaign without violating the law. The detailed restrictions and limitations that were enacted after the military revolution to control political election activity border on the absurd. Campaign activities which are proscribed by the election laws were engaged in by both sides, but at home we would consider most of such activities as part of practicing the "art of politics" and not illegal. Many of the violations were undoubtedly committed in sheer ignorance of the administrative red tape involved. At the same time there was no doubt considerable deliberate violation for the simple reason that present legal restrictions severely handicap modern day campaigning. In spite of NDP charges, Pak has consistently called for honest and fair elections. Where there have been transgressions so far, we do not see these as deliberate, planned efforts by Pak or the senior DRP hierarchy. Most of them stem from overzealous subordinates and local officials. There is no evidence to show that there was any massive interference by the police or the government machinery during the campaign. Local incidents did, of course, occur and were duly reported by us. These, however, were not of sufficient magnitude or frequency to appear to have any significant impact on the electoral process. As of election eve, we have no evidence to support charges of election-rigging, ballot box stuffing, etc. There will be some hanky-panky in some of the voting districts without question but then I doubt if there has ever been a free election anyplace in the world that did not involve some of them. The sound and fury here of illegal activities and election rigging far exceeds the realities of the situation. Such tactics are part of the Korean political scene because it has been true in the past; it prepares the ground and provides the alibi for the loser; it also places the loser in a good position to call for a recount if the margin of victory is narrow. From what we have seen and heard from impartial observers, this will be as honest and fair an election as you will find at home or in Britain or any other generally accepted politically mature democracy. If our forecast is right, the final results should show Pak as the winner. This is based on our soundings, which show that most Koreans feel that Pak has made a reasonably successful effort to modernize the country and to improve the lot of the people as a whole. It is also based on the recognition that the DRP organization can effectively deliver the vote. If Yun should win, it will be not because the people have faith in him, in his leadership or in his policies. It will be, rather, a vote of protest against Pak. We have seen no signs of an "opposition boom" and it would surprise everyone if a protest vote carried Yun into the Blue House. There is a question, however, that many people are asking themselves--what will happen if by some chance Yun should win; will Pak turn over the government? Our reaction is that he would and would ask the people to rally behind the new government. This would not be the end, however. We suspect that the military would accept this change but watch it very closely. If Yun could not maintain political stability in the country, continue the pace of economic growth and development, and preserve Korea's international position and prestige, we believe they would move against him. The military would give Yun at least a six month trial period but we doubt whether they would permit him to stay in power if his administration started to lose the gains achieved since the 1961 military revolution. As I mentioned in the beginning, I see this election and its campaign as being most significant. It has been more a confrontation of policy issues and public pledges between two major political parties than a battle between personalities seeking to attract adherents by virtue of personal magnetism and charisma. The audiences at rallies were quiet, but their magnitude evidenced a high level of interest in the election. The strong adverse reaction to the early phases of the campaign, when speeches were peppered with personal abuse of the opposing candidate and his functionaries, revealed the seriousness with which the voter approached his civic responsibility. Both sides promptly turned to stuffing the voter with their views on substantive issues and they paid close attention to voter reaction. The debates over issues affected party strategy as the campaign moved along. Yun's and NDP efforts to stir up the people in terms of their dissatisfaction with the circumstances in which they lived had its effect. In the closing days the sensitivities of the DRP to the possible inroads being made by the NDP on the farmers sent the DRP stumping teams scurrying into the countryside, particularly in the Chollas. Pak, in the meantime, continued his efforts in the cities in an effort to capture the urban areas which were his weakness in 1963. The campaign and the elections are significant in another sense for they involved as candidates the leaders of two different political generations. In Yun, we had the type of political figure who dominated Korean politics from 1948 to 1961--the individual who gathered followers on a personal but very fluid basis; who spent most of his life fighting against the institution of government, which was an alien power; whose life was mostly shaped by traditional and ancient Korean thought, values and mores, with little exposure to the outside world and its ways. In Pak, we have the prototype of the new political figure in Korea. He is an organization man, not an individual; a manager of a political party, not a leader of a personal cult. He spent his mature life (his 30's and 40's) in a free Korea and not under an alien regime. He has been heavily exposed to the ways and ideas of the outside world. He has seen and experienced the implications of modern science and technology and has recognized that these must be appropriately introduced into Korean life if Korea is to survive. We have, in brief, in this election a conflict of generations. If Yun loses, as we believe he will, it will mean the demise of that generation politically. This demise will have its greatest meaning for the opposition. Will the current opposition coalition shatter into numerous pieces or will it stay substantially together with only chipping away of bits and pieces? We are inclined to think that the latter will be the case. The opposition will keep itself largely intact with small groups breaking off to start their own party. There are too many younger men in the opposition today who can see a successful political future for themselves only if they remain united. They have not yet been possessed by the type of egotism, vanity and self-assurance that make them feel that the party needs them more than they need the party. To summarize: the campaign itself was heavily spotted with illegal practices by both sides. But what was involved were minor actions designed to lure, entice and convince the voter to support a particular candidate, which violated an impractically strict election law. There was no evidence of efforts to manipulate the actual vote or impair or frustrate the individual's right of free choice in the polling booth. The atmosphere of military government which prevailed in 1963 was gone. Freedom of political discussion was prevalent. There were no concerns about the police, [K]CIA or military would haul off to jail anyone who talked against Pak. The people took the election and its issues seriously though unemotionally. Violence and extremism were notable by their absence. The 1967 campaign was a mature and responsible one; the Korean people and its emerging party system can be proud of it. It will be interesting to see whether tomorrow and time bear out these thoughts. Sincerely yours, Winthrop G. Brown/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
117. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 7, 1967, 0841Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, June 7, in which Rostow noted that the telegram contained "a wise observation" on approaching the Koreans for more troops "with perhaps a bit more iron than he suggests." The memorandum indicates the President saw it. 6635. For Secretary and Bundy from Ambassador. Subject: Tactics and Considerations on Any New Request for Further Troops for Vietnam. 1. Before leaving this post,/2/ I would like to give you my thoughts in the event we decide to ask for a further contribution of Korean forces to South Vietnam in the near future. /2/Brown left Seoul June 10; he was replaced by William J. Porter. 2. If we plan to make such a request, the manner in which the question is raised with President Pak will be of primary importance. 3. I would recommend that we do not confront him with a formal request for more forces as the first step. Rather, we should go to the President and tell him that we wish to consult with him about a common problem. We should explain to him in detail our estimate of the situation in South Vietnam, the strategy which we propose to follow in the long and short term, how we would propose to carry it out, what forces we think would be necessary to do so, what we are planning to do ourselves. Recalling that President Johnson and he both agreed that it would be in the interests of both of them to bring the affair to some sort of satisfactory conclusion at the earliest possible date, we should then ask him whether and to what extent Korea would be able to assist. 4. This would avoid confronting him with a formal request, to which he would have to answer yes or no. He is probably expecting a direct request. Having the matter presented to him in the form of consultation about a common problem with a view to planning common action would provide him greater room for maneuver in handling his domestic problems and would be greatly appreciated. It would enable him, if he felt that he could respond in some degree, to do so in the form of a voluntary, self initiated offer of cooperation. It would make clear our understanding of and consideration for the problems which he personally will face, and I think would be the approach best calculated to put him in a responsive frame of mind./3/ /3/Bundy instructed the Vice President to follow Brown's suggested approach during his talks with Pak when attending the President's inauguration in Seoul. (Telegram 217692, TOVIP 2, to Seoul, June 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S) Humphrey discussed the matter with Pak during a meeting on June 30 and broached the subject again during a farewell call on July 3. (Telegram 23 from Seoul, July 1; ibid., POL 7 US/HUMPHREY; and telegram 72 from Seoul, July 5; ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) 5. President Pak's personal attitude is, of course, the most crucial single factor in the whole situation. 6. Secondly, I have already made it clear that we will have to be prepared to pay a substantial price for a further contribution. I would recommend that we be generously forthcoming at the outset and not adopt a bargaining approach. This also will contribute to the proper frame of mind on the Korean side and will help President Pak in his problems with the Assembly and the public. Regrettably, many Koreans, including high officials, do not feel that we have yet adequately fulfilled our commitments for the last troop dispatch and consider our attitude as being far from generous or understanding. The price that we should be ready to offer should include something very dramatic, even though this might not be strictly appropriate or necessary for military or economic reasons. But something of this kind, calculated to appeal to Korean pride, to reflect a noticeable gain or advantage to the nation, and to provide a reassurance to Korean public opinion, would be a real and perhaps necessary element for an affirmative response. 7. Lastly, I must reiterate that securing a further ROK troop contribution will be difficult under the best of circumstances and that success is by no means a certainty. If we are seriously contemplating such a move we should now be preparing the ground against that time by doing the relatively small things that benefit the ROK, reflecting our generosity and understanding toward a steadfast friend and ally. Our current attitudes and positions on a number of items under discussion between ourselves and the ROKs, e.g., ROK civilian participation in the Vietnam pacification program, troop strength levels, the Korean combat ration, and procurement in Korea, while quite justified if taken in isolation, are not helping to create a frame of mind that would make them respond instinctively in a cooperative and friendly manner. 8. In all this, we must bear in mind that, in response to opposition charges during current election campaign, President Pak has consistently maintained that his government has no intention of sending additional troops to Vietnam. If additional troops are to be sent, he would have a very real practical problem in obtaining the required authorizing legislation from the Assembly. The Assembly and the public would have to be persuaded that circumstances make it necessary for the President to do what he has publicly said he has no intention of doing and that this will be to the clear advantage of Korea. The President himself must be given solid grounds for believing that he can accede to our request without seriously damaging his own political position. Brown
118. Editorial Note On June 8, 1967, Koreans voted to elect 175 members of the National Assembly. Although several splinter parties participated in the campaign, the contest focused on candidates from the two major parties, the Democratic Republican Party and the New Democratic Party. When the results were tallied, the Democratic Republican Party won a majority of 130 seats, while 44 seats went to the opposition New Democratic Party. The Masses' Party, the sole successful splinter party, won a single seat. Since the Democratic Republican Party's margin of victory, giving it better than a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, was unexpectedly large, the opposition New Democratic Party charged that the Democratic Republican victory had resulted from illegalities and fraud. The charges of corruption spurred student unrest and demonstrations, which intensified post-election dissatisfaction. Opposition party leaders sought to nullify the election results by demanding a new election, and newly elected opposition members refused to take their seats at the start of the Assembly session on July 1. Those circumstances produced a serious political crisis. Both parties acknowledged election irregularities, but the Democratic Republican Party and President Pak denied the opposition's charges that the election had been manipulated from Seoul. The Embassy also reported that irregularities, in fact, stemmed from lack of central control, allowing local candidates and local officials willingly to engage in or encourage malpractices and to ignore election rules. Post-election investigations identified persons who had engaged in such practices, leading the Democratic Republican Party to expel nine of its newly elected Assembly members from the party immediately after the election and an additional eight members in September and October. Fearful that the Democratic Republican Party would use its majority to change the Constitution, thereby enabling President Pak to serve a third Presidential term, and concerned about future election prospects, opposition party leader Yu Chin-o demanded that 1) President Pak publicly apologize for rigging the election, 2) the election results be nullified and a new election held, 3) those responsible for the irregularities be punished, and 4) guarantees be instituted to prevent future election irregularities. Largely because of disarray within the New Democratic Party and because of conciliatory moves made by the Democratic Republican Party, both sides negotiated to end the impasse, which officially ended on November 29 when all but two elected Assembly members took their seats. (Airgram A-33 from Seoul, July 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 14 KOR S; and INR Intelligence Note No. 960, December 1; ibid., POL 15-2 KOR S)
119. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 22, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, 1967. Secret. Drafted on June 29. Sent to Hughes, Denney, and Evans. SUBJECT /2/Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS [Here follows a discussion of Singapore.] Korea Mr. Colby reported that in response to Mr. Berger's request, his people had reviewed North Korean infiltrations of South Korea and had come to the conclusion that their purpose was the establishment of cells which might eventually be used not only for the collection of intelligence but for the support of guerilla warfare. He cited interrogations of the few agents who have been captured and said that his analysts had concluded that large numbers of North Vietnamese were in training for eventual infiltration. There was considerable speculation among members of the staff both at Headquarters and in the field that the North Koreans were taking a page from the North Vietnamese book and planned to establish a base for eventual warfare in South Korea. Mr. Berger questioned Mr. Colby closely as to whether there were indications that the objective of the North Korean infiltrations might be assassination of South Korean leaders. Mr. Colby's reply indicated that he believed any attempts at assassination would depend largely on opportunity and that he felt that this was not a major objective. [Here follows a discussion of Vietnam.]
120. Report Prepared by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, June 23, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Secret. Transmitted to the White House under cover of a June 24 memorandum from the CIA Operations Center to Rostow. SECURITY CONDITIONS IN SOUTH KOREA 1. The risks involved in Vice President Humphrey's visit to the Seoul area and his attendance at the 1 July inauguration of ROK President Pak are twofold. Pak's domestic political opponents may use the occasion to demonstrate against his regime, creating a situation in which the safety of the Vice President might be jeopardized. More serious, it is possible that North Korean Communist agents will carry out violent attacks on Pak, members of his government, or on Vice President Humphrey himself. 2. Domestic Political Opponents. South Korea is presently experiencing considerable political tension. Members of the leading opposition party and anti-regime student elements have been angrily protesting alleged rigging of the 8 June legislative elections by the Pak government and its party machinery. The government has conceded that illegal tactics--vote buying, open balloting, ballot-box stuffing, police pressures, and the like--were used in certain districts and has moved to right a few of these wrongs. But it has refused to consider opposition demands for new elections nationwide. A compromise of sorts, perhaps involving the resignation of a few high administration officials, seems likely. But it is also probable that before the dust is permitted to settle, some opposition elements will mount additional public protests and carry out plans for obstructing legislative business, including a boycott of the inaugural ceremonies. 3. Anti-regime protests by students, in Seoul and elsewhere, reached a peak of intensity last week, but have been terminated as a result of firm police action and the suspension of college classes by the government. If classes resume, however, additional student street demonstrations may take place. 4. In sum, there is a possibility that Vice President Humphrey's visit will be marred by public protests of some sort against the Pak regime. It seems unlikely, however, that any demonstrations or other antics by the political opposition and its student allies would be carried out so as deliberately to embarrass or endanger the Vice President. There has been no hint that opposition leaders hold the US in any way responsible for the alleged election frauds. Moreover, in recent years, South Koreans have evidenced an unwillingness to wash dirty linen in front of foreign dignitaries; on the contrary, domestic factions have tended to submerge differences on occasions of international significance in the interest of preserving national prestige. 5. In any case, we believe that South Korean security forces available in the Seoul area would be capable of controlling any demonstration by anti-regime elements. The National Police, who will have the main responsibility for the safety of the foreign guests, are tough and experienced in crowd control. So are the ROK Army contingents permanently assigned to internal security duties in the Seoul area. Intelligence organizations--the ROK CIA and the ROK Army CIC--are efficient and cooperative with their US counterparts. They will probably round up known troublemakers and issue stern warnings in appropriate political and student circles. 6. North Korean Communist Agents. In October 1966, on the occasion of President Johnson's trip to South Korea, we were able to dismiss the danger of violence by North Korean Communist agents with the notation that "their missions have not involved deliberate violence but rather intelligence collection and recruitment." (SNIE 40/50-66, para. 11)/2/ Since that time, the situation has changed markedly. For various reasons, some related to ROK participation in the Vietnam War, Pyong-yang has stepped up its infiltration of agents southward, and more important, it has initiated a campaign of sporadic violence against UN forces in the DMZ area. North Korean agents are also attempting sabotage missions for the first time since the Korean Armistice./3/ And the North Koreans have begun to infiltrate small teams of highly-trained agents to scout for likely guerrilla base areas in remote rural regions./4/ /2/SNIE 40/50-66, October 13. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 40/50-66) /3/One such effort, on 22 May just south of the DMZ, resulted in the destruction of two US infantry barracks with the loss of two men killed and nineteen wounded. [Footnote in the source text.] /4/Three such groups have been discovered by ROK security forces. Attempts to run them down have resulted in the deaths of thirteen ROKs and eight North Koreans; at least 29 North Koreans remain at large. [Footnote in the source text.] 7. It is apparent, therefore, that North Korea is no longer disposed to refrain from acts of violence in the South; indeed, Pyongyang has evidently decided to accept the risks involved in shedding a limited amount of South Korean and US blood. Would Pyongyang take the added risk involved in any attempt to assassinate leaders of South Korea and the US? We are aware of several North Korean direct threats against the life of President Pak and the dispatch of occasional agent teams charged with this mission. The possibility of another Communist effort of this sort during the inaugural period cannot be dismissed. The political gains for the North could be considerable; Pak provides the only real cement for whatever degree of political stability exists in South Korea. An attempt on Pak, of course, would endanger those notables, including the Vice President, in his vicinity. 8. It seems unlikely, however, that the Communists would focus an assassination effort on Mr. Humphrey. The political justification from the North Korean viewpoint would be much less compelling than that for an attack on Pak. 9. We cannot, of course, exclude the possibility of an assassination attempt by some Communist or other radical acting on his own or an attempt by a psychopath. For the Board of National Estimates:
121. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 29, 1967. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, 1967. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.] [Continue with the next documents]
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